Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don’t Add Up Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick To cite this version: Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Ayumi Igarashi, Yair Zick. Finding Fair and Efficient Allo- cations When Valuations Don’t Add Up. The 13th Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory (SAGT 2020), Sep 2020, Augsburg (Virtual Conference), Germany. pp.32-46, 10.1007/978-3-030-57980-7_3. hal-02955635 HAL Id: hal-02955635 https://hal.sorbonne-universite.fr/hal-02955635 Submitted on 2 Oct 2020 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Finding Fair and Efficient Allocations When Valuations Don't Add Up? Nawal Benabbou1, Mithun Chakraborty2, Ayumi Igarashi3, and Yair Zick4 1 Sorbonne Universit´e,CNRS, Laboratoire d'Informatique de Paris 6, LIP6 F-75005, Paris, France
[email protected] 2 University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA
[email protected] 3 National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan ayumi
[email protected] 4 University of Massachusetts, Amherst, USA
[email protected] Abstract. In this paper, we present new results on the fair and ef- ficient allocation of indivisible goods to agents whose preferences cor- respond to matroid rank functions.