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L Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X

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L Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X International Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X L - Lane Message Authentication Code Using Three Hop Routing Protocol in Ad hoc Network M Jagatheeswari J Srinivasan Dept. of Computer Science and Application Dept. of Computer Science and Application SCSVMV University SCSVMV University Kanchipuram, Tamil Nadu , India Kanchipuram , Tamil Nadu , India Abstract - Generally Ad Hoc Networks consist of the Public Key Infrastructure and Certificate Revocation Lists for their security. The authentication of a received message under checking process if the certificate of the sender is included with the CRL, and verifying the authentication of the certificate and signature of the sender. In this paper we replace the time consuming Certificate Verification List (CRL) checking process by an efficient Revocation Checking Process using a secure and efficient L - Lane Hash Message Protocol using Three Hop Routing Protocol. The Three Hop Routing Protocol is used to increase the wireless capacity and highly performing wireless network. It quickly distributes the information around the sender and no single point of failure. In our proposed system, we describe Message authentication in ad hoc network using Three Hop Routing Protocol. That can significantly decrease the message loss ratio with the conventional authentication methods. This will help to improve the security and performance evaluation. Keywords - L - Lane HMAC, Vehicular Networks, Communication Security, Message Authentication, Certificate Revocation, HMAC. I. INTRODUCTION Best of our knowledge, this is the first solutions to Ad-hoc network is a network that consist of public key reduce the Certificate Authentication Delay resulting infrastructure and certificate revocation list for from checking the time consuming CRL Process in send/received the message packet using Central Access VANET. Hash function is a function that can map the Point such as Router, many Ad-hoc network are Local data of arbitrary size to fixed size. Hash function Area Network (LAN) where the computer or other accelerate table by deducting duplicate records. The devices that can send data directly from one devices to security of HMAC is limited by a birth day attack, that another devices rather than going through a Centralized is, HMAC is use a compression function with n-bit n/2 Access Point in Ad-hoc Networks. VANETs consist of output gets after about 2 Queries. In addition, L-Lane Onboard Unit and Road Side Unit HMAC inherits the design principles of the original Vehicle to Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle to Infrastructure HMAC, such as single-key usage and off-the-shelf hash- (V2I) are the Basic Communication which allows function calls. communicates with each other through OBU. 1. Objective Each data packet of sender is included with CRL The objective of this paper is to speed up the Message Certificate and Verified Authentication Certificate and Authentication Process and to avoid time consuming Signature of the Sender. Most of the research area certificate verification process using a secure and focusing Checking Process and development of MAC efficient L-Lane Hash Message Authentication Code. layers as well as application ranging from collisions 2. Scope avoidance to the Onboard Service Unit. In feature, this system will be implementing in any ad hoc environment for secure and speedy data packet In this paper, we replace the time consuming Certificate verification Verification List (CRL) checking process by an efficient Revocation Checking Process using a secure and II. SYSTEM ANALYSIS efficient L - Lane Hash Message Protocol using Three 1. Problem Definition Hop Routing Protocol. The Three Hop Routing Protocol Checking the CRL process is a time consuming is used to increase the wireless capacity and highly process which leads an inevitable challenge in ad-hoc performing wireless network. It quickly distributes the network. To ensure the reliable operation of ad-hoc information around the sender and no single point of networks, increase the amount of authentic failure. information gained from the Received Messages. Each node should check revocation status of the entire received certificate is a timely manner. In this paper © 2019 IJSRET 134 International Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X we introduce an efficient revocation process using a privacy challenges in VENET. Raya and Hubaux use a fast and secure L-Lane HMAC function. classical PKI to provide the secure privacy preserving communication Studer et al propose an efficient 2. Existing System authentication and revocation scheme called TACK. The key management protocol adopts a probabilistic Tack technique may not function properly while RAS key distribution approach based on pre-deployed requires completely cover the network symmetric keys. The ability to check a CRL for a large number of IV. SYSTEM DESIGN certificates in a timely manner leads an inevitable 1. System Architecture challenge to Ad hoc Networks. 