2015 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College

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Cover photo by Kristin A. Wagner.

ISSN: 2165-9117 Staff

EDITORS-IN-CHIEF

Jennifer Rowland Nada Zohdy

MANAGING EDITORS

Aya Majzoub Lauren Leatherby Jenny Quigley-Jones Zane Preston

ASSOCIATE EDITORS

Kristin Wagner Ari Schriber Kevin Moss Andrew Ma Soumia Aitelhaj Olivia Holt-Ivry Katie Gonzalez

Acknowledgments

The Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy would like to thank a number of individuals and institutions whose support proved invaluable to the production of this fourth edition. These include Martha Foley, publisher; Richard Parker, faculty advisor; and the HKS Journals Office, without whose patient guidance none of this would have been possible. Additionally, we would like to thank Hilary Rantisi, Krysten Hartman, and the entire Middle East Initiative for their generous contributions to the journal’s long-term sustainability and strategic vision; as well as Greg Harris, Jeffrey Seglin, and all those who participated in this year’s editors’ workshops. We would especially like to thank our staff for its commitment, hard work, and attentive- ness to detail, consistently demonstrated throughout the editing process. Table of Contents

1 Letter from the Editors ARTICLES By Jennifer Rowland and Nada Zohdy 30 Diversifying for a Green Future: The Case of the United Arab Emirates INTERVIEW By Muhammed Y. Idris and Joelle Thomas 3 Leading From Crisis: An Exclusive Interview with 37 The Arab Uprisings and Their Former Tunisian Prime Minister External Dimensions: Bringing Mehdi Jomaa Migration In Interviewed by Nada Zohdy By Tamirace Fakhoury

44 A Corridor for Egypt’s FEATURES Economic Development By Farouk El-Baz 6 Obama’s Middle East Report Card 51 The Hijacking of Algerian By Brian Katulis Identity By Kheireddine Bekkai 11 The Line in the Sand: Is Sykes- Picot Coming Undone? By Michael Wahid Hanna COMMENTARIES

22 The Prospects and Perils of the 58 Independent Civil Society: Coalition’s War on ISIS A Necessary Ingredient for By Faysal Itani Stability and Security in the Middle East & North Africa By Amira Maaty

62 Over the River: Jordan’s Dependency on Transboundary Water Resources By Sarah McKnight Letter from the Editors

By Jennifer Rowland and Nada Zohdy ISIS’ takeover; and Faysal Itani analyzes the US coalition’s strategy to defeat ISIS, arguing We are thrilled to present the fourth edition that it cannot succeed without empowering of the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics Sunni civilians. Muhammed Idris and Joelle and Policy (JMEPP). JMEPP’s mission is to Thomas turn to economics in an assessment of provide cutting-edge analysis on issues of policy the United Arab Emirates’ efforts to go green. relevance to the Middle East and North Africa Tamirace Fakhoury points out a blind spot in (MENA) region. Our Spring 2015 volume the study of the Middle East and North Africa: captures the troubling developments of the past how large diaspora communities affect political year in the Middle East and North Africa. In dynamics in their home countries. Farouk 2014, the Syrian conflict that has so beguiled the El-Baz takes us to Egypt, where he proposes international community spilled over into Iraq, a grand economic plan to pull the country out with the swift and shocking rise of the Islamic of poverty and set it on a path toward long- State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). ISIS is causing term growth. From Egypt, we move west to the ever-complex alliances in the region to shift the oft-neglected country of Algeria, where in peculiar ways. In Iraq, US airstrikes provide Kheireddine Bekkai argues for more inclusive cover for Iranian-backed militias fighting ISIS; education policies on national identity. Finally, while in Yemen, the United States supports a Amira Maaty comments on the region’s Saudi intervention against a different Iranian- desperate need for robust civil societies, while backed armed group that has taken control of Sarah McKnight calls for improvements in the Yemeni capital. Jordan’s water policies. Meanwhile, simmering political disputes Given the enormity of the challenges facing in Libya escalated into a full-blown civil war, the Middle East today, we at JMEPP feel it is sparking concern in neighboring Egypt, where both an obligation and a privilege to view the the old authoritarian order remains in control contemporary policy challenges and opportu- despite the country’s popular revolution. The nities facing the region from new perspectives, Gulf countries contemplate their responses to with the strength and credibility of voice that record-low oil prices, continuing negotiations comes from using the platform of the Harvard between the United States and Iran, and the Kennedy School. threat of ISIS. And Tunisia remains one of We invite you to read, comment, and con- the region’s only bright spots. In November, tribute in the coming weeks, months, and years. Tunisians voted in the country’s first free and Only through active debate and constructive fair presidential elections. This year’s Journal engagement will we move toward sound brings new analysis to many of these complex policies capable of overcoming the momentous events and broader regional trends. challenges facing the region. It is an exciting We begin with the positive: an exclusive time here at the Journal, and we hope you will interview with former Tunisian Prime Minister join the conversation. If you like what you see, Mehdi Jomaa. In this year’s feature articles: please subscribe to future editions through our Brian Katulis zooms out to assess the Obama website: www.hksjmepp.com. administration’s record in the Middle East over the past six years; Michael Wahid Hanna Jennifer Rowland & Nada Zohdy refutes the notion that the Iraqi and Syrian Editors-in-Chief borders will need to be redrawn as a result of Cambridge, MA, April 2015

2014–2015, Volume IV | 1

Leading From Crisis: An Exclusive Interview with Former Tunisian Prime Minister Mehdi Jomaa

Interviewed by Nada Zohdy

JMEPP: Thank you for meeting with big [development] gap between the inland us Prime Minister Jomaa. Tunisia, and coastal areas of the country, and we of course, has been widely praised must address that. We can’t address these as a successful example of an Arab social and development imbalances and democracy. But what do you think other issues without making fundamental is the single greatest challenge fac- economic reforms. ing Tunisia’s nascent democracy now that it has completed its democratic JMEPP: We know that Tunisia is seen transition? as a model for democracies in the Middle East, but who do you look to? JOMAA: I think first is our economic What country do you see as a model challenge. As we succeeded in our polit- for your democracy? ical transition, we must also succeed in making an economic transition as well. JOMAA: I think we are not a model for We have to make many reforms, and you anyone actually. Maybe we are an exam- know it’s not simple to make economic re- ple, but we don’t like to say model be- forms. And it’s less simple when you know cause we have our specificities and certain that we are again in a period of transition, things cannot be replicated anywhere. But but we have to find enough courage to do it’s an experience in creating hope and it. It is mandatory for us to do this be- that could inspire other countries. And it’s cause the revolution that happened in Tu- good for the young people. Similarly, we nisia was for freedom as well as for more don’t have a single model to follow, every jobs, more opportunities, and more bal- country has its own specificities. But we anced [regional] development. We have a share many of the fundamental values that

2014–2015, Volume IV | 3 are included in our constitution, like free- has contributed to this problem, and dom of expression, freedom of belief, and what do you think is necessary to many other universal values that do not solve it? come from one specific country but are common values. JOMAA: I don’t think the move to democracy produced combatants. No, first JMEPP: During your year as Prime we must say no more, because this hap- Minister, what was the most import- pened just after the revolution when the ant decision you made, given the po- state was weak. As you know, the aim of litical crisis that was the backdrop of the revolution was to shake the [foundation how you came to office?

JOMAA: The first thing was how we It wasn’t democracy managed the political crisis and security but the lack of the state situation, in order to bring about stability [that contributed to the and allow for free and fair elections in a safe environment. We also prioritized the emergence of foreign fight against terrorism. We put a lot of en- fighters].” ergy into this and achieved a great success. Tunisia is now safer, and we have more protected boundaries from all the threats of] the state, throughout the regime. The coming from outside or inside. police at that time were seen as the tool of repression of the regime. And so [extrem- JMEPP: Was there a particularly im- ists] took advantage of that, and some of portant decision for enforcing the se- [these fighters] immigrated to other coun- curity? tries in the Middle East. Since that time, things have changed a lot. We now control JOMAA: Yes, there were many that we our land, we control our country, we con- made. We laid out the concept of a “crisis trol our boundaries, and we cut the flow. cell,” and I consulted on these decisions So, it wasn’t democracy but the lack of the around the table with leaders in the dif- state [that contributed to the emergence of ferent ministries, interior, police depart- foreign fighters]. That was the challenge ments, etc. It’s an organization that helped caused by the revolution. I think things us make decisions quickly but also [was] are better now, but the problem now is based on the right inputs and information. how to deal with the people coming back We call this our “crisis cell,” but it’s real- from Syria and Iraq. But it’s not a question ly a crisis management committee. It al- that we have to face on our own—many lowed us to face the decisions we needed other countries, even in Europe now and to make in a quick manner and efficient throughout the world, are facing this ques- way, and we see now some other countries tion, and we are working in collaboration are also doing this, which is really good. with these other countries to address this issue. JMEPP: So, Tunisia as a model for other countries (laughs). Tunisia JMEPP: The next question is with re- is also a major source of foreign gards to your personal plans now that fighters for the Islamic State, ISIS. you have just left office. You came Do you think the move to democracy to office as an apolitical, technocratic

4 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy candidate, but over the last year, you is inherent and inherited from our history have become a very popular public and tradition. That’s the first point which figure. Even though you don’t have is important. Second, we have a good civil a history in traditional politics and society, which exerted a lot of pressure on political parties, do you think this is political parties to push them to find an something you might do in the fu- agreement and compromise. It was very ture? important that we have a very active civil society, and women in the civil society are JOMAA: In the near future, I think I will more active than men. If you know Tu- first recover and resume having a civil, nisia, you know how present women are, normal life. In the future, it depends on and that’s one of the key factors of Tuni- if the country has any need for me and sia’s success. my team. If so, we will serve in any position, either political or not, as we have the — qualifications to help support this country and continue to contribute. Anyhow, I Nada Zohdy is a graduating Master in will not set up a political party today, and Public Policy candidate at the John F. Ken- we will see for the future. I can’t forecast nedy School of Government at Harvard really. University and is Co-Editor-in-Chief of the Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern JMEPP: Politics in the United States Politics and Policy. especially is very polarized, and compromise is very hard. But you Mehdi Jomaa served as Prime Minister came to power as Prime Minister as of Tunisia from January 2014 to February the result of a remarkable compro- 2015. He was chosen to lead an indepen- mise. Why do you think compromise dent, technocratic government and guide has been successful in Tunisia, and Tunisia towards its first general elections what will help make it successful in under the new constitution. His appoint- the future? ment was the result of a compromise between Tunisia’s primary political factions after months of acute political crisis. Prior And when you look at the to his appointment as head of government, history of Tunisia, you see Jomaa served as Minister of Industry in the that every time we had cabinet of Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh a big crisis, the exit was from March 2013. His previous career was in the aeronautics industry. compromise. It is inherent and inherited from our history and tradition.

JOMAA: I think it’s the history of Tu- nisia. It’s a country with 3,000 years of history based on tolerance and compromise. And when you look at the history of Tunisia, you see that every time we had a big crisis, the exit was compromise. It

2014–2015, Volume IV | 5 Obama’s Middle East Report Card

By Brian Katulis

Abstract

Heading into his last year and a half in office, President Obama faces a challenge in leaving behind a successful legacy in the Middle East. In his tenure, Obama delivered on ending the expansive US military presence in Iraq and protecting the homeland from major terrorist attacks. Yet, the Obama administration has not gained a solid footing on how to adapt to the 2011 Arab revolts and the continued aftermath, a sea change in a struggle for power within the region. Although Al-Qaeda may be a shadow of its former self, a more formidable Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) is taking its place and drawing the United States back into turmoil in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia and Iran’s rivalry and proxy wars are claiming more countries like Syria and Yemen. President Obama’s Middle East policy in his final two years will be judged by his ability to coordinate between two efforts: to wage a successful campaign against ISIS and to deliver on a deal with Iran that prevents it from acquiring nuclear weapons while assuaging the fears of Israel and Ameri- ca’s Gulf allies. The United States must also learn from the mistakes of the recent past and reinvigorate its investment in smart power policy tools that can meaningfully handle the constant shifts in Middle East dynamics.

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President Obama’s Middle East policy sula (AQAP), to prevent a major attack on record in his first six years in office was the United States and avoiding making the mixed and lacked significant achievements. same strategic blunders as his predecessor. Overall, Obama’s approach was cautious, Attempts to advance Israeli-Palestinian as the United States reacted to fast-moving peace fell short twice, and efforts to bro- events. Obama’s strategy predominantly ker a peaceful settlement to Syria’s vicious focused on degrading terrorist networks, civil war have not succeeded. Furthermore, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Penin- America’s response to the ongoing political

6 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy shifts of the Arab uprisings has been un- George Mitchell, and he extended an offer even. of engagement with Iran. The administra- Obama’s strategic approach has placed tion’s engagement on Iran yielded more the United States in a bystander role in fruit than the efforts on the peace process some of the biggest shifts and dynamics in front. The international framework for en- the region, including the 2011 Arab uprisings and their aftermath. The administration’s overall framework—of reducing Obama’s strategic America’s commitments in the region in approach has placed order to rebalance or pivot to other regions the United States in a of the world—was partially overtaken by events in 2014, including the rise of the bystander role in some ISIS. of the biggest shifts Looking ahead to his final two years in and dynamics in the office, Obama faces a challenging regional region, including the 2011 landscape. At the start of 2015, the two top priorities are addressing the threats Arab uprisings and their posed by terrorist networks, such as the aftermath. Islamic State in Iraq and Al-Sham (ISIS) and AQAP, and dealing with Iran’s nuclear program. Reaching a deal with Iran on gaging and containing Iran on the nuclear its nuclear program is still possible. But front opened the door to renewed nego- with or without a deal, the repercussions tiations in Obama’s second term that may of Iran’s influence and role in the region yield some significant results. By contrast, will be a major issue for President Obama two separate efforts to advance Israeli-Pal- and his successor for years to come. The estinian peace talks—one led by Mitch- campaign against ISIS will face signif- ell at the start of Obama’s first term and icant challenges in both Iraq and Syr- a second spearheaded by Secretary of State ia in Obama’s last two years. How this John Kerry at the start of Obama’s second campaign and the efforts to engage Iran term—collapsed in the face of differenc- are managed together will have a major, es between the two parties and divisions long-lasting impact on the trajectory of within both camps. US policy in the Middle East. The regional, social, and political up- heaval that began in Tunisia at the end of Looking Back on Obama’s Middle 2010 forced the administration to repri- East Record: Hesitant Responses to oritize the Middle East and North Afri- Surprising Transformations ca. The power shifts that toppled leaders President Obama entered office prom- in four countries—Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, ising a new style of engagement with the and Yemen—had significant reverberations Middle East. He set a new tone in a series not only in those countries but across the of speeches and media appearances in his region. In each country, the United States first year in office and vowed to fulfill his struggled to adapt its forms of engagement campaign promise of ending America’s in- to meet the new social, economic, and po- volvement in the war in Iraq. litical challenges. For all of the talk about Obama signaled early on a strong fo- “smart power” and the need to use other cus on Middle East peace by appoint- components of US power in foreign poli- ing a prominent envoy in former Senator cy, the United States was slow to respond

2014–2015, Volume IV | 7 with a meaningful set of policy tools that Middle East policy. President Obama’s were relevant to the challenges facing reluctance to intervene in the conflict, each of these countries. For example, the especially early on, was reasonable and Obama administration made public an- understandable. In retrospect, however, nouncements about new types of assistance dynamics spiraled out of control and spread to smooth the economic and political transitions in key countries in efforts such as the Deauville Partnership announced with In its last two years, the other G8 countries in 2011. However, not administration will have much of this promised aid was delivered, two major priorities when and it was ultimately dwarfed by the mas- it comes to the Middle sive infusions of aid that Gulf countries in the region delivered to countries like East: the campaign against Egypt. ISIS and Iran’s nuclear Furthermore, the new regional com- program. petition for power and influence that emerged in this period from 2011 to 2014 among different power centers in the re- across Syria’s borders. The September 2013 gion complicated Obama’s engagement on nonstrike event—when the Obama admin- the Middle East. Saudi Arabia, the Unit- istration did not follow through on exact- ed Arab Emirates, Qatar, and Turkey were ing a cost on the Assad regime for its use of all adopting more assertive stances on the chemical weapons—created confusion in political transitions in other countries. Af- the region about America’s overall role. It ter a few months of being more vocal and also produced incentives for regional actors active in response to changes in the re- to become deeply involved in Syria’s civil gion—including America’s direct military war. By the start of 2015, the conflict in intervention in Libya in 2011—the Obama Syria had taken an estimated 200,000 lives administration became more cautious and and uprooted nearly a third of the country.1 tentative by 2012. Heading into his last two years in office, At the same time, the Obama admin- President Obama has closed down three istration was continuing its efforts to end embassies in Syria, Libya, and Yemen due America’s combat role in Iraq. US troops to security threats. Similarly, America is withdrew from Iraq in 2011, but until slowly increasing its military footprint in the summer of 2014, the administration Iraq and embarking on a rebel train-and- was disinclined to use diplomatic lever- equip exercise in Syria and Iraq to deal age to shape Iraq’s internal politics. The with the ISIS threat. growing authoritarianism of former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Looking Ahead to Obama’s Last increased sectarianism in Iraq contributed Two Years: Investing in Regional to the reemergence of violent extremism Stability and terrorist groups such as ISIS. By early In its last two years, the administra- 2014, the situation had spiraled out of con- tion will have two major priorities when trol inside of Iraq, and the dynamics started it comes to the Middle East: the campaign to mix with the combustible violence in against ISIS and Iran’s nuclear program. Syria’s civil war next door. Without a change of government in Israel Syria will perhaps be viewed by histori- and a major shift in Palestinian dynamics, ans as the greatest shortcoming of Obama’s it is unlikely that the administration will

8 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy invest significant time or energy in the Is- olutionary Guards Corps) from which the raeli-Palestinian peace process. Political United States was absent due to reservations change has stalled out in Egypt, and chaos over providing air cover to hostile elements in Syria is likely to make the region as a which had also rejected US involvement. whole more resistant to challenges to cur- Furthermore, the active support Iran pro- rent rulers. vides to Hezbollah in Lebanon, a terrorist The campaign against ISIS will be a ma- group that has actively threatened the Unit- jor focus, even in the absence of an overall ed States and its allies, is deeply problematic. strategy for Syria. The Obama administra- It is unlikely that the anti-ISIS cam- tion must maintain coalition unity in this paign or Iran diplomacy will produce campaign, though ISIS’ recent atrocities complete results by the end of Obama’s have made this task less difficult. More- time in office, but tangible steps forward over, the administration has greater clarity on these two top priorities could strength- on the Iraq side of this strategy than on the en overall stability in the region. Indeed, Syria side. Its plan to train a Syrian oppo- mishandling policy on these two fronts sition force to fight ISIS lacks urgency, and could lead to a wider conflagration and it is far from clear whether the size of the tensions. For example, if a nuclear deal proposed force—5,000 fighters trained a with Iran moves forward, this will likely year—will be sufficient to hold territory heighten the sense of insecurity and feel- seized from ISIS. ings of abandonment already expressed by Iran and the P5+1 appear closer to a deal Gulf countries and Israel after an interim over Tehran’s nuclear program than at any deal in the Joint Plan of Action (JPOA) point in recent memory after the unveiling was announced in November 2013 and in April 2015 of the “Joint Comprehensive the continued Shia-Sunni sectarian ten- Plan of Action”2 that paves the way to a fi- sions across the region. The United States nalized agreement. However, this appear- will need to offer reassurances to Israel ance could prove deceiving, and even if a and key Gulf partners that will continue final deal is signed, the regional reverbera- to remain vigilant about the problematic tions will be difficult for the United States to role Iran plays in the region. manage. Israel and Gulf Arab countries have In addition to these central challenges expressed their extreme reservations about a of Iran and ISIS, there is a structural chal- possible deal with Iran. Offering reassuranc- lenge that the United States and other out- es and enduring support to those partners side actors face in the Middle East: how to will be important for any possible deal with respond more effectively to the ongoing Iran to have staying power. Furthermore, political, social, and economic shifts in the the Obama administration should be clear- region. The 2011 popular uprisings and eyed and realistic about the possibilities and their aftermath were the symptoms of lon- limits of US-Iran cooperation in the region, ger-term challenges that do not appear to particularly on the anti-ISIS campaign. For be going away anytime soon. Nevertheless, example, in the campaign to degrade ISIS, US engagement with the region remains the United States has already found limits to heavily weighted towards the work of its how much the forces in Iraq backed by Iran military and intelligence agencies. For the are willing to actively cooperate with the United States to have a more effective pol- efforts of the US-led coalition against ISIS. icy towards the Middle East, it will need to This became apparent in March 2015 in the revisit the aspirations of smart power and initial failed efforts to retake Tikrit by Shiite make more significant investments in the rebels guided by the IRGC (Iranian Rev- diplomatic, economic, and political en-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 9 gagement tools that can have a meaningful impact on a wider range of countries in the Middle East for years to come.

