Filing # 101726973 E-Filed 01/15/2020 04:34:59 PM

SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA CIRCUIT COURT

DELANEY REYNOLDS, et. al, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) v. ) CASE NO.: 18-CA-000819 ) ) THE STATE OF FLORIDA; RON DESANTIS, in his ) JURY TRIAL REQUESTED official capacity as Governor of the State of Florida; ) et al., ) ) Defendants. ) )

SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ CONSOLIDATED RESPONSE TO DEFENDANTS’ MOTIONS TO DISMISS

INTRODUCTION

This memorandum of law is filed in accordance with this Court’s Order Authorizing

Supplemental Pleading (January 6, 2020), to supplement Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Response to

Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss,1 which was filed on March 8, 2019 (“Response”).

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs, eight young Floridians, have sought judicial protection of their constitutional

substantive due process and common law public trust rights. Plaintiffs have alleged that the

Defendants have exceeded the limits of their constitutional authority by collectively creating,

controlling, and operating a fossil fuel-based energy system that infringes upon Plaintiffs’

1 The Defendants have filed three separate Motions to Dismiss. For the Court’s convenience the Plaintiffs filed one Consolidated Response. Plaintiffs use the following abbreviations for the three separate Motions to Dismiss: (1) Governor DeSantis’ Motion to Dismiss: “Gov. Mtn,;” (2) the State of Florida, Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services, Commissioner Nikki Fried, and the Public Service Commission’s Motion to Dismiss: “FDACS Mtn.;” and (3) Florida Department of Environmental Protection and Board of Trustees of the Internal Improvement Trust Fund’s Motion to Dismiss: “FDEP Mtn.”

1 fundamental constitutional rights to life, liberty, property, pursuit of happiness, and access to essential public trust resources.2 Plaintiffs filed the proposed Supplemental First Amended

Complaint (“Supplemental Complaint”) on October 16, 2019, which was accepted and deemed filed as the Plaintiffs’ operative pleading by this Court on January 6, 2020, and includes recent factual developments and allegations regarding Defendants Governor Ron DeSantis, the Florida

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (“FDACS”), FDACS Commissioner Nikki

Fried, and the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (“FDEP”) that make it increasingly clear that Defendants have control of and are operating Florida’s energy system in a way that places Plaintiffs at risk of continued and worsening harm. In particular, the recent developments include:

• FDEP’s recommendation to certify Tampa Electric Company’s fossil fuel infrastructure

project at its Big Bend power plant in Hillsborough County, Florida as being compliant

and consistent with FDEP’s standard jurisdiction and as serving the public interest, in spite

of the project’s significant emissions of greenhouse gases (“GHG”), which are pollutants

that accumulate in the atmosphere and cause dangerous climate change. Suppl. Compl. ¶

• Governor DeSantis,’ vote to certify Tampa Electric Company’s fossil fuel infrastructure

project at its Big Bend power plant in Hillsborough County, Florida, which produced the

majority needed for the Cabinet to approve the certification. This certification locks in the

use of significant amounts of natural gas, and substantial GHG emissions, for decades.

• FDACS’ recommendation to the Public Service Commission (“PSC”), in PSC proceedings

under the Florida Energy Efficiency and Conservation Act (“FEECA”), that it “give serious

2 The Plaintiffs have also alleged infringement of an unenumerated right to a stable climate system that sustains human life. Response at 5-10.

2 consideration to eliminating the [conservation] goal-setting and program implementation

process requirements under FEECA,” even though this program is designed to conserve

the use of expensive energy resources, “particularly petroleum fuels.” § 366.81, Fla. Stat.

• FDACS Commissioner Fried’s issuance of the Florida Energy and Climate Plan to guide

the FDACS Office of Energy “in the years ahead,” which illustrates it is within Defendants’

existing authority to prepare a remedial plan like that requested by Plaintiffs in their Prayer

for Relief, but nonetheless perpetuates the continued use of fossil fuels in Florida.

See Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149(v)-(y), Ex. A-D.

The supplemental allegations confirm Defendants’ pattern and practice of unconstitutional behavior through its perpetuation of a fossil fuel-based energy system, despite Defendants’ knowledge that such a system causes Plaintiffs’ harm. See, e.g., Suppl. Compl. Ex. D at i

(recognizing that “[t]he climate science is clear: climate change is accelerating because of human activity – and few places are more vulnerable to its effects than Florida. If our state is unprepared to address this climate crisis, Floridians will pay the price.”). Defendants’ recent conduct also supports Plaintiffs’ legal position that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiffs’ constitutional due process and public trust claims. Response at 2.

