Session Presentation

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

Session Presentation #CLUS Security for the Rest of Us Tips, Tricks, and Open Source for the Non-Enterprise Mike McPhee - Systems Engineer @mikey_mcphee BRKSEC-1346 #CLUS Abstract • 62% of all cyber-attacks target small and medium businesses, and more than half of of those breached won't last 6 months due to remediation costs and lost production or reputation. The same security approaches that work for global enterprises with dedicated SOCs and budgets can't work everywhere. The "little guys" deserve to operate securely too. This session will help participants find a more compact, integrated set of security tools and processes that work for their non-Enterprise businesses. Participants will see how to refine requirements and design streamlined security architectures and fill holes with integrated tools that enhance visibility and enable automation. The session will also introduce simple integration steps that can reduce workloads while improving detection and protection. Participants will then see how Cisco's products like Firepower NGFW, Meraki, ESA, WSA, Threat Response and endpoint products can be used alongside open-source tools & information for a more secure but right-sized architecture. #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 3 What is this session about? • Goal: Defend more effectively, reduce workload • Constraints/Considerations: • Impossible without tight integration and openness • Integration & openness exist in two primary focus areas: • Intelligence feeds • Solution-to-Solution • Solution: • Holistic requirement analysis unveils opportunities • Easy, quick-hit integrations blend solutions reduce workloads + improve efficacy. #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 4 About me • 6 year Systems Engineer with Cisco • Security focus with 200-2500 user & SMB coverage • 12+ years designing C2 systems • 6 years in US Navy (bubblehead) • CCIE #41663 (R&S, Security) • CCDE 20180018 • GSEC • Weezer and Foo Fighters fan, so let’s get going! #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 5 Important: Reference Materials Embedded! • Focus on awareness of integrations and benefits/effort around them For Your Reference • Meant to be a leaping-off point, not an exhaustive walkthrough – pointers to other sessions for depth • Download slides! Includes lots of hidden how-to’s Session worth visiting! • We cannot cover • Basic standup or inherent capabilities of each product • Detailed Configuration – this is an introductory session • Programming – we have great DevNet sessions to assist! #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 6 Cisco Webex Teams Questions? Use Cisco Webex Teams to chat with the speaker after the session How 1 Find this session in the Cisco Live Mobile App 2 Click “Join the Discussion” 3 Install Webex Teams or go directly to the team space 4 Enter messages/questions in the team space Webex Teams will be moderated cs.co/ciscolivebot#BRKRST-1346 by the speaker until June 16, 2019. #CLUS © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 7 Agenda • What’s in your threat picture? • A typical small or midmarket security architecture • Beginning with the easy stuff • Building a smarter perimeter • Automating the Interior • Conclusion #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 8 What are you afraid of? What threats are trending for security? Sophisticated, Using technology Exploitation of security gaps high-impact threats to avoid detection in endpoints and cloud • Ransomware cryptoworms • Encrypted threats • Unpatched, unmonitored endpoints • Self-propagating malware • C2 channels that use legitimate internet • Lack of speedy services remediation • Campaigns launched from single domain From the Cisco 2018 Annual Cybersecurity Report #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 10 What have the last few years taught us? We all have much to protect Attackers don’t care about size Attackers target your organization’s: Victims suffer huge costs & degraded reputation: Of all attacks result in financial damages of >$500k including… lost revenue, Customer data 54% customers, opportunities, and out-of- pocket costs (Cisco 2018 Cisco Security Capabilities Benchmark Study) Of small businesses are unable to sustain Intellectual property their business more than six months 60% following a cyberattack (October 2016, The National Cyber Security Alliance (NCSA) Company secrets Of midmarket companies have 53% experienced a breach (2018 Cisco SMB Cybersecurity Report) #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 11 It isn’t popular to view threats through a small business lens • Lots of awesome reports! But… • Poor representation of small/medium (non- enterprise) environments • Change is happening… • Cisco