Evolutionary Perspectives on Social Cognition 459

1 Evolutionary Perspectives

3 Joshua M. Ackerman, Julie Y. Huang, 4 & John A. Bargh

5 INTRODUCTION The growth and acceptance of the evolutionary 36 perspective on human sociality has not followed 37 6 Social cognition evolved. This statement seems an easy progression. Early applications of sociobi- 38 7 simple and uncontroversial enough. After all, ology (the precursor of evolutionary psychology) 39 8 social cognition is a product of biological struc- to humans were met with strong resistance. 40 9 tures (brain and body), and “nothing in biology Following the publication of his landmark 41 10 makes sense except in the light of evolution” Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (1975), of which 42 11 (Dobzhansky, 1964, p. 449). It was not until rela- only the final of 27 chapters was devoted to 43 12 tively recently, however, that an evolutionary per- humans, the eminent biologist E. O. Wilson was 44 13 spective began to gain real traction within the field harangued by scholars within and outside of his 45 14 of social psychology. Over the past few decades, own department (in one example, Wilson had 46 15 application of evolutionary theory to the under- water poured on his head by a protestor during 47 16 standing of psychological phenomena has taken a conference) (Wilson, 1995). Even today, misun- 48 17 off, emerging in a wide number of specialty and derstandings exist (e.g., Buller, 2005; but see 49 18 flagship journals (Webster, 2007). Database Barrett, Frederick, Haselton, & Kurzban, 2006; 50 19 searches for terms like “evolution” show that in Cosmides, Tooby, Fiddick, & Bryant, 2005; 51 20 primary social psychological sources, even the Kenrick, 1995). (For a review of the “standard” 52 21 2000s represent a twofold increase in appear- objections to evolutionary psychology, including 53 22 ance over the 1990s. This Handbook is a good issues of automaticity, learning, cultural variation, 54 23 example − no previous incarnation of the and interpretive errors such as the naturalistic fal- 55 24 Handbook of Social Cognition featured a chapter lacy and concerns about theoretical falsifiability, 56 25 on evolutionary perspectives. Perhaps Kenrick, see Confer et al., 2010; Conway & Schaller, 2002; 57 26 Schaller, and Simpson (2006, p. 2) summarized it Kenrick, Ackerman, & Ledlow, 2003; Neuberg, 58 27 best: Kenrick, & Schaller, 2010; Symons, 1992.) Thus, 59 it may help to begin this chapter by establishing 60 28 Once upon a time, social cognition represented a a general understanding of an evolutionary per- 61 29 relatively small and austere little niche in the study spective within psychology. Following this, we 62 30 of social behavior. Today, it hardly makes sense to highlight how this perspective carves social cogni- 63 31 treat social cognition as a specialized domain of tion at different conceptual joints than has tradi- 64 32 inquiry or to separate the study of social cognition tionally been the case. Finally, we consider how a 65 33 from the study of psychology more broadly… .The recent synthesis of evolutionary and developmen- 66 34 same trajectory now characterizes the evolutionary tal perspectives − scaffolding theory − can help to 67 35 perspective on social psychology. frame the emergence of linkages between specific 68

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1 social cognitive processes over the course of an change; in some species they have been known to 57 2 individual’s as well as a species’ history. dramatically alter both the phenotype and the 58 genotype within a single generation (Gottlieb, 59 1998; Weber & Depew, 2003). For all species, 60 including humans, adaptations arose to solve 61 3 An evolutionary perspective problems within specific contexts, and therefore 62 4 At its core, an evolutionary perspective is a collec- they are at least somewhat sensitive to intraper- 63 5 tion of specialized principles united by the sonal, interpersonal, and cultural contexts. These 64 6 common theme of adaptive design. How we think, contexts provide the critical information and 65 7 feel, act, and exist is the result of selective forces affordances to which people respond (Gibson, 66 8 that, over long periods of time, have shaped the 1979; McArthur & Baron, 1983). In sum, “noth- 67 9 body and mind to promote effective propagation ing about humans could possibly be immune from 68 10 of those same design features. To properly account developmental intervention” (Tooby & Cosmides, 69 11 for the outcomes of this process, an evolutionary 1992, p. 80). 70 12 perspective must be goal-based, engineering- Unlike many psychological approaches, an 71 13 focused, and interactionist in principle. As a goal- evolutionary perspective connects humans to the 72 14 based perspective, the many mental adaptations rest of the biological world. Evolution affects all 73 15 studied by evolutionary researchers are initially organisms. Indeed, hypotheses about humans are 74 16 considered to provide solutions to fine-grained, often drawn from observing the behavior of other 75 17 specific goals which themselves serve the “end” species, and this comparative research has demon- 76 18 goal of differential reproduction. This goal frame- strated both connections across species and the 77 19 work reinforces the notion that cognition is for species-specific nature of human cognition and 78 20 action (e.g., Morsella, Bargh, & Gollwitzer, 2008). behavior relative to that of other animals. For 79 21 Viewing the regularities and biases of social cog- instance, work on the social behavior of other 80 22 nition as potential adaptations provides insight primates has improved our understanding of 81 23 into why those features might exist as well as how human morality (de Waal, 2006) as well as shown 82 24 to study them. the universality of biases and states such as loss 83 25 Typically, an evolutionary analysis also requires aversion and cognitive dissonance (Chen, 84 26 an engineering focus. For instance, Tooby and Lakshminaryanan, & Santos, 2006; Egan, Santos, 85 27 Cosmides (1992) detail five central components of & Bloom, 2007). With respect to loss aversion, a 86 28 such an analysis: investigators should identify an large amount of research suggests that people 87 29 adaptive target (a proposed biologically success- overweight losses relative to equivalent gains 88 30 ful outcome), background conditions (a descrip- (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1991), and thus 89 31 tion of the relevant ancestral environment in prefer to avoid situations where losses could be 90 32 which the mental feature likely emerged), a design incurred. Monkeys show the same tendencies. 91 33 (a detailed depiction of the components and Given the choice between one piece of apple and 92 34 boundaries of the feature), a performance exami- two pieces of apple from which one piece was 93 35 nation (how the feature acts in the world and the always removed prior to the transaction (making 94 36 outcomes it produces), and a performance evalua- the expected value of each choice equal), capuchin 95 37 tion (an assessment of how well the design has monkeys strongly prefer the single apple offers 96 38 met the adaptive target). This process can help to (Chen et al., 2006). They dislike incurring the 97 39 determine whether a particular mental construct is “loss,” even though the end result is identical 98 40 likely to be an adaptation. An engineering focus across choices. The presence of such sophisticated 99 41 also highlights the historical constraints that biases in “economic” reasoning within distantly 100 42 restrict existing adaptations from achieving opti- related primates has shed new theoretical light on 101 43 mal functionality. evolved unconscious cognitive and motivational 102 44 Finally, as is apparent from this analysis, an processes in humans (Bargh & Morsella, 2008); as 103 45 evolutionary perspective necessitates an interac- a consequence, these are now being looked for, 104 46 tionist approach. Selection acts on phenotypes and detected, in young children for the first time 105 47 (e.g., bodies, behaviors), which emerge as a result (see, e.g., Dunham, Baron, & Banaji, 2008). 106 48 of gene−environment interactions. Although an Although an understanding of human as animal 107 49 evolutionary perspective is commonly misunder- is true of certain other research approaches (e.g., 108 50 stood as advancing the idea of inevitable and using rats and pigeons as models for human 109 51 immutable traits, evolutionary theories recognize behavior), and has historically been important 110 52 the importance of epigenetic influences on devel- within the broader field of psychology (Darwin, 111 53 opment which occur after birth in response to the 1872; James, 1890/1950; McDougall, 1926), 112 54 specific contingencies of one’s environment (see many researchers had moved away from this 113 55 Table 23.1). Epigenetic alterations are particularly position before the advent of sociobiology and 114 56 important in the face of rapid environmental evolutionary psychology. For instance, Maslow 115

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Table 23.1 Glossary of terms