Brian Katulis is a senior fellow at Amer- ican Progress, where his work focuses on US national security policy in the Middle East and South Asia. Katulis has served as a consultant to numerous US government agencies, private corporations, and non- governmental organizations on projects in more than two dozen countries, including Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Yemen, Egypt, and Colombia. From 1995 to 1998, he lived and worked in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Egypt for the National Democrat- ic Institute for International Affairs. Katulis received a master’s degree from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs and a BA in history and Arab and Islamic studies from Villanova University. In 1994 and 1995, he was a Fulbright scholar in Amman, Jordan, where he conducted research on the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. Katulis has published articles in several newspapers and journals, including The Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, The Boston Globe, The Bal- timore Sun, and Middle East Policy, among other publications. He is coauthor of The Prosperity Agenda, a book on US national security published by John Wiley & Sons in 2008. Katulis speaks Arabic.

Endnotes

1 “Syria Death Toll Now Exceeds 210,000: Rights Group,” Reuters, 7 February 2015.

2 “Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Regarding the Islamic Re- public of Iran’s Nuclear Program,” US De- partment of State, 2 April 2015.

10 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy The Line in the Sand: Is Sykes-Picot Coming Undone?

By Michael Wahid Hanna

Abstract

The current state of de facto fragmentation in both Iraq and Syria will endure for the foreseeable future, particularly in Syria, which has long since ceased functioning as a unitary state. But the current catastrophe also offers a roadmap for eventual political equilibrium: greater decentralization that does not seek to reconstitute the dysfunctional political order represented by the status quo ante. Creating a sustainable model of governance for both Iraq and Syria will require recognition of both the current reality of sectarian and ethnic polarization and the role of overly centralized repressive modes of governance in fuelling those conflicts. For outside parties seeking to formulate coherent policy responses, an assumption of continued fragmentation is a must, while advocating formal partition is a mistake.

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As civil strife and conflict have curtailed and ethnic lines. the reach of Baghdad and Damascus, a pop- Despite this moment of undeniable ular notion has emerged suggesting that fragmentation and violence, however, the artificial colonial-era boundaries of these predictions of partition are untenable, Iraq and Syria are collapsing. The popular have limited organic traction, and misun- and mistaken refrain is that the Sykes-Picot derstand the processes and ramifications of Agreement is unraveling. This has engen- state formation. Further, and most impor- dered a number of misguided suggestions tantly, they propose unnecessarily radical that the borders of the Arab state system are solutions to the familiar crises of gover- the principal drivers of conflict and now nance that plague the entire Arab world, require significant overhaul along sectarian irrespective of the nature of the states of

2014–2015, Volume IV | 11 the region and the process by which their conflict to justify the need for a strong cen- borders were demarcated. tralized state.”1 The current state of de facto fragmenta- International IDEA suggests four ba- tion in both Iraq and Syria will endure for sic advantages flowing from decentraliza- the foreseeable future, particularly in Syria, tion, namely, improving service delivery; which has long since ceased functioning as addressing neglect of marginalized areas; a unitary state. But the current catastrophe promoting democratic citizenship; and also offers a roadmap for eventual political equilibrium: greater decentralization that does not seek to reconstitute the dysfunc- Importantly, the discourse tional political order represented by the sta- of partition is largely tus quo ante. Creating a sustainable model external to these conflicts of governance for both Iraq and Syria will require recognition of both the current re- and of ten originates in the ality of sectarian and ethnic polarization West. and the role of overly centralized repressive modes of governance in fuelling those conflicts. preserving national unity and stability.2 For outside parties seeking to formulate The theoretical benefits of decentralization coherent policy responses, an assumption in an autocratic and poorly governed Arab of continued fragmentation is a must, while world should be clear. However, the issue advocating formal partition is a mistake. of decentralization is a fraught one in the Arab world and is continuously informed Decentralization, Not Partition by the legacy of imperialism and the lin- Even absent the specter of conflict-in- gering suspicions of the intentions of out- duced fragmentation and increased sectar- side actors. For example, a September 2013 ian and ethnic polarization, the option of op-ed that merely contemplated the pos- greater decentralization and devolution of sibility of a remapped Middle East, which power to subnational levels would be de- included a map delineating “How 5 Coun- sirable. Autocratic forms of governance are tries Could Become 14,”3 spawned a heated marked by their high levels of centraliza- and conspiratorial reaction in the region tion, and this is particularly so in the Arab that framed the exercise as an expression world, which lags behind other regions of of strategic intent.4 Similar reaction greeted the world with respect to levels of decen- the July 2011 independence of South Su- tralization. Instead, much of the region is dan.5 marked by “deconcentration,” whereby The traumatic experience of decoloni- authority, management, and responsibili- zation in the Arab world has produced an ties are distributed among the various lev- abiding fear that the devolution of power els of a central government, as opposed to within states will lead to the eventual frac- sharing such duties and tasks with autono- ture and potential partition of the states of mous subnational governments. In addition the region—a fear that has been ably ex- to historical administrative antecedents, as ploited by abusive and centralizing rulers. a recent report by the International Insti- This has stunted the development of public tute for Democracy and Electoral Assis- discourse on the issue throughout the re- tance (IDEA) notes, “political elites in the gion and has fueled demagogic mischar- region have continually exploited nation- acterizations of efforts to push for greater alism and periods of regional and internal devolution and decentralization. This has

12 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy been exacerbated in recent years by the soft partition or outright secession overlook chronic and burgeoning violence and in- the reality of state formation and the dura- stability that have overtaken wide swaths bility of national identity despite horrific of the region. violence and civil strife.6 While the theoretical benefits of decen- While much focus has been given to the tralization mesh with the objective realities colonial provenance of borders in the Arab of war-torn Iraq and Syria, the current set- world and their supposed arbitrary charac- ting of zero-sum military conflict and inter, the drawing of borders and the creation grained suspicion has limited the ability of of national identities is never a self-evident well-intentioned actors to formulate ratio- process. The intervening years have pro- nal policy responses. The differing trajec- duced nationalist attachments, and such tories and legal architectures in place also forms of identity have proven resilient. mean that any formalized decentralization The bloody struggles for power and the process will necessarily proceed on quite calcification of sectarian and ethnic iden- different timelines. tity have fueled conflict and bloodshed but Importantly, the discourse of partition is have not created significant momentum for largely external to these conflicts and of- secessionism among mainstream actors. In- ten originates in the West. Separatism has stead, even in the context of vicious, and not been a core goal of most of the ma- at times zero-sum, struggles for power, the jor combatant factions save for certain key combatant factions have largely assumed exceptions, and the identity of those ex- the continued territorial integrity of Iraq ceptions limits the possibilities of success and Syria. for separatist efforts. The most prominent A recent assessment of public opinion in such exception is the Islamic State (IS), also Syria noted that “almost all [respondents] known as ISIS or ISIL, which has adopt- rejected the division of Syria,” although ed transnational goals aimed at erasing re- “most Syrians in this study want and expect gional borders and establishing a caliphate. their side to prevail in the conflict and are The spectacular and gratuitous violence of willing to come together, as long as recon- the group, coupled with its openly revi- ciliation is on their terms.”7 Similarly, aside sionist efforts to overturn the internation- from the fundamental rejections of any al order, undermine the breadth of appeal form of conventional state sovereignty by of such efforts and blunts the possibilities IS, no mainline Arab political actors have for cultivating support in the internation- advocated formal partition in Iraq, and al community. Jabhat al-Nusra, the official even milder forms of ethnosectarian federal-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, shares similar alism and soft partition have never gained a transnational, long-term objectives but has critical mass of popular support. largely focused its efforts inside Syria. Furthermore, despite war-induced de- The only responsible actor advocating mographic shifts in Iraq and Syria, many separatism is Iraqi Kurdistan, but any bid mixed areas of the country remain, and any for independence by the Kurdistan Re- new efforts to draw hard internal partitions gional Government (KRG) is much more would be a spur for renewed sectarian and difficult to envision than is popularly un- ethnic violence. Lastly, the crude ethno- derstood, as will be discussed further be- sectarian logic of such partitions would mar low. notions of citizenship and undermine the Among mainline Arab actors in Iraq possibilities for heterogeneous and plural- and Syria there is also a notable lack of sep- istic societies. aratist sentiment. The outside advocates of The impulses and necessity for decen-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 13 tralization, on the other hand, are acute. macy and further fuel suspicions regarding Long-running conflict and fragmentation the intentions of outside actors. have changed the internal boundaries of Iraq and Syria and, particularly in the case Iraq’s Path to Decentralization of Syria, fundamentally altered the political In contrast to Syria, decentralization is economy of those areas outside the control already formally underway in Iraq and is of the central state. While Syria’s strategic taking place within a constitutional frame- stalemate has not produced static internal work. The exact parameters of the accom- boundaries as the conflict remains tactical- modation between Baghdad and Iraq’s rely fluid, certain outlying areas have effec- gions, however, remain contentious and tively been ceded by the Assad regime. unresolved. Iraq’s flawed 2005 constitution When this practical reality is coupled itself reflects Iraq’s underlying and ongo- with the intractable political and identity ing political and identity crises. Based on crises facing each country, it becomes clear Iraq’s recent experience and “given the that overly centralized outcomes will only strong association between federalism and perpetuate grievance and conflict, as Bagh- the Kurds’ ultimate desire for statehood, dad and Damascus have proven unable to almost any exploration of greater local au- govern effectively and fairly even prior to tonomy by the provinces raises suspicions the much more challenging polarized con- of a partitionist agenda.”8 To move beyond text. Forcing centralized outcomes will en- this current impasse, any enduring dispen- sure that current crises are institutionalized sation will have to contend with the reali- and further complicate the possibilities for ty and irreversibility of Kurdish autonomy negotiated de-escalation. while understanding the undesirability of An eventual political settlement in each formalizing similar ethnosectarian ar- country will require some form of accom- rangements for other parts of the country. modation between the center and outly- The politics of decentralization in Iraq ing areas. Enduring stability is unlikely have changed dramatically since the coun- to emerge without political compromises try adopted its constitution. While Sun- on the issue of centralization, particularly ni-majority regions in Iraq have more re- as devolution of powers and authority recently come to see the potential benefits of mains one of the few paths to dealing with decentralization, Iraq’s Sunni Arab politi- the intractable set of problems presented by cal leaders were previously opposed to any demography and the hardening of sectari- forms of decentralization. The psychology an and ethnic identities. In short, neither a underlying this rejection was complex, majoritarian government in Iraq nor a mi- bound up with the intractable disputes noritarian government in Syria will have regarding territorial boundaries with the the wherewithal to pacify, let alone govern Kurds and the difficulty in accommodating effectively and equitably, Sunni-majority to the demographic and political reality of and Kurdish areas without political com- a Shia-led political order. Simply put, im- promise on the question of subnational au- portant strands among Iraq’s Sunnis had thorities and power. grown accustomed to ruling Iraq from the Finally, for outside actors, partition center and were not yet ready to concede would represent a disastrous precedent in that future prize. Incidentally, this same an already unstable region. The lack of or- rejectionist attitude continues to be an ganic constituents for partition and seces- animating rationale for IS and its recruit- sion would also mean that any such process ment. Conversely, “during the writing of imposed by the outside would lack legiti- the 2005 constitution—a period of intense

14 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy civil strife—a powerful group of Shia Isla- greater autonomy on the part of Sunni-ma- mists openly championed the Kurdish-in- jority provinces. This check is further spired model of ethnosectarian federalism strengthened by the utter devastation that as a hedge against the return of a Sunni has been wrought in many of the country’s strongman such as Saddam Hussein.”9 In Sunni-majority areas, a devastation that has the ensuing years, that model of ethnosec- only accelerated in the wake of IS’ mili- tarian federalism has never gained wide- tary campaign, territorial acquisition, and spread traction beyond the KRG, but many persistent terrorism. The centrality of oil of Iraq’s Sunni political leaders have come to this arrangement means that “a relative- to see decentralization as a buffer between ly equitable distribution of this wealth will be key to future stability,” but this “will 12 The centrality of oil to also require a relatively strong Baghdad.” This suggests that full implementation of this arrangement means the constitutional arrangements for decen- that ‘a relatively equitable tralization would prove unworkable and distribution of this wealth counterproductive in practice; country- will be key to future wide regionalization, including Basra and the South, would likely set in motion pow- stability,’ but this ‘will also erful interests and forces that would under- require a relatively strong cut the economic viability of the Iraqi state. Baghdad.’ But it is also clear that the current political order is unable to provide equitable and fair governance to all its citizens. While Sunni-majority areas and a Shia-led central claims that Sunni marginalization is the state. This process accelerated after the US prime driver of the rise of IS are misguided withdrawal and as power was increasingly and hyperbolic, it is undoubtedly true that concentrated in the person of former Prime Iraq’s Sunni citizens have legitimate griev- Minister Nouri al-Maliki. ances based on the actions of Baghdad. As former US military officer and offi- In this light, “a system of asymmet- cial Douglas A. Ollivant notes, there is an ric federalism may be the most practical inherent tension in the push for greater de- solution for the problems that Iraq fac- centralization by Iraq’s Kurds and Sunnis: es because it most accurately reflects the “On the one hand, they want a Baghdad country’s enduring ethnic and political re- that cedes power, one that is weak enough alities.”13 In this case, an asymmetric out- not to interfere with their regional arrange- come would recognize the special status of ments. On the other hand, they also want the KRG while allowing for further and a strong Baghdad, one that has the abili- necessary decentralization in other parts ty to pull oil revenue from Basra province of the country. As Hiltermann, Kane, and (the source of about 80 percent of Iraq’s oil Alkadiri further highlight, “no other mod- income) and distribute it throughout the el is likely to enable the country to reach country.”10 As he further explains, “oil na- an acceptable solution for Kurdistan while tionalism is the fundamental arrangement at the same time ensuring that the central underlying the Iraqi state.”11 This redistrib- government in Baghdad is viable enough utive model and the inequitable geographic to function.”14 dispersion of natural resources will create Reaching a settlement along these lines a formidable check against separatist am- previously eluded Iraq’s political class, even bitions among the Kurds and the drive for at a time of decreasing violence and insta-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 15 bility. With the rise of IS and the loss of tion could encourage the mobilization of significant territory to that group, sectari- a critical mass of Sunni fighters, who will an and ethnic polarization, and the further be indispensable in degrading IS military deterioration of trust among communities, power and reach. These steps would alter have undermined the prospects for reach- Iraq’s polarized sectarian political and se- ing such an accommodation. Nonetheless, curity dynamics. the instability of the current juncture ren- For much of the Shia base and political ders such political steps imperative. How- class, the issue is seen through the lens of ever, the trauma of IS’ dramatic territorial suspicion surrounding the ultimate loyal- expansion and unmitigated violence has ties and intentions of Iraqi Sunnis and the had appreciable effects on Iraq’s political belief that not insignificant portions of the leaders and creates a potential basis for new community colluded with or acquiesced to and necessary accommodations. the rise and spread of IS. These suspicions The most immediate concern in this extend beyond Iraq’s Shia, and all of “these regard is bound up with the institutional- other communities in Iraq believe—cor- ization of the Popular Mobilization Forces rectly—that at least a minority of Iraq’s (PMF) and the manner in which the cen- Sunni citizens have provided and will pro- tral government interacts with and supports vide shelter to ISIL because . . . they fun- such local forces in Sunni-majority areas in damentally reject the post-2003 political the future. The complex dynamics under- order in which Sunni Arabs have only the girding this issue can be seen in microcosm power their demographics can democrati- in the approach of Iraq’s political factions cally generate.”15 to the legislative issue of a National Guard It remains the case that the PMF issue force, which is understood by Sunnis as a will serve as a litmus test for the willingness necessary step for challenging IS and liber- and ability of Iraq’s political class to cobble ating IS-controlled territory in Sunni-ma- together a practicable resolution that incen- jority areas. Further, the presence of Irani- tivizes cooperation between Baghdad and an proxy groups within the broad array of the provinces. Further afield, successful mobilized militias and fighters has height- decentralization in Sunni-majority areas of ened sectarian tensions on this issue, par- Iraq could provide a model for such efforts ticularly with the specter of future military in Syria. offensives in Sunni-majority areas. To create a sustainable asymmetric Perhaps most importantly for Iraq’s Sun- structure will also require the normaliza- nis, the PMF issue will go a long way in tion and stabilization of Baghdad-KRG determining whether the community can ties, which remain strained despite interim have any confidence in functional decen- arrangements to halt further deterioration. tralization. That confidence will be depen- As Joost Hiltermann points out, “Baghdad dent on whether the central government and Erbil are being pushed apart by the way can allow for provincial-level control of one of the two main Kurdish parties has PMFs while properly and proportionately openly called for Kurdish independence resourcing those forces. In return, provin- (while the other has not excluded it), by cial leaders will have to allow the central unilateral moves in the disputed territo- government an oversight and collabora- ries, and by an ongoing quarrel over oil tive role. The precedent established by the and money.”16 For Iraq’s Kurds, the pros- PMF issue will have a disproportionate pect of independence remains an ultimate role in clarifying the political incentives for goal, and many believed those hopes were many Sunni leaders, and a positive resolu- buoyed by the territorial gains made in the

