IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 1
Is a System Motive Really Necessary to Explain the System Justification Effect?
A Response to Jost (2019) and Jost, Badaan, Goudarzi, Hoffarth, and Mogami (2019)
Chuma Kevin Owuamalam1; Mark Rubin2; Russell Spears3
1University of Nottingham, Malaysia
2The University of Newcastle, Australia
3University of Groningen, Netherlands
06-03-2019
Citation:
Owuamalam, C. K., Rubin, M., & Spears, R. (2019). Is a system motive really necessary to
explain the system justification effect? A response to Jost (2019) and Jost, Badaan,
Goudarzi, Hoffarth, and Mogami (2019). British Journal of Social Psychology.
Author Note
Correspondences to Chuma Kevin Owuamalam, Division of Organisational and Applied
Psychology, University of Nottingham Malaysia, Jalan Broga 43500 Semenyih, Selangor,
Malaysia. Email: [email protected]
Word count 3,381 words (excluding tables, figure and references).
IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 2
Abstract
The debate between the proponents of SIMSA and SJT does not pivot on whether system justification occurs – we all agree that system justification does occur. The issue is why it occurs?
System justification theory (SJT; Jost & Banaji, 1994) assumes that system justification is motivated by a special system justification motive. In contrast, the social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA; Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2018) argues that there is insufficient conclusive evidence for this special system motive, and that system justification can be explained in terms of social identity motives, including the motivation to accurately reflect social reality and the search for a positive social identity. Here, we respond to criticisms of SIMSA, including criticisms of its social reality, ingroup bias and hope for future ingroup status explanations of system justification. We conclude that SJT theorists should decide whether system justification is oppositional to, or compatible with social identity motives, and that this dilemma could be resolved by relinquishing the theoretically problematic notion of a system justification motivation.
Keywords: system justification, social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA), hope, ingroup bias; social reality.
IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 3
Is a System Motive Really Necessary to Explain the System Justification Effect?
A Response to Jost (2019) and Jost, Badaan, Goudarzi, Hoffarth, and Mogami (2019)
At the heart of the debate between system justification theorists (e.g., Friesen, Laurin,
Shepherd, Gaucher, & Kay, 2019; Jost, 2019; Osborne, Sengupta, & Sibley, 2019) and social identity theorists (Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, 2019; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Spears,
Jetten, & Doosje, 2001) is whether an autonomous system justification motive is necessary to explain instances of system justification. System justification theory (SJT) assumes that this special system motive exists, and that it is necessary to explain instances of system justification amongst the disadvantaged. In contrast, the social identity model of system attitudes (SIMSA) questions the existence of an autonomous system justification motive and explains system justification with reference to previously-established motives, including the need for an accurate reflection of social reality (Rubin & Hewstone, 2004, p. 826; Spears et al., 2001; Tajfel &
Turner, 1979, p. 37; Turner, 1980, p. 142) and the need for a positive social identity (Martiny &
Rubin, 2016; Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel, 1981, p. 68). Hence, both SJT and SIMSA agree that people engage in system justification. The key difference between SJT and SIMSA is about why they engage in system justification.
Jost (2019) and Jost, Badaan, Goudarzi, Hoffarth, and Mogami (2019) argued against
SIMSA’s objections to the existence of a special system justification motive and its necessity in explaining the system justification phenomenon. The “evidence problem” is well articulated in
Owuamalam et al. (2019), and our response to Jost et al.’s (2019) comments on our arguments are summarized in Table 1. Below, we focus on the “necessity problem.”
The point that Owuamalam, Rubin, and Spears (2019) made is that personal and social identity motives can explain instances of system justification amongst the disadvantaged, and IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 4 that it is not necessary to invoke a separate system motive. SIMSA focuses on three social identity-based explanations of system justification: the social reality explanation, the ingroup bias explanation, and the hope for future ingroup status explanation. Jost (2019) objected to each of these explanations. We address each of his objection in turn.
Objections to SIMSA’s Social Reality Explanation
According to SIMSA, it is socially maladaptive for the disadvantaged to challenge their unfavorable position within a system when the elevated status of the higher status outgroup is achieved legitimately. We used a football league analogy to illustrate why losing teams might accept rather than challenge their low status position (see Owuamalam et al., 2019, pp. 6-7). Jost
(2019) partly agrees and partly disagrees with SIMSA’s position. Jost (2019) agrees when stating that
the act of “admitting defeat”—or “acknowledging objective differences,” as Marilynn
Brewer (2007, p. 733), put it—does reflect an ideological process of taking for granted
(consciously or nonconsciously) the legitimacy of the status quo, even if it involves
nothing more than “complicitous silence” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 188; see also Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Zelditch, 2001). Likewise, in a football game, “admitting defeat”
assumes the legitimacy of the league, rules of competition, the referees’ authority and
conduct, and the other team’s behavior (Jost, 2011).
However, Jost’s (2019; Jost et al., 2019) objection is that our football example trivializes the situation and does not adequately represent the entire spectrum of system justification amongst the disadvantaged. According to Jost (2019), the football analogy
drastically misrepresents the psychology of system justification; poor people, women,
and sexual minorities, among others, do not feel as if they “played” and “lost.” The IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 5
position taken by Rubin and Hewstone (2004)—and echoed by Owuamalam et al.
(2018)—trivializes (and therefore seriously mischaracterizes) problems of social and
economic inequality—and ignores the many ways in which inequality is legitimated in
society (Costa-Lopes et al., 2013).
We acknowledge that our football league analogy does not sufficiently account for the many ways in which system justification manifests amongst the disadvantaged, which was why we offered two further explanations under the SIMSA framework (i.e., the ingroup bias and hope for future ingroup status explanations). We also acknowledge that a football league analogy does not address all the complex ways in which intergroup relations operate amongst the poor, women, and sexual minorities (nor was it meant to). However, neither of these concessions imply that the football league example is irrelevant to cases of system justification amongst the disadvantaged.
It remains an example, or analogy, that illustrates a general principle. It does not imply that other more complex principles are also at work. Hence, we are unsure why the basic principle and processes that are illustrated in the football team situation should be discounted as being irrelevant to other situations in which intergroup status hierarchies are achieved via legitimate social competition. We would note that generalizations from simple situations to more complex, serious situations are commonplace in the conduct of psychological science, and system justification theory itself is grounded on the minimal group examples of outgroup favoritism that
Jost (2019) now criticizes as being “trivial.” We would also note that Jost’s (2019) criticism does not undermine the logic behind SIMSA’s social reality explanation, and that it does not diminish the utility of the empirical evidence that Owuamalam et al. (2019) used to support this explanation (e.g., Owuamalam, Rubin & Issmer, 2016).
Objections to SIMSA’s Ingroup Bias Explanation IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 6
According to SIMSA, people can sometimes conceive the “system” as an ingroup and, consequently, they may accept and even support their societal systems as a result of ingroup bias.