Term Definition Example

Affordance Informational relationship between A smiling person affords possible individual and environment, friendship; a growling lion affords specifically the utility offered by an potential injury external cue for a perceiver Costly signaling Demonstrations (behavioral, physical) Wearing expensive items shows the of fitness quality that occur at a possession of and (likely) ability cost and thus are relatively to acquire resources “honest” signals Differential parental investment Cost of producing and rearing offspring Women tend to be romantically dictates mating-related selectivity choosier than men Epigenetic factors Influences on gene expression that Resource scarcity, toxin exposure, occur without altering the genotype operational sex ratio Genotype Genetic makeup (specific alleles) of an individual Inclusive fitness Combination of individual fitness with People often allocate support to fitness produced by providing for relatives proportional to their genetic relatives relatedness Loss aversion Tendency to overweight and thus People may show twice as much prefer avoiding losses relative to negativity to a $5 price increase making equivalent gains as they do happiness to a $5 price discount Ontogeny Developmental trajectory of organisms over the life span Phenotype Observable characteristics of an Height, eye color, posture, language individual, including (internal and external) morphology and behavior Phylogeny Evolutionary history of a species, especially in terms of ancestral relations to other species Scaffolding Referring to connections between Physical warmth (temperature) and mental structures (concepts, goals) social warmth (trust) are mentally that emerge from ontogenetic or associated phylogenetic processes Sexual selection Process focusing on traits that promote Sexual dimorphisms, costly signaling success at intrasexual competition and intersexual mate choice, often at a cost to survival-related fitness

1 (1943, p. 392) claimed in his seminal work on processes are tuned to produce functional solu- 13 2 motivation, “It is no more necessary to study ani- tions to adaptively important goals. Much of this 14 3 mals before one can study man than it is to study research falls into two structural bins: lower-order 15 4 mathematics before one can study geology or perception effects and higher-order interpersonally 16 5 psychology or biology.” Instead, an evolutionary relevant processing. Within these bins, many of the 17 6 perspective provides a meta-theory that helps to standard topics in social cognition − accuracy and 18 7 integrate research from a diverse range of fields bias, attention and memory, categorization, person 19 8 that speak to social cognitive processes, from psy- perception, stereotypes, emotion, theory of mind, 20 9 chology to anthropology to economics. and so on − have been reframed in an evolutionary 21 light. Such processes address goals at multiple 22 levels of analysis (e.g., proximal, developmental), 23 but the general focus of most evolutionary research 24 10 ADAPTIVE SOCIAL COGNITION has been on providing answers to the question of 25 the ultimate function, or biological adaptiveness, 26 11 Research using an evolutionary perspective has of cognitive structures (Kenrick, Griskevicius, 27 12 demonstrated how a wide span of social cognitive Neuberg, & Schaller, 2010; Tinbergen, 1963). 28

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1 That is, what is this process good for? Why does Epley, & Gilovich, 2001). Strictly speaking, such 60 2 it exist? How might it have aided a person over the beliefs can be considered to be errors (e.g., involv- 61 3 course of evolutionary time? This latter question ing anchoring and adjustment), but the direction 62 4 is critical, because although cognitive processes of these errors suggests that they may also be adap- 63 5 are likely to have been adaptive when they tive solutions to uncertainty. Public self-relevant 64 6 emerged in the ancestral past, it is also likely that information is critically important to one’s place 65 7 relatively recent ecological and cultural changes in a social group, and thus giving this information 66 8 have created environments in which some of these more weight than it deserves may encourage 67 9 processes no longer maintain the same adaptive people to maintain their social affiliations by 68 10 value. Thus, evolutionary researchers typically adhering to group norms and self-censoring devi- 69 11 pursue questions of historical function, and of ant behavior. In another example of error mana- 70 12 the related issue of historical contingency (i.e., gement, people tend to underweight signals of 71 13 Do features exist as they do simply because their forgiveness after committing transgressions 72 14 evolution has been constrained by what previously (Friesen, Fletcher, & Overall, 2005). Doing so 73 15 existed?). may encourage stronger, and more effective, rec- 74 16 A focus on function does not imply that mental onciliation attempts than would otherwise occur. 75 17 adaptations produce perfect outcomes. Changes In sum, oversensitivity to reputational information 76 18 in environments over time can lead to errors in and undersensitivity to forgiveness information 77 19 information processing. People also make errors may help prevent consequences that could be 78 20 even in situations that match ancestrally relevant deadly in ancestral environments, such as ostra- 79 21 problems. Researchers have traditionally regarded cism and aggression (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 80 22 such problems as the result of improperly applied Haselton & Nettle, 2006). Thus, social cognitive 81 23 heuristics or as motivated by a desire to enhance biases should be viewed in terms of their ultimate, 82 24 proximate feelings of self-esteem (e.g., Greenberg adaptive effects, and not whether they represent 83 25 et al., 1993; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982; logical or “accurate” ways of thinking. 84 26 Miller & Ross, 1975). However, many error- Highlighting adaptive function in this way shifts 85 27 generating cognitive biases are entirely consistent the conceptual frame typically applied to social 86 28 with, and in fact predicted by, an evolutionary cognition. It suggests that classic formulations − 87 29 approach. Factual accuracy is not necessarily the those that organize the mind according to process 88 30 goal of natural selection. Instead, biases should or mental structure − might (unintentionally) 89 31 arise wherever they promote more functional present commonalities between processes or struc- 90 32 outcomes for basic adaptive problems. This notion tures that evolved for quite distinct purposes. For 91 33 is detailed by error management theory (EMT), example, understanding how emotion works in 92 34 which suggests that cognitive biases are often general is a worthwhile pursuit, but different emo- 93 35 not flaws, but design features that improve tions serve (and likely arose to serve) very differ- 94 36 responses under uncertainty (Haselton & Buss, ent functions; thus, we might predict that particular 95 37 2000; Haselton & Nettle, 2006; see also Ackerman, emotions are somewhat different in both what they 96 38 Shapiro, & Maner, 2009; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, do and how they do it. The same may be true of 97 39 1996; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002; Nesse, most classic social cognitive constructions, includ- 98 40 2005). EMT considers information processing as ing stereotypes, social comparisons, and so on 99 41 a signal detection problem, and points out that (e.g., Todd, Hertwig, & Hoffrage, 2005). The 100 42 false-negative and false-positive judgments or mental gerrymandering in which we typically 101 43 decisions may actually aid people’s fundamental engage, although useful, may interfere with an 102 44 goal pursuit. When judgments are uncertain, understanding of the mind as a toolbox for solving 103 45 people may err on the side of overinclusiveness specific types of problems. It is important to point 104 46 (a false-positive bias) or underinclusiveness (a out that answering questions of function has his- 105 47 false-negative bias). Though it may seem that both torically been integral to research on human cogni- 106 48 errors are substandard outcomes, uncertainty will tion (e.g., James, 1890/1950). The modern advent 107 49 inevitably produce errors, and thus it pays for of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology has 108 50 people to exhibit the “correct” form of bias. EMT given this problem-based approach the theoretical 109 51 describes the evolutionary pressures that led to spotlight. To shine in this spotlight, then, we might 110 52 particular directions of bias as, on average, a func- first want to answer: What problems might cogni- 111 53 tion of minimizing the more adaptively costly tive processes have evolved to solve? 112 54 errors. 55 For example, people may overweight public 56 self-relevant information as in the case of the spot- Fundamental social domains 113 57 light effect. In this effect, people presume their 58 actions are more salient to others than is true There are innumerable goals that humans pursue 114 59 (Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Savitsky, on a day-to-day basis, yet the vast majority of 115

