The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Chapter 4 Seismic Risk Assessment
Seismic risk assessment was carried out as the update of the risk assessment of 2002 JICA project of “The Study on Earthquake Disaster Mitigation in the Kathmandu Valley” for the purpose of providing basic information for the formulation of disaster risk reduction and management plans for pilot municipalities. The assessment was performed based on the latest available data and taking into account the new research results on risk assessment as well as the characteristics of ground motion, building damage and human casualties caused by the Gorkha Earthquake, which occurred on 25 April 2015, right before the commencement of the project. The main features of risk assessment of this project are summarized as below.
No building inventory, which is important for risk assessment, exists in KV. In order to establish building inventory, building survey for all buildings was made by the project for former Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City and Bhaktapur municipality. In addition, building information for all buildings in Budhanilkantha and former Karyabinayak municipalities was collected. The building inventory for the other municipalities were created by estimation based on satellite image and sample structure type survey.
The damage function of buildings was developed based on the building damage data of the Gorkha Earthquake as well as the seismic resistant capacity analysis of typical structures of Nepal.
Nonlinear flexural deformation of RC piers subject to seismic excitation was estimated by a statistical method and was used to classify the damage degree of bridges.
Human casualties were estimated based on the death rate and injured rate of the Gorkha Earthquake for different damage levels and different structure types. Three earthquake occurrence scenes: night, weekday noon and weekend afternoon, were considered for human casualty estimation.
Building damage and human casualties were also estimated for 2030 for the purpose of determination of disaster risk reduction target, assuming different cases of structure type distribution.
The contents of seismic risk assessment cover structural damage of buildings, roads, bridges,
4-1 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) water supply pipelines, sewage pipelines, power poles and mobile base transceiver station (BTS) towers as well as human casualties and the direct economic loss and impact on the tourism industry. The summary of risk assessment results is shown in Table 4.1
Seismic risk assessment results from one scenario ground motion are shown in the main report as an example. A map book, which includes all of the risk assessment results together with the basic information for seismic hazard and risk assessment as well as seismic hazard results, was compiled for easy reference. The contents of the map book are given in Table 4.2.
REMARKS
The scenario earthquakes are not the prediction of future earthquakes. Risk assessment was carried out based on scientific research and investigation results but with inevitable assumptions. Its results might have uncertainties and are not the guarantee of the future damage of a scenario earthquake. The purpose of risk assessment is to provide basic information for the development of disaster risk reduction and management plan of pilot municipalities in KV.
4-2 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.1 Summary of risk assessment results
Physical Damage Economic Loss (mil. NPR)*1 Human Casualty (Population: 2016: 2,786,929; 2030: 3,805,926) Category Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Night (Weekday and weekend) 3,034 9,133 22,179 35,726 24,961 65,314 136,060 199,643 Death 0.11% 0.33% 0.80% 1.28% Heavy damage 11,880 35,766 86,861 139,914 (EMS DL4&5) Injured 0.43% 1.28% 3.12% 5.02% 5.6% 14.7% 30.6% 44.9% 279,031 642,743 1,196,080 1,613,314 Evacuee 10.01% 23.06% 42.92% 57.89% Weekday (noon, 12:00) 2,784 8,282 19,959 31,956 21,967 42,940 62,691 67,418 Death 0.10% 0.30% 0.72% 1.15% Building (2016) Moderate damage 132,999 371,003 761,531 1,098,353 10,905 32,435 78,168 125,152 (Total building 444,554) (EMS DL3) Injured 0.39% 1.16% 2.80% 4.49% 4.9% 9.7% 14.1% 15.2% 285,850 652,798 1,206,530 1,619,792 Evacuee 10.26% 23.42% 43.29% 58.12% Weekend (afternoon, 18:00) 2,123 6,393 15,526 25,008 43,564 67,770 77,713 70,462 Death 0.08% 0.23% 0.56% 0.90% Slight damage 8,316 25,036 60,803 97,940 (EMS DL2) Injured 0.30% 0.90% 2.18% 3.51% 9.8% 15.2% 17.5% 15.9% 279,942 645,483 1,202,734 1,624,032 Evacuee 10.04% 23.16% 43.16% 58.27% 33,763 88,681 185,796 273,269 4,121 12,508 30,583 49,381 Case-0 Death 5.6% 14.6% 30.6% 45.1% 0.11% 0.33% 0.80% 1.30% 28,377 79,075 171,977 258,044 3,434 11,017 27,930 46,017 Case-1 Death 4.7% 13.0% 28.4% 42.5% 16.7% 11.9% 8.7% 6.8% 13,627 56,452 146,361 234,477 1,721 8,135 24,356 42,526 Case-2 Death Building (2030) 2.2% 9.3% 24.1% 38.7% 58.2% 35.0% 20.4% 13.9% (Heavy damage, Total building 606,506)*2 12,162 49,970 131,095 213,481 1,438 6,733 20,526 36,715 Case-3 Death 2.0% 8.2% 21.6% 35.2% 65.1% 46.2% 32.9% 25.6% 16,147 52,413 129,904 210,181 2,052 7,887 23,086 41,146 Case-4 Death 2.7% 8.6% 21.4% 34.7% 50.2% 36.9% 24.5% 16.7% 11,138 41,230 111,854 189,357 1,476 6,524 20,842 38,733 Case-5 Death 1.8% 6.8% 18.4% 31.2% 64.2% 47.8% 31.9% 21.6% 237 737 1,654 2,486 Heavy damage 444 1,545 4,002 6,555 4.1% 12.9% 28.9% 43.4% Death
School 253 539 810 875 0.05% 0.18% 0.47% 0.77% Moderate damage 20,462 51,231 98,171 134,932 (Total building 5,731) 4.4% 9.4% 14.1% 15.3% 1,739 6,051 15,673 25,671 568 916 1,057 960 Injured Slight damage 9.9% 16.0% 18.4% 16.8% 0.20% 0.71% 1.84% 3.02% 20 64 153 235 Heavy damage 3.4% 11.0% 26.2% 40.2%
Health facility 24 55 83 94 Moderate damage 27,534 68,588 165,683 232,782 (Total building 584) 4.1% 9.4% 14.2% 16.1% 51 85 105 97 Slight damage 8.7% 14.6% 18.0% 16.6% 20 59 126 186 Heavy damage 4.2% 12.3% 26.4% 38.9%
Government building 20 44 66 73 Moderate damage 2,444 8,669 16,514 22,708 (Total building 478) 4.2% 9.2% 13.8% 15.3% 44 71 85 80 Slight damage 9.2% 14.9% 17.8% 16.7%
Length in landslide 0 6.6 98.5 390.6 area (km) Road*3 0.0% 0.1% 1.7% 6.7% 0 471 1,620 2,878 (Total length 5,811 km) Length in liquefaction 0 76.1 274.9 455.3 area (km) 0.0% 1.3% 4.7% 7.8% 0 1 12 32 Heavy damage 0.0% 2.2% 26.7% 71.1%
Bridge 2212711 Moderate damage 377 898 1,359 1,914 (45 bridges assessed)*4 4.4% 46.7% 60.0% 24.4% 18 17 6 2 Slight damage 40.0% 37.8% 13.3% 4.4%
982 1,921 3,496 5,161 Water supply (Existing) Damage points 36 71 129 191 (Total length 1,167 km) 0.84 1.65 3.00 4.42
124 255 460 676 Water supply (Planned) Damage points 5 9 17 25 (Total length 699 km) 0.18 0.36 0.66 0.97
Sewage 4.81 8.15 11.94 18.21 Damage Length (km) 76 135 200 290 (Total length 1,192 km) 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.5%
1,327 3,991 9,156 13,992 Power distribution Pole broken 19 56 129 197 (Total pole 190,851) 0.7% 2.1% 4.8% 7.3%
Mobile BTS tower 43 143 372 601 Tower damage 82 272 707 1,142 (Total tower 1,043) 4.1% 13.7% 35.7% 57.6% Source: JICA Project Team
4-3 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.2 Contents of Map Book
No. Caption No. Caption A. Basic Conditions C. Earthquake Risk Assessment A-1 Study Area and Pilot Municipality C-1 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 (WN) A-2 Distribution of Population in 2016 at Night C-2 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 (CNS-1) A-3 Distribution of Estimated Population in 2030 at C-3 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 Night (CNS-2) A-4 Building Distribution in 2016 C-4 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 (CNS-3) A-5 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (without C-5 Distribution of Moderately Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 BSPS) (WN) A-6 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (with BSPS C-6 Distribution of Moderately Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 Case-1) (CNS-1) A-7 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (with BSPS C-7 Distribution of Moderately Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 Case-2) (CNS-2) A-8 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (with BSPS C-8 Distribution of Moderately Damaged Building & Ratio in 2016 Case-3) (CNS-3) A-9 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (with BSPS C-9 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 without Case-4) BSPS A-10 Estimated Building Distribution in 2030 (with BSPS C-10 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 with BSPS Case-5) Case-1 A-11 Distribution of School Building C-11 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 with BSPS Case-2 A-12 Distribution of Health Facility Building C-12 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 with BSPS Case-3 A-13 Distribution of Government Building C-13 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 with BSPS Case-4 A-14 Road Network C-14 Distribution of Heavily Damaged Building for 2030 with BSPS Case-5 A-15 Emergency Transportation Road Network (ETRN) C-15 School Building Damage Proposed by JICA RRNE A-16 Distribution of Bridge C-16 Health Facility Building Damage A-17 Distribution of Water Supply Network (Existing) C-17 Government Building Damage A-18 Distribution of Water Supply Network (Planned) C-18 Possible Damage of Road by Liquefaction A-19 Distribution of Sewage Network C-19 Possible Damage of Road by Slope Failure A-20 Estimated Power Pole Distribution C-20 Possible Link Blockage of Road by Building Damage A-21 Distribution of Mobile BTS Tower C-21 Possible Link Blockage of ETRN by Building Damage C-22 Damage of Bridge B. Earthquake Hazard Assessment C-23 Priority Rank of Bridge for Seismic Strengthening B-1 Geomorphological Map C-24 Distribution of Water Supply Network Damage (Existing) B-2 Altitude Distribution Map C-25 Distribution of Water Supply Network Damage (Planned) B-3 Distribution of Collected Borehole Data C-26 Distribution of Sewage Network Damage B-4 Rock Depth Distribution and Location of Borehole C-27 Distribution of Power Pole Damage B-5 Location of Microtremor Measurement C-28 Distribution of Mobile BTS Tower Damage B-6 Geological Cross-Section EW C-29 Distribution of Death in 2016 at Night B-7 Geological Cross-Section NS C-30 Distribution of Death in 2016 at Weekday Noon B-8 Estimated AVS30 from Ground Model C-31 Distribution of Death in 2016 at Weekend Afternoon B-9 Predominant Period of Ground C-32 Distribution of Death Ratio in 2016 at Night B-10 Fault Model of Scenario Earthquake C-33 Distribution of Death Ratio in 2016 at Weekday Noon B-11 Peak Ground Acceleration Distribution C-34 Distribution of Death Ratio in 2016 at Weekend Afternoon B-12 Peak Ground Velocity Distribution C-35 Comparative Vulnerability MAP B-13 Seismic Intensity (MMI) Distribution B-14 Distribution of Liquefaction in Rainy Season B-15 Distribution of Liquefaction in Dry Season B-16 Distribution of Slope Failure B-17 AVS30 Map base on Geomorphological Unit B-18 Liquefaction Susceptibility Map B-19 Earthquake Induced Slope Failure Susceptibility Map Source: JICA Project Team
4-4 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
4.1 Necessity and objectives of Seismic Risk Assessment
According to EM-DAT (Figure 4.1.1), natural disasters in the world has increased sharply from around the 1970s, peaking at around 2005, and remaining at a higher level from then. Natural disasters result in not only life and economic loss, but also as obstructions to the sustainable development of the economy. In order to reduce disaster risk globally, the UN had initiated the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR) for the 1990s in 1987 at its 42nd General Assembly. After IDNDR, Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) was adopted in the 2nd World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2005. Based on HFA, the world has promoted disaster risk reduction activities and produced steady results with the development of legal frameworks, establishment of DRR organizations, strengthening of collaboration among organizations, capacity development, and structural and non-structural measures to reduce vulnerability. On the other hand, the activities which lead to direct reduction of risk are comparatively limited due to the lack of budget and knowledge. In this circumstance, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (Sendai Framework) was adopted in the 3rd World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2015, where sustainable development with mainstreaming DRRM is emphasized through advocating for four priorities for action and assigning seven global targets. Risk assessment is closely related to the Priority for Action 1 of Sendai Framework: Understanding Disaster Risk and Priority for Action 2: Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance to Manage Disaster Risk. Risk assessment is essential to provide basic information for the development of disaster risk reduction policy and plan to achieve the disaster risk reduction goal for human casualties, economy loss and critical infrastructure damage.
Seismic risk assessment of this project is planned to be utilized for the determination of risk reduction goal, the creation of disaster risk reduction and management plan and support for CBDRRM activities of pilot municipalities. It has been used for the development of the Kathmandu Valley Resilient Plan (KVRP) under JICA RRNE project and can be expected to be used for preparation of the disaster risk reduction and management plans of the municipalities in KV other than the three pilot municipalities. It also provides useful information for the formulation of Business Continuity Plans (BCP) for local government as well as utility companies.
4-5 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Drought
Storm
Flood
Earthquake
Source: EM-DAT Figure 4.1.1 Natural disaster trends in the world
A common issue for seismic risk assessment in many countries including Nepal is the lack of basic information such as earthquake damage data and structural inventory. Insufficient earthquake damage data makes it difficult to prepare a specific fragility curve. The lack of inventory will directly affect the precision of risk assessment. This project faced the same issues and some assumptions and presumptions were made to compliment the insufficiency. During the process of risk assessment, the damage data and findings from the Gorkha Earthquake have been used whenever possible. The update of risk assessment may be required in the future in case new findings from the Gorkha Earthquake are obtained and/or the building, infrastructure and lifeline inventories are completed.
4.2 Scenario Earthquakes and Their Occurrence Scene
Three scenario earthquakes were adopted in seismic hazard assessment. Four possible ground motion levels were applied for Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake because it is located adjacent to the epicenter of the Gorkha Earthquake and the ground motion attenuation characteristics of the Gorkha Earthquake have to be considered. Considering the purpose of the project, among the six ground motion levels of seismic hazard results, four of them are chosen as the target ground motion for risk assessment. Besides, different scenario earthquake occurrence scenes were considered for risk assessment to have alternatives of disaster because the time when an earthquake will happen is not predictable.
4.2.1 Scenario Earthquakes and Ground Motion Used for Risk Assessment
Three scenario earthquakes, i.e. Far-Mid Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake (M = 8.6), Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake (M = 7.8) and Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake (M = 7.8) were considered in hazard assessment. Ground motion for Far-Mid Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake and Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake was estimated directly from
4-6 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
attenuation formula, while that for Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake was estimated from the attenuation formula with four modification factors of 1/3, 1/2, 2/3 and 1/1 to consider smaller accelerations recorded in KV from Gorkha earthquake. Considering the possibility of ground motion level and reality of disaster risk reduction countermeasures, the ground motion to be used for risk assessment was discussed in WG1 and 4th JCC meeting, which lead to the conclusion of that (1) Far-Mid Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake would not be forwarded for risk assessment because it is very far from KV and will not cause significant damage due to its weak ground motion, (2) ground motion from Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake (without modification) would be used for risk assessment and, (3) ground motions with modification factor of 1/3, 1/2 and 2/3 from Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake would be used for risk assessment, and ground motion with modification factor 1/1 (no modification) would not be used for risk assessment since it may largely over-estimate ground motion. As a result, four ground motions noted as WN, CNS-1, CNS-2 and CNS-3 were finally selected for risk assessment as shown in Table 4.2.1. To identify different ground motions from one scenario earthquake, the ground motion used for risk assessment are called scenario ground motion hereinafter.
Table 4.2.1 Scenario ground motion for risk assessment Scenario Earthquake Modification Factor for PGA Notation Western Nepal Scenario Earthquake 1/1 WN 1/3 CNS-1 Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake 1/2 CNS-2 2/3 CNS-3 Source: JICA Project Team
4.2.2 Earthquake Occurrence Scenes
A difference in occurrence time of earthquakes will not cause a difference in the structural damage of building, infrastructure and lifeline facilities, but do affect human casualties due to the different populations inside building at the time of an earthquake occurrence. In this regard, the earthquake occurrence scenes (occurrence time) for 2016 was considered for night, weekday noon and weekend afternoon based on the survey results of inside building ratio in different day (weekday and weekend) and time. In this project, for the purpose of determination of risk reduction targets, risk assessment was also conducted for 2030, when two scenes were considered: (1) extrapolation of building structure type of 2016, meaning without any strengthening measures to upgrade building seismic performance and (2) assuming total building seismic capacity is somehow improved with five supposed cases to consider possible structure type distribution in the future.
4-7 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
(1) Earthquake Occurrence Scenes for 2016
The different situations, mainly of population distribution, weekday, weekend (holiday), daytime and night were considered for the determination of earthquake occurrence scenes of 2016. As a result, three scenes at night (2:00am), weekday noon (12:00pm) and weekend afternoon (18:00pm) were decided as shown in Figure 4.2.1. Population inside building for each occurrence scene was assigned based on the questionnaire survey. The spreading of fire was not taken as a factor for earthquake occurrence scene because of its low possibility in Nepal. Population distribution for night comes from a census and that for weekday daytime was derived from the origin-destination (OD) survey data, obtained from The Project on Urban Transport Improvement for Kathmandu Valley, JICA, which accounts for the movement of workers and students from their home to office or school. The main features of different occurrence scenes are summarized in Table 4.2.2.
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.2.1 Earthquake occurrence scenes for 2016
4-8 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.2.2 Features of different earthquake occurrence scenes Scene Feature More human casualties may occur as compared to the daytime Night (2:00 am) May cause delay on search and rescue due to the difficulty of (Ratio of inside building 100%) personnel mobilization Difficulty in speedy evacuation, especially in winter or rainy season, which may increase human casualties More human casualties may happen in office and commercial facilities, rather than in homes Weekday Noon (12:00 pm) There are a large number of people who have to stay in (Ratio of inside building 90%) offices and commercial facilities due to transportation problems caused by road and bridge damage Less human casualties than the other scenes Weekend Afternoon (18:00 pm) May cause delay on search and rescue due to the difficulty of (Ratio of inside building 70%) personnel mobilization Source: JICA Project Team
(2) Earthquake Occurrence Scenes for 2030
Two scenes for 2030, with and without strengthening of the total building seismic capacity (Figure 4.2.2), were considered to provide information for determination of risk reduction targets in disaster risk reduction and management plan. The scene of without strengthening of the building seismic performance (Extrapolation) means the structure type distribution of 2030 is the same as that of 2016. The scene with strengthening building seismic performance (Seismic Strengthening) changes the structure type distribution of 2016, having different cases with different assumptions. The effect of building seismic performance strengthening could be obtained by comparing the results from the two scenes of with and without. Since the purpose of risk assessment for 2030 is to understand the risk reduction effect, earthquake occurrence time at night is used as a reference. The contents of risk assessment for 2030 are building damage and life loss, and the damages of infrastructure and lifeline facilities were not estimated due to the difficulty and reliability of estimation on future inventories without sufficient information under current incomplete data set. The contents of risk assessment for earthquake occurrence scenes of 2016 and 2030 are described in Table 4.2.3.
Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.2.2 Earthquake occurrence scenes for 2030
4-9 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.2.3 Earthquake occurrence scenes and risk assessment contents Infrastructure Human Economic Year Scene Building / Lifeline Casualty Loss Night 2016 Weekday noon ○ ○ ○ ○ Weekend afternoon Extrapolation 2030 Seismic ○ － ○ － Strengthening Source: JICA project Team
4.3 Approach and Results of Seismic Risk Assessment
Structural damage of general buildings, schools, hospitals, government buildings, roads, bridges, water supply pipeline networks, sewage pipeline networks, power poles and mobile base transceiver stations (BTS) and human casualty and economic loss for each scenario earthquake ground motion was carried out. This approach of risk assessment is basically that commonly used in Japan and modified as necessary and availability of damage data from the Gorkha Earthquake. The approach was discussed in WG meetings as well as individually with counterparts and related organizations, so as to reach common consensus.
4.3.1 Damage to Buildings
Methodology of risk assessment
A flow of risk assessment is shown in Figure 4.3.1. Building inventory data (refer to Section 2.2.1 building), result of hazard assessment (PGA, refer to PR) and proposed damage function of building were used for the damage assessment of each 250m x 250m grid, and collected to estimate the risk of the building. Refer to Appendix 2.4 for the detail.
4-10 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.1 Flow of building risk assessment
Proposed damage function for building
Proposed damage function for buildings is shown in Figure 4.3.2. Damage functions for typical (centre) area and perimeter area were used per the predominant period of the ground. This allocation was done based on the response analysis at each grid for average building period of 0.3 to 0.7sec. against predominant period of the ground. Category of the damage function and structural type is shown in Table 4.3.1. The damage function of building shows the damage ratio for general buildings, and the damage probability for public buildings, since the number is limited at each grid.
a) General (centre) area of the Valley b) Perimeter area of the Valley, suffix p (predominant period of the ground, (predominant period of the ground Tg > 1.5sec & Tg ≤0.3sec) 0.3sec< Tg ≤ 1.5sec) Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.2 Proposed Damage function for DG 4+ 5 at center area and perimeter area
4-11 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.1 Category of damage function and structural type
Centre (general) area of the Valley: predominant period of the ground, Tg > 1.5sec & Tg ≤0.3sec Perimeter area of the Valley, suffix p: predominant period of the ground 0.3sec< Tg ≤ 1.5sec Source: JICA Project Team
The method and procedure for the development of damage function is described in detail in Appendix 7. The damage function is created based on the building damage data of Gorkha earthquake, soil amplification characteristics of KV, seismic performance capability of buildings as well as the experience of developing damage function in Japan. The damage function of 2002 project is also used as a reference. The damage function is assumed as log-normal distribution. It is created for six structure categories and three damage levels. The parameters of damage function for central area of KV are shown in Table 4.3.2 and Table 4.3.3 is that for perimeter area. Table 4.3.2 Damage function for central area of KV
EMS DL4 & 5 EMS DL3, 4 & 5 EMS DL2, 3, 4 & 5 Standard Standard Standard Mean Mean Mean deviation deviation deviation Masonry 1 5.00 0.66 4.725 0.66 4.525 0.66 Masonry 2 5.40 0.62 5.10 0.62 4.70 0.62 Masonry 3 5.80 0.55 5.55 0.55 5.175 0.55 Masonry 4 6.07 0.55 5.85 0.55 5.55 0.55 RC 1 6.24 0.50 6.00 0.50 5.75 0.50 RC 2 6.40 0.50 6.15 0.50 5.90 0.50 Source: JICA Project Team
Table 4.3.3 Damage function for perimeter area of KV
EMS DL4 & 5 EMS DL3, 4 & 5 EMS DL2, 3, 4 & 5 Standard Standard Standard Mean Mean Mean deviation deviation deviation Masonry 1 4.86 0.66 4.585 0.66 4.385 0.66 Masonry 2 5.26 0.62 4.96 0.62 4.56 0.62 Masonry 3 5.66 0.55 5.41 0.55 5.035 0.55 Masonry 4 5.93 0.55 5.71 0.55 5.41 0.55 RC 1 6.10 0.50 5.86 0.50 5.61 0.50 RC 2 6.26 0.50 6.01 0.50 5.76 0.50 Source: JICA Project Team
4-12 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Damage function of historical building (monument) covers historical buildings (monuments) at Protected Monument Zone, PMZ at three Durbar Squares in KV. Damage ratio is as plotted in Figure 4.3.3 with supposed PGA by the 2015 Gorkha earthquake. Category of “Reconstruction” by damage data of DOA was considered as Damage Grade 4+ 5, and “Retrofitting/ Conservation” was considered as DG 2+3 of EMS 98 respectively. Refer to the damage data of the Appendix 7 of the report.
DG 4+5 DG 3+4+5 DG 2+3+4+5
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0% Damage ratio of buildings of ratio Damage 0 200 400 600 800
：DG 4+5 ：DG 2+3+4+5 Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.3 Proposed damage function for historical buildings (monuments)
Assessment Results
Building damages estimated for each scenario ground motion are summarized in Table 4.3.4 and the details are given after.
4-13 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.4 Estimated building damage (Upper: damage number; Lower: damage ratio)
Scenario earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage Level WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Heavy damage 24,961 65,314 136,060 199,643 (EMS DL4&5) 5.6% 14.7% 30.6% 44.9% Buildings (2016) Moderate damage 21,967 42,940 62,691 67,418 (Total buildings 444,554) (EMS DL3) 4.9% 9.7% 14.1% 15.2% Slight damage 43,564 67,770 77,713 70,462 (EMS DL2) 9.8% 15.2% 17.5% 15.9% 33,763 88,681 185,796 273,269 Case-0 5.6% 14.6% 30.6% 45.1% 28,377 79,075 171,977 258,044 Case-1 4.7% 13.0% 28.4% 42.5% 13,627 56,452 146,361 234,477 Case-2 Buildings (2030, EMS 2.2% 9.3% 24.1% 38.7% DL4&5) 12,162 49,970 131,095 213,481 (Total buildings 606,506) Case-3 2.0% 8.2% 21.6% 35.2% 16,147 52,413 129,904 210,181 Case-4 2.7% 8.6% 21.4% 34.7% 11,138 41,230 111,854 189,357 Case-5 1.8% 6.8% 18.4% 31.2% 237 737 1,654 2,486 Heavy 4.1% 12.9% 28.9% 43.4% Schools 253 539 810 875 Moderate (Total buildings 5,731) 4.4% 9.4% 14.1% 15.3% 568 916 1,057 960 Slight 9.9% 16.0% 18.4% 16.8% 20 64 153 235 Heavy 3.4% 11.0% 26.2% 40.2% Health facilities 24 55 83 94 Moderate (Total buildings 584) 4.1% 9.4% 14.2% 16.1% 51 85 105 97 Slight 8.7% 14.6% 18.0% 16.6% 20 59 126 186 Heavy 4.2% 12.3% 26.4% 38.9% Government buildings 20 44 66 73 Moderate (Total buildings 478) 4.2% 9.2% 13.8% 15.3% 44 71 85 80 Slight 9.2% 14.9% 17.8% 16.7% Source: JICA Project Team
The estimated PGA by the four scenario earthquakes is 150 to 200gal for WN, 150 to 400gal for CNS-1, 250 to 600gal for CNS-2, and 300 to 800gal for CNS-3 generally. The epicenter is close in case of CNS and the PGA changes by the location. Ground motion expressed by MMI is VII for WN, VII to VIII for CNS-1, VIII (partially IX) for CNS-2 and VIII to IX for
4-14 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
CNS-3. PGA of the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake is estimated as 150 to 200gal, and the intensity VII by MMI. Refer to PR for the Hazard Assessment. Design PGA of IS 1893-1 (2002) is 180gal for information.
(1) Damage to general buildings
Results of the assessment by four cases of scenario earthquakes in 2016 and in 2030 are shown below. Damage ratio of building by the scenario earthquakes CNS-1 and CNS-2 have mainly been introduced.
Damage at year 2016
The total number of buildings has been estimated as 444,554 buildings. The ratio of each structural type is 47% for “RC non-engineered”, 28% for “Brick and stone masonry with cement mortar joint”, 14% for “Brick and stone masonry with mud mortar joint”, and 2% for “Others (RC engineered, and others)”. Result of risk assessment for general building in 2016 is shown in Figure 4.3.4 and Table 4.3.4 (Portion of 2016 of the table). Buildings with heavy structural damage (grade 4 and 5 by EMS 98) due to the scenario earthquake CNS-1 has been estimated as 65,314 buildings which is 14.7% of the total number of buildings.
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.4 Result of risk assessment for general building in year 2016 (CNS-2, Left：Damage number, Right：Damage ratio)
Damage at year 2030
The total number of building has been estimated as 606,506 buildings. The result of risk assessment for general buildings in 2030 is shown in Figure 4.3.5 and Table 4.3.4 (Portion of 2030 and without Building Seismic Performance Strengthening). Buildings with heavy structural damage (grade 4 and 5 by EMS 98) due to the scenario earthquake CNS-1 has been estimated as 88,681 buildings which is 14.6% of the total number of buildings, if no building seismic performance strengthening (Case0) is taken.
4-15 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.5 Result of risk assessment for general building in year 2030 (Without BSPS, CNS-2, Left: Damage number, Right: Damage ratio)
Result of estimated damage of building, heavy structural damage (damage grade 4+5) and moderate structural damage (damage grade 3), at year 2030 is shown in Table 4.3.7 where five cases of BSPS are taken. As far as the number and ratio of structural type, refer to “Section 2.2.1 Building”. Refer to separated “Map book” for the map of damage assessment for Case 1 to Case 5.
Building damage and corresponding economic losses are shown in Table 4.3.5 for the cases of with and without BSPS for CNS-1. Varying according to the cases, the number of heavily damaged buildings is reduced from 11% to 53% and the amount of loss is reduced from about 8% to 30%. The cost for the case of with BSPS, comparing with those of without BSPS, is shown in Table 4.3.6. For Case 1, which means the masonry building with cement mortar are constructed instead of mud mortar for new buildings from 2016 to 2030, the building cost will increase about 9%. In the case of Case 2, where all new and existing mud mortar masonry buildings are replaced by cement mortar buildings, the cost increases about 14%. On the other hand, in the Case 4 and Case 5, which change the majority of masonry buildings from both mud mortar and cement mortar, to engineered RC buildings, leads to a considerable increase of building cost due to the increase of building numbers and high unit construction cost.
