INDICATIONS of PROPULSION SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS November 2004 6
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DOT/FAA/AR-03/72 Indications of Propulsion System Office of Aviation Research Malfunctions Washington, D.C. 20591 November 2004 Final Report This document is available to the U.S. public through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. U.S. Department of Transportation Federal Aviation Administration NOTICE This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation in the interest of information exchange. The United States Government assumes no liability for the contents or use thereof. The United States Government does not endorse products or manufacturers. Trade or manufacturer's names appear herein solely because they are considered essential to the objective of this report. This document does not constitute FAA certification policy. Consult your local FAA aircraft certification office as to its use. This report is available at the Federal Aviation Administration William J. Hughes Technical Center’s Full-Text Technical Reports page: actlibrary.tc.faa.gov in Adobe Acrobat portable document format (PDF). Technical Report Documentation Page 1. Report No. 2. Government Accession No. 3. Recipient's Catalog No. DOT/FAA/AR-03/72 4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date INDICATIONS OF PROPULSION SYSTEM MALFUNCTIONS November 2004 6. Performing Organization Code 7. Author(s) 8. Performing Organization Report No. S.T. Clark, R.E. Iverson, R.J. Mumaw, J.A. Sikora, J.L. Vian, and V.J. Winters CDRL Item 3c 9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No. (TRAIS) The Boeing Company P.O. Box 3707 Seattle, WA 98124 11. Contract or Grant No. DTFA03-01-C-00032 12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered U.S. Department of Transportation Final Report Federal Aviation Administration 09/25/01 through 12/31/02 Office of Aviation Research 14. Sponsoring Agency Code Washington, DC 20591 ANE-100, ANM-100 15. Supplementary Notes The FAA William J. Hughes Technical Monitor was William Emmerling. 16. Abstract This report summarizes the concepts, risks, issues, and conclusions of efforts to assess technical feasibility and operational appropriateness of providing indications of propulsion system malfunctions. 17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement Propulsion system malfunction, Inappropriate crew response This document is available to the public through the National Technical Information Service (NTIS), Springfield, Virginia 22161. 19. Security Classification (of this report) 20. Security Classification (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price Unclassified Unclassified 257 Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72) Reproduction of completed page authorized ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This study involved a large and diverse group of individuals and organizations. The following individuals, in particular, are acknowledged for their participation, work, and support: The Boeing Company: Sam Clark, John Doherty, Jenny Gertley, Gene Iverson, Allen John, Joe MacDonald, Jay Mesick, Randy Mumaw, Bob Myers, Joel Purificacion, James Johnson, Eric Schwartz, Joe Sikora, Doug Swanson, Dennis Tilzey, Nasser Vaziri, John Vian, and Van Winters General Electric: Sarah Knife, Stephen Bitter, and Pete Toot Federal Aviation Administration: Don Altobelli, Ann Azevedo, Bill Emmerling, Gary Horan, Mike McRae, and Hals Larsen Impact Technologies: Greg Kacprzynski, and Mike Roemer Pratt & Whitney: William Cousins, Scott Carr, and Art Becker United Air Lines: Marilyn Hardy iii/iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page EXECUTIVE SUMMARY xix 1. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 1-1 1.1 Introduction 1-1 1.2 Approach 1-1 2. DISCUSSION, SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 2-1 2.1 Discussion 2-1 2.2 Summary and Conclusions 2-2 2.3 Recommendations 2-3 3. OVERALL PSM DETECTION AND ANNUNCIATION RISK/BENEFIT ASSESSMENT (TASK 1.3) 3-1 3.1 Terms and Definitions 3-1 3.2 Benefit/Risk Assessment of PSM Annunciations 3-4 3.3 General Operational Benefit and Risks of PSM Annunciation 3-4 3.4 Potential Operational Benefit of PSM Annunciation 3-4 3.5 Operational Risks of PSM Annunciation 3-5 3.6 General Detection Feasibility Considerations 3-5 3.6.1 Identification of Malfunctioning Engine 3-5 3.6.2 Detection Time Lag Rule 3-6 3.6.3 Recoverability/Nonrecoverability 3-6 3.6.4 Detection Feasibility 3-6 3.6.5 False Detection Risk Discussion 3-7 3.6.6 Failure to Detect Risk Discussion 3-7 3.6.7 Recoverability Research Recommendations 3-7 3.7 Powerloss Annunciation Potential Operational Benefits/Risks 3-8 3.7.1 Powerloss Annunciation Potential Benefits 3-8 3.7.2 False Powerloss Detection Risks 3-8 3.7.3 Failure to Annunciate/Detect Powerloss Risks 3-9 3.7.4 Confidence of Correct Powerloss PSM Detection 3-9 3.7.5 Powerloss Detection Further Research 3-10 3.8 Surge Annunciation Potential Operational Benefits and Risks 3-10 v 3.8.1 Surge Annunciation Potential Benefits 3-11 3.8.2 Surge Detection/Annunciation Risks 3-11 3.8.3 Confidence of Correct Surge PSM Detection 3-12 3.8.4 Surge Detection Further Research 3-13 3.9 Failed Fixed Thrust Annunciation Potential Operational Benefits and Risk 3-13 3.9.1 Failed Fixed Thrust Annunciation Potential Benefits 3-13 3.9.2 Failed Fixed Detection/Annunciation Risks 3-14 3.9.3 Confidence of Correct Failed Fixed Thrust PSM Detection 3-14 3.9.4 Failed Fixed Thrust Further Research 3-15 3.10 High Vibration Annunciation Potential Operational Benefits and Risks 3-15 3.10.1 High Vibration Annunciation Potential Operational Benefits 3-15 3.10.2 High Vibration Detection/Annunciation Risks 3-15 3.10.3 Confidence of Correct High Vibration PSM Detection 3-16 3.10.4 High Vibration Further Research 3-16 3.11 Thrust Asymmetry 3-17 3.11.1 Thrust Asymmetry Annunciation Potential Benefits and Risks 3-17 3.11.2 Confidence of Correct Thrust Asymmetry PSM Detection 3-18 3.12 The PSM Benefit, Detection Potential, and Risk Summary 3-18 4. OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT—TASKS 2.1, 1.2, 6.2, AND 6.1 4-1 4.1 In-Service Data Assessment (Task 2.1) 4-1 4.1.1 Research Objective and Goal 4-1 4.1.2 Task 2.1 Overview and Background 4-1 4.1.3 Discussion of Inappropriate Crew Response 4-3 4.1.4 Task 2.1 Review and Analysis Methodology 4-4 4.1.4.1 The AIA PSM+ICR Report Data Review and Analysis 4-4 4.1.4.2 The PSM and IFSD Data Review 4-5 4.1.5 The Review and Analysis of AIA PSM+ICR Report Events 4-6 4.1.5.1 The PSM+ICR Report Events Overview 4-6 4.1.5.2 The PSM+ICR Category Characterizations and Related Conclusions 4-6 vi 4.1.5.3 The AIA PSM+ICR Report Event Analyses and Related Conclusions 4-10 4.1.5.4 General and Specific PSM+ICR Safety Concerns From Event Analyses 4-22 4.1.6 Review and