2. 1 Disadvantages Ad hoc Networks is vulnerable to variety of attacks such as injecting false information, modifying and replaying the disseminated messages can be easily launched. To abstain the leakage of the real identities and location information of the drivers from any external eavesdropper. The scale of Ad hoc Networks is very large. The security of HMAC is limited by birthday attack. 2.2 Proposed system In this project, it is to proposed to design and implement an algorithm for identifying In this paper, we resolve the problem of birthday limit attack using Multi-Lane Hash Message Authentication Code (M-HMAC) using Three Hop Routing protocol which replaces the CRL checking process by an efficient revocation checking process using a fast and secure Multi-Lane HMAC function. M-HMAC is suitable not only for Ad hoc Networks but also for any network employing a PKI system. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first solution to reduce the authentication delay resulting from checking the CRL in Ad hoc Networks. Fig.1 Multi Lane HMAC Architecture. 2.3 Advantages Multi-Lane HMAC has the lowest computation V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT complexity 1. Computation The proposed M-HMAC in authentication reduces 5.1 Packet Delivery Ratio the end-to-end delay compared with that using CRL Verification checking process. 5 8 10 18 III. RELATED WORKS 15 28 The primary security requirement of VANET is I. 20 38 Message Authentication II. Massage Integrity and III. 25 48 Non-reputation and privacy preservation. Public Key 30 58 Infrastructure (PKI) employees CRL to manage the 35 58 certificates efficiently the CRL size is very large and 40 58 the received message is expected to long. Alber Wasef 45 58 and Xuemin (Sherman) Shen proposed an Expedite 50 58 Message Authentication (EMAP) for VENET which 55 58 replaces the time consuming CRL process by an 60 58 efficient revocation checking process. 65 58 70 58 This process uses a Hash Message Authentication 75 58 Code (HMAC) to decrease the message loss ratio. 80 58 Hubaux et al., address the issues of security and 85 58 © 2019 IJSRET 135 International Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X 90 58 15.0 11.95509214302492 95 58 15.5 11.95509214302492 100 58 16.0 11.95509214302492 105 58 16.5 11.95509214302492 5.2 Packet Loss Ratio 17.0 11.95509214302492 0 2 17.5 11.95509214302492 0.5 2 18.0 11.95509214302492 1 2 18.5 11.95509214302492 1.5 1 19.0 11.95509214302492 2 1 19.5 11.95509214302492 2.5 1 20.0 11.95509214302492 3 1 5.4 Packet Revocation Delay 3.5 1 10.0 14.454952443891992 4 2 10.5 13.954812365981919 4.5 1 11.0 11.455132296088671 5 2 11.5 11.95505223505752 5.5 2 12.0 16.454972183774046 6 1 12.5 17.95509214302492 6.5 2 13.0 13.95509214302492 7 2 13.5 12.95509214302492 7.5 1 14.0 14.95509214302492 8 2 14.5 12.95509214302492 8.5 2 15.0 15.95509214302492 9 2 15.5 17.95509214302492 9.5 1 16.0 13.95509214302492 10 1 16.5 15.95509214302492 10.5 1 17.0 13.95509214302492 11 1 17.5 14.95509214302492 11.5 1 18.0 16.95509214302492 12 1 18.5 16.95509214302492 12.5 2 19.0 16.95509214302492 13 2 19.5 18.95509214302492 13.5 1 20.0 18.95509214302492 14 1 5.6 Snap Shot 14.5 1 15 1 15.5 2 16 1 16.5 2 17 2 17.5 2 18 1 18.5 2 19 2 19.5 1 5.3 Authentication Delay 10.0 9.4549524438919921 10.5 9.954812365981919 11.0 10.455132296088671 11.5 10.95505223505752 12.0 11.454972183774045 12.5 11.95509214302492 13.0 11.95509214302492 13.5 11.95509214302492 14.0 11.95509214302492 14.5 11.95509214302492 © 2019 IJSRET 136 International Journal of Scientific Research & Engineering Trends Volume 5, Issue 1, Jan-Feb-2019, ISSN (Online): 2395-566X Fig. 2 Packet Delivery Ratio. VI.CONCLUSION We have proposed L - Lane Message Authentication Protocol for Ad Hoc Networks, which expedites message authentication by replacing the time- consuming CRL checking process with a fast revocation checking process employing L Lane HMAC function using Three Hop Routing Protocol. In addition, Multi Lane Message Authentication along with Three Hop Protocol has a modular feature rendering it integral with any PKI system. Furthermore, it is resistant to common attacks while outperforming the authentication techniques employing the conventional CRL. Therefore, L - Lane Message Authentication Protocol can significantly Fig.3 Packet Loss Ratio. decrease the message loss ratio due to message verification delay compared to the conventional authentication methods employing CRL checking. Future Enhancement Our feature work will focus on the certificate authentication acceleration and to improve the Message Packet Loss Ratio.
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