4-16 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.5 Building Damage and Loss Amount Reduction in Reduction in Reduction in Buildings with number of Loss amount Case loss amount loss amount heavy damage damaged (mil. NPR) (mil. NPR) (%) buildings Case0 88,681 269,789 Case1 79,075 10.8% 247,974 21,815 8.1% Case2 56,452 36.3% 227,573 42,216 15.6% Case3 49,970 43.7% 187,832 81,956 30.4% Case4 52,413 40.9% 221,349 48,440 18.0% Case5 41,230 53.5% 207,520 62,269 23.1% Source: JICA Project Team
Table 4.3.6 Cost Increase of Cases with BSPS to the Case without BSPS Buildings to be Cost increase to Ratio of Cost Construction Case rebuilt or newly Case 0 (mil. increase cost increase per Cost (mil. NPR) constructed NPR) (%) year Case1 161,953 881,718 79,718 9% 5,694 Case2 243,047 1,072,452 148,391 14% 10,599 Case3 452,543 2,690,179 299,228 11% 21,373 Case4 293,099 2,263,313 894,945 40% 63,925 Case5 389,795 3,009,995 1,233,103 41% 88,079 Note: Building increase from 2016 to 2030 is 161,952; construction cost is 802,000 mil. NPR Cost increase per year is calculated for 14 years, from 2017 to 2030. Source: JICA Project Team
4-17 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.7 Results of building damage assessment (2016, 2030 and 2030 with 5 cases of BSPS)
Building Damage Scinario Eq. Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) 2016 WN 24,961 5.6% 21,967 4.9% CNS-1 65,314 14.7% 42,940 9.7% CNS-2 136,060 30.6% 62,691 14.1% Total Number: 444,554 CNS-3 199,643 44.9% 67,418 15.2%
Building Damage Scinario Eq. 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) without BSPS WN 33,763 5.6% 29,831 4.9% (※1) CNS-1 88,681 14.6% 58,470 9.6% CNS-2 185,796 30.6% 85,520 14.1% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 273,269 45.1% 91,892 15.2% Rate of Mitigating Damage Building Damage Scinario Eq. by BSPS (※2) 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) Heavily Partly with BSPS WN 28,377 4.7% 26,558 4.4% 16.0% 11.0% Case01 CNS-1 79,075 13.0% 55,103 9.1% 10.8% 5.8% CNS-2 171,977 28.4% 83,859 13.8% 7.4% 1.9% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 258,044 42.5% 92,321 15.2% 5.6% -0.5% Rate of Mitigating Damage Building Damage Scinario Eq. by BSPS (※2) 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) Heavily Partly with BSPS WN 13,627 2.2% 18,881 3.1% 59.6% 36.7% Case02 CNS-1 56,452 9.3% 50,010 8.2% 36.3% 14.5% CNS-2 146,361 24.1% 83,717 13.8% 21.2% 2.1% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 234,477 38.7% 95,133 15.7% 14.2% -3.5% Rate of Mitigating Damage Building Damage Scinario Eq. by BSPS (※2) 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) Heavily Partly with BSPS WN 12,162 2.0% 16,590 2.7% 64.0% 44.4% Case03 CNS-1 49,970 8.2% 45,067 7.4% 43.7% 22.9% CNS-2 131,095 21.6% 78,997 13.0% 29.4% 7.6% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 213,481 35.2% 93,462 15.4% 21.9% -1.7% Rate of Mitigating Damage Building Damage Scinario Eq. by BSPS (※2) 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) Heavily Partly with BSPS WN 16,147 2.7% 17,900 3.0% 52.2% 40.0% Case04 CNS-1 52,413 8.6% 45,293 7.5% 40.9% 22.5% CNS-2 129,904 21.4% 79,695 13.1% 30.1% 6.8% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 210,181 34.7% 95,190 15.7% 23.1% -3.6% Rate of Mitigating Damage Building Damage Scinario Eq. by BSPS (※2) 2030 Heavily (DG4+5) Partly (DG3) Heavily Partly with BSPS WN 11,138 1.8% 14,252 2.3% 67.0% 52.2% Case05 CNS-1 41,230 6.8% 40,974 6.8% 53.5% 29.9% CNS-2 111,854 18.4% 77,650 12.8% 39.8% 9.2% Total Number: 606,506 CNS-3 189,357 31.2% 96,203 15.9% 30.7% -4.7% ※1: BSPS: Promotion on Building Seismic Performance Strengthening ※2: Rate of Mitigating Damage by BSPS Compared to 2030 Without BSPS Source: JICA Project Team
4-18 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Damage ratio of buildings with heavy and very heavy structural damage for 2030 without BSPS and for 5 cases of 2030 with BSPS is shown at upper portion of Figure 4.3.6. Ratio of damage reduction against 2030 without BSPS is shown at lower portion of the same figure. The special case that all buildings are “RC engineered” in 2030 is shown as “2030 with BSPS (Reference)” at the right end for reference.
Rate of Damage Building (Heavily: DG4+5)
50% WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 45.1% 42.5% Rate(%) = Damage Building Number / Total Building Number 38.7% 40% 35.2% 34.7% 30.6% 31.2% 30% 28.4% 24.1% 25.4% 21.6% 21.4% 20% 18.4% 14.6% 13.0% 13.5% 9.3% 8.2% 8.6% 10% 6.8%
Building Damage Rate (Heavily) 5.6% 4.7% 3.8% 2.2% 2.0% 2.7% 1.8% 0.5% 0% Without BSPS With BSPS Case01 With BSPS Case02 With BSPS Case03 With BSPS Case04 With BSPS Case05 With BSPS (Reference) 2030 with/without BSPS
Rate of Mitigating Damage by BSPS Compared to Without BSPS (Heavily: DG4+5)
100% WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 90.1%
Rate(%) = (Without BSPS - With BSPS) / Without BSPS 80% 73.9% 67.0% 64.0% 59.6% 60% 56.0% 52.2% 53.5% 43.7% 43.7% 40.9% 39.8% 40% 36.3% 29.4% 30.1% 30.7% 21.2% 21.9% 23.1% 20% 16.0% 14.2% 10.8% 7.4%5.6%
Rate of Mitigating Damage by BSPS (Heavily) BSPS by Damage Mitigating of Rate 0% With BSPS Case01 With BSPS Case02 With BSPS Case03 With BSPS Case04 With BSPS Case05 With BSPS (Reference) Cases of With BSPS Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.6 Building damage ratio (DG 4+5) in 2030 with BSPS (upper) and ratio of damage reduction (lower) by scenario earthquakes
(2) Damage to school buildings
The total number of school buildings was estimated as 5,731 buildings based on a school building inventory as of 2016 and the result of damage assessment is shown in Figure 4.3.7, Table 4.3.8 and Figure 4.3.8. The ratio of each structural type are, 61% for “Masonry”, 30% for “RC non-engineered”, and 9% for “RC engineered”, and more than half are masonry structure. Buildings with heavy and very heavy structural damage (grade 4 and 5 by EMS 98) due to the scenario earthquake CNS-1 and CNS-2 were estimated as 737 buildings (12.9%) and 1,654 buildings (28.9%) respectively, which is the total of the damage probability of each building. The probability of damage grade 4+5 for each building against the CNS-2 is shown in Figure 4.3.7. Refer to the “Map Book” for more detail.
4-19 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.7 Result of risk assessment for school building (distribution)
Table 4.3.8 Result of risk assessment for school buildings (number and ratio) Scenario Damage Level Total (5,731) Earthquaake DL2 DL3 DL 4 & 5 WN 568 253 237 1,058 18.5% CNS-1 916 539 737 2,192 38.2% CNS-2 1,057 810 1,654 3,521 61.4% CNS-3 960 875 2,486 4,321 75.4% Source: JICA Project Team
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.8 Result of risk assessment for school buildings (number and ratio)
It was noted the seismic risk assessment (3 damage degrees) for 1,200 public school buildings based on NBC was carried out by MOE and ADB (National Workshop on School Earthquake Safety, 2010) and the results are outlined in Attachment 2.5.1.
4-20 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
(3) Damage to health facility buildings
The total number of health facilities has been estimated as 584 buildings based on a health facility inventory as of 2016 and the result of damage assessment is shown in Figure 4.3.9, Table 4.3.9 and Figure 4.3.10. The ratio of each structural type is, 40% for “Masonry”, 51% for “RC non-engineered”, and 9% for “RC engineered”. Buildings with heavy and very heavy structural damage (grade 4 and 5 by EMS 98) due to the scenario earthquake CNS-1 and CNS-2 is 64 buildings (11.0%) and 153 buildings (26.2%) respectively, which is the total of the damage probability of each building. Ratio of buildings with moderate damage (grade 3) and more are 20.4% and 40.4% respectively. The probability of damage grade 4+5 for each building against the CNS-2 is shown in Figure 4.3.9. Refer to the “Map Book” for details of each building.
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.9 Result of risk assessment for medical facilities (distribution)
Table 4.3.9 Result of risk assessment for medical facilities (number and ratio) Scenario Damage Level Total (584) Earthquaake DL2 DL3 DL 4 & 5 WN 51 24 20 95 16.3% CNS-1 85 55 64 204 34.9% CNS-2 105 83 153 341 58.4% CNS-3 97 94 235 426 72.9% Source: JICA Project Team
4-21 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.10 Result of risk assessment for medical facilities (number and ratio)
The results of seismic assessment for 28 buildings of fourteen important hospitals based on the four level earthquakes are described in the report by WHO (A Structural Vulnerability Assessment of Hospitals in Kathmandu Valley, 2002). Please refer to Attachment 2.5.1 for the summary.
(4) Damage to governmental buildings
The total number of governmental buildings has been estimated as 478 buildings based on a governmental building inventory as of 2016 and the result of damage assessment is shown in Figure 4.3.11, Table 4.3.10 and Figure 4.3.12. The ratio of each structural type is, 50% for “Masonry”, 2% for “RC non-engineered”, and 48% for “RC engineered” (including buildings not compatible to the latest seismic code). Buildings with heavy and very heavy structural damage (grade 4 and 5 by EMS 98) due to the scenario earthquake CNS-1 and CNS-2 is 59 buildings (12.3%) and 126 buildings (26.4%) respectively, which is the total of the damage probability of each building. Ratio of buildings with moderate damage (grade 3) and more are 20.4% and 40.4% respectively. The probability of damage grade 4+5 for each building against the CNS-2 is shown in Figure 4.3.11. Refer to the “Map Book” for more detail.
4-22 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.11 Result of risk assessment for governmental buildings (distribution)
Table 4.3.10 Result of risk assessment for governmental buildings (number and ratio) Scenario Damage Level Total (478) Earthquaake DL2 DL3 DL 4 & 5 WN 44 20 20 84 17.6% CNS-1 71 44 59 174 36.4% CNS-2 85 66 126 277 57.9% CNS-3 80 73 186 339 70.9% Source: JICA Project Team
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.12 Result of risk assessment for governmental buildings (number and ratio)
(5) Damage to historical buildings (monuments)
Risk assessment of historical buildings (monuments) at the Protected Monument Zone (PMZ) of 3 Durbar Squares (Hanumandhoka, Patan, and Bhaktapur World Heritage Site
4-23 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
(WHS)) was done. In the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake, 21 monuments (19.4%) were damaged with “Reconstruction” which is equivalent to damage grade 4+5, and 28 monuments (25.95) were damaged with “Retrofitting/Conservation), which is equivalent to damage grade 2+3, and total 49 out of 108 monuments were damaged (45.4%). Damage data at each Durbar Square is shown in Attachment 2.4.1. There is no big difference of PGA at 3 Durbar Squares by each scenario earthquake, and damage number and damage ratio is shown in Figure 4.3.13. Ratio of monument with damage grade 4+5 by scenario earthquake the CNS-1 and the CNS-2 is 50.4% and 72.8% respectively.
Damge Grade 4+5 Dmage Grade 2+3 120 95.9% 91.4% 100 12.3 78.0% 80 18.7
60 52.1% 27.6
40 28.1 20
Damage of Monument (Nos) (Nos) Monument of Damage 23.9 50.4 72.8 83.6 0 WN1234 CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Scenario Earthquake
Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.13 Result of risk assessment of historical building at 3 Durbar Squares (total 108 monuments)
According to the following reference, PGA 0.266g (g: gravity acceleration) was estimated as a hazard assessment with 475 years return period at the bedrock of the area of Durbar Square. As far as the response at the free surface ground, 0.542g (linear response) and 0.22g (equivalent linear response) at Kathmandu Durbar Square, 0.425g (linear response) and 0.314g (equivalent linear response) at Lalitpur (Patan) Durbar Square, 0.32g (linear response) and 0.208g (equivalent linear response) at Bhaktapur Durbar Square are shown. The result of equivalent linear response is relatively similar to that of the scenario earthquake CNS-1.
Reference: Prem Nam Maskey, 2014 ,“Seismic Hazard at the Monument Zones of the World Heritage Site of the Kathmandu Valley”, CARD, IOE, Tribhuvan University, Nepal
(6) Risk assessment by a detail building survey
Drawings, material strength and weight data for a total of eleven buildings were collected through a detail building survey during the 1st year of the project, and the seismic capacity for both directions (x and y directions) of each building were assessed using a simplified
4-24 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
method. The summary is shown in Figure 4.3.14. Effective PGA (cm/sec2, gal) causing damage grade 4 (heavy damage) and more by EMS-98 was estimated, and the estimated PGA has some range considering the variety of building response by earthquake waves and reliable accuracy of the assessment (shown by blue color dotted line). Data of detail assessment is shown the Attachment 2.5.1 of the report.
Effective PGA of the range of 200~300gal was supposed at the center area in the valley by the scenario earthquake CNS-1, and the area is shown in red color dotted line. Similarly the range of 250~400gal was supposed by the scenario earthquake CNS-2 and the area is shown in red color dotted line for essential public buildings such as school, hospital and governmental building.
It is to be noted at the south side of the valley where PGA of 150~400gal by CNS-1 and PGA of 250~600gal by the CNS-2 have been estimated, but buildings there were supposed to be located at the center area in the valley.
700
Estimated PGA causing
heavy damage of bldg
600
RC eng. (x, y) (x, eng. RC Residential
eng. (x, y)
RC eng. (x, y) (x, eng. RC Hospital
- 500
RC non RC Residential RC eng.. (x, y) (x, eng.. RC Localgovernmental
Brick/cement(x, y) Residential 400 rise resi.
RC eng. (x, y) (x, eng. RC Governmental
Brick/mud (x, y) Residential Brick/cement(x, y) School
PGA by CNS-2 y) (x, eng. RC High - PGA by CNS-2
Brick/mud (x, y) Historical At the center 300 at the center causing heavy structural damage structural heavy causing
Adobe(x, y) Residential PGA by CNS-1 PGA by CNS-1
(gal) (gal) at the center At the center 200 Design PGA by IS 1893-1 (2002) Observed PGA by 2015 Gorkha Earthquake 100 Estimated PGA PGA Estimated
0 Essential pub. bldg Essential pub. bldg 0 1 2 2 4 3 6 7 8 9 10 4 12 5 14 6 16 8 1810 1120 22 Masonry RC Note: Usage, 1~6: Residential, 7 : School, 8 : Hospital, 9 : Historical building, 10 & 11 : Governmental building Structural type, 1: Adobe, 2 & 9 : Brick masonry with mud mortar joint, 3 & 7 : Brick masonry with cement mortar joint, 4 : Non-engineered RC, 5, 6, 8, 10 and 11 : Engineered RC (including building designed by old design code), photos (1~9) by ESS, photos 10, 11 by the project Source: JICA Project Team, photos（1~8）by ESS Figure 4.3.14 Risk assessment of eleven buildings based on detailed building survey
(PGA causing heavy damage was assessed by a simplified method, and the range of PGA by scenario earthquakes at the center in the valley was added.)
4-25 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Observed PGA due to the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake (average 147gal, area of green color dotted line) is shown in the Figure, and design PGA by IS 1893-1 (2002) is shown using yellow color dotted line in the Figure. According to IS 1893-1 (2002), design PGA is 180gal which is the half of 360gal, possible maximum ground acceleration. PGA for design is not shown explicitly in NBC 105. Importance factor 1.5 for essential public buildings such as monument, school, hospital and governmental building is indicated at design codes.
Damage due to the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake
Damage grade 3 of EMS-98 for building No. 1 (Adobe), DG 3 for building No. 2 (Brick masonry with mud mortar joint), DG 3 for building No.4 (RC with soft story), and DG 2 for building No. 6 (High-rise RC) were recorded respectively. No damages for other buildings. Buildings are supposed after the repair work or no damage in the following assessment.
The result of risk assessment of each building which location is supposed at the center of the valley is as follows.
1) Design PGA
A high probability of DG 4 and more has been estimated for building No.1 (Adobe), building No.2 (Brick masonry with mud mortar joint), and building No. 4 (RC with a soft story) for general buildings (against 180gal). A high probability of DG 4 and more has been estimated for building No.7 (Brick masonry with cement mortar, school), building No.9 (Brick masonry with mud mortar joint, historical building) for essential buildings (against 270gal= 180 gal x 1.5).
2) Scenario earthquake CNS-1
A high probability of DG 4 and more has been estimated for building No.3 (Brick masonry with cement mortar joint), and building No. 6 (Engineered hi-rise RC) within general buildings.
3) Scenario earthquake CNS-2
A high probability of DG 4 and more has been estimated for building No.10 (RC, governmental building), and building No.11 (RC, local governmental (municipality) building) for essential buildings. Some probability of DG 4 has been estimated for recently constructed building No. 8 (Engineered RC, hospital) is estimated. Low probability of DG 4 has been estimated for building No. 5 (Engineered RC), and also, it has been estimated that the building was designed with enough allowance, but will suffer DG 3 (brick wall damage).
(7) A study on the result of risk assessment
Estimated PGA by 4 scenario earthquakes is 150 to 200gal for WN, 150 to 400gal for CNS-1,
4-26 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
250 to 600gal for CNS-2, and 300 to 800gal for CNS-3 generally. The epicenter is close in case of CNS and the PGA changes by the location. In the above (6), estimated PGA was supposed as the effective PGA for buildings and the damage risk of each building has been evaluated by supposing that the location is the center of the valley. The damage situation for overall valley has been studied here.
1) Scenario earthquake WN
The size of ground motion for the scenario earthquake WN is similar to that of the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake (PGA is 150gal at the center and 200gal at the perimeter is estimated generally), and the damage degree is also similar.
2) Scenario earthquake CNS-1
The ratio of damage level 4 (heavy structural damage) and more is 15% for general buildings in the case of CNS-1. The ratio of damage level 4 and more is more than 10% for schools, medical facilities and government buildings. PGA at the center of the valley is 200 to 300gal, and the ratio of damage grade 4 and more is approximately 20% for brick masonry with cement mortar, and more than 10% for RC building. Furthermore the damage at the south area of the valley results in almost destruction for brick masonry with mud mortar, damage ratio of heavy structural damage is 40 to 50% for brick masonry with cement mortar, and is 20 to 30% for RC building generally. On the other hand, the damage at the north area of the valley has been estimated to the degree of slightly bigger than that of the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake. The following two points are characteristics.
■ There is a high possibility of damage grade 4 and more at the center and south area of the valley for public buildings; those are the essential facilities for disaster mitigation. ■ There is a big difference of damage situation between the south and north area of the valley.
3) Scenario earthquake CNS-2
The size of ground motion of the CNS-2 is generally 1.5 times of that of the CNS-1. Estimated PGA at the center area is 250 to 400gal, and big damage for masonry mainly including RC building is assessed. Estimated PGA at the south area is 400 to 600gal, and almost destruction for masonry including cement mortar type, and 40 to 60% for RC building. In addition, the damage at the north area has been assessed.
4) Scenario earthquake CNS-3
The ground motion by the CNS-3 might be overestimated, and the assessed damage also might be overestimated.
4-27 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
4.3.2 Damage to transportation Infrastructure
(1) Damage to roads
The purpose of risk assessment on roads is to identify the degree of traffic disturbance induced by an earthquake. Landslides, liquefaction and blockage caused by collapsed building debris were the major reasons of road damage.
1) Damage by slope failure and liquefaction:
Roads located in high potential areas of slope failure and liquefaction are at risk of traffic disturbance by severed roads due to sediment, subsidence of road base and fluctuation of road structures. In this project, possible damaged roads due to slope failure and liquefaction were identified by spatially comparing the 250m mesh-grid potential maps of slope failure and liquefaction based on the scenario seismic ground motion and the map of existing road network for each grid. The road lengths that have been determined to have high potential of slope failure and liquefaction for each scenario earthquake is shown in Table 4.3.11.
4-28 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.11 Summary of lengths of possible damaged road by slope failure and liquefaction
(Km) Slope Failure: High Liquefaction: High Road Class Total Length WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 NH: National Highway 0.0 0.0 1.3 2.8 0.0 1.8 7.6 11.2 61.6 (DOR)
FRN: Feeder Roads Major 0.0 0.9 8.8 25.1 0.0 5.6 12.8 19.3 290.1 (DOR)
FRO:Feeder Roads Minor 0.0 0.0 1.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.9 84.7 (DOR)
SUR: Strategic Urban Road 0.0 0.0 1.6 4.6 0.0 4.3 13.6 18.3 129.0 (DOR)
District or Village Road 0.0 5.7 85.8 355.6 0.0 64.3 241.0 405.6 5,245.2
Total 0.0 6.6 98.5 390.6 0.0 76.1 274.9 455.3 5,810.6
Remark: There is no Mid-Hill Road (MH) and Postal Road (PR) in the study area based on the annual statistic document preparead by DOR Source: JICA Project Team
2) Road blockage of the narrow streets:
There is a risk of road blockage due to the debris of collapsed buildings by earthquake ground motion in the relatively narrow streets. In this project, the risk of traffic disturbance after the earthquake due to the collapse of adjacent buildings was estimated to calculate the road link blockage rate for each grid targeting the central city where narrow streets are concentrated. First, the road link blockage rate by road segment was calculated based on a typical road width of objective road and a building damage rate of the grid where the road segment is located. Then, the average of road link blockage rates weighted by length of road segments was calculated in each grid.
① Width of representative road: Less than 3.5m Rate of road-link blockage (%)＝0.9009×Rate of damaged building(%)＋19.845
② Width of representative road: 3.5m to < 5.5m Rate of road-link blockage (%)＝0.3514×Rate of damaged building(%)＋13.189
③ Width of representative road: 5.5m to < 13m Rate of road-link blockage (%)＝ 0.2229 ×Rate of damaged building(%)－1.5026 Rate of damaged building = (Rate of total damage + ½×Rate of partial damage) Source: Central Disaster Prevention Council, Japan
The typical road width is set based on the road network data which has the attribute data for road widths, and the building damage rate is the sum of half of the complete destruction rate (DL4+5) and half of partial destruction rate (DL3) for each grid. Figure 4.3.15 shows the result of evaluated road link blockage for the emergency transportation road network proposed by JICA RRNE project.
4-29 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.15 Distribution of road link blockage rates on the ETRN due to the debris of collapsed buildings by scenario earthquake (CNS-2)
From the distribution of potential slope failure based on scenario earthquakes, it can be observed that the potential of slope failure in the mountain area surrounding the Kathmandu Valley is higher than one in the central area, mainly depending on the distance from the epicenter of scenario earthquakes. There are high potential areas for liquefaction along alluvial plain and valley plain formed by tributary stream classified in the geomorphological map.
From distribution of road link blockage rate by grid, in overall, the rates are larger in the south area and mainly depending on the difference in strength of seismic motion due to the distance from the epicenter. In the distribution, when focused only on emergency transportation road network, the rates depend on the width of roads.
(2) Damage to bridges
1) Evaluation Criteria
If the earthquake risk of a bridge is regarded as the functional disturbance of road that can be represented by the event-related collapse of the substructure and the possibility of falling down of the superstructure. In this project, the possibility of collapse of the bridge substructure was evaluated utilizing "Response ductility factor" caused by the earthquake motion, and it was designated as an important index for quantitatively evaluating the risk of the earthquake at the bridge.
The liquefaction of the ground affects the stability of the structure at the time of earthquake, but the liquefying possibility evaluation in this project is based on insufficient soil test of each bridge site. In order to investigate the possibility of liquefaction with sufficient accuracy, it is necessary to carry out at least a boring test including grain size measurement of each layer at bridge site and PS logging, if possible. In this project, no borehole tests were
4-30 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
performed for individual bridge sites, though data were supplemented by referring to the micro topography classification and as such. From the viewpoint of micro topography classification, there is no difference in liquefaction potential for each bridge site, as almost all of the bridges in the Kathmandu Valley are located at the crossing of the river. Considering this point, the influence of liquefaction potential was not considered in the damage assessment. If the influence of liquefaction potential is going to be strongly utilized, the evaluation score of all the bridges may be lowered under investigation by one level.
2) Response Ductility Factor
Collapse of the bridge piers is the most noticeable failure mode for multiple span bridges and this event can be evaluated with "Response ductility factor" as the most quantitative indicator. Deformation of pier may exceed the elastic region when receiving seismic motion designated as the scenario earthquake in this project. "Response ductility factor" (how many times the deformation of elastic limit deformation occurs) is an effective index for evaluating the collapse process of the structure. In order to investigate the ductility factor, it is necessary to analyze the force-deformation relation of the structure from elastic region to plastic region. A general drawing and a reinforcing bar arrangement are necessary to fulfill the purpose of analysis. However, these drawings were not available for almost all the bridges within the survey area. Therefore, a kind of estimation method that is discussed in “Seismic Assessment Tool for Urgent Response and Notification” (the technical note of the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management No.71) was utilized. A kind of parameter designated as “yield seismic intensity” mentioned in this document can be utilized. Also, the force-deformation relation of the pier can be estimated using this parameter. As even this estimation method requires the data of external shape and dimensions of each objective, so general drawings of each bridge were created by on-site survey and the drawings were utilized. The response ductility factor was analyzed using the force-deformation relation of the pier and the response spectral value obtained from the result of WG 1. The response spectrum has been assigned for each 250m grid from the result of the hazard assessment within the study area. A regression formula was proposed in the research report of NILIM No.71, based on the investigations on the bridges of Japan, where the response of pier could be estimated from external dimensions of structure without detail information of rebar arrangement. Applying this regression analysis, it is needed to consider the fact that, this regression formula was established for different seismic design standard used in different time period. Regression analysis was made for four periods according to the design concept of the earthquake resistant design code. The coefficients of regression equation: α, β, γ are shown in Table 4.3.13.
4-31 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.12 Four period classification of earthquake resistant design code applied for regression analysis Period of earthquake Policy features resistant design code A. before 1980 Linear analysis utilizing response spectra Preliminary study on non-linear analysis was applied considering ductile B. 1980～1990 behavior Large scale earthquake motion (about 400 Years of return period) C. 1990～1995 considering ductile behavior D. after 1995 Special code utilizing the experience of 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake Source: JICA Project Team
The bridges to be surveyed do not conform to the earthquake resistant design code of Japan. Therefore a group of regression formulas were chosen in accordance with a classification closer to the policy of the target bridge design from the above classification with reference to construction year and construction agency etc. However, there are few cases where it can be judged that the bridges targeted this time are provided with reinforcing bars that take into consideration the ductility design concept. Even in the case where the reinforcing bars are designed with consideration of the ductility design concept, it is classified as “A” because it cannot be classified after “B” because there are problems in terms of detailed structure. (for instance, without movement limiting device in bearing)
Technical note of NILIM No.71 set the indicator called the yield seismic intensity Khy to estimate the force-deformation relation of the piers, and the regression equation to obtain this is expressed by the following equations 4.3.1) to 4.3.3) It is defined as follows.
K =β×T 4.3.1) T =2.01× W +0.3W /K 4.3.2)
K =α×K 4.3.3)
Where, α, β, γ: Coefficient of the regression equation
Ty: Equivalent natural period that is equivalent to the stiffness under yielding process
K0: Initial stiffness
Khy: Initial stiffness
Ky: yield seismic intensity (tf/m)
Wu: Weight of superstructure (tf)
Wp: Weight of pier (tf) Relation between four periods of groups and coefficient of the regression equation α, β, γ are shown in Table 4.3.13.
4-32 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.13 Relation between four periods of groups and coefficient of the regression equation
Classifi Regression coefficient Design concept of corresponding Japanese code applied age cation α β γ A Linear analysis utilizing response spectra before 1980 0.39 0.23 -0.463 Preliminary study on non-linear analysis was applied B 1980～1990 0.39 0.25 -0.328 considering ductile behavior Large scale earthquake motion (about 400 years of return C 1990～1995 0.39 0.25 -0.277 period) Considering ductile behavior D Special code utilizing the experience of Kobe Earthquake after 1995 0.41 0.33 -0.484 Source: Prepared by JICA Project Team, based on the input from technical note of NI L IM No.71
Given the value Sa of the ground response spectrum presumed for the point, the response ductility factor μr is obtained by the equation 4.3.4).
If 1 × μ = +1 a) ×
4.3.4) If 1 ×
μ = b) × Where;
μr: Response ductility factor
Sa: Value of acceleration response spectrum G: Acceleration of gravity
Khy: Yield seismic intensity
The threshold of the response ductility factor μr obtained as a result is shown in Figure 4.3.16.
Period of applied Code No significant damage D : (after 1993) slight B and C : (1980~1990) medium
A : severe (before 1980)
Source: Prepared by the JICA Project Team, based on Junichi SAKAI and Shigeki UNJOH; Development of Quick Earthquake Damage Detection Method for Bridges Using Intelligent Sensor Unit, PWRI Technical Note Figure 4.3.16 Reference work for threshold value of response ductility factor
4-33 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
In addition, in Chapter 3, Recommendations on Utilizing Risk Assessment Results, the case of a bridge with single spans, the case where the substructure is consisted of masonry (stone, brick), the case where the material is wooden and the cases with scouring effects, as well as the problems of measures have been mentioned.
3) Results
The possibility of collapse of the superstructure and substructure is assumed as a risk of bridges against seismic shaking due to scenario earthquakes in the project. First, the response ductility factor at the base of targeted pier due to scenario earthquakes is obtained. Then, the damage degree of targeted pier is estimated by using the relationship between threshold values of the ductility factor obtained from the past earthquake damages and the loading tests prepared by the Public Works Research Institute in Japan. The response ductility factor is an index indicating the number of times the horizontal displacement becomes the elastic limit deformation. In this analysis, the external dimensions and material of the bridge are necessary, especially the condition of the reinforcing bars is important, but, the information of reinforcing bars with most bridges in the study area were unknown. Therefore, it was decided that the response ductility factor corresponding to the acceleration response spectrum of scenario earthquakes to be calculated based on the yield seismic intensity (Khy) obtained based on an estimation method that is discussed in “Seismic Assessment Tool for Urgent Response and Notification” (the technical note of the National Institute for Land and Infrastructure Management No.71). Even with this evaluation process, since the outer dimensions of the piers and the weight of superstructure are necessary, they were obtained by measurement at the targeted bridge sites.
The estimated result of possible damaged bridges due to scenario earthquakes, by classification into four degrees: no significant damage, slight, moderate and heavy is shown in Table 4.3.14, summarized in Table 4.3.15 and the distribution of damaged bridges is shown in Figure 4.3.17 for CNS-2 as an example.
As for the bridge types, besides multi-span bridges which were targeted for risk assessment based on the response ductility factor as described above, there are single-span bridges which have low risk for bridge collapse, and low seismic capacity bridges such as whose substructure were constructed from masonry. In addition, from the viewpoint of the possibility of bridge collapse, the girder length is an important factor, and, it is better to consider the effect of a pier scour as the bearing force of foundation of the pier against the horizontal external force will be insufficient. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation flow which consists of five stages incorporating above factors was developed as a simple method to consider the degree of urgency required for measures (refer to 3.2.2).