16 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy wake of the collapse of the Iraqi security Baghdad. This will require a permanent forces, particularly as much of those gains agreement on oil management and rev- happened in disputed territories such as the enue sharing, which would “cement an symbolically potent city of Kirkuk. Fur- equitable economic relationship between thermore, generalized international sup- the central government and its Kurdish port for potential Kurdish independence is counterpart . . . [and] provide the Kurds now at an all-time high. with the tools they need to build up the But this popular reading of trends is region under their own direction and al- perhaps misplaced. In fact, for the first low it to flourish.”20 It will also require time since the era of Saddam Hussein, a willingness not to rely on territorial the security of the KRG has come un- conquest as a means of resolving the open der serious threat. As Cale Salih points question on disputed internal boundaries; out, “the very real danger ISIS pos- such an approach will ensure renewed es to Kurdistan, the complexity of the future political and potentially military Kirkuk question, the economic calcu- conflict with Baghdad. Finally, and in lations of the KRG, and the regional tension with Iraqi Kurdish aspirations, the and international context” demonstrate KRG should “work to strengthen the Iraqi this threat.17 Perhaps most significantly, state as a way of protecting its region from Turkey, which has unexpectedly outside attack,” as “[o]nly a state capable of constructed positive relations with Iraq’s exercising full control over both Shiite and Kurds despite prolonged antagonisms, Sunni areas can provide security guaran- has come out clearly against the prospects tees to the Kurds.”21 of Iraqi Kurdish independence.18 There The need for a broad accommodation have also been recent positive signals of on decentralization remains acute, and as cooperation between Baghdad and Erbil IS loses momentum in Iraq, the need for and a willingness to engage in more seri- robust planning for post-IS governance in ous dialogue.19 liberated territories gains greater urgency and would boost the prospects for both the immediate military campaign against Without a meaningful IS and other rejectionists and the lon- resource base and ger-term viability of Iraq. The crisis posed following the destruction by IS has also reconfigured the landscape of its industrial backbone, of Iraqi politics, loosening the mainstream Shia commitment to centralization and no future central enabling much greater latitude for serious government in Damascus discussions of administrative decentraliza- will be in a position to tion. An asymmetric outcome would also easily bring outlying areas most accurately reflect the existing realities of the country. It would be best accom- under its administrative plished through constitutional revision, but orbit. the unlikelihood of that occurring suggests that the most constructive way forward would be through legislative action. Such To institutionalize and safeguard its efforts at legislative reform have failed pre- autonomy, the KRG will have to eschew viously in producing functional outcomes ad hoc dispensations and seek a more sta- but must again be attempted despite the ble and enduring political settlement with even more challenging backdrop.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 17 Syria’s Indefinite Strategic Stalemate vated localized pro-regime militia forces, The prospects for decentralization in most notably the National Defense Forces. Syria are made more challenging by the These militias have become centers of au- protracted nature of the Syrian civil war thority, and their empowerment will ne- and the near certainty that the military cessitate a reordering of power and patron- conflict will continue for years to come. As age relationships within the regime that Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Mazur high- will further attenuate the center’s control light, “[t]he Syrian regime’s militarization over certain pro-regime areas. of the conflict and the subsequent escala- Furthermore, with an inconclusive tion of the fighting, fueled by a multitude military conflict and intense enmities and of actors, have set Syrians’ sights even more suspicions as a backdrop, it is difficult to narrowly on their regions.”22 This loos- imagine the basis upon which a central ening of binding ties between the center state could be successfully reconstruct- and opposition-held territory suggests that ed. Similarly, the unlikelihood of regime any eventual political settlement to end the change suggests that an Alawite-led central fighting will require some form and degree state will endure, although in a truncated of meaningful decentralization. form. In such circumstances, formalizing All sides in the Syrian conflict suffer decentralization would offer future protec- from exhaustion and manpower limitations tion against the depredations of the central that undermine the ability of any faction or government for the country’s aggrieved alignment of factions to end the war mil- majority Sunni population. Properly craft- itarily. The intervention by US-led mili- ed localized forms of administration could tary forces against IS has also had a much also offer protection to concentrated seg- more limited impact in Syria than Iraq due ments of the country’s extensive and vul- to the lack of effective coordination with nerable minority population. Such steps suitable ground forces. The prospects for are unlikely to fuel further fragmentation major shifts in US Syria policy remain or inspire secessionist intent as a result of unlikely for the remainder of the Obama the resiliency of Syrian national identity. administration. Coupled with the lack of This is not to suggest uniform notions of serious international diplomatic efforts and Syrian nationalism. In fact, “in contem- the continued unwillingness of the Assad porary Syria, a central function of national regime to negotiate in good faith, there is identity for both regime supporters and the no reason for optimism over the trajectory opposition is to create a bridge between of future conflict in Syria. otherwise unlike groups and to wall off Without a meaningful resource base and one’s opponents as traitors (takhwin).” 23 following the destruction of its industrial This is a testament to the fact that while backbone, no future central government protracted conflict has fundamentally al- in Damascus will be in a position to easily tered the country’s social fabric, it has still bring outlying areas under its administra- not resulted in the creation of secessionist tive orbit. This fiscal distress is further ex- movements. Nationalism remains a fram- acerbated by new patterns of patronage to ing mechanism for legitimacy. satisfy constituencies, such as local militia The fragmentation of the country has forces, that have arisen and matured during largely evolved in relation to the military wartime. These more recent trends build conflict, but there are constituencies with- upon longstanding and chronic neglect of in Syria who see decentralization as a pos- rural areas. sible pathway to sustainable politics. Chief The Assad regime itself has also culti- among these groups are Syria’s Kurds, who

18 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy have never fully integrated into the opposi- and the unsuccessful regime attempts to tion movement for a variety of reasons and encircle and besiege Aleppo, suggest that continue to face state hostility and opposi- attrition will effectively limit the territorial tion to their efforts for autonomy. Speaking ambitions of the regime. in 2012, Abdul-Hakim Bashar, the presi- In the interim, while political negoti- dent of the Kurdish National Council of ations aimed at bridging the gap between Syria, advocated for political decentraliza- the Assad regime and the opposition writ tion, arguing that “a decentralized political large should be pursued if the opportunity system reassures all parties in Syrian society arises, this longer-term effort should not that the future will be to their liking.”24 come at the expense of bottom-up efforts While lacking international backing or a to reinforce local and subnational adminis- hospitable legal environment upon which tration and governance. Admittedly, build- to pursue autonomy, in contrast to the sit- ing a political track toward decentralization uation of Iraqi Kurds, Syria’s Kurds have has to date proven fruitless. Attempts at carved out areas of de facto autonomy. de-escalation through the negotiation and For most other fighting factions, the replication of local ceasefires and the sub- prospect of negotiation has been so remote sequent establishment of more formalized and secondary to the all-encompassing local autonomy have failed, largely due to military fight that systematic and focused the unwillingness of the Assad regime to attention to preferred governance struc- negotiate seriously and in good faith. Local tures and frameworks has been far from ceasefires have come to be seen by the re- paramount. However, the reality of endur- gime as a vehicle for negotiating surrender. ing de facto fragmentation and the lack of Opportunities to reinforce local actors have mainstream secessionist intent suggest that also been, and will continue to be, limited Syria’s future will likely depend on accom- by the specter of IS, Jabhat al-Nusra, and modating the country’s radically altered other Salafi jihadi actors and the ever-pres- shape. Some analysts have suggested that ent menace of regime airpower. However, the Syrian regime has also come to a re- such efforts should be periodically revived lated conclusion. David W. Lesch suggest- in the hopes that attrition, both military ed in 2014 that Syrian regime officials “see and economic, will shift the political calcu- decentralization as a strategic necessity. For lus of the Assad regime and its international them, it is the best way for components of backers and force more serious negotiations the regime to ensure at least some mod- with non-extremist rebel groups. Even if icum of power and status in the future. such de-escalatory steps have future trac- The regime has neither the manpower nor tion, more static conflict and stable lines money—much less the legitimacy or cred- of territorial control represent the upper ibility—to reassert anywhere close to the limit of achievable, medium-term goals. authority it once enjoyed over the terri- Nonetheless, such opportunities should be tories it has lost, and even over much of actively pursued and presented as both a what it nominally controls.”25 Despite the precedent and an incentive. obvious bad faith of the Assad regime, this observation again points to the difficulties Conclusion in reconstructing a strong centralized state. While the reality of fragmentation is As a practical matter, the intent of the As- well underway in Iraq and Syria, the pro- sad regime in this regard may be superflu- cess of establishing a sustainable political ous: recent military developments, such as settlement and eventual reconciliation will the March 2015 fall of Idlib to rebel forces evolve in radically different settings and

2014–2015, Volume IV | 19 on significantly divergent timelines. Cen- ber of the Council on Foreign Relations. tral to any such efforts in either country will be decentralization, which represents an important tool that accommodates the reality and legacy of ethnosectarian con- Endnotes flict without succumbing to the reduc- tive logic of demographic determinism. 1 “Decentralization in Unitary States: In contrast, with limited organic support, Constitutional Frameworks for the Mid- partition represents a needlessly radical and dle East and North Africa,” International untenable approach to crisis management. IDEA, 2014, 14. As such, outside actors should aggressive- ly pursue diplomatic openings presented 2 Ibid. by the fragmented reality of the present. It is through such subnational arrangements 3 Robin Wright, “Imagining a Remapped and devolved autonomy that sustainable Middle East,” The New York Times, 28 Sep- outcomes might emerge. tember 2013.

4 Zeinobia, “Regarding the NYTimes Map Dividing 5 Arab Countries in to Michael Wahid Hanna is a senior fellow 14,” Egyptian Chronicles Blog, 1 October at The Century Foundation. He works on 2013; Michael Collins Dunn, “Egyptian issues of international security, internation- Xenophobia and the Misreading of Robin al law, and US foreign policy in the Mid- Wright’s Map,” Middle East Institute Edi- dle East and South Asia. He has published tor’s Blog, 2 October 2013. widely on US foreign policy in newspapers and journals, including articles in The New 5 “South Sudan and the Arab World: A York Times, Los Angeles Times, The Boston Plot to Do Down Islam,” The Economist, Globe, The Christian Science Monitor, The 13 January 2011: “Through the lens of the New Republic, Democracy, The Middle East Muslim Brotherhood’s slick Arabic-lan- Report, and World Policy Journal, among guage website, the referendum on the fu- other publications, and is a frequent con- ture of South Sudan looks rather different tributor to Foreign Policy. He appears reg- from its portrayal elsewhere. The looming ularly on MSNBC, PBS, BBC, NPR, and partition of Sudan is not, it says, the logical Al Jazeera, including appearances on Char- outcome of five decades of civil war. It is lie Rose and Up with Steve Kornacki. He the fruition of a century-old Western ec- served as a consultant for Human Rights clesiastical plot to close Islam’s gateway into Watch in Baghdad in 2008. Prior to join- Africa, and the start of a plan to break other ing The Century Foundation, Hanna was Arab countries into feeble statelets so as to a senior fellow at the International Human grab their riches.” Rights Law Institute. From 1999 to 2004, Hanna practiced corporate law with the 6 Reidar Visser, “Proto-Political Concep- New York law firm Cleary Gottlieb Steen tions of ‘Iraq’ in Late Ottoman Times,” In- & Hamilton. Fluent in Arabic, he was a ternational Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Stud- Fulbright scholar at Cairo University. He ies Vol. 3, No. 2 (2009): 143; Fanar Haddad, received a JD from the New York Univer- “The Terrorists of Today are the Heroes sity School of Law, where he was an editor of Tomorrow: The Anti-British and An- of the Law Review. Hanna is a term mem- ti-American Insurgencies in Iraqi Histo-

20 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy ry,” Small Wars & Insurgencies Vol. 19, No. 4 19 “Al-Bayati: Infisal Ikleem Kurdistan (2008): 451; Kheder Khaddour and Kevin Bada’ Yanhasir wa Yataraja’ Katheeran wa Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions,” honak Ajwa’ Jadeeda bayn Baghdad wa Er- Middle East Report Vol. 43 (2013). bil,” Alsumaria News, 6 April 2015.

7 Craig Charney, “Maybe We Can Reach a 20 Hiltermann, “Clearing the Landmines.” Solution: Syrian Perspectives on the Con- flict and Local Initiatives for Peace, Justice, 21 Ibid. and Reconciliation,” Syria Justice and Ac- countability Center, 2015. 22 Khaddour and Mazur, “The Struggle for Syria’s Regions.” 8 Joost Hiltermann, Sean Kane, and Raad Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary,” 23 Ibid. The National Interest, 28 February 2012. 24 “Kurdish Syrian Council: Key to Sta- 9 Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s bility is Decentralization,” Al-Monitor, 23 Federalism Quandary.” May 2012.

10 Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq Will Con- 25 David W. Lesch, “A Path to Peace in tinue to Need a Strong Central Govern- Syria,” Foreign Policy, 2 July 2014. ment,” Al Jazeera America, 16 January 2015.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 Hiltermann, Kane, and Alkadiri, “Iraq’s Federalism Quandary.”

14 Ibid.

15 Douglas A. Ollivant, “Iraq After the Islamic State: Politics Rule,” War on the Rocks, 18 February 2015.

16 Joost Hiltermann, “Clearing the Land- mines from Iraqi Kurdistan’s Future,” International Crisis Group In Pursuit of Peace Blog, 24 March 2015.

17 Cale Salih, “Kurdistan Isn’t About to Leave Iraq Amid ISIS Fighting,” TIME, 6 August 2014.

18 “Turkish Premier Says a Kurdish State Would ‘Endanger the Region’,” Rudaw, 14 January 2015.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 21 The Prospects and Perils of the Coalition’s War on ISIS

By Faysal Itani

Abstract

Over the last two years, the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) captured much of and established a proto-state in Iraq and Syria. In September 2014, the United States assembled a coalition to “degrade and eventually destroy” the jihadist group. Because ISIS’ future in Iraq is intimately linked to its position in Syria, defeating it in one but not the other would ensure its survival and may allow it to reemerge in both. This article examines the coalition campaign’s results and prospects in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, the coalition has made significant progress in blunting ISIS’ momentum and mobilizing its local rivals. Although these successes are limited, reversible, and involve a risky strategy, they could in theory restore basic security in Iraq. In Syria, by contrast, the coalition has failed to significantly weaken ISIS or strengthen its local rivals. Instead, its campaign of air strikes has set in motion local developments among the Syrian insurgency and population that may exacerbate the country’s long-term political and security problems and further empower ISIS. Ultimately, only a strategy that strengthens local Sunni partners with the ability to fight effectively and govern legitimately can defeat ISIS.

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Introduction jihadists’ capture of Mosul, Iraq’s second The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS) largest city, in June 2014.1 While dramatic, is a product of Iraq’s and Syria’s sectarian this was not ISIS’ first strategic victory in polarization, political dysfunction, and the either Syria or Iraq, where for months it had alienation of the local Sunni population manipulated and outmaneuvered its rivals, from the Iraqi and Syrian regimes. The US- gaining resources and recruits. In Novem- led anti-ISIS coalition was triggered by the ber 2013, ISIS established full control and

22 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy a de facto capital in Raqqa, northern Syria. ing.5 The United States successfully pushed Control over significant hydrocarbons re- for replacing Prime Minister Nouri al-Ma- sources and infrastructure ensured its con- liki with Haider al-Abadi, whom it judged tinued financial self-sufficiency.2 Shortly to be less sectarian, hostile, and repressive thereafter, it captured Fallujah in Iraq.3 towards Sunnis—many of whom came to ISIS’s success is largely due to its rivals’ weakness and passivity and the dysfunction of political regimes, rather than its ISIS has lost some own size or military capability as a light momentum and mobility, infantry force. Because Sunni-Shia ten- but it…still controls much sions in Iraq—and Sunni-Alawite tensions of Sunni Arab Iraq, with in Syria—empower ISIS, non-Sunni efforts against it only reinforce its narrative and the cooperation or tacit appeal. Sunni allies would be the most ef- acquiescence of Iraqi fective tool against ISIS, and any coalition Sunni tribal and secular strategy that does not reflect that is likely to insurgent groups who fail. The results in Iraq and Syria indicate as much. The coalition strategy in Iraq does, remain skeptical toward in principle, involve empowering Sunnis the government’s promise against ISIS and reintegrating them into of political reform. mainstream politics—though in practice progress on this front has been limited. In Syria, no such strategy exists. see ISIS as preferable to the Iraqi security forces. Abadi seems to have some cautious The Coalition Campaign in Iraq support from certain Sunni forces willing to After Mosul fell, the United States in- fight ISIS, on the condition that they receive creased material support for Iraq’s armed government support and greater autonomy forces, deployed several hundred military and economic support from Baghdad in a advisors, and assembled a coalition to launch post-ISIS Iraq.6 air strikes on ISIS. The immediate coalition The coalition campaign in Iraq has had priorities are preventing ISIS from threat- some positive results. ISIS has taken casu- ening major population zones—including alties and failed to capture Kirkuk or hold the Kurdish city of Kirkuk and the capital the Mosul Dam, for example. And it has Baghdad—as well as sensitive assets such as lost control of Iraq’s largest oil refinery in the Mosul Dam and the Baiji oil refinery. Baiji.7 Where the coalition has concentrat- The campaign also aims to save Iraq’s mil- ed air strikes, local forces have often blunted itary, on which the United States has spent or reversed ISIS offensives.8 These coalition billions, from collapse, in light of its poor successes have, to some extent, undermined performance against ISIS in June 2014 and the perception of ISIS as an unstoppable systemic corruption and mismanagement in force—a perception that played a signifi- the armed forces.4 cant role in facilitating ISIS recruitment and Officially, the United States has condi- psychological warfare. Iraqi government tioned support for the government of Iraq successes against ISIS in Tikrit have further on political change that addresses Sunni undermined ISIS’ image of infallibility.9 grievances and incentivizes Sunnis to fight Despite showing some results and poten- ISIS, as they did with much success against tial, the coalition’s strategy for Iraq faces se- Al-Qaeda in Iraq during the Sunni Awaken- rious challenges and carries high risks. ISIS

