WITTGENSTEIN AND PHYSICALISM*

Joseph AGASSI Tel-Aviv University and York University, Toronto

I am embarrassed: I intended to perform my designated as­ signment and discuss the views of Ludwig Wittgenstein and physi­ calism, to confront them, to present a dialogue between them; I found myself embarrassingly corroborating Wittgenstein's central thesis: philosophers of necessity can say nothing as philosophers. This should not trouble me particularly, as I am willing to speak not as a philosopher; but I do not know what to say. My failure to find anything to say, try hard as I did, is no surprise, since my assignment imposes on me conflicting criteria for the significance of assertions, the modern positivist and the ancient dialectical. The ancient dia­ lectical criterion for the significance of assertions concerns the choice of a good question, and of a good answer to it; this splits the search for a significant assertion into two searches: for a good question and for a good answer to it. Traditionally, the choice of a question was deemed a mere preliminary, a preparatory act; a dialogue was supposed to begin only after an answer to a chosen question was offered, and the claim was made, that an answer is significant; the dialogue began with the move to a new question: is the proposed answer true or false? It can be seen at once, without discussing the criterion for the goodness of any question or answer, that I have arrived at my conflict: the conflict is reached the moment the ancient dialectical criterion meets the modern, positivist criterion, the one for which Wittgenstein is so famous: there are and can be no philosophical questions: the puzzle does not exist. And, of course, no questions, no answer; no answer, no dialogue.

* Paper read at the Austrian-Israeli Wittgenstein Centenary Symposium in Tel-Aviv University on May 3, 1989, and corrected at the suggestions of the referees and the editor of this journal. 68

And so there is nothing to say about the opinions of Wittgenstein, except the two points that are quite unproblematic: first, his opinions count here only when he is considered as a philosopher (so that we are not expected to discuss, or even to be familiar with, his opinions about politics, psychology, sex, etc.); second, as a philosopher he held the opinion that he held no opinions. And so I could not find anything problematic about Wittgenstein that I could discuss here. Instead, I offer a story, since there is no doubt that Wittgenstein has played a great role in the history of twentieth-century philosophy. As the story is of recent philosophy, I will need a little philo­ sophical apparatus to narrate it, and since the story is scarcely philosophical, it may be easier to dispense with the philosophical apparatus straight away. What is needed is some familiarity with attitudes towards philosophy or metaphysics, or, to be more specific, familiarity with attitudes towards metaphysical assertions. Let me then offer a brief survey of views against metaphysics; I will repeat it all later on.

0. The History of Anti-Metaphysics

The first modem attack on metaphysics was made by Sir Francis Bacon, in his celebrated Novum Organum of 1620. His attack was epistemological, methodological and linguistic. Epistemologically, he followed the ancient dichotomy between know ledge and opinion, and he declared all opinions prejudices and superstitions. Hence, metaphysics too is either science or superstition. If it is superstitious, we should avoid it. And to be scientific it needs empirical support. Methodologically, he said, metaphysics should be the apex of scien­ tific research, and then, being properly backed by the whole of science, metaphysics will enjoy scientific status, unlike today's metaphysics that precedes science and ill influences all research as it is a prejudice and a superstition. Linguistically, he said, metaphysical concepts today have no independent meanings. For example, when we analyze Aristotle's theory of the elements we find it empty. For example, the term "humid" or "moist" in it conveys nothing more than what it means in ordinary language, so that Aristotle's theory of the elements conveys no added information.