DISCUSSION

I. PLAINTIFFS’ SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE

The Plaintiffs seek to protect their substantive due process rights guaranteed by Article I,

§§ 1, 2, and 9 of the Florida Constitution. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 151-206; Response at 4-10. The recent actions taken by Defendants FDEP, Governor DeSantis, FDACS, and Commissioner Fried confirm the existence of the fossil fuel-based energy system and the systemic nature of the

Defendants’ conduct that Plaintiffs’ allege is perpetual and unconstitutional. See Suppl. Compl. ¶

3 149(v)-(y). Specifically, Defendant FDEP’s recommendation to certify the Tampa Electric

Company’s fossil fuel infrastructure project at its Big Bend power plant in Hillsborough County,

Florida, and Defendant Governor DeSantis’ subsequent vote to certify the fossil fuel infrastructure project, are recent examples of acts taken as part of the state’s energy system that result in high levels of GHG emissions and contribute to Plaintiffs’ injuries. See Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149(v), (w); see also Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149 (describing Defendants’ aggregate acts and omissions that make up the state’s fossil fuel energy system and cause Plaintiffs’ harm). This fossil fuel energy project, in conjunction with the other actions described in the Supplemental Complaint, would not operate absent authorization from Defendants. As such, the allegations in the complaint, which explain how this action and other similar acts taken under color of state law deprives Plaintiffs of their constitutional rights by exacerbating climate change and endangering Plaintiffs, are assumed to be true and are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Rankin v. Colman, 476 So.2d 234, 236, 237

(Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (assuming as true allegations in complaint that constitutional injury was a result of policies and procedures implemented by the Defendant and explaining that to allege a constitutional violation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,3 “the plaintiff must allege only that a person acting under color of state law deprived him of rights protected by the United States Constitution or federal statutes.”); Wilson v. County of Orange, 881 So.2d 625, 629 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (same).

II. PLAINTIFFS’ PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE CLAIMS ARE JUSTICIABLE

Florida’s public trust doctrine is a long-standing part of Florida’s common and constitutional law. See Response at 11-22. Defendants’ continued implementation of an energy

3 The statute under which plaintiffs’ constitutional claims were brought in Rankin was 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because they alleged the state law actor violated the U.S. Constitution. Here, Plaintiffs allege state government actors have violated the Florida Constitution, but the analysis in Rankin is relevant because Florida courts consistently apply federal due process case law in state constitutional cases. See, e.g., Dep’t of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So.2d 957, 962 (Fla. 1991) (citing and relying on federal due process decisions in state constitutional due process case).

4 system that foreseeably and substantially impairs Florida’s public trust resources and serves to obstruct public access to these resources implicates Defendants’ duties under the public trust doctrine. Response at 20; Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 14, 19, 20, 24, 116, 137, 144, 149 (v)-(y), 166, 168,

170, 171, 184; see also ¶ 74 (“Scientific evidence demonstrates that non-linear sea level rise would submerge much of Florida . . . unless there are immediate reductions in CO2 and GHG pollution.”);

¶¶ 95-98, 101, 114, 120 (detailing the devastating effects of sea level rise in Florida, including the loss of beaches). Therefore, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants have breached their legal duty (partially codified in Article X, Section 11 of the Florida Constitution) “to preserve and control [state trust] lands and the waters thereon and the use of them for the public good.” State ex rel. Ellis v. Gerbing, 47 So. 353, 355 (1908). This Court has the jurisdiction to interpret and enforce this mandatory and existing legal duty. Response at 11-19.

The recent actions of Defendants FDEP, Governor DeSantis, FDACS, and Commissioner

Fried also demonstrate that Defendants have control over the amount of GHG emissions that arise from the state’s energy system. Whether the Defendants are exercising this control in compliance with common law and constitutional obligations is a question that is appropriate for judicial resolution on the merits. For example, Defendant Commissioner Fried’s recent Energy and

Climate Plan confirms Defendants’ ability to shape the state’s energy system but also shows a gross abdication of control of trust properties. See, e.g., Suppl. Compl. Ex. D at i (“Ten years have passed since the state has considered a comprehensive energy plan.”); State ex rel. Ellis, 47 So. at

355 (finding that abdication of general control over trust lands and waters constitutes a breach of duty to preserve and control such lands and waters for the public good). This is the type of conduct that gives rise to a viable public trust claim. Id.