Again, Jost (2019) appeared to misunderstand some aspects of this view but understand other aspects. Jost (2019) misunderstands SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation when he assumes that it implies that “poor people would ‘identify with’ rich people (like Country Club Republicans)”
(Jost, 2019, pp. 20-21). SIMSA does not make this assumption or prediction. Instead, SIMSA predicts that, under some circumstances, poor people may identify with a superordinate group
(“system”) that subsumes poor and rich people. This identification with a superordinate ingroup helps to explain why the poor can support Republican/conservative policies even if those policies are detrimental to their economic prospects. Furthermore, as social identity-based research on the ingroup projection model has shown (Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, & Waldzus, 2003), some subgroups (e.g., Republicans), especially high-status groups (Rubin, 2012), can be seen to represent the superordinate group (e.g., Americans and national interests) better than others (e.g.,
Democrats). Hence, identifying with the superordinate group (“system”) can also entail a bias towards subgroups that are perceived to be more prototypical of that group.
However, Jost (2019) understands the ingroup bias explanation correctly when highlighting Shayo’s (2009) evidence that:
poor people around the world identify more strongly with their nation (and less strongly
with their social class) in comparison with rich people, and those who identify more
strongly with the nation are less supportive of economic redistribution than those who do
not.
This evidence fits SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation because it shows that, as Shayo (2009) explained, “people tend to identify more with high-status groups [i.e., nations] than with low IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 7 status groups [i.e., low social class groups]” (p. 147), and they are willing “to sacrifice material payoffs in order to enhance group status.” (p. 148). Hence, when lower class people identify with, and show bias towards, their nation, they may also show an ingroup bias in favour of their nation’s intergroup hierarchy, resulting in an aversion to economic redistribution. In short, we agree with Jost (2019) that Shayo’s work shows that “social identification and system justification are intertwined.” But, if social identification can explain system justification as Jost
(2019) acknowledges via Shayo’s (2009) evidence, then why is it necessary to posit a special system justification motive that works against the social identity motive?
Robbie Sutton was a peer reviewer who reviewed Jost’s (2019) paper. In his review, Sutton included a detailed critique of Owuamalam et al.’s (2016, 2018) work, including SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation for system justification. We are grateful to Jost for passing on this critique to us. Sutton argued that some systems cannot be conceived as groups. In particular, he argued that the university-ranking system used by Owuamalam, Rubin and Issmer (2016) cannot be conceived as a group. However, this point seems to be based on a misunderstanding of
Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer’s (2016) research hypotheses and design. Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer (2016) did not test SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation for system justification. They only tested (1) a group reputation management explanation and (2) a hope for future ingroup enhancement explanation. Neither of these explanations assumed that the university-ranking system was an ingroup, and Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer (2016) never made this claim in their article. Instead, Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer (2016) used the university ranking system to manipulate group status by asking participants to compare their university with another
Australian university that had scored either higher or lower on three status-relevant indices:
“university reputation and prestige;” “course satisfaction of graduates;” and “graduate salaries, IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 8 employment and further study” (p. 11, our emphasis). Note that Jost and Burgess (2000, Study
1) used a similar approach to manipulate group status, also referring to “average financial income, career advancement and promotions, status of professions entered, rates of admission to graduate and professional schools, and years of postgraduate education completed” (p. 297). But
Jost now criticizes the use of this approach in support of SIMSA.
To be clear, although Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer (2016) did not treat the university ranking system as a group in their research, this and other such systems can be conceived as social groups. Consistent with self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, &
Wetherell, 1987), “any variable such as common fate, shared threat, proximity, similarity, shared interests, co-operative interaction or positive interdependence which could function cognitively as a criterion of social categorization to produce an awareness of shared social identity could lead to group formation” (Turner & Bourhis, 1996, p. 34, emphasis in original). Hence, as we explained in our previous article, SIMSA and the social identity approach more broadly
“provides a rich and articulated conceptualization of the social group that allows an equally articulated conceptualization of ingroup favouritism” (Owuamalam et al., 2019, p.8).
Our online supplementary document (Table S1) details our response to the other ancillary critiques raised by Jost (2019; and Robbie Sutton) that are connected to SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation.
Objections to SIMSA’s Hope for Future Ingroup Status Explanation
According to SIMSA, people may accept and justify the status quo (even if it is currently disadvantageous to them), if they believe that there is a realistic hope for them to improve their social status within the system in the long run. Again, Jost (2019) both disagrees and agrees with this hope for future ingroup status explanation of system justification. Jost’s (2019) objection is IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 9 based on Jost and colleagues’ (2017) re-analysis of Rankin et al.’s (2009) survey of low-income
Americans. They found that 47% of low-income Americans did not expect to become rich one day, arguing that “contrary to Owuamalam and colleagues' supposition, the perceived likelihood of future success – however realistic or unrealistic – does not seem to account for system justification in the economic sphere” (Jost et al., 2017). In response, we point out that SIMSA explains that hope for future ingroup status is most likely to predict system justification when the social system is perceived to be stable in the short term but unstable in the long term
(Owuamalam et al.’s, 2018, system stability caveat). It is unclear whether the low-income
Americans in Rankin et al.’s study perceived economic mobility (“the American Dream”) to be a viable option in the long term. Furthermore, the situation is complicated in the case of socioeconomic status, because social class groups (i.e., “low income Americans”) are defined by their status. Hence, a low SES group cannot engage in upward economic mobility and become a high SES group without losing its identity as a “low SES group” in the way that, for example, women or racial minorities might better their social standing in the future while retaining their gender/racial identity.
Jost (2019) objected to SIMSA’s system stability caveat for its hope explanation by referring to Sutton’s argument that it is folly to “talk about stability through time as anything other than stability in the long term, because ‘stable, but only in the short term’ seems oxymoronic.” As Owuamalam et al. (2018) explained, “social systems that are stable in the short term cannot be altered through group members’ current actions (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) but may, nonetheless, be amenable to change in the longer term” (p. 94). It is unclear why Sutton regards this proposition to be oxymoronic. Take the gender pay gap for example. This pay gap has been relatively stable in Australia for around 20 years. Hence, it is certainly stable in the short-term. IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 10
However, it is currently at a 20-year low and there is a possibility that, in the long term (say over the next 10-20 years), the pay gap can be closed. Hence, although women may feel that their current actions cannot close the gender pay gap in the short-term, they may nonetheless feel that the system is mutable in the long-term. Consequently, they may appraise Australia’s employment system as being sufficiently fair and just in order to support their hope that it will narrow or close the pay gap in the future, thereby improving women’s status in the workplace relative to men.
SJT researchers would argue that a special system justification motive causes women to evaluate the employment system as fair and just. Instead, following SIMSA, we argue that this system justification supports a hope for future ingroup status that is motived by longer-term social identity motives.