2014–2015, Volume IV | 23 has lost some momentum and mobility, but Iraq seems unlikely. Yes, as the Iranian role it continues to maneuver and mount offen- in and influence over the war effort against sives that often succeed. It still controls much ISIS deepens, such a reconciliation becomes of Sunni Arab Iraq, with the cooperation or more difficult. tacit acquiescence of Iraqi Sunni tribal and Lastly, the coalition’s unwillingness to secular insurgent groups who remain skepti- meaningfully weaken ISIS in Syria will nec- cal toward the government’s promise of po- essarily limit the utility of its campaign in litical reform. ISIS also poses a continuing Iraq. As long as ISIS can move fighters and asymmetric threat to the country’s stability. goods across the border and as long as they Attacks on strategic targets could provoke can recruit soldiers and capture equipment an all-out sectarian war, as was the case in in Syria, ISIS can survive, and even thrive, 2006 when militants bombed an important in Iraq. Whatever the coalition strategy’s Shia shrine in Samarra. successes in Iraq, it can only generate lasting There are also formidable political ob- results if paired with a rational strategy for stacles to accommodating Sunni grievances. defeating ISIS in Syria. First, even if Prime Minister Abadi is sin- cere in his outreach to Sunnis, he is only one The Coalition Campaign in Syria member in a broad, complex, and divided Despite months of coalition air strikes Shia political establishment, which contains over Syria, ISIS still controls its core terri- some elements who share Maliki’s sectari- tory in Raqqa, Deir al Zour, and Aleppo an outlook. Furthermore, Maliki had years provinces and is making inroads around Da- to cultivate powerful allies within the Iraqi mascus and into southern Syria. In the areas political and security establishment. If Aba- under its control, ISIS has displaced rival di intends to empower Sunnis, he will need Sunni, non-jihadist Syrian rebel groups, se- to overcome these entrenched interests, in verely repressed local tribal challengers, and a context of significant Iranian pressure to is threatening the regime’s remaining mili- limit Sunni power and preserve Shia domi- tary outposts. Non-jihadist, nationalist reb- nance in Iraq. el groups demonstrated far greater military Additionally, many Sunnis still perceive success against ISIS in early 2014 than the Iraq’s armed forces as Shia occupiers. As coalition campaign thus far and, as large- such, a Sunni force would be more likely to ly Sunni forces, are best situated to replace secure its coreligionists’ support against ISIS them and govern these Sunni territories.13 and prevent its resurgence in Sunni territo- However, these nationalist groups have been ry. Yet, due to Shia and Iranian opposition, weakened significantly in the past year un- Abadi has struggled to implement a plan to der continuing regime and jihadist attacks.14 build a Sunni-led Regional National Guard Coalition air strikes against ISIS in Syria to fight ISIS.10 Moreover, Iraq appears to be have had some limited military success, kill- moving in the opposite direction. Rath- ing several hundred militants and prevent- er than incorporate Sunnis into the effort ing the group from taking the Kurdish town against ISIS, the fight has been dominated of Kobane.15 Coalition air strikes on ISIS’ oil by Shia militias that appear to be commit- and gas assets have likely hurt its finances ting widespread atrocities against Sunnis.11 and therefore its ability to run a proto-state, These militias are trained, and their opera- albeit at the expense of civilians who de- tions are led by Iran, whom many Iraqi Sun- pended on ISIS for public goods.16 Howev- nis view with deep suspicion.12 If the mili- er, Kobane is not critical to ISIS’ plan, and tias are not demobilized and replaced by a losses there have not visibly affected ISIS’ Sunni-led force, a political reconciliation in overall military posture or capability in Syr-

24 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy ia. Overall, ISIS remains one of the most ists. The air campaign and US government assertive, effective, and adaptable military positions and statements on the Syrian con- actors in Syria. flict threaten the strength and standing of The coalition does not appear to have a moderate Syrian rebels who are likely the strategy for creating effective Sunni part- most effective potential tool against ISIS. ners against ISIS in Syria. In early 2014, ISIS From the start, insurgents dependent on was forced to cede substantial territory to its US support had been chronically under- rebel rivals but later regrouped, consolidat- funded and underresourced, placing them ed, and regained the initiative against them. at a significant disadvantage to extrem- This demonstrated ISIS’ ability to recover ist groups with more dependable support from temporary military setbacks if local ri- streams, some of which came from Tur- vals are unable to hold territory, due in large key, Gulf states, and private donors. After part to unrelenting regime air and artillery announcing its intention to train and equip attacks. Thus, an air campaign without a Syrian fighters, the United States has insist- ground strategy, without allies to provide ed its mission will be fighting jihadists, not reliable intelligence, and without local forc- the regime.21 Syrian fighters and civilians in es able to hold and govern territory is un- opposition-held areas view the regime as the likely to defeat a highly motivated, deeply primary threat, not ISIS and Jabhat al-Nus- embedded militant group that controls re- ra (JAN), and would likely see any fighters sources, population zones, heavy weapons, that target the jihadists but not the regime and territory. The US military has admitted as mercenaries, not liberators. Already, the as much.17 United States’ failure to confront the regime President Obama’s administration has directly or by proxy, and its insistence that publicly stated the need for an effective local Syrians focus on its enemies, not their own, partner against ISIS and has recognized that has created perceptions among civilians and the Syrian regime is not such a partner as fighters alike that it is aligned with the re- it is the driver of, rather than an antidote gime. to, Sunni radicalization.18 It has repeatedly In addition, the coalition has carried promised to arm and train moderate reb- out air strikes against JAN, making Syria’s els, but little has been delivered.19 Even so, moderate rebels JAN’s enemies by associ- as conceived, the White House’s proposed ation.22 This helped put these groups in a train-and-equip program will likely be in- conflict with JAN that the United States sufficient to replicate the moderate rebels’ itself had conceded they were not prepared battlefield successes against ISIS in early for. JAN recognized that it was a US target, 2014 or fill the governance and security vac- that US-aligned rebels would be forced to uums the jihadists have exploited. The pro- contribute to war against it, and that it had gram, which would train 5,000 fighters per better target them before the promised US year, leaves the rebels vastly outnumbered train-and-equip program materialized. In by regime forces and would take five to six October 2014, JAN drove US-aligned reb- years to match ISIS’ current numbers.20 el groups out of their strongholds in Idlib Not only does the coalition lack an ef- province.23 Since then, a rebel group, once fective strategy against ISIS in Syria, but its closely aligned with the United States, has current strategy has set in motion devel- dissolved itself and joined a coalition domi- opments among the Syrian insurgency and nated by Islamists.24 population that are likely to exacerbate the JAN is a jihadist, US-designated terrorist country’s long-term political and security group and not a feasible, long-term Sunni problems and further empower the extrem- partner against ISIS. However, JAN is a po-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 25 tent enemy of ISIS. Therefore, provoking In Syria, on the other hand, it is not even it to attack Syrian moderates weakens the theoretically possible that the current US effort against ISIS. Additionally, target- strategy would substantially weaken ISIS ing JAN without ensuring that moderates in the long run or address the root causes are ready to replace it on the ground only of its emergence. ISIS will probably survive serves to make these territories easy targets for ISIS. Finally, the coalition air campaign has At present, there does not inevitably killed Syrian civilians, whom the appear to be an effective regime also regularly targets.25 Thus, from US plan to strengthen some Syrians’ perspectives, the United States Syrian Sunnis against is fighting jihadists, wants Syrian moderate rebels to do the same, treats the regime as a ISIS; on the contrary, the marginal problem, and refuses to meaning- coalition campaign is fully help moderates fight either ISIS or the undermining that goal. regime. The United States is fueling Syri- an perceptions that it—and the local rebel groups it nominally backs—is helping the and perhaps even thrive as long as its Sunni Syrian regime.26 rivals are weak, and the Syrian state is politically toxic to much of the Syrian Sunni The Outlook in Iraq and Syria population. At present, there does not ap- The historical records in Iraq and Syria pear to be an effective US plan to strengthen and an analysis of local actors’ aims, priori- Syrian Sunnis against ISIS; on the contrary, ties, and capabilities in both countries indi- the coalition campaign is undermining that cate that mobilizing and strengthening ISIS’ goal. Any Sunni-led force would need to be Sunni rivals offers the best chance of weak- able to effectively fight both ISIS and the re- ening and ultimately defeating ISIS, with- gime, as fighting one without the other is out exacerbating the sectarian tensions that operationally not feasible. Fighting only one allowed it to emerge and attract recruits. In side would inevitably lead to the other side Iraq, the coalition strategy does, in theory, taking advantage of any diversion of rebel seek to incentivize and enable Iraqi Sunnis efforts and resources, effectively ensuring to fight ISIS. Admittedly, the mobilization the moderates’ defeat by both. of Iraqi Shia militias directly undermines this. However, it remains possible that Abadi Options for Syria and his allies could foreseeably grant Sunnis Presently, the US policy debate over Syr- a greater political and economic role in Iraq ia revolves around three options. The first (perhaps after the ISIS emergency abates) is the aforementioned train-and-equip pro- and demobilize some of the Shia militias. gram, which in its current proposed form Also, the two major international players in will likely be ineffective. To have results Iraq, the United States and Iran (and indeed against ISIS, it would need to be substan- the Iraqi Shia) have no interest in repeating tially augmented and accelerated and should the ISIS experience in Anbar and Nineveh, enable rebels to defend themselves against though they likely disagree on how best to regime air and artillery attacks as well. Also, avoid that. If the dominant forces in Iraq rather than repeatedly and publicly high- conclude that the solution is greater repres- lighting the weakness of both the train-and- sion of Sunnis, they are unlikely to defeat equip program and the moderate rebels, US the jihadist insurgency. officials should boost their allies’ credibili-

26 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy ty and chances of success by tackling these experiments in the past.30 Ultimately, this is weaknesses instead. A US-led Military Op- the most effective means of preventing ISIS’ erations Command (MoC) based in Jordan reemergence in rebel territory. The “safe has had some success in building strong zone” idea is promising, but there is much moderate insurgent partners in southern ambiguity over how, where, by whom, and Syria, who have been allowed to fight the with which local Syrian partners it would be regime and contain jihadists. The MoC enforced. It is also not clear that the United strategy may be a model for a larger scale States or Turkey would be willing to bear train-and-equip strategy at a national level. the costs and risks of open hostilities against The second option, championed by the Syrian regime. Neither would likely be United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de willing to shoulder the burden without the Mistura, focuses on “freezing” the fight- other’s cooperation. ing in Aleppo, where the regime and ISIS The strategy most likely to result in the threaten to encircle rebel forces. In theory, lasting defeat of ISIS in Syria—and therefore this freeze would allow humanitarian aid in Iraq as well—would combine elements of to reach Aleppo’s besieged population and all three proposals outlined above: a robust, establish a framework for broader cessation coalition-led train-and-equip and advisory of regime-rebel hostilities, freeing both to program; a political negotiation track be- fight ISIS.27 That is possible, but the re- tween rebels and the regime; and the cre- gime may simply redeploy forces against ation and enforcement of a safe zone in rebel rebels elsewhere, leaving them and ISIS to territory, in which opposition groups can fight one another around Aleppo. If so, a organize, build institutions, govern territo- “freeze” in Aleppo would strengthen the ry, and present Syrians and the international regime and weaken the rebellion across community with a credible alternative to Syria. That would ultimately improve ISIS’ both the regime and ISIS. All three are pre- position. Rebel forces are therefore insisting requisites to a broad, fair political settlement that any freeze in Aleppo be accompanied between the regime and Sunni-led opposi- by limits on regime redeployment. It is un- tion. Only such a settlement would allow clear that the regime would accept such an Syrians to focus on fighting ISIS and, ulti- arrangement. The regime has treated pre- mately, addressing the sectarian repression vious ceasefires as localized affairs reached and political dysfunction that gave rise to it. by besieging and starving populations and has simply used them to redeploy resources against rebels elsewhere, rather than as a means to a broader political process and Faysal Itani is a resident fellow with the settlement.28 Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for The United States and Turkey have re- the Middle East. Itani is a Middle East an- portedly discussed a third option: creating a alyst who focuses on the Levant, including “safe zone” along the Syrian-Turkish border, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan. His ex- over which regime aircraft could not oper- pertise includes the conflict in Syria and its ate.29 In the short run, this would offer mod- regional impact, sectarian politics, and po- erate forces relief from regime air strikes and litical economy. Before joining the Atlan- allow them to concentrate their efforts on tic Council, Itani worked as a risk analyst fighting ISIS. In the longer run, it would al- advising governments, corporations, and low rebels to establish governing institutions on Syrian territory, safe from the regime air and artillery attacks that undermined such

2014–2015, Volume IV | 27 international organizations on political, cussion with the author, December 2014. economic, and security affairs in the region. Itani holds an MA in strategic studies and 9 Qassim Abdul-Zahra, “War with Isis: Iraq international economics from the Johns Government Claims Most of Tikrit Is Lib- Hopkins University School of Advanced erated,” The Independent, 12 March 2015. International Studies, a certificate in public policy from Georgetown University, and a 10 Prominent Sunni politician from Anbar BA in business from the American Univer- Province, Iraq, Discussion with the author, sity of Beirut. November 2014.

11 “Absolute Impunity: Militia Rule in Iraq,” Amnesty International, October Endnotes 2014.

1 Jessica Lewis, “The Islamic State of Iraq 12 Caleb Weiss, “Iranian General at the and Al-Sham Captures Mosul and Advances Forefront of the Tikrit Offensive,” The Long Toward Baghdad,” Institute for the Study of War Journal, 5 March 2015. War, 11 June 2014. 13 Roy Gutman, “Al Qaida Fighters Pushed 2 Chris Looney, “Al-Qaeda’s Governance from Much of Northern Syria, But Fighting Strategy in Raqqa,” Syria Comment, 8 De- Still Rages,” McClatchyDC, 5 January 2014. cember 2013; Matthew Levitt, “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State,” Testimony 14 This author uses the term “moderate” to submitted to the House Committee on Fi- refer to those Syrian insurgent groups that nancial Services, 13 November 2014. are not Al-Qaeda affiliates or ISIS, do not seek to impose an Islamist political ideology 3 Liz Sly, “Al-Qaeda Force Captures Fal- by force, and publicly espouse a national- lujah Amid Rise in Violence in Iraq,” The ist agenda. The term “moderate” does not Washington Post, 3 January 2014. imply that a group is ideologically liberal or secular. 4 Yasir Abbas and Dan Trombly, “Inside the Collapse of the Iraqi Army’s 2nd Division,” 15 Julian Borger, “US Claims ISIS Demor- War on the Rocks, 1 July 2014. alised by Heavy Losses from Air Strikes,” The Guardian, 19 December 2014. 5 Mark Wilbanks and Efraim Karsh, “How the ‘Sons of Iraq’ Stabilized Iraq,” The Mid- 16 Kareem Fahim, “Strikes by U.S. Blunt dle East Quarterly Vol. 17, No. 4 (Fall 2010): ISIS But Anger Civilians,” The New York 57–70. Times, 13 November 2014.

6 Prominent Sunni politician from Anbar 17 Gayle Tzemach Lemmon, “Promises of Province, Iraq, Discussion with the author, Syrian Rebel Train-and-Equip Program November 2014. Meet the Battlefield’s Realities,” Defense One, 10 October 2014. 7 “After Tikrit, Iraqi Forces May Turn Back to Baiji: U.S. Official,” Reuters, 2 April 2015. 18 Agence France Presse, “Obama Rules Out Alliance with Assad against ISIS,” The 8 United States Marine Corps general, Dis- Daily Star, 16 November 2014.

28 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 19 Tim Mak, “US Hasn’t Even Started Training Rebel Army to Fight ISIS,” The Daily Beast, 25 November 2014.

20 Maggie Ybarra, “U.S. to Train 5,000 Syrian Rebels to Fight Militants,” The Washington Times, 13 September 2014.

21 Josh Rogin, “Syrian Rebels: We’ll Use US Weapons to Fight Assad, Whether Obama Likes It or Not,” The Daily Beast, 12 September 2014.

22 Kate Brannen, “Exclusive: U.S. Renews Air Campaign Against Khorasan Group,” Foreign Policy, 6 November 2014.

23 Keenan Duffey, “Map: Nusra Cleanses Idlib Province,” Syria Direct, 13 November 2014.

24 Caleb Weiss, “US-Backed Hazm Move- ment Disbands after Al Nusrah Attack,” The Long War Journal, 2 March 2015.

25 “US-led Strikes Have Killed 865 People in Syria, 50 Civilians,” Reuters, 12 Novem- ber 2014.

26 Ruth Sherlock, “US Air Strike on Reb- el Ally Is Helping Assad, Say Syrians,” The Telegraph, 6 November 2014.

27 Senior United Nations diplomatic officer, Discussion with the author, November 2014.

28 Aryn Baker, “Local Ceasefires Are Un- likely to Bring an End to the Syrian War,” TIME, 29 May 2014.

29 United States Marine Corps general, Discussion with the author, December 2014.

30 Ibid.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 29 Diversifying for a Green Future: The Case of the United Arab Emirates

By Muhammed Y. Idris and Joelle Thomas

Abstract

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is unlike any other Middle Eastern country in its vision for a clean energy future. This paper explores the factors that have contributed to the UAE’s successful and burgeoning alternative energy movement. We argue that the abundance of capital from natural resources coupled with the vision of political leadership in the United Arab Emirates provides for an enabling environment in which policies for sustainable diversification away from hydrocarbons can be debated, codified, and implemented. This has led to creative public-private partnerships for power generation, attractive regulations for foreign investment, and an ambitious renewable energy initiative, which are hallmarks of an energy innovation strategy uncommon in settings where oil dominates the economic and political landscape.

