AUTHOR REPORT NO AVAILABLE from EDRS PRICE ABSTRACT Our Demographically Divided World, Worldwatch Paper United Nations Fund
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DOCUMENT REsumE ED 277 640 SO 017 871 AUTHOR Brown, Lester R.; Jacobson, Jodi L. TITLE Our Demographically Divided World, Worldwatch Paper 74. INSTITUTION Worldwatch Inst., Washington, D.C. SPONS AGENCY United Nations Fund for Population Activities, New York, N.Y. REPORT NO ISBN-0-916468-75-5 PUB DATE Dec 86 NOTE 58p. AVAILABLE FROMWorldwatch Institute, 1776 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W Washington, DC 20036 ($4.00). PUB TYPE Information Ana1ys6= (070) -- Reports - Evaluative/Feasibility (142) EDRS PRICE MF02 Plus Postage. PC Hot Available from EDRS. DESCRIPTORS *Birth Rate; Cross Cultural Studies; *Demography; *Developing Nations; Foreign Countries; Higher Education; *Income; *Overpopulation; *Population Trends; Resources ABSTRACT Existing demographic analyses do not_explain the negative relationship between population growth and life-support systems that are now emerging in scores of developing countries. The demographic transition, a theory first outlined by demographer Frank Notestein in 1945, classified all societies into one of three stages. Drawing heavily on the European experience, it has provided the conceptual framework for a generation of_demographic research. During the first stage of the demographic transition, which characterizes premodern societies, both birth and death rates are high and 1:3opulation grows slowly, if at all. In the second stage, living conditions improve as public health measures, including mass immunizati-)ns, are introduced and food production expands. Birth_ rates rem.n high, but death rates fall and population grows rapidly. The third state follows when economic and social gains, including lower infant mortality rates, reduce the desire for large families. As in_the first stage, birth rates and death rates are in equilibrium, but at a much lower level. The theorists do not saY what happens when developing countries get trapped in the second stage, unable to achieve the economic and social gains that are counted upon to reduce births. Nor does the theory explain what happens when second-stage population growth rates of 3% per year continue indefinitely and begin to overwhelm local life-support systems. (BZ) ********* Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best that can be made from the original document. ***** * ****************************** Vorldwatch Institute is an independent, nonprofit research organiza- tion created to analyze and to focus attention on global pro !ems. Directed by Lester R. Brown, Worldwatch is funded by private foun- dations and United Nations organizations. Worldwatch papers are written for a worldwide audience of decision makers, scholars, and the general public. Financial support for this paper was provided by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities. Sections of this paper may be repro- duced in magazines and newspapers with acknowledgment to Worldwatch Institute. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Worldwatch Institute and its directors, officers, or staff, or of funding organizations. oCopyright Worldwatch Institute, 1986 Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 86-51475 ISBN 0-916468-75-5 Printed on recycled paper Table of Contents Introduction . ........... ... 5 A Dividing World.. .. ....... ... .. 6 Carrying Capacity Stresses ... .. 11 Diverging Food and Income Trends.... 16 Growing Rural Landlessness ... .... 22 Population Growth and Conflict 25 The Demographic Trap 32 National Fertility Declines . .... ... 35 Completing the Demographic Transition 41 Notes... .. ............. 49 Introductic nemporary world is being divided in two by demo- ,rij forces Nearly half the world, including the indus- countries and China, has completedor nearly Ipleted the demographic transition. These countries, where tertility is at or below the replacement level, have eitherestab- lished a balance between births and deathsor they are in the process of doing so. In the other half, where birthrates remain high, rapid population growth is beginning to overwhelm locallife-support sys- tems in many countries, leading to ecological deteriorationand de- clining living standards. Once this deterioration begins, rapid population growth andeco- logical deterioration feed on each other, pushing countriesinto a demographic trap. In effect, ecological deterioration,economic de- chne, and political instability reinforce each other, confrontinggov- ernments with the prospect of social disintegration. Interrupting this downward spiral now rivals in importance nuclear disarmamenton the international agenda. Existing demographic analyses do not explain thenegative relation- ships between population grewth and life-supportsystems