Despite the above misunderstandings, we are glad that Jost (2019) agrees that hope for future ingroup status (or expectations of upward social mobility) “could indeed be one of many reasons why people engage in system justification” (p. 18). Jost (2019) justified this apparent shift in position following recent evidence by Day and Fiske (2017) that shows that moderate (or realistic) social mobility expectations explain system justification. According to Jost (2019,
Footnote 5, p. 18),
another possibility, which is consistent with the emphasis in social identity theory on
beliefs about social mobility (Hogg & Abrams, 1988), is that people perceive the social
system as more legitimate to the extent that it allows for (some) people to improve upon
their situation. (our emphasis)
If by “their situation” Jost is referring to their ingroup’s situation, then his position is consistent with SIMSA. However, in this case, it is unclear how this hope for future ingroup status can be regarded as being “perfectly compatible with system justification theory” (Jost, 2019, Footnote IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 11
5, p. 18). System justification theory assumes that social identity and system justification motives are in conflict among the disadvantaged (Jost, 2019, p. 22). In contrast, SIMSA argues that the social identity motive can cause system justification among the disadvantaged. The incompatibility between these two positions is quite stark. In particular, the hope of future ingroup status explanation assumes that people support the system because they want to improve their ingroup’s status and achieve a positive social identity. It is unclear whether Jost now accepts that this social identity motive could be “one of many reasons why people engage in system justification” (Jost, 2019, p. 18) or whether this explanation is invalid. Before embarking on a further quarter century quest for ways to “reduce system justification motivation” (Jost et al.
2019, p. 8), it is perhaps useful to understand:
1. why low-income Americans in Rankin et al.’s (2009) survey expressed pessimism about their
future prospects in the ‘land of opportunities’, when Day and Fiske (2017) found an
optimism-induced support for the system in the same American society, and
2. when a hope-induced system justification is likely or unlikely to emerge.
Concluding Remarks
The inconsistencies in Jost’s (2019; Jost et al., 2019) critique of SIMSA’s approach are reminiscent of the wider theoretical confusion about SJT that has yet to be resolved (see Table 1).
One approach to this confusion is to refer back to the wealth of literature on SJT and argue (as
Jost et al., 2019 does) that the critics of SJT are confused because they do not have a good understanding of the historical development of the theory. But, the nit-picking over SJT’s historical development (see Jost et al., 2019, p.4) seems relatively unproductive because it neither addresses the evidential problems nor the issue concerning the necessity of an autonomous system motive raised by Owuamalam et al. (2019). What really matters, is the IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 12 current instantiation of system justification within SJT framework. In this respect, it is useful to note that the list of cognitive, existential, epistemic, and relational motives that are thought to lie behind system justification—and that continue to have close connection to personal/group motives—now totals 11 at our last count (Owuamalam et al., 2019). Specifically, system justification is thought to be caused by:
1. cognitive dissonance and consistency (Jost, Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003, p. 15);
2. cognitive conservatism (Jost et al., 2003, p. 15);
3. attributional simplicity (Jost et al., 2003, p. 15);
4. intolerance of ambiguity and illusion of control (Jost et al., 2003, p. 15);
5. needs for order, structure, closure, and control (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, Table 2; Jost et al.,
2003, p. 15; Jost et al., 2017);
6. reactions against threats to the system and consequent instability (Jost & Hunyady, 2005,
Table 2);
7. perception of a dangerous world (e.g., threats of violence, crime, and terrorism; Jost &
Hunyady, 2005, Table 2);
8. fear of death (Jost & Hunyady, 2005, Table 2; Jost et al., 2017);
9. insecurity and affiliation with similar others (Jost, Ledgerwood, & Hardin, 2008);
10. the desire to coordinate social relationships (Jost, Gaucher, & Stern, 2015; Jost et al., 2008);
and
11. the need to establish a shared social reality (Jost et al., 2015; Jost et al., 2017; Jost et al.,
2008).
In some ways, it is easier to ask what does not cause system justification than what does cause it.
Another problem with this plethora of antecedents is that it reduces the falsifiability of system IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 13 justification theory.
The 25-year quest for a special system justification motivation has also generated copious amounts of indirect evidence that do not, in our opinion, conclusively eliminate personal and social identity motives as alternative explanations. Yet, researchers (e.g., Osborne et al., 2019, p.16) are adamant that a special system motivation guides behavior, stating that
system justification theory has developed into a generative and influential framework that
helps to explain when, and under what conditions, people will fail to act in accordance
with their own personal and group-based interests, but instead respond in ways that
maintain the system. (our emphasis)
This statement is remarkable, even when these researchers’ own evidence demonstrates that system justification: a) advances the psychological interests of the disadvantaged – as per the palliation hypothesis,
the need for uncertainty reduction, and the need for control (Bahamondes-Correa, Sibley, &
Osborne, in press; Jost, 2019, Osborne et al., 2019; see also Owuamalam, Paolini, & Rubin,
2017) and, that it b) manifests mostly strongly amongst people who depend on, or are otherwise invested in their
social systems (see Friesen et al., 2019; Jost, 2019 for a review).
It seems, therefore, that SJT researchers cannot quite make up their minds about whether system- justifying attitudes are oppositional to or compatible with the personal- and group-based interests of the disadvantaged. Of course, we appreciate the potential dilemma for SJT researchers here: maintaining the position that system justification is oppositional to social identity motives amongst the disadvantaged, ignores the evidence to the contrary (e.g., Owuamalam, Rubin,
Spears, & Weerabangsa, 2017). On the other hand, admitting that system justification is IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 14 compatible with social identity motives raises questions about the necessity of the special system justification motive, the key distinguishing feature of SJT. We believe that this dilemma can be resolved by relinquishing the theoretically problematic notion of a special system justification motivation that works against the interest of the disadvantaged. However, if the system motive is discarded in favor of a personal- and/or group-based interest explanation such as SIMSA, then there is no more ‘mystery’ to unravel (Jost, 2017; Jost, 2019, Jost et al., 2019; Osborne et al.,
2019) and then there is no further basis for system justification theory as a distinct perspective.
IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 15
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Table 1.
Response to Jost et al.’s (2019) View of the Theoretical Inconsistencies Presented by Owuamalam et al. (2019).
Theoretical inconsistency pointed out by Owuamalam Jost et al.’s (2019) reply Our response et al. (2019)
1. The disadvantaged are likely to The point of research by Kay and Friesen The initial evidence that Jost et al. (2019) support the existing social order most (2011) and Laurin, Gaucher, and Kay discussed shows that people are motivated to strongly when the system is stable (2013), it seems to us, is to demonstrate justify stable social systems (Kay & Friesen, but also most strongly when the that people are motivated to justify an 2011; Laurin, Gaucher, & Kay, 2013) but not system is unstable given SJT’s established social system (the status quo) unstable systems. However, the other line of uncertainty assumption. After all, but not circumstances that are in flux (a research that Jost et al. refers to shows that, if unstable systems should generate system that is not clearly established, that unstable systems induce a chronic or greater uncertainty than stable ones, is not experienced as the status quo). This temporary sense of uncertainty, then people and people should be most motivated is consistent with the theoretical notion should engage in system justification (Hennes, to seek stability and order via system that a stable (seemingly inevitable) social Nam, Stern, & Jost, 2012; Jost et al., 2012). justification under such conditions. system satisfies epistemic needs for Hence, as we originally suggested, the certainty more than a social system that is inconsistency in SJT is that both stable and not clearly established (i.e., a unstable systems should motivate system counterfactual possibility). In another line justification. This type of flexibility is of research, Hennes, Nam, Stern, and Jost problematic because it does not permit the (2012) demonstrated that people who are falsification of the theory. chronically lower (vs. higher) in the need for cognition (and therefore higher in the desire for certainty) endorsed more conservative, system-justifying beliefs and opinions, and Jost et al. (2012) found that temporarily inducing a sense of uncertainty reduced support for system-challenging collective action even on the part of low system justifiers. There is no inconsistency IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 22
between these lines of research. People who seek to reduce uncertainty (either chronically or temporarily) are more likely to justify the social system, but this will only satisfy their epistemic motivation when the social system is solidly established and therefore provides a sound basis for the attainment of order, certainty, and closure.