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Introduction global competitive position for the national The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is economy in a setting where oil dominates unlike any other Middle Eastern coun- the economic and political landscape. The try in its vision for a clean energy future. UAE government generates 80 percent of Its status as a top oil producer has not en- its revenue from hydrocarbons, and the ticed the UAE to rest on its resource-rich country has one of the highest rates of per laurels. Instead, its creative public-private capita energy consumption in the world. partnerships for power generation, attrac- Yet, rapid economic and demographic tive regulations for foreign investment, and growth over the past decade continue to ambitious renewable energy initiative are strain the country’s electricity grid, partly hallmarks of a national strategy to carve a run on imported natural gas. Furthermore,

30 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy heavy dependence on oil exports and costly ate workforce as well as international firms public subsidy programs threaten the sta- that contribute to development. Moreover, bility of federal government revenues. This the UAE’s capital endowments are sufficient context creates an environment in which a enough to allow it to maintain a long-term diversification of energy sources is critical investment horizon, a prerequisite for the for the UAE’s energy security and econom- development of renewable energy technol- ic outlook, to which the UAE’s alternative ogies and projects. energy program offers promising solutions. While many would argue that natural re- This paper explores the factors that have source wealth allows for such an aggressive contributed to the UAE’s successful and diversification strategy, existing frameworks burgeoning alternative energy movement. allow the UAE to triumph in its energy am- What factors have contributed to the pro- bitions in spite of its resource endowments. gression of the UAE into a hub for renew- One needs to look no further than its GCC able energy growth in the region? First, we neighbors to see that while many states have explore the opportunities presented by its similar endowments, few have significantly natural resource wealth for promoting do- contributed to the promotion of renewable mestic development in key sectors, includ- energy at a global scale. Saudi Arabia, for ing energy. Second, we consider the role of example, accounts for 15.9 percent of world leadership and vision, notably by the late oil reserves and over 90 percent of gov- Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan and his ernment revenues are from hydrocarbons.3 descendants, in translating the vision into Despite announcing a move to build over action. Lastly, we examine elements of an fifty gigawatts of nuclear and solar energy enabling environment that has attracted investment into the renewable energy sector, including human capital, institutions, and The abundance of capital government-led public-private partnerships, from natural resources, with special attention to Masdar and its par- coupled with the vision of ent, Mubadala Development Company. political leadership in the Natural Resource Wealth UAE, creates an enabling Like other states in the Gulf, the United environment where Arab Emirates is a key player on the world policies for sustainable energy scene. It accounts for over 7 percent diversification away from of the world’s proven oil reserves, making it the fifth largest oil producer in the Mid- hydrocarbons can be dle East and third in the Gulf Cooperation debated, codified, and Council (GCC).1 It also accounts for 3 per- implemented. cent of the planet’s natural gas reserves, put- ting it in the top five natural gas suppliers in the region. Conservative estimates suggest capacity in 2012, the projects continue to be that over 85 percent of domestic economic delayed, and no nuclear power plants have activity in the UAE can be attributed to oil been constructed.4 exports and over 80 percent of the govern- As the development of alternative ener- ment’s revenue comes from the hydrocarbon gies attenuates the value of traditional hy- sector.2 These natural resource endowments drocarbons on which MENA (Middle East allow the UAE to remain a tax-free jurisdic- and North Africa) states are largely depen- tion, which attracts a high quality expatri- dent, this is a rational response. Further-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 31 more, the abundance of natural resources An Enabling Environment tends to be associated with a decline in The abundance of capital from natural economic competitiveness and corrupt in- resources, coupled with the vision of po- stitutions designed to funnel revenue from litical leadership in the UAE, creates an endowments into the elite coffers—a phe- enabling environment where policies for nomenon commonly referred to as the “re- sustainable diversification away from hy- source curse.” drocarbons can be debated, codified, and The UAE has seen significant growth implemented. These programs focus on in- in its relatively short history. This growth vestments in human capital and providing has been coupled with the development of an institutional context designed to incen- world-class institutions and suggests that tivize innovation through public-private there are other factors that are important to partnerships for research and development. consider when thinking about UAE lead- In what follows, we focus on policies and ership on the renewable energy front. projects that have allowed the UAE to successfully attract private investments in re- Leadership and Vision newable energy during a period of high oil The late visionary Sheikh Zayed bin prices and regional political instability. Sultan al Nahyan understood that diversification of government revenue sources Human Capital Development beyond oil rents would be essential for For the UAE to meet and exceed its re- long-run development when he helped newable energy targets, they must be able to found the country in 1971. He established identify, train, and attract the human capi- investment funds for oil rents—earmark- tal necessary for research and development, ing money for domestic investments in as well as management of advanced tech- education, healthcare, transportation, nologies, systems, and facilities. By some and infrastructure—but also sought to estimates, this will include 25,000 jobs re- maximize gains by investing abroad. quiring technical experience in the sciences, From a nation of less than 500,000 peo- engineering, and mathematics by 2030.6 As ple, he encouraged the robust growth of this growing need has been acknowledged the manufacturing and services sectors, by analysts and pundits, the political leader- making energy sources and capital read- ship within the UAE has made a concerted ily available, reducing barriers to trade, effort to address any shortfall in qualified and establishing free economic zones. human capital at all levels. Keeping true to his vision for serving the At the highest level, this includes the people of the UAE, he encouraged so- establishment of various forums and exhi- cially responsible growth. “Every factory bitions related to renewable energy, such as small or big must serve the Union. Every the World Future Energy Summit (WFES), project should be directed to the welfare the largest conference of its kind on re- of society. If this is achieved, the com- newable energy, water, and sustainability munity will experience happiness for the through which public and private sector synergy accomplished among each oth- firms and institutions discuss, debate, and er.”5 This leadership is also manifested in showcase cutting-edge solutions in the re- the promotion of women in leadership, newable energy space. For example, this especially on the environment and sus- year’s summit included over 32,000 at- tainability fronts, and can be found in tendees from 170 countries and 900 energy policies that aim to promote private sec- companies from 47 countries.7 Venues like tor innovation. WFES showcase the UAE as a world leader

32 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy in renewable energy and offers opportuni- er, Masdar will continue to support projects ties to attract established high-quality pro- in solar photovoltaic, wind, waste-to-ener- fessionals to renewable energy. Moreover, gy, and solar cooling. the UAE has made investments in estab- Masdar is perhaps best known for its lishing energy-related research and devel- headquarters at Masdar City, the world’s opment centers with specialized graduate degree programs to build domestic human Masdar is perhaps best capital. One good example of this is the Masdar Institute, a joint venture between known for its headquarters the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Masdar City, the world’s and Masdar. first zero-carbon, zero- waste, car-free city, which Institutional Context Above and beyond its investments in uses 20 percent of the human capital, public and private sector energy used by a city actors also recognize the need for an in- fueled on conventional stitutional context that spurs innovation energy of the same size. in renewable energy. In the UAE, this includes, among other things, the creation of The city has the potential enabling institutions and laws, including to house 1,500 clean-tech the establishment of specialized entities, businesses. to incentivize research and development in both the public and private sector. One good example of this effort at work in the first zero-carbon, zero-waste, car-free city, public space is the institutionalization of which uses 20 percent of the energy used innovative practices and tools by requiring by a city fueled on conventional energy of government entities to reduce spending the same size.8 The city has the potential and dedicate savings to research and devel- to house 1,500 clean-tech businesses—cre- opment. This mandate is broad by design, ating a renewable energy research hub of and it funds internal and external programs universities and research facilities devel- such as national training programs and in- oping, piloting, and commercializing new novation incubators. renewable technologies. While there are The UAE has further institutionalized many other initiatives for promoting pri- its vision for a clean energy future by creat- vate sector involvement within the UAE, ing designated institutions for carrying out we conclude our case study of the UAE’s the vision. Masdar is entirely devoted to energy diversification policy by focusing the development of sustainable low-carbon on the creative public-private partnerships energy projects and manages the Masdar that have enabled the state to pursue its am- Initiative—the UAE’s hallmark multibil- bitious renewable energy targets with the lion dollar investment in renewable and support of the private sector. alternative energy and clean technology. Masdar supports innovations in clean en- Public-Private Partnerships ergy technologies from research and devel- In an approach that differs from many opment to commercialization and scale-up other MENA countries, the UAE has by housing laboratories for new technology shaped its energy sector through the in- research and financing new solutions. With volvement of the private sector. Even in an initial focus on concentrating solar pow- traditional oil and gas exploration and

2014–2015, Volume IV | 33 production, the UAE has a history of part- 1 concentrated solar power plant benefited nering with international oil companies— from financing from a syndicate of interna- including BP, Oxy, Shell, and Total—for tional commercial banks, which included the riskiest stages of oil development, rep- BNP Paribas and Société Générale, along- resenting the government’s ability to an- side the National Bank of Abu Dhabi and ticipate and manage risk, work effectively with external partners, and galvanize international expertise. Similarly, in con- Although these public ventional electricity generation and water funds drive investment desalination, the UAE has partnered with into the UAE’s burgeoning international power project developers— including GDF Suez (France), SembCorp renewable energy sector, (Singapore), KEPCO (Korea), and Tokyo having the government Electric Power (Japan)—to attract over $17 as the main driver of billion in foreign investment and assume alternative energy the risks of operating and maintaining the power plants. investment comes with Policies to encourage foreign investment disadvantages. and involvement have propelled the country’s ranking on the World Bank’s Doing Business index to 33 out of 183 for 2012.9 is supported in partnership with developers For example, in Dubai, companies incor- Abengoa Solar and Total. porated in free economic zones enjoy 100 Despite the attractive investment op- percent foreign ownership and expatriation portunities for private firms at Masdar, the of capital and profits, full exemption from lion’s share of renewable energy develop- import/export income and corporate taxes, ment is financed by the UAE’s four invest- and low-cost operations coupled with a one- ment companies—all majority-owned by stop shop service that eliminates red tape and the state. These government-backed en- facilitates quick and easy business registra- tities include the Mubadala Development tion. Equally interesting work is being done Company, the International Petroleum to encourage innovation within the private Investment Company, the Abu Dhabi In- sector. One policy that promotes innovation vestment Council, and the Abu Dhabi In- is the designation of innovation zones gov- vestment Authority. The Abu Dhabi In- erned by special rules and regulations, investment Authority is one of the world’s cluding foreign ownership, tax exemptions, largest sovereign wealth funds with $627 and labor assistance. These terms have made billion in assets invested in infrastructure the UAE an attractive destination for estab- and development projects within the UAE lishing headquarters for research and devel- and abroad, including in conventional and opment operations. renewable energy projects. The investment These services are particularly salient groups are able to channel government for renewable energy developers interested funds into infrastructure projects through in benefiting from the laboratory research effective partnering with the private sec- and development facilities in Masdar City, tor at the global level. For example, Masdar which simultaneously serves as an incuba- Power, a Masdar subsidiary, has established tor of new technologies. Commercial banks a joint venture with Spanish-based engi- are also attracted by the UAE’s renewable neering firm SENER to develop, demon- energy projects; the 100 megawatt Shams strate, and deploy next-generation, con-

34 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy centrating solar power technologies. Muhammed Y. Idris is a research fellow Although these public funds drive in- at the Middle East Initiative within the vestment into the UAE’s burgeoning re- Belfer Center for Science and International newable energy sector, having the gov- Affairs at the John F. Kennedy School of ernment as the main driver of alternative Government at Harvard University, where energy investment comes with disadvan- his research focuses on the political econ- tages. Government control of bidding omy of the Middle East and North Africa. processes are often plagued by special in- Joelle Thomas is a Master in Public Poli- terests leading to economically inefficient cy candidate at the John F. Kennedy School outcomes. For example, project developers of Government at Harvard University. bidding on construction projects of solar generation plants are required to use Mas- dar-developed technology instead of their own, leading firms to invest more in pol- Endnotes itics than innovation. Oil and gas developers with existing relationships with the 1 “United Arab Emirates Profile,” US En- state are also cautious, forgoing opportu- ergy Information Administration, accessed nities to bid on solar projects in favor of January 2015. maintaining a relationship with Abu Dhabi and access to the energy sources. 2 “Statistical Review of World Energy,” Despite these challenges, the UAE’s pivot British Petroleum, June 2013. towards green energy would not have been possible without government support. New 3 “Saudi Arabia Profile,” US Energy Infor- renewable technologies have high initial mation Administration, accessed January costs, and a long time is needed to recover 2015. the investment. Therefore, they require reg- ulatory and financial support from govern- 4 “Saudi Arabia’s Nuclear, Renewable En- ment at the initial phases. Government sup- ergy Plans Pushed Back,” Reuters, 19 Janu- port will be necessary to take new products ary 2015. through development and decrease the cost as a result of economies of scale.10 5 Hamad Ali Hasan Alhosani, “The Po- Finally, in order to promote a real piv- litical Thought of the Late H.H. Sheikh ot towards a green energy future, the UAE Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan, Founder of must roll back subsidies on power and wa- the United Arab Emirates (1966–2004)” ter. These subsidies give citizens the im- (doctoral thesis, Durham University, 2011), pression that both are abundant resources, 82. promoting overconsumption as opposed to environmental conscientiousness and 6 Thilanka Sooriyaarachchi and Toufic conservation. Currently, the UAE spends Mezher, “UAE’s Renewable Energy Goals about $2,500 per person in subsidies for Depend on Skilled Workforce,” The Na- fossil fuel consumption, making it eighth tional, 29 June 2014. in the world for largest subsidies.11 Low oil prices in early 2015 present an opportuni- 7 “Leading the Debate on Future Energy ty to reduce subsidies, which is both good and Sustainability,” Abu Dhabi Sustain- policy and sends a message to the public ability Week, 2015, 14. that conservation is critical for a green energy future. 8 “Masdar Initiative Supports Clean Ener-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 35 gy,” Embassy of the United Arab Emirates, accessed 23 February 2015.

9 “Doing Business 2012,” The World Bank, 2012, 6.

10 Zoheir Hamedi, “Energy Transition in Rentier States: A Multi-Level Perspective,” in Political Economy of Energy Reform: The Clean Energy-Fossil Fuel Balance in the Gulf, eds. Giacomo Luciani and Rabia Ferroukhi (London: Gerlach Press, 2013), 109.

11 Vijo Varkey Theeyattuparampil et al., “Clean Energy Solution Choices for the Power Industry in the GCC,” in Political Economy of Energy Reform: The Clean Ener- gy-Fossil Fuel Balance in the Gulf States, eds. Giacomo Luciani and Rabia Ferroukhi (London: Gerlach Press, 2013), 215.

36 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy The Arab Uprisings and Their External Dimensions: Bringing Migration In

By Tamirace Fakhoury

Abstract

The 2011 Arab uprisings and their aftermath have highlighted the links between transnational and local politics.1 Still, the extent to which these transformations have diasporic dimensions has commanded little policy and research attention.2 This article puts forward observations as to whether—and if so, how—we can assess the impact of Arab migration on the post-2011 transformations in the Middle East. It draws on the findings I have reached as a result of my field research focusing on the activist politics of Egyptian, Syrian, Libyan, and Yemeni communities since 2011. The research was carried out in the United States, Germany, and Lebanon. Online interviews were also carried out with activists in England. The article calls for factoring in the consequences of migration on post-Arab Spring political change through a twofold prism. On one hand, Arab world out-migration dynamics and diaspora politics affect the balance of power among contending factions in Arab nation-states. On the other, states that receive migrants from the Arab world become de facto players in the Arab geopolitical landscape. Migration generates political linkages, making it impossible to disentangle local configurations of power from transboundary and global ones.

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Growing Prevalence and Influence of Africa and the Levant, a percentage that is Arab Migration Trends twice as high as the world average.3 Not- In recent years, Arab emigration has withstanding such significant patterns of been growing. Arab expatriates consti- out-migration, the impact of Arab emi- tute approximately 6 percent of the local gration on domestic political systems has population in the countries across North not been operationalized. Since the nine-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 37 teenth century, nationals from the Arab ars and policymakers often pay little atten- world have migrated—for predominantly tion to the linkages between Arab migra- economic and political reasons—to various tion and the politics of democratization or destination regions, namely to the Gulf, authoritarianism. Europe, North America, and Latin Ameri- Though the picture remains blurred, ca. To date, we know little about their ori- both political dissenters and regime sup- entations and activities.4 For instance, we porters in exile have historically sought to do not know much at all about the profile forge a politics of claims-making: dissenters of migrant categories that have sought to in exile have promoted anti-regime activ- strengthen pro-regime networks and those ities through lobbying, protests, publica- that have sought to expose the cracks in tions, etc.7 Regime supporters have sought their origin countries’ regimes. to reinforce pro-regime loyalties through Contemporary scholarship has estab- cooperative channels with their homeland’s lished interrelationships between migra- incumbents or with other transnational tion and politics.5 Immigrant communi- loyalist groups. ties affect transformations “back home” Arab regimes have themselves drawn on the “migration card” to reinforce their power base. Governmental institutions in Both political dissenters Egypt or Morocco have sought to retain and regime supporters power over their diasporas by externalizing in exile have historically a state-defined form of Islam, through financing mosques and Muslim associations sought to forge a politics abroad.8 Countries such as Syria, Libya, Al- of claims-making: geria, and Tunisia have forced opposition dissenters in exile have actors to leave or have kept dissenters in the promoted anti-regime diasporic pool at bay.

activities through lobbying, Diverse Forms of Influential Arab Di- protests, publications, etc. asporic Activisms Regime supporters have The 2011 Arab wave of contention and sought to reinforce pro- its aftermath have had marked diasporic features and ramifications whose signifi- regime loyalties through cance ought to be assessed.9 Here, I sketch cooperative channels tentative observations arising from my field with their homeland’s research since 2011. incumbents or with other My research shows that those communities engaged in a wide repertoire of online transnational loyalist and offline activism. Libyans in the United groups.. States and in England have sought to provide alternative media accounts of events in Libya. They have carried out teach-ins through external voting, the funding of and presentations on the history of “Libya political agendas, or return migration. under Ghaddafi.” They have further pro- They also circulate either pro-democratic vided “contact points” for locals in case of or pro-authoritarian norms.6 internet breakdown. Some have returned Still, for all the debate on the relation- to Libya to provide humanitarian assistance ship between migration and politics, schol- or assist refugees along the Tunisian-Syrian

38 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy border. Many have established diaspo- have set up initiatives to count the dead and ra-based civil society organizations (CSOs) report human rights violations to interna- that have engaged in activities such as gau- tional organizations. Many have lobbied in ging expatriates’ perceptions on constitu- capitals such as Washington and London tion writing. Egyptian activists helped in various ways to sustain the momentum of con- Both local and diasporic tention in Tahrir Square. For instance, as political factions have Egyptian authorities disabled the Inter- established contact net for five days beginning on 28 January 2011, activists in the United States contri- with sympathizers in buted to circumventing the crackdown on the diaspora during the social media by maintaining contact with 2011 uprisings and their locals through landlines and diffusing in- aftermath. Actors—be formation through other means. In 2012, Egyptian expatriates were actively enga- they secular, Islamist, or ged in orchestrating the global campaign supporters of the ancien for external voting rights. Since then, a régime—have sought myriad of epistemic and artistic communi- to shift the scale of ties in America and Germany have collabo- rated with Egyptian locals in codesigning contention to regional and projects geared towards safeguarding “the transnational avenues. 2011 legacy.” Although Yemeni diasporic communities had been relatively unmobilized in for more articulate foreign policy stances the last decades, they experienced a tem- vis-à-vis the war-ravaged country. Thou- porary upsurge of activism in the United gh diasporic momentum has subsided since Kingdom and the United States when the 2013, Syrian activists in cities such as Ber- Arab Spring began. For instance, activists lin and Hamburg seek to reinvigorate what based in the United Kingdom orchestrated they qualify as a “waning diasporic activi- aid campaigns to support local opposition sm.” They stage pilot projects and work- actors during the 2011 uprising, engaged shops with a view to debating which forms with policymakers, and deliberated on of cultural and political participation may avenues to participate in the 2013–2014 yield results for their embattled homeland. Yemeni National Dialogue Conference. Still, assuming that diasporas have en- In the United States, for instance, Yemeni gaged only in forms of political resistance youth activists staged information campai- provides a reductionist picture. The nature gns on ways to participate in domestic af- and scope of diasporic interaction with do- fairs through education, civil activism, and mestic politics remains very diverse, and a political leadership. According to some of systematic appraisal of its various forms is my respondents, it is hoped that empowe- needed. ring communities living outside of Yemen My research shows that both local and may serve as a catalyst for longer term poli- diasporic political factions have established tical transformations. contact with sympathizers in the diaspora Despite Syria’s complex conflict dyna- during the 2011 uprisings and their after- mics, Syrian communities in the United math. Actors—be they secular, Islamist, Kingdom, Germany, and the United States or supporters of the ancien régime—have