SMB Cybersecurity Report (2018): http://cs.co/9009Eeqa5 • Verizon DBIR Report: https://vz.to/2KSHAC0 • SANS 2018 IR Survey: https://bit.ly/2IBBzrh #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 12 Malicious Binaries and Encryption hamper visibility Attackers embrace encryption to conceal their command-and- control activity October 2017 12% Increase November 2016 50% 38% 19% 70% 268% Global Encrypted Web Traffic Malicious Sandbox Binaries with Encryption #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 13 Recent events have exposed a focus on multi-vendor silos and lack of adherence to simple best practices • WannaCry and Nyetya: rapid-moving, self-propagating network-based attacks Network-Based Ransomware Worm • Poor patch hygiene old vulnerabilities and tricks will happen again #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 14 Visibility and analytics can help expose malicious use of legitimate resources • Cybercriminals adopting C2 channels that use legitimate Internet services: • Powershell & WMI • SMB • DNS Easy Setup IP Address Leverage Source: Anomali Encryption for C2 Reduce Burning Infrastructure Subverts Domain and Whitelisted Certificate Intelligence Adaptability #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 15 Better focus on the fundamentals can make a big impact of malicious payloads are 81% 86% delivered through email (73%) and web (13%) #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 16 A typical small or midmarket security architecture Agenda • What’s in your threat picture? • A typical small or midmarket security architecture • Identifying the gaps in typical architectures • So how can we fix this? • Using models to chart a path • Beginning with the easy stuff • Building a Smarter Perimeter • Automating the Interior • Conclusion #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 18 Defenders still favor perceived “best of breed” to provide “defense in depth” 72% vs. 28% use best-of- use single vendor breed solution #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 19 But is it possible we are in over our head? #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 20 Fragmented architectures generate noise and alert fatigue 100% of Security Events 92% of Events Cause Alerts 8% Experienced No Alert ? 44% 56% of Alerts are Investigated of Alerts are NOT Investigated • Uninvestigated alerts still create 34% of Investigated huge business risk 66% of Alerts Alerts are Legitimate Prove Benign • Cluttered Visibility – plenty of opportunities to miss something 51% 49% • More tools usually = more places of Legitimate of Legitimate Alerts are Alerts are NOT to work less time to remediate Remediated Remediated #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 21 Focus on protection products alone spawns strategic, operational, and tactical Issues • Focus on single-product protection (inbound) at 26% expense of system-wide can be detection (outbound) addressed by People products alone • Overemphasis on products leaves openings for attackers Products Policies 74% • Too much reliance on might also neglected staff to hold it all require people together and/or processes to address #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 22 So how can we fix this? Borrow the USAF OODA Loop! Step 1: Observe Step 2: Orient • Understand mission • Select model or methodology • Assess threats/risks • Prioritize goals & establish O O success metrics A D Step 4: Act Step 3: Decide • Implement • Select cost-effective solutions • Train and dedicate resources to achieve goals/mitigate risks • Continually monitor success • Look for quick-wins to buy time for longer-term projects #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 23 Observe: Know yourself! (and your mission) (Sun Tzu’s most important lesson) • What are the priorities? • Evaluating balance of Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability important • Risk priorities & mitigation options vary by industry/geo/org. • Examples (notional): C C Confidentiality I C A I Integrity I A A Availability Utility Healthcare Credit Union #CLUS BRKSEC-1346 © 2019 Cisco and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Cisco Public 24 Cybersecurity’s cold truth – risk is unavoidable
Recommended publications
  • Major Project Final