2. System justification soothes moral Yes, system justification is negatively We agree that it is important to distinguish outrage and thereby reduces political associated with moral outrage directed at between system-challenging and system- mobilization amongst the the societal status quo and the desire to supporting protest. We also agree that the disadvantaged, but also system participate in system-challenging distinction between normative and non- justification intensifies anger on the collective action (e.g., Becker & Wright, normative protest can be considered as a system’s behalf, that ultimately 2011; Jost et al., 2012; Osborne, Jost, distinction between non-disruptive and results in political mobilization on Becker, Badaan, & Sibley, in press; disruptive protest respectively (Jost et al., behalf of the status quo amongst Wakslak, Jost, Tyler, & Chen, 2007). At 2012, p. 199). However, it remains the case people who feel disenfranchised in the same time, system justification is that even system-supporting protest can be some way. positively associated with backlash (and disruptive, insofar as it involves strikes and anger) against system-challenging forms of riots and upsets the social order (Jost et al., protest and the desire to participate in 2012, p. 199). For example, supporters of the system- supporting protest on behalf of the recent government shutdown in the U.S.A. status quo (Osborne et al., in press). There would claim that, although the shutdown was is no inconsistency here as long as one disruptive, it was necessary in order to achieve distinguishes clearly between system- the broader goal of securing the U.S.A’s challenging and system-supporting forms southern border and preventing illegal of collective action, which the Social immigrants from entering the country. In other Identity Model of Collective Action words, although the shutdown was a (SIMCA) does not, but our integrative disruptive (non-normative) form of protest, it model does (see Jost, Becker, Osborne, & was nonetheless system-supporting. Does SJT Badaan, 2017a). predict that, when faced with a threat to their social system, members of disadvantaged IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 23
groups will engage in this type of disruptive, non-normative protest in order to protect that system, even if this protest poses an additional threat to the system? And does SJT predict that this “attack the system to save the system” strategy is truly independent from personal and/or group motives amongst the disadvantaged? Our own research suggests that group identification predicts the extent of both non-disruptive (normative) protest and disruptive (non-normative) protest (Owuamalam, Rubin, & Issmer, 2016, Study 3).
More importantly, it is unclear why defending (or protesting in support of) a system “on which [people’s] livelihoods depend” (Jost, 2017, p.3) constitutes an action that is enacted in the service of a special system motive that works against the personal/group interests of the disadvantaged. So, the contradiction here does not disappear simply because an interest- based collective action is rebranded as being ‘challenging’ or ‘supportive’ of the status quo.
3. System justification ‘does not Unlike Owuamalam et al. (2019), we make In our paper, we constantly referred to offer an equivalent function that a clear distinction between objective personal (ego) and group (collective) motives, operates in the service of protecting interests (what is in the rational self- interests, and identities. This personal-social the interests of the self or the group,’ interest of a given social group) and distinction is deeply rooted in the theoretical but it is beneficial to people’s subjective well-being (what makes people framework of social identity theory from personal well-being. feel good). A famous example is Marx’s which SIMSA is derived. Hence, we make a account of religion, which suggests that clear theoretical distinction between these poor people may embrace religious beliefs concepts. Our point is that, if system IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 24
as a way of coping with desperate justification is beneficial to people’s material circumstances, and this gives them or subjective interest (i.e., “what makes people consolation of an emotional nature. At the feel good”), then it is possible that system same time, it presumably makes them less justification is driven by personal motives likely to participate in collective action rather than by a special system justification that would make their lives better in an motivation. As Jost et al.’s (2019) union economic sense. Thus, there is no workers example shows below, system inconsistency between the notion that justification may sometimes simply be system-justifying beliefs serve a palliative motivated by the need to feed oneself and function and, at the same time, undermine one’s family (i.e., don’t bite the hand that objective class interests. feeds you). Is this need based on a special system justification motive or is it based on a personal motive? We would argue the latter.
Also, because Marx observed that poor people might cope with desperate circumstances by embracing religion does not necessarily imply that a natural consequence of such coping would be political demobilization. Martin Luther King Jr., was a religious minister, but he was also a political activist.
Finally, going back to Tajfel (1978): social identity theory has always acknowledged the subjective and objective aspects of social identity, inter alia, and indeed the concept social reality constraints makes little sense without recourse to an objective reality and associated interests.
4. System justification is most likely There is no motivational reason for people In the workers example, Jost et al. (2019) to occur when personal and group to justify social systems on which they do argued that the personal and group interests of interests are weak, but it is also most not depend (or that do not affect them). In non-union workers will be lower than those of IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 25 likely to occur when people are addition, Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004) union workers. This may be true. However, dependent on their systems for some hypothesized that members of our point is that the personal interests of both (personal and/or group-based) disadvantaged groups would be less likely union and non-union workers are intrinsically benefit. to justify the status quo when personal and linked to their financial dependence on their group interests are high in salience, job. Workers cannot be highly dependent on because these circumstances would their job to feed themselves and their families activate opposing ego and group and yet, at the same time, have low personal justification motives. Once again, there is interest in their job. If financial dependence is no inconsistency between these two ideas. high then, ipso facto, personal interests are Here is an example: the personal and group high (see also Owuamalam, Rubin, & Spears, interests of workers who lack union 2016; Rubin, 2016). As Owuamalam, Rubin representation will be weaker than those and Spears (2016) noted, “researchers have who possess union representation, and yet to provide convincing evidence that because of that the former group will be system dependence is conceptually and more likely to accept the demands and empirically distinct from personal/group decisions of management as legitimate and interests” (p. 3). Consequently, in our view, to justify the organizational status quo. the evidence that shows that system This is especially likely if they are justification is strongest under conditions of financially dependent on the job to feed system dependence is also consistent with the themselves and their families (van der SIMSA view that system justification is Toorn, Tyler, & Jost, 2011). However, they strongest under conditions of self- and group- will not necessarily be motivated to justify interests. the status quo in some other organization that is irrelevant to them.
5. Dissonance-based system First, it is not entirely clear to us that We have also never said that (a) cognitive justification operates consciously, as dissonance-related processes must occur at dissonance reduction and system justification per cognitive dissonance theory, but a conscious level of awareness. Second, are one and the same nor that (b) system also unconsciously, when dissonance we have never suggested that cognitive justification cannot operate at nonconsious is least likely. dissonance reduction and system levels. Our point is that dissonance-based justification are one and the same. Third, it system justification is unlikely to operate at is true that Jost and Banaji (1994) the nonconscious level. We base this argument theorized that system justification may on the point that dissonance is most likely to IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 26
operate either consciously or occur when people are aware (i.e., not unconsciously. Is there some reason why it unconscious) of the competing preferences cannot operate at conscious and open to them (see Gawronski & Strack, 2004, nonconscious levels of awareness, like and classic statements of dissonance theory). many other goal systems?