2014–2015, Volume IV | 39 sought to shift the scale of contention to indirectly impacts the political landscape regional and transnational avenues. Still, back home. It may signal legitimation or we know little about the “transnational contempt for transition Arab governments migrant circuits”10 through which such and for key political actors in the region. contacts are woven and about which host For instance, political refugees escaping the governments have been receptive to their ongoing turmoil in Syria, Iraq, or Egypt politics of claims-making. The extent to have been welcomed, marginalized, or which transnational Islam has cross-bor- tracked in accordance to their sect and po- der roots has been well documented.11 litical orientations and in accordance with Yet, the literature is scarce in findings on the extent to which the country of recep- whether—and if so, how—secular Arab tion sympathizes or shuns the new regimes migrant groups have crafted their politics that have replaced old autocracies. In an of dissent prior to the 2011 uprisings. Also, effort to mend ties with the Sisi regime while many articles have documented how in Egypt, Qatar exiled Egyptian Muslim contenders in diaspora have cheered the Brotherhood leaders in 2014 that sought 2011 revolutions, the activities of pro-regi- refuge in Qatar following the fall of the me and Islamist expatriate actors received Morsi government. In the wake of a de- less media attention during the same time epening “post-spring” cleavage between period. Shiites and Sunnis, the expulsion of Leba- It is worth adding that diaspora politics nese Shiites from the United Arab Emirates shapes Arab political regimes in various in March 2015 sends an ominous message convoluted—albeit underresearched— to Hezbollah regarding its military role in ways. For instance, as the Tunisian case re- Syria. It further highlights that securitizing veals, political trends within diaspora com- migration has become a central feature of munities have had bearing through exter- governance. nal voting on the local balance of power The policies of the host society may fur- between secular and Islamist groups.12 ther dampen or exacerbate the perceptions Economic remittances that diasporas send of marginality that exiled actors harbor to locals may strengthen resistance but also over time, impacting the way these actors provoke reprisals. My conversations show draw on their receiving context as a plat- that when Egyptian expatriates fund local form for “long-distance nationalism.” The projects of political resistance, this spurs the selection procedures and forms of hospi- regime to crack down on dissidents. tality that host societies practice, vis-à-vis post-Arab Spring refugees, may be expect- The Country of Reception and the ed to shape their political consciousness Impact of New and Longstanding and forms of mobilization. For example, Refugees refugee inflows to Germany from Syria Notwithstanding forms of Arab activ- and Iraq have lately caused contentious de- ism in exilic spheres, the 2011 uprisings bates on their integration into the urban have generated new waves of refugees and social fabric. This has coincided with the impacted the international governance of rise of the right-wing Pegida movement in migration. The country of reception has Dresden, making the issue a hotbed public become a key agent shaping the terrain of item. Arab politics through its own policies. Ambivalent and ad hoc practices of The politics of hospitality (or lack there- host societies may also add another layer of) that receiving contexts adopt, vis-à-vis of complexity to the protracted nature of categories of refugees and political exiles, post-2011 conflicts and their spillovers. In

40 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Lebanon, where society is divided along is unrealistic to study the terrain of Islamist pro-Asad or anti-Asad sympathies, the in- politics in today’s Syria without accounting corporation of Syrian refugees in different for their cross-border and diasporic roots. communities has been conditioned by their We are called upon to account for the background and political allegiances. myriad ways through which migration concomitantly interacts with Arab state Spillovers of Post-Uprisings Political structures and with global politics. Arab Crises through the Migration Lens world diasporas often reproduce the same In yet another perspective, countries of cleavages along which local Arab commu- reception have lately become the theater nities are organized. They affect inter- and for some post-uprisings political crises. Migrant groups have replicated domestic conflicts through the prism of protests Arab world diasporas and clashes in cityscapes such as Hamburg, often reproduce the same Celle, and Hannover.13 In the context of cleavages along which the Syrian conflict and the ascent of ISIS, immigrant forms of protest have refracted local Arab communities are the various ways through which politicized organized. forms of religion (e.g., Sunni Islam versus Alevism in post-2011 Syria) acquire new political salience in diaspora. Confronta- intra-state conflicts through sending re- tions pitting Islamist groups against Yaze- mittances and transmitting political norms dis and Kurds in Hamburg in light of ISIS back home. They project overseas forms of attacks on Mosul and Kobane are a case in political consciousness bound to affect their point. In October 2014, for example, the host society’s social landscape, foreign pol- Kurdish community organized a demon- icy, and international relations. stration in the vicinity of a Sunni mosque However, it would be simplistic to dis- in Hamburg, denouncing ISIS offensives miss diasporic spheres as platforms for con- in the northern parts of Iraq and Syria. It flict exacerbation. They are rather inter- was reported back then that Kurdish dem- locutors for gauging the interdependencies onstrators ended up clashing with so-called between the local and global. Also, the var- “radical Islamists,” conjuring fears that the ious ways through which diasporas such as conflict “back home” had spread to Ham- Tunisian communities have promoted de- burg. mocratization should not be discounted.14 Any policy discussion related to “post- Policy Implications of Arab Migration spring” transformations cannot but deve- The Arab state remains the primary ter- lop a migration-related agenda. Questions rain for the reenactment of political and with which experts are called to grapple conflict dynamics between contenders for are manifold: How have different Arab power. Yet, fully delimiting the theatri- emigration waves affected the local balance cal stage of Arab uprisings requires look- of power between regime and opposition ing beyond “bounded communities” and actors? Has out-migration benefited or state-confined concepts of the political. For backfired on local authoritarianism? Has it instance, gaining insights into the way Tu- drained the reservoir of pro-democratic re- nisian social movements drove change in sources from the Arab state? To what extent 2011 requires reconstructing their alliances have migrants rearticulated forms of polit- with Tunisia’s diasporic spheres. Further, it ical sectarianism? What are the circum-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 41 stances under which migration flows and 5 Jonathon W. Moses, “Emigration and their governance affect the “post-spring” Political Development: Exploring the Na- geopolitical field, making it impossible to tional and International Nexus,” Migra- separate local from transboundary drivers tion and Development Vol. 1, Issue 1 (2012): of change? 123–137. Such are some of the questions that ought to guide the international debate on 6 Stefan Rother, “Changed in Migration? Arab migration, one that considers the im- Philippine Return Migrants and (Un) portance of migrant communities beyond Democratic Remittances,” European Journal security and labor prisms. of East Asian Studies Vol. 8, No. 2 (2009): 245–274.

7 Christoph Schumann, “Political ‘Articu- Tamirace Fakhoury is an assistant pro- lation’ in the Diaspora: Media, Language, fessor of political science at the Lebanese and ‘Dialogue’ in the Case of Arab-Amer- American University. Recipient of the Al- icans,” Diaspora: A Journal of Transnational exander von Humboldt Fellowship, she is Studies Vol. 13, No. 2/3 (2004): 307–330. currently carrying out research on the nexus between Arab migration and politics at 8 Jonathan Laurence, “The 21st-Century the German Institute of Global and Area Impact of European Muslim Minorities Studies in Hamburg. on ‘Official Islam’ in the Muslim-Majority World,” Philosophy and Social Criticism Vol. 40, No. 4–5 (2014): 449–458.

Endnotes 9 Teresa Graziano, “The Tunisian Diaspo- ra: Between ‘Digital Riots’ and Web Ac- 1 Maha Abdelrahman, “The Transnation- tivism,” Social Science Information Vol. 51, al and the Local: Egyptian Activists and No. 4 (2012): 534–550; Anja Wollenberg Transnational Protest Networks,” British and Jason Pack, “Rebels with a Pen: Ob- Journal of Middle Eastern Studies Vol. 38, Is- servations on the Newly Emerging Media sue 3 (2011): 407–424. Landscape in Libya,” The Journal of North African StudiesVol. 18 Issue 2 (2013): 191– 2 François Burgat, Opening of the Interna- 210. tional Conference on the Role of Diaspo- ras, Migrants, and Exiles in 10 Roger Rouse, “Mexican Migration and the Social Space of Postmodernism,” Dias- the Arab Revolutions and Political Transi- pora: A Journal of Transnational Studies Vol. 1, tions, Tunis, Tunisia, 16 October 2014. No. 1 (1991): 8–23.

3 Philippe Fargues, “International Migra- 11 Dale F. Eickelman, “Trans-state Islam tion and the Nation State in Arab Coun- and Security,” in Transnational Religion and tries,” Middle East Law and Governance Vol. Fading States, eds. 5, Issue 1–2 (2013): 5–35. Susanne H. Rudolph and James Piscatori 4 Louise Cainkar, “New Texts Out Now: (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 27–46. Louise Cainkar, Global Arab World Migra- tions and Diasporas,” Jadaliyya, 22 May 2013. 12 Thibaut Jaulin, “Mapping Exter-

42 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy nal Voting: the 2011 Tunisian Election Abroad” (conference paper presented at workshop on Arab Expatriates and Revolt in their Homeland, Harvard University, June 2013).

13 “Reactions to Riots in Hamburg, Celle,” Deutsche Welle, 8 October 2014.

14 Sari Hanafi, “The Arab Revolutions: Who Are the Actors?” Global Dialogue, 7 May 2011.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 43 A Corridor for Egypt’s Economic Development

By Farouk El-Baz

Abstract

Since the dawn of history, Egypt’s population has been confined to the Nile Valley and its Delta, less than 6 percent of its total area. During the past century, the population increased from 15 to 80 million. It is estimated that by 2050, it will top 140 million. Thus, there is a dire need to increase the livable area. The proposed Development Corridor opens twice as much land for expansion just west of the inhabited region. It continues for 1,200 km from the Mediterranean Sea coastline west of Alexandria to the border with Sudan. Its basic components are an eight-lane highway, a railroad for transport of goods and people, an electricity line to be powered by solar energy, and a water pipeline from Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam. A preliminary study indicates that the Corri- dor would require $24 billion to be completed in ten years. It adds 10.5 million acres of land for agriculture, new communities, industrial parks, entertainment complexes, transportation, tourism, etc. Most significantly, it would employ millions of Egyptian youths and open new vistas for them to innovate and forge a better future.

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Throughout history, civilization has blos- In Egypt today, all three components somed in any region where a people’s col- are largely missing. The uprising in Janu- lective action has resulted in: (1) production ary 2011 and the upheavals that followed of excess food for the growth of bodies and proved a general sense of dissatisfaction and minds; (2) division of labor in a fair and or- a rejection of the status quo. The situation ganized manner; and (3) comfortable living on the ground today falls short of assuring in urban areas, where individuals would be younger generations of a better future. It able to create and innovate. will not change on the ground unless steps

44 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy are taken to assure better development vast tracts of fertile soils that are amenable schemes that would benefit large segments to reclamation; most of such regions have of the fast-growing population. The pro- potential for groundwater resources. This posed “Development Corridor” provides strip is also comparatively free of sandy ar- an innovative solution to this problem. eas and is not crossed by lines of shifting The first requirement for expansion dunes as in the case of regions farther west. outside of the Nile banks and its Delta is The proposed Corridor includes the fol- adequate transportation.1 Since the estab- lowing: (1) a superhighway with the high- lishment of the Egyptian state over 5,000 est international standards at 1,200 km in years ago, the Nile has served as an integral length, going from west of Alexandria to mechanism for transporting people, news, the southern border of Egypt; (2) at least products, armies, and tax collectors—all twelve east–west branches, approximately hallmarks of a unified, sustainable state. 800 km in length, to connect the highway Today, it is not possible to foresee the establishment of a modern network of transportation systems within the confines of Such an initiative would the Nile Valley and its Delta, because that limit urban encroachment would significantly reduce precious agri- upon agricultural land cultural land. Thus, it is imperative to open and open a myriad of new vistas for expansion outside of the inhabited strip. opportunities for new The Corridor introduces a plan for a su- communities close to perhighway along a strip of land just west overpopulated towns. of the inhabited, heavily populated areas of Egypt that are currently centered on the banks of the Nile. Such an initiative would to high-density population centers along limit urban encroachment upon agricul- the way; (3) a railroad for fast transport tural land and open a myriad of opportuni- which runs parallel to the superhighway; ties for new communities close to overpop- (4) a water pipeline from Lake Nasser for ulated towns. It opens unlimited space for human use of freshwater; and (5) an elec- new schools and training centers, industrial tricity line to supply energy during the ear- zones, trade centers, and tourism. It would ly phases of development. provide virgin territory for development initiatives in every field. This in itself gives 1. North–South Highway hope to the new generations of Egyptians As previously mentioned, the main su- for a better future. It represents the best perhighway runs parallel to the Nile River possible use of the country’s land resources. from Egypt’s Mediterranean Sea coastline This particular strip of land was chosen to its border with Sudan. Its distance from because of its unique natural characteris- the western scarp of the Nile Valley var- tics. It is basically flat with a gentle north- ies from ten to eighty kilometers, based ward slope from west of the southern city on the nature of the crossed land. It begins of Aswan to the coast of the Mediterranean near El-Alamein, perhaps at El-Hamman, Sea. The lack of topographic prominences for the establishment of a new interna- makes it easy to pave and build upon. It tional port. Egypt requires a technologi- is also devoid of east–west crossing valleys cally advanced port to serve future needs that are prone to flashfloods, as in the case of importation and exportation as well as of the eastern Nile bank. It passes close to increased trade with Europe and the ex-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 45 pansion of maritime transport worldwide. road and its maintenance, as well as to be In the meantime, the northern branch of responsible for manning the toll stations, the superhighway extends to Alexandria providing emergency services, and main- and its present port and airport; it also ex- taining the utility of the superhighway. tends eastward through the northern strip Naturally, such an organization requires a of the Nile Delta. The superhighway ends specific mandate and clear laws and regula- near the border with Sudan to form a link tions that would assure its safety, authority, between the two countries, as well as far- and utility. ther south in Africa. These characteristics would require a 2. East–West Connectors private sector organization to manage the Branches of the main highway are

46 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy roughly oriented east–west and should be to allow for more robust development of established prior to the north–south high- the iron deposits and other natural resourc- way to allow for timely urban expansion. es within that large natural geological de- They are designed to connect the north– pression. south highway to all major centers of pop- Minya Branch: This city has been one ulation; similarly, they assure easy trans- of Egypt’s major population centers since port between the main cities of Egypt and ancient times. However, little development between the main agricultural production has reached its shores because of the cen- areas and the outside world. As shown in tralization of projects in and around Cairo. Figure 1, these include the following from It has a university and can generate numer- north to south: ous avenues for local and regional develop- Alexandria Branch: This branch connects ment if it is better connected to the nation- the main north–south highway to the road al market. leading to Alexandria as well as to its port Asyut Branch: This case is identical to the and airport. The eastern terminus of this former. Additionally, Asyut has an airport branch would connect with roads leading that could be upgraded for international to the northern cities and towns of the Nile transport. It is also the end point of the road Delta coastal zone. that leads to the New Valley Governorate. Delta Branch: This connects the super- Qena Branch: This connector would highway with the heart of the Nile Del- open agricultural development south of the ta, particularly at the city of Tanta. The Nile bend and all the way to the Western branch would be optimized through the Desert plateau. Its plain originated as fan construction of an elevated, new road deposits of streams that were more active within the Delta to limit encroachment on during wetter climates in the geological fertile land. It would also require a bridge past; therefore, groundwater resources po- built over the Rosetta Branch of the Nile tentially underlie it. River. From its terminal point at Tanta, it Luxor Branch: This branch would allow links with presently existing roads to loca- for unlimited growth of tourism and recre- tions throughout the region. ation on the plateau that overlooks the larg- Cairo Branch: This branch connects the est concentration of ancient Egyptian ar- superhighway with the Cairo-Alexandria chaeological sites, which constitute a third road and eastward to the densely populated of all the world heritage sites. region around Cairo. This would also al- Kom Ombo-Aswan Branch: Here, over low the use of cargo land transport between 735,000 acres of reclaimable fertile land lie Alexandria and Suez as an alternative to the west of the Nile. The region once hosted Suez Canal when the need arises. channels that brought in water from East- Faiyum Branch: This connector would ern Desert highlands. Segments of these be ideal for future solar energy generation ancient watercourses were recently re- as it lies along a flat plain that is part of vealed by radar images from space. These a perfectly level, sand-free limestone sur- former rivers deposited fertile soils more face. It would cover an area equivalent to than three meters in thickness. The Devel- over 2,500 square kilometers, which would opment Corridor, located along its western be sufficient for generating more than all border, would link the vast region to the the energy needs of Egypt via solar power rest of the country, both for attracting labor alone. and distributing products and goods to the Bahariya Branch: This branch would im- rest of the country. prove the existing road to a series of oases Toshka Branch: The superhighway goes

2014–2015, Volume IV | 47 through a depression, where a canal from human consumption at fuel stations, hotels, Lake Nasser has created several lakes. The and other areas requiring water. A pipe of area is devoid of an adequate transportation approximately one meter in diameter would infrastructure. The superhighway would likely provide the necessary resources. provide all necessary mechanisms to trans- The total length of the required pipe- port people, material, and products to and line is about 1,100 km. This is less than half from the region. that of the Great Man-Made River system Lake Nasser Branch: This connector is at in Libya. In that case, the main pipeline is a site that is amenable to the development four meters in diameter, is buried under of a major fishing port along the shores of seven meters of soil, and carries water from Lake Nasser to the north (downstream) of numerous wells in the south to the coastal Abu Simbel. Plentiful fish from the lake zone with a total length of more than 2,000 could be transported to distribution centers km. In comparison, the proposed pipeline throughout Egypt. is neither technically difficult nor economically taxing to accomplish. 3. Modern Railway Freshwater would need to be pumped Egypt’s railway system was among the from the surface level of Lake Nasser up first in the world. It was established in 1854 to the plateau, in several stages totaling and has been somewhat upgraded since approximately 300 meters; it would flow then. However, a much more advanced rail- northward along the topographic gradient road system is necessary to serve present and without any consumption of energy. Water future development needs, and a rail track flow down-gradient might even be usable parallel to the superhighway would serve to produce mechanical energy to generate that purpose. That north–south track would electricity. be connected to others along the east–west roads to assure ease of transport of goods and 5. Electricity Line people throughout the country. Initial phases of the proposed Corri- The superhighway ends at the southern dor require energy for manufacturing, border of Egypt, a short segment of road lighting, and refrigeration, among oth- would connect it to the shores of Lake Nass- ers. Therefore, the project requires a line er at the northern border of Sudan. Pres- to supply electricity. At the outset, power ently, there is a railroad that connects the could be supplied by any one of the genera- border at Wadi Halfa with towns of eastern tion plants along the Nile Valley as deemed Sudan along the Red Sea. Thus, it would appropriate. In the meantime, urban com- facilitate transport between Egypt and the munities, industrial plants, and agricultural main cities and towns of Sudan, and poten- farms would be encouraged to utilize so- tially to other countries in East Africa. lar and/or wind energy resources as much as possible. However, in a later phase, 4. Water Pipeline solar-generated power could be a main No long-term development could be as- source of energy all along the Corridor as sured without the presence of freshwater. well as throughout Egypt. Several areas along the path of the east– west connectors promise the existence of Project Benefits groundwater, which could be used for ag- It is important to evaluate the pros and ricultural purposes. However, a pipeline cons of such a massive project. In this case, of freshwater from Lake Nasser is required it is difficult to think of any drawbacks from to run the length of the superhighway for environmental or socioeconomic points of