4-34 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.14 Bridge inventory and damage of multi-span bridges
No. Damage assessment for multi span Structure Length Width No. Name Latitude Longitude of type (m) (m) span WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 1 Hanumante 27.67422 85.39953 RC T-Beam 50.40 3 12.50 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy 2 Hanumante 27.67425 85.39961 RC T-Beam 50.40 3 9.10 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy 3 Manohara 27.67369 85.35833 RC T-Beam 80.00 5 13.00 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy 4 Jagate 27.66411 85.44175 RC T-Beam 8.60 1 7.90 5 Hanumante Khola 27.67750 85.40792 RC T-Beam 19.70 1 11.95 6 Hanumante Khola 27.66783 85.35314 RC Slab 25.00 4 3.50 NO Moderate Moderate Heavy 7 Hanumante Khola 27.67322 85.36453 RC T-Beam 38.01 3 5.44 NO Moderate Moderate Heavy 8 Chokin Chila 27.67353 85.44781 RC T-Beam 13.35 3 7.10 9 Mulsanghu 27.68228 85.45778 RC T-Beam 15.00 1 5.00 10 Budhi Gandaki 27.65175 85.41234 RC Slab 12.00 2 5.10 11 Ghatte Khola 27.66033 85.39631 RC Slab 14.10 3 4.10 Khatripauwa 12 27.70812 85.19628 RC Slab 3.20 1 7.50 River 13 Bishnumati 27.69806 85.30258 RC T-Beam 83.10 8 13.60 14 Manamati 27.69628 85.29325 RC Slab 12.70 2 19.60 15 Khadkulo 27.69214 85.27756 RC Slab 10.70 2 22.00 16 Balkhu Khola 27.68617 85.26028 RC T-Beam 33.70 1 12.00 17 Bagmati 27.68658 85.34350 RC T-Beam 84.00 5 20.45 NO Slight Moderate Heavy 18 Manohara 27.67509 85.35494 RC T-Beam 84.00 5 9.50 NO Moderate Moderate Heavy 19 Dhobi Khola 27.69067 85.32811 RC T-Beam 50.90 3 20.52 Slight Slight Moderate Heavy 20 Bagmati 27.70608 85.34939 RC T-Beam 48.00 3 15.50 NO Slight Moderate Heavy 21 Manohara River 27.67275 85.34147 RC T-Beam 112.00 7 15.50 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy 22 Khasibazar 27.69000 85.23369 RC T-Beam 48.00 3 15.50 Slight Slight Moderate Heavy 23 Suichatar 27.69961 85.28167 RC Slab 13.60 2 15.60 NO Moderate Heavy Heavy 24 Bishnumati 27.73519 85.30758 RC T-Beam 64.00 4 15.50 NO Moderate Heavy Heavy 25 Basundhara Khola 27.74186 85.33358 RC Slab 8.40 1 17.10 26 Dhobi Khola 27.72186 85.34564 RC T-Beam 48.00 3 15.50 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy 27 Bagmati River 27.68481 85.29892 RC T-Beam 128.00 8 15.50 NO Slight Moderate Moderate 28 Balkhu Khola 27.68497 85.29758 RC T-Beam 42.00 3 15.50 NO Slight Moderate Heavy 29 Bishnumati Khola 27.72550 85.30536 RC T-Beam 60.00 4 12.80 NOSlight Moderate Moderate 30 Bishnumati 27.78175 85.35583 Truss 15.32 1 3.95 Steel plate 31 Manomata 27.72928 85.44547 41.80 3 6.33 NO NO Slight Moderate Girder 32 Bagmati 27.72194 85.38131 RC T-Beam 66.75 4 9.50 NO Slight Moderate Moderate Steel plate 33 Mahadev Khola 27.72961 85.43028 41.84 3 6.30 NO NO Slight Moderate Girder 34 Sali Nadi 27.74625 85.48072 RC T-Beam 25.00 1 8.30 Masonry 35 Ghatte Khola 27.74036 85.38956 31.30 3 5.25 Arch 36 Jammotari River 27.74650 85.41056 RC Slab 27.60 2 5.40 37 Thulo Khola 27.78731 85.27278 RC T-Beam 16.65 1 6.30 38 Bhadramati 27.71664 85.28289 RC Slab 6.50 1 8.70 39 Bishnumati 27.71375 85.30242 RC T-Beam 74.10 2 12.30 NO Moderate Heavy Heavy Steel plate 40 Mahadev Khola 27.74083 85.30322 32.00 1 6.30 Girder 41 Bishnumati Khola 27.74472 85.31639 RC T-Beam 13.30 1 5.15 42 Bishnumati River 27.75608 85.32744 RC T-Beam 9.00 1 9.50 43 Shivapuri Khola 27.80358 85.32183 RC T-Beam 7.00 1 6.70 44 Samakhusi Khola 27.72808 85.31461 RC Slab 10.60 2 6.90 45 Miteri 27.73614 85.35286 RC T-Beam 7.50 1 4.00 46 Dhobi Khola 27.76164 85.36431 RC T-Beam 14.25 1 4.30 47 Manohara 27.68631 85.36444 RC T-Beam 60.20 3 10.95 NO Slight Moderate Moderate 48 Bagmati River 27.71222 85.37269 RC T-Beam 50.05 3 5.00 Slight Slight Moderate Moderate 49 Manohara River 27.70372 85.39369 RC T-Beam 62.59 3 5.55 NO Moderate Moderate Heavy 50 Manohara River 27.71394 85.41103 RC T-Beam 62.08 3 6.70 NO Slight Moderate Moderate 51 Sali Nadi 27.72922 85.46961 Timber 8.00 1 4.20 Steel plate 52 Bagmati 27.68961 85.31889 154.45 6 14.30 Slight Slight Moderate Heavy Girder
4-35 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
No. Damage assessment for multi span Structure Length Width No. Name Latitude Longitude of type (m) (m) span WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Steel plate 53 Bagmati 27.68928 85.31664 153.60 6 10.67 Girder 54 Nallu 27.57550 85.31253 RC T-Beam 38.00 2 6.35 NO Slight Moderate Heavy 55 Karmanasa 27.64797 85.33572 RC Slab 42.00 7 7.60 56 Khahare 27.59503 85.37719 RC Slab 6.90 1 6.00 Steel plate 57 Godabari 27.64722 85.36492 24.00 4 4.00 Girder Steel plate 58 Gwarko 27.66608 85.33347 21.88 1 9.30 Girder 59 Karma Nasa 27.67108 85.34278 Timber 20.05 3 3.70 60 Nakhu 27.66494 85.30586 RC T-Beam 37.10 1 12.30 H- Steel 61 Gaurighat 27.71300 85.35000 11.10 1 3.30 Girder Sinamangal 62 27.69900 85.34700 RC T-Beam 58.30 4 7.60 NO Slight Moderate Heavy Bridge 63 27.69200 85.35100 RC T-Beam 19.00 1 7.50 64 27.68900 85.34800 RC T-Beam 30.55 2 7.50 NO NO Slight Slight Mahadevsthan 65 27.68300 85.33900 RC T-Beam 25.20 1 5.70 Bridge Bagmati Maohara 66 27.67900 85.33500 RC T-Beam 25.60 1 10.80 Dovan 67 Sankhamul Bridge 27.68500 85.32800 RC T-Beam 50.45 3 11.70 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy 68 27.69200 85.31100 RC T-Beam 87.05 4 8.10 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy Steel plate 69 Teku Bridge 27.69300 85.30300 134.00 5 5.50 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy Girder Chovar Bagmati RC Arch 70 27.65900 85.29400 38.70 1 10.60 Bridge Bridge 71 27.70100 85.21700 RC T-Beam 7.80 1 3.75 H- Steel 72 27.70000 85.22100 7.20 1 5.20 Girder 73 27.69300 85.23800 RC T-Beam 8.20 1 5.50 74 27.69400 85.24400 RC Slab 11.60 1 4.20 75 27.69300 85.24700 RC T-Beam 18.60 1 5.40 76 27.69200 85.25100 RC T-Beam 8.70 1 6.00 77 27.68826 85.25617 RC T-Beam 8.05 2 4.00 78 27.68300 85.27000 RC T-Beam 21.00 3 3.71 79 27.69100 85.27600 RC Slab 15.40 2 2.50 80 27.69200 85.27700 RC Slab 8.06 1 4.50 81 27.69100 85.27800 RC T-Beam 6.40 1 2.20 82 27.69100 85.28200 RC T-Beam 14.30 1 5.40 83 27.69000 85.28700 RC T-Beam 25.50 1 6.80 84 27.68700 85.29300 RC T-Beam 21.40 2 5.20 Moderate Heavy Heavy Heavy 85 27.77300 85.31700 RC T-Beam 9.80 1 5.05 86 Indrayani Pul 27.74900 85.31500 RC T-Beam 13.70 1 3.75 87 27.74400 85.31500 RC T-Beam 13.00 1 3.80 88 27.74200 85.31400 RC T-Beam 20.70 1 10.50 89 27.74000 85.31200 RC Slab 13.00 1 2.60 90 27.74000 85.31100 RC T-Beam 11.80 1 4.35 91 27.72000 85.30000 RC T-Beam 36.00 2 6.75 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy Steel plate 92 Dallu Bridge 27.70900 85.30300 60.00 3 7.30 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy Girder Tankeshwori 93 27.70200 85.30200 RC T-Beam 76.40 5 11.75 NO Slight Moderate Heavy Bridge 94 Teku Dovan 27.69200 85.30100 RC T-Beam 62.73 3 6.20 Moderate Moderate Heavy Heavy 95 27.75166 85.35930 RC Slab 8.20 1 6.90 96 27.74823 85.35878 RC Slab 5.85 1 9.80 97 27.74700 85.36370 RC T-Beam 14.30 1 5.20 98 27.73999 85.35229 RC Slab 10.50 1 3.55 99 27.73942 85.35338 RC T-Beam 12.30 1 2.55 100 27.73600 85.35280 RC T-Beam 10.00 1 4.05 101 Nilo Pul 27.73104 85.34923 RC Slab 14.10 3 8.10 NO NO Slight Moderate 102 27.72932 85.35018 RC Slab 12.20 2 3.30
4-36 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
No. Damage assessment for multi span Structure Length Width No. Name Latitude Longitude of type (m) (m) span WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 103 27.72800 85.35000 RC Slab 8.10 1 3.00 Bhatkeko Steel plate 104 27.71800 85.34000 45.09 3 6.90 Slight Moderate Moderate Heavy pul/Pahelo Pul Girder Steel plate 105 Kalopul 27.71200 85.33700 57.10 2 9.30 Slight Slight Moderate Heavy Girder 106 Ratopul 27.70800 85.33700 RC T-Beam 37.20 1 12.45 107 Seto pul 27.70300 85.33600 RC T-Beam 46.00 3 12.70 NO Slight Moderate Moderate H- Steel 108 27.68781 85.32648 10.85 1 4.05 Girder 109 27.69800 85.33100 RC T-Beam 12.70 1 7.70 110 27.69400 85.33000 RC T-Beam 14.00 1 7.80 Steel plate 111 Simrik Pul 27.69300 85.32900 38.00 3 7.30 NO NO Slight Moderate Girder H- Steel 112 27.68800 85.32600 9.90 1 2.50 Girder 113 27.68800 85.32500 RC T-Beam 10.20 1 4.25 114 Khairo Pul 27.68700 85.32400 RC T-Beam 15.00 1 9.15 115 27.66900 85.43700 RC T-Beam 16.00 1 8.00 116 27.66963 85.43756 RC Slab 7.90 1 8.40 H- Steel 117 27.66900 85.43400 18.50 3 4.60 Girder H- Steel 118 27.66900 85.43200 23.00 4 2.50 Girder H- Steel 119 27.66900 85.43100 23.30 3 4.38 Girder Masonry 120 27.66800 85.42700 24.65 3 4.50 Arch H- Steel 121 27.66800 85.42500 27.00 3 3.85 Girder 122 27.67300 85.40900 RC T-Beam 14.10 1 8.50 123 27.67500 85.40800 RC T-Beam 19.05 3 3.67 124 27.67100 85.38600 RC Slab 34.30 5 4.53 125 27.67200 85.37800 RC T-Beam 45.10 3 5.80 NO NO Slight Slight 126 27.66903 85.35875 RC T-Beam 30.00 2 4.60 127 27.66420 85.36337 RC T-Beam 49.60 2 7.30 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy 128 27.66400 85.33500 RC T-Beam 14.65 1 6.25 H- Steel 129 27.66977 85.33949 17.00 3 3.96 Girder 130 27.60700 85.34900 Timber 6.00 1 4.00 131 27.69800 85.28600 RC T-Beam 8.90 1 4.75 132 27.69600 85.29900 RC T-Beam 10.00 1 13.80 133 27.67000 85.35200 RC T-Beam 20.00 2 3.70 Slight Moderate Heavy Heavy Manohara Bridge 134 27.67800 85.33500 RC T-Beam 46.20 1 10.00 Chyasal 135 27.65100 85.31300 RC T-Beam 21.00 1 6.30 136 27.72132 85.32795 RC Slab 5.20 1 11.65 137 27.72100 85.32900 RC Slab 6.00 1 5.00 138 27.72000 85.32600 RC Slab 7.50 1 13.00 139 27.71700 85.32500 Timber 10.00 1 13.00 140 27.70300 85.32200 RC T-Beam 9.30 1 9.90 141 27.70200 85.32100 RC T-Beam 24.00 3 13.90 142 27.69858 85.31980 RC Slab 5.90 1 7.45 143 27.69696 85.31919 RC Slab 9.40 1 14.15 Masonry 144 27.69600 85.31900 6.00 Arch 145 27.69178 85.31607 RC Slab 10.00 1 19.10 Source: JICA Project Team
4-37 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.15 Summary of bridge damage estimation (Upper: Number of damaged bridges, Lower: Damage ratio) Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 0112 32 Heavy 0.0% 2.2% 26.7% 71.1% Bridge 22127 11 Moderate (45 bridges assessed) 4.4% 46.7% 60.0% 24.4% 18 17 6 2 Slight 40.0% 37.8% 13.3% 4.4% Source: JICA project team
Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.17 Distribution maps of possible damaged bridges
The bridges are usually expected to be assessed by conducting individual diagnosis taking into consideration that bridges are important social foundation facilities. In reality, however, it is also required to understand the magnitude of the risk when keeping in view the bridge in the survey area as a whole. In this survey, each bridge has been modeled and the extent of damage on the bridge pier when the scenario earthquake occurs has been studied. The scale used is the response ductility factor. When the value of the response ductility factor exceeds about 3, collapse of the pier might begin. Looking at the results of this study from this point of view, the response ductility factor of one bridge in CNS - 1, 12 bridges in CNS - 2, and 32 bridges in CNS - 3 exceeds 3.
Twelve bridges will correspond to damaged bridge, and is to be well considered as the bridge is one of the most important infrastructures.
In the report of the hazard assessment, the earthquake ground motion of CNS - 2 is about 8 in MMI seismic intensity scale, and there is a part that is estimated as MMI 9. If it is discussed what value correspond to these value of MMI seismic intensity to compare with
4-38 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
the findings on history of earthquake damage in Japan, the MMI seismic intensity of 8 is equivalent to “5 strong” in Japan Meteorological Agency scale, according to “Relation between Meteorological Agency Measurement Scale and MMI Based on K-NET Strong Motion Record” for example. The MMI seismic intensity of 9, which is the earthquake ground motion estimated as CNS-2, corresponds to 7 at the Meteorological Agency scale. Generally, in Japan it is said that damage is caused to public structures such as bridges from around 5 in the seismic intensity scale of the Meteorological Agency. This can be observed from the experience of the earthquake damage caused by the 1964 Niigata earthquake (M 7.5), the 1978 Miyagi Prefecture offshore earthquake (M 7. 4), etc. Of course, the structures in Nepal are different from that of Japan, but, it can be a rough guide to help with its understanding. The fact that the value of the response ductility factor of twelve bridges exceeds 3 in CNS – 2 case, it be compared without discomfort by taking into consideration the above mentioned situation.
If the idea of damage function by cumulative distribution function adopted in building risk assessment is used for bridges, half of them may be under the situation of collapsing, because, the seismic motion whose response ductility factor is equal to 3 by analysis corresponds to the median value. For an example, if considered that the response ductility factor of some bridges out of the above mentioned twelve bridges exceeds 3, roughly speaking, six to twelve bridges will collapse. It is considered that it is possible to take measures for resistance against earthquake by targeting such bridges by various efforts. But it can be said that 32 bridges at CNS-3 are beyond the scope of normal efforts.
Incidentally, there is no example of response ductility factor corresponding to 3 as a result of the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake. This can be agreed based on the absence of remarkable bridge damage caused by this earthquake.
4.3.3 Damage to Lifeline Facilities
(1) Damage to water supply pipeline networks
1) Flow diagram of risk assessment of water supply
For damage estimation of water supply pipelines, the standard damage rate R(v) is used and it is given as the function of the PGV based on the recent findings of earthquake damage of pipelines. Damage to underground pipelines due to the earthquake motion can be explained in terms of the effect of the deformation of the surface ground, rather than the damage due to the vibration of the pipe itself. When the wavelength is assumed to be a natural period of the surface ground, the strain would be proportional to the velocity amplitude. Therefore PGV is suitable as the explanatory variable in comparison with the PGA, as PGV represents the strain of the ground whereas PGA represents the inertial force.
4-39 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Therefore, PGV has been utilized as the explanatory variable for standard damage rate R(v). Liquefaction potential, micro-terrain, pipe type, joint type and pipe diameter also affects the estimated damage. The estimated damage ratio of the pipeline is indicated as the number of damage point per pipeline length. A flow diagram to estimate the damage ratio of the pipeline is shown in Figure 4.3.18.
START
Yes Liquefaction potential exist No
PGV (cm/s) Standard damage rate R(V) Setting of the pipe type, joint Micro-terrain type, type of Setting of the correction correction coefficient type and pipe pipe, joint type and Cp、Cd coefficient Cp、Cd、Cg diameter diameter of pipe
Estimated damage rate Estimated damage rate
END
Source: Japan Water Research Center, Research for the establishment of the pipe damage prediction by the earthquake (edited by JICA Project Team on the basis of the Digest version March 2013 report) Figure 4.3.18 Flow diagram of risk assessment of water supply
If there is no liquefaction potential, the standard damage rate R(v) is given by the function that includes explanatory variables of PGV, micro-terrain, pipe type, joint type and pipe diameter.
R =C ×C ×C ×R( ) 4.3.5)
Where; Rm: Expected damage ratio (number of damage point per pipeline length (km)) Cp: Coefficient of pipe type and joint type Cd: Coefficient of pipe diameter Cg: Coefficient of Microtopography R(V): Standard damage rate (Number of damage point per / pipeline length (km))
. R( ) =9.92×10 × (V−15) 4.3.6) V: Peak Ground Velocity of ground surface (cm/s)
However coverage is:
When there is the possibility of liquefaction, regardless of earthquake ground motion intensity (PGV), the estimated damage rate R(v) is calculated by the following formula. The reason for it is based on the fact that, once the ground liquefies, pipe loses the support of the surrounding ground and the strain and stiffness of the ground do not affect the pipeline
4-40 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
damage. Therefore, the function of Eq. 4.3.7) does not include the explanatory variables of PGV and micro-terrain.
R =C ×C ×R( ) 4.3.7)
Where; Rm: Expected damage ratio (number of damage points per pipeline length (km)) Cp: Coefficient of pipe type and joint type Cd: Coefficient of pipe diameter R(L): Standard damage rate for liquefied ground (Number of damage point per / pipeline length (km))
R( ) =5.5 4.3.8)
2) Setting of the correction coefficient
The standard damage rate R(V) should be modified considering the condition at each site and characteristics of each of the different pipes. It is necessary to set the correction coefficient of the function such that it meets the actual situation of the study area. However, reliable statistics that can be referred to is completely insufficient for this study area. For example, spatial and systematic records of water supply damage related to the past earthquake hazards in Kathmandu Valley do not exist. Not only the water leakage positions have not been identified, but analysis that takes into account the differences about pipe type and other effective elements has not been done yet. Therefore, the damage evaluation function for this study was decided based on the experience in Japan. This was agreed upon with the Executive Director of KVWSMB, the responsible agency of the risk assessment of water supply and sewerage systems in the study area. The technical assistance, such as ongoing risk assessment, is necessary and should be continued.
a) Correction coefficient of the pipe type and joint type
Each coefficient is set as shown below, by comparing the commonality between situation of pipe in Japan and situation of pipe in Nepal with referring to the research results of Japan Water Research Center.
4-41 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.16 Correction coefficient of the pipe type and joint type
pipe type and joint type Cp CI cast-iron pipe 2.5 DI ductile cast-iron pipe (K Type joint) 0.3 GI galvanized iron 2.5 HDPE high density polyethylene 0.3 PVC polyvinyl chloride 1.0 SI stainless iron 0.5 Source: edited by JICA Project Team on the basis of Japan Water Research Center;” Research for the establishment of the pipe damage prediction by the earthquake digest version report, march 2013” Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare; Study Group report on the earthquake resistance of the pipe, June 2014
3) Coefficient of pipe diameter
Coefficient of pipe diameter was set as follows.
Table 4.3.17 Coefficient of pipe diameter
Pipe diameter Cd φ50～φ80 2.0 φ100～φ150 1.0 φ200～φ250 0.4 φ300～φ450 0.2 φ500～φ900 0.1 Source: Japan Water Research Center;” Research for the establishment of the pipe damage prediction by the earthquake digest version report, March 2013”
4) Coefficient of Microtopography
Coefficient of Microtopography was set as follows.
Table 4.3.18 Coefficient of microtopography
Microtopography Cg mountain land, piedmont flat, hilly zone, volcanic area 0.4 volcanic piedmont, volcanic hill gravel terrace, loam terrace 0.8 bottom of the valley, alluvial fan, backswamp 1.0 delta, coastal lowland natural levee, previous river course 2.5 sand bank・gravel bank, dune filled ground, drained land, lake 5.0 Source: Japan Water Research Center;” Research for the establishment of the pipe damage prediction by the earthquake digest version report, March 2013”
5) The schema of risk assessment for each grid
Specific risk assessment work is as follows: 250m × 250m grid was set, as an estimation unit, on the basis of GIS data, and, the estimated
4-42 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
damage rate was provided for each pipe type in each grid. Each grid can have pipes of different pipe types. Number of damage points was calculated by damage rate multiplied pipe length for each pipe type in a unit grid. The total number of damage points was obtained by summing up those calculated number of each different pipe types in a unit grid. An example of schematic drawing is shown in Figure 4.3.19.
Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.19 An example of schematic drawing for pipe damage rate summary of each grid
6) Results
In this project, it was decided to estimate the number of damage points of the underground pipeline for the water supply by grid using a damage function which consists of standard damage rate calculated from PGV value and a few correction coefficients. For setting correction coefficients, the possibility of liquefaction, the type of geomorphology and the characteristics of pipes by node such as a material type and a diameter have been considered. The estimated results are shown in Table 4.3.19.
Figure 4.3.20 and Figure 4.3.21 show estimated damage distributions and lists of number of damage points by municipality for the current water supply network and the planned network due to CNS-2.
4-43 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Table 4.3.19 Summary of estimated result of pipeline damage of water supply network (Upper: Number of damage points, Lower: Damage ratio) Scenario earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Damage points 982 1,921 3,496 5,161 Water supply (Existing) Damage ratio (Total length 1,167 km) 0.84 1.65 3.00 4.42 (point/km) Damage points 124 255 460 676 Water supply (Planned) Damage ratio (Total length 699 km) 0.18 0.36 0.66 0.97 (point/km) Source: JICA Project Team
Pipe Length Number of Damage Points (Spot) Municipality (km) WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 KMC 615 583 1,072 1,956 2,889 LMC 213 184 444 791 1,159 KIRTIPUR 56 31 80 146 216 MADHYAPUR THIMI 50 33 71 129 189 BHAKTAPUR 45184074110 GOKARNESHWAR 44 25 40 75 112 BUDHANILKANTHA 37 33 46 87 130 TOKHA 28344889133 GODAWARI 17 5 14 26 38 TARKESHWAR 17 12 16 30 45 NAGARJUN 11 11 21 39 58 CHANGUNARAYAN 81358 SURYABINAYAK 8 3 8 14 21 CHANDRAGIRI 8 3 7 13 19 MAHALAXMI 5 4 11 19 28 KAGESHWORI MANOHARA 4 1 2 3 4 DAKSHINKALI 00000 BAGMATI 00000 KONJYOSOM 00000 SHANKHARAPUR 00000 Grand Total 1,167 982 1,921 3,496 5,161 Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.20 Estimated damage distribution and the list of number of damage points by municipality for the current water supply network due to CNS-2
4-44 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
Pipe Length Number of Damage Points (Spot) Municipality (km) WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 KMC 493.5 83.8 162.3 294.1 433.1 LMC 204.4 40.4 92.5 165.1 241.6 GOKARNESHWAR 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 BUDHANILKANTHA 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 NAGARJUN 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 BAGMATI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 BHAKTAPUR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 CHANDRAGIRI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 CHANGUNARAYAN 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DAKSHINKALI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 GODAWARI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KAGESHWORI MANOHARA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KIRTIPUR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 KONJYOSOM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 MADHYAPUR THIMI 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 MAHALAXMI 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 SHANKHARAPUR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SURYABINAYAK 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 TARKESHWAR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 TOKHA 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Grand Total 699.1 124.4 255.2 459.8 675.6 Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.21 Estimated damage distribution and the list of number of damage points by municipality for the current water supply network due to CNS-2
Looking at the distribution of the number of damaged areas in the current water network by scenario earthquake CNS-2, considering that the water supply network is one of the important infrastructures, damage rate tends to be mostly depending on micro topographic classification. The damage of the planned waterway network is noticeably slight compared to the damage of the current waterworks network. The reason is due to the use of earthquake resistant materials such as ductile cast iron pipe and high density polyethylene.
As a comprehensive understanding of damage rate, it is a reasonable value considering that the earthquake ground motion is in the range of more than 5 in the Japan Meteorological Agency scale and 8 in the MMI seismic intensity or higher.
4-45 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report)
(2) Damage to sewage pipeline networks
1) Flow of risk assessment of sewage systems
It is known that sewage pipelines and manholes tend to lift up when the surrounding ground liquefies, as the pipeline is almost empty if not in the case of full flow, and the unit weight is lighter than the weight of the surrounding liquefied soil. It is important to take care of the effect of liquefaction along with the effect of ground motion especially for the risk assessment of the sewage system. There is no inside pressure in sewers as the transport system of the sewer is gravity flow. Therefore, although the appearance is similar, the damage tendency of the sewage pipeline and water supply pipeline are completely different. Hence, the damage estimation function for sewerage system is developed from a completely different concept than that of the water supply pipeline. It can be said that there is not an effective difference between the situation of sewage pipes in Kathmandu Valley and that of Japan on the basis of the above explained difference. It is considered the methodology applied at the committee of “Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Japan”, “Tokyo Metropolitan Government” and “Kanagawa Prefecture” can be applied to this study. Estimated damage is expressed by the total length of damage in each grid. The relation between the damage rate of sewage pipeline and explanatory valuable such as liquefaction potential and pipe type is shown in Table 4.3.20.