6. Hope-induced system justification From the perspective of system Jost et al. (2019) explained that the hope that helps people to cope with justification theory, people want to believe people will benefit directly from the system is disadvantage, but also hoping that that the social systems on which they not “the only reason” for system justification. one’s outcomes will improve in the depend will treat them fairly. In that sense First, we are glad that Jost et al. agree that future has little to do with system (and perhaps others), system-justifying hope for future improvement may be a reason justification. belief systems do help people to cope with for system justification. We agree that hope disadvantage (Jost & Hunyady, 2002). But for future ingroup improvement is not “the this does not mean that the only reason only reason.” SIMSA offers two other why people support the capitalist system is identity-based reasons for system justification: because they hope (and hold out faith) that (a) the reflection of social reality and (b) they will benefit directly from the system, ingroup bias. But if an interests-based hope such as by becoming rich one day. On the for future ingroup status can explain system contrary, we find that poor people who are justification as Jost (2019) acknowledges, then optimistic about their own financial futures why is a special system justification are no more likely to justify the social motivation necessary? In any case, we look system than poor people who are more forward to the results of Jost and colleagues pessimistic (Jost, Langer, Badaan, studies on hope. We recommend that they Azevedo, Etchezahar, Ungaretti, & consider hope for future ingroup status as a Hennes, 2017b). In any case, it is key variable in their studies. important to distinguish clearly between the emotion of hope and the expectation of future rewards. We are presently conducting research to investigate the possibility that increasing emotional experiences associated with certain kinds of hope will reduce system justification motivation and promote system- IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 27
challenging collective action.
7. System justification serves a Following Kluegel and Smith (1986), Jost The point that we were making was that it is palliative function for the well-being and Hunyady (2002) proposed that system in people’s personal interest to feel good about of the disadvantaged, but it is also justifying beliefs serve the (short-term) themselves in order to function properly. If the negatively related to the well-being palliative function of making everyone— system motive does not operate in the service of the disadvantaged. whether advantaged or disadvantaged— of protecting the psychological interests of the feel better about the status quo. Research disadvantaged (Jost & Banaji, 1994, p.10), does indeed suggest that system then activating this motive should be justification is associated with increased unconnected to how people feel about positive affect and decreased negative themselves. We recommend that system affect (e.g., Haines & Jost, 2000; Jost, justification theorists clarify their hypotheses Pelham, Sheldon, & Sullivan, 2003; in order to explain why system justification is Waklsak et al., 2007). At the same time, most likely to increase positive affect and why Jost and Hunyady argued that—because it is also most likely to lead to depression and system justification is potentially in other negative states, when the system motive conflict or contradiction with ego and is theorized to be unconnected to the group justification motives—it may also be psychological interests of the disadvantaged. associated with depression, neuroticism, ambivalence, and internalization of inferiority over longer periods of time. This is what research by Jost and Thompson (2000) suggested, and recent studies involving sexual minorities suggest that system justification exerts both protective (or palliative) effects as well as deleterious consequences, such as internalized homonegativity (Bahamondes- Correa, 2016; Suppes, Napier, & van der Voorn, in press). Thus, it makes little sense to assume, as Owuamalam et al. (2019) appear to, that system justification must be either good or bad for members of IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 28
disadvantaged groups. There are costs and benefits associated with it.
8. The system justification motive is In an effort to distinguish system- With regards to Bonnot and Krauth-Gruber’s unconsciously activated only when defensiveness in response to system-level (2018) study, Rubin’s (2016) point was simply the system (but not social identity) is threats (as hypothesized on the basis of that making French nationality salient may threatened, but also that the system system justification theory) from group- also make French gender stereotypes salient motive is unconsciously activated defensiveness in response to group-level (superordinate identities can after all frame when social identity needs and threats (as hypothesized on the basis of intergroup comparison at the lower level tendencies are active qua social identity theory), Liviatan and Jost according to self-categorization theory). He dependency on social systems. (2014) demonstrated that a threat to the had no evidence that the maths and verbal task U.S. socioeconomic system (but not a performance effects observed by Bonnot and threat to the group of Americans) Krauth-Gruber could be explained as greater increased the automatic cognitive adherence to those stereotypes through a accessibility of legitimacy-related words in process of social identification. However, a lexical decision task. In a separate line of neither Bonnot and Krauth-Gruber nor Jost et research, Bonnot and Krauth-Gruber al. had any evidence against this potential (2018) found that women who were made explanation. to feel dependent on the social system emphasized their verbal proficiency over Liviatan and Jost’s (2014, Experiment 1b) math- related proficiency, apparently provided some evidence that threat to engaging in self-stereotyping that America’s capitalist economic system (i.e., a maintained male hegemony in STEM “system threat”) produced a system fields. Based on earlier work using a justification effect, whereas threat to similar paradigm, Rubin (2016) claimed America’s creativity (i.e., a “group threat”) that the system dependency manipulation did not. The researchers concluded that this could have made French national evidence ruled out an ingroup bias explanation identification salient, which might have led of system justification. However, the null women to act in ways that are consistent finding for the threat to American creativity with gender stereotypes. From our point of does not necessarily imply that the significant view, it needs to be clarified why it is part finding for the threat to American capitalism of “French national identity” that women is unrelated to national identity. It is possible (but not men) are stronger in verbal than that some threats to national identity are more IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 29
math proficiency. A more likely effective than others, and that capitalism is explanation, it seems to us, is that women more central to the American identity than in the high (vs. low) system dependency creativity. condition are justifying gender disparities in Western societies rather than expressing Nonetheless, the bigger question that Jost et an identification with France. In any case, al. (2019) did not address in their response is we see no obvious incompatibility between how and why an unconscious system these two different research programs. justification motive can be activated when the system is threatened, but not activated when the social identity—that is based on that system and motivated by system dependence—is threatened. IS SYSTEM JUSTIFCATION REALLY INDEPENDENT FROM SOCIAL IDENTITY 30
Online Supplementary Document Table S1. Ancillary Issues in the Debate between SJT and SIMSA: The First Column Contains Quotes from Jost (2019) and Jost et al. (2019), and the Second Column Contains our Response to them. Objections from Jost (2019) Our Response The Prior Critiques of SIT were not Really Critiques In proposing system justification theory, we took seriously—perhaps more seriously than the authors This is untrue. As Rubin and Hewstone (2004) pointed out… themselves—two critiques of social identity theory wielded by Hewstone and Ward (1985) and Hinkle and Brown (1990). Both argued that existing approaches to intergroup relations— including that of Jost and Banaji (2004) referred to Hinkle and Brown’s (1990, p. 49) argument that “out-group Tajfel and Turner (1979)—failed to provide an adequate account of outgroup favoritism (see Jost & favouritism per se does not fit with [social identity theory’s] view that group members create and Banaji, 1994, for details). maintain positive social identities by engaging in in group favouring processes of intergroup comparison”. However, according to SIT, ingroup favouritism is not the only way to support one’s social identity. In particular, Tajfel and Turner (1979) made it clear that, although members of low status groups may show out-group favouritism in deference to a stable and legitimate status hierarchy, they are also motivated to adopt cognitive identity management strategies (“social creativity” strategies) in order to mitigate the impact of their negative social identity. Hence, although out-group favouritism goes against the need for a positive social identity, cognitive identity strategies support this need, consistent with SIT. Jost and Banaji (2004) also suggested that Hewstone and Ward (1985) criticised SIT for providing an inadequate account of outgroup favouritism. In fact, Hewstone and Ward explained the outgroup favouritism in their research in terms of social identity processes interacting with the cultural context (pp. 618, 620).