48 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy view. There is, however, a question of how munities, agriculture, industry, trade, and long it would take to secure a return on the tourism along a strip of land, at least 2,000 investment of such elaborate infrastructure. km long, close to the presently inhabited This question can only be answered by areas. a detailed economic feasibility study, best This is particularly timely because the undertaken by expert consulting com- country is presently facing insurmountable panies or organizations with inputs from problems of overcrowding in all major cit- global the academic community. ies combined with the lack of opportunities That being said, it is possible to list the for younger generations. Due to the finan- benefits of the proposed project as follows: cial difficulties facing the Egyptian government today, such a project would ideally be 1. Arresting dangerous urban encroach- led by the private sector, perhaps through ment on precious agricultural land local Arab and international investors. throughout Egypt It might be feasible to initiate a corpo- 2. Opening new land for land reclama- rate body that would issue bonds—first in tion and the production of food Egypt, and then in the Arab world—fol- 3. Establishing new areas for urban and lowed by a call to international banks and industrial growth near large cities investment institutions. Perhaps the guid- 4. Creating vast numbers of job opportu- ing principle would be that no profit would nities for the country’s prosperity be expected until the completion of the 5. Reducing environmental deteriora- infrastructure, which some experts suggest tion throughout the Nile Valley would require ten years. That said, there 6. Relieving the existing road network might be better scenarios to be put forward from heavy and dangerous transport by knowledgeable people in this regard. 7. Initiating new ventures in tourism and Finally, it would be advisable to involve ecotourism all along the Corridor the youth of Egypt in the process. Uni- 8. Connecting the Lake Nasser region versity students could compete for prizes and its projects with the rest of the to recommend projects on either side of country the east–west roads. High school students 9. Creating a large physical environment could be given opportunities to compete in for economic projects by the private naming these east–west branches and the sector new towns and villages to be established 10. Involving the population at large in along them. In having large numbers of the development of the country people become involved in the project, it 11. Offering Egypt’s youth an opportunity would have a better chance for being per- to take part in rebuilding their country ceived as a “national project:” one that the 12. Focusing people’s energy on produc- whole society would own and protect. tive initiatives that would lead to a better future

Method of Execution Farouk El-Baz is the director of the Cen- The proposed Development Corridor ter for Remote Sensing at Boston Univer- concerns the expansion of the living area sity. He is recognized for his role in the in Egypt parallel to the Nile Delta in the selection of landing sites and the training north and all along the Nile River in the of astronauts for the Apollo missions to the south. It would provide numerous oppor- moon. He is a member of the US National tunities for the development of new com- Academy of Engineering, and the Geolog-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 49 ical Society of America has established an award for desert research in his name.

Endnotes

1 NB: All references to research that contributed to informing this project were gathered under the auspices of Dr. Mo- hamed Fathi Sakr, the National Project Di- rector for Development Planning Division Support at the Egyptian Ministry of Eco- nomic Development. All facts were delivered to a Ministerial Committee convened by the Prime Minister in 2006 (including the Ministers of Economic Development, Transportation, the Environment, Elec- tricity, and International Cooperation). The government’s internal document, submitted by the group of experts, was completed in late 2009. The report (in Arabic) has not been published.

50 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy The Hijacking of Algerian Identity

By Kheireddine Bekkai

Abstract

Over half a century after its independence from France, Algeria is still struggling with its identity. The long French colonial occupation left Algerians with many questions regarding their language, their history, and their overall sense of belonging. Algerian identity has been defined in various ways throughout the occupation and after the independence and is still being redefined at present. This article focuses on how the successive leaders in Algeria have dealt and are dealing with the issue of identity in the country. It will also narrate the steps that have been taken in order to fabricate and implement an Algerian identity, also shedding light on recent developments.

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Both French and post-independence Al- mathematics because of its past (and to an gerian rulers imposed a simplistic, narrow extent, current) prominence as the lan- definition of identity on Algeria. These guage of instruction of such subjects in the choices were dictated by ideologies associ- Algerian education system.1 This percep- ated with colonization and Pan-Arabism, tion is bolstered by the notion that there marginalizing other key components of is a greater amount of information on the Algerian identity. In doing so, both the subjects available in French. This is to be colonizer and the dictator were able to ef- compared with Arabic, which has consis- fectively maintain power in pitting cultur- tently been taught and perceived as the lan- al, linguistic, and ethnic facets of Algerian guage of philosophy and literature. Tama- identity against the other. This strategy zight, for its part, was rarely taught until generated a certain complex vis-á-vis cer- the late 1980s. tain languages—especially, but not limited Government officials in Algeria have to, French. French is considered by Alge- long pursued a unique policy in building rians to be the language of sciences and a national unifying identity for their citi-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 51 zens. This initiative began as a reaction to culture, language, and customs constituted the long and bloody colonization Algeria a prolonged, thorough effort to Francize suffered at the hands of the French, who the country. It did not succeed completely, invaded Algeria in July 1830 and declared though. One of the many facets of French it a French territory in 1848. In order to es- Algeria’s new identity was a hybrid lan- tablish control over this vast land—a region guage and culture consisting of French, nearly four times the size of the French European, Algerian Arabic, and Amazigh/ mainland—the French authorities began Tamazight elements. The change was so sending tens of thousands of French citi- dramatic that the current Algerian presi- zens to Algeria with numerous incentives, dent Abdelaziz Bouteflika stated that colo- including free swaths of fertile land and no nization resulted in the “genocide of iden- taxes. tity, history, language, and traditions.” He These events marked the start of fun- said further: “We no longer know wheth- damental change for Algeria: the birth of er we are Amazigh, Arabs, Europeans, or L’Algérie Française. The French authorities French.” 2 In using “genocide,” Bouteflika went to great lengths to engineer a new meant that France deliberately and system- identity for the natives of this North Af- atically attempted to exterminate local Al- rican addition to their extensive empire. gerian culture in order to replace it with a A major component of this strategy was to foreign one. legally replace the local languages of Ar- abic and Tamazight, the latter of which Post-Independence Challenges is spoken by the native Amazigh com- While there were many uprisings against munity, with French. The French began French rule that took place throughout the to subject Algerians to the same practices colonization of Algeria, a particularly vio- that the rest of the citizens of the Métrop- lent series of revolts began in 1954. French le endured, even teaching them that their rule was finally dissolved in 1962. The ancestors were French Gaulles. The term newly independent Algeria was immedi- ately faced with a multitude of challenges that were similarly overwhelming as the The term “Arab” became joy of freedom: in addition to the chaos synonymous with produced by the rapid departure of hun- uncultivated and barbaric dreds of thousands of European settlers, and was systematically Algerians had been left without experience in the handling of state affairs of the coun- assigned a negative try, let alone one emerging as independent connotation. from colonial rule and as geographically large and culturally diverse as Algeria. The new, youthful leaders of the coun- “Arab” became synonymous with unculti- try decided to remedy the challenges left vated and barbaric and was systematically behind by the colonizers with a type of assigned a negative connotation. (The use shock therapy to achieve the re-Algerian- of this term in a pejorative manner lingered ization of the country. The first Algerian long after the French departure; decades president post-independence, Ahmed Ben later, it still remains in use in Algeria. To Bella, wanted to recover the Arabic di- describe a job poorly done, one would re- mension of Algerian language and culture fer to it as an “Arab job”.) The process un- as quickly as possible. He began to do so in dertaken by the French to replace the local 1963, just after independence.3 This proved

52 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy insurmountable even for him: when he was and government offices were ordered to invited to visit Egypt just after the indepen- begin using Arabic for instruction and on dence at the behest of Egyptian president all official correspondence. Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ben Bella was unable Ben Bella was overthrown in 1965 and to address his audience in Arabic, leaving was succeeded by Houari Boumediene, an him publicly “humiliated.”4 (Nasser was at Arabist with an academic career that in- the time the embodiment of Arabization cluded stints at the prestigious Islamic in- and pan-Arabism.) In response to this and stitutions of Az-Ziytouna in Tunisia and as part of his pan-Arabism initiative, Nasser Al-Azhar in Egypt. It was under Boume- sent droves of Arabic instructors to Algeria, diene’s rule that the process of Arabization, an effort that ultimately also contributed to with the appointment of education minis- the rise of Islamism in Algeria as instruc- ter Moustapha Lacheraf, was fully imple- tors infused the teaching of Arabic with the mented.5 teaching of Islam. What took place from the 1960s through Bilingual Illiteracy the 1970s can only be described as an over- Schools in Algeria were given a short zealous effort to purge Algeria of its French window of time of several years to comply component and substitute it with what with the government project of full Arabi- were perceived as entirely authentic Alge- zation. The generation going through the rian elements—this, however, excluded the school system at this time was designated a Amazigh identity for a number of reasons. “transitory class” or classe transitoire. Mathe- Firstly, it was easier to reinforce Arabic in matics and the sciences were still taught in the atmosphere of pan-Arabist movements French, but history, geography, literature, throughout the region; secondly, Amazigh and philosophy were to be instructed in was seen as a dividing element as opposed Arabic. By the early 1980s, during the last to a uniting one because it was thought generation of the transitory classes, any- to represent only a small minority of the one hoping for a successful future would country. Similarly, Tamazight was not not have opted for Arabic instruction. This perceived—especially by the authorities was for the simple reason that French was but also by the average Algerian—to have still inherently valued by society and, con- the same prestige or practical purposes as sequently, in the academic and professional Arabic did. There was not a unified Ama- realms. An individual aspiring to become zigh movement that compared to the size a doctor or engineer would be expected to of pan-Arabism, with the exception of a be at least bilingual, and mastery of French contained movement in the mountainous was required in order to take high-level Kabyle region of northern Algeria. courses in high school and university. One of the first initiatives of this purg- By the mid-1980s, Algerian schools cel- ing of French identity was a renaming of ebrated the switch to full Arabic instruc- the streets and main thoroughfares: em- tion. The authorities boasted about this blematic squares and routes such as Place great “achievement” but did so avoiding Bugeaud, rue D’Isly, and rue Michelet the subject of the quality and competence became Sahet Chouhada, rue Larbi Ben of this new generation of youth. The new M’hidi, and rue Didouche Mourad—the school system was christened al madrasa al latter names all symbolic not only of Al- asasiyya or the “Fundamental School.” The geria’s Arabic heritage but also of the rev- Algerian population used a perversion of olution and the Algerian resistance to the the French version, L’école fondamentale, French. Soon after, schools, universities, partially Arabizing it to create the term

2014–2015, Volume IV | 53 “ fawdha mentale” which, in the Algerian Ouahran, Constantine, and Annaba. Chil- hybrid Arabic dialect, translates to “men- dren are instructed from an early age that tal chaos.” The general Algerian response colloquial Arabic is improper and, in some to this new curriculum was to deem it a cases, even vulgar; pupils are taught in for- failed curriculum producing bilingual illit- mal Arabic and prevented from using any erates—in other words, generating youth colloquial Arabic in the classroom.7 Offi- who were unable to master either French cial correspondence is also supposed to be or Arabic. in formal Arabic in accordance with a law At the root of the failure were sever- passed in 1997, although it is said that se- al factors: the process of Arabization was nior officials often receive a French transla- rushed and poorly planned, and it was not thoughtful of the complex, deeply root- ed linguistic and cultural realties on the Bouteflika is the first ground.6 The first schools developed in Algerian leader, post- this new period did not have textbooks independence, who is both or systems in place to replace what the capable of and confident in French education system offered before. This made it more of a political measure switching between formal than a substantial, carefully executed ed- Arabic, Algerian Arabic, ucational strategy. Similarly, there was a and French with ease. significant lack of qualified instructors and teaching material—while Egypt and other Arab countries continued to send Arabic tion alongside of the original, official Ara- teachers to Algeria, they often did not have bic copy. This is provided in order to ease teaching credentials at all, let alone in the the administrative process, due primarily instruction of the Arabic language. Alge- to the lack of comprehension of formal Ar- rian professors were untrained and unpre- abic and the relative fluency of Algerian of- pared for the sudden switch. This remained ficials in French. This inferiorization of the the case at all levels of the academic system colloquial language that average Algerians until the early 1990s, except for a partially use most of the time has major effects on successful attempt to reform higher educa- the way in which Algerians perceive their tion. Even academic institutions that have own identity. high educational standards, such as the Since Bouteflika came to power in 1999, national Algerian Institute for Translation he has altered the perception of identity yet and Interpretation, would hire professors in again: going against the protocol of all of translation who were incapable of speaking the presidents before him, Bouteflika is the formal Arabic, despite the fact that students first Algerian leader, post-independence, were expected to translate a multitude of who is both capable of and confident in languages into formal Arabic. switching between formal Arabic, Algeri- an Arabic, and French with ease. In doing Algerian “Schizophonia” so, he has catered his language choice to his The language spoken in Algeria today is audience and encompassed all of them into known as Algerian Arabic. In reality, this his identity. In justifying his choice, after constitutes a mix of Arabic, Tamazight, addressing the French parliament in French French, Spanish, and in some cases Turkish in 2012, he asked, “Why follow the proto- and/or Italian. This holds true especially col when we can make it easier and speak in the major coastal cities such as Algiers, in a language that we both understand and

54 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy grasp?” He has also questioned the imple- Algeria has refused to join the International mentation of the Arabization process, even Organization of the Francophonie, which suggesting a return to teaching French at is still perceived by the establishment as a an early age in a bilingual teaching system. neocolonial tool.8 In fact, the current Minister of Education, The other major component of the Al- Nouria Benghabrit-Remaoun, has been gerian linguistic identity, Tamazight, was tasked with exploring the feasibility of this excluded from any formal or national rec- proposal as an educational reform, among ognition until 2002, and then only after other potential alterations to the education many violent protests.9 In April 1980, for system. example, the Algerian army was purport- Algerians continue to question their ed to have killed at least thirty-two people identity and struggle with accepting all demonstrating for the official recognition of its dimensions. Unlike neighbors Tu- of the Amazigh.10 The Algerian linguis- nisia and Morocco, Algeria continues to tic landscape resembles that of its western grapple with its two adopted languages neighbor, Morocco, representing a patch- of Arabic and French, as well as with its work of an Amazigh population on which native language of Tamazight. The first Arabic and French have been imposed, ei- of the three is used as an identity marker ther for religious/postcolonial purposes in although it is not actively developed, as it the case of Arabic, or for practical reasons is used to merely copy or directly trans- of social mobility in the case of French at late from French. The second serves as a various points throughout Algeria’s histo- communication tool for practical purpos- ry.11 es. Tamazight is rarely used outside of the Kabyle area, generally regionally contained Proud To Be Algerian and never used in an official setting. Arabic Overall, the process of postcolonial Ara- remains the national and official language bization in Algeria has been a chaotic one, of the country, as stated in the constitution. and many generations of citizens have paid Its usage is confined to formal situations, the price for it: rushed, poorly planned, such as official communication, education, and politicized are among the many adjec- the media, and in religious institutions. Just tives Algerians have used to describe the as it is elsewhere in the region, formal Ar- process.12 That said, there are signs that Al- abic is not used in daily life and is not con- gerian leaders and intellectuals may have sidered to be the mother tongue. French, learned several valuable lessons from this on the other hand, has been seen by many failure: they are slowly but surely learning as what Algerian novelist Kateb Yacine, a to accept and include the many languages prominent figure of the Amazigh cause and spoken by Algerians. An additional lesson a critic of Arabization as it was enforced in learned is that significantly more effort the Algerian context, has deemed a “war should be placed on the development of bounty.” In other words, a language that Arabic as a language used outside of the served as a weapon against the coloniz- traditional realms of literature and social er and as a tool with which to climb the sciences; there is discussion of improving social ladder. French also served the Ama- its use in the technical realms of mathemat- zigh and the feminist movements in their ics and sciences. There is also some discus- respective struggles for an official recog- sion about the extent of the “sacredness” of nition. Although it is counted among the the language.13 largest francophone countries in the world The only component that is absent in in terms of the number of French speakers, this linguistic and cultural equation is the

2014–2015, Volume IV | 55 native Amazigh heritage. Despite the fact French heritage language and culture pro- that Tamazight was recently recognized gram and serves as president of the New as a national language in 2002, it lacks England chapter of a French expatriate the interest that formal Arabic and French organization. Since joining the faculty at command from the general population for Boston University, Mr. Bekkai has been a practical reasons.14 In other words, if one panelist and moderator in many panel dis- masters Arabic or French, they will often cussions and talks hosted by local organi- be more likely to get a job. However, the zations regarding the issues of identity and situation of the Amazigh movement and immigration. He is also interested in media the fight for Tamazight recognition appears studies, journalism, and international rela- to have changed, at least on the surface. tions, particularly as it pertains to the di- Tamazight has legal status and is finally alogue between Western societies and the recognized as a national language. Legisla- Arab world. tors are discussing ranking it equally with Arabic to become the second national and official language of the country. After more than half a century of inde- Endnotes pendence, Algerians continue to struggle with their cultural identity. In the 1940s, 1 Khaoula Taleb Ibrahimi, “L’Algérie: Co- Abdelhamid Ben Badis, an Algerian reli- existence et Concurrence des Langues,” gious and political figure, wrote an anthem L’Année du Maghreb Vol. 1, 2004, 207–218. that children in Algeria are still asked to memorize by heart: “The Algerian popu- 2 José Garçon, “Bouteflika accuse de nou- lation is Muslim and belongs to the Arab veau la France de génocide,” Libération, 18 world.”15 Today, intellectuals, politicians, April 2006. and average citizens alike are challenging this definition. As author Kamel Daoud 3 Gilbert Grandguillaume, “L’arabisation stated in response to a French journalist’s au maghreb,” Revue d’Aménagement linguis- question of whether he felt Arab, “No, I am tique (Winter 2004): 13. not. I am Algerian and proud.” 4 Lounis Aggoun, “Ben Bella, l’agneau qui se voyait plus méchant que les loups,” Études Coloniales, 23 April 2012. Kheireddine Bekkai holds an MA in the instruction of French as a foreign language 5 Nabila Amir, “Boumediène et la décol- from La Sorbonne in Paris, France. He onisation linguistique,” El Watan, 27 De- also holds two BAs, one in applied foreign cember 2008. languages with a focus on Arabic, French, and German and the other in translation 6 Ibrahimi, “L’Algérie.” and interpretation in Arabic, French, and German. Since his arrival in the United 7 Jacques Leclerc, “Algérie: La politique States in 2000, Mr. Bekkai has been teach- linguistique d’arabisation,” CEFAN, ac- ing French and Arabic courses in language, cessed 25 March 2015. translation, literature, and culture. He is particularly active with NGOs and has 8 Mohamed Berkani, “Francophonie: l’Al- participated in several interfaith outreach gérie et son ‘butin de guerre,’” Géopolis, 18 committees. Mr. Bekkai also works with a March 2015.