    2015 PiFi Analyser MASON MCCALLUM, NATHAN VAZ AND TIMOTHY LY NORTHERN SYDNEY INSTITUTE | Meadowbank Executive summary Wireless networks have become more prevalent in contemporary society, as such it is important to accurately study the impact that wireless networking can have on personal security and privacy. The PiFi Analyser project outlines the methods behind passively recording wireless networks and mapping the recorded data with associated GPS location data. The ensuing report confirms the methodologies and technologies proposed can operate to scopes that could be used to significant effect. 1 | P a g e Contents Executive summary ................................................................................................................................. 1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................................ 4 Literature Review .................................................................................................................................... 5 Objectives ............................................................................................................................................... 7 Method ................................................................................................................................................... 9 Building the Device ............................................................................................................................. 9 Testing device
    [Show full text]
  • LAB 13: Wifi Security PA197
    LAB 13: WiFi security PA197 Sven Relovsk´y,Patrik Rehuˇs,Michal Snajdrˇ [email protected] Sven Relovsk´y,Patrik Rehuˇs,Michal Snajdrˇ [email protected] LAB 13: WiFi security Warning All of the advice/information that I'll give is purely for educational pur- poses. MU will not be responsible for any illegal use of this tutorial. Don't hack any wireless network, unless you are the owner of that network. Sven Relovsk´y,Patrik Rehuˇs,Michal Snajdrˇ [email protected] LAB 13: WiFi security We will try... Wifi security - vulnerabilities I Hidden SSID I MAC filtering I Weaknesses in WEP encryption I Security vs. Comfort (Is WPS secure?) I WPA/WPA2 capture handshake I Homework: WPA2 attacks KISMET tool I Detection of attacker's/fake access points Sven Relovsk´y,Patrik Rehuˇs,Michal Snajdrˇ [email protected] LAB 13: WiFi security Lab prerequisities 1. Hardware I laptop with a WiFi module (must support monitor mode) 2. Software I specialised Linux distro Kali Linux - All-In-One solution I airmon-ng { a bash script designed to turn wireless cards into monitor mode I airodump-ng { a packet capture tool for aircrack-ng I aireplay-ng { inject ARP-request packets into a wireless network to generate traffic I aircrack-ng { a 802.11 WEP / WPA-PSK key cracker I wash { utility for identifying WPS enabled points I reaver with Pixie { modified version - exploits a security hole in wireless routers I kismet { network detector, packet sniffer, and intrusion detection system for 802.11 wireless LANs Sven Relovsk´y,Patrik Rehuˇs,Michal Snajdrˇ [email protected] LAB 13: WiFi security Why is WiFi security so important? I WiFi connection is very popular (flexible, comfortable, cheap) I number of devices is rapidly increasing due to Internet of Things (IoT) I we transfer sensitive data Vulnerabilities I connect to devices in network (capture webcam, access to shared network storage, control intelligent things - heating, light .
    [Show full text]
  • Comparison of Wireless Network Penetration Testing Tools on Desktops and Raspberry Pi Platforms
    Comparison of Wireless Network Penetration Testing Tools on Desktops and Raspberry Pi Platforms Aparicio Carranza, PhD1, Daniel Mayorga, BTech1, Casimer DeCusatis, PhD2 and Hossein Rahemi, PhD3 1New York City College of Technology - CUNY, Brooklyn, NY USA, [email protected] 2Marist College, Poughkeepsie, NY USA, [email protected] 3Vaughn College of Aeronautics & Technology, East Elmhurst, NY USA, [email protected] Abstract– Wireless networks have become ubiquitous due to their transparent mode to capture packets in the 2.4 GHz band from ease of use and facilitation of mobile devices such as smart phones, a Netgear router [6]. We set up a WLAN for testing using a tablets, and various Internet of Things (IoT) applications. This has standard commercial dual band Cisco wireless router; driven a need for more advanced wireless penetration testing although our testing was conducted in the 2.4 GHz band, this techniques, and for more technical professionals trained in wireless work should be readily extensible to the 5 GHz band. Our security. In this paper, we investigate three popular open source wireless penetration testing tools (Aircrack –ng, Reaver, and Kismet) wireless router supports Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS) for and compare their behavior on a traditional desktop computer and testing with Reaver, and configuration options for WEP, a Raspberry Pi model 3. Use cases include packet sniffing and WPA, and WPA2 encryption [7-10]. While we recognize that decryption of WEP, WPA, and WPA2 passwords. Based on this WPS contains a known vulnerability and is not recommended work, we make recommendations for using specific tools in for sensitive applications, and that likewise WEP and WPA cybersecurity training and education.