Table 4.3.20 Relation between the damage rate of sewage pipeline and explanatory valuable
Liquefactio JMA intensity scale 5- 5+ 6- 6+ 7 Pipe type n potential Instrumental value 4.75 5.25 5.75 6.25 6.75 PVC polyvinyl chloride・ A～D ALL 1.0% 2.3% 5.1% 11.3% 24.9% Ceramic Work Pipe Other than above A 15 2) Setting the damage rate and parameter According to KUKL (Kathmandu Upatyaka Khanepani Limited), that manages the sewer system, pipe types buried in, and sewer in the Kathmandu Valley are predominantly reinforced concrete pipe and vinyl chloride pipes, whereas ceramic work pipes are very limited. There isn’t a ground that is sufficient to prove the difference between the characteristic of pipeline in Kathmandu and that of Japan. Also, if there was any effective lesson that could be learned from the experience from some previous record of earthquakes in Nepal, the Study tTam could have listened to it earnestly. The intensity of ground motion was converted from PGA value by the formula proposed by Midorikawa. Liquefaction potential was referred to the PL value, which is given in the report of WG1. 4-46 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 3) Estimation of the pipe damage Pipe damage is calculated for each flow-down areas by Eq. 4.3.9). D = ∑∑ L ・R 4.3.9) Where; Dl: Total length of damaged pipe (km) Lij: Pipe length (km) Rij: Damage rate for each pipe type (%) Subscript i, j represent “Pipe Type” and “Pipe Diameter” respectively 4) Results Since the underground pipeline for sewage system tends to rise easily when the surrounding ground of the pipeline is liquefied because there is an empty part in the cross section of the pipeline, it is important to consider the effect of liquefaction together with earthquake ground motion. As compared to the water supply pipeline, where a certain water pressure must be maintained, the sewer system is a natural flow of sewage. So, the situation of pipeline in Nepal is basically similar to one in Japan. In consideration of the above points, it was decided to directly utilize the sewerage risk assessment method in Japan adopted by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism, Tokyo metropolitan city and, Kanagawa Prefecture in the project. Estimated damage is expressed in terms of extent of damage (km) for each grid. The estimated results are shown in Table 4.3.21. Figure 4.3.22 shows estimated damage distribution and the list of damage length of pipeline by municipality for the current network due to CNS-2. Table 4.3.21 Summary of estimated result of pipeline damage for sewage network (Upper: Damage length, Lower: Damage ratio) Scenario earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Sewage Damage Length 4.81 8.15 11.94 18.21 (Total length 1,192 km) (km) 0.4% 0.7% 1.0% 1.5% Source: JICA project team 4-47 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Pipe Length Length of Damaged Sewage Pipeline (km) Municipality (km) WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 KMC 638.6 2.6 4.2 6.1 9.3 LMC 171.8 0.7 1.5 1.8 3.2 NAGARJUN 59.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 1.2 MADHYAPUR THIMI 56.9 0.2 0.5 0.6 0.9 TOKHA 48.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 BHAKTAPUR 47.4 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.9 BUDHANILKANTHA 43.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 GOKARNESHWAR 40.7 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 KAGESHWORI MANOHARA 23.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 KIRTIPUR 22.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5 MAHALAXMI 20.4 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 SURYABINAYAK 16.2 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.3 CHANDRAGIRI 2.8 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 CHANGUNARAYAN 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 BAGMATI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 DAKSHINKALI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 GODAWARI 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 KONJYOSOM 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SHANKHARAPUR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 TARKESHWAR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Grand Total 1,191.7 4.8 8.2 11.9 18.2 Source: JICA project team Figure 4.3.22 Estimated damage distribution and the list of damage length by municipality due to CNS-2 Looking at the distribution of the number of damaged areas in the sewage system network by scenario earthquake CNS-2, considering that the water supply network is one of the important infrastructures, the bias due to place is not so noticeable. However, the evaluated value shown here does not take into account the effect of liquefaction, as it was thought that the liquefaction potential distribution given as a result of the hazard analysis in this survey is just a possibility of occurrence, so it might be rather excessive for use in this study. (3) Damage to power poles Risk assessment of electricity is generally carried out by estimating the damage to the distribution network. In the case of the Committee of Tokyo Metropolitan city, the number of households which will suffer power outages is estimated by referring to the breakage rate 4-48 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) of utility poles of power distribution in the area as shown in Figure 4.3.23. In this project, for the risk assessment of electricity, it was decided to follow the approach that has been conducted in Japan. START Set the surveyed area Power distribution area within the utility pole number setting Utility pole breakage rate setting by Utility pole breakage rate setting by ground building damage Rb (%) quake Rs (%) Utility pole broken number Nfp= Np×Rb＋Np×Rs Distribution number of house hold per Pole Hp The number of households of Power outage Dhp= Hp×Nfp END Source: Tokyo Metropolitan University Figure 4.3.23 Flow Diagram of power outage number calculation due to the utility pole breakage of the power distribution in the area caused by the earthquake Utility poles broken by the earthquake are divided as: the case due to ground motion and the collateral case due to the collapse of buildings in the proximity. Regarding the “Utility pole breakage rate setting by earthquake motion Rs (%)”, there isn’t enough evidence that shows that the obvious cause of utility poles breakage is from earthquake motion. It is believed that the main causes of collapse of the utility pole are wind and snow fall. Only a small number of earthquakes cause the breakage of the utility poles. The case of breakage of the utility pole by the earthquake begin to appear at the ground motion intensity of about Ⅴ (in Japan's Meteorological Agency seismic intensity) but even in the case of ground motion intensity of about Ⅶ breakage rate does not reach 1%. The relation between the Japan Meteorological Agency seismic intensity and utility pole breakage rate is shown in Table 4.3.22. This is based on the experience of the utility pole damage in the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. 4-49 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.22 Utility pole breakage ratio caused by earthquake motion Japan's Meteorological Agency seismic intensity 5 6 7 Utility pole breakage ratio (%) 0,00005 0.056 0.8 Source: Cabinet Office, Japan It is preferable to set the electric pole breakage rate by considering the actual situation of the study area. However, due to the lack of damage and inventory data, it is not so easy and realistic to estimate the earthquake resistant capacity of poles in Kathmandu. Therefore the utility pole breakage rate in this study will be applied by referring to the value from a report of Japan. Regarding the intensity of ground motion, PGA value has been referred utilizing the formula proposed by Midorikawa. Regarding the “Utility pole breakage rate setting by building damage Rb (%)”, this element means the damage due to the fact that the building is leaning against pole. This is calculated using Eq. 4.3.10) and Eq. 4.3.11) by applying the building damage rate of the relevant area of the (DL4 + 5) as an explanatory variable. Nfp = Np×Rb 4.3.10) Rb =0.17115×Bdl45 4.3.11) Where; Rb: The utility pole breakage rate by building damage (%) Bdl45: Building damage rate of the relevant area of the (DL4 + 5) Nfp: Utility pole breakage number Np: Utility pole number The seismic risk assessment of electricity in Japan is generally carried out by estimating the damage to the power distribution network. In addition, a method of calculating the number of blackouts from the breakage rate of utility poles in the power distribution area has been adopted. In this project, it was decided to follow the existing approach of the seismic risk assessment of electricity in Japan. Table 4.3.23 shows the estimated results of the number of utility pole broken. Figure 4.3.24 shows estimated distribution of utility pole broken and the list of building number without electricity, by municipality, due to CNS-2. 4-50 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.23 Summary of estimated result of utility poles damage for power distribution network (Upper: Number of utility pole broken, Lower: Damage ratio) Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Power distribution 1,327 3,991 9,156 13,992 Pole broken (Total pole 190,851) 0.7% 2.1% 4.8% 7.3% Source: JICA Project Team No. of No. of Building Number of Failure Poles Number of Building Without Power Municipality Building Pole per Pole WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 KMC 151,863 64,979 2.34 546 1,328 2,973 4,509 1,275 3,103 6,948 10,539 LMC 52,821 27,814 1.90 171 739 1,598 2,324 324 1,403 3,034 4,414 GODAWARI 21,203 4,055 5.23 27 142 307 440 141 742 1,603 2,301 SURYABINAYAK 19,015 8,146 2.33 48 208 489 738 112 485 1,141 1,722 CHANDRAGIRI 18,214 8,735 2.09 82 307 679 970 170 641 1,416 2,023 GOKARNESHWAR 17,463 7,093 2.46 34 70 198 357 83 172 489 879 BUDHANILKANTHA 17,066 14,024 1.22 66 108 344 655 80 132 418 797 CHANGUNARAYAN 16,655 1,912 8.71 9 27 72 124 77 233 631 1,083 NAGARJUN 16,000 7,432 2.15 60 167 410 642 129 360 883 1,381 MAHALAXMI 15,698 6,692 2.35 34 162 360 532 79 380 844 1,248 TARKESHWAR 15,608 5,142 3.04 28 47 142 263 84 144 431 797 TOKHA 13,962 7,301 1.91 37 65 187 338 70 123 357 646 KAGESHWORI MANOHARA 13,949 6,348 2.20 26 65 173 295 56 142 381 648 BHAKTAPUR 13,811 4,953 2.79 51 141 294 434 143 393 819 1,211 MADHYAPUR THIMI 13,258 9,338 1.42 49 170 404 625 69 241 574 887 KIRTIPUR 11,471 5,864 1.96 56 226 474 662 110 442 928 1,296 SHANKHARAPUR 7,423 316 23.46 2 3 9 17 49 81 220 392 DAKSHINKALI 6,961 707 9.84 3 17 42 66 33 167 415 648 KONJYOSOM 1,56400.0000000000 BAGMATI 55100.0000000000 Grand Total 444,554 190,851 1,326 3,991 9,156 13,992 3,085 9,383 21,532 32,914 Note: The No. of pole for Municipalities, such as Changunarayan, Shank Harapur and Dakshinkali, is not completely estimated due to the incomplete road network. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.24 Estimated distribution of utility pole broken and the list of building number without electricity by municipality due to CNS-2 Looking at the distribution of the number of damaged places, the difference due to the different scenario earthquakes and the location (the distance from the epicenter) are clear. 4-51 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) However, it must be noticed that the basic data of this survey is the utility pole distribution, which was estimated from some assumptions about the data of the distribution area, the data of the road distribution and the relation between the road and the density of the utility pole. It is necessary to discuss the result taking into consideration of above points. (4) Damage to mobile telecommunication BTS 1) Events representative of telecommunication risk Approximately 94% of the number of telephone subscriber lines in Nepal is mobile phone contracts at present. Therefore, the risk of communication interference in the surveyed area can be represented by the network damage of mobile phones, and the number of damages can be estimated by counting damage of base transceiver station. Base stations that transmit and receive at the end of each cellular phone network are called BTS (Base Transceiver Station), and there are cases where equipment combining an antenna and a transmission device is installed on the roof of a building and those are installed on the ground. The majority is the former. Vulnerability function of the antenna is set up and utilized since the function of the cellular phone network is assumed to be lost due to the damage of the base station antenna. In the case where the antenna is installed on the roof of a building, it is assumed that the function is retained only when avoiding both the damage of the antenna and the damage of the building, and combines the damage rates of both. Results show the number of damage cases and damage rate for each scenario earthquake and shows the distribution within the survey target area. 2) Vulnerability function when a base station is installed on the roof of a building If it is thought that the base station antenna maintains the relay function of the mobile phone only in the case where both the roof-top antenna and the building that supports it avoid destruction, the damage ratio as roof-top antenna and building as a whole pBA is given by equation 4.3.12) applying damage ratio of antenna pA and damage ratio of building pB. pB,A =1-(1- pB )×(1- pA ) 4.3.12) Where; pBA: Damage Ratio as roof-top antenna and building as a whole pA: Damage Ratio of antenna pB: Damage Ratio of building The damage function of the base station antenna is set as the cumulative distribution function of the lognormal distribution with the Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) as the explanatory variable in the same way as the building damage function was set in section 4.3.1. The set antenna tower damage function is shown in Figure 4.3.25. 4-52 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 10 縦軸値 累積分布関数 p(x) 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 Damage Ratio 0.2 0.1 0 0 200 400 600 800 (PGA) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.25 Damage function of the base station antenna Structural design document of 2 cases of antenna towers in the Kathmandu Valley (height 20 m (ground), 12 m (for rooftop)) were acquired, and Japan Architectural Institute "Tower Steel Structural Design Guidelines" 1980 are referred to set this damage function. In the lognormal distribution, the median value of In (x) was taken to be 6.2 taking the logarithm of 500 gal and the standard deviation of ln (x) was set to 6.2 with reference to the results of general steel framework structure etc. The basis for setting the average value of PGA in the lognormal distribution to 500 gal is as follows. Amplification when transmitting the building Earthquake motion that is given to roof top structure is amplified in the process of transferring from the ground surface to the top of the building. For example, this amplification effect is set as shown in Figure 4.3.26 in "Guidelines for designing tower steel structure" (Japan Architectural Institute, 1980). for rooftop tower for rooftop tower Standard base shear coefficient Natural period ratio of tower and building (adapted from; "Guidelines for designing tower steel structure" (Japan Architectural Institute, 1980) Figure 4.3.26 Amplification when transmitting the building 4-53 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) This guideline shows the design base shear coefficient when PGA is about 0.1 G. For example, when the natural period iT1 of the steel tower and the natural period bT1 of the building are close to each other in the range of the horizontal axis value of 0.8 to 1.2 (the so-called resonance effect) the standard shear coefficient of the steel tower is maximized and the design base shear coefficient is 0.9. The tower natural period ratio in the Kathmandu Valley is considered to correspond to this range. From design example of antenna tower Looking at the example of the structural analysis document in the Kathmandu Valley obtained for reference, mass of antenna is 2,577 kg, earthquake shear force is 1,291 kg and wind load is 2,388 kg. Base shear coefficient of the antenna tower for earthquake resistant design is; (earthquake shear force) / (mass of antenna) = 1,291 / 2, 577 = 0.50. However, the critical condition for the steel tower is the wind load. In the case of the structural analysis document, the ratio of the wind load and the seismic load is; (wind load) / (layer shear force at the time of earthquake) = 2, 388 / 1,291 = 1.85. Therefore, the estimated value for earthquake resistant design of the antenna tower, which can indicate the earthquake acceleration is; (Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of the ground surface) × (Base shear coefficient of the antenna tower for earthquake resistant design) / (the standard shear coefficient of the steel tower) × (the ratio of the wind load and the seismic load) =0.1G×0.50/0.9×1.85= 0.1028 What has been described here is a value to be applied in design analysis. Therefore the above value of earthquake acceleration includes some sort of safety factor in consideration that the allowable stress of the material includes variation, and its value for safety factor is about 1.5. In addition, when the ductility of the antenna tower structure is taken into account, the so-called Reduction Factor R, is estimated to be equivalent to (R = 3 to 4). (Regarding this tower structure, structural characteristic coefficient Ds defined by earthquake resistance criteria in Japan may correspond to about 0.25, so capacity of ductility is considered good) As a result, the expected value that the antenna tower actually suffers corresponding to the grade of damage can be obtained as the estimated basic value on design analysis multiplied by (Safety factor that takes into account allowable stress variations of materials) and (Ductility of structure, so-called Reduction Factor R); 4-54 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 0.1G×0.50/0.9×1.85×1.50×(3～4)= 0.46G~ 0.62G The average of above result (046-0.62) is 0.54G and, it is approximated as 0.5G, or say 500 gal. 500 gal is the surface peak ground acceleration. It is assumed the structure will have 50% of probability of damage under this PGA level. The damage function P is given as the cumulative distribution function of the lognormal distribution as shown in the equation 4.3.13). S a ln S a SFP a 4.3.13) Where; Sa: spectral acceleration S a : expected median value by which the structure suffers corresponding damage grade ζ: standard deviation of ln S a Φ: standard normal cumulative distribution function In the lognormal distribution, the median value of S a when the structure suffers corresponding damage grade is set to 500 gal. Regarding variation, the standard deviation of general steel structure is considered as 127, and the standard deviation of ln S a ζis set to 0.25. (If the software “Excel” is going to be applied and when inputting the "mean value of In (Sa)" in logarithmic normal distribution, take the logarithm of 500 gal and make it 6.2 ) (the function format shall be set “TRUE”) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.27 shows the damage function of the entire base station including antenna and building obtained by the formula 4.3.12). In this case building model was set as the RC non-engineered. 4-55 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Damage function of the entire base station e Ratio g Dama Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) Damage function of the building Damage function of the antenna Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.27 Damage function of the entire base station including antenna and building 3) Case where the base station antenna is installed on the ground directly In the case where the base station antenna is installed on the ground directly, there is no amplification in the process of transmitting earthquake ground motion in the building, but the design conditions of the antenna tower are thought to be given in anticipation of it, and as shown in Figure 4.3.25 The damage function shown is applied as it is as a damage function of the entire base station antenna. 4) Results The terminating station where radio waves for mobile phones are transmitted and received is called Base Transceiver Station (BTS). BTS has a combination of antenna and transmission device; a number of BTSs are installed on the roof of the building. Since the damage of BTSs is directly related to the risk of disconnection of mobile phones’ network, focus has been given to damage estimations of BTS itself, and the building that BTS is installed on, as the seismic risk assessment for telecommunication in the project. The estimated result of BTS damage is shown in Table 4.3.24. Figure 4.3.28 shows distribution of estimated damage rates by roof-top BTS due to CNS-2. The main cause of BTS damage is due to the damage of the building. In addition, approximately 77% of buildings on which BTS is installed are RC non-engineered buildings, and it is one of the dominant factors to explain the number of BTS damage. 4-56 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.24 Summary of estimated result of BTS damage for mobile telecommunication network (Upper: Number of BTS damage, Lower: Damage ratio) Scenario Earthquake Ground Motion Category Damage WN CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 Mobile BTS tower 43 143 372 601 Tower damage (Total tower 1,043) 4.1% 13.7% 35.7% 57.6% Source: JICA project team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.28 Distribution of estimated damage rates by roof-top BTS due to CNS-2 Looking at the distribution of the number of expected loss in base station of cell phone by scenario earthquake CNS-2, considering that the telecommunication network is one of the important infrastructures, it is a serious level of 35.7% of the total. Distribution of damage depends on the distribution of earthquake ground motion due to location (distance from the seismic source). 4.3.4 Human Casualties (1) Approach for Human Casualty Estimation Human casualties are recognized to be mostly attributed to building damage from the past earthquake experience. The approach for death estimation used by the 2002 JICA project was a statistical relationship between the number of deaths and number of damaged buildings. In this project, considering the requirement for different earthquake occurrence scenes and data availability, the number of deaths is estimated from building damage, population inside building when earthquake occurs and the death rate. The formula is shown below. 4-57 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Number of death = Death rate * (Number of buildings damaged * Population of damaged building * Ratio of persons inside buildings) The injured was estimated from the relationship between number of deaths and number of injured. The method was also used by the JICA 2002 project. Number of injured = Injured rate * Number of deaths The number of evacuees, who need temporary housing after an earthquake, was considered to be the people whose residence suffered major damage of EMS level 3, 4 or 5 but not including fatalities. Buildings with a damage level 3, 4 and 5 are considered not safe for immediate occupation after an earthquake and it will take some time to repair them. Number of evacuees = Population in buildings with damage level 3, 4 or 5 - Number of deaths (2) Estimation of Death rate and Injured rate Building damage and number of dead and injured people as a result of the Gorkha Earthquake were used for the estimation of the death rate and the injured rate. It was observed from the Gorkha Earthquake that the human casualty may have different features for urban and rural area and masonry and RC structures. The results of the Gorkha Earthquake confirmation survey, conducted by NRA including damage level and number of deaths, were collected and used for the death rate and injured rate estimation. It is found that the total of human casualties vs building damage of the Gorkha Earthquake is relatively small compared with other earthquakes in the world (refer to Figure 4.3.29). On the other hand, if the focus is on the whole KV area, it is observed the human casualty is larger than that of the total affected area. Furthermore, the human casualty of KMC, LSMC and Bhaktapur municipality, the populated urban municipalities, has a large death number and close to the average level of the worldwide earthquakes. The difference of human casualties among whole affect area, the KV area and the three urban municipalities may be attributed to different building structure type, population density, as well as inside building ratio between urban and rural areas. 4-58 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: Retouched from Coburn & Spence (1992) Figure 4.3.29 Life loss vs building damage for Gorkha Earthquake and those in the world It is known that the ground motion of the Gorkha Earthquake is rather small with respect to the conventional attenuation and Total number of collapsed buildings is small. Since the ground motion of scenario earthquake is stronger than that of the Gorkha Earthquake, it may cause more total building collapse and, consequently, result in more loss of life. On the other hand, since the target area of this project is limited to KV only, it is considered that it is appropriate to use the data of the three urban municipalities of KV to calculate the death rate for the purpose of human casualty estimation in this project. Building damage verification survey of NRA shows that the death were mostly from the building having damage level 4 (DL4) and 5 (DL5) and different trends between the damage levels. In order to consider this difference, death rate was estimated for damage level 4 and 5, respectively. NRA data also shows difference of the rate of deaths between masonry and RC buildings. The death rate for RC buildings is larger than that of masonry buildings. This may be due to the relative larger occupation of RC buildings and the pancake collapse of RC buildings as observed in Gongabu area. The higher death rate of RC building doesn’t mean RC building itself is dangerous than masonry building, because RC building will be less damaged then masonry building when subjecting to the same intensity of ground shaking. In order to consider a different death rate for both damage level (DL4 and DL5) and structure type (masonry and RC), the death rate is estimated by the following formula. 4-59 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Number of death = DMA4 + DMA5 + DRC4 + DRC5 where DMA4 (death caused by masonry buildings with DL4) = Population in masonry buildings with DL4 * DRMA4 DMA5 (death caused by masonry buildings with DL5) = Population in masonry buildings with DL5 * DRMA5 DRC4 (death caused by RC buildings with DL4) = Population in RC buildings with DL4 * DRRC4 DRC5 (death caused by RC buildings with DL5) = Population in RC buildings with DL5 * DRRC5 and DRMA4, DRMA5, DRRC4 and DRRC5 are death rate for different structure type and damage level, respectively. A large number of masonry buildings were damaged in the Gorkha Earthquake. Based on NRA data, the death rate for masonry buildings in damage level 4 (DRMA4) and 5 (DRMA5) was calculated and shown in Figure 4.3.30, which shows the result of individual municipality as well as the three municipalities as a whole. All of the results show that the death rate of damage level 5 is higher than that of damage level 4 but varies among them. Since the death rate will be used for the estimation for whole KV, the death rate calculated from the total data of three municipalities was considered appropriate for this purpose. The death rate for masonry building of damage level 4 (DRMA4) is 0.0101, and death rate for masonry building of damage level 5 (DRMA5) is 0.0160. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.30 Death rate of masonry building The death rate of RC buildings in damage level 4 (DRRC4) and 5 (DRRC5) is shown in Figure 4.3.31. Due to the very limited number of data, the calculated results show a strong deviation and it is difficult to conclude a unit value for the future estimation. In this regard, the death rate of RC building will not be derived from direct calculation but through the 4-60 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) relationship of death rate between RC and masonry buildings, shown in Figure 4.3.32. From the figure, deviation can be observed and it is noted the increase of death rate of RC building for damage level 5 is smaller than that for damage level 4. This is considered due to the very limited number of RC buildings with damage level 5. In order to reduce the affect of small number of data, the death rate from combined damage level 4 and 5 data was calculated, showing an increase factor of 1.78. Making use of this factor, the death rate of RC buildings of damage level 4 is calculated as DRRC4 = 1.78 * DRMA4 = 0.0180 and that for damage level 5 is DRRC5 = 1.78 * DRMA5 = 0.0284. It should be noted that the high death rate for RC buildings does not mean RC buildings are more vulnerable than masonry building, but the collapse of RC buildings could lead to less survival possibility than with masonry buildings. Figure 4.3.33 shows an example of typical building damage of masonry building and RC building both with DL5 in Gorkha earthquake. Pancake type crash of RC building leads to less possibility of survival. This might explain why the larger death rate of RC buildings than that of masonry buildings. In fact, there are many RC buildings in KV similar to that shown in the figure and similar pancake type crash might occur in the future earthquake. Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.31 Death rate of RC building Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.32 Death rate of masonry and RC buildings 4-61 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.33 Damage pattern of masonry and RC buildings in the Gorkha Earthquake (Left: masonry; Right: RC building, pancake crash of first floor, both DL5) Injured rate was calculated from the number of death and the number of injured in Gorkha earthquake. The number of injured is 3.92 times of the number of death. (3) Results of Human Casualty Estimation 1) Human Casualties Caused by General Building Damage Human casualty caused by general building damage was estimated for four scenario ground motions and three occurrence scenes. The results are summarized in Table 4.3.25. The estimated number of death was compared with that of past earthquakes in Figure 4.3.29, which shows an about average level among past earthquakes. The distribution of the number of deaths and ratio of deaths (number of deaths/population) are shown in Figure 4.3.34 for CNS-2 and night as an example. The distribution for the other scenario ground motions and occurrence scenes can be found in the map book. Needless to say, human casualty varies with scenario ground motions and occurrence scenes. In the case of the occurrence scene of night, for example, the deaths due to the scenario ground motion WN is 3,034, while the deaths due to scenario ground motion CNS-3 is as high as 35,726. It is observed that the deaths mostly happened in the central area, within or around the ring road, because of the high population density. The southern part of KV shows a relative high death ratio since it is close to the earthquake fault, having a stronger ground motion and higher building damage ratio. Human casualties estimated for the three cases of central Nepal south scenario earthquake are larger than that of the Gorkha Earthquake. It is necessary to take this into account in the future disaster risk reduction and management for dealing with dead bodies, care of injured, securing evacuation space and stockpiling of emergency food and materials. 4-62 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.25 Results of human casualty estimation Scenario Earthquake Occurrence Scene Human Ground Weekend (18:00) Weekday (12:00) Night Casualties Motion Number Ratio Number Ratio Number Ratio WN 2,123 0.1% 2,784 0.1% 3,034 0.1% CNS-1 6,393 0.2% 8,282 0.3% 9,133 0.3% Death CNS-2 15,526 0.6% 19,959 0.7% 22,179 0.8% CNS-3 25,008 0.9% 31,956 1.1% 35,726 1.3% WN 8,316 0.3% 10,905 0.4% 11,880 0.4% CNS-1 25,036 0.9% 32,435 1.2% 35,766 1.3% Injured CNS-2 60,803 2.2% 78,168 2.8% 86,861 3.1% CNS-3 97,940 3.5% 125,152 4.5% 139,914 5.0% WN 279,942 10.0% 285,850 10.3% 279,031 10.0% CNS-1 645,483 23.2% 652,798 23.4% 642,743 23.1% Evacuee CNS-2 1,202,734 43.2% 1,206,530 43.3% 1,196,080 42.9% CNS-3 1,624,032 58.3% 1,619,792 58.1% 1,613,314 57.9% Note: Total population: 2,786,929, Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.34 Distribution of number (left) and ratio (right) of death 2) Deaths due to School Building Damage There are a total of 2,115 schools in KV, including public and private schools, with an estimated 851,121 students as shown in Table 4.3.26. The death of students due to school building damage was estimated under the assumption, for the worst case, that all of the students were inside building when earthquake occurs. The results are 444 deaths for scenario ground motion of WN, 1,545 for CNS-1, 4,002 for CNS-2 and 6,555 for CNS-3. Figure 4.3.35 shows the distribution of structure type of school buildings and the damage of each structure type. It can be noticed that masonry buildings account for 61% out of the total 4-63 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) of 5,731 school buildings, non-engineered RC buildings for 30% and engineered RC buildings are only 9%. As a consequence, the damage of school buildings are focused mainly on masonry and non-engineered RC buildings. In order to reduce school damage, the retrofitting or reconstruction of the vulnerable school buildings is the pressing challenge. Table 4.3.26 Number of schools and students in KV Public Private Total School No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of School Student School Student School Student Primary 150 9,612 175 21,035 325 30,647 Lower secondary 106 15,193 122 23,670 228 38,863 Secondary 175 63,987 893 348,239 1,068 412,226 Higher secondary 101 68,700 135 95,771 236 164,471 College 32 74,112 226 130,801 258 204,914 Total 564 231,605 1,551 619,516 2,115 851,121 Source: GFDRR：Open data for Resilience Initiative (http://www.kathmandulivinglabs.org/projects/mapping-schools-and-hospitals), supplemented by the Project Team Source: JICA project Team Figure 4.3.35 School building structure type (left) and building damage (right) 3) Human Casualties Estimated for 2030 Human casualty was estimated for 2030 for the six cases of building damage indicated in Table 4.3.7. The results are given in Table 4.3.27. The population of 2030 is estimated as 3,805,926, about 1.37 times of that of 2016 (2,786,929). In the case of Case-0 with the same structure type distribution as 2016, the deaths of 2030 will be increased accordingly around 1.37 times for all scenario ground motions, almost the same rate of population increase. For the other cases, the human casualty varies with different structure type distribution. Since human casualty depends highly on building damage, the strengthening of the seismic performance of not only new buildings but also existing buildings is critical issue to reduce human casualty in the future. 4-64 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.27 Human casualties estimated for 2030 Scenario Ground Building Structure Type Distribution of 2030 2016 Motion Case-0 Case-1 Case-2 Case-3 Case-4 Case-5 WN 3,034 4,121 3,434 1,712 1,438 2,052 1,476 CNS-1 9,133 12,508 11,017 8,135 6,733 7,887 6,524 CNS-2 22,179 30,583 27,930 24,356 20,526 23,086 20,842 CNS-3 35,726 49,381 46,017 42,526 36,715 41,146 38,733 Source: JICA Project Team 4.3.5 Economic Impact Assessment (1) Estimated items of Economic Loss Economic loss due to earthquakes is composed of “direct damage” by the physical damage of property and “indirect damage”, i.e. “Reduction of GDP”, brought about by retarded production activities due to an earthquake. Direct loss2016：Amount of physical damage for housing / building and infrastructure 2030：Number of physical damage for housing / building. Economic loss Due to earthquake Indirect loss：2016：Decreased amount of production brought about by retarded production activities due to an earthquake. (2) Target and estimated methodology of direct loss The target of direct loss is the damage of building and lifeline/infrastructure facilities. The restoration cost of housing/buildings and lifelines/infrastructure is assumed to be the loss amount. In the case of 2036, the target of direct loss is only for the number of damaged buildings. Table 4.3.28 Items and estimated method of the target of direct loss (target of quantitative evaluation) Target item of direct loss Estimated methodology (Quantitative evaluation) 2016: Restoration cost of housing/building (except for the Housing/Building damage damaged property inside housing/ building) 2036: Number of damaged housing/building Lifeline/Infrastructure damage 2016: Restoration cost of lifeline/Infrastructure Source: JICA Project Team 4-65 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 1) Estimated methodology of the number and amount of loss of damaged housing/ buildings Evaluation and estimation were conducted by the following procedure in terms of 250 m grids. Number of housing /building Information about the ratio on Damage function on 250 m grid housing /building structure type Number of damaged housing /building on each housing /building structure type Number of damaged housing/building Ｘ Average construction cost Amount of loss of housing /building 2) Evaluation and estimation methodology of amount of loss for Lifeline/Infrastructure The evaluation and estimation method of damage of each lifeline/infrastructure was applied to estimate the amount of loss of lifelines/infrastructure. The damage amount was calculated based on the following process. Damage measurement or X Average construction cost Number of damage place Amount of loss of lifelines & Infrastructure (3) Target and Estimated methodology of indirect loss Quantitative evaluation of indirect loss is difficult because the correlation of indirect loss cannot be evaluated definitely, thus indirect loss was principally conducted by qualitative evaluation. However, as the tourism sector is an important source of foreign exchange earnings which occupies 4.7% of foreign exchange earnings in Nepal, and it is also an important sector which occupies 4.3% of GDP in Nepal, the decreased amount of production 4-66 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) in tourism sector due to the retarded production activities from earthquake damage was evaluated quantitatively. Actual evaluation items and methods of tourism sector are as follows: Table 4.3.29 Quantitative evaluation items and estimation methodology in tourism sector (2016) Quantitative evaluation items Estimated methodology Decreased amount of tourism revenue Number of tourist in 2016 Ｘ Expenditure/tourist/day ― Number of tourist in the time of earthquake occurrence X Expenditure/tourist/day＝Decreased amount of tourism revenue Decreased amount of income of employee Length of unemployment due to earthquake X in tourism industry Number of employee in tourism sector X Average income of employee a day in tourism sector = Decreased amount of income of employee in tourism sector. Decreased amount of foreign exchange Decreased amount of foreign exchange earnings in earnings from tourism sector Nepal is estimated by the current ratio of foreign exchange earnings from tourism sector for foreign exchange earnings Negative impact for GDP Negative impact amount is estimated by the occupation ratio for GDP of current tourism industry. Source: JICA Project Team (4) Direct damage Estimated damage amounts of “direct damage” due to physical damage for property of estimated target of economic loss by scenario earthquake ground motion are shown as follows. 