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1 these are representative of a set of fundamental et al., 2000; Jackson, Wu, Linden, & Raymond, 58 2 social goals. In fact, these fundamental goals them- 2009; Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001). These pat- 59 3 selves filter down into one primary purpose − terns are especially strong in high-anxiety indi- 60 4 facilitating differential reproduction. Reproduction, viduals or individuals primed with other cues to 61 5 and the reproductive fitness of offspring, is the threat (e.g., Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001), 62 6 final cause (in the Aristotelian sense) of social suggesting that the goal to avoid harm sensitizes 63 7 cognition. (Readers unfamiliar with this approach (and perhaps oversensitizes) people to potential 64 8 should note that this problem of differential repro- dangers. Interestingly, identification of anger is 65 9 duction, along with those discussed below, is quicker when it appears on male faces than on 66 10 ultimate in nature and not necessarily what a female faces (Becker, Kenrick, Neuberg, 67 11 person would explicitly or even implicitly report.) Blackwell, & Smith, 2007). This effect appears to 68 12 Considering all aspects of social cognition as be due to the evolution of the physical structure of 69 13 (potentially) feeding into this one primary purpose male and female faces, and not existing gender 70 14 illuminates research questions that would other- stereotypes. Specialized attunement to male anger 71 15 wise go unasked, and reshapes our understanding may be quite functional, as men are more likely 72 16 of how and how well cognition works. Of course, to inflict physical damage on others (Vivian & 73 17 there are many steps that people take to address Langhinrichsen-Rohling, 1994), and more likely 74 18 this purpose. A number of researchers have to engage in extreme aggressive thinking (e.g., 75 19 attempted to organize these steps into functional homicidal fantasies) (Buss, 2005; Kenrick & 76 20 domains of social life (e.g., Ackerman & Kenrick, Sheets, 1993). 77 21 2008; Bugental, 2000; Buss, 1999; Fiske, 1992; Indirect safety threats can take many forms, 78 22 Kenrick, Li, & Butner, 2003; Kenrick et al., 2010). but evolutionary accounts have largely focused 79 23 Such organizations share a great deal of common- on group membership as a cue to the presence or 80 24 ality (good for those theorists positing universal absence of potential threat. Humans are naturally 81 25 mechanisms), allowing us to consider social cog- group-forming creatures (Baumeister & Leary, 82 26 nitive processing from the standpoint of relatively 1995; Caporael, 1997), and the group boundaries 83 27 few adaptive functions. These domains include we create afford other people relevance for our 84 28 interpersonal aggression (enacting and reacting to fundamental goals. That is, the interpersonal inter- 85 29 physical threats), disease avoidance (protecting actions that mattered most to individuals’ evolu- 86 30 oneself from contagious agents), mating (select- tionary outcomes (e.g., mate selection, reciprocal 87 31 ing, attracting, and keeping romantic partners), exchange, negotiation of status hierarchies) his- 88 32 status (power and prestige considerations), affilia- torically occurred within coalitional groups. This 89 33 tion (managing social connections), and inclusive is still largely true today (Fiske, 1992). We are 90 34 fitness (managing relationships with biologically also more interdependent and empathetic with 91 35 related others). These fundamental domains, these “in-group” members. Indeed, when faced 92 36 which we now review, incorporate most of the with safety threats, in-group members band 93 37 common problems a person might encounter in together, increasing the likelihood of in-group 94 38 social situations. prosocial behavior (e.g., Griskevicius et al., 2006; 95 Van Vugt, De Cremer, & Janssen, 2007). Because 96 of the outcomes these close ties allow, in-group 97 39 Interpersonal aggression interactions necessitate more complex inferences 98 40 The domain of interpersonal aggression refers to than interactions with out-group members. 99 41 the ways in which people physically threaten and Whereas in-group members afford us a variety 100 42 are threatened by others. Much of the social cog- of potential benefits, over evolutionary time, out- 101 43 nitive work in this domain has investigated group members have typically not. As a result, 102 44 responses to direct or indirect threat cues. Perhaps out-group membership serves as an easy cue to 103 45 the most commonly studied direct threat cue is the potential threat (this is true even if the base rate of 104 46 angry expression. A large literature suggests that threats is higher within in-groups). Consistent 105 47 people are especially attuned to the presence of with this idea, people heuristically associate many 106 48 angry individuals, and respond by devoting a high out-group members with harm (e.g., Becker et al., 107 49 degree of cognitive resources to these individuals. 2010; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005; Eberhardt, Goff, 108 50 This is true from a very early age, as infants rap- Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Faulkner, Schaller, Park, 109 51 idly visually discriminate anger and respond with & Duncan, 2004; Navarrete et al., 2009; Trawalter, 110 52 functionally appropriate negative behaviors (e.g., Todd, Baird, & Richeson, 2008). People also more 111 53 Serrano, Iglesias, & Loeches, 1995). As adults, readily perceive intentions of threat in out-group 112 54 people also find it difficult to disengage their members (Maner et al., 2005), especially when 113 55 visual attention from angry faces, and they exhibit primed by cues to danger such as ambient dark- 114 56 enhanced memory for such faces (e.g., Ackerman, ness (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). Out-group 115 57 Shapiro, Becker, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2011; Fox members may also frequently be the targets of 116

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1 cognitions that facilitate aggression, such as dehu- transmission suggests that people may be espe- 58 2 manization (e.g., Bandura, Underwood, & cially likely to over-perceive or over-react to a 59 3 Fromson, 1975; Harris & Fiske, 2006). wide variety of cues (Haselton & Nettle, 2006; 60 4 Out-group membership often has been opera- Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Li, Ackerman, White, 61 5 tionalized in terms of racial differences (in fact, Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2011; Tybur, Bryan, Magnan, 62 6 race is not itself a “natural” category, but a proxy & Caldwell Hooper, 2011). That is, although people 63 7 for group membership; Kurzban, Tooby, & may have developed some lay theory of contagion 64 8 Cosmides, 2001), but can be indicated by reli- (probably mediated by physical contact), the 65 9 gious, cultural, gender, and many other individual uncertain and constantly changing nature of dis- 66 10 differences as well. Combinations of group cues ease threats would promote heuristic avoidance 67 11 also may produce particular functional relevancies responses to many cues that are actually not 68 12 (e.g., Black men are more associated with physi- indicative of contagion. 69 13 cal threat than Black women; Navarrete, Indeed, people associate a large number of 70 14 McDonald, Molina, & Sidanius, 2010). Indirect physical and behavioral abnormalities with disease 71 15 threat cues become especially powerful in their (e.g., Park, Schaller, & Crandall, 2007; Schaller, 72 16 effects on cognition when accompanied by direct Park, & Faulkner, 2003; Zebrowitz, Fellous, 73 17 threat cues. For instance, subliminally priming Mignault, & Andreoletti, 2003). For example, 74 18 images of guns and knives leads White perceivers people attend to but show decreased preference 75 19 to visually attend more to Black men (Eberhardt for others with unusual facial features such as 76 20 et al., 2004). Angry expressions can amplify birthmarks, scars, and other asymmetries (e.g., 77 21 memory for Black men, even countering cognitive Ackerman et al., 2009; Grammer & Thornhill, 78 22 processing deficits typically found for out-group 1994; Kurzban & Leary, 2001). (Such asym- 79 23 members (Ackerman et al., 2006; also see Becker metries may in fact be indicative of early-life 80 24 et al., 2010). At an evaluative level, although peo- exposure to disease agents [Thornhill & Gangestad, 81 25 ple’s judgments of stimuli typically contrast away 1993].) When primed with other cues to disease, 82 26 from extreme examples (Schwarz & Bless, 1992), people also become more suspicious of out-group 83 27 White individuals viewing angry Black men members (who may be carriers of diseases to 84 28 assimilate the perceived threat to other, non-angry which perceivers have not developed immunity), 85 29 Black faces (Shapiro, Ackerman, Neuberg, Maner, infer less extraversion and openness in themselves 86 30 Becker, & Kenrick, 2009). Such findings highlight (which can inhibit interpersonal contact), and 87 31 the functional tuning of a number of cognitive behaviorally avoid others (e.g., Heinemann, 88 32 processes − by devoting more resources to the Pellander, Vogelbusch, & Wojtek, 1981; Houston 89 33 processing of potential safety threats, people are & Bull, 1994; Mortensen, Becker, Ackerman, 90 34 likely better able to track and respond to (and less Neuberg, & Kenrick, 2010). A number of other 91 35 likely to miss) these dangers. yet-untested formulations of classic social cogni- 92 tive constructs may emerge from a motivation to 93 avoid disease. 94 36 Disease avoidance 37 Interpersonal aggression is not the only safety- 38 related danger associated with social interaction. Mating 95 39 People are also carriers of contagious diseases. A large portion of research taking an evolutionary 96 40 This is not simply due to the advent of large, approach has focused, to some degree, on the 97 41 modern societies. Disease-causing organisms have topic of mating. It is clear why − differential 98 42 been a recurrent problem throughout human reproduction represents the primary end of the 99 43 evolutionary history (Gangestad & Buss, 1993; evolutionary game. However, mating processes 100 44 Low, 1990). People, therefore, likely acquired are also linked by Darwin’s other major theory, 101 45 specific cognitive strategies for managing disease- sexual selection. Sexual selection suggests that 102 46 relevant cues (Gangestad, Haselton, & Buss, heritable traits that promote competitive success 103 47 2006; Kurzban & Leary, 2001; Park, Faulkner, & for mates will be selected, even if they negatively 104 48 Schaller, 2003; Zebrowitz & Collins, 1997). affect survival (Darwin, 1871). Thus, people may 105 49 Although these strategies should produce some- take risks, spend themselves into the poorhouse, 106 50 what similar responses to those in the physical or even kill each other as a function of (ultimate, 107 51 safety domain, there are important differences. unconscious) reproductive pressures (e.g., Daly & 108 52 For example, the emotion of disgust functions in Wilson, 1983, 1988; Miller, 1998, 2000). 109 53 the service of disease avoidance (Tybur, Lieberman, Within the broad domain of mating, several 110 54 & Griskevicius, 2009), and is seen in reaction to unique types of problems exist (Miller & Todd, 111 55 targets associated with disease, whereas anger is 1998). People must select, attract, and retain roman- 112 56 generally not (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). The tic partners. Selection, as with all forms of judg- 113 57 relatively indirect and invisible nature of disease ment and decision making, involves evaluation of 114