    [Show full text]
  • Server / Drone / Client Infrastructure[Edit] Kismet for Mac Keyboard
    Kismet For Mac Developer(s) Mike Kershaw (dragorn) Stable release 2020-04-R3[1] / May 2, 2020; 5 months ago Repository Written in C++ Operating system Cross-platform Type Packet Sniffer License GPL Website www.kismetwireless.net 1. Kismet For Mac Keyboard 2. Kismet For Mac Download 3. Kismet For Mac Os 4. Kismet For Mac Kismet is a network detector, packet sniffer, and intrusion detection system for 802.11wireless LANs. Kismet will work with any wireless card which supports raw monitoring mode, and can sniff 802.11a, 802.11b, 802.11g, and 802.11n traffic. The program runs under Linux, FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, and Mac OS X. The client can also run on Microsoft Windows, although, aside from external drones (see below), there's only one supported wireless hardware available as packet source. Distributed under the GNU General Public License,[2] Kismet is free software. Features[edit] Traditional Lipsticks, Liquid Lipsticks, Matte Lipsticks, Lip Plumping Glosses, Lip Liners and More! Showing 1–21 of 70 results. Rated 5.00 out of 5. CEO Semi-Matte Lipstick $ 18.00 Add to cart. Yours Truly Semi-Matte Lipstick $ 18.00 Add to cart. Sweetie Semi- Matte Lipstick. Two files stored in the /etc/kismet directory called 'apmanuf' and 'clientmanuf' are used to help Kismet determine the types and manufacturers of AP or wireless clients based on MAC. KisMAC is an open-source and free sniffer/scanner application for Mac OS X. It has an advantage over MacStumbler / iStumbler / NetStumbler in that it uses monitor mode and passive scanning. Kismet differs from other wireless network detectors in working passively.
    [Show full text]
  • Exploring Open Source Wireless Tools by Jake Snyder (The Dread Pirate Roberts) @Jsnyder81 Who Am I?
    Exploring Open Source Wireless Tools By Jake Snyder (The Dread Pirate Roberts) @jsnyder81 Who am I? • Wireless Engineer at CompuNet Inc • CCIE-W #43153 • CWNE #161 • Security Enthusiast • Linux hobbiest • Wireless Field Day Delegate (http://techfieldday.com/event/wfd8/) • Blogger • Maker What does a set of professional tools cost? What I use at work: Ekahau ESS: $4000 Omnipeek: $2500 Chanalyzer + WiSpy: $1250 Aircheck: $2000 *All prices are approximates Professional tools in my first year. • Airmagnet Survey pro • Yup, that was it. http://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/Princess-Bride-Quotes-35919789#photo-35919789 “I mean, if we only had a wheelbarrow, that would be something.” -Westley Sometimes you have to build a wheelbarrow • Linux VM • Proxim 8494 • Airmon-NG • Wireshark “Well, why didn’t you list that among our assets in the first place” -Westley All these tools… Why Open Source? Pros: Cons: • Low Cost • Free if your time is worth • Flexibility nothing • Lots of available tools • Pieces of a solution, you have to put it together • Low barrier to entry • Requires knowledge • Time = investment “Please consider opensource as an alternative to suicide.” – Prince Humperdink What are my hobbiest opensource costs? Options for todays presentation: Raspberry PI: $223 Intel NUC $436 Raspberry PI 2B $38 NUC5CPYH: $134.00 ASUS USB-N53 $45 8G Memory: $34 Micro SD Card: $15 SSD: $40 Case: $5 Intel 7265 $28 Ubertooth: $120 WiSpy 2.4Ghz: $200 Existing Laptop: $8 • USB stick to boot linux • The chocolate coating makes it go down easier • VM is an option, albeit not a good one My Preferred Wireless Adapters • Asus USB-N53 • Intel 726x • 802.11n • 802.11ac • 2x2:2 • 2x2:2 • USB 2.0 • Mini PCIe half height and m.2 • Ralink RT3572 using RT2800 Driver • Intel IWLWIFI: Non-Free firmware • Works on Raspberry PI required • $45 on Amazon • $27 on amazon • Has issues with Deauth/Dissassoc • Lots of clients using them packets not being passed to host.