More generally, it can be argued that SIT does provide an adequate account of outgroup favoritism. Tajfel and Turner, (1979, p. 37) explained that “subordinate groups…internalize a wider social evaluation of themselves as ‘inferior’ or ‘second class’, and this consensual inferiority is reproduced as relative self-derogation.” SIT also explained when this ingroup derogation and outgroup favouritism is most likely to occur vis-à-vis stability and legitimacy (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 37; see also Rubin & Hewstone, 2004, p. 828).
The Strong Hybrid Version of the System Justification Hypothesis It does not follow from the logic of system justification theory that the disadvantaged are usually or Jost et al., 2004 (p. 909) stated that “the strongest, most paradoxical form of the system justification typically more likely than the advantaged to support the overarching social system, which is a view hypothesis, which draws also on the logic of cognitive dissonance theory, is that members of that has been repeatedly misattributed to us (Brandt, 2013; Caricati, 2017; Owuamalam et al., 2016b, disadvantaged groups would be even more likely than members of advantaged groups to support the 2018; Vargas-Salfate et al., 2018b). status quo, at least when personal and group interests are low in salience.” This statement implies that, when personal and group interests are low in salience, members of disadvantaged groups should be usually or typically more likely than members of advantaged groups to support the status quo. As Owuamalam et al. (2019) noted, there is an obvious reason why the strong dissonance-based version of system justification theory has received so much research attention: It provides the most theoretically distinctive and diagnostic predictions in contrast with SIT. As Owuamalam et al. (2019) explained, “without the ‘the strongest, most paradoxical form of the system justification hypothesis’ (Jost et al., 2004, p. 909), we are left with a much weaker form of the hypothesis that makes predictions that coincide with many of the interest-based predictions made by social identity theory.” For example, both SJT and SIT would predict that, when an intergroup status hierarchy is perceived as stable and legitimate, members of the low status group will acknowledge the superiority of the high status group (e.g., (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 37; see also Rubin & Hewstone, 2004, p. 828). The difference between SJT and SIT under these conditions is not in the prediction but in the explanation. SJT proposes that this acknowledgement is motivated by a special system justification motive, whereas SIT assumes that it functions in the service of people’s social identity.
The Weak Version of the System Justification Hypothesis What is remarkable to me is that disadvantaged groups—such as members of the working class— This weak version of the system justification hypothesis does not seem to fulfil the requirements for a subscribe to the legitimacy of the status quo as much as they do (Jost, 2017; see also Manstead, 2018). clear scientific hypothesis. In particular, it is unclear how researchers might be expected to falsify the This is what needs to be understood and overcome —if one hopes for an end to unnecessary social and hypothesis that “disadvantaged groups…subscribe to the legitimacy of the status quo as much as they economic suffering, as I do. do” (our emphasis). Exactly how much should disadvantaged groups be expected to subscribe (or not) to the legitimacy of the status quo? How do we test whether the extent to which they actually subscribe to the status quo is consistent or inconsistent with SJT?
The Rarity of Moral Outrage/Protest Amongst Society’s Losers We are unsure about the basis on which Jost (2019) asserts that moral outrage (or indeed the the fact that moral outrage and protest activity are surprisingly rare among society’s “losers” expression of such emotions) is rare. People do protest even when events that they are outraged about are least personally relevant (e.g. Occupy Wall Street protests) and this is evident even in Jost’s own work (see Jost et al., 2012). The question is why are people sometimes unlikely to protest against issues that anger them, and Owuamalam et al. (2019) adds to the numerous social identity explanations for social stasis (e.g. fear, perceived efficacy, cost-benefit appraisals) by offering three further accounts for this phenomenon under the SIMSA framework (i.e. the social reality caveat, ingroup bias and hope for future improvements to social identity).
SIMSA Accepts that System Justification Occurs. It Disputes Why it Occurs. In such contexts the act of “admitting defeat”—or “acknowledging objective differences,” as Marilynn We completely agree. As Jost (2019) explained, “acknowledging objective differences” (Brewer, 2007, Brewer (2007, p. 733), put it—does reflect an ideological process of taking for granted (consciously or p. 733) does require group members to accept the legitimacy of those differences (a la SIT). Likewise, nonconsciously) the legitimacy of the status quo, even if it involves nothing more than “complicitous a football team cannot “admit defeat” unless they first accept that both sides have played the same silence” (Bourdieu, 1986, p. 188; see also Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Zelditch, 2001). Likewise, in a game by the same rules. Indeed, it was Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 41) who first argued that low status football game, “admitting defeat” assumes the legitimacy of the league, rules of competition, the group members may only be expected to acknowledge the superiority of the high status group after referees’ authority and conduct, and the other team’s behavior (Jost, 2011). they have accepted the legitimacy of the status quo:
When winning and losing establish shared group evaluations concerning comparative superiority and inferiority, then, so long as the terms of the competition are perceived as legitimate and the competition itself as fair according to these legitimate terms, the losing group may acquiesce in the superiority of the winning out-group (our emphasis).
Hence, we agree with Jost (2019) that “playing by the rules of the game” involves “granting legitimacy to (and reinforcing) status and power differences.” This is not the point of our criticism against SJT. The key distinction between SIMSA and SJT is not based on whether system justification effects occur but rather why they occur. SJT assumes that system justification is motivated by a special system justification motive. In contrast, SIMSA explains system justification with reference to more conventional motives, including the need for accuracy in response to social reality and the need for a positive social identity (see also Rubin & Hewstone, 2004; Tajfel, 1981, p. 68). In short, we do not challenge the evidence for system justification, we challenge the evidence for a system justification motive. As Owuamalam et al. (2018) explained, “SIMSA…account[s] for both passive and active support for social hierarchies in a theoretically consistent manner and without recourse to the theoretically problematic notion of an independent system-justification motive” (p. 4).