Analysis of Post-AIA Report PSM, IFSD, and PSM+ICR Data 4-25 4.1.6.1 Propulsion System Malfunction Data 4-25 4.1.6.2 Post-AIA Report PSM+ICR Events on Boeing Aircraft 4-33 4.1.6.3 The AIA Report PSM+ICR and 2000-2001 PSM Data Comparison/Analysis 4-35 4.1.6.4 Post-AIA Report Data Summary, Calculations, and Comments 4-38 4.1.7 Task 2.1 Report Conclusions and Recommendations 4-40 4.1.7.1 General 4-40 4.1.7.2 Traceability Task 2.1 Conclusions and Recommendations 4-43 4.2 Operational Assessment of PSM Annunciations (Task 1.2) 4-44 4.2.1 Engine Indication and Crew-Alerting Systems 4-44 4.2.2 Engine Indication System 4-46 4.2.2.1 Engine Indications 4-46 4.2.2.2 Engine Indication Annunciations/Alerts 4-49 4.2.3 Crew-Alerting Systems 4-51 4.2.3.1 General 4-52 4.2.3.2 Engine Indication and Crew-Alerting System Alert Levels 4-52 4.2.3.3 Engine Indication and Crew-Alerting Systems Inhibits 4-53 4.2.4 Flight Deck Design and Operational Philosophy, Requirements, and Guidelines 4-54 vii 4.2.4.1 Flight Deck Design and Operational Philosophy 4-54 4.2.4.2 Flight Deck Interface Design Guidelines and Requirements 4-55 4.2.4.3 Applicable Federal Aviation Regulations 4-56 4.2.5 Operational Assessment 4-57 4.2.5.1 Safety Concerns and Focus—Task 2.1 Data Analysis 4-58 4.2.5.2 Inappropriate Crew Response Prevention Potential 4-61 4.2.5.3 Existing Indications, Alerts, and Functions PSM+ICR Prevention Potential 4-66 4.2.6 Desired/Required Crew Awareness and Response—Potential Annunciations 4-72 4.2.6.1 Potential Safety and Operational Benefits and Risks 4-73 4.2.6.2 Summary, Conclusions, and Preliminary Recommendations 4-81 4.3 Human Factors Considerations (Task 6.2) 4-85 4.3.1 Introduction 4-85 4.3.2 Engine-Related Flight Crew Tasks 4-86 4.3.2.1 Engine Performance Monitoring 4-86 4.3.2.2 Crew Engine Health Monitoring (and Managing Nonnormals) 4-87 4.3.3 Enhancement Opportunities for Current Indications 4-87 4.3.3.1 Detection of Change 4-88 4.3.3.2 Interpretation of Change 4-89 4.3.3.3 Thrust Indication 4-91 4.3.3.4 Accident/Incident Literature 4-92 4.3.4 Role of the Flight Deck Interface in Propulsion System Management 4-93 4.3.4.1 Supporting Performance Monitoring 4-93 viii 4.3.4.2 Supporting Monitoring Engine Health and Managing Nonnormals 4-95 4.3.5 Designing for Engine-Related Tasks 4-96 4.3.5.1 Level of Representation 4-97 4.3.5.2 Level of Support From the Flight Deck Interface 4-99 4.3.5.3 Allocation Guidelines: Human Processor Strengths and Weaknesses 4-107 4.3.6 Indication Ideas 4-114 4.3.7 Summary and Recommendations 4-117 4.4 Noncommercial Aircraft Technology Survey (Task 6.1) 4-120 4.4.1 Task 6.1 Objective and Goal 4-120 4.4.2 Task 6.1 Overview/Background and Methodology 4-121 4.4.3 Aircraft and Engine Descriptions 4-123 4.4.3.1 F15E 4-123 4.4.3.2 F18E/F 4-123 4.4.3.3 F22 4-124 4.4.3.4 AV8B 4-124 4.4.3.5 C17 4-124 4.4.3.6 V22 4-125 4.4.3.7 AH64D 4-126 4.4.3.8 Gulfstream V 4-126 4.4.4 Summary of Survey Results 4-126 4.4.5 Potential Precedent and Technology Transfers 4-126 4.4.5.1 Engine Indication Concepts 4-129 4.4.5.2 Propulsion System Malfunction Indication Annunciations 4-129 4.4.5.3 Propulsion System Malfunction Alert Annunciations 4-129 4.4.5.4 Display Management Concepts 4-130 4.4.5.5 Airplane-Level Information Display 4-130 4.4.5.6 Health Monitoring and Control 4-130 ix 4.4.5.7 Airplane Flight Control or Control Function 4-130 4.4.6 Task 6.2 Conclusions 4-131 4.4.7 Task 6.2 Recommendations 4-131 5.