    [Show full text]
  • Online Monitoring Using Kismet
    San Jose State University SJSU ScholarWorks Master's Projects Master's Theses and Graduate Research Spring 2012 ONLINE MONITORING USING KISMET Sumit Kumar San Jose State University Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects Part of the Computer Sciences Commons Recommended Citation Kumar, Sumit, "ONLINE MONITORING USING KISMET" (2012). Master's Projects. 243. DOI: https://doi.org/10.31979/etd.rexc-dkr7 https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/etd_projects/243 This Master's Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Master's Theses and Graduate Research at SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Projects by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact [email protected]. ONLINE MONITORING USING KISMET A Project Presented to The Faculty of the Department of Computer Science San Jose State University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Science by Sumit Kumar May 2012 c 2012 Sumit Kumar ALL RIGHTS RESERVED The Designated Project Committee Approves the Project Titled ONLINE MONITORING USING KISMET by Sumit Kumar APPROVED FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF COMPUTER SCIENCE SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY May 2012 Dr. Mark Stamp Department of Computer Science Dr. Chris Pollett Department of Computer Science Dr. Cay Horstmann Department of Computer Science ABSTRACT Online Monitoring using Kismet by Sumit Kumar Colleges and universities currently use online exams for student evaluation. Stu- dents can take assigned exams using their laptop computers and email their results to their instructor; this process makes testing more efficient and convenient for both students and faculty.
    [Show full text]
  • Evaluating Kismet and Netstumbler As Network Security Tools & Solutions
    Master Thesis MEE10:59 Evaluating Kismet and NetStumbler as Network Security Tools & Solutions Ekhator Stephen Aimuanmwosa This thesis is presented as part requirement for the award of Master of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering Blekinge Institute of Technology January 2010 © Ekhator Stephen Aimuanmwosa, 2010 Blekinge Institute of Technology (BTH) School of Engineering Department of Telecommunication & Signal Processing Supervisor: Fredrik Erlandsson (universitetsadjunkt) Examiner: Fredrik Erlandsson (universitetsadjunkt i Evaluating Kismet and NetStumbler as Network Security Tools & Solutions “Even the knowledge of my own fallibility cannot keep me from making mistakes. Only when I fall do I get up again”. - Vincent van Gogh © Ekhator Stephen Aimuanmwosa, (BTH) Karlskrona January, 2010 Email: [email protected] ii Evaluating Kismet and NetStumbler as Network Security Tools & Solutions ABSTRACT Despite advancement in computer firewalls and intrusion detection systems, wired and wireless networks are experiencing increasing threat to data theft and violations through personal and corporate computers and networks. The ubiquitous WiFi technology which makes it possible for an intruder to scan for data in the air, the use of crypto-analytic software and brute force application to lay bare encrypted messages has not made computers security and networks security safe more so any much easier for network security administrators to handle. In fact the security problems and solution of information systems are becoming more and more complex and complicated as new exploit security tools like Kismet and Netsh (a NetStumbler alternative) are developed. This thesis work tried to look at the passive detection of wireless network capability of kismet and how it function and comparing it with the default windows network shell ability to also detect networks wirelessly and how vulnerable they make secured and non-secured wireless network.