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1 relevant criteria and determination that those cri- riskier judgments, less conformity, more creativ- 60 2 teria pass some threshold of acceptability. There ity, and a variety of other cognitive changes that 61 3 is broad agreement about the criteria that are act as costly signals (e.g., Griskevicius, Cialdini, 62 4 important for “good” mating decisions (e.g., most & Kenrick, 2006; Griskevicius et al., 2007; Maner 63 5 people want romantic partners who are kind, trust- et al., 2003; Miller, 2000; Van den Bergh, Dewitte, 64 6 worthy, intelligent, and likable), but much research & Warlop, 2008). In some instances, men may be 65 7 has also examined sex differences in the qualities motivated to pursue more rapid romantic commit- 66 8 people desire in mates (Buss, 1989; Li, Bailey, ment (Ackerman, Griskevicius, & Li, 2011), and 67 9 Kenrick, & Linsenmeier, 2002; Schmitt, 2005). they may even begin to think cooperatively in 68 10 This work has consistently shown that women order to overcome the romantic thresholds that 69 11 tend to prefer status and resource-acquisition women (utilizing their own forms of cooperation 70 12 potential in potential mates more than men do, as a method of quality control) set (Ackerman & 71 13 whereas men tend to prefer indicators of physical Kenrick, 2009). 72 14 attractiveness and fecundity more than women do Once a romantic couple forms, people’s cogni- 73 15 (e.g., Buss, 1989; Buss & Barnes, 1986; Buunk, tion shifts to a mate-retention mindset. This pro- 74 16 Dijkstra, Fetchenhauer, & Kenrick, 2002; Li et al., duces increased attentional focus on desirable 75 17 2002). Generally, women are more selective than members of the same sex (to ward off potential 76 18 men in the qualities they judge to be romantically interlopers), paired with a reduction in attraction 77 19 acceptable (Buss & Schmitt, 1993; Kenrick, to the opposite sex (to reduce the potential of 78 20 Sadalla, Groth, & Trost, 1990). This discrepancy straying). A host of additional defensive strategies 79 21 is explained by the principle of parental invest- also come on-line (e.g., Buss & Shackelford, 80 22 ment, which stresses that in any sexual species 1997; Campbell & Ellis, 2005; Maner, Gailliot, 81 23 marked by differential investment in offspring, the Rouby, & Miller, 2007; Maner, Rouby, Gonzaga, 82 24 sex that invests more will be choosier in selecting 2008; Shackelford, Goetz, & Buss, 2005; Simpson, 83 25 mates (Trivers, 1972). In people, women spend Gangestad, & Lerma, 1990). These kinds of empir- 84 26 more physiological resources to produce eggs ical findings highlight the importance of romantic 85 27 than men do to produce sperm and women spend concerns at an ultimate, if not a proximate level, 86 28 more time rearing children; thus, women are and indicate that many outcomes beyond simple 87 29 romantically choosier. Of course, degree of choos- direct mating decisions are influenced by mating- 88 30 iness also depends on the type of relationship, or related cognition. 89 31 mating strategy, people pursue (Gangestad & 32 Simpson, 2000). When looking for long-term, 33 committed partners, men and women often look Status 90 34 for similar qualities, though when looking for The drive for power and prestige within social 91 35 short-term partners (a situation that exaggerates groups is a hallmark of all societies (Barkow, 1989; 92 36 the costs of choosing poorly) women tend to be Brown, 1991; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989). The motiva- 93 37 somewhat pickier than men (Buss & Schmitt, tion to acquire status likely stems from the natural 94 38 1993; Clark & Hatfield, 1989; Kenrick et al., tendency for human groups to form dominance 95 39 1990; Li & Kenrick, 2006). hierarchies (indeed, this is true of all group-living 96 40 The ways in which people attract and retain primates), and for higher-ranking members of 97 41 romantic partners extend these patterns of evalua- those hierarchies to prosper (for a more detailed 98 42 tion. Because parental investment leads women to review of status-based processes, see Fiske, 2010). 99 43 be choosier than men, women often play the role In fact, attaining status can result in greater inter- 100 44 of selector and men often play the role of selectee personal influence (Miller, Collins, & Brief, 101 45 (Miller, 1998). In terms of mate quality (reproduc- 1995), material resources (Cummins, 1998), and 102 46 tive potential), everyone is not created equal, and self-esteem (Tesser, 1988), as well as decreases in 103 47 thus men typically compete to be selected (Buss, stress-related health problems (Adler, Epel, 104 48 1988; Geary, Vigil, & Byrd-Craven, 2004). This Castellazzo, & Ickovics, 2000; Cummins, 2008). 105 49 competition can be direct, through combat or ritu- Objective status is thus certainly valuable, but 106 50 alized events, but it commonly takes the form of even perceiving relatively high levels of status can 107 51 costly signaling. Such signals require significant produce many of these benefits independent of 108 52 investment and are designed (at a functional level) actual status (Cummins, 2008). 109 53 to demonstrate the quality of a particular man over It is no surprise, then, that people possess a 110 54 and above that of other men. Think peacock tails number of cognitive adaptations that facilitate 111 55 (although in men we see other forms of conspicu- status seeking. For example, many of the positive 112 56 ous consumption, such as sports cars and picking illusions people exhibit, from unrealistic opti- 113 57 up the check at meals.) When presented with mism to a heightened sense of personal control, 114 58 mating-relevant cues, men exhibit increased atten- likely function by encouraging successful actions, 115 59 tion to attractive women as well as correspondingly promoting the signaling of high-quality traits, 116