5 III. THE PLAINTIFFS’ CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY THE PRIMARY JURISDICTION DOCTRINE

Defendants claim that the primary jurisdiction doctrine bars the Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims. FDEP Mtn. at 9, 10. As Plaintiffs argued in their Response, the primary jurisdiction doctrine is inapplicable to Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims “since the legal effect of the complained of activity, together with an appropriate remedy, is peculiarly a judicial matter.” State ex rel. Shevin v. Tampa Elec. Co., 291 So.2d 45, 48 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1974); Response at 22-28. To be clear,

Plaintiffs are not arguing that the substantive due process clause of the Florida Constitution imposes a positive obligation on Defendants. Rather, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ affirmative actions exceed the scope of their constitutional authority. Bd. of Pub. Instruction for Sumter County for & on Behalf of Special Tax School Dist. No. 12 v. Wright, 76 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1955) (the

Florida Supreme Court “has consistently adhered to the fundamental principle that our state constitution is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, power.”).

The new facts in the Supplemental Complaint affirm that there is no need for this Court to defer to Defendants’ resolution of any of the issues raised in this case. Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 149(v)-

(y). Defendants’ recent actions illustrate Defendants’ pattern and practice of maintaining a fossil fuel-based energy system. Supp. Compl. ¶¶ 149. Defendant Fried has explicitly declared an “all- of-the-above” energy policy, which necessarily continues the use of fossil fuels. Suppl. Compl. ¶

149(x), Ex. C at 7. This statement of policy, along with Defendants’ conduct described throughout the Supplemental Complaint, illustrates that there is “nothing for an agency to decide” prior to this

Court’s resolution of Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims.4 State ex rel. Shevin, 291 So.2d at 48. An

4 While State ex rel. Shevin is a nuisance case, its’ primary jurisdiction analysis is applicable to the case at bar. Substantive due process rights are protected if the challenged government conduct bears a reasonable relationship to a permissible governmental objective, and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppressive. Lane v. Chiles, 698 So.2d 260, 263 (Fla. 1997). In a nuisance action, the presiding court must similarly determine the reasonableness of the

6 administrative agency lacks the expertise and authority to interpret and apply constitutional substantive due process and public trust law. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction, therefore, does not apply and does not prohibit judicial review of the Plaintiffs’ claims.5 Response at 28.

IV. THE POLITICAL QUESTION AND SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINES DOES NOT BAR THE PLAINTIFFS’ DUE PROCESS OR PUBLIC TRUST CLAIMS

Plaintiffs’ claims implicate none of the Baker6 formulations that indicate that a nonjusticiable political question exists. Response at 28-39. The Plaintiffs are not asking the Court to infringe upon another branch of government as Defendants suggest. FDACS Mtn. at 15. Rather,

Plaintiffs ask the Court to protect these youth Plaintiffs and fulfill its “judicial responsibility to interpret and construe provisions of the Constitution where there are ambiguities or conflicts.”

Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So.2d 312, 314 (Fla. 1977); Simms v. State Dep’t of Health & Rehabilitative

Servs., 641 So.2d 957, 961 (Fla 3rd Dist. 1994) (“Historically, the courts have possessed inherent and statutory authority to protect children.”).

Plaintiffs also do not ask the Court to adopt specific policies or dictate the formulation of specific agency actions. Gov. Mtn. at 7; FDEP Mtn. at 22, 23; Response at 30, 31. Instead,

Plaintiffs properly ask this Court to issue declaratory relief as to the constitutionality of

Defendants’ systemic conduct and injunctive relief in the form of an order that directs the

Defendants to bring Florida’s energy system into constitutional compliance. As to the injunctive relief, the Court would not determine the state’s energy policy but would defer to the judgment

defendants’ conduct. See Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So.2d 552, 555 (Fla. 1956) (finding that whether a particular use constitutes a private nuisance generally turns on whether use is reasonable under the circumstances). 5 Notably, some of Defendants’ unconstitutional acts described in the Supplemental Complaint are not “agency actions” that are subject to the Administrative Procedures Act (see, e.g., Supp. Complaint, ¶¶ 149(i), (j), (k), (l), (m)), including Defendants FDACS’ and Commissioner Fried’s Energy and Climate Plan published in October 2019. Supp. Compl. ¶ 149(y). 6 See Response at 29, 30. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962); Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding, Inc. v. Chiles, 680 So.2d 400, 408 (Fla. 1996).