Brandt’s (2013) Evidence Jost argued that Brandt (2013) “found little or no consistent evidence of group-based self-interest. His We disagree with this interpretation of Brandt’s (2013) evidence. Brandt (2013, p. 771) found that “six null results are therefore equally at odds with theories of realistic group conflict, social identification, effects out of 14 were significant and positive, directly contrary to the status–legitimacy hypothesis. and social dominance” That is, people with more education (ANES), who were White (GSS), who were male (WVS), or who had high social class (GSS and WVS) were more likely to see the social system as legitimate compared to their less educated, ethnic minority, female, and lower social class counterparts.” Note that these six positive associations between status and legitimacy are consistent with SIT, which predicts that high status groups should show greater system justification than low status groups (see also Brandt, 2013, p. 765).
Owuamalam et al. (2016b, 2018) Conflate Self-Interest with Self-Relevance They conflate “self-interest” with “self-relevance” when they suggest that there is an incompatibility We acknowledge that we conceptualize self-interest as being closely related to self-relevance. between cognitive dissonance theory and the hypothesis that system justification motivation among However, the close relationship is real. Readers will find it difficult to think of something that is members of disadvantaged groups “should be apparent only when their personal and group interests are relevant to them but that does not have the potential to affect them or one of their social groups. relatively weak,” because “dissonance should be greatest when dissonance-arousing cognitions are self-relevant and important” (p. 92). Jost (2019) agrees “that people are only motivated to justify the status quo when it is personally relevant (see Kay et al., 2002).” SJT operationalises this personal relevance in terms of system dependence (e.g., Jost, Gaucher, & Stern, 2015). However, as Owuamalam et al. (2016b) explained, “theoretically, it is unclear why dependence on a social system (e.g., healthcare) would not be strongly related to (vested) personal and group interests associated with that system.” To drive this point home, Owuamalam et al. (2016b) noted that system justification researchers who have measured and manipulated system dependence have tended to do so in relation to personal and group interests. For example, Kay et al.’s (2009) manipulation of system dependence referred to “enormously broad effects on your life and wellbeing...[affecting] the taxes you pay, the job and investment opportunities made available to you...”. In addition, their measure of system dependence included items such as “the decisions and actions of the federal government affect me personally” (p. 427). Hence, we believe that connecting self-interest with self-relevance is not only logical but also accepted practice in this research area (for a further illustration, see Rubin’s, 2016, comment on Bonnot & Krauth-Gruber, 2017).
It is naïve to assume that the only people who defend and justify the capitalist system, for instance, are It is unclear why it is naïve to make this assumption. As Owuamalam, Rubin, and Spears (2016) noted, those who benefit from the system or are otherwise motivated by self-interest (or, for that matter, only “researchers have yet to provide convincing evidence that system dependence is conceptually and those who identify with the group of “capitalists”). empirically distinct from personal/group interests” (p. 3). At the very least any credible account of an independent system justification motive surely has to rule this out. Consequently, in our view, the evidence that shows that system justification is strongest under conditions of system dependence is also consistent with the SIMSA view that system justification is motivated by self- and group-interests.
Owuamalam et al. (2018) Confuse Social Stability with a Lack of Choice I see no reason from a cognitive dissonance perspective why a highly stable social system—such as The point that Owuamalam, Rubin and Spears (2016) made, which was also repeated in Owuamalam, capitalism—would fail to inspire motives for justification, as long as citizens feel that they are Rubin and Spears (2019), is not that instances of system justification may never occur in stable choosing to participate in it—as opposed to being coerced (as in a totalitarian system). systems. It is that (a) SJT predicts that system justification is most likely under conditions of uncertainty (e.g., Jost et al., 2012), (b) unstable systems are more likely to produce uncertainty than stable systems, and consequently (c) system justification should be more likely to occur in unstable systems than in stable systems.
Robbie Sutton’s Critique as represented by Jost (2019). It [i.e., Owuamalam, Rubin, & Issmer, 2016, Study 2] doesn’t have an orthogonal manipulation of We agree that we did not manipulate short-term stability in Owuamalam, Rubin, and Issmer (2016) short vs. long-term stability study. However, our design did allow us to investigate the critical effects of long-term stability (stable/unstable) when short-term stability was high. If short-term stability was low, then we would expect a social competition strategy to manifest rather than a system justification strategy. Hence, the low short-term stability condition is not critical to competitive tests between SJT and SIT.
The manipulation refers to more or less stochastic fluctuations through time and not about the We believe that Tajfel would agree with our concept of long-term status stability. Our belief is based likelihood of progress: for one group to systematically improve its position, of the kind that interested on Tajfel and Turner’s (1979, p. 45) own football analogy: Tajfel. […] The manipulation does not refer to any change in the system. It just refers to the hierarchical position of groups within the system. Let us consider a comparison between two football teams that have come first and second in their league, respectively. There is no argument about which has the higher status, but alternative comparative outcomes were and, in the future, still will be possible. When the new season begins, the teams will be as comparable and competitive as they had been before. In this instance, the status difference does not reduce the meaningfulness of comparisons because it can be changed (emphasis in the original).
Note that Tajfel and Turner pointed out that “there is no argument about which [football team] has the higher status.” It is clear who won the league, and the second-placed team must concede to this social reality, which is stable in the short-term. However, as Tajfel and Turner explained, in the longer term, when the new season begins, the status system can be changed.
Sutton’s reference to “the likelihood of progress” suggests that he is conflating system stability with upward mobility. Owuamalam, Rubin and Issmer’s (2016) hypothesis was that the mere perception of long-term instability would be sufficient for highly identified group members to engage in system justification in order to support a system that they viewed as having the potential to improve their ingroup’s social status. Given this hypothesis, it would have been inappropriate to advise our participants that it was “likely” that their ingroup’s status would increase over time because this manipulation would not test our hypothesis. SIMSA posits that group members engage in system justification because they hope to improve their ingroup status, not because they are assured of improving the ingroup status. Furthermore, this alternative manipulation would be likely to be viewed with skepticism by our participants. How are we supposed to know that the current low status ingroup will achieve a higher status in the future?
Owuamalam et al. “also describe the university system ranking system as ‘legitimate,’ which they Owuamalam, Rubin and Issmer’s (2016, Study 2) experimentally manipulated three variables: (1) describe as a precondition for [system justification] effects, but no effort is made to manipulate the group identification, (2) group status, and (3) long-term status stability. We agree that it would also legitimacy of the university ranking system: the legitimacy of the ranking system is rather a DV.” have been helpful to experimentally manipulate (4) short-term stability and (5) the legitimacy of the university system. However, this approach would have resulted in a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 between-subjects design and, with 50 participants per cell, we would have needed to recruit 1,600 participants. Given our time and resource constraints, we decided to concentrate on the most theoretically relevant manipulations.