    [Show full text]
  • Wi-Fi Monitoring & Kismet
    Wi-Fi Monitoring & Kismet Mike Kershaw @KismetWireless Sharkfest 2019 Intro ● Wi-Fi sniffing has been around since the late 1990s ● Still something we need to do now… ● More and more “last-mile” is going to wireless ● More and more sensors, control networks, etc are going to wireless ● Offices are increasingly using Wi-Fi instead of running cable ● BYOD (Bring Your Own Device) is huge ● Plenty of security problems need monitoring Get off my lawn ● Kismet is over 18 years old now ● I used to joke it was old enough to drive. Now it’s old enough to buy cigarettes and vote. ● Undergone several significant rewrites over that period ● Most recent major rewrite in the last few years adds all new capabilities, user interfaces, etc ● More on this later though... Why do we need something special? ● Why do we even need another tool just to monitor Wi-Fi ● There’s already so many that monitor packets ● Maybe have heard of one or two ● Rhymes with “Tire Bark” ● I heard there’s some sort of conference about it? Wi-Fi is a unicorn ● Truly shared medium. Anywhere signal goes, it impacts something ● Not just shared media with your network, but shared with everyone near you ● Multiple networks overlap bandwidth and channel access ● Isn’t Ethernet. Your OS might act like it is. It isn’t. ● Remember the OSI model? You’re suddenly really going to care about layer 1 and 2 more than you ever did before. ● Knowing a network is there is not knowing what’s going on with the network ● Knowing what’s impacting your network is not simple! Discovering Wi-Fi networks ● Several techniques can be used to discover Wi-Fi ● Scanning mode: looks for advertising networks; can’t see clients, but does a good job showing what access points are out there.
    [Show full text]
  • Network Security Toolkit Iso Free Download Network Security Toolkit (NST) 24 7977 Installation Step by Step
    network security toolkit iso free download Network Security Toolkit (NST) 24 7977 Installation Step by Step. Network Security Toolkit, aka NST, is a Linux distribution for security professionals and network admins, using MATE as the default desktop environment and as such it is lightweight and runs fast. The latest stable version NST 24 7977 was released on July 4th, 2016. It’s based on the recently released Fedora 24, with the best-of-breed open source network security applications added such as: WireShark WUI Scapy Multi-Traceroute (MTR) ntopng pcap netflow Netfilter Kismet …… These tool can work with Mercator, Google Maps, Google Earth and WebGL Globe to geolocate IP addresses which you can access by visiting the Web user interface (WUI). Very cool indeed. geolocation and graphic tool matrix. So this tutorial will show you how to install Network Security Toolkit 24. Let’s get started. Step 1: Download Network Security Toolkit 24 7977 ISO Image. The NST ISO image can be booted in live mode for those who like to have a try before installing to hard drive. Go to the official website, http://www.networksecuritytoolkit.org which looks so 2010 and a bit of confusing because the download link is not easy to find. Click the Release button on the upper left menu, then click Download . And you will be taken to SourceForge. Click the iso link to download. Note that NST only support 64 bit CPU. It’s a 2.8 GB file so now you can grab a cup of coffee or tea. Step 2: Create a Live DVD/USB.