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1 and buffering against failures (Campbell, 1986; of rules, incentives, and cognitive biases. Perhaps 58 2 Haselton & Nettle, 2006; Weinstein, 1980). These the best-known decision rule that helps to main- 59 3 illusions act as forms of self- and other-deception tain effective group functioning is reciprocal altru- 60 4 that can aid people faced with status challenges ism (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Trivers, 1971). 61 5 (Cummins, 2008; von Hippel & Trivers, 2011). From an evolutionary perspective, cooperation 62 6 Competing motivations to maintain group mem- between unrelated individuals is a puzzle (Why 63 7 bership may help to constrain unrealistic status help others if it doesn’t help my own genes?), but 64 8 perceptions within groups, however (Anderson, reciprocal altruism ensures that many interactions 65 9 Srivastava, Beer, Spataro, & Chatman, 2006). will involve relatively equal exchanges (Clark, 66 10 Other cognitions motivated by status seeking Mills, & Powell, 1986; Fiske, 1992; see also 67 11 include legitimizing perceptions of rigid social Cosmides & Tooby, 1992). Indeed, many in-group 68 12 structures (Sidanius & Pratto, 2001), the desire relationships are reciprocal in nature (Ackerman 69 13 for leadership (Van Vugt, Hogan, & Kaiser, 2008), & Kenrick, 2008; van Lange, 1999; Van Vugt & 70 14 and preferences for the use of particular social van Lange, 2006). The notion that people (and 71 15 exchange rules (Ackerman & Kenrick, 2008; many other animals; Trivers, 1971) are inclined 72 16 Fiske, 1992). Interestingly, the manner in which towards exchanges that are often time delayed 73 17 our minds are shaped by status ambitions may and content varying requires the use of particular 74 18 depend on the stability of one’s status position. social cognitive abilities. People must remember 75 19 We might expect that status attainment is associ- their interaction partners, and they must be able 76 20 ated with competitive thoughts, and indeed, people to calculate the abstract value of exchange goods 77 21 who acquire high status act competitively (or self- and services. Additionally, people need to be on 78 22 ishly) when status hierarchies are unstable. the lookout for free riders − those trying to cheat 79 23 However, when one’s position is relatively safe, the system by drawing physical or social resources 80 24 high-status individuals instead behave more coop- without adequate repayment (Price, Cosmides, & 81 25 eratively, focusing on group goals (Maner & Tooby, 2002; Yamagishi, 1986). Although social 82 26 Mead, 2010). norms help to reduce cheating behavior, people 83 27 Although women gain a number of social and have evolved specialized mechanisms for detect- 84 28 material benefits by elevating their power and ing cheaters in social exchanges (e.g., Cosmides, 85 29 prestige, men gain a unique benefit from rising in 1989) and for responding negatively to exchange 86 30 the status hierarchy − an increase in mating attrac- violations (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002). 87 31 tiveness. As mentioned earlier, status confers The fundamental nature of the goal for social 88 32 romantic desirability on men to a much stronger connection is acutely made by research on threats 89 33 degree than it does on women (Baize & Schroeder, to one’s place in a group − the problem of social 90 34 1995; Buss, 1989; Li et al., 2002). Thus, the exclusion. Forms of exclusion (rejection, ostra- 91 35 advertisement of status by men is largely a func- cism, being ignored) are hugely impactful on 92 36 tion of sexual selection pressures. Men therefore individuals, producing an array of negative conse- 93 37 are more attuned than women to potential losses quences on judgment, self-control, emotion, and 94 38 of status (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Gutierres, mental health (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Williams, 95 39 Kenrick, & Partch, 1999). This cross-domain ben- 2007a, 2007b). For example, after being exclu- 96 40 efit of status suggests that status cognitions over- ded, people feel pain (Eisenberger, Lieberman, 97 41 lap with mating cognitions, at least for men. For & Williams, 2003), exhibit deficits in intelligent 98 42 example, men who perceive a higher proportion thought and the ability to self-regulate appropri- 99 43 of males relative to females in their environment ately (Baumeister & DeWall, 2005), and experi- 100 44 (a cue to mating competition) respond by mentally ence aspects of emotional numbness (DeWall, 101 45 discounting the future and accepting more risk Baumeister, & Masicampo, 2009). When given 102 46 in their decisions (a status-relevant outcome) the opportunity, people also display a compensa- 103 47 (Griskevicius, Tybur, Ackerman, Delton, & tory motivation to make connections with new and 104 48 Robertson, in press). The same is not true for old interaction partners. For instance, excluded 105 49 women. We might expect similar forms of overlap people conform more to others’ opinions (Williams, 106 50 in other situations that cue mating and status. Cheung, & Choi, 2000), form more positive 107 impressions of and desires to interact with new 108 people (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 109 51 Affiliation 2007), and spend money in the service of identify- 110 52 People everywhere desire to form social groups ing with others (Mead, Baumeister, Stillman, 111 53 (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Caporael, 1997; Rawn, & Vohs, 2011). These patterns make func- 112 54 Leary & Cox, 2007). In-group relationships afford tional sense. Over evolutionary time, exclusion 113 55 a number of benefits − safety, romance, direction would have been tantamount to a death sentence, 114 56 in uncertain situations − and thus people attempt and thus people should possess mechanisms that 115 57 to manage those social connections using a variety are especially sensitive to exclusion. Thus, people 116

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1 are attuned to cues of potential rejection, like has historically been performed more often by 58 2 averted gaze (Wirth, Sacco, Hugenberg, & women than men. Kinship over-inclusion is also a 59 3 Williams, 2010), and they may also over-respond likely contributor to “implicit egotism” effects in 60 4 by anthropomorphizing animals and objects after which liking of and identification with others (as 61 5 exclusion (Epley, Waytz, & Cacioppo, 2007). One well as with occupations and places to live) is 62 6 important cognitive mechanism that helps to often based merely on superficial similarities such 63 7 regulate social connections is self-esteem. Instead as sharing initials or birthdays (Cohen, Garcia, 64 8 of representing a domain-general evaluative Apfel, & Master, 2006; Jones, Pelham, Carvallo, 65 9 mechanism as it has traditionally been considered, & Mirenberg, 2004). 66 10 it may be that self-esteem evolved as an indicator An interesting extension of inclusive fitness 67 11 of one’s level of acceptance in social groups involves parent−offspring conflict (Godfray, 1995; 68 12 (Leary, Tambor, Terdal, & Downs, 1995; also see Trivers, 1974). Functional, gene-level goals 69 13 Kirkpatrick, & Ellis, 2001). sometimes differ for children and parents, produc- 70 ing tensions over issues of resource investment 71 (e.g., how much and for how long children should 72 14 Inclusive fitness be supported), prosocial vs egotistic behavior, 73 15 The domain of inclusive fitness refers to the and even the decisions children make as adults. 74 16 manner in which people manage relationships For instance, parents often attempt to exert direct 75 17 with biologically related others. Biological kin- or indirect influence over the romantic choices 76 18 ship involves a different type of interpersonal tie, their children make, and these attempts typically 77 19 characterized by unique psychological mecha- stress a different set of mate qualities than chil- 78 20 nisms, than the typical affiliative relationship dren prefer (Buunk, Park, & Dubbs, 2008; Dubbs 79 21 (Park & Ackerman, 2011). Overlapping genetic & Buunk, 2010). In sum, inclusive fitness as a 80 22 structure can itself create an incentive to inter- domain of inquiry represents an important, but 81 23 act prosocially, if genes for altruism are shared understudied, window into social cognition. 82 24 between kin. Thus, the typical (cooperative) deci- 25 sion rule active among related individuals is a 26 function of the cost to oneself relative to the ben- Domain-specific and domain-flexible 83 27 efit to the other, multiplied by the probability that cognitive processing 84 28 the relevant gene is shared (Hamilton, 1964). 29 Higher degrees of relatedness often lead to higher An evolutionary perspective suggests specific 85 30 degrees of help, in terms of social support (Kivett, ways in which information relevant to functional 86 31 1985), physical safety (Daly & Wilson, 1998), problems, such as those that arise within funda- 87 32 economic inheritance (Smith, Kish, & Crawford, mental domains, is likely to be processed. 88 33 1987), and even willingness to rush into a burn- Solutions to a given problem are thought to entail 89 34 ing building to save someone (Burnstein, Crandall, the use of distinct, or modular, computational 90 35 & Kitayama, 1994). However, a high degree of mechanisms that are relatively independent of 91 36 relatedness also often leads to lowered sexual those used to address other functional problems 92 37 attraction in order to minimize genetic problems (Barrett & Kurzban, 2006; Kurzban & Aktipis, 93 38 with incest (Ackerman, Kenrick, & Schaller, 2007; Santos, Hauser, & Spelke, 2002; Sherry & 94 39 2007; Fessler & Navarrete, 2004). Schacter, 1987; Sperber, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 95 40 These forms of processing do not necessitate 1992). For instance, people use different decision 96 41 many of the cognitive requirements of strategies rules and memory procedures to manage language 97 42 like reciprocal altruism, but they do require a learning, food aversion, facial memory, and spa- 98 43 means of distinguishing kin from non-kin, and tial location. This modularity involves specificity 99 44 closer kin from less close kin. In humans, perceived of processing (e.g., which inputs relate to which 100 45 similarity, familiarity (especially co-residence functions) but it does not necessarily imply fixed 101 46 during childhood), and maternal perinatal associa- at birth or completely encapsulated responses. 102 47 tion (seeing one’s mother caring for an infant from Organisms typically possess a number of open- 103 48 birth) all may act as signals of relatedness ended mental programs that draw on environmen- 104 49 (DeBruine, 2005; Lieberman, Tooby, & Cosmides, tal information to shape those mechanisms’ 105 50 2007; Park, Schaller, & Van Vugt, 2008). When development (Mayr, 1976), or “fill the tank” (con- 106 51 such cues are present, people may be over-inclusive, sider that cars, which are specialized to accept 107 52 mentally representing unrelated others using gasoline as input, can also run on vegetable oil). 108 53 kin-based psychological mechanisms (Park & This information is often fitted to species-specific 109 54 Ackerman, 2011; Shepher, 1971; Westermarck, ecological tasks. For example, rats, which have 110 55 1921). This can support outcomes such as surrogate poor vision and rely on taste and smell to find 111 56 parenting by unrelated individuals (stepparents, food at night, easily condition aversions to novel 112 57 friends, elders, etc.), a behavior that, interestingly, tastes but not to novel visual stimuli (Garcia & 113