7 and discretion of the Defendants as to the best way to develop and implement the technical details of a remedial plan that meets their constitutional obligations. Response at 31, n. 23. Defendants

FDACS’ and Commissioner Fried’s publication of their Energy and Climate Plan not only recognizes that there is an “energy system” in Florida, but also illustrates that it is within

Defendants’ existing authority to prepare a remedial plan as requested by Plaintiffs. Suppl. Compl.

¶ 149(y), Ex. D.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ claims require the Court to define Florida’s fossil fuel energy system or to “determine the boundaries” of the governmental policy that is causing

Plaintiffs’ harm. FDACS Mtn. at 29, 30; Response at 37. However, Plaintiffs’ Complaints have adequately alleged the scope of the governmental conduct that is being challenged as unconstitutional and violative of the public trust doctrine to survive a motion to dismiss.

Furthermore, the new facts provided in the Supplemental Complaint confirm and underscore that

(1) there is an energy system in Florida that is guided by the legislature’s energy policy;7 (2) the energy system is implemented by the Defendants (Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 42-53, 149; Suppl. Compl. ¶

149(v)-(y)); (3) the energy system that Defendants are implementing includes an “all-of-the- above” energy policy that perpetuates the use of fossil fuels despite knowledge of the resulting harms (Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149(x), (y)); (4) Defendants have prioritized and continue to prioritize fossil fuel development activities over technically available and feasible alternatives (¶ 149(v)-

(y)); and (5) Defendants’ aggregate actions implementing the energy system have locked in dangerous levels GHG emissions for decades (¶ 149) that is contributing to the Plaintiffs’ injuries.

Response at 37. In short, Florida’s energy system is already well-defined; Plaintiffs are asking the

7 See § 377.601(2), Fla. Stat. (2019) (declaring Florida state energy policy). Plaintiffs do not challenge this statute as an unconstitutional exercise of legislative authority. Rather, Plaintiffs challenge the aggregate actions and omissions Defendants have taken in implementing Florida’s energy system as being violative of their constitutional substantive due process and public trust rights.

8 Court to review Defendants’ actions taken to implement the energy system to ensure constitutional compliance.

Even if the Defendants’ unconstitutional conduct constitutes a de facto policy, which is a question of fact to be resolved on the merits,8 “the wrongful taking of liberty [may] result[] from either affirmatively enacted or de facto policies, practices, or customs . . . .” Haygood v. Younger,

769 F.2d 1350, 1359 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (cert. denied sub nom. Cranke v. Haygood, 478

U.S. 1020 (1986)); Depew v. City of St. Marys, Georgia, 787 F.2d 1496, 1499 (11th Cir. 1986) (to establish a policy or custom to show liability for a constitutional deprivation under § 1983, the custom can be “informal” and “need not receive formal approval.”); Battista v. Cannon, 934

F.Supp. 400, 403, 406 (M.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that allegations that sheriff had de facto policies and customs that deprived constitutional rights precluded dismissal). Here, Plaintiffs have adequately alleged that Defendants “carry out an unconstitutional ‘custom or practice’ which was the ‘moving force [behind] the constitutional violation[s]’” alleged in this case. Almendarez v. City of Hollywood, 2016 WL 10540360 *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2016) (quoting Grech v. Clayton Cty.,

Ga., 335 F.3d 1326, 1330 (11th Cir. 2003)).

V. DEFENDANTS ARE PROPER PARTIES AND THE COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO HEAR THESE IMPORTANT CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES

The Defendants are all proper parties in this action because this action challenges conduct taken by each of the named Defendants. Response at 45. The energy system, which is the source of Plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries, is under the creation, control, and supervision of the

8 When a de facto policy is alleged, its existence is a factual matter for determination on the evidence. Mitchell v. Dupnik, 75 F.3d 517, 525 (9th Cir. 1996) (evidence established the existence of a “de facto policy . . . [that] did not meet the requirements of due process” even where pattern and practice establishing de facto policy ran contrary to official written policy).