56 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 9 “Chronology for Berbers in Algeria,” The Minorities at Risk Project, accessed 24 March 2015.

10 “20 avril 1980: Début du ‘printemps berbère’ en Algérie,” Perspective Monde, accessed 23 March 2015.

11 Ibrahimi, “L’Algérie.”

12 Ryadh Benlahrech, “Maghreb: pour- quoi l’arabisation a échoué?” Jeune Afrique, 7 November 2013.

13 Mohamed Maamouri, “Language Ed- ucation and Human Development: Arabic Diglossia and Its Impact on the Quality of Education in the Arab Region” Interna- tional Literacy Institute, 1998.

14 Paul Adrian Raymond and Mohsin Ali, “Infographic: The Berber Struggle,” Al Ja- zeera, 6 July 2014.

15 Nadjib Achour and Youssef Girard, “Autonomie et identité arabo-islamique,” International Solidarity Movement, 18 March 2012.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 57 Independent Civil Society: A Necessary Ingredient for Stability and Security in the Middle East & North Africa

By Amira Maaty

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Independent civil society in the Middle regimes are dismantling the very civic East and North Africa (MENA) has once space most needed to challenge radical ide- again fallen victim to regional and interna- ologies, constructively channel youth frus- tional prioritization of security and stability trations, and ensure greater accountability over reform and democratization. The rise and good governance. of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Sham Pointing to the threat of Islamic extrem- (ISIS)—also known as the Islamic State— ist groups, several Arab states, including US has shifted international attention away allies such as Bahrain, Egypt, Saudi Ara- from the much-needed political and eco- bia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), nomic reforms called for during the Arab have taken steps over the past year to limit uprisings that began in late 2010. Instead, freedom of assembly, association, and inde- US and European diplomacy and assis- pendent media. This includes policies that tance to the MENA region have refocused directly or indirectly restrict the formation, on security and violent extremism.1 Au- activities, and funding of nongovernmen- tocratic Arab regimes have exploited this tal organizations; legal prosecution of civ- opportunity to suppress nonviolent critics ic groups and their members; harsh prison and dissidents at home under the guise of sentences for protestors; and censorship, ha- counterterrorism efforts including laws and rassment, travel bans, and smear campaigns policies that criminalize and define basic against journalists, bloggers, civic leaders, freedoms as terrorism.2 In doing so, these and other individuals publicly critical of

58 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy the state. In addition to longstanding laws Interior, Habib al-Adly, has claimed that the restricting free association and expression, January 2011 revolution “was an American Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE adopt- conspiracy aimed at implementing a new ed new counterterrorism laws in 2014 that Middle East plan, whereby leaders who re- broadly define terrorism to include: “any fuse to cooperate on pursuing their vision group which disrupts public order or threatens the safety, security, or interests of soci- Large-scale crackdowns ety;”3 “any act that harms the reputation or standing of the state;”4 or those who “under- against nonviolent mine the stability, safety, unity, sovereignty, dissidents and critics or security of the State.”5 These laws give divert limited government authorities wide powers to dissolve, freeze resources away from real assets, and issue harsh sentences—including the death penalty—to members of designat- security threats such as ed terrorist organizations. Based on these militant radicalization and definitions, Egypt has moved to freeze the violent extremism. assets of “over 1,000 charities and organizations with apparent links to the [Mus- lim] Brotherhood, many of which provided were ousted.”11 This narrative has been and public and social services” and dissolved an continues to be a dominant theme of Egyp- additional 300 NGOs;6 the UAE govern- tian state media since 201112 and one that is ment has designated eighty-three terrorist echoed in state-supported media through- organizations that include charitable and out the region. advocacy organizations that operate legally Subordinating civic freedoms to imme- in the United States and Europe;7 and doz- diate security priorities has negative impli- ens of peaceful activists in Saudi Arabia have cations for local and regional stability. First, been arrested and are facing trial.8 Also in large-scale crackdowns against nonviolent the past year, Bahrain, which had similar- dissidents and critics divert limited gov- ly amended its anti-terrorism laws in 2013, ernment resources away from real security modified citizenship laws allowing the In- threats such as militant radicalization and terior Ministry to revoke citizenship from violent extremism. Second, stifling mod- anyone who “causes harm to the interests of erate voices in the region empties regional the Kingdom or acts in a way that contra- ideological debates of all but illegitimate venes his duty of loyalty to it,”9 and in Janu- state narratives and radical Islamist dis- ary 2015, seventy-two Bahrainis, including course, which is harder to silence. There journalists, doctors, and political and hu- are many examples of Arab civil society man rights activists, were stripped of their initiatives across the region that challenge citizenship.10 These actions have shrunk the rhetoric of extremists and provide the already limited regional civic space and platforms for constructive debate and dis- have fed widespread xenophobic conspiracy cussion. This includes groups that mon- theories about the United States and other itor and advocate for action against hate Western governments seeking to destabilize speech and incitement, youth civic educa- the region. Many of these outlandish the- tion programs that promote tolerance and ories are promulgated by the same security acceptance, independent think tanks that establishments that have long enjoyed the offer solutions for countering extremism, overwhelming bulk of Western aid. Egypt’s engagement of community and religious recently acquitted, Mubarak-era Minister of leaders to counter radical discourse, and

2014–2015, Volume IV | 59 others. However, many of these are lim- effective programs to increase community ited in scope and reach due to the type of awareness of the dynamics of radicalization restrictions described above. Third, it pits and teach the skills associated with build- the state against civil society at a time when ing resilience and resistance to the drivers the latter should be a critical interlocutor of violent extremism.”14 Treating civil society as a long-term Shrinking civil society interest secondary to short-term security challenges is a fatal flaw in counter-radi- space limits the emergence calization strategies in the Middle East and of new ideas and leaders North Africa. Decades of security-oriented at a time when they are funding and cooperation has lent interna- most needed, and civil tional legitimacy to autocratic governments and has failed to make the region society can play a critical more secure. Rather, at the same time that role in countering violent such security policies have been priori- extremism. tized, the region has seen a “steady increase in the number of [jihadist] groups during the 1990s and 2000s,” including “a 58 [per- between state institutions, citizens, and so- cent] increase in the number of Salafi-ji- ciety at large. Although governments may hadist groups from 2010 to 2013.”15 Now, fear civil society’s calls for transparency and more than ever, civil society freedom and accountability, the latter can also serve as independence must be an integral compo- a valuable partner for service delivery and nent of Western security assistance and co- community engagement, channeling the operation in the region. energies of disenfranchised and discon- tented youth towards constructive purposes. Youth across the region were initially energized to actively serve and better their Amira Maaty is the Senior Program Of- communities post-Arab Spring as demon- ficer for the Middle East and North Africa strated by various formal and informal Programs at the National Endowment for youth initiatives that emerged during that Democracy. She is also a PhD candidate in period but have since been discouraged Public Administration and Public Affairs by restrictions they’ve faced and the over- at the School of Public and International all deteriorating conditions in the region. Affairs, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and Fourth, civil society provides a space for State University (Virginia Tech). a plurality of stakeholders to deliberate, identifying and debating the challenges facing their societies. In 2014, Tunisian civil society spearheaded a National Di- Endnotes alogue that broke through a political impasse and resulted in a roadmap that put 1 Fran Burwell, Danya Greenfield, and Tunisia’s democratic transition back on Amy Hawthorne, “A Transatlantic Ap- track.13 Shrinking civil society space limits proach for the Arab World: Stability the emergence of new ideas and leaders at through Inclusivity, Good Governance, a time when they are most needed. Finally, and Prosperity,” Atlantic Council, 21 Jan- civil society can play a critical role in coun- uary 2015. tering violent extremism; it “can develop

60 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy 2 Michele Dunn and Frederic Wehrey, 13 Hafedh Chekir, “The Legislative Elec- “U.S.-Arab Counterterrorism Cooper- tions in Tunisia – The Start of a New Phase ation in a Region Ripe for Extremism,” or Continuation of Trench Warfare?” Arab Carnegie Endowment for International Reform Initiative, December 2014. Peace, 23 October 2014. 14 Georgia Holmer, “Countering Violent 3 Ryan J. Suto, “Egypt’s New Terrorism Extremism: A Peacebuilding Perspective,” Law,” Atlantic Council, 12 December United States Institute of Peace, September 2014. 2013.

4 Rivka Azoulay, “Criminalizing Dissent: 15 Seth G. Jones, “A Persistent Threat: The How Saudi Arabia’s Counterterrorism Law Evolution of al Qa’ida and Other Salafi Ji- Is Used to Suppress Peaceful Opposition hadists,” RAND Corporation, 2014. Movements,” Project on Middle East De- mocracy, 10 October 2014.

5 “UAE: Terrorism Law Threatens Lives, Liberty,” Human Rights Watch, 4 Decem- ber 2014.

6 Todd Ruffner, “Under Threat: Egypt’s Systematic Campaign against NGOs,” Project on Middle East Democracy, March 2015, 6.

7 Nafeesa Syeed, “UAE Classifies 83 Groups as Terrorist Organizations,” Bloomberg Business, 16 November 2014.

8 Azoulay, “Criminalizing Dissent.”

9 “Bahrain: Citizenship Rights Stripped Away,” Human Rights Watch, 21 August 2014.

10 “Bahrain Revokes Citizenship of 72 People, Including Journalists, Doctors, and Activists,” Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 2 February 2015.

11 “Habib al-Adly: I Asked for the Military to Intervene during January 25 Protests,” Mada Masr, 9 August 2014.

12 Ruffner, “Under Threat,” 13–15.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 61 Over the River: Jordan’s Dependency on Transboundary Water Resources

By Sarah McKnight

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Some of the most prominent, defining much of its natural habitat, and the famous memories of my time as a Fulbright fel- Dead Sea is rapidly diminishing at aston- low in Jordan came from the “water day” ishing rates. in my neighborhood of Jabal Amman. In As a hydrogeologist with a passion for most of Jordan, water day was the one day research, I always engaged my neighbors in the week when either the lumbering and friends in discussions about Jordan’s water truck would come or the public wa- water issues and how they connected to ter system would open to provide enough the region’s politics. I learned that people water to fill every family’s roof tanks and struggled to work their lives around the complete as many water-consuming chores ever-escalating water shortage crisis. The as possible. Every Wednesday, a weekly weekly “water day” phenomenon, along stream would flood my street as my neigh- with Jordan’s tense and sometimes contro- bors would dutifully wash their apart- versial diplomatic relations with its neigh- ments’ floors, and I would stuff my wash- boring countries, continues to breed dis- ing machine with as many loads as I could trust towards the Jordanian government in muster. Beyond the water access issues that the already skeptical population. While the cause minor inconveniences and suggest government needs to continuously foster ominous forebodings for the future, the productive diplomacy with its neighbors, country already suffers from drying water Jordan also needs to focus on more water reserves: Azraq, the precious sanctuary for conservation and production measures that migrating birds, is disappearing, the rich rely on resources within its borders in or- biodiversity of the Arabian Desert has lost der to lessen the burden on the country’s

62 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy strained regional relations as well as to en- al issue as neither country has accepted an sure a more secure future for the nation. agreement. Jordan can only depend on the Jordanians’ doubts will not dissipate nonrenewable, ancient aquifer for between quickly, as Jordan’s geopolitical environ- approximately twenty-five to fifty years ment creates a dismal future for this thirst- before the country completely depletes the ing country. While Jordan annually has approximately 114 cubic meters (m3) of renewable water per capita, which equates Currently, only to a total of an estimated 682 million m3 approximately a third of per year, the country needs at least an esti- Jordan’s water supply mated 1.6 billion m3 per year to match its growing needs by 2020.1 Currently, only comes from intraborder approximately a third of Jordan’s water precipitation. supply comes from intraborder precipitation.2 Jordan has also historically depend- ed on obtaining most of its water from the water, conditional on Saudi Arabia not in- basin and tributaries associated with the creasing its withdrawal from the part of the now dwindling Jordan River, which is also aquifer that lies within the Saudi borders.7 politically significant as both a religious The Unity Dam on the Yarmouk River, a icon as well as a tourist destination shared source of less importance located along the with the Palestinian territories and Israel.3 Syrian border, only provides minor relief to Beyond surface water, Jordan taps into an Jordan’s water woes. Similarly, Syria’s on- overwhelming 143 million m3 of nonre- going civil war and growing needs could newable groundwater per year.4 As climate never guarantee the reservoir as a long- change continues to dwindle the already term, dependable source.8 Wrought and scant rainfall—amounting to between 100 slowed by stale negotiations, the proposed to 200 millimeters per year—and as the World Bank-supported Red Sea-Dead Sea population continues to swell with grow- pipeline relies on maintaining robust re- ing numbers of refugees from multiple lations in an ever-tense political environ- neighboring countries, Jordan continues ment with Israel, and there is currently no to develop and search for alternative wa- guarantee over the amount of potable water resources both within and beyond the ter Jordan would receive from the project.9 country’s borders.5 Though Jordan strives for innovative water Jordan finds itself surrounded by a cha- production methods, these efforts continue otic milieu of conflict that both compli- to create a transboundary dependency re- cates and infringes upon progress towards quiring strenuous diplomatic efforts, leav- a long-term, sustainable water policy. All ing the country with a future lacking both water sources that Jordan plans to devel- stability and security. op involve cooperation with neighboring To survive, the Jordanian government countries. Of its current water sources, must further develop its water manage- the Disi Water Conveyance Project began ment and production policies by focusing pumping 100 million m3 per year from on advancing efforts strictly within the southern Jordan to Amman 2013.6 Ever a country’s borders. The Jordanian govern- contentious issue with Saudi Arabia, who ment can support innovative agriculture shares a section of the Disi aquifer with technology, invest in desalination, further Jordan, the question of access and usage develop water recycling methods, provide rights remains an unanswered internation- opportunity for public engagement, de-

2014–2015, Volume IV | 63 velop and encourage surface water runoff sure further national security and less de- conservation, and further utilize the bril- pendence on the already strained relations liant minds of Jordan’s youth and research- with its neighboring countries. Jordan’s ers. Specifically, the Jordanian Ministry of water shortage will not reach desperation Water and Irrigation helps rural farmers if the Hashemite Kingdom focuses on de- learn new methods for conserving wa- veloping and protecting its water supply ter.10 Similarly, as new irrigation technol- independently from its neighbors, by fo- ogy with improved efficiency continues to cusing and improving upon the already develop, the government may consider fi- established water conservation technology nancially supporting the poor rural farmers while further investing in the innovative to gain access to such technology. Jordan brain power of the Jordanian people. In the could also pursue numerous other options Middle East’s environmentally and politi- that expand upon already functioning and cally harsh landscape, Jordan’s solution to successful programs, including increasing the water question should focus beyond the waste water recycling systems, redefining mere application of all the possible tech- public and agricultural water consumption, niques. Rather, the Jordanian government and heightening the public’s awareness of will protect its people most by strategizing and engagement in responsible water us- a nation-focused, adept approach to priori- age. As another option, Jordan could fur- tizing effective domestic innovations. ther consider seawater desalination, though the process involves great complexity and inspires environmental concerns. Howev- er, new developments in desalination pro- Sarah McKnight graduated from Mount cesses have cut the price of production in Holyoke College with a major in geology half.11 With all the possible solutions readily in 2011 and spent the following year on a within reach, such expansion and redefi- Fulbright scholarship at the University of nition of Jordan’s water policy would not Jordan. She put her advanced Arabic lan- inevitably lead to a self-sufficient water sys- guage skills to work at the Orphan’s Asso- tem, but it would gradually ensure greater ciation, Bekaa Refugee Camp, in Jordan, water security with more options for con- teaching English to children. While in tingency, as well as an increased chance for Jordan, Sarah also compiled historical and approaching the country’s water budget. modern seismic data in order to reassess the Fortunately, despite the country’s dubi- potential hazard of the Dead Sea transform ous circumstances, Jordan can take advan- fault system and performed assessments on tage of numerous resources that are readily groundwater flow and subsurface structure available within the country’s borders. Jor- in areas around the country. She current- dan has one of the most robust water in- ly works as a hydrogeologist for Inland frastructure systems in the region, provid- Professional Corporation in Hanover, ing dependable access to over 98 percent MA, as a consultant doing environmental of the population.12 With such an impres- site assessment, evaluating the extent sive system already established, Jordan has of contaminants and their transport in a wide breadth of opportunity for shifting groundwater. the demand for water closer to the supply. The further implementation of innovative technology and techniques in water conservation and production already within Jordan’s borders will help the country en-

64 | Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy Endnotes 10 José Ciro Martínez, “Wheat Subsidies in Jordan May Be Too Little Too Late,” 1 Karen Frenken, ed., “Irrigation in Al-Monitor, 22 July 2014. the Middle East Region in Figures: AQUASTAT Survey-2008 (FAO Water 11 Anthony Bennett, “Cost Effective De- Reports),” Food and Agriculture Organi- salination: Innovation Continues to Lower zation of the United Nations, 30 July 2009. Desalination Costs,” Filtration+Separation, 14 February 2012. 2 “A Comparative Study of Water Data Across Israel, West Bank, and Jordan,” Wa- 12 Abdel-Nabi Fardous et al., “Harnessing ter Resources Action Project, December Salty Water to Enhance Sustainable Liveli- 2013. hoods of the Rural Poor in Four Countries in West Asia and North Africa: Egypt, Jor- 3 Jim Kundell, ed., “Water Profile of Jor- dan, Syria, and Tunisia,” The Hashemite dan,” The Encyclopedia of the Earth, 30 Kingdom of Jordan Ministry of Agricul- September 2011. ture, August 2004.

4 Amer Salman et al., “The Economics of Groundwater Use in Agriculture Under Different Water Prices and Supply Regimes in the Upland Area of Jordan,” CIHEAM, 2002, 177–190.

5 Frenken, “Irrigation in the Middle East”; Kundell, “Water Profile of Jordan.”

6 Arun Elhance, Hydropolitics in the Third World: Conflict and Cooperation in Interna- tional River Basins (Washington, DC: Unit- ed States Institute of Peace, 1999), 85–122; Hana Namrouqa, “King Inaugurates Disi Water Project,” The Jordan Times, 17 July 2013.

7 Elhance, Hydropolitics; Greg Shapland, Rivers of Discord: International Water Disputes in the Middle East (London: Palgrave Mac- millan, 1997).

8 Frenken, “Irrigation in the Middle East.”

9 Jeremy M. Sharp, “The ‘Red-Dead’ Canal: Israeli-Arab Efforts to Restore the Dead Sea,” Congressional Research Ser- vice, 2008.

2014–2015, Volume IV | 65 Call for Submissions

Deadline: November 30, 2015

The Harvard Journal of Middle Eastern Politics and Policy (JMEPP) is accepting submissions for its print and online publications. JMEPP is a nonpartisan policy review published at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. The Journal pres- ents a diversity of advanced scholarship on issues of policy relevance to the contemporary Middle East and North Africa.

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