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1 Koelling, 1966). Although commonly misunder- Consistent with this, in their work on “befriend- 60 2 stood as “less evolved” than closed programs ing” in response to stress, Taylor and colleagues 61 3 (which are fixed), open programs are clearly adap- suggest that friendship processes “may have pig- 62 4 tive. Creatures would simply not last long if they gybacked onto the attachment-caregiving system” 63 5 were unable to respond to the changing require- employed in kinship interactions (Taylor et al., 64 6 ments of dynamic environments. People may have 2000, p. 412). 65 7 an even greater degree of flexibility than many These two examples, peak attunement and 66 8 animals in the kinds of information that they apply friendship processing, demonstrate that the inputs 67 9 to particular functional problems, but some degree considered relevant for a particular cognitive 68 10 of processing specificity still exists. We rarely see system may extend beyond the domain for which 69 11 people trying to make friends with shrubbery or that system evolved. Along similar conceptual 70 12 compete for status with sandwiches. lines, emerging work in the fields of social cogni- 71 13 Despite the general lack of one-upmanship tion and neuroscience suggests that open-ended 72 14 between person and lunch, a significant amount of systems might allow for cognitive connections 73 15 flexibility exists in how domain-relevant informa- to emerge between seemingly different domains 74 16 tion is processed and applied. Cognitive systems of processing. In the next section, we review the 75 17 may be designed to manage novelty (Flinn, 2006; ideas underlying this research and suggest that 76 18 Gangestad et al., 2006; Miller, 2000) or cast a the cross-modular development of the mind can 77 19 wide net in terms of which stimuli are perceived be explained by one particular perspective − 78 20 as relevant (Bargh, Green, & Fitzsimons, 2008; scaffolding theory. 79 21 Haselton & Nettle, 2006), and the biases these 22 systems produce can appear to apply beyond the 23 problems for which they evolved. Consider two 24 examples. From an evolutionary perspective, a A SCAFFOLDED MIND 80 25 mating motivation is designed to promote the 26 search for suitable romantic partners, which, for An understanding of the human social world 81 27 humans, includes only other humans. However, requires, and historically has required, great cog- 82 28 the decision rules that direct evaluation of suitable nitive flexibility. How might people manage the 83 29 mating characteristics may affect a broader set of novel information to which they are continually 84 30 evaluations. One such characteristic is peak life exposed? One possibility is by “fitting” this new 85 31 stage (broadly, time of maximal fecundity). information to existing knowledge structures. This 86 32 Studies show that an active mating goal causes process of conceptual integration is the hallmark 87 33 preferential attunement to targets representing a of scaffolding (Williams, Huang, & Bargh, 2009). 88 34 peak stage of development, such as women in In architecture, scaffolding refers to supporting 89 35 early adulthood but not as toddlers or older adults physical structures used to shape and construct 90 36 (Huang & Bargh, 2008). Demonstrating the wide buildings (we might also think of physical founda- 91 37 net this motivation may cast, mating-primed peak tions as being a form of scaffolding). This imagery 92 38 preference also occurs for other living targets, can also be applied to mental structures. In the 93 39 including bananas and flowers, but not for inor- mind, scaffolding refers to the utilization of 94 40 ganic objects such as cars. primitive (foundational, pre-existing) concepts as 95 41 Another example of flexible processing involves the basis for the development of derived (later) 96 42 the manner in which people think about their conceptual knowledge. This process may be one 97 43 friends. Friendship is a functionally different form of active construction, as when parents provide 98 44 of relationship than is biological kinship in that contextual support for language learning (Cazden, 99 45 we are not genetically related to our friends. 1983; Wood, Bruner, & Ross, 1976), but the focus 100 46 Yet, friends experience many kinship-relevant of much recent work, and our review here, is on 101 47 psychological cues such as prosociality, attitudi- the passive, unintentional co-opting of primitive 102 48 nal similarity, and self−other overlap (e.g., Park mental structures. In particular, existing work sug- 103 49 & Schaller, 2005; Park et al., 2008). For a number gests that a key source for primitive concepts 104 50 of reasons, women may experience many of these involves knowledge of the physical world 105 51 cues more strongly than men, which may increase (Shepard, 1984, 2001; Tooby & Cosmides, 1992), 106 52 the probability that women sometimes view whereas a key source for derived concepts involves 107 53 friends as akin to family members (Ackerman more abstract knowledge, including our under- 108 54 et al., 2007). Indeed, women’s responses to friends standing of the social world. It is clear why − 109 55 on two important kinship indicators (disgust in people, and other organisms, must interact with 110 56 response to sexual activity and nepotistic benevo- the physical world before they are able to make 111 57 lence) suggest that they may process friends using use of social information. This is of course an 112 58 the same mechanisms as those used to process kin overgeneralization, but it remains essentially true. 113 59 (Ackerman et al., 2007; Park & Ackerman, 2011). Newborns encounter a host of physical, sensory 114

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1 inputs before developing the mental capacities to 2010). Such questions remain to be answered, 60 2 understand complex social interactions (Mandler, but we expect that no one answer is universally 61 3 1992). true. 62 4 Scaffolding is an experiential process, but its In comparison to phylogenetic scaffolding, the 63 5 roots extend into the natural history of humans application of (primitive) concepts that are experi- 64 6 and biological organisms more generally. In fact, enced over the course of human development to 65 7 our use of the terms primitive and derived is itself later-experienced information (derived concepts) 66 8 co-opted from the literature on anatomical evolu- is referred to as ontogenetic scaffolding (Williams 67 9 tion. In this literature, a derived feature is a physi- et al., 2009). Through ontogenetic scaffolding, 68 10 cal structure (e.g., a wing) that is adapted from basic sensorimotor experiences encountered over 69 11 a pre-existing structure (e.g., an arm). As Mayr the course of development serve as a foundation 70 12 (1960, p. 377) pointed out, “The emergence of for understanding later, more abstract concepts. 71 13 new structures is normally due to the acquisition Much of the work supporting the idea of ontoge- 72 14 of a new function by an existing structure . . . the netic scaffolding, and our focus here, again 73 15 resulting ‘new’ structure is merely a modification involves the passive process of utilizing early 74 16 of a preceding structure.” The evolutionary devel- physical knowledge in the service of later abstract 75 17 opment of mental structures likely proceeded in knowledge. This form of scaffolding may recruit 76 18 a similar fashion (Bargh & Morsella, 2008; Buss, phylogenetic linkages, and it may also involve 77 19 Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & Wakefield, relatively domain-general physical concepts (e.g., 78 20 1998; Kenrick et al., 2010; Panksepp, 2004). sensations) that support integration of higher-level 79 21 More recent mental systems − designed to manage concepts (e.g., beliefs, impressions). 80 22 new, recurrent and species-specific needs − were How ontogeneic scaffolding might work is a 81 23 not fashioned out of whole cloth, but built in part hotly contested question at present (see Anderson, 82 24 from existing materials. These pre-existing struc- 2010; Barsalou, 1999; Boroditsky & Ramscar, 83 25 tures therefore would have established the ground- 2002; Hurley, 2008; Niedenthal, Barsalou, 84 26 work (by analogy, a schema) for the processing Winkielman, Krauth-Gruber, & Ric, 2005). 85 27 of information in novel domains, and likewise Generally, research has tended to support the idea 86 28 set constraints on how the derived structure could that abstract mental tasks recruit brain regions 87 29 function (of course, some modification would associated with sensorimotor functioning (e.g., 88 30 necessarily occur in order for the new cognitive thinking about verbs/actions activates motor con- 89 31 system to be adaptive; Wakefield, 1999). Psycho- trol areas and thinking about nouns/objects acti- 90 32 logically, then, information processing within a vates vision areas; Damasio & Tranel, 1993). The 91 33 derived domain should retain many of the hall- same is likely true for higher-order cognition, as 92 34 marks of information processing within the rele- we describe below. 93 35 vant primitive domain. This process of recruiting At least two models strongly make the case for 94 36 previously evolved mental systems can be referred sensorimotor processing serving as the primitive 95 37 to as phylogenetic scaffolding (Williams et al., feature on which abstract (and social) processing 96 38 2009). is scaffolded. One of these, the “neural exploita- 97 39 Phylogenetic scaffolding is likely widespread tion hypothesis,” suggests that because cognition 98 40 throughout the human mind. Over evolutionary is for action, thinking about things (simulation) 99 41 time, all organisms have faced certain basic, criti- requires activation of action-related brain regions 100 42 cal goals − for example, finding and processing (Gallese, 2008; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). This 101 43 food, avoiding predation or environmental damage, occurs because, just as the premotor system func- 102 44 and reproduction. As species evolved, some devel- tions to control and structure perception and 103 45 oped more complex social (and psychological) action patterns, the premotor system (becomes 104 46 systems. These systems required new ways of decoupled from these procedures and then) is 105 47 managing information, but they also relied on used to control and structure later-arising social 106 48 many of the same information-processing mecha- cognitive procedures (Gallese, 2008). As Anderson 107 49 nisms. The social world is largely physical, after (2010) describes it, people develop schemas 108 50 all. Thus, when people deal with interpersonal through experiences with objects and events that 109 51 and intrapersonal psychological issues − e.g., guide actions related to those objects and events. 110 52 How do I know if she is a good person? How do I The components of these schemas are used to 111 53 know if I’m a good person? − how these issues are construct concepts that have some (broadly 112 54 addressed is in part influenced by mechanisms defined) functional relation to elements of the 113 55 that existed previously. This influence could occur prior experiences. A second model, the “shared 114 56 simply through constraint of how derived mental circuits model,” provides a more complex, hierar- 115 57 mechanisms function (e.g., use of only certain chical construction of feedback loops that are 116 58 inputs), through recruitment of pre-existing neural predicated on sensorimotor processes and facilitate 117 59 regions, or some other process (Anderson, 2007a, social cognitive processing (e.g., mindreading) 118