    [Show full text]
  • Wireless Course: Wi-Fi Tools
    Wireless Course: Wi-Fi Tools These slides have been updated and condensed from the original course material All things Great and Wi-Fi “How do I get my insulin pump configured for WEP?” -- A real customer Sniffing Wi-Fi - Very simple - but requires firmware and drivers that can do it. - Linux definitely can. BSD often can. Windows can only with special hardware. MacOS can - sometimes. - Mobile devices often cannot due to firmware limitations Don’t call it promisc mode - Promisc mode on wired Ethernet turns off the hardware filter, but still reports 802.3 Ethernet frames - Monitor mode turns off associating to APs and returns 802.11 formatted frames! - No longer an Ethernet device to Linux! 802.11 in normal (or promisc) mode - 802.3 formatted data frames from the network you’re associated to - *Maybe* some data-only frames from overlapping networks, because sometimes, drivers suck - Not much else 802.11 in Scanning Mode - What Netstumbler uses - What your OS uses to display nearby networks - Queries card firmware for advertising networks - No way to get packetized data, just summaries - Really noisy 802.11 in Monitor Mode - Raw 802.11 frames - Management frames (beacons, probes, etc) - Data frames (from all networks overlapping this channel) - Ack, CTS, RTS frames - Broken crap, like fragmented frames Broken Frames - Normally cards only report valid frames - Some devices and drivers will report invalid frames which are corrupted - Collisions are the most common problem - FCS (frame checksum) filtering is your friend What Supports Monitor? - Anything using mac80211-based (ie in-kernel) drivers in Linux probably works - Anything using out-of-kernel drivers almost definitely does not work - Beware! Many distributions ship out-of-kernel busted drivers! - Atheros is good.
    [Show full text]
  • Network Sniffers and Tools in Cyber Security
    © 2018 JETIR November 2018, Volume 5, Issue 11 www.jetir.org (ISSN-2349-5162) NETWORK SNIFFERS AND TOOLS IN CYBER SECURITY 1Rachana R. Buch, 2Sachi N. Shah 1Assistant Professor, 2Assistant Professor 1Department of Computer Engineering 1Atmiya University, Rajkot, India Abstract:In the cyber world, there are numerous kinds of programmers which is utilized to hack username, passwords and personal details, account subtle elements, and touchy data about the client through their gadget or network. A procedure of catching, interpreting, and investigating network activity is called network sniffing. Network sniffers are same as a programmer which is gathered or assemble data from the Network i.e. IP address, MAC address, Hostname and so forth through which they can keep an eye on the network movement or they watch or gather a log of packets by packet sniffing. Network sniffers have utilized a few tools like Wireshark, Kismet, hping, TCPdump, and Windump for checking packets which are traverses the network. Index Terms: Cyber Security, Network sniffers, Packet Sniffers, Tools, Wireshark, hping, Kismet, TCPdump, and Windump. I. Introduction to Network Sniffers: fig.1 how network sniffer works 1.1 Network Sniffing: The procedure of catching, decoding, and analyzing network movement is called network sniffing. [2] Network Sniffing is a technique of observing each packet that crosses the network. Network sniffing is a tool that can enable you to find network issues by enabling you to catch and view packet level data on your network it likewise screens or sniffs out the data flowing over computer network links in real time. [2] A few sniffers work with TCP/IP packets yet more sophisticated tools can work with numerous other network protocols and at lower levels including Ethernet frames.[14] JETIR1811392 Journal of Emerging Technologies and Innovative Research (JETIR) www.jetir.org 685 © 2018 JETIR November 2018, Volume 5, Issue 11 www.jetir.org (ISSN-2349-5162) 1.2 Network Sniffer types: fig.
    [Show full text]
  • Using the Network Security Toolkit
    Using the Network Security Toolkit Ronald Henderson rhenderson@unifiedholdings.com Paul Blankenbaker [email protected] Using the Network Security Toolkit by Ronald Henderson by Paul Blankenbaker Copyright © 2003, 2004 Respective Authors This document provides guidelines for the typical usage of the Network Security Toolkit for common problems. Table of Contents 1. Getting Started ..................................................................................................................1 Check the System Requirements................................................................................1 Downloading And Burning The ISO Image.............................................................3 On A Linux System ............................................................................................3 On A Windows System......................................................................................5 Examine the Boot Options ..........................................................................................5 Booting .................................................................................................................5 Booting Without a DHCP Server......................................................................6 The NST_CDROM_IDE Option (ide) ..............................................................6 Using A Serial Console At Boot........................................................................6 Choose a Access Method.............................................................................................9
    [Show full text]