1 an Introduction to Law and Economics
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 2003 Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law Alan Schwartz Robert E. Scott Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Contracts Commons Recommended Citation Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L. J. 541 (2003). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/339 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Article Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law Alan Schwartz* and Robert E. Scottt* CONTENTS I. IN TROD U CTION ................................................................................. 543 II. JUSTIFYING AN EFFICIENCY THEORY OF CONTRACT ........................ 550 A . W hat Firms M axim ize .................................................................. 550 B. Why the State Should Help Firms ................................................ 555 III. THE ENFORCEMENT FUNCTION ........................................................ 556 A. Enforcement Often Is Unnecessary.............................................. 557 B. EncouragingRelation-Specific Investment .................................. 559 C. -
JUDICIAL GLOBALIZATION Justice Artemio V. Panganiban I Congratulate the Philippine Judicial Academy
JUDICIAL GLOBALIZATION1 by Justice Artemio V. Panganiban I congratulate the Philippine Judicial Academy (Philja) -- led by its eminent chancellor, Madame Justice Ameurfina A. Melencio Herrera -- for spearheading the First Australasia Judicial Educators Forum (AJEC). This gathering provides judicial educators from 21 countries a venue for exchanging views and experiences. Paradigm Shifts in Law and Legal Philosophy The topic assigned to me this morning is “Paradigm Shifts in Law and Changing Philosophical Perspectives.” This assignment requires a study of how the gigantic strides in other fields of 1 Lecture delivered by Supreme Court Justice Artemio V. Panganiban before the First Australasia Judicial Educators Forum (AJEF) on February 14, 2003 at the New World Renaissance Hotel, Makati City. 2 human knowledge have affected and continue to affect law in general and judicial doctrines in particular. In turn, I believe that the major transformational shifts in the world have been brought about mainly by the informational and technological revolution unfolding even now as I speak. I refer to computerization, minuterization, digitization, satellite communications, fiber optics and the Internet – all of which, taken together, tend to integrate knowledge on a worldwide scale. This international integration of knowledge, technologies and systems is referred to as globalization. According to Thomas L. Friedman in his current best seller, The Lexus and the Olive Tree,2 “[t]he challenge in this era of globalization—for countries and individuals—is to find a healthy balance between preserving a sense of identity, home and community, and doing what it takes to survive within the globalization system.” Otherwise stated, the need of the hour is to balance national interest with international survival. -
Multijurisdictional Practice of Law
RULE 4-5.5 UNLICENSED PRACTICE OF LAW; MULTIJURISDICTIONAL PRACTICE OF LAW (a) Practice of Law. A lawyer shall not practice law in a jurisdiction other than the lawyer’s home state, in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in that jurisdiction, or in violation of the regulation of the legal profession in the lawyer’s home state or assist another in doing so. (b) Establishing an Office and Holding Out as Lawyer Prohibited Conduct. A lawyer who is not admitted to practice in Florida shall not: (1) except as authorized by other law, establish an office or other regular presence in Florida for the practice of law; or (2) hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice law in Florida. ; or (3) appear in court, before an administrative agency, or before any other tribunal unless authorized to do so by the court, administrative agency, or tribunal pursuant to the applicable rules of the court, administrative agency, or tribunal. (c) Authorized Temporary Practice by Lawyer Admitted in Another United States Jurisdiction. A lawyer admitted and authorized to practice law in another United States jurisdiction who has been neither disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, nor disciplined or held in contempt in Florida by reason of misconduct committed while engaged in the practice of law permitted pursuant to this rule, may provide legal services on a temporary basis in Florida that: (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in Florida and who actively -
Policing the Self-Help Legal Market: Consumer Protection Or Protection of the Legal Cartel?