1) Estimated amounts of building damage Estimated amounts of building damage are figured out: multiply number of damaged building of each structure estimated on 250 m grid by restoration cost (Table 4.3.30). Unit cost used for restoration of building has been estimated based on the results of interview of building owner and building contractor. 4-67 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.30 Restoration unit cost of each building structure Restoration unit cost Structure Type Damage Level Average sq.m (NPR/house) Adobe Level 1 0 Level 2 55,200 Level 3 92,000 80 Level 4 184,000 Level 5 184,000 Stone with mud mortar Level 1 0 Level 2 282,000 Level 3 470,000 80 Level 4 940,000 Level 5 940,000 Brick with mud mortar Level 1 0 Level 2 493,200 Level 3 822,000 120 Level 4 1,644,000 Level 5 1,644,000 Stone with cement mortar Level 1 0 Level 2 423600 Level 3 706000 80 Level 4 1412000 Level 5 1412000 Brick with cement mortar Level 1 0 Level 2 705600 Level 3 1176000 120 Level 4 2,352,000 Level 5 2,352,000 RC Frame non engineered Level 1 0 Level 2 2100600 Level 3 3501000 180 Level 4 7,002,000 Level 5 7,002,000 RC Frame engineered Level 1 0 Level 2 2316600 Level 3 3861000 180 Level 4 7,722,000 Level 5 7,722,000 Source: JICA Project Team Estimated damage amounts were calculated for each district and municipality, based on each scenario earthquake ground motion. Biggest estimated damage amounts are CNS-3 in terms of scenario earthquake ground motion. Estimated damage amount is 1,098,353 million NPR. Smallest estimated damage amounts are for WN scenario earthquake ground motion. Estimated damage amounts are 132,999 million NPR. Estimated damage amounts in Kathmandu District are biggest in every scenario earthquake ground motion. Though the ratio of the estimated damage amounts is different based on the scenario earthquake ground 4-68 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) motion, the estimated damage amounts in Kathmandu District is around 58% to 68%; estimated damage amounts in the Bhaktapur District is around 12% to 14%; the estimated damage amounts in the Lalitpur District is around 20% to 28%. And the estimated damage amounts in Kathmandu metropolitan city is biggest in Kathmandu District, so it occupies around from 32% to 37%. Table 4.3.31 shows the estimated damage amounts of schools, government buildings, health facilities and historical architecture individually in terms of estimated damage amounts of building. Estimated damaged amounts for health facility are biggest and estimated damage amount for historical architecture is smallest. Table 4.3.31 Estimated damaged amounts of each scenario earthquake ground motion (Unit: Million NPR) District Municipality and VDC CNS-1 CNS-2 CNS-3 WN Bhaktapur 11,570 22,392 31,529 4,536 Changunarayan 11,128 24,543 37,062 3,726 BHAKTAPUR Madhyapur Thimi 11,378 23,877 34,396 3,426 Suryabinayak 15,769 32,751 47,208 4,260 Total (BHAKTAPUR) 49,845 103,563 150,195 15,947 Budhanilkantha 7,490 21,198 36,607 4,279 Chandragiri 25,664 48,190 64,429 8,275 Dakshinkali 6,016 11,976 16,947 1,583 Gokarneshwar 7,981 20,586 34,319 4,117 Kageshwori Manohara 6,045 15,452 25,248 2,622 Kathmandu 118,000 244,421 352,694 49,390 Kirtipur 18,771 33,123 42,936 5,833 Nagarjuna 14,650 31,653 46,616 5,959 Shankharapur 1,441 3,931 7,090 939 KATHMANDU Tarkeshwar 6,875 17,998 30,095 4,521 Tokha 5,911 15,983 27,094 3,396 Total（KATHMANDU） 218,844 464,511 684,075 90,914 Bagmati Rural Municipality 272 574 860 67 Godawari 27,257 51,396 69,725 6,227 Lalitpur Metropolitan 57,355 107,349 145,934 15,861 Mahalaxmi 16,670 32,493 45,053 3,837 Konjyosom Rural Municipality 378 810 1,225 77 Total （Lalitpur） 102,314 193,460 264,083 26,138 Grand Total 371,003 761,534 1,098,353 132,999 Source: JICA Project Team 4-69 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.32 Direct loss of school, health and government buildings and historical architecture (Unit：Million NPR) Government Historical Scenario ground motion Schools Health Facilities Buildings Architecture WN 20,462 22,534 2,444 1,321 CNS-1 51,231 68,588 8,669 1,925 CNS-2 98,171 165,683 16,514 2,267 CNS-3 134,932 232,782 22,708 2,377 Source: JICA Project Team 2) Estimated damage amount of lifeline/infrastructure Table 4.3.33 shows the estimated damage amounts of roads, bridges, water supply, sewage, power distribution and mobile BTS in terms of each scenario earthquake ground motion. Estimated damage amounts of lifeline/infrastructure have been figured out by multiplying length or number of structure damage by corresponding unit restoration cost. , and showing the unit restoration cost of each lifeline and infrastructure. Estimated damage amounts of road, bridge account for approximately 70% of all lifeline/infrastructure on every scenario ground motion. Table 4.3.33 Estimated damage amounts of road, bridge, sewage, power distribution and mobile BTS (Unit：Million NPR) Scenario Water Power Mobile Roads Bridges Sewage Total ground motion supply distribution BTS 0 377 36 76 19 82 590 WN 0.0% 63.9% 6.1% 12.9% 3.2% 13.9% 100.0% 471 898 71 135 56 272 1,903 CNS-1 24.8% 47.2% 3.7% 7.1% 2.9% 14.3% 100.0% 1,620 1,359 129 200 129 707 4,144 CNS-2 39.1% 32.8% 3.1% 4.8% 3.1% 17.1% 100.0% 2,878 1,914 191 290 197 1,142 6,612 CNS-3 43.5% 28.9% 2.9% 4.4% 3.0% 17.3% 100.0% Source: JICA Project Team Table 4.3.34 Restoration unit cost on road structure (Unit：NPR/M) Width Road structure 3.5 Meter 5.5 Meter 7.0 Meter Gravel 2,100 3,300 4,200 Black Topped 5,600 8,800 11,200 Rigid Pavement 18,200 28,600 36,400 Brick Paved 12,740 20,020 25,480 Earthen 1,470 2,310 2,940 PCC 18,200 28,600 36,400 Stone Paved 11,830 18,590 23,660 Source: DOR 4-70 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.35 Bridge restoration unit cost (Unit：NPR/M) Width of Bridge Damage Level 3.5m width 7m width Heavy 700,000 /m 1,000,000 /m Moderate 350,000 /m 500,000 /m Slight 210,000 /m 300,000 /m Source: DOR Table 4.3.36 Restoration unit cost of mobile BTS, power distribution, sewage and water supply (Unit：NPR) Infrastructure Restoration cost Mobile BTS 1,900,000 /tower (20 Meter tower) Power distribution 14,083 /pole (PSC power pole) Sewage 15,900 /meter (Hume Pipe) Water supply 7,400 /meter (DI pipe) Source: DOWSS, NEA, NTC 3) Direct damage amounts on each scenario earthquake ground motion Table 4.3.37 shows the direct damage amounts of building and infrastructure and composition ratio in terms of each scenario earthquake ground motion. Biggest damage amounts were found for CNS-3 scenario earthquake 1,104,965 million NPR. Smallest damage amounts are in WN scenario earthquake, 133,589 million NPR. Damage amounts of building accounts for over 90% of direct damage amounts in all on each scenario earthquake ground motion. This is due to the difference of damage number of building and infrastructure. However, this does not imply the strong seismic adequacy of infrastructure. Is is due to the number of buildings which is larger than the number of infrastructure. The ratio of heavy damage to bridges in CNS-3, for example, is 71.1% and the number of damage is 32 bridges, on the other hand, damage ratio of building is 44.9% and the number of damage is 199,643 buildings. Table 4.3.37 Direct damage amounts on each scenario ground motion (building, infrastructure) (Unit：Million NPR) Scenario ground motion Buildings Infrastructure Total 132,999 590 133,589 WN 99.4% 0.6% 100.0% 371,003 1,903 371,275 CNS-1 99.5% 0.5% 100.0% 761,531 4,144 765,675 CNS-2 99.5% 0.5% 100.0% 1,098,353 6,612 1,104,965 CNS-3 99.6% 0.4% 100.0% Source: JICA Project Team 4-71 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 4) Impact for Nepal Economy of direct damage amounts on each scenario earthquake ground motion a) Comparison of direct damage amounts and GDP in Kathmandu Valley Figure 4.3.36 shows the comparison of direct damage amounts on each scenario earthquake ground motion and GDP in Kathmandu Valley3. CNS- 3 CNS- 2 GDP in Kathmandu Valley CNS- Direct damage amounts 1 WN 0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 Source: JICA Project Team made this based on the data of Nepal Rastra Bank Figure 4.3.36 Comparison of direct damage amounts on each scenario ground motion and GDP in Kathmandu Valley Current GDP in Nepal is approximately 2,120 billion NPR and GDP in Kathmandu Valley (657,200 million NPR) is estimated to account for 31% of GDP in Nepal. In case of CNS-2 and CNS-3 of scenario earthquake ground motion, direct damage amounts are more than current GDP in Kathmandu Valley. b) Comparison of direct damage amounts and GDP in Nepal Figure 4.3.37 shows the comparison of direct damage amounts on each scenario earthquake ground motion and GDP in Nepal. 3 “The Share of Kathmandu Valley in the National Economy” Nepal Rastra Bank / Research Department Economic Development Division, July 2012 4-72 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) CNS-3 CNS-2 GDP Direct damage CNS-1 WN 0 500,000 1,000,0001,500,0002,000,0002,500,000 Source: JICA Project Team made this based on the data of Nepal Rastra Bank Figure 4.3.37 Comparison of direct damage amounts on each scenario earthquake ground motion and GDP in Nepal Direct damage amounts account for 30% of GDP in Nepal in scenario of CNS-2, and approximately 50% of GDP in Nepal in scenario of CNS-3. In scenario earthquake ground motion of CNS-2 and CNS-3, CNS-2 and CNS-3 are predicted to big impact for the economy of Nepal if indirect damage amounts are added to direct damage amounts. (5) Indirect Damage Quantitative evaluation of indirect damage is difficult to clarify the casual correlation, so tourism sector which is important sector for Nepal economy and Kathmandu Valley is only evaluated quantitatively. Decline of production activities in tourism sector due to earthquake has been evaluated quantitatively. 1) Impact for the tourism sector and Nepalese economy due to the occurrence of earthquakes Direct damage such as the collapse of historical architecture due to earthquake occurrence is large, but indirect damage is larger and occurred continuously. The decline of tourists and daily spending of tourists are also decreased due to the occurrence of earthquake. Decline of tourists produce the decrease of tourist spending, and the loss of job opportunity within the tourism industry. And that the decrease of tourist from abroad produces the decrease of foreign exchange earnings and gives big impact for GDP 2) Decline of tourists When the Gorkha Earthquake (Mw 7.8) occurred 76 km west of Kathmandu on April 25th, 2015, 790,000 tourists of previous year (2014) decreased to 550,000 tourists. 4-73 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (Approximately 30% decrease) An earthquake size of this Gorkha earthquake is placed on the intermediate position between the scenario earthquake ground motion WN and CNS-1, thus impact for tourist of each scenario earthquake ground motion are estimated on assumption that the impact for tourism industry by scenario earthquake WN ground motion is smaller than the Gorkha Earthquake. Source：Estimated based on the tourism stats of Nepal Figure 4.3.38 Transition of tourist between before earthquake and after earthquake In the case of WN scenario earthquake ground motion which is smallest one, number of tourists has been predicted to decrease to 27% within one year from the occurrence of an earthquake. In the case of scenario earthquake ground motion CNS-3, number of tourists has been predicted to decrease to 40% within one year from the occurrence of an earthquake. 3) Loss of Job Opportunity According to the data of the Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation, the number of employees currently in the tourism sector is 138,148 and the current number of tourists is about 800,000 people a year, which means that one employee is responsible for about six tourists. Employees of the tourism sector have been estimated based on the declined of tourists by influence of earthquake on each scenario earthquake ground motion. Table 4.3.38 Transition of employees in the tourism sector on before or after of earthquake Before earthquake Rate of Scenario After earthquake Number of job (Number of job loser ground motion (Number of employee) loser employee) (%) WN 138,148 96,718 41,430 30.0% CNS-1 138,148 92,573 45,575 33.0% CNS-2 138,148 89,810 48,338 35.0% CNS-3 138,148 82,902 55,246 40.0% Source：JICA Project Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 4-74 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 41,430 to 55,246 employees in tourism sector are estimated to lose their jobs because of an earthquake occurrence. 4) Decline of tourist expenditure According to the statistics of the Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation, current tourist expenditure a day is estimated to 4,508 NPR4. This tourist expenditure a day is estimated to decline to 3,669 NPR by earthquake occurrence. Though earthquake scale regarding 3,669 NPR expenditures is not clearly defined, expenditure a day is estimated to be decreased to 3,669 NPR. (Figure 4.3.39) 5,000 4,508 (Unit: NPR) 4,500 4,000 3,669 3,500 3,000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 Before Earthquake Occurrence of Earthquake Source：JICA Study Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation Figure 4.3.39 Transition of tourist expenditure a day on before or after of earthquake According to the statistics of the Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation, current mean sojourn day of a tourist is thirteen days, this sojourn day is assumed to be not changed before or after of earthquake. Current, or say before earthquake, expenditure of a tourist per year is 46,883 million NPR. Based on this assumption, a tourist’s expenditure for a year, in terms of each scenario ground motion, is as follows, as the number of tourist is changed based on the scale of scenario earthquake ground motion. Table 4.3.39 Transition of expenditure a year of tourist on before or after of earthquake (Unit：Million NPR) Before After Decreased Rate of Scenario ground motion earthquake earthquake amounts decrease WN 46,883 26,710 20,173 43% CNS-1 46,883 25,566 21,318 45% CNS-2 46,883 24,802 22,081 47% CNS-3 46,883 22,895 23,989 51% Source：JICA Project Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture, Tourism & Civil Aviation 4 $43 (1$=104.832 NPR) 4-75 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Tourist expenditure a year is estimated to decrease from 20,173 million NPR to 23,989 million NPR due to the earthquake occurrence. And rate of decrease is estimated from 43% to 51%. 5) Decline of foreign exchange earnings Current ratio of foreign exchange earnings by the tourism sector is around 4.7% of total amounts of foreign exchange earnings. It is equivalent of 470 million $. After an earthquake, foreign exchange earnings are estimated to decrease as the following table due to the decrease of current tourist, and the decrease of expenditure a day of tourist impact by earthquake occurrence. Table 4.3.40 Transition of foreign exchange earnings on before or after of earthquake (Unit：Million $) Scenario ground Before After Decreased Rate of motion earthquake earthquake amounts decrease WN 470 267.9 202.1 43.0% CNS-1 470 258.5 211.5 45.0% CNS-2 470 249.1 220.9 47.0% CNS-3 470 230.3 239.7 51.0% Source：JICA Project Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation Current foreign exchange earnings, 470 million $, are estimated to be decreased to 267.9 million $ to 230.3 million $, rate of decrease is estimated to 43% to 51%. 6) Impact for Nepal economy a) Impact for GDP by tourism sector Current contribution by tourism sector for GDP is said to be around 4.3% according to the statistics data of Ministry of Culture and Civil Aviation. Mentioned before, tourist is predicted to decrease around 30%～40% due to the earthquake occurrence and as a result, around 30% to 40% of employees in the tourism sector will lose their jobs and expenditure by tourists and foreign exchange earnings are estimated to be decreased to around 43%～ 51%. These negative impacts for tourism sector produce the decrease the contribution for GDP by tourism sector. Current GDP of Nepal is around 2,120 billion NPR, and contribution amounts for GDP by tourism sector is 91 billion NPR. The change of contribution of tourism sector to GDP before and after earthquake is shown in Table 4.3.41. 4-76 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.3.41 Transition of contribution amounts for GDP by tourism sector on before or after of earthquake (Unit：Billion NPR) Contribution amounts for Contribution amounts Scenario Decreased Rate of GDP by tourism sector for GDP by tourism ground motion amounts decrease before earthquake sector after earthquake WN 91 51.87 39.13 43.0% CNS-1 91 50.05 40.95 45.0% CNS-2 91 48.23 42.77 47.0% CNS-3 91 44.59 46.41 51.0% Source：JICA Project Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation Current contribution amounts for GDP by tourism sector are estimated to decrease to 39.13 billion NPR to 46.4 billion NPR, and rate of decrease is estimated to 43% to 51%. Figure 4.3.40 shows the estimation result of negative impact for GDP by tourism industry due to earthquake. However, GDP value after earthquake is not considered the negative impact of other industry except for tourism industry, thus actual impact for GDP is estimated to be bigger. (Unit：Billion NPR) ** Impact for GDP due to earthquake is only considered for the negative impact of tourism industry, thus actual negative impact for GDP due to earthquake is estimated to be bigger than this this value. Source: JICA Project Team estimated based on the stats of Ministry of Culture & Civil Aviation Figure 4.3.40 Impact for GDP due to earthquake Impact for GDP due to earthquake is estimated to be the decrease of 39.1 billion NPR to 46.4 billion NPR at least, and it is equivalent to the rate of minus 1.85% to 2.19%. b) Impact for Nepal economy Figure 4.3.41 shows that the impact on Nepal’s economy due to direct economy loss (loss amounts of building and infrastructure) and indirect damage amounts (tourism sector). 4-77 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) CNS-3 CNS-2 GDP Direct damage CNS-1 WN 0 500,000 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.3.41 Comparison of damage amounts for each scenario earthquake ground motion and GDP in Nepal In scenario earthquake of CNS-3, aggregated amounts of direct damage and a part of indirect damage (only for the tourism sector) accounts for over 50% of GDP in Nepal, thus, CNS-3 is predicted to inflict enormous damage on the Nepalese economy if indirect damage amounts of other sectors are added to the damage amounts. 4.4 Comparative Vulnerability Analysis of KV Comparative vulnerability analyses among municipalities inside KV is performed based on the seismic hazard and risk assessment results as well as social conditions, which provides the information to understand the relative status of each municipality in terms of seismic hazard and its social condition. Seismic hazard and risk assessment results indicate the risks of a municipality faced, while social conditions suggest the capability or difficulty for search and rescue and evacuation after an earthquake disaster. The indicators used for comparative vulnerability analysis is given in Table 4.4.1. Table 4.4.1 Indicators for comparative vulnerability analysis Indicators of Seismic Hazard and Risk Indicators of Social Conditions Seismic intensity (MMI) Population density Building damage ratio Open space per person Human casualty ratio Narrow road ratio Source: JICA Project Team Comparative vulnerability analyses were carried out by ranking the indicators with score from one to five. Score of one means relatively low vulnerability whereas score of five implies relatively high vulnerability. The score is assigned for each indicator according to its value comparing with the whole value range, which is equally divided into 5 segments in normal or log scale, depending on the property of the indicator. In this way, the analysis is 4-78 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) applied to the twenty municipalities inside KV based on the seismic hazard and risk assessment results of scenario ground motion of CNS-1. The range and corresponding score for each indicator is shown in Table 4.4.2. Table 4.4.2 Score and range of each indicator Seismic Hazards and Risk Social Conditions Seismic Population Score Building Death Open space Narrow intensity density (persons damage ratio ratio (m2/person) road ratio (MMI) per hectare) 1 5.44 - 5.74 5.16-9.49 0.12 - 0.24 1.48 - 4.07 14.13 - 30.9 87.5 - 90 2 5.74 - 6.04 9.49-13.82 0.24 - 0.36 4.07 - 11.22 6.46 - 14.13 90 - 92.5 3 6.04 - 6.34 13.82-18.15 0.36 - 0.48 11.22 - 30.9 2.95 - 6.46 92.5 -95 4 6.34 - 6.64 18.15-22.48 0.48 - 0.6 30.9 - 85.11 1.35 - 2.95 95 - 97.5 5 6.64 - 6.94 22.48-26.81 0.6 - 0.72 85.11 - 234.42 0 - 1.35 97.5 - 100 Source: JICA Project Team Based on above table, the evaluated scores for 20 municipalities are shown in Table 4.4.3. Figure 4.4.1 shows the scores of seismic hazard and risk and social condition and the total score of each municipality, from which it can be observed that Bagmati, Godawari and Chandragiri have the highest score showing that these municipalities are comparably more vulnerable than the other municipalities. A possible reason for the higher vulnerability of these municipalities is their proximity to the fault/source area of the earthquake. Another reason for them being more vulnerable is that these areas have more vulnerable buildings, like adobe and masonry buildings. On the other hand, Kageshwori Manohara Municipality has the least score meaning that this municipality is least vulnerable. It should be pointed out that the vulnerability analysis is based on the Central Nepal South Scenario Earthquake, so that it is scenario earthquake specific and it may change for the scenario earthquake located in the other areas. The two metropolitan cities of Kathmandu Valley, namely Kathmandu metropolitan city and Lalitpur metropolitan city, both have moderate vulnerability. It should be noticed that, if from the point view of absolute damage but not damage ratio, they are the most vulnerable ones, as these areas are densely populated and have bigger number of buildings. When the analysis had been done ratio wise, they are moderately vulnerable as these municipalities have more earthquake resistant buildings, too. Among the pilot municipalities, Budhanilkantha is the least vulnerable, followed by Bhaktapur. Lalitpur Municipality stands as the most vulnerable pilot municipality. As Budhanilkantha is farther away from source of the earthquake, the seismic hazard and risk indicators have low score. Also, among the three pilot municipalities it has the least population density. The detail of score and vulnerability distribution of KV is shown in Figure 4.4.2. 4-79 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 4.4.3 Vulnerability score of each municipality Seismic Hazard and Damage Social Condition Total S.N. Municipality Seismic Building Human Population Open Narrow Score Intensity Damage Casualty Density Space Road 1 Bagmati 5 5 4 1 5 5 25 2 Bhaktapur 1 4 3 5 2 5 20 3 Budhanilkantha 2 1 1 4 4 5 17 4 Chandragiri 5 5 5 3 3 4 25 5 Changunarayan 4 2 2 2 4 5 19 6 Dakshinkali 5 5 4 2 3 5 24 7 Godawari 5 5 5 2 3 5 25 8 Gokarneshwar 2 1 1 3 3 5 15 9 Kageshwori manohara 1 1 1 3 3 5 14 10 Kathmandu metropolitan 4 2 2 5 3 1 17 11 Kirtipur 3 5 5 4 1 5 23 12 Konjyosom 4 5 4 1 5 5 24 13 Lalitpur metropolitan 4 4 3 5 2 3 21 14 Madhyapur thimi 2 2 2 5 3 4 18 15 Mahalaxmi 4 3 3 3 5 5 23 16 Nagarjun 3 3 3 3 5 5 22 17 Shankharapur 2 1 1 2 4 5 15 18 Suryabinayak 5 3 3 3 5 4 23 19 Tarkeshwar 3 1 1 3 5 5 18 20 Tokha 1 1 1 4 5 4 16 Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.4.1 Comparison of vulnerability among municipalities 4-80 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 4.4.2 Distribution of vulnerability of KV 4.5 Recommendations for Future Update of Risk Assessment Seismic risk assessment was carried out based on the limited data of Nepal. Site surveys and estimations were made to supplement the insufficiency. Collected data together with that obtained through surveys made by this project were compiled into a GIS database and shared with the Nepal counterpart. The results of risk assessment reflected the seismicity and ground motion characteristics of KV after Gorkha earthquake, but could not incorporate the latest findings because the project started shortly after the quake. On the other hand, urbanization is progressing and the amount of buildings, infrastructure and lifeline facilities are increasing. The update of risk assessment may be needed after the building and infrastructure inventories are developed and/or the social situation significantly changed. For the purpose of future update of risk assessment, some recommendations are given below. 4.5.1 Recommendations for Technical Aspects of Risk Assessment (1) Recommendations on Overall Risk Assessment Process Seismic risk results depend considerably on the seismic hazard results. It is observed that the recorded ground motion of the Gorkha Earthquake in KV was much smaller than that estimated from attenuation. It is important to investigate and reveal the reason in order to have the hazard analysis more reliable. 4-81 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Building inventory was limited to only four municipalities out of the total of 22 municipalities (at the time of the risk assessment). The estimated number of building and structure type distribution for the other municipalities were used for the risk assessment. Since the results of the building damage estimation is directly affected by data precision, the creation of a complete building inventory is essential. Likewise, the information regarding infrastructure and lifeline, necessary for risk assessment, is either not complete and not compiled in GIS format or not existing. In order to supplement the insufficient information, site survey was conducted for bridges and rooftop mobile Base Transceiver Stations (BTS). Additionally, the number and distribution of power pole was estimated. It is necessary to continuously develop, maintain and update the infrastructure and lifeline data for the future risk assessment. The creation and update of building, infrastructure and lifeline inventory is not only necessary for improving risk assessment accuracy, but also important for the development of disaster risk reduction and management plan and implementation of seismic countermeasures as well. The project of Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development (SATREPS) and The Project on Rehabilitation and Recovery from Nepal Earthquake (RRNE) are under implementation and the research on the Gorkha Earthquake are carried out by many researchers. It is expected the risk assessment could be updated in the case of the accumulation of data and new findings by the projects and research. Risk assessment of the project is limited to KV area only. The risk assessment for the other cities and areas, which exposure to high seismic risk, is considered necessary and urgent. (2) Recommendations for Risk Assessment of Individual Structures a) Buildings The lack of building inventories, especially public building inventories including structural type and GIS data, should be improved. NBC 105 was enforced in 2003, where the importance factor of 1.5 is stipulated for essential public buildings. If this factor had been applied to the engineered RC public buildings, the damage would be reduced by approximately 70%. In the future reparation of building inventories, the inclusion of such kinds of information is requested. Building damage function is prepared incorporating damage data of the 2015 Gorkha Earthquake. Two damage functions for the centre area and perimeter area of the valley are 4-82 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) provided. Accelerations observed at four locations are utilized for the purpose, but strong motion at the perimeter is not available. It is desirable that strong motion observation at the perimeter area should be strengthened. The damage function should be updated when more information on building damage and ground shaking intensity are available. b) Roads Seismic risk to roads is a comprehensive result of road collapse, liquefaction, collapse of bridges, and blockade of narrow streets by surrounding buildings. It is necessary for the road administrator to collectively manage the data to examine the possibility of occurrence of each individual phenomenon with integral management. It is important to make a ledger inventory at first and then decide the priority for action. The ledger should be maintained in a unified format. c) Bridges Detail as built drawings are necessary for accurately evaluating the seismic resistance capacity of bridges. Unfortunately, only a few bridges in KV have such kinds of drawings. The results of bridge damage assessment should be considered as preliminary because the information on reinforcing bar layout and foundation, which are indispensable for evaluation, are not available. Another critical issue for the evaluation is the applied design standard and it also is not clear. The DoR bridge database lacks the important information which is necessary for risk assessment. The creation of a complete bridge ledger is necessary and urgent. d) Water Supply The regression equation applied in the risk assessment of this project was derived from the result of a careful water leakage survey in Japan. It is desirable to implement verification by thorough investigation of water leakage caused by future earthquakes. The technology for post-earthquake water leakage surveys is needed. e) Sewage System The sewage systems in Kathmandu Valley do not cover the entire area currently. The sewage systems were built and managed by different entities. An integrated data set does not exist and the improvement of the situation is considered to be needed. There was no sewage damage reported from the Gorkha Earthquake. It is supposed some parts of the sewage pipeline might be damaged. The detail damage survey after an earthquake is important for the purpose of future damage assessment. f) Electricity Power poles in KV are quite different from Japanese cylindrical cross section RC poles. The 4-83 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) pole is commonly a pre-stressed RC pole with rectangular cross section. In this case, the strength of the long axis (the strength against the horizontal force in the direction in which the electric wire is hung in tension) is quite weak compared to another direction. Due to the weak direction, there can be more damage than the damages observed in Japan from the RC cylindrical pole. For the purpose of future update of risk assessment, it is desirable to carry out research and investigation on the seismic strength of the unique poles of KV. g) Telecommunication Most of the mobile BTS (towers) are installed on the top of buildings in KV. Therefore, it is mandatory that the buildings should be strong enough to support BTS to make it functional during or after an earthquake. Unfortunately, it is estimated that many buildings would suffer damage from the scenario earthquake. It is recommended to make a seismic diagnosis for these buildings and retrofitting as necessary. h) Human Casualties The basic information regarding buildings and population is important for human casualty estimation. There are a large number of people who live in KV but their registration is not in KV. Since these types of people are not included in the census survey data, it is recognized there is a big discrepancy between the statistical population and real residence population. In this regard, the development of a real residence population database is important for the human casualty estimation. i) Economic Impact Loss due to physical damage of property (direct loss) was only assessed due to the lack of proper data for indirect loss estimation in this risk assessment. In the case of infrastructure damage, for example, indirect loss might be much larger than direct loss. It should be acknowledged that the result of economic loss assessed here may be smaller than the actual loss. It is recommended to arrange the socioeconomic data, in particular, Input-Output tables to make indirect loss estimations in the future. 4.5.2 Recommendations for Institutional Aspects of Risk Assessment (1) Recommendations on Overall Risk Assessment Process In response to the Priority for Action of Sendai Framework for DRR: Understanding Disaster Risk, it is important to promote risk assessment not only for earthquake but also for flood, landslide, etc.. For the purpose, an organization, for example, a committee who can overlook and integrate the capacity of different ministries, agencies and universities, would be desirable. Implementation of risk assessment for different disasters could be done by making use 4-84 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) of the technology and resource of both public and private research institutes and universities of Nepal. It is important for local government to a secure disaster management system and enhance the budget for concrete risk reduction. Continuous development, maintenance and update of GIS-based data are important for risk assessment.. A leading organization to integrate and maintain the data is necessary. MoUD, the main counterpart of technology transfer for risk assessment, is expected to play an essential role for data management and establishing a mechanism for future risk assessment updating. (2) Recommendations on Risk Assessment of Individual Structures 1) Buildings For building risk assessment, it is important for MoUD and DUDBC, the responsible organization for building administration, to secure the personnel, management system and technology transmission. It is also necessary to cooperate with CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics) for data sharing and building inventory creation. For promotion of seismic strengthening of existing buildings, such as school, hospital as well as general buildings, and complete compliance of seismic code for new buildings, it is essential to strengthen the coordination among MoUD, MoE and MoH and local government. 2) Roads It is necessary for the road administrator to collectively manage the data to examine the possibility of occurrence of each individual phenomenon and to manage it centrally. However, it is not easy to deal with these very wide subjects. It is desirable to start with the clarification of the road range covered by each institution such as DoR, DOLIDAR, DUDBC, KVDA, and MoUD. 3) Bridges The database of existing bridges is being maintained by the road department (DOR), but only some bridges are covered. In addition, there is no detailed information on bridges such as drawings and design document. In addition to risk management of bridges, it is also important to develop a bridge database in order to maintain and manage bridges for every day. For bridges that will be constructed in the future, a system will be required to manage intensively consolidated design documents. 4-85 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 4) Water Supply In this project, risk assessment of existing water supply network and planned water supply network was implemented. GIS data has been developed and utilized, but continuous update is required from now on. When data is updated, a mechanism for providing data to DUDBC is necessary for revising the future risk assessment. Risk assessment in this project is carried out by statistical methods. Implementation of more detailed risk assessment by individual agencies is also required in the future. 5) Sewage System The sewerage system of the Kathmandu Valley is incomplete even under the present situation; the basic development of the system should be prioritized. Investigation of the damage situation after the earthquake is also inadequate, so, future investigation is necessary. GIS data has been developed and utilized, but continuous update is required from now on. When data is updated, a mechanism for providing data to DUDBC is necessary for revising the future risk assessment. Risk assessment in this project is carried out by statistical methods. Implementation of more detailed risk assessment by individual agencies is also required in the future. 6) Electricity The loss of function of the electric power network is caused by the damage of utility poles, but in the current situation of Nepal there are many cases of utility poles that are thought to be greatly inclined even at normal times. It is important to check maintenance and management in the normal situation and confirm the current situation. It is required to make inventory of the electric power facilities. In this project, risk assessment was carried out by estimating the distribution network and the number of utility poles, but in the future it is necessary to develop more accurate GIS data. At the stage when these data are prepared, a mechanism for providing data to DUDBC is necessary for revising the future risk assessment. 7) Telecommunication In this project, the mobile phone network which accounts for most of communication was evaluated as a representative of communication. Focusing on the base station (BTS), evaluation is being carried out. However each cellular phone companies do not possess individual data, so we investigated that independently. 