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1 (for details, see Hurley, 2008). Additional possible sensation of physical warmth because early-life 57 2 models exist, however. For instance, certain experiences with physical warmth were often 58 3 emerging theories in neuroscience highlight the manifested during times of care and trust, such as 59 4 re-use of previously existing neural structures, and infant−mother contact (Bowlby, 1969; Harlow, 60 5 some of these go beyond the re-use of sensorimo- 1958). If so, later contact with warm objects 61 6 tor mechanisms (e.g., Anderson, 2007b, 2010; should conceptually prime trust and helpfulness. 62 7 Dehaene & Cohen 2007). Indeed, in one study, people who briefly held a 63 8 In the following empirical review, we focus on cup of hot coffee were more likely to rate another 64 9 the contribution of sensorimotor processing to person as socially warm than were people who 65 10 more abstract social processing. This conceptuali- held a cup of iced coffee (Williams & Bargh, 66 11 zation of scaffolding suggests the primacy of 2008). In a second study from this paper, briefly 67 12 physical processing over social processing, which touching a heated therapeutic pad (as opposed to 68 13 we believe characterizes much of the recent a cold therapeutic pad) increased the likelihood 69 14 embodied cognition work and is generally consist- that participants would choose to give a gift 70 15 ent with evolutionary history (others have seen to their friends rather than take it for themselves. 71 16 things differently; e.g., Ostrom, 1984). This should It also appears that similar neural regions are 72 17 not be taken to mean that social cognition is in involved in processing physical and social warmth 73 18 any way less important than non-social cognition. (Meyer-Lindenberg, 2008). For instance, during 74 19 Humans are fundamentally a social species, per- an economic trust (“dictator”) game, touching a 75 20 haps more so than any other. This fact may argue warm product increased people’s willingness to 76 21 that people necessarily possess a high degree of sacrifice their own immediate gains for potential 77 22 specialized, un-scaffolded mental structures for future shared profits with a partner, and this 78 23 processing the social world; however, it could increase was mediated by activation in insula 79 24 likewise suggest that a means of facilitating social (Kang, Williams, Clark, Gray, & Bargh, 2011). 80 25 cognition (through scaffolding) might be an espe- Indeed, the same specific region of insula became 81 26 cially important adaptation for humans. activated following physical cold temperature 82 27 Our claim is not that physical processing can sensation as well as after betrayals of trust (i.e., 83 28 account for the sophisticated nature of all human social coldness) in the economics game (Kang et 84 29 social processing; rather, scaffolding advances al., 2011, Study 2). 85 30 our understanding of the development and conse- In addition to temperature, there are three 86 31 quences of this conceptual integration when it other fundamental object-related properties about 87 32 does occur. A scaffolding approach also may be which people acquire knowledge − weight, tex- 88 33 uniquely powerful in helping to explain the role of ture, and hardness (Lederman & Klatzky, 1987). 89 34 incidental influences on both social judgments Evidence suggests that unique abstract concepts 90 35 and decisions, as well as on goal pursuit. Moreover, are scaffolded onto these properties as well. 91 36 it can provide a framework with which to predict Physical weight (heaviness) appears to be associ- 92 37 domains where these connections are likely to ated with importance and seriousness, physical 93 38 occur. Below, we concentrate on research that texture (roughness) with difficulty and argumenta- 94 39 employs priming methods to demonstrate such tiveness, and physical hardness with evaluative 95 40 physical and social associations. Because links rigidity. In several studies, people holding heavy 96 41 between primitive and derived structures are often clipboards judged job candidates as being more 97 42 retained, priming methods can be especially useful seriously interested in the position, viewed cur- 98 43 in revealing these underlying structural connec- rency as having more value, and engaged in 99 44 tions (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). more cognitive elaboration during preference for- 100 mation tasks (Ackerman, Nocera, & Bargh, 2010; 101 Jostmann, Lakens, & Schubert, 2009). In other 102 studies, touching rough puzzles made social inter- 103 45 Scaffolded concepts actions seem less coordinated and effortless, 104 46 Work in the realm of embodied social cognition is whereas touching hard objects (and even sitting in 105 47 quite varied, but a representative sample has hard chairs) led people to view others as both 106 48 focused on the manner through which tactile sen- more stable and strict, and themselves to engage 107 49 sory experiences make associated concepts more in more rigid negotiations (Ackerman et al., 108 50 mentally accessible. Consider the tactile dimension 2010). Such findings demonstrate how tactile sen- 109 51 of warmth−coldness, a fundamental object prop- sorimotor experiences may serve as the concep- 110 52 erty (Lederman & Klatzky, 1987) and also a funda- tual foundation for (facilitating understanding of) 111 53 mental component of interpersonal evaluation derived, abstract knowledge. We have suggested a 112 54 (Asch, 1946; Fiske, Cuddy, & Glick, 2007). The speculative reason why aspects of social warmth 113 55 conceptual understanding of interpersonal warmth would be commonly tied to physical warmth 114 56 (i.e., trust, helpfulness) may be scaffolded on the (cueing infant−caretaker closeness), and the same 115