POLICING THE SELF-HELP LEGAL MARKET: CONSUMER PROTECTION OR PROTECTION OF THE LEGAL CARTEL? JULEE C. FISCHER* INTRODUCTION The emergence of information technology in the legal field is spearheading new approaches to the practice of law, but the legal community is questioning whether the new technology may be a double-edged sword. The Information Revolution is reshaping traditional lawyer functions, forcing innovations in everything from research and document management to marketing and client communications. Yet, just as technology drives change inside law firms, consumers too are seizing the knowledge that is increasingly at their fingertips. The market is flourishing for self-help legal counsel. An increasing array of Internet Web sites often dispense legal advice and information free of charge. This advice ranges from estate planning and contract issues to custody battles and torts. Further, the legal industry is witness to the advent of do-it-yourself legal software packages marketed directly to consumers. Innovative? Yes. Easier? Certainly. But to what extent is this a blessing or a curse, both to lawyers and consumers?1 Self-help law can be defined as “any activity by a person in pursuit of a legal goal or the completion of a legal task that [does not] involve legal advice or representation by a lawyer.”2 Consumers participating in the self-help market are typically driven by factors such as relative cost, self-reliance, necessity, and distrust of lawyers.3 Clearly, such products offer the public up-front benefits of convenience and availability. Nevertheless, larger issues arise concerning who is responsible for the advice and whether it is dispensed by lawyers. -
Methods of Measuring the Economy, Efficiency and Effectiveness Of
Methods Of Measuring The Economy, Efficiency And Effectiveness Of Public Expenditure ANNEX 7: August 2015 1 | P a g e TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 Introduction .......................................................................................................................................... 3 2 PER Context ........................................................................................................................................... 3 3 Necessity of the measures .................................................................................................................... 4 4 Measurement and coding ..................................................................................................................... 5 5 Assumptions .......................................................................................................................................... 5 6 Definitions and basic qualitative measures .......................................................................................... 6 6.1 Measuring Efficiency with DEA ..................................................................................................... 9 6.1.1 DEA ...................................................................................................................................... 10 6.1.2 Assumption of DEA ............................................................................................................. 10 6.2 Scale Efficiency Issues in DEA ..................................................................................................... -
The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation
Pepperdine Law Review Volume 12 Issue 1 Article 1 12-15-1984 Guiding the Invisible Hand: The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation Elizabeth Michelman Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, and the Legal Profession Commons Recommended Citation Elizabeth Michelman Guiding the Invisible Hand: The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation, 12 Pepp. L. Rev. Iss. 1 (1985) Available at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/1 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pepperdine Law Review by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected], [email protected], [email protected]. Guiding the Invisible Hand: The Consumer Protection Function of Unauthorized Practice Regulation ELIZABETH MICHELMAN*t Today's regulation of the unauthorized practice of law must be justified to both the legal profession and the public at large. This article attempts to examine some of the important issues facing UPL regulation. It begins by postulating that, although the courts probably have the most legitimate au- thority to control UPL, they should be careful to exercise this power in the public interest. It examines the role of the market in delivering legal serv- ices and argues that a free market system cannot adequately ensure legal competence. Some alternative regulatory structures better equipped to guarantee quality are explored. Finally, the article comments on several emerging areas of lay involvement in providing legal service, cautioning that care should be taken to balance consumer needs with consumer pro- tection. -
2013 Mont Pelerin Society Membership List
MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 1 ARGENTINA Dr. Martin Krause _____________________ San Isidro, Buenos Aires Argentina Dr. Alberto Benegas-Lynch Jr. San Isidro, BU Argentina 2000 Eduardo Marty 1978 Buenos Aires Argentina Gerardo Bongiovanni 2004 Rosario, Santa Fe Argentina Maria Gabriela Mrad 2007 Buenos Aires Argentina Mr. Walter Castro 2002 Rosario, Santa Fe Argentina Professor Martin Simonetta 2011 Buenos Aires Argentina Mr. Eduardo Helguera 2011 Argentina 1988 _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 2 Professor Hector Siracusano AUSTRALIA _____________________ Buenos Aires Argentina Dr. Tanveer Ahmed Drummoyne, NSW Australia 1994 Life Member 2011 Eduardo Stordeur Argentina DR. Janet Albrechttsen 2012 Sydney, NSW Dr. Esteban Thomsen Australia Martinez, Buenos Aires Argentina 2011 1988 Professor James Allan Mr Guillermo Yeatts Sherwood, Brisbane, QLD Australia San Isidro, Buenos Aires Argentina 2010 1998 Mr. David Archibald Dr. Meir Zylberberg Perth, WA Buenos Aires Australia Argentina 2011 1969 Life Member _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 3 Prof. Jeff Bennett Ms. Juel Briggs Gladesville, NSW Gundaroo, NSW Australia Australia 2008 2011 Mr. Chris Berg Mr. Robert Carling Mosman, NSW Melbourne, VIC Australia Australia 2011 2011 Mr. James Cox PSM Dr. Peter J. Boxall AO Sydney, NSW Coogee, NSW Australia Australia 2011 2011 Dr. Jonathan Crowe T. C. Beirne School of Law- The Professor Geoffrey Brennan University of Queensland Canberra W232A Forgan Smith Building, St. Lucia Capus Australia Brisbane, QLD 4072 Australia 1987 2011 _______________________________________________________ H = Home Phone O = Office Phone F = Fax 19/20_ = Year of Membership * = Past President MONT PELERIN SOCIETY DIRECTORY- 2013 4 Michael Darling Mr. -
4000 Contract Law: General Theories
4000 CONTRACT LAW: GENERAL THEORIES Richard Craswell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School © Copyright 1999 Richard Craswell Abstract When contracts are incomplete, the law must rely on default rules to resolve any issues that have not been explicitly addressed by the parties. Some default rules (called ‘majoritarian’ or ‘market-mimicking’) are designed to be left in place by most parties, and thus are chosen to reflect an efficient allocation of rights and duties. Others (called ‘information-forcing’ or ‘penalty’ default rules) are designed not to be left in place, but rather to encourage the parties themselves to explicitly provide some other resolution; these rules thus aim to encourage an efficient contracting process. This chapter describes the issues raised by such rules, including their application to heterogeneous markets and to separating and pooling equilibria; it also briefly discusses some non- economic theories of default rules. Finally, this chapter also discusses economic and non-economic theories about the general question of why contracts should be enforced at all. JEL classification: K12 Keywords: Contracts, Incomplete Contracts, Default Rules 1. Introduction This chapter describes research bearing on the general aspects of contract law. Most research in law and economics does not explicitly address these general aspects, but instead proceeds directly to analyze particular rules of contract law, such as the remedies for breach. That body of research is described below in Chapters 4100 through 4800. There is, however, some scholarship on the general nature of contract law’s ‘default rules’, or the rules that define the parties’ obligations in the absence of any explicit agreement to the contrary. -
Federal Sentencing Reform Jon O
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture Lectures 4-23-2003 Federal Sentencing Reform Jon O. Newman Senior Judge for the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/lectures_kaplan Part of the Criminal Law Commons Recommended Citation Newman, Jon O., "Federal Sentencing Reform" (2003). Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture. 19. http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/lectures_kaplan/19 This Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Lectures at Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. HOFSTRA UNNERSITY 5ci-rOOLOF lAW 2002-2003 Howard and Iris Kaplan Memorial Lecture Series The Honorable Jon 0. Newman Senior Judge, Un ited States Co urt of Appeals for the Second Circuit JON 0 . NEWMAN j on 0. Newman is a Senior Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for th e Second Circuit (Connecticut, New York and Vennont.), on which he has served since june 1979. He was Chief judge of the Second Circuit from july 1993 to June 1997, and he served as a United States District judge for the Distri ct of Connecti cut from j anuary 1972 until his appointment to th e Court of Appeals. judge Newman graduated from Princeton University in 1953 and from Yale Law School in 1956. -
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics
Columbia Law School Scholarship Archive Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 1996 Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics Avery W. Katz Columbia Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons Recommended Citation Avery W. Katz, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Economics, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2229 (1996). Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/610 This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please contact [email protected]. POSITIVISM AND THE SEPARATION OF LAW AND ECONOMICS Avery Wiener Katz* INTRODUCION The modem field of law and economics - that is, the application of economic analysis to legal subjects other than trade and business reg- ulation - is now over thirty years old, but it remains controversial in the legal academy and, to a lesser extent, in the profession at large. Since its beginnings in the early 1960s, the economic approach has pro- voked substantial opposition and antagonism. The sources of this resis- tance, however, are a matter of dispute. Many economists and economi- cally influenced lawyers attribute it to more traditional lawyers' reluctance to learn a new and unfamiliar set of concepts and techniques. Critics of the economic approach offer a variety of other explanations. Some are skeptical of the utility of abstract theoretical modeling in the social sciences,' others object to economics' central behavioral assump- tion of rational choice,2 still others criticize economics' supposed liber- tarian politics and ideological allegiance to laissez-faire. -
Law and Political Economy in a Time of Accelerating Crises
Angela P. Harris, School of Law, UC Davis James J. (“Jay”) Varellas III, Department of Political Science, UC Berkeley* Introduction: Law and Political Economy in a Time of Accelerating Crises Abstract In this time of accelerating crises nationally and worldwide, conventional understandings of the relationships among state, market, and society and their regulation through law are inadequate. In this Editors’ Introduction to Volume 1, Issue 1 of the Journal of Law and Political Economy, we reflect on our current historical moment, identify genealogies of the Law and Political Economy (LPE) project, articulate some of the intellectual foundations of the work, and finally discuss the journal’s institutional history and context. Keywords: Law and Political Economy I. Introduction Ernest Hemingway’s 1926 novel The Sun Also Rises contains this famous exchange: “How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked. “Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.” In the United States and around the world, we are facing intertwined crises: skyrocketing economic inequality, an increasingly destabilizing and extractive system of global finance, dramatic shifts in the character of work and economic production, a crisis of social reproduction, the ongoing disregard of Black and brown lives, the rise of new authoritarianisms, a global pandemic, and, of course, looming above all, the existential threat of global climate change. From the vantage point of mid-2020, it is impossible to avoid the sense that these crises, like Mike’s bankruptcy, have emerged both suddenly and as the result of problems long in the making. It is also clear that these interlocking crises are accelerating as they collide with societies whose capacities to respond have been hollowed out by decades of neoliberalism. -
The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court Neomi Raot
A Backdoor to Policy Making: The Use of Philosophers by the Supreme Court Neomi Raot The Supreme Court's decisions in Vacco v Quill' and Wash- ington v Glucksberg2 held that a state can ban assisted suicide without violating the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In these high profile cases, six phi- losophers filed an amicus brief ("Philosophers'Brief') that argued for the recognition of a constitutional right to die.3 Although the brief was written by six of the most prominent American philoso- phers-Ronald Dworkin, Thomas Nagel, Robert Nozick, John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, and Judith Jarvis Thomson-the Court made no mention of the brief in unanimously reaching the oppo- site conclusion.4 In light of the Court's recent failure to engage philosophical arguments, this Comment examines the conditions under which philosophy does and should affect judicial decision making. These questions are relevant in considering the proper role of the Court in controversial political questions and are central to a recent de- bate focusing on whether the law can still be considered an autonomous discipline that relies only on traditional legal sources. Scholars concerned with law and economics and critical legal studies have argued that the law is no longer autonomous, but rather that it does and should draw on many external sources in order to resolve legal disputes. Critics of this view have main- tained that legal reasoning is distinct from other disciplines, and that the law has and should maintain its own methods, conven- tions, and conclusions. This Comment follows the latter group of scholars, and ar- gues that the Court should, as it did in the right-to-die cases, stay clear of philosophy and base its decisions on history, precedent, and a recognition of the limits of judicial authority.