4-86 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Chapter 5 Pilot Activities This chapter summarizes the pilot activities which were carried out in the three pilot municipalities: Lalitpur Metropolitan City, Bhaktapur Municipality and Budhanilkantha Municipality, mainly based on the results of the hazard and risk assessment. The purposes of pilot activities are not only the implementation of the activities themselves such as the formulation of plans and capacity building of the pilot municipalities, but also to develop the model of a systematic local disaster risk reduction and management framework with activities based on the disaster risk assessment in Nepal. In this sense, it was also aiming to consider the measures for nationwide dissemination to all the local governments in Nepal by summarizing and examining the outputs and issues collected through the activities. This chapter consists of: 5.1 Pilot Municipalities, 5.2 BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Pilot Municipalities, 5.3 Standard Operation Procedure (SOP), 5.4 Technical Guideline for Formulation of Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan, 5.5 Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan for Pilot Municipalities, 5.6 CBDRRM Activities and 5.7 Recommendations for Future Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Activities in the Municipal Level and Nationwide Dissemination of Pilot Activities. Before starting the pilot activities, the pilot municipalities were selected. (5.1) Three municipalities from different districts were selected based on the regional characteristics and damage conditions due to the Gorkha Earthquake, etc. Then, mainly in the first phase, the following activities for emergency response and recovery/reconstruction, which were added to the project considering the changes of the situation due to the Gorkha Earthquake, were implemented. The BBB Recovery and Reconstruction (RR) Plan for Pilot Municipalities was formulated. It consists of the damage situation and direction of reconstruction along with basic policies and action plans based on the concept “Build Back Better (BBB)” (5.2). Emergency Response Chronicle Survey of the Gorkha Earthquake in 2015 was prepared to clarify the status of actual emergency response situation and issues by interviews to the related organizations (Appendix 3). DRR Awareness Activities were implemented for the community and residents in the pilot municipalities. The main purpose of the activity is to disseminate the basic knowledge for a safe building for reducing the damage by future earthquakes. Development and dissemination of earthquake awareness brochure, earthquake awareness workshops, broadcasting of radio awareness program were implemented (Appendix 5). In the second phase, the following activities of original components of the project were conducted toward disaster risk reduction and effective emergency response in the future. A 5-1 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) was developed as one guideline which is enable to understand specific emergency response activity in case of real disaster in order to make disaster response process effective, organized and result-oriented. It consists of four chapters and four appendixes including establishment of Emergency Response Head Quarter (ERHQ) and activity flowchart of each section (5.3). The Technical Guideline for Formulation of Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan (TG LDCRP) for all local levels of Nepal was developed. TG LDCRP helps to formulate the practical and effective Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan (LDCRP) easily by local level and is a supporting manual aiming to give guidance and is to be utilized as a reference document so that local level such as municipality can understand its detail contents, formulation procedures, examples of description and notes to be considered (5.4). The Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan (LDCRP) were formulated for pilot municipalities. LDCRPs for pilot municipalities were developed by utilizing the result of the earthquake risk assessment to consider the target for disaster risk reduction according to Sendai Framework and consider the necessary activities to achieve its targets (5.5). Considering the importance of the promotion of the community DRRM activities for achieving the Sendai Framework, and as one of the proposed activities in the BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plans in the pilot municipalities, community DRRM activities were conducted in a selected pilot ward in each of the three pilot municipalities (5.6). As the end of this chapter, through these pilot activities, Recommendations for Future Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Activities in the Municipal Level and Nationwide Dissemination of Pilot Activities (5.7) were considered. In this chapter, the details of the pilot activities are described. 5.1 Pilot Municipalities 5.1.1 Selection of Pilot Municipalities For the implementation of the pilot activities, three pilot municipalities were selected for the project. The JICA Project Team discussed with MoUD, MoFALD, and candidate municipalities, which was suggested by MoUD and MoFALD, for deciding the pilot municipalities. The confirmed pilot municipalities were Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City, Bhaktapur Municipality, and Budhanilkantha Municipality. The criteria to choose the pilot municipalities were differences of regional character and the damage situations, and they were selected from three different districts in Kathmandu Valley. The three pilot municipalities were agreed upon during the 1st JCC. The location and damage situation, and summary of the pilot municipalities are summarized in Table 5.1.1. 5-2 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.1.1 Overview of the pilot municipalities at the beginning of the project Municipality Budhanilkantha Bhaktapur Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan District Kathmandu Bhaktapur Lalitpur Area Rural(New Municipality) Urban Urban (ha) 3,499 655 2,494 Population (Census 2011) 107,918 81,748 254,308 Building Heavily 3,382 5,950 2,325 Damage Partially 6,569 2,092 2,771 Death 19 252 49 Gorkha Casualty Earthquake Injured 87 397 128 Several Damage and Great damage in typical Several damage in Damage Status recently established new area especially heritage overall city Municipality sites Source: Census 2011, Information from Each Municipality At the beginning of the project, Kathmandu Valley consisted of 21 municipalities in three districts. However, while implementing the project activities, a new constitution was enacted and to fulfil the requirements of the constitution, all old municipalities and VDCs were restructured in 2017. Similarly Kathmandu Valley was also restructured and it now consists of three districts with twenty municipalities including a part of two rural municipalities as shown in Figure 5.1.1. Especially for the pilot municipalities which were confirmed in the 1st JCC, Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City was promoted to be a Metropolitan City by incorporation with parts of former Karyabinayak Municipality as well as reorganized ward boundaries. The boundary of Bhaktapur Municipality and Budhanilkantha Municipality is same as before, however, the ward boundaries were restructured. Accordingly, the pilot activities were implemented for pilot municipalities as follows. Pilot Activities added after the Gorkha Earthquake: Old pilot municipalities (Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City, Bhaktapur Municipality, Budhanilkantha Municipality) with old ward boundary 5.2 BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan Volume 4: Emergency Response Chronicle Survey of the Gorkha Earthquake in 2015 Volume 4: DRR Awareness Activities Pilot Activities of original component: New pilot municipalities (Lalitpur Metropolitan City, Bhaktapur Municipality, Budhanilkantha Municipality) with new ward boundaries 5.3 Standard Operation Procedure (SOP) 5.4 Technical Guideline for Formulation of Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan 5.5 Local Disaster and Climate Resilience Plan 5.6 CBDRRM Activities 5-3 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.1.1 Comparison of administrative boundary of municipalities in Kathmandu Valley (Upper: Old, Lower: New) and Locations of the pilot municipalities 5-4 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 5.1.2 Profile of Pilot Municipality Basic information concerning the pilot municipalities is important and essential for implementing pilot activities. In order to grasp the overall picture of pilot municipalities, the JICA Project Team collected the fundamental information and summarized the profiles of the pilot municipalities. The profiles of pilot municipalities consist of mainly three thematic categories: introduction, natural condition and social condition related to disaster risk reduction and management as shown in Table 5.1.2. The information shown in the profiles is mainly based on the results of seismic hazard assessment in Chapter 3 and information which the JICA Project Team collected through the seismic risk assessment in Chapter 4. The profile of each pilot municipality is shown in Figure 5.1.2, Figure 5.1.3 and Figure 5.1.4. Table 5.1.2 Contents of profile for pilot municipalities Basic Information Category Information Category Information Introduction Introduction Summary of municipality, number of ward, etc. Topography Location, ward boundary , topographic map with elevation Natural Geology Geological map Condition Hazard susceptibility Liquefaction susceptibility map, Slope failure susceptibility map Population Population data in 2001 and 2011 by CBS Census Building Number and rate of each building structure type Facility Category of school, health facility, number of facilities related to DRRM such as governmental buildings and fire station, etc. Social Land use Area of each land use and transition of built up Condition area Infrastructure, Lifeline and Open Length of road network in each category, and Space information of other infrastructures such as bridge, water supply network, sewage network, BTS tower and open space Source: JICA Project Team 5-5 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.1.2 Profile of Lalitpur Metropolitan City 5-6 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.1.3 Profile of Bhaktapur Municipality 5-7 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.1.4 Profile of Budhanilkantha Municipality 5-8 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 5.2 BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for Pilot Municipalities The JICA Project Team formulated the BBB Recovery and Reconstruction (RR) Plan for the quick revitalization after the Gorkha Earthquake in the three pilot municipalities. The plans helped to clarify the reconstruction policies and to act as the base for the reconstruction projects. Accordingly, it was required to be developed preferentially in the Project. In the formulation of the plan, based on the concept of "Build Back Better (BBB)" which was proposed in the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, to take advantage of the recovery and reconstruction experience of Japan taking into account the actual situation of Nepal, the vision of recovery and reconstruction, the basic policy and action plan were included in the presentation. Also the plan was configured to be well coordinated with the existing development plans and the result of the earthquake hazard assessment. In addition, the plan was configured to be integrated with the LDCRP which has been formulated by the project based on the result of the risk assessment. Relationship among the BBB RR Plan, LDCRP, the earthquake hazard assessment and risk assessment are shown in following figure. Details of BBB RR Plan Damage To show the policy for recovery and reconstruction after the Gorkha Earthquake Vision Hazard assessment Basic Plan Geomorphological Land Use, etc. Microzonation Integrate the Action Action Plan Result of Analysis plan with the LDCRP (Preparation and LDCRP Mitigation part) Risk Assessment To show the DRRM measures and system based on the risk Result of assessment. The DRRM Assessment includes Preparation, Response, Mitigation and DRR. Mitigation Target DRR/DRM Measures Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.1 Relationship among BBB RR Plan, LDCRP, and Hazard and Risk Assessment 5-9 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 5.2.1 Damage survey of pilot municipalities Prior to the formulation of a recovery and reconstruction plan for the pilot municipalities, the JICA Project Team conducted various damage surveys to clarify the damage situation caused by the Gorkha earthquake. (1) Profile of pilot municipalities The characteristics of three pilot municipalities (Lalitpur, Bhaktapur, and Budhanilkantha) are described below. Lalitpur: It is located right beside Kathmandu Metropolitan City. The northern area of Lalitpur is developed along with Kathmandu Metropolitan City and it configures as the central area of Kathmandu Valley as the Sub-metropolitan City. The municipality constitutes of many historical areas including Patan Durbar Square, which is enlisted as a world heritage site. Also, a large portion of Lalitpur is occupied by residential buildings. Recently, Lalitpur merged the adjacent three Village Development Committees (VDCs) into a municipality, hence expanding its territory. Bhaktapur: It is located 12km east of central Kathmandu, and is the third largest municipality in the Kathmandu Valley. It is well known as the historical district with its Durbar Square as World Heritage Sites. Old buildings in the historical settlements were severely damaged by the earthquake. Budhanilkantha: It is located on the north of Kathmandu Metropolitan City. In 2014, the six Village Development Committees, Budhanilkantha, Kapan, Chunikhel, Chapali Bhadrakali, Mahankal, Khadka Bhadrakali, were merged into one municipality. The southern parts are mainly residential areas. On the other hand, the northern parts are hilly areas connected to the Shivapuri-Nagarjun National Park. (2) Damage survey of pilot municipalities Damage survey of pilot municipalities affected by the Gorkha earthquake was conducted on the basis of the investigation results of the field survey and the information gathered from government institutions. 5-10 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 1) Damage survey by the satellite image Immediately after the Gorkha earthquake that occurred on April 25, 2015, it was difficult to grasp the damage situation as the system for collecting damage information was not secured. Therefore, the main damage information was investigated by satellite image. Especially the damage situation investigation by satellite image which UNOSAT carried out, was very useful in order to grasp the whole picture of the damage. The following figure shows the damage situation caused by the Gorkha earthquake based on the satellite image for the entire Kathmandu Valley and each pilot municipality. It is difficult to grasp the damage situation from the details, but it was possible to confirm a rough distribution of damage and the concentration of damage. Budhanilkantha Lalitpur Bhaktapur Source: UNOSAT, etc. Figure 5.2.2 Damage Situation caused by the Gorkha Earthquake Based on the Satellite Image Also, Google, etc. published satellite images from before and immediately after the earthquake. Immediately after the Gorkha earthquake, the JICA Project Team grasped the overview of the damage situation in each municipality and used it as a basic data of field survey shown next while utilizing these satellite images. 5-11 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: Google earth Figure 5.2.3 Satellite image before and after the Gorkha Earthquake at the Bhaktapur Durbar Square (Left: 12 March, 2015 (Before the earthquake), Right: 3 May, 2015 (After the earthquake)) 2) Damage survey by field survey In the project, the project members visited Nepal from early May 2015 after the Gorkha earthquake and started the damage survey by field survey. In addition, after the selection of the pilot municipalities, the JICA Project Team carried out a field survey in each pilot municipality to grasp the actual damage situation and characteristics of the damage. Furthermore, for Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City and Bhaktapur Municipality, the detail damage survey for all buildings was conducted by cooperation with the re-consignment organizations. For Budhanilkantha Municipality, the result of the damage survey which another donor agency conducted was collected. Emergency damage survey and summary of detail building damage survey by the re-consignment organizations are shown in the Appendix 6. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.4 Photos of field survey (Left: Bhaktapur (12 June, 2015), Right: Budhanilkantha (30 June, 2015)) 5-12 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 3) Damage survey by PDNA The Nepalese government together with the international community carried out the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), just after the earthquake to identify the damage cost estimation. The assessment was carried out mainly targeting fourteen affected districts and pointed out the damage, losses and needs for 23 sectors. The three districts in the Kathmandu Valley are included among the affected fourteen districts and the rough damage situation at the district level was listed. As the assessment results are at the district level, and all damage situations are covered for each sector, the JICA Project Team carried out a survey of the PDNA report in order to understand each damage. In addition, the results of the PDNA were set to be included in the damage situation in the recovery and reconstruction plan for each pilot municipality. Table 5.2.1 List of sector in PDNA Social Sectors Infrastructure Sectors Housing and Human Settlement Electricity Health and Population Communication Nutrition Community Infrastructure Education Transport Cultural Heritage Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Productive Sectors Cross-Cutting Sectors Agriculture Environment and Forestry Irrigation Employment and Livelihoods Commerce and Industry Gender and Social Inclusion Tourism Social Protection Financial Sector Governance Disaster Risk Reduction Poverty and human development Macroeconomic impact assessment Source: PDNA Table 5.2.2 Example of the result of damage and loss assessment (e.g. Agriculture) District-wise Summary of Damages and Losses (NPR million) Crop subsector Livestock subsector Agriculture total District Total Total Total Private Public Damage Losses Damage Losses Damage Losses Effect Effect Effect (%) (%) Bhaktapur 176.00 185.71 361.70 84.35 55.55 139.90 260.35 241.26 501.61 88.37 11.63 Kathmandu 441.65 176.05 617.70 117.18 163.55 280.73 558.84 339.60 898.44 98.57 1.43 Lalitpur 108.63 113.15 221.78 63.71 110.79 174.51 172.35 223.94 396.29 91.44 8.56 Source: PDNA 4) Collection of damage information by related agencies In addition to the above surveys, the JICA Project Team also collected the damage information which the relevant agencies of the Nepalese government compiled. Specifically, from each pilot municipality, human and building damage of each ward was collected. Also 5-13 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) from the relevant agencies of the central government, the damage information for important facilities, such as public buildings, schools, hospitals, and cultural heritages, was collected and integrated to the GIS. This information was taken for the recovery and reconstruction plan for each pilot municipality. The following figure shows as a damage situation of cultural heritages of Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City as an example. Source: DUDBC Figure 5.2.5 Damage status of cultural heritage in Lalitpur 5.2.2 Case Study of the recovery and reconstruction plan in Japan The JICA Project Team carried out the case studies of recovery and reconstruction plans in Japan in order to utilize the knowledge and experiences of Japan effectively for the formulation of BBB RR Plan in the pilot municipalities. The recovery and reconstruction plans in Japan have been formulated not only for earthquakes, but also for floods caused by typhoons and heavy rain, landslides, volcanic eruptions, etc., with great damage. Some disasters, in which the recovery and reconstruction plan were formulated in Japan, are shown in the Table 5.2.3. From the viewpoint of recovery and reconstruction from the extensive damage caused by the earthquake, the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in 1995, and the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011 were selected as the case study. Specifically, items such as how the government supported for a large-scale disaster, what was the contents and the timing of the recovery and reconstruction planning, and how recovery and reconstruction plan was helped for the implementation for actual recovery and reconstruction were clarified. 5-14 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) The result of these case studies was the fundamental data in order to examine the conditions of recovery and reconstruction plan, in view of the regional characteristics and damage situation of pilot municipalities. Table 5.2.3 Example of recovery and reconstruction formulated in Japan Main local gov. Main local gov. Year Disaster which formulated Year Disaster which formulated the RR plan the RR plan 1958 Kanogawa typhoon Shizuoka pref. 2000 Mt. Usu Eruption Hokkaido pref. 1959 Isewan typhoon Aichi pref. 2000 Miyake-island eruption Miyake village 1960 Chile EQ and Tsunami Iwate pref. 2000 Tokai heavy rain Aichi pref. 1977 Mt. Usu Eruption Hokkaido pref. 2000 West Tottori EQ Tottori pref. 1982 Nagasaki flood Nagasaki pref. 2001 Geiyo EQ Kure muni. 1983 Heavy rain Shimane pref. 2001 South west Kochi heavy Kochi pref. rain 1983 Miyake-island eruption Tokyo metropolitan 2002 Typhoon No.6 Iwate pref. gov., Miyake village 1983 Middle Japan Sea EQ Akita pref. 2003 Minamata heavy rain Kumamoto pref, Minamata muni. 1985 Mt. Chizuki Landslide Nagano pref. 2003 Northern Miyagi EQ. Miyagi pref. 1986 Typhoon No.10 Tochigi pref. 2004 Fukui heavy rain Fukui pref. 1990 Mobara city tornado Mobara muni. 2004 Typhoon No.16 Miyazaki pref. 1991 Mt. Unzen Eruption Shimabara muni. 2004 Typhoon No.23 Hyogo pref. 1993 South-West off Hokkaido pref. 2004 Niigata Chuetsu EQ. Niigata pref., Hokkaido earthquake Nagaoka muni., etc. 1993 Heavy rain Kagoshima pref. 2005 West Off Fukuoka Fukuoka muni. Earthquake 1993 Typhoon No.13 Kagoshima pref. 2007 Noto EQ Ishikawa pref., Wajima muni., etc. 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Hyogo pref., Kobe 2007 Niigata Chuetsu-oki EQ Kashiwazaki muni. EQ muni., etc. 1997 Harihara debris flow Izumi muni. 2008 Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku EQ Kurihara muni. 1998 Fukushima heavy rain Fukushima pref. 2011 Great East Japan EQ Iwate pref., Miyagi pref., Fukushima pref., etc. 1999 Storm surge Shiranuhi muni. Source: Manual of measures for reconstruction, Cabinet office in Japan (1) Case study of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake which occurred on January 17, 1995, was an inland large earthquake of magnitude 7.3, and caused the deaths of 6,434 people. The earthquake was the worst disaster among the natural disasters that occurred after the World War II, before the Great East Japan Earthquake occurred. The general flow till the formulation of a reconstruction plan by local governments after the occurrence of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake is shown in the figure below. After the central government showed a basic policy of reconstruction, affected municipalities such as Kobe formulated the reconstruction plan in about half a year. The detail is shown as follows. 5-15 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) National Level Local Level 1.17, 1995 Great Hanshin Earthquake Emergency Responses Disaster Management Headquarters (Nation/ Prefecture/ Municipalities) 1 month Act the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Reconstruction Committee 2 month Reconstruction Headquarters (Nation/ Prefecture/ Municipalities) Supplementary Budget Reconstruction Guidelines 3 month Basic Concept & Restoration Measures (Kobe City) Vision 4 month Supplementary Budget 5 month Plan Basic Policies Reconstruction Plan (Kobe City) 6 month for Reconstruction Reconstruction Plan 7 month (Hyogo Pref.) ~ 10 month 3 years Action Infrastructure project ~ (Project) 5 year 5 year Plan Promotion Project promotion project ~ Revision 7 year 3 year promotion project ~ 10 year Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.6 Flow of formulation of reconstruction plan after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake 1) Enactment of the laws and formulation of basic policies by the national government After the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, many relevant laws were enacted for the relief to the victims. On February 24, 1995, about one month after the earthquake, “The Law on the basic policy and the organization of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake" was enacted. In the Law, quick promotion of the reconstruction of the affected region was shown by determining the establishments of the reconstruction headquarters for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake along with the revelation of the basic principles for the reconstruction of the affected region. As the basic principles, "Restoration of Life", "Reconstruction of Economy" and "Development of Safe society” were shown. Then, on April 28, 1995 three months after the earthquake, the reconstruction headquarters which was established based on the above mentioned Law, presented the “Concept and urgent measures toward the recovery and reconstruction of the Hanshin-Awaji region”. It showed the contents of urgent measures of national government to be implemented for reconstruction. Moreover, on July 28, 1995, the headquarters announced the “Policy towards the reconstruction of the Hanshin-Awaji region". In this policy, three basic concepts "Restoration of Life," "Reconstruction of Economy" and "Development of Safe society” were described. The necessity of each concept is shown below. "Restoration of Life" is important so that the victims can have willingness to a new life, and measures to ensure the stability of life that are required to be implemented. 5-16 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) "Reconstruction of Economy" is important to activate the affected region, together with infrastructure development as well as ensuring the employment. Comprehensive economic support measures are essential. "Development of a Safe Society” based on the lessons learned from the earthquake is important. The formation of the structural basis of the region with disaster resistance, and comfort and convenience are necessary, as well as the development a safe and attractive society with consideration to the environment, elderly and disabilities is required. 2) Formulation of reconstruction plans by local government The case study for the formulation of reconstruction plan by local government shows an example of the Kobe Municipality. Kobe Municipality published a reconstruction plan in about half a year after the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Its contents followed the national policies and set four targets of "safety", "economy", "attraction", and "collaboration". The plan consisted of the reconstruction plan and major reconstruction measures for each target. In addition, the detail development plan was also formulated including the land use policies and urban planning. The planning period has been planned ten years in view of the damage situation and integrity of the prefectural plan, etc. Source: Reconstruction plan of Kobe municipality, edited by JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.7 Overview of the reconstruction plan of Kobe municipality (2) Case study of the Great East Japan Earthquake The Great East Japan Earthquake which occurred on March 11, 2011, was a subduction-zone earthquake of magnitude 9.0, and more than 18,000 were dead or missing. The earthquake was the worst disaster among the natural disasters that occurred after World War II. The 5-17 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) general flow till the formulation of a reconstruction plan by the local governments after the occurrence of the Great East Japan Earthquake is shown in the figure below. The basic flow is the same as at the time of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake; after the national government showed a basic policy of reconstruction, many of the municipalities affected by the disaster formulated a reconstruction plan within about one year after the disaster. The detail is shown as follows. National Level Local Level 3.11, 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake Emergency Responses Emergency Reconstruction Design Council System & Institutional Law 1 month Vision 1st Supplementary Budget 2 month Principles / Guidelines for Reconstruction Basic Act For Reconstruction 3 month Reconstruction Headquarters 4 month Basic Policy for Reconstruction nd 5 month 2 Supplementary Budget Reconstruction Plan 6 month Plans 7 month > Prefecture > Municipality 8 month 3rd Supplementary Budget 9 month Law for Special Zone for Reconstruction 10 month 11 month Reconstruction Agency & Fund 1 year Special Zones for Reconstruction Action 4th Supplementary Budget (Project) ~ Reconstruction Grant Project 10 years Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.8 Flow of formulation of reconstruction plan after the Great East Japan Earthquake 1) Enactment of the laws and formulation of basic policies by national government After the Great East Japan Earthquake, many relevant laws for the relief to the victims were enacted similar to the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. On June 24, 2011, approximately three months after the earthquake, "The basic law for reconstruction of Great East Japan Earthquake" was enacted. The law determined the basic principles and basic policies for the establishment of the reconstruction headquarters for the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the Reconstruction Agency. Hence, on July 29, 2011, about four months after the disaster, the national government announced a "basic policy for reconstruction from the Great East Japan Earthquake" based on the law. In this policy, the following three points were mentioned as the measures need to be implemented. These three points were basically similar to the basic principles as in the case of Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake; specially “Life”, ”Economy” and ”Safety” were the basic guideline for the reconstruction. 5-18 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Measures for the restoration of the life of the victims and the recovery and reconstruction of the disaster stricken area Measures to be implemented urgently for the recovery and reconstruction of local economy Nationwide urgent measures for the disaster management and disaster risk reduction based on the lessons learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake Furthermore, in the policy, not only recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake was indicated, but also the efforts for the future, such as, the policy for “Build Back Better” were included. Also, at the time of the Great East Japan Earthquake, the Reconstruction Agency was established in February 2012 as an organization for implementing the reconstruction projects on the basis of the above mentioned Law, etc. The Reconstruction Agency has been placed in the Cabinet. The roles which are indicated in the law on establishment of the Reconstruction Agency are as follows. Matters related to planning and the general coordination of basic policy on measures for reconstruction Matters related to the support of reconstruction projects by local government, promotion of implementation of the reconstruction projects by relevant agencies and coordination Matters in addition to be listed in the preceding two items The role and the framework of the coordination of the Reconstruction Agency is shown in the following figure. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.9 Framework of Reconstruction Agency 5-19 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 2) Formulation of reconstruction plans by local government The case study for the formulation of reconstruction plans by local government shows examples of Iwate Prefecture and Sendai Municipality. Iwate Prefecture, in August 2011, five months after the earthquake, formulated the basic reconstruction plan and reconstruction action plan (first phase) from the earthquake and tsunami of the Great East Japan Earthquake. The plan, as the same national policy, listed three principles towards the reconstruction as "ensuring safety" (Safety), "restoration of livelihood" (Life), "reconstruction of economy" (Economy). In each principle, non-structural measures and structural measures to be implemented are described in detail and is divided into three phases (emergency, short-term, medium-term). The planning period is eight years and the overview of the plan is shown in the Figure 5.2.10. Sendai Municipality formulated the earthquake reconstruction plan in November 2011, eight months after the earthquake. In this plan, it shows the four directions towards the reconstruction, in addition to the three basic principles: life, safety and economy, it has set the corresponding to the energy saving as the own direction for the reconstruction. Moreover, the municipality selected ten projects as reconstruction projects, and the planning period is five years. The overview of the plan is shown in the Figure 5.2.11 Emergency Short Term (2-3Y) Mid Term (3-4Y) Long Term (2-3Y) Response Restoration Reconstruction Development Debris Removal Debris Processing Safety Multi-preventative Community Planning Emphasis on Road Reconstruction Reconstruction of Main Road Network Temporary Public Housing Housing Hybrid Housing (with refuges and community facilities) Financial Support Multi-support system concerning housing reconstruction Life Job Creation Support for Job Creation / Training for new industry Temporary medical Establishment support for medical service / Remote medical care area Welfare Service program Restoration of Educational Facilities Recovery of Construction of local-economy related facilities Economy Livelihood (Fishery, Forestry, Agriculture, New Industry, etc.) Temporary stores Support for expanding markets (incl. outside of Japan) Financial Support Support fund for the two-layer debt cancellation scheme Source: Reconstruction plan of Iwate prefecture, edited by JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.10 Overview of the reconstruction plan of Iwate Prefecture 5-20 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: Reconstruction plan of Sendai municipality, edited by JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.11 Overview of the reconstruction plan of Sendai Municipality (3) Law for Reconstruction from large-scale disaster As noted above, in Japan, it was usual to emergency enact the special laws that shows the basic principles of reconstruction and establishment of the reconstruction headquarters, in the response stage after a large-scale disaster. However, on the basis of the lessons and issues learned from the Great East Japan Earthquake, from the background of a need to prepare a framework for reconstruction in advance, the “Law for Reconstruction from large-scale disaster” was enacted in June 2013 as a permanent law that is mainly for the reconstruction. In the basic philosophy of this law, the restoration of the "life", the reconstruction of the “economy” and promotion of development of "safety" community are also stated. In addition, in the law, it was decided that the formulation of a reconstruction plan by specific affected municipalities was possible. And, it defined the contents of the plan as follows. 1. Area of the plan 2. Goal of the plan 3. Current status and Future vision, Basic policy on land use 4. Responsible organization and area of the reconstruction project 5. Contents of the Life and Economy of the residents 6. Period of the plan 7. Other necessary matters This law enacted after about two years from the Great East Japan Earthquake, and the Kumamoto earthquake, which occurred in April 2016, became the first application to the law. 5-21 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 5.2.3 Condition setting of the BBB RR Plan The JICA Project Team set the conditions of the BBB RR Plan such as the objective, position and period of the plan. Condition setting was considered on the basis of the case studies in Japan shown in 5.2.2. The detail of each condition is shown as follows. These conditions are basically common in each pilot municipality. (1) Objective of the plan Objectives for the formulation of the BBB RR Plan were set as follows. Setting and sharing of goals and direction To clarify the goals and direction of the reconstruction To promote more effective reconstruction actions To share the vision among all the stakeholders such as government, private sectors and residents To the public relations of reconstruction measures/actions Synchronized coordination of reconstruction projects To clarify the role and responsibility of each reconstruction action among all the stakeholders To coordinate the reconstruction actions among all the stakeholders Effective implementation of reconstruction actions To implement reconstruction actions not only for urban development but also for industrial development, welfare, education, and widely various fields To clarify the priority of reconstruction actions To implement the reconstruction projects efficiently and comprehensively by monitoring consistency and coordinating such widely various reconstruction projects (2) Position of the plan 1) National reconstruction and rehabilitation policy The Government of Nepal, as indicated above, carried out the Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA) together with the international community, just after the Gorkha earthquake. The Government of Nepal initiated the concept of “Build Back Better” (BBB) towards the resilience of the society with emphasis on the improvement of the disaster risk reduction system in Nepal. In addition, the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) was established in January 2016 as the leading agency for the reconstruction from the earthquake. NRA has prepared the National Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Policy to envisage a 5-22 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) guideline for reconstruction and recovery. Based on this policy, the national government has formulated the Framework and Sector plan, etc. The BBB RR Plan for the pilot municipalities is expected to fulfil important roles as the basis for appropriately reflecting the national reconstruction policies. 2) Position of the BBB RR Plan on the municipal level In the legal system of Nepal, there is nothing that defines the recovery and reconstruction plan, and there is no legal framework. However, as described above, a recovery and reconstruction plan is important in showing the direction of recovery and reconstruction of each pilot municipality, and is planned to be a master plan for recovery and reconstruction. Therefore, the position of the recovery and reconstruction plan was determined to be considered as municipalities’ own document even though there is no legal framework. In addition, for the part related to disaster prevention and mitigation of the recovery and reconstruction plan, according to the concept of BBB, it was decided to be integrated to the regional disaster risk management plan which will be formulated in the project. Also, in order to move toward a more resilient society than before, the scope area of the plan is set the whole area of each pilot municipality. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.12 Positon of the BBB RR Plan (3) Period of the plan The target period of the plan was basically set five years following the national policy. And the period was divided into three phases; recovery, revitalization and development as shown in Figure 5.2.12. Considering the reconstruction project for each of these stages, it was decided to plan step by step from the recovery to the further development of the municipality. 5-23 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.13 Period of the BBB RR Plan (4) Structure of the plan The BBB RR Plan was planned to consist of two plans, one is the basic plan in which is indicated the basic policies, and another one is the action plan for the implementation in detail. The basic plan shows the entire image of the reconstruction such as vision and grand design based on the damage status and direction for the future. The action plan includes the responsible organizations in the municipality in consideration given to the coordination with national or district organizations in order to achieve the policies. In addition, in the action plan, by considering budget, importance, urgency and time needed, several actions were selected out of all the actions as the priority project. The structure of the plan is shown as follows. VISION Basic Plan Grand Design BASIC POLICY Basic Policy (divided into 5 Visions) Framework Action Plan Action Plan ACTION Priority Project Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.14 Framework image of the BBB RR Plan 5-24 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.15 Structure of the BBB RR Plan Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.16 Cover page of the BBB RR Plan (Left: Lalitpur, Center: Bhaktapur, Right: Budhanilkantha) 5-25 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 5.2.4 Consideration of the Vision for the BBB RR Plan (1) Primary Vision “Build Back Better (BBB)” The primary vision, which is commonly applied to the all municipalities, is “Build Back Better (BBB)”. Disaster management can be formulated as a cycle of “Prevention and Mitigation”, “Preparedness”, “Emergency Responses”, and “Recovery and Reconstruction”. In the stage of “Recovery and Reconstruction”, it is necessary to consider help to reduce the damage due to the disasters that may occur in the future. This means that the recovery and reconstruction aims at not only the restoration but also helps create a disaster-resistant condition. With lessons learned from the disaster experiences, this concept “BBB” has become one of the four priorities for action in the “Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction”, adopted in Sendai, Japan 2015. Since the Gorkha Earthquake is the first large-scale disaster that occurred after the adoption of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, BBB was set as a primary vision to be formulated in the recovery and reconstruction plan in order to embody the concept of build back better reconstruction. Table 5.2.4 Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 Priority for Action Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 Priority for Action 1. Understanding disaster risk 2. Strengthening disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk 3. Investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience 4. Enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and “Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction Source: Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 Disaster Resilience with BBB Next Disaster Disaster mitigation efforts No Disaster Gorkha Disaster BBB Disaster & without BBB DRR Recovery Recovery Time Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.17 Concept of BBB 5-26 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (2) Consideration of key principles Key Principles for the recovery and reconstruction plan were set based on the primary vision “BBB”. The principles are to be applied to all BBB plans, not specific to the selected pilot municipalities. The key principles adopted were "Life", "Safety" and "Economy", which have been the common principles according to the case study in Japan shown in 5.2.2. Detail is shown as follows. Table 5.2.5 Key principles The most important subject is to help the victims get back their ordinary lives. Life Furthermore, from the BBB point of view, the recovery and reconstruction plan should be a guide towards a better life with a stable livelihood for the future. It is necessary to improve safety and create a resilient city against all possible Safety disasters. Each and every measure of the recovery and reconstruction plan has to emphasize the safety and security of the people’s lives. Economic activities which have been hampered by an earthquake have to be recovered at an early stage and they would be vital issues for the city. In addition, Economy recovery of the basic infrastructures such as road networks is also necessary to support economic activities. Thus, the recovery and reconstruction plan should aim at the vital regional economy and further development. Source: JICA Project Team (3) Consideration of the Vision for each pilot municipality According to the primary vision and principles, visions for the selected pilot municipalities were to be defined. Since they should be accommodated to the regional characteristics and damage of each municipality, they were finalized through the formulation process of the recovery and reconstruction plans, including discussion with the counterparts of each municipality. For each municipality, five visions were set; for four of the five visions, they were set to be common visions as basically essential for all municipalities. Specially, three of the visions were decided to be set from key principles "Life," "Safety" and "Economy". In addition, for the one vision other than the above, “community based disaster risk management” was decided to be set because the importance of community cooperation is very important, which has been confirmed in the past experiences in Japan and the Gorkha Earthquake as well (Figure 5.2.18). 5-27 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: NSET, Two decades of earthquake risk management actions judged against the Gorkha earthquake of Nepal April 2015, New Technologies for Urban Safety of Mega Cities in Asia (USMCA 2015), Kathmandu, October 2015, http://www.nset.org.np/usmca2015/keynote/2_KN2_fullpaper_Amodmani Dixit.pdf Figure 5.2.18 Extricated victims and recovered dead bodies by different SAR teams of the Gorkha Earthquake For the last vision of the five visions, it was decided to set a specific one for each pilot municipality, considering the damage situation, and direction of reconstruction and regional characteristics. For Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City, since the city is an urban city and the population is more than 250,000 people, the resilience of city and society is required. For Bhaktapur Municipality, since the city is historical city and cultural heritages are the most important resources and severe damage had occurred, the resilience of the historical city is required. For Budhanilkantha Municipality, since the city was newly established as a municipality, enhancement of governance is necessary for the mitigation of future earthquakes. In view of these perspectives, visions of each pilot municipality were set as shown in the Table 5.2.6. Lalitpur Bhaktapur Budhanilkantha Great damage in Several Damage Several damage in typical area and recently overall city especially heritage established newly sites Municipality Revitalization Regional More of Historical Governance Resilient Characteristics city Key Safety Principles Life Economy Importance of Common Community Community VISION Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.19 Each Vision of the pilot municipalities 5-28 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.6 Each Vision of pilot municipality Development of Resilient Disaster Management City Revitalization and Improvement of Livelihood Lalitpur Urban Planning with Sustainable Development for a Safer and Secure City Promotion and Improvement of Industry Strengthening of Community Disaster Risk Management Development of Resilient Disaster Historical City Revitalization and Improvement of Livelihood Urban Planning for a Safer and Secure City Bhaktapur Promotion of Tourism and Ensuring the Safety of Tourists Strengthening of Community Disaster Risk Management & Resilient Disaster Management System of Municipality Building Resilient Institutional Framework Revitalization and Improvement of Livelihood Urban Planning for a Safer and Secure City Budhanilkantha Promotion and Improvement of Industry Strengthening of Community Disaster Risk Management & Resilient Disaster Management System of Municipality Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.20 5 Visions (e.g. Lalitpur) 5.2.5 Formulation of BBB RR Basic Plan Based on the considerations above, the basic plan for recovery and reconstruction of the pilot municipalities were formulated showing mainly the basic policies. The outline of the basic plan is shown as follows. Chapter 1 and 2 were formulated based on the contents described above. Therefore, in this section, mainly the contents related to the Chapter 3 are shown. Chapter 3 consisted of 3-1) Grand design which shows the image of the overall concept and the cooperation of the basic policy, 3-2) Framework of Basic policy which shows the overall configuration of the basic policy and 3-3) Basic Policy which shows the basic policy as well as the main action list and figures and tables. The main actions which are required are listed, and have contents to connect to a more detailed action plan. Detail is shown as follows. 5-29 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.7 Outline of the BBB RR Basic Plan Table of Contents Outline CHAPTER 1. OUTLINE OF PLAN 1-1. Background Overview of the Gorkha Earthquake, damage status and necessity of the plan 1-2. Damage Status Summary of the damage status on municipal level, the result of PDNA and detail building damage survey 1-3. Objective Objective of the plan ・Setting and sharing of goals and direction ・Synchronized coordination of reconstruction projects ・Effective implementation of reconstruction actions 1-4. Position Position of the plan (master plan for recovery and reconstruction) 1-5. Period Period of the plan (five years and will be integrated into the regional disaster risk management plan) 1-6. System Structure of the plan and reconstruction system CHAPTER 2. VISION OF RECONSTRUCTION 2-1. Primary Vision Concept of Build Back Better (BBB) 2-2. Three Key Principles, Three Key Principles（Life, Safety, Economy）, Slogan and Slogan and Five Visions Five Visions CHAPTER 3. BASIC POLICY 3-1. Grand Design Image of the overall concept and the cooperation of the basic policy 3-2. Framework of Basic policy Framework of Basic policy which shows the overall configuration of the basic policy 3-3. Basic Policy Basic Policy which shows the basic policy included in the main action list and figures and tables. Source: JICA Project Team (1) Consideration of the grand design for the recovery and reconstruction The grand design for recovery and reconstruction shows the image of the overall concept and the cooperation of the basic policy. It shows the basic policy of each vision and connection of each sector. An example of the grand design which was created is shown in Figure 5.2.21. 5-30 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (e.g. Lalitpur) (e.g. Figure 5.2.21 Design of the BBB RR Plan Grand Source: JICA Project Team Team Project Source: JICA 5-31 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (2) Consideration of the framework of basic policy The overall configuration and framework of the basic policy, was examined in consideration of the basic policy in the recovery and reconstruction plan. The visions were classified into several sectors, and in order to further embody the sector, the sectors were classified into several sub-sectors. The reconstruction actions were considered in each sub-sector. Classifications of sectors and sub-sectors were determined with examination of the PDNA and case study of past reconstruction plans in Japan. An example of the framework of the basic policy is shown in Figure 5.2.22. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.22 Framework of the basic policy (e.g. Lalitpur) 5-32 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (3) Consideration of the Basic Policy In order to consider the basic policy for each pilot municipality and discuss it with the counterparts, the draft of common action list to be implemented for all municipalities were created based on the national reconstruction policy, roles of the municipality on the Local Self Governance Act, etc. The structure of the list is shown as follows. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.23 Format of common action list The JICA Project Team discussed the basic policy and action list with the counterparts of each pilot municipality based on the draft of action list. Since the list is common for all municipalities, the list was modified according to the characteristics, damage status and priority, and finalized. The list was pre-configured so that it can be used until the formulation of the detail action plan. After the list was finalized, the JICA Project Team formulated the basic policy part including the figures and tables for ease of understanding visually. The layout of the basic policy is shown in Figure 5.2.24. 5-33 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.24 Layout of the basic policy part Housing Life Housing damaged by the Gorkha EQ shall be supported for Public Building Safety proper reconstruction on their own, and housing construction with Policies for public buildings are to promote earthquake resistance seismic resistant shall be supported for future earthquakes. of public buildings not to decline public services after disaster and secure quick emergency operation activities. Livelihood Infrastructure Residents damaged by the Gorkha EQ shall be supported for livelihood reconstruction. Infrastructure including roads, bridges, and lifelines should be reinforced their structure and supply system to secure required transportation and provide water, electricity, fuel, etc. Health, Medical and Social Welfare Cultural Heritage LSMC has many culturally important heritages which got severe Health, medical and social welfare shall be recovered, improved damages. It is necessary to reduce the spreading damages and and cooperated on in order to proceed with the effective activities keep the attraction. at the time of disaster. Waste Management Land Use Restriction Disaster waste and debris, which were caused by buildings It is required to designate land use restriction with building collapsed because of the Gorkha EQ, shall be disposed of properly. regulations to create resilient city. In addition, Future disaster waste management shall be developed. Education Policy for Each Zone Early recovery and strengthening of disaster management Damage and geomorphological conditions differ from areas. It is functions for schools shall be promoted. Disaster management necessary to understand them and take appropriate measures education shall be enhanced. depending on the areal conditions. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.25 Examples of the basic policy (Left: Life, Right: Safety, e.g. Lalitpur) 5-34 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (4) Formulation of BBB RR Basic Plan Based on the result of consideration and discussion with counterparts of each pilot municipality, the BBB RR basic plans were finally formulated. 5.2.6 Land Use Assessment In order to set sectoral policies for urban planning and land use, “High-density Areas” and “Disaster Stricken Areas” are specified from the detailed building damage survey and “Vulnerable Areas” are specified from the hazard assessment. These specified areas are examined through GIS by overlaying on the current land use, zoning plan, and urban growth patterns in the whole Kathmandu Valley and the three pilot municipalities. Policies for land use are indicated in accordance with the characteristics of the pilot municipalities and compiled as a priority project in the BBB RR Plan. (1) Introduction for Land Use Assessment 1) Sector of Urban Planning Policy Policies for urban planning fall in to the vision of “Safety” among the five major visions of the BBB RR Plan, and it has five separate sectors. The vision and the sectors are summarized in Table 5.2.8. Land use assessment is an essential part of urban planning control for BBB RR Plan to create resilient cities, and a necessary step to formulate sectoral policies for the sector of “Land Use Restriction” and “Policies for Each Zone”. Table 5.2.8 Sectors of Urban Planning Policy Vision Sector (Category) Sub-category Public Building to promote earthquake Recovery, Seismic Resistant, and Safety of Public resistance of public buildings, not to decline Building public services after a disaster and secure quick Development of Disaster Management Park (Open emergency operation activities Space) Recovery, Seismic Resistant, and Safety of Road Infrastructure to reinforce their structure and and Bridges supply system to secure required transportation and provide water, electricity, fuel, etc. Recovery, Seismic Resistant, and Safety of Lifelines Cultural Heritage to reduce the spreading Recovery, Seismic Resistant, and Safety of damage and keep the attraction* Cultural Heritages SAFETY: Urban Planning SAFETY: Land Use Restriction to designate land use restriction with building regulations to make the Promotion of Land Use Restriction city resilient. Policies for Each Zone to take appropriate with sustainable development for safer and secure city city secure and safer for development with sustainable Development of Reconstruction Promotion Zone measures depending on the areal conditions. Note: In the case of Bhaktapur Municipality, “Cultural Heritage” comes under the Vision of “RESILIENT HISTORICAL CITY” Source: JICA Project Team 5-35 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 2) Target Area of the Assessment For the land use assessment of the project, the following two target areas are set: Kathmandu Valley for understanding the overview and macro trend. It served as basis for developing overall policies for future development. Pilot municipalities for detailed recommendations based on analysis. As municipalities are the key authorities, providing zoning designation and building and development permission is required. It is also necessary to understand the differences of areal characteristics of the municipalities. 3) Overall Procedure for Land Use Assessment As a base of assessment, the following urbanization features and plan are examined. Current Land Use: The data source is from UNDP in 2012. It shows the urbanization pattern by type of land use in the Kathmandu Valley. Land Use Zoning: It is compiled in the building by-laws in 2007 together with building regulations. Each municipality gives building permission based on the by-laws. However, Budhanilkantha Municipality does not have appropriate land use zones as they were a newly established municipality by combining surrounding VDCs. Urban Growth pattern: Past development to 2012 and future development projections in 2020 and 2030 by UNDP shown on the map to grasp urban growth trend. And future development directions in view of reconstruction and disaster management should be set by considering the actual damage (earthquake impact), building density, and geomorphological condition. They would be overlaid on top of the urbanization features for conducting land use assessment. And then, “Disaster Stricken Area”, “High-density Area”, and “Vulnerable Area” would be indicated. 5-36 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.26 Overall Procedure for Land Use Assessment (2) Assessment by Building Density and Earthquake Impact (Actual Building Damage) 1) Identification of High-density Areas and Disaster Stricken Areas Basically, the assessment is for the urbanized areas and targets recovery from the earthquake damage and prevention from spreading more damage. Areas where the building density is high are generally vulnerable to disasters and need special attention for reconstruction, and, areas which have severe earthquake damage need comprehensive reconstruction measures and actions. In order to examine those areas, the results of the detailed building damage survey in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City and Bhaktapur Municipality were used. In the case of Budhanilkantha Municipality, the survey result had not been finalized yet, therefore the building density was examined from the building footprint estimated by satellite imagery and the building damage was not deeply examined as the damage was not concentrated in comparison to the other municipalities. a) High-density Area High-density Area (Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City): The number of buildings are counted by a 100m x 100m grid. The dense areas are found in the historical center of the municipal area, where heritage sites are concentrated. The rural towns, Sunakothi and Harisiddhi are also dense. In those areas, approximately 100 buildings stand per hectare. 5-37 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.9 High-density Area of Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City High-density Area 1 High-density Area 2 High-density Area 3 (Historical Center) (Sunakothi) (Harisiddhi) 127 (5.0% to total municipal 5 (0.2% to total municipal 3 (0.1 % to total municipal Area (ha) area) area) area) No. of Total 12,951 617 283 Bldg. Building Density 102.0 /ha 123.4 /ha 94.3 /ha Source: JICA Project Team 1 3 2 Note: Based Grid 100 x 100m. Density is calculated based on the grid. Areas where building density is approximately more than 60 building per hector is are identified. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.27 Building Density of Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City 5-38 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) High-density Area (Bhaktapur Municipality): The number of buildings are counted by a 50m x 50m grid. The dense areas are found in the historical center of the municipal area, where heritage sites are concentrated. Around the Durbar Square, the area is less dense due to the presence of open spaces, but surrounding areas are very dense. More than 11% to the total municipal area is designated as High-density area. Table 5.2.10 High-density Area of Bhaktapur Municipality High-density Area 1 (Historical Center) Area (ha) 73 (11.1% to Total Area) No. of Total Bldg. 7,944 Building Density 108.8 Source: JICA Project Team Note: Based Grid 50 x 50m. Density is calculated based on the grid. Areas where building density is approximately more than 60 building per hector is are identified. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.28 Building Density of Bhaktapur Municipality 5-39 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) High-density Area (Budhanilkantha Municipality): Since there is no detailed data available, the building density was estimated from satellite imagery. As the Figure 5.2.29 shows, the dense areas are concentrated in the southern part of the municipal area. If the density is compared with the historical area of the valley, the density of the Budhanilkantha is still low. Note: There are no detailed building data available. The building footprint density map was generated by the satellite imagery in October 2014, based on 250 x 250m grid. Areas where building footprint density is more than 34% is designated as high-density area (1/3 of the areas are occupied by buildings) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.29 Building Density of Budhanilkantha Municipality b) Disaster Stricken Area Disaster Stricken Area (Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City): Areas which received severe damage are identified. Heavy damage is concentrated in the historical center of the municipality, and several locations in the residential areas are identified. In addition, the rural areas also received damage. For the rural areas, some of the disaster stricken areas are inside the rural town, while others are in the farm land. For this area, the geomorphological condition should be examined for more reliable assessment, which will be explained in the next part of this section. In those identified areas, in total, 10% of the buildings suffered 5-40 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) severe damage. Table 5.2.11 Disaster Stricken Area in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Disaster Stricken Area Outside 604 Area (ha) 1,926 (23.9% to total municipal area) No. of Total Building 15,811 36,879 No. of Damaged Building 1,578 279 Damaged Building Ratio 10.0 % 0.7 % Source: JICA Project Team Note: Based Grid 100 x 100m. Damaged Level: Substantial, Heavy, Very Heavy, and Destruction. Areas which received more than 10% of the damage and the surrounding area are identified. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.30 Building Damage Map of Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Disaster Stricken Area (Bhaktapur Municipality): Areas which received severe damage are identified in the historical city center and in several other locations, such as some residential areas and farm lands. For this area, the geomorphological condition should be examined as it seems that the area is nearby rivers or streams. In those identified area in total. 16% of the buildings suffered severe damage. 5-41 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.12 Disaster Stricken Area in Bhaktapur Municipality Disaster Stricken Area Outside Area (ha) 203 (31.0% to total Area) 452 No. of Total Building 9,798 3,687 No. of Damaged Building 1,578 39 Damaged Building Ratio 16.1% 1.1% Source: JICA Project Team Note: Based Grid 50 x 50m. Damaged Level: Substantial, Heavy, Very Heavy, and Destruction. Areas which received more than 20% of the damage and the surrounding areas are identified. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.31 Building Damage Map of Bhaktapur Municipality 5-42 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) 2) Overlaying High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area When the two identified areas (High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area) are overlaid, it is found that most of the Disaster Stricken Areas overlap on the High-density Area. It is clearly seen that those overlapped areas are the historical centers of the municipalities in Lalitpur and Bhaktapur, also, those areas are culturally important and have high concentration of the heritage monuments. In general, directions for reconstruction should be considered as follows. Overlapped Area (Both High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area): Damage was concentrated in High-density Areas and most of those areas are historical centers. In order to avoid more damage in the case of another disaster, comprehensive measures should be taken to promote reconstruction. Disaster Stricken Area (only): They are found at several places in the municipality. Prior reconstruction is necessary. Further, improvement of earthquake resistance is required to secure the safety of people. It is also necessary to consider ground and soil conditions as the area might have weak ground condition. High-density Area (only): Fortunately, there was no heavy damage due to the Gorkha earthquake. However, the areas continue to have high-risk from another disasters. Measures to avoid multiple damages should be taken. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.32 Overlaid Disaster Stricken Area (blue) on High-density Area (pink) 3) Assessment with Current Land Use The identified High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area were overlaid on the current land use (2012) to examine which land use types are dense and suffered damage due to the earthquake. 5-43 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) a) Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Overlapped Area (Both High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area) In the historical center of Lalitpur. Majority of land use is “Residential” (approximately 80% of the overlapped area). The other land uses are “Mixed Residential/Commercial” and “Special Area (Heritage)”. In Sunakothi, mainly “Residential” In Harisiddhi, mainly “Rural Settlement” Disaster Stricken Area (only) Some “Residential Area” and “Mixed Residential/Commercial area” in the northern part of Lalitpur Rural Area located in the southern part of Lalitpur. The areas are not urbanized yet. (Mainly “Residential Area” in “Agriculture”). High-density Area (only) Around the overlapped area, and majority of land use type is “Residential” It is also noted that the following land use categories had severe damage due to the earthquake. Both areas are high-density areas having historical urban conditions. 100% of the total “Special Area” (Heritage) is located in the Overlapped Area and Disaster Stricken Area. It is found in the historical center of the municipality. 100% of the total “Rural Settlement” is located in the Overlapped area and Disaster Stricken Area. It is found around Harisiddhi. 5-44 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.33 Disaster Stricken Area (blue) and High-density Area (pink) on Land Use (Lalitpur) 5-45 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.13 Share of Land Use in Disaster Stricken Area and High-density Area (Lalitpur) Land Use Category Disaster Stricken Disaster (ha) only Area % Area High-density (ha) only % Area Overlapped (ha) % Outside (ha) % (ha) Total % Agricultural 265.9 52.9% 0.7 2.1% 2.8 2.7% 765.3 41.4% 1034.7 40.9% Forest 15.2 3.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 25.4 1.4% 40.7 1.6% Industrial 8.7 1.7% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 10.1 0.5% 18.7 0.7% Institutional 14.6 2.9% 0.2 0.5% 0.1 0.1% 86.0 4.6% 100.8 4.0% Military 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 16.7 0.7% Mixed Residential/ 37.0 7.4% 3.9 11.6% 5.0 4.9% 53.3 2.9% 99.2 3.9% Commercial Public Utilities 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 24.9 1.0% Recreational / Open Space 3.1 0.6% 0.8 2.4% 0.0 0.0% 10.4 0.6% 14.4 0.6% Residential 140.1 27.9% 26.8 78.9% 82.2 81.4% 798.0 43.1% 1047.0 41.4% Rural Settlement 0.7 0.1% 0.0 0.0% 3.5 3.5% 0.0 0.0% 4.2 0.2% Special Area 0.1 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 3.7 3.7% 0.0 0.0% 3.8 0.2% Transportation 12.2 2.4% 1.5 4.5% 3.4 3.4% 47.6 2.6% 64.7 2.6% Waterbody 3.7 0.7% 0.0 0.0% 0.3 0.3% 19.6 1.1% 23.5 0.9% Others 1.7 0.3% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 34.7 1.9% 36.4 1.4% Total 503.0 34.0 101.0 1850.2 2529.8 Source: JICA Project Team b) Bhaktapur Municipality Overlapped Area (Both High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area) In the historical center of Bhaktapur. Due to the open spaces, the area around the Durbar Square is excluded as building density becomes low on the 50m based grid. Majority of land use is “Mixed Residential/Commercial” (almost 80% of the overlapped area) and some are “Special Area (Heritage)”. 5-46 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Disaster Stricken Area (only) Around the Durbar Square. Because of the open spaces, it is not marked as high-density, but damage to the historical monuments was heavy. Some “Residential Area” around the historical center Some “Residential Area” surrounded by areas with agricultural use, it means that some buildings got damaged in non-urbanized areas. High-density Area (only) Around the overlapped area, and majority of land use type is “Residential” It is has been noted that the following land use categories had severe damage due to the earthquake. Both are high-density area having historical urban condition. Almost 80% of the total “Mixed Residential/Commercial” land use types are located in the overlapped area, as the historical areas are identified as “Mixed Residential/Commercial” in the land use classification. Almost 80% of the total “Special Area” lies in the overlapped area and Disaster Stricken Area. Many cultural heritages were damaged in this area. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.34 Disaster Stricken Area (blue) and High-density Area (pink) on Land Use (Bhaktapur) 5-47 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.14 Share of Land Use in Disaster Stricken Area and High-density Area (Bhaktapur) Land Use Category Disaster Stricken Disaster (ha) only Area % Area High-density (ha) only % Area Overlapped (ha) % Outside (ha) % (ha) Total % Agricultural 70.6 53.7% 0.0 0.0% 1.1 1.5% 294.3 65.4% 366.0 55.9% Forest 1.3 1.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 5.5 1.2% 6.8 1.0% Industrial 1.0 0.7% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 4.0 0.9% 5.0 0.8% Institutional 1.4 1.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 23.7 5.3% 25.0 3.8% Mixed Residential/ 8.4 6.4% 0.0 1.0% 54.9 76.8% 6.8 1.5% 70.1 10.7% Commercial Recreational / Open Space 1.3 1.0% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 1.2 0.3% 2.6 0.4% Residential 37.9 28.8% 2.0 98.0% 13.1 18.3% 94.8 21.1% 147.8 22.6% Special Area 3.9 3.0% 0.0 0.0% 1.9 2.6% 1.4 0.3% 7.2 1.1% Transportation 2.7 2.1% 0.0 0.0% 0.3 0.5% 4.1 0.9% 7.2 1.1% Waterbody 1.0 0.7% 0.0 1.0% 0.3 0.4% 5.1 1.1% 6.4 1.0% Others 2.0 1.5% 0.0 0.0% 0.0 0.0% 9.3 2.1% 11.3 1.7% Total 131.5 2.0 71.5 450.3 655.3 Source: JICA Project Team c) Budhanilkantha Municipality In the case of Budhanilkantha Municipality, there is no detailed data for building damage, so only high-density areas are examined. High-density Area Most areas in the southern part of the municipality are identified as “Residential Area”. Urbanization continues from the border of the Kathmandu Metropolitan City to the southern part of the municipality. 5-48 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.35 Disaster Stricken Area (blue) and High-density Area (pink) on Land Use (Budhanilkantha) 4) Assessment with Zoning Plan After the assessment with land use as described above, the identified high-density and disaster stricken areas are overlaid on the land use zoning map from the Building By-laws (2007). With confirmation of the current land use condition, policies which should be taken in each identified area were indicated. a) Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Overlapped Area (Both High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area) The area covers “Preserved Cultural Heritage Sub-zone”, “Preserved Monument Sub-zone”, and “Mixed Old Residential Sub-zone”. The area is almost same as the historically important city center. In the rural town, Sunakothi and Harisiddhi are classified as “Urban Expansion Zone”. The urban condition does not match with the actual urban context. 5-49 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Disaster Stricken Area (only) In addition to the overlapped area, some of the “Residential Zone” and “Dense Mixed Residential Sub-zone”. “Urban Expansion Zone” in a not highly urbanized area High-density Area (only) Some of the “Mixed Old Residential Zone” and “Dense Mixed Residential Zone” As Figure 5.2.36 shows, the areas identified as high-density and disaster stricken area are overlaid on the land use zoning map. The indications for land use policies are explained below. A) High-density area with huge number of damaged buildings in the historical center: the overlapped area is almost same as the historically important area. For this area, prior and comprehensive reconstruction measures are needed. B) High-density areas without heavy damage: Those areas continue to have high-risk against disasters. Comprehensive preventive measures are required. C) Disaster Stricken Area along the major roads: Especially, the ring road is expected to function for emergency transport usage, therefore smooth traffic flow should be secured even after a disaster. Higher seismic resistance of the road and buildings is required along the emergency transport route. D) Designated as a residential area with some damage: It seems the areas are located close to a river. Therefore, the geological and topographical condition should be confirmed before building construction. E) High-density area with huge building damage in the rural town (Sunakothi and Harisiddhi): The zoning map designates the areas as “Urban Expansion Zone”. However, the areas are high-density with old buildings. Comprehensive reconstruction measures should be taken and it is necessary to designate appropriate land use zones. F) Rural areas with some damage: In some buildings damage is found in rural areas. In the municipality, urbanization would be expected in those areas. Therefore, the geological and topographical condition should be confirmed before urbanization and appropriate zoning are applied. 5-50 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.36 Disaster Stricken Area (blue) and High-density Area (pink) on Zoning Plan (Lalitpur) b) Bhaktapur Municipality Overlapped Area (Both High-density Area and Disaster Stricken Area) The area covers “Preserved Cultural Heritage Sub-zone” and “Preserved Monument Sub-zone”. The area is almost same as the historically important city center except for Durbar Square as the building density is not high there. Disaster Stricken Area (only) Most of “Preserved Cultural Heritage Sub-zone” and “Preserved Monument Sub-zone” suffered severe damage. Other disaster stricken areas are scattered in many parts of the municipal area, and zoning designations are “Residential Sub-zone”, “Commercial Sub-zone”, and even “Special Planning Sub-zone” which is newly urbanized area with land pooling scheme. High-density Area (only) Except for a few places, almost all of the High-density Areas are overlapped with the Disaster Stricken Area. 5-51 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) As Figure 5.2.37 shows, the areas identified as High-density and Disaster Stricken are overlaid on the land use zoning map. The indications for land use policies are explained below. A) High-density area with huge number of building damage in the historical center: the overlapped area is almost same as the historically important area. For this area, prior and comprehensive reconstruction measures are required. B) High-density area without heavy damage: Those areas continue to have a high-risk against disasters. Comprehensive preventive measures are needed. C) Disaster Stricken Area along the major roads: Especially, Araniko Highway is expected to function for emergency transport usage, therefore, smooth traffic flow should be secured even after a disaster. Higher seismic resistance of the road and buildings is required along the emergency transport route. D) Damaged Areas designated as “Residential Area”: Actually, the areas are not fully urbanized yet, and urbanization can be expected. Therefore, geological and topographical condition should be confirmed before building construction. E) Damaged areas in Planned Residential Area: The area is newly developed land with land pooling scheme, still some concentrated damage were found. Therefore, geological and topographical condition should be confirmed before building construction, and proper seismic resistant measures should be recommended. F) Nearby River: Some concentrated damage found along the river, designated as commercial or residential sub-zone. It is necessary to pay careful attention for building construction and urbanization. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.37 Disaster Stricken Area (blue) and High-density Area (pink) on Zoning Plan (Bhaktapur) 5-52 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) c) Budhanilkantha Municipality In the case of Budhanilkantha Municipality, the building damage survey result had not been finalized yet, therefore only the building density was examined from the building footprints. Figure 5.2.38 shows the overlay of relatively high-density area onto the zoning map of the Municipality. The area is designated as “Urban Expansion Area”. For the municipality, although urbanization would be expected, no appropriate zones are identified. In the view of disaster management as well as development control, revision of zoning plan with consideration of topographical and geomorphological condition is highly recommended. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.38 High-density Area on Zoning Plan (Budhanilkantha) (3) Assessing highly vulnerable areas: assessment by highly hazardous areas and built-up areas Highly hazardous area and build-up area were overlaid to identify highly vulnerable areas. The reason for identifying highly vulnerable areas was to pay more attention to such locations with vulnerable conditions so that the reconstruction and (re)development can be 5-53 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) handled in a strategic way. By doing so, reduction in damage due to future earthquakes can be anticipated. In this process of assessment, Geographic Information System (GIS) was introduced to identify firstly the highly hazardous areas (HHA) using geomorphological conditions, and secondly the vulnerable areas, using combined information of highly hazardous areas and built-up areas. From the result of the assessment, it was processed to understand macro- and micro- statuses of vulnerabilities at two levels, Kathmandu Valley and municipalities of the three pilot areas. 1) Identifying highly hazardous area Highly hazardous areas (HHA) were analyzed based on the geomorphological conditions of the Kathmandu Valley. The reason for analysing HHA was to have the result serve as a basis for deciding land use, and where to promote and where to limit development. Three indicators: 1) shakability, 2) liquefiability, and 3) slope-instability are used for this HHA analysis (note: shakability and liquefiability are terms that do not exist in proper English, however, they were originated in this study to properly share the message and concepts of hazards). Data used in HHA assessment are, in a large part, originally developed by the Study Team; sub-surface geology zonation are used for shakability, liquefaction susceptibility is utilized for liquefiability, and a combination of slope failure susceptibility and areas with slopes steeper than 30 degrees are used for slope-instability. HHA are evaluated by overlaying these three types of information, all of which are classified into five levels. Areas targeted for evaluation include Kathmandu Valley and three targeted municipalities. a) Giving scores for shakability Data on sub-surface geology zonation was used to classify areas into five levels of ground stability as shown in Table 5.2.15. A low score means that the area is more shakable, and if the score is high, the area is less shakeable. The assessment result reveals that the areas in central Kathmandu Valley are susceptible for higher shakability. Table 5.2.15 Shakability scores Ground stability Rock/Soil description Hazard level (relative) points C+ Soft rock 5 Less shakeable C- Very dense soil and soft rock 4 D+ Dense and still soil 3 D- still soil 2 E+ soft soil 1 More shakable Source: JICA Project Team 5-54 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.39 High shakability area in Kathmandu Valley b) Giving scores for liquefiability Data on liquefaction susceptibility was used to classify whether or not a certain area is likely to liquefy. Score 1 is given to areas that are liquefiable (See Table 5.2.16). The result reveals that liquefaction is likely to happen in the central part of Kathmandu Valley. Table 5.2.16 Liquefiability scores Soil Liquefiability Hazard level Geomorphology surface Characteristics points (relative) al (Alluvial plain) 1 Liquefiable vp (valley plain formed by tributary 1 Liquefiable stream) fr (former river course) Liquefiable with 1 Liquefiable bm (back marsh) high ground 1 Liquefiable nl (natural levee and slightly hilly water level Liquefiable 1 area formed by dry river bed) at (artificially transformed land Liquefiable 1 except terraces) Source: JICA Project Team 5-55 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.40 High liquefiability areas in Kathmandu Valley c) Giving scores for slope-instability Two types of data on slope failure susceptibility and slopes steeper than 30 degrees are used to provide scores for the assessment of slope-instability. Areas with high slope failure susceptibility were given a Score of 1 and areas with slope failure susceptibility were given a score of 2. Similarly, a score of 1 was given to areas with a slope greater than 30 degrees and also to the areas having both conditions, i.e. high slope failure susceptibility and steep slope greater than 30 degrees (See Table 5.2.17). The result suggests that the slope-instability is more apparent in the circumference of the Kathmandu Valley. 5-56 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.17 Scoring slope-instability Soil Slope stability Hazard level Geomorphology surface Characteristics points (relative) LS (Land slide and land collapse) Steep/unstable 1 More collapsible es (Eroded slope and cliff) Steep/unstable 1 More collapsible fa (fan) Soft 2 Collapsible ta (Tauls) Steep/unstable 2 Collapsible Slope Inclination hazard level Slope inclination Characteristics stability points (relative) Slope greater than 30 degrees Steep 1 More collapsible Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.41 High slope-instability areas in Kathmandu Valley d) Identifying highly hazardous areas Highly hazardous areas (HHA) are identified using three indicators aforementioned: shakability, liquefiability, and slope-instability. The highly hazardous areas identified are the areas that need to take resilience measures paying highest level of attention in the territory. The ways to read and interpret the hazards are based on colours; and the analysis suggests that the type of hazard in the Kathmandu Valley could be a single type of hazard or a combination of two hazards. Table 5.2.18 explains the colours used in the hazard representation. 5-57 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.18 Colours representing hazard types in highly hazardous areas Liquefiability Slope instability Shakability Shakability and slope instability Shakability and slope instability Source: JICA Project Team Highly hazardous areas in the Kathmandu Valley Of the approximately 720 km2 area of the Kathmandu Valley, 36% (260 km2) is identified as highly hazardous area. Identified hazard types and its areas are: 28.38% (73.48 km2) of liquefiable areas, 52.74% (136.53 km2) of areas with slope-instability, 9.11% (23.59 km2) of shakeable areas, 4.29% (11.10 km2) of areas with shakability and liquefiability, and 5.48% (14.18 km2) of areas with shakability and slope-instability. Among varied hazard types, more than half (approx. 53%) are identified with high slope-instability, which is due to the geological condition of Kathmandu Valley. Table 5.2.19 Highly hazardous areas in Kathmandu Valley (by type of hazards) Proportion within highly Types of hazard(s) High hazard area (km2) hazardous areas (%) Liquefiability 73.48 28.38 Slope-instability 136.53 52.74 Shakability 23.59 9.11 Shakability and liquefiability 11.10 4.29 Shakability and slope-instability 14.18 5.48 Source: JICA Project Team 5-58 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.42 Distribution of highly hazardous area in Kathmandu Valley Highly hazardous areas in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Of approximately 2,490 ha of Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City, 43% (1,080 ha) is identified as highly hazardous area. Among hazardous areas identified, 41.08% (442.02 ha) is high liquefiable area, 14.67% (157.82 ha) is high slope-instability area, 25.50% (274.36%) is high shakability area, 10.28% (110.61 ha) is highly shakeable and liquefiable area, and 8.48% (91.25 ha) is high shakability and slope-instability areas. Among the areas identified as highly hazardous, more than 40% are identified with high liquefiability. Table 5.2.20 Highly Hazardous Areas in Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City Highly hazardous area Proportion within high Types of hazard(s) (ha) hazards area (%) Liquefiability 442.04 41.08 Slope-instability 157.82 14.67 Shakability 274.36 25.50 Shakability and liquefiability 110.61 10.28 Shakability and slope-instability 91.25 8.48 Source: JICA Project Team 5-59 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.43 Highly Hazardous Areas in Lalitpur Sub-Metropolitan City Highly hazardous areas in Bhaktapur Municipality Of approximately 655 ha of Bhaktapur Municipality, 63% (412 ha) is identified as highly hazardous area. Among hazardous areas identified, 58.24% (240.21 ha) is high liquefiable area, 6.73% (27.74 ha) is high slope-instability area, 23.07% (95.15 ha) is high shakability area, 1.58% (6.54 ha) is highly shakeable and liquefiable area, and 10.38 % (42.83 ha) are high shakability and slope-instability areas. Among the area identified as highly hazardous areas, more than 58% is identified with high liquefiability. Table 5.2.21 Highly hazardous areas in Bhaktapur Municipality Highly hazardous area Proportion within high Types of hazard(s) (ha) hazards area (%) Liquefiability 240.21 58.24 Slope-instability 27.74 6.73 Shakability 95.15 23.07 Shakability and liquefiability 6.54 1.58 Shakability and slope-instability 42.83 10.38 Source: JICA Project Team 5-60 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.44 Highly hazardous area in Bhaktapur Municipality Highly hazardous areas in Budhanilkantha Municipality Of approximately 3,500 ha of Budhanilkantha Municipality, 48% (1,128 ha) is identified as highly hazardous area. Among hazardous areas identified, 36.76% (414.58 ha) is high liquefiable area, 60.81 % (685.77 ha) is high slope-instability area, 0.44 % (4.98 ha) is high shakability area, 0.80 % (9.05 ha) is high shakeable and liquefiable area, and 1.19 % (13.40 ha) is high shakability and slope-instability areas. Among the area identified as highly hazardous area, more than 60% is identified as slope-instability area and 37% is identified as high liquefiability area. Meanwhile, Budhanilkantha has minimum high shakability area within highly hazardous areas identified, due to its geomorphological conditions. Table 5.2.22 Highly hazardous areas in Budhanilkantha Highly hazardous areas Proportion within high Types of hazard(s) (ha) hazards area (%) Liquefiability 414.58 36.76 Slope-instability 685.77 60.81 Shakability 4.98 0.44 Shakability and liquefiability 9.05 0.80 Shakability and slope-instability 13.40 1.19 Source: JICA Project Team 5-61 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.45 Highly hazardous areas in Budhanilkantha Municipality 2) Identifying highly vulnerable areas To identify highly vulnerable areas, two types of data were used. The first was the data on built-up areas, developed by UNDP, which distinguishes past development (up until 2012) and future development (projection up until 2030). The second was the assessment result of highly hazardous areas identified in section 1). These two data were then overlaid to show the vulnerable areas – which will be set at the priority areas – in Kathmandu Valley. This assessment aimed to represent highly hazardous areas in developed areas, so that the area where actual impact are to be observed upon the event of an earthquake will be identified. There are two approaches to mitigate vulnerability in priority areas; for the built-up areas (developed areas) mitigation measures would be the major approaches to adopt, and for projected built-up areas (future development areas), land use control would be the way to manage vulnerability reduction to minimize development on hazardous areas. a) Development patterns of the built-up area Historically, past development took place in the central part of Kathmandu Valley and expanded outward. The built-up area was calculated as approximately 107km2 by 2012, and 5-62 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) is projected to expand up to 166.37 km2 by 2020 and to 228.71 km2 by 2030. This suggests that the speed of urban expansion for the next 20 years when compared to the past development is extremely hastened. Table 5.2.23 Development patterns of the built-up area in Kathmandu Valley Built-up areas (km2) Proportion to Kathmandu Year (area additionally expanded) Valley (%) 2012 107.09 14.83 2020 (projected) 166.37 (59.28) 23.04 2030 (projected) 228.71 (62.34) 31.68 Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.46 Development patterns of built-up area in Kathmandu Valley (2000 -2030) b) Highly vulnerable areas in Kathmandu Valley To identify highly vulnerable areas in the Kathmandu Valley, this analysis overlaid information on highly hazardous area identified in the earlier section and the built-up area that distinguishes the past and future (projected) expansion. Interpretation of the map to be developed in this section is based on the colouring rule adopted as the highly hazardous areas in the earlier section, and a distinction between past and future developments will be represented by a red line of the expansion up to 2012 and projected development up to 2030. The area projected to have no development by 2030 is distinguished as shadowed with grey. The result suggests that the past development took place in the central part of the valley and 5-63 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) expanded outward along the geomorphological conditions, although this area has high liquefiability and shakability hazards. Future expansion between 2012 and 2030 is projected to occur hastily in the outskirts of the Kathmandu Valley, to the edge of steep hilly areas where development is difficult, and the area has high liquefiability and slope-instability. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.47 Highly vulnerable areas in Kathmandu Valley c) Highly vulnerable areas in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Past development in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City took place in the north-central part of the city, and is projected to expand towards the southern end of the city by 2030. In 2012, 1,373 ha (approximately 55% of the total city area calculated at 2,493.45 ha) was already developed, and 86% of the city’s area is projected to turn into built-up area by 2030. Although some areas have high shakability, liquefiability and a combination of these two hazards, past development area has expanded to areas where hazards are relatively less. As for the future development, development up to 2030 is projected to happen towards south and will take place mainly in the high liquefiable and some of the slope-instability areas, thereby requiring appropriate measures to reduce risks upon development. 5-64 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.24 Development patterns of the built-up area in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City Proportion to the City’s Total Year Built-up area (ha) Area (%) 2012 1,372.68 55.1 2020 (Projected) 547.34 22.0 2030 (Projected) 234.28 9.4 Total 2,154.29 86.4 Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.48 Highly Vulnerable areas in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City d) Highly vulnerable areas in Bhaktapur Municipality The built-up area of Bhaktapur Municipality has expanded from the center of the city towards the outer side, and most of the city’s proper is expected to be developed by 2030. In 2012, 263.74 ha (approximately 40% of the city’s total area of 655.34 ha) was already developed and 76% of the city is projected to be developed by 2030. Analysis result suggests that there are less high vulnerability areas in the city center, while areas outside the central city are the areas with high susceptibility for liquefaction and shakability, and with some high slope-instability. City’s development up to 2030 is projected to expand outward (to north and northeast), where majority of the developing areas are analyzed to be high 5-65 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) liquefiable and shakeable areas and that required appropriate approaches and measures for development. Table 5.2.25 Development patterns of the built-up area in Bhaktapur Proportion to the City’s total Year Built-up area (ha) area (%) 2012 263.74 40.25 2020 (Projected) 118.55 18.09 2030 (Projected) 116.30 17.75 Total 498.59 76.08 Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.49 Highly vulnerable areas in Bhaktapur Municipality e) Highly vulnerable areas in Budhanilkantha Municipality The built-up area of Budhanilkantha is expanding from the southern end to the north of the city. Urbanization is expected to accelerate as the municipality was just upgraded to city from village in 2007. By 2012, 705.60 ha (approximately 20% of the municipality’s total area of 3,498.93 ha) was already developed, and 45% of the municipality is projected to be developed by 2030. Projected developing areas between 2012 and 2030 are calculated to be doubled from the past development, which expanded from the time of municipality’s 5-66 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) origination to 2012. Analysis result suggests that the past development took place on high liquefiable areas, whereas projected development will partially occur in the high liquefiable and slope-instable areas. That said, measures to mitigate identified vulnerabilities in the past development area, and appropriate ways to control hazards by introducing land use areas are critical. Table 5.2.26 Development patterns of the built-up areas in Budhanilkantha Municipality Proportion to the City’s total Year Built-up area (ha) area (%) 2012 705.60 20.17 2020 (Projected) 488.45 13.96 2030 (Projected) 368.97 10.55 Total 1,563.03 44.67 Source: JICA Project Team Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.50 Highly vulnerable areas in Budhanilkantha 3) Principles of land use policy for resilient development a) Built-up area (Past development) Transforming the urban form of the existing built-up areas is not realistic, thus, strategies and programs to strengthen existing structures for resistance against earthquakes are the 5-67 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) better approaches to take. That is, measures to avoid slope failure should be considered in areas susceptible for slope-instability, programs to improve soil and land conditions for construction in areas likely to liquefy should be promoted, and methods to strengthen building structures in areas having high susceptibility of ground shaking should be well adopted. Considering land use control in the built-up area is the last resort, only at time the when strengthening/improving measures for existing infrastructures/buildings are not minimizing vulnerability. Examples of land use controls include: i) community relocation away from hazards, and ii) land adjustments avoiding the use of hazardous land. b) Projected built-up area (Future development) Land use needs to be carefully considered to avoid using highly hazardous areas during new development. Since future urbanization is projected to expand outward towards the fringe of the Kathmandu Valley, high slope-instability areas are particularly required to be considered and avoided for development to minimize loss and damage from slope failure. Meanwhile, population growth in Kathmandu Valley has hastened and new development is unavoidable even if minimized. In the case of new development, any new construction would require strict regulation enforcement including the preventive measures from earthquakes. For instance, stabilizing land and soil for newly constructing buildings in liquefiable areas, and constructing new buildings complying with building codes while introducing earthquake resistance technologies in high shakeable areas, would be the priority measures for action. 5-68 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.27 Strategies and programs to improve resilience by urban development and hazard types Developmen Type of Development strategy Procedure Programs/actions t type hazardous area Mitigate future disaster impacts by: Designate: 1) Invest on preventive 1) preventing slope failure 1) high slope-instability construction measures (for and Slope-instability areas; and slope failure); 2) identify area with high 2) areas to prevent slope 2) Community/household slope-instability, failure relocation (small scale) especially for areas with larger population 1) Invest on preventive Mitigate future disaster Designate: construction measures (for Developed Liquefiability impacts by improving 1) high liquefiable areas liquefaction) especially for area (stabilizing) soil and land in urbanized areas public buildings on urbanized land Mitigate future disaster Understand: impacts by: 1) Improve building earthquake 1) high shakable areas to Shakability 1) preventing building resistant (Public and important strengthen buildings in collapse in high facilities have higher priorities) the area shakability areas Identify: 2) moving buildings (esp. 2) Move high valuable facilities 2) active faults and (active faults) public facilities) off from away from the faults when designate "fault zone" the active faults reconstructing as hazardous area 1) Designate high slope-instability areas as urbanization Avoid/minimize development controlled area in land use Designate high Slope-instability of areas susceptible for slope zoning (to prevent any slope-instability areas failure development); 2) Minimize development on slope failure susceptible areas 1) Include preventive Avoid/minimize future 1) Understand high construction measures (for disaster impacts by liquefiable areas, and liquefaction) esp. for new Liquefiability minimizing vulnerable 2) Minimize development public buildings; development in high in the high liquefiable 2) Educate residents about Future liquefiable area areas liquefaction for stabilizing land development upon new building construction area 1) Make new buildings earthquake resistant upon Avoid/minimize future 1) Understand high construction (public and disaster impacts by shakeable areas to important facilities have higher Shakability minimizing vulnerable promote constructing priorities); development in high more earthquake 2) Inform residents on shakability shakability area resilient buildings and preventive measures upon new building construction 2) Identify active faults 3) Include the designated "fault Avoid future earthquake and designate area zone" to urbanization (active faults) impacts by controlling "fault hazardous as "fault controlled area in future land zones" zone" use zoning Source: JICA Project Team (4) Indications for land use policy by municipalities Priority measures listed below are developed based on the results of land use assessment, which included: “high-density area”, “disaster stricken area”, and “vulnerable area”. Measures listed are divided into two types of urban areas, “high-density area and disaster stricken area”, as well as “vulnerable area”, and two types of development areas, “developed area” and “future development area”. 5-69 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.28 Land use policies of each municipality Priority Priority measures Municipality Area Developed Area Future Development Area Historical city centre and rural town High-density with high building density Area > Comprehensive reconstruction N/A Disaster measures and appropriate Stricken Area rezoning Lalitpur 1) Measures against liquefaction 1) Measures against liquefaction > Minimize development Vulnerable > Improve soil and land 2) Measures against Area 2) Measures against shakability slope-instability > Improve seismic resistance > Avoid development High-density Historical area with high building Area density N/A Disaster > Comprehensive reconstruction Stricken Area measures Bhaktapur 1) Measures against liquefaction 1) Measures against liquefaction Vulnerable > Improve soil and land > Minimize development Area 2) Measures against shakability 2) Measures against shakability > Improve seismic resistance > Improve seismic resistance High-density Area > Update zoning plan reflecting N/A Disaster urbanization and hazard types Stricken Area Budhanilkantha 1) Measures against liquefaction > Minimize development Vulnerable 1) Measures against liquefaction 2) Measures against Area > Improve soil and land slope-instability > Avoid development Source: JICA Project Team 5.2.7 Formulation of BBB RR Action Plan The BBB RR Action Plan for pilot municipalities was formulated based on the basic plan as shown in 5.2.5. The outline of the action plan is shown as follows. Action plan is composed of four chapters, Chapter 1 shows the overview of the action plan, and Chapter 2 shows the action plan as the main part. Chapter 3 shows the detail project sheet of the selected project as the priority project in the action plan. In addition, Chapter 4 shows the method of monitoring and evaluation for the implementation of actions. The detail is shown as follows. 5-70 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.29 Outline of the BBB RR Action Plan Table of Contents Outline CHAPTER 1. OUTLINE OF PLAN 1-1. Objective Objective of the action plan (For the implementation) 1-2. Framework Framework of the action plan (structure) CHAPTER 2. ACTION PLAN Action plan for each vision Sector Title of action, detail contents Responsibility Duration Estimated cost Matching with National Policy Integration into disaster risk management plan CHAPTER 3. PRIORITY PROJECT Detail contents of the priority project selected from the action plan CHAPTER 4. MONITORING AND Method of monitoring and evaluation for the EVALUATION implementation of actions Source: JICA Project Team (1) Formulation of BBB RR Action Plan The JICA Project Team formulated the action plan for specifically attaining the objectives which are shown in the basic plan of BBB RR Plan. The action plan included the responsible organizations in the municipality and relevant stakeholders in consideration of the coordination with the national and district organizations. The action plan is a guide to regenerate the damaged areas as a model of reconstruction. For this purpose, it is desirable that an effect of the action plan would cover a wide range to contribute and encourage the reconstruction work of the whole area. By considering budget, importance, urgency and time needed, each action plan was sorted into three phases by priority (e.g. Recovery phase, Revitalization phase, and Development phase). Concretely, the measures such as housing reconstruction require short term activities, as measures for CBDRM and so on need long term activities. The long term activities are to be integrated with the LDCRP. The detailed contents of the action plan are referred in the Attachment 5 BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for pilot municipalities. 5-71 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.51 Framework of the action plan Table 5.2.30 Main Differences of action plan among pilot municipalities Vision Lalitpur Bhaktapur Budhanilkantha Life -- - Safety -- - ・Support for Tourism Industry Economy ・Safety for Tourist (guidance system, stockpile) ・Construction and ・Management and management of enhancement of the fire Resilient disaster management brigade/equipment training centre DM ・Countermeasures for ・Multiplexing means of landslide communication Community -- - ・Restriction to enter areas where severe damages Historical ・Development of bases for City culture of DM in collaboration with cultural heritage sites as the symbol of BBB ・Enhancement of governance Governan through the reconstruction ce ・Enhancement of organization Source: JICA Project Team (2) Selection of the priority projects The priority projects were selected as per the priority, necessity and importance of the 5-72 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) projects in the action plan. The priority projects were prepared as a project sheet for each project, and further details of the contents were described in order to start the implementation smoothly. Concretely, mason training, etc., were selected as the priority projects with the prospect of budgeting and high priority for seismic resistance of buildings. In addition, in this project, the formulation of local disaster and climate resilience plans and community disaster risk and reduction activities were implemented as the projects with high priority. (3) Development of framework for monitoring and evaluation Furthermore, for the reconstruction and restoration plan to be properly implemented, the framework of the monitoring and evaluation of action plan was developed. Based on the above, BBB RR Plans for pilot municipalities were finally completed. 5.2.8 Finalization of the BBB RR Plan As described above, although the formulation of the recovery and reconstruction plan for the pilot municipalities were completed, the JICA Project Team supported for the official approval and finalization for actual implementation of the action. (1) WSs for dissemination and public comment of recovery and reconstruction plan in pilot municipalities Workshops (WS) were held in each pilot municipality for the introduction and dissemination of information and getting public comments. Municipal council members, municipal officials, each ward secretary and leaders of community disaster management committees, etc. were invited and the workshops were held on May 8, 2016 for Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City, on May 11, 2016 for Budhanilkantha Municipality, and on July 20, 2016 for Bhaktapur Municipality. More than 100 people in Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City, and 40 people in Budhanilkantha Municipality and Bhaktapur Municipality actively participated and listened to the explanation. In the question-and-answer session, in particular, the importance of implementation of the plan was focused on, and also the participants mentioned that there still are areas where the reconstruction work has not started yet. Source: JICA Project Team Figure 5.2.52 Photo of WSs in pilot municipalities (Left: Lalitpur, Right: Budhanilkantha) 5-73 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) (2) Official approval of the recovery and reconstruction plan from municipal council As described above, the contents of the recovery and reconstruction was finalized. The JICA Project Team supported the official approval of the plan from the municipal council towards the comprehensive implementation of the plan. For the process of the official approval, the executive officer of the municipality consults with the municipal council, and after the approval from the council, the plan shall be the official document of the municipality with official approval. For the Lalitpur Sub-metropolitan City and the Budhanilkantha Municipality, the plans were finally approval by the municipal council(Lalitpur: August 2016, Budhanilkantha: September 2016). (3) Budgeting of the recovery and reconstruction plan For the implementation of recovery and reconstruction for municipalities, mainly the budget is disbursed through NRA, its Central Level Project Implementation Units (CLPIU) and by Municipalities. According to NRA, the progresses of reconstructions, in particular for private housing and training, in district level are shown as follows. Table 5.2.31 Progresses of reconstructions Progresses of reconstructions Kathmandu Lalitpur Bhaktapur (As of 16 Dec 2017) District District District Private Housing Grant Distribution Household Surveyed 48,144 31,159 28,835 Eligible for Housing Grants 45,622 27,509 27,601 Retrofitting Beneficiaries 575 667 280 Identified Households that received Grant 40,691 24,294 24,249 Private Housing Reconstruction Construction Completed 2,652 931 362 Under Construction 6,025 3,414 4,742 Training by I/NGOs Short Training (Planned) 414 739 368 Short Training (Reached) 360 507 332 Vocational Training (Planned) 0 18 0 Vocational Training (Reached) 0 18 0 Note: Households that received Grant is total number for first, second and third installation Source: NRA, edited by JICA Project Team In addition, in the pilot municipalities, programs related to the BBB RR Plan which were developed in this project have also been budgeted. Table 5.2.32 shows the relevance between the actions of the BBB RR Plan and the approved programs which have been budgeted in the case of Lalitpur. Although they are not completely connected to the plan, several programs for recovery as well as targeted towards future disaster risk reduction have been budgeted under the concept of BBB. 5-74 The Project for Assessment of Earthquake Disaster Risk for the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal Final Report (Main Report) Table 5.2.32 Budgeting of BBB RR Plan (e.g. Lalitpur) BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan 2073/74 2074/75 Budget Budget No Action list Approved programs (Sept. 16, 2016) Approved programs (NPR) (NPR) 1. Revitalization and Improvement of Livelihood Exemption on municipal drawing permit (building construction permit) charges for new construction and Financial support for the reconstruction of houses reconstruction for both residential and commercial 1-1-1 damaged by the Gorkha EQ buildings Tax exemption for completely damaged houses Mason training 500,000 Implementation of training of house reconstruction for 1-1-5 Provide trainings for contractors as well as site visits for masons, local communities, technicians, etc. 150,000 seismic design and construction Awareness program for earthquake resistant building Development of capacity and public awareness for seismic 1-1-6 construction (booklet, brochures, TV programs, radio, 150,000 resistant houses display, etc.) Financial support for the livelihood reconstruction of Charges exemption for recommendations based on the ID 1-2-1 victims of earthquake victims 1-2-2 Establishment of a livelihood help desk Training for school teachers (form School DM committee) 1-5-4 Training for teachers 300,000 in 5 schools 2. Urban Planning with Sustainable Development for a Safer and Secure City Conservation of public land/open spaces and management Construction of park and management 1,600,000 Several Development of open spaces as evacuation sites and and establishment of new parks 2-1-10 disaster management bases Select a open space and develop it as a model park for 500,000 DM Road construction, maintenance and expansion works Several Road expansion Several Improvement of earthquake resistant roads for smooth Road maintenance Several 2-2-2 transportation and evacuation, especially for designated Mapping of emergency routes within municipality building emergency transportation roads and evacuation routes 300,000 and community building and manage for emergency exit Development of sustainable stockpiling of water and fuel Conservation of ponds Several 2-2-8 for emergency use stored in earthquake resistant and safe Conservation of water sources Several Construction/maintenance of public toilets (including those 2-2-9 Improvement of the sanitation management system Several near open spaces) Continuous development of the expansion of the supplying Construction and maintenance of sewer lines Several area and upgrading of existing facilities to be aseismic 2-2-10 resistance and with a stable water, sewage, and electricity supply system Prioritizing recovery through the judgement of urgency 2-3-2 Prepare inventory of heritages 150,000 from seismic diagnosis and historical importance Recovery of the prioritized cultural heritage sites in 2-3-3 Recovery and reconstruction of various heritages 8,182,000 Reconstruction and maintenance of various heritages consideration of seismic resistance and their original value 3. Promotion and Improvement of Industry Support for the employment of victims who have lost work 3-1-1 (financial support) Skill development training for women who were victim of Support for employment, employment training in 200,000 earthquake 3-1-2 consideration of vulnerable people and deprived/marginalized people (Pichadiyeko barga) The business run in completely damaged houses shall get 3-3-3 Recovery support for stores, shops and cottage industries 50% exemption in business tax Disaster management 6,000,000 4. Development of Resilient Disaster Management City Enhancement of DM fund 500,000 With the view of making policy for DM, gather the earthquake victims and share their experience, and 4-1-1 Formulation of disaster management plan 250,000 prepare reports so to make it easier to prepare plans for them Select three ward with earthquake resistant building and Development of stockpile warehouses, and ensuring 500,000 4-2-2 manage for emergency stockpile disaster stockpiles Manage emergency stockpile in Ward 9 500,000 Establish exhibition room for management of various Construction and management of disaster management 4-2-3 photographs, preparedness materials, safe materials for 100,000 training centre contractors, etc. Implementation of disaster management exercises for 4-3-4 Trainings and Management for fire control 300,000 emergency response Inspect the emergency management plans of some 4-3-5 Designation of disaster base hospitals, medical centres important hospitals in the municipality and prepare report 250,000 including activities that have to be implemented Implementation of events for promoting the establishment 4-4-2 Conduct various programs on EQ safety day 200,000 of culture of disaster prevention/ resilience 5. Strengthening of Community Disaster Risk Management Implementation of awareness-raising programmes on 5-1-2 Awareness programs Several DRR/DRM Implementation of DRR/ DRM capacity development DM related programs and trainings in each ward 5-2-4 1,500,000 programmes for community leaders (compulsory fire control related training) Source: Lalitpur Metropolitan City, edited by JICA Project Team Attachment 5: BBB Recovery and Reconstruction Plan for pilot municipalities 5-75