9 Defendants Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149. Since each Defendant played and continues to play a role in causing the constitutional violations alleged in the Supplemental Complaint, and has the authority to remedy the constitutional violations, the Court has the authority to consider the Plaintiffs’ claims and order Defendants to comply with their constitutional obligations. Response at 45.

The Governor in this case is a proper party, which is exemplified by his recent actions.

Response at 46. Suppl. Compl. ¶ 149(w). Governor DeSantis, as part of the Power Plant Siting

Board, voted to certify the Tampa Electric Company’s fossil fuel infrastructure project at its Big

Bend power plant. The Governor’s vote led to the Cabinet’s approval of the certification. Suppl.

Compl. ¶ Ex. B at 83, 84. Defendant Governor DeSantis’ continues his unconstitutional conduct and thus he continues to play a key role in creating and controlling the energy system in Florida.

Similarly, FDEP’s most recent actions—its recommendation to certify the Tampa Electric

Company’s fossil fuel infrastructure project as being in the “public interest”—demonstrates

FDEP’s commitment to a course of conduct that contributes to Plaintiffs’ past and future constitutional injuries.

Plaintiffs’ have alleged that Defendant FDACS has implemented its statutory authority in a way that results in dangerous levels of GHG emissions that are causing and contributing to

Plaintiffs’ constitutional injuries. Suppl. Compl. ¶¶ 46, 47, 51, 53, 149, 149(x), (y). Defendants

FDACS’ and Commissioner Fried’s recent actions demonstrate that they continue to breach their constitutional obligations. Commissioner Fried has issued an Energy and Climate Plan that contains no statewide GHG emission reduction targets or sector-specific GHG emission reduction goals of any kind, and has explicitly called for the continued use of fossil fuels and the elimination of the energy conservation goal-setting and program implementation process requirements under

FEECA. Moreover, FDACS’ plan largely ignores the vast amount of research and data available

10 to Defendants (some of which is created by Defendants) illustrating how Florida’s energy system can be operated in a fashion that does not harm Florida’s children. See, e.g., Suppl. Compl. ¶

149(u).

In carrying out their existing statutory responsibilities with respect to the state’s energy system, these Defendants can only implement their authority in a manner that is compliant with the Florida Constitution and they have failed to do so. The recent facts included in the

Supplemental Complaint further demonstrate that Defendants Governor DeSantis, FDEP, FDACS, and Commissioner Fried are proper parties in this action.

CONCLUSION

The Supplemental Complaint includes new developments that are illustrative of

Defendants’ policy and practice of implementing an energy system based on fossil fuels that causes

Plaintiffs’ harm. Defendants’ are pursuing a course of conduct that violates the constitutional rights of youth by continuing to authorize fossil fuel development and prioritize fossil fuel resources over renewable energy resources in their plans for the state’s energy system. The recent activities of the

Defendants thus underscore Plaintiffs’ position in their Response to Defendants’ Motions to

Dismiss that this Court indeed has jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiffs’ constitutional substantive due process and public trust claims, and that Plaintiffs’ claims are justiciable and of great constitutional importance.

Respectfully submitted this 15th day of January, 2020,

11 JOHNSON POPE BOKOR JOHNSON POPE BOKOR RUPPEL & BURNS, LLP RUPPEL & BURNS, LLP

/s/ Guy M. Burns /s/ F. Wallace Pope, Jr. GUY M. BURNS, FBN 0160901 F. WALLACE POPE, JR., FBN 124449 401 East Jackson Street, Suite 3100 911 Chestnut Street Tampa, Florida 33602 Clearwater, Florida 33756 Ph: (813) 225-2500 Ph: (727) 461-1818 Fx: (813) 223-7118 Fx: (727) 441-8167 Email 1: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs

JANE WEST LAW, P.L LAW OFFICE OF MITCHELL A. CHESTER, P.A., /s/ Jane West JANE WEST, FBN 159417 /s/ Mitchell A. Chester 24 Cathedral Place, Ste 504 MITCHELL A. CHESTER, FBN 288136 St. Augustine, FL 32084 150 S. Pine island Road, Ste. 300 Ph: (904) 471-0505 Plantation, Florida 33324 Email 1: [email protected] Ph: (954) 759-9960 Email 2: [email protected] Fx: (954) 759-9930 Counsel for Plaintiffs Email 1: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs

ERIN L. DEADY, P.A. DEB SWIM, PLLC /s/ Erin S. Deady ERIN L. DEADY, FBN 0367310 /s/ Deb Swim 54 ½ SE 6th Avenue DEB SWIM, FBN 336025 Delray Beach, FL 33483 1323 Diamond Street Ph: (954) 593-5102 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Email: [email protected] Ph: (850) 733-1004 Counsel for Plaintiffs Email: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs

LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS, LAW OFFICES OF MITCHELL, RAFFERTY ANDREA K. RODGERS & PROCTOR, PA /s/ Andrea K. Rodgers /s/ Matthew D. Schultz ANDREA K. RODGERS, MATTHEW D. SCHULTZ, FBN 64032 WSBN 38683 pro hac vice 316 South Baylen Street, Suite 600 3026 NW Esplanade Pensacola, FL 32502 Seattle, WA 98117 Ph: (850) 435-7140 Ph: (206) 696-2851 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs

13 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15 day of January, 2020, a true and correct copy of the foregoing has been electronically filed with the Clerk of the Court utilizing the Florida Courts e-

Filing Portal system, and served electronically upon all counsel of record, including the following:

Karen A. Brodeen, Esq. Jeffrey Brown FBN 512771 FBN 843430 Senior Assistant Attorney General State of Florida Department of Office of the Attorney General Environmental Protection The Capitol, PL-01 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS 35 Tallahassee, FL 32399-1050 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Ph: (850) 414-3665 Ph: (850) 245-2007 Fx: (850) 413-7555 Fx: (850) 245-2298 Email 1: [email protected] Email 1: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Email 3: [email protected]

Kelley F. Corbari Nicholas A. Primrose FBN 103692 FBN 104804 State of Florida Department of Deputy General Counsel Environmental Protection Executive Office of the Governor 3900 Commonwealth Blvd., MS 35 The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, FL 32399-3000 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Ph: (850) 245-2289 Ph: (850) 717-9310 Fx: (850) 245-2298 Email 1: Email 1: [email protected] [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Email 3: [email protected]

John MacIver FBN 97334 Deputy General Counsel Executive Office of the Governor The Capitol, PL-05 Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0001 Ph: (850) 717-9310 Email 1: [email protected]

14 Respectfully submitted,

JOHNSON POPE BOKOR JOHNSON POPE BOKOR RUPPEL & BURNS, LLP RUPPEL & BURNS, LLP

LAW OFFICE OF ERIN L. DEADY, P.A. MITCHELL A. CHESTER, P.A.,

/s/ Erin S. Deady /s/ Mitchell A. Chester ERIN L. DEADY, FBN 0367310 MITCHELL A. CHESTER, FBN 288136 54 ½ SE 6th Avenue 150 S. Pine island Road, Ste. 300 Delray Beach, FL 33483 Plantation, Florida 33324 Ph: (954) 593-5102 Ph: (954) 759-9960 Email: [email protected] Fx: (954) 759-9930 Counsel for Plaintiffs Email 1: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs

JANE WEST LAW, P.L DEB SWIM, PLLC

/s/ Jane West /s/ Deb Swim JANE WEST, FBN 159417 DEB SWIM, FBN 336025 24 Cathedral Place, Ste 504 1323 Diamond Street St. Augustine, FL 32084 Tallahassee, FL 32301 Ph: (904) 471-0505 Ph: (850) 733-1004 Email 1: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Email 2: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs

15 LAW OFFICES OF LEVIN, PAPANTONIO, THOMAS, ANDREA K. RODGERS MITCHELL, RAFFERTY & PROCTOR, PA /s/ Andrea K. Rodgers ANDREA K. RODGERS, /s/ Matthew D. Schultz WSBN 38683 pro hac vice MATTHEW D. SCHULTZ, FBN 64032 3026 NW Esplanade 316 South Baylen Street, Suite 600 Seattle, WA 98117 Pensacola, FL 32502 Ph: (206) 696-2851 Ph: (850) 435-7140 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Counsel for Plaintiffs Counsel for Plaintiffs