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Punishment Based on Customary Law?

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Punishment Based on Customary Law? Punishment Based on Customary Law? The Crime against Humanity of Deportation and Enforced Transfer According to § 7 (1) (4) of the German Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (International Law Criminal Code) Von Dr. jur. Dr. phil. Milan Kuhli , Frankfurt am Main* I. Introduction duct addressed in this paragraph deals with acts of deporta- The German International Law Criminal Code – the Völker- tion and enforced transfer of a person concerned through strafgesetzbuch (VStGB) – is now being actually applied. expulsion or other coercive acts from the area in which the This was illustrated only recently by a decision of the Bun- victim is lawfully present, into another state or region, in desgerichtshof (BGH – Federal Court of Justice) about breach of a ge-neral rule of international law. The act has to whether the presumed leader of a rebel militia operating in be committed in the context of an extensive or systematic Congo was to be kept in pre-trial detention. The Court af- attack against any civilian population. The German wording firmed that the defendant was to be deemed a suspect regar- of § 7 (1) (4) VStGB is: ding crimes against humanity under the VStGB. 1 It remains to be seen how the criminal trial proceeding will develop. “Wer im Rahmen eines ausgedehnten oder systematischen However, the opportunities offered to German courts by the Angriffs gegen eine Zivilbevölkerung […] einen Men- VStGB as a new instrument for prosecuting crimes against schen, der sich rechtmäßig in einem Gebiet aufhält, ver- humanity, genocide, and war crimes are to be welcomed. treibt oder zwangsweise überführt, indem er ihn unter Whereas there may be valid criticism of the way in which Verstoß gegen eine allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts international law is implemented in specific cases, there can durch Ausweisung oder andere Zwangsmaßnahmen in ei- be little objection to the principle of prosecuting the most nen anderen Staat oder in ein anderes Gebiet verbringt, serious crimes. 2 […]“. However, certain limits should be observed not only when applying international criminal law in specific cases, but also The requirements that the victim must be staying lawfully in defining the substantive crimes involved. Safeguards pro- (“rechtmäßig”) in the area and that the offence must be com- tecting the defendant are especially important in cases of mitted in breach of a general rule of international law (“Ver- prosecution for the most serious crimes. It is thus striking that stoß gegen eine allgemeine Regel des Völkerrechts”) consti- certain provisions of the VStGB contain legal conceptions tute references to – inter alia – customary international law. which lack clear definition and which are unusual in German The reference is dynamic, i.e. it refers to developing custom- criminal law generally. More specifically, the VStGB con- ary international law, instead of statically referring to cus- 3 tomary international law as it was when the VStGB entered tains a number of references to customary international law. 6 Certain acts are, for instance, classified as criminal offences into force. Hence, changes in customary international law if they