that are now emerging in scores of Third World countries. The demographic transition, a theory first outlined by the eminent demographerFrank Notestein in 1945, classified all societies intoone of three stages Drawing heavily on the European experience, it has providedthe conceptual framework for a generation of demographic research. The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments provided by Joseph Speidel, Tom Merrick, Carl Haub lataldi Judy Jacobsen, lyoti Singh, and James Chui on early drafts of this paper. We are particularly indebted to our colleague Edward C. Wolf for contributing to the analysis in the closing section of the paper. Thanks also to Susan Nords for production aSsistance. During the first stage of the demographic transition, which char- acterizes premodern societies, both birth and death rates are high and population grows slowly, if at all. In the second stage, living condi- tions improve as public health measures, including mass immu- nizations, are introduced and food production expands. Birth rates remain high, but death rates fall and population grows rapidly. The third stage follows when economic and social gains, including lower infant mortality rates, reduce the desire for large families. As in the first stage, birth rates and death rates are in equilibrium, but at a much lower level. This valuable conceptualization has been widely used by demo- graphers to explain differential rates of growth and to project national and global populations. But as we approach the end of the twentieth century, a gap has emerged in the analysis. The theorists did not say what happens when developing countries get trapped in the second stage, unable to achieve the economic and social gains that are counted upon to reduce births. Nor does the theory explain what happens when second-stage population growth rates of 3 percent per yearwhich means a twentyfold increase per centurycontinue in- definitely and begin to overwhelm local life-support systems. Once incomes begin to rise arid birth rates begin to decline,the pro- cess feeds on itself and countTies cail quickly move tothe equilibrium of the demographic transition's third stage. Unfortunately, these self- reinforcing trends also hold for the forces that lead to ecological deterioration and economic decline: Once populations expand to the point where their demands exceed the sustainable yield Of local for- ests, grasslands, croplands, or aquifers, they begin directly or in- directly to consume the resource base itself. Forests and grasslands disappear, soils erode, land productivity declines, and water tables fall. This in turn reduces per capita food production and incomes, triggering a decline in living standards. A Dividing World Close to a generation ago, countries were conveniently classified as developed or developing, according to their level of income. Roughly 7 Polarized population growth rates are driving roug ly half the world toward a better future and half toward ecological deterioration and economic decline." one-fifth of the world was classified as developed and four-fifths as developing. As of the early eighties, it is more useful for some pur- poses o classify countries according to whether their incomes are rising or falling; according to the direction in which their incomes are likely to move rather than their income levels per se. By thismeasure, polarized population growth rates are driving roughly half the world toward a better future and half toward ecological deterioration and economic decline. As the nineties approach, new de-:Lographic criteria are needed. The world is dividing largely into countries where population growth is slow or nonexistent and where living conditions are improving, and those where population growth is rapid and living conditionsare deteriorafing or in imminent danger of doing so. In the second group are countries now in their fourth decade of rapid population growth. Not only have they failed to complete the demographic transition, but the deteriorating relationship between people and ecological support systems is lowering living standards in many of these countries, making it difficult for them to do so. The risk in some countries is that death rates will begin to rise in response to declining living standards, pushing countries back into the first stage. In 1963, Frank Notestein pointed out that "such a rise in mortality vf'3uld demonstrate the bankruptcy of all our [develop- mentj efforts." For a number of countries, that specter of bankruptcy is growing uncomfortably close.2 Grouping; geograpi-lc regions according to the rate of population growth shows five oi them, containing 2.3 billion people, in the slow growth category. (Bei! -Cable 1.) Bracketed by Western Europe, which is on the verge of reatiting zero population growth, and by populous East Asia, which gre-,vs 1.0 percent