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1 may be true for other tactile forms of scaffolding this need disappeared (i.e., was apparently satis- 57 2 (e.g., important things generally are physically fied) if they had briefly held something warm 58 3 heavier, the friction caused by physical roughness following the exclusion experience (Bargh & 59 4 makes movement more difficult, hard things are Shalev, in press). Furthermore, even simulating 60 5 inherently rigid). However, important questions physically safe experiences can interrupt people’s 61 6 remain as to whether these, and other, scaffolded goal-driven responses to social rejection, specifi- 62 7 links are themselves adaptive. cally by reducing experienced negative affect as 63 well as intentions to behave prosocially (Huang, 64 Ackerman, & Bargh, 2011). 65 Another example of goal scaffolding involves 66 8 Scaffolded goal pursuit the processing of physical and moral contagion. 67 9 Much of the research into scaffolded cognition Concerns about physical contagion stem from the 68 10 has focused on conceptual linkages. Emerging fundamental desire to avoid disease transmission. 69 11 research, though, suggests that scaffolding may The desired end state of contagion goals involves 70 12 also be implicated in goal-related processes avoiding physical impurities (social indicators 71 13 (Williams et al., 2009). A goal is a mental repre- of which are discussed above), and the means 72 14 sentation of a desired end state, including the through which to attain this state include specific 73 15 means through which to attain that end state avoidance behaviors and emotions such as disgust 74 16 (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Bargh, 1990; (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Rozin, Millman, & 75 17 Kruglanski et al., 2002). Mental representations of Nemeroff, 1986). Interestingly, concerns about 76 18 goals are distinguishable from concepts through moral contagion involve similar outcomes (avoid- 77 19 their abilities to turn on, persist in activation ing moral impurities) attained by similar means 78 20 through a delay, and deactivate following achieve- (avoidant actions, felt disgust) (Haidt, 2007; Rozin 79 21 ment of the end state (Fishbach & Ferguson, et al., 1999). Consider the moral euphemisms of a 80 22 2007). Through scaffolding, one goal may act as a “dirty player” who cheats at a game or of “wash- 81 23 primitive and one as a derived goal such that the ing away one’s sins.” Again, we should expect that 82 24 activation, operation, and completion of one goal scaffolding will set the stage for goal-related 83 25 may influence pursuit of the other goal (Williams actions at one level to interfere with goal pursuit 84 26 et al., 2009). Thus, pursuit of one goal may inform at another level. Typically, people judge unethical 85 27 progress of the other, linked goal. acts quite negatively. Deliberating on such acts 86 28 Some basic evidence supports the associa- can elicit a desire for physical cleanliness, and 87 29 tion of physical and social goal processing. For engaging in physical cleaning actions can make 88 30 instance, Zhong and Leonardelli (2008) show that moral offenses appear less wrong and actually 89 31 participants who recall being socially excluded interrupt the goal to restore one’s own moral 90 32 (an experimental manipulation that threatens purity (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2009; Zhong 91 33 affiliation goals; Park & Maner, 2009) rate the & Liljenquist, 2006). The nature of this physical 92 34 ambient temperature of their room as colder com- and moral scaffolding may even be specific to the 93 35 pared to participants who do not recall being motor modality involved. Verbal offenses trigger a 94 36 socially excluded. Both neural regions and genes desire to clean the mouth but not the hands, and 95 37 that process social affiliation threats also appear written offenses trigger a desire to clean the hands 96 38 to overlap with those that process physical pain but not the mouth (Lee & Schwarz, 2010). It is not 97 39 (Eisenberger, Lieberman, & Williams, 2003; Way, yet known whether actual interruptions of social 98 40 Taylor, & Eisenberger, 2009). For example, social goal pursuits by physical means are modality- 99 41 rejection can trigger feelings of physical numb- specific in this way. 100 42 ness (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006), which has 43 been identified as a defensive mechanism in the 44 human body to minimize distress from physical 45 injury. If we presume that goal processes which FUTURE DIRECTIONS 101 46 serve social rejection concerns are scaffolded on 47 goal systems that respond to physical pain (see Scaffolding 102 48 also MacDonald & Leary, 2005), management of 49 pain goals also may interfere with management of A number of open questions remain regarding a 103 50 rejection goals. scaffolded view of the human mind. For instance, 104 51 Consistent with this possibility, ingesting a to what extent are metaphoric priming effects 105 52 physical painkiller (Tylenol [acetaminophen]) can dissociable from pure semantic priming effects? 106 53 decrease both affective and neural reactions to Semantic priming can account for many meta- 107 54 social rejection (DeWall et al., 2010). In another phoric priming effects through the hypothesized 108 55 set of studies, socially excluded individuals were process of ontogenetic scaffolding, such that the 109 56 found to have an increased need for affiliation, but original physical concept (e.g., hardness) acquires 110

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1 additional, analogous meanings over the course multiple component structures such as good 57 2 of one’s experiences. The process would be simi- selves, bad selves, ought selves, and ideal selves 58 3 lar to that of stereotype formation and eventual (Markus & Nurius, 1986). 59 4 automatization. As stereotypes form, the original Yet, from an evolutionary perspective, compo- 60 5 group-differentiating information (e.g., skin color, nent selves cannot be generally good or bad, but 61 6 gender, age) becomes associated over time with only good or bad for some purpose. The notion 62 7 additional group-related content (e.g., stereotypic of a coherent, singular self makes even less sense 63 8 group qualities gleaned passively from the media, (Bargh & Huang, 2009; Kurzban & Aktipis, 64 9 parents, peers, other cultural sources). With suffi- 2007). Different aspects of the self likely arose for 65 10 cient use of the stereotype representation, the different purposes, and at different times. Indeed, 66 11 new meanings eventually become co-activated this evolutionarily derived, function-driven per- 67 12 with the old in an all-or-none fashion (Devine, spective has been applied to multiple aspects 68 13 1989; Hayes-Roth, 1977). In this way, the (more of mental life that have traditionally been consid- 69 14 concrete) features that activated the original con- ered under the aegis of the self, including self- 70 15 cept (e.g., physical hardness) now also activate the representations (Kurzban & Aktipis, 2007), beliefs 71 16 accrued (more abstract) features as well (e.g., (von Hippel & Trivers, 2011), motivations (Bargh 72 17 decreased willingness to compromise). & Huang, 2009; Tetlock, 2002), and phenomenal 73 18 There is no reason why embodied grounding states associated with consciousness (Morsella, 74 19 or metaphoric priming effects must all have the 2005). Similar conclusions might be drawn about 75 20 same underlying cause. There may well be multi- other traditional concepts, such as contrast and 76 21 ple causes: semantic priming may be responsible assimilation effects (Shapiro et al., 2009). Across 77 22 for some types of connections, possibly hard/soft various functional domains, these phenomena 78 23 or rough/smooth, but not be as necessary in the may exhibit important differences of process and 79 24 production of others, such as warm/cold, which outcome, suggesting that we may wish to view the 80 25 are supported by specific anatomical connections mind first in terms of function and only then in 81 26 (Kang et al., 2011). It is here that developmental terms of process. 82 27 research on infants and toddlers (pre-verbal chil- Reconsidering how the conceptual joints of 83 28 dren), as well as on non-human primates, would social cognitive research are carved offers other 84 29 be especially useful in distinguishing between intriguing implications. The very term uncon- 85 30 possible innate, early-experience, and semantic scious has been used in social cognition, and 86 31 priming accounts of physical-to-psychological cognitive science more generally, primarily to 87 32 influences (see Dunham et al., 2008). If these refer to effects that occur when a person is una- 88 33 physical influences on social judgments and behav- ware of the presence of a stimulus, thus operation- 89 34 ior are found in children who have not yet devel- alizing “unconscious” processes in terms of what 90 35 oped complex semantic knowledge, or in other the mind can do with subliminally presented stim- 91 36 primates, this would favor an innate or scaffolding uli (e.g., Dehaene, Changeux, Naccache, Sackur, 92 37 account over a semantic priming interpretation. & Sergent, 2006; Loftus & Klinger, 1992). That 93 38 We consider such developmental-comparative same term, however, has long been used in evolu- 94 39 approaches as critical for future investigations of tionary theory to refer to the unintended aspects 95 40 the scaffolded human mind. of a process, which were assumed to involve 96 supraliminal, not subliminal stimuli. Darwin 97 (1859) used the term “unconscious” (Freud was 98 only 3 at the time) when describing how farmers 99 41 Reconceptualizing social cognition and stockbreeders produced larger ears of corn 100 42 The domain-oriented approach espoused by evolu- and fatter sheep by implicitly following the laws 101 43 tionary perspectives represents a shift from tradi- of natural selection. Moreover, Dawkins (1976) 102 44 tional phenomenon- or process-oriented approaches wrote of nature as the “blind watchmaker, the 103 45 to social cognition. Cognitive structures previ- unconscious watchmaker,” stressing that there 104 46 ously examined in terms of process (i.e., how they was no intentional guiding hand in producing 105 47 work) may be fruitfully re-examined in terms of complex, evolved designs (see also Bargh & 106 48 function (i.e., why they work). One prime candi- Morsella, 2008; Buss et al., 1998; Dennett, 1991, 107 49 date for functional reappraisal is the self-construct. 1995). Limiting (theoretically) the powers of 108 50 The self, and various processes related to the self unconscious influence to how the mind can handle 109 51 (e.g., self-esteem, self-enhancement, self-control, subliminally presented stimuli is a conceptual 110 52 self-consistency), are standard topics within social mistake, as it confuses the operational definition 111 53 cognition (e.g., Bandura, 1989; Brewer, 1991; of an unconscious process with the actual scope or 112 54 Kihlstrom & Klein, 1994). Such aspects of the domain of its operation (Bargh, 1992; Morsella & 113 55 self-concept are typically considered quite broadly Bargh, in press). It also puts a conceptual road- 114 56 in their function, even when the self is divided into block in the way of appreciating the role of the 115

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