The Anarchy argument Owuamalam et al. (2018) also claim it is inconsistent with system justification theory to propose that We agree that challenging the system and pushing for social change aggravates feelings of uncertainty “a rejection [of the social system] is likely to be regarded as being unrealistic because it implies a and threat. In the case of system rejection, the uncertainty is uncertainty about what will happen after revolution and anarchy that could invoke much greater uncertainty and threat” (p. 94), but it is not. the old system, its groups, and associated social identities have gone, and what the new system, new This is precisely why I argue that challenging the system—and pushing for social change—aggravates groups, and new social identities will be like. The threat is that things may be worse in the new system feelings of uncertainty and threat and triggers backlash (Hennes et al., 2012; Jost & Hunyady, 2005; than in the old. Hence, our point is that system rejection, and the ensuring anarchy, involves incredible Jost et al., 2008a, 2017b). stakes that seem to be unacknowledged by SJT. Although system justification researchers have touched on the idea of system rejection (Cichocka & Jost, 2014, p. 18; Jost et al., 2012), they do not consider its ultimate implications for social identities. Indeed, to our knowledge, SJT has never considered nor been confronted by this anarchy argument, but this counterfactual is central to the implications of any form of system rejection that is implied as being the “obvious” counter to system acceptance or justification. System rejection is thus far from obvious or easy or a natural default in contrast to system justification.
Objections from Jost et al. (2019) Our Response In an effort to grapple with the phenomenon of working class conservatism, Owuamalam et al. write As we explained previously, SIT makes the straightforward prediction that, to the extent that poor that: “poor Americans may vote for political parties that are against the increased subsidization of Americans identify with America, they will not support political parties that they perceive to national health care, and they may vote for these parties because they identify highly with America, promulgate anti-American attitudes and values, including the rejection of free market capitalism, they perceive free market capitalism to be a defining value of this national ingroup, and they are materialism, or anything else that is perceived to work against an American identity. Importantly, this motivated to engage in behaviours (including voting) that support these values” (p. 8), but this is ingroup favouritism can occur even if it causes personal disadvantage (e.g., Abrams & Emler, 1992; question-begging. Why don’t poor Americans support political parties that will provide them with Gagnon & Bourhis, 1996). SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation of system justification applies these SIT health care, why don’t poor Americans reject materialistic and other symbols of American identity that principles to the national level and argues that even poor Americans will be willing to forgo some devalue and disparage them, and why don’t they question the legitimacy of free market capitalism, personal advantages in order to achieve a positive social identity vis-à-vis their nationality. which forces them to work harder and harder for less pay from one decade to the next, and so on? Theoretical hand-waving about “superordinate group identification” brings us no closer to answering these important questions about the specific contents of ideologies and identities.
Biko recognized a fundamental truth about ideology and social relations that Owuamalam et al. (2019) Some of the ideas that we hold may not be good for us personally (e.g., voting for a political party that do not: some of the ideas we hold are quite simply not good for us, and in that sense, they do not serve causes relative deprivation). Nonetheless, these ideas may help to support a positive social identity our interests or the interests of our in-groups. (e.g., identifying with a right-wing political party; Abrams & Ellemers, 1996). In short, we need to be clear about what “us” means and SIT and SIMSA provides the tools to understand why some group interests (e.g., nationality) may be incompatible with personal and other group interests (e.g. social class). These different levels of self/reality avoid the problem of defining the mismatch between personal and group interests in terms of “false consciousness”, bias etc. Interests are identity contingent.
Second, Owuamalam et al. (2019) speculate that: “Perhaps in response to the foregoing issues, recent Our point is not that SJT never said system justification could be unconscious (it did, as Jost notes), but revisions of SJT now emphasize that the system justification motivation mostly operates at the rather that SJT has de-emphasised the conscious part of its proposition and now seem to focus more on nonconscious level.” They fail to realize that the nonconscious basis of system justification was nonconscious system justification. Hence, according to Jost (2017a, our emphasis): “My work focuses proposed in the very first article by Jost and Banaji (1994), and it received prominent treatment in a on system justification motivation — the tendency to defend, bolster and justify aspects of the societal major review article published after the first decade of research by Jost, Banaji, and Nosek (2004). status quo, often at a nonconscious level of awareness.” It is important to note, however, that Jost did not address the substantive issue raised by Owuamalam et al. (2019) in the specific section that he highlighted. The question was: can a dissonance-based system justification motivation operate unconsciously? We think that it cannot, at least based on Gawronski and Strack (2004).
Third, and finally, Owuamalam et al. write that, “Harding and Sibley (2013) have attempted to resolve To be clear, Jost et al. (2019) are not disputing our interpretation of Harding and Sibley (2013). Their these theoretical inconsistencies in a time-course palliation hypothesis, arguing that system justification concern seems to be about who first raised the time-course palliation hypothesis. We note that Jost and offers short-term respite to the well-being of the disadvantaged, but ultimately worsens their well-being Hunyady (2002) may have raised the possibility of a time-course palliation hypothesis, but we credited in the long run” (pp. 12-13). In truth, Harding and Sibley were investigating a hypothesis about short- Harding and Sibley (2013) because, in our view, they were the ones to provide the first formal test of term vs. long-term tradeoffs that was advanced in the very first article on the palliative function of the hypothesis. Again, the issue of “who said what when” can be regarded as a distraction to the more system justification by Jost and Hunyady (2002). substantive issues. their failure to understand that the theory specifies three (ego, group, and system justification) motives The first part of Jost et al.’s (2019) critique here is untrue. Owuamalam, Rubin and Spears (2019) were rather than just one (Jost & Banaji, 1994), and this clearly explains why members of advantaged clear about these motives, stating, for example, that: groups are typically stronger supporters of the social system than members of disadvantaged groups (Jost, Burgess, & Mosso, 2001). We regard SIMSA’s social identity explanation as more parsimonious than SJT’s system motive explanation because it explains the system justification phenomenon using two constructs (personal and group motives) whilst SJT explains it with three constructs (‘ego’ [or personal], group, and system motives).
The second part of Jost et al.’s (2019) comments argues that the ego and group justification explanations are typical for members of advantaged groups because, for this group, the system motive is in sync with their personal and group motives. We have argued that a diagnostic test of the existence of the special system motive needs to demonstrate that it also occurs amongst the disadvantaged because, in this instance, SJT assumes that personal/group interested motives are opposed to the system justification motive. Owuamalam et al.’s (2019) argument concentrated on this diagnostic portion of system justification theory, showing that a closer look at the system-justifying tendencies amongst the disadvantaged demonstrates that they may also be explained in terms of a social accuracy and identity motives.
Owuamalam et al. (2019) claim that their account is more parsimonious than ours, writing that: We find Jost’s (2019) question to be helpful, and we are also happy to let readers decide which is the “people who are less strongly invested in their subgroup identities are likely to be more willing to more parsimonious explanation. We would simply note that SIMSA’s ingroup bias explanation refers recategorize at the superordinate level, identify strongly with this common ingroup, and show common to a single motivation: the need to achieve a positive social identity. The system justification ingroup bias. Hence, [we predict] that people who show low subgroup identification and high ingroup explanation accepts this social identity motive but introduces a second motivation: the need to justify identification will show the greater common ingroup favouritism, which can explain system the system. Hence, from our perspective, the social identity explanation is more parsimonious because justification” (p. 10). We ask the reader which is the more parsimonious explanation—the one above or it uses fewer theoretical constructs to explain the same phenomenon. this one: for members of disadvantaged (but not advantaged) groups there is a negative association between group justification motives to favor their own (sub)group and system justification motives to favor (out)groups that are privileged by the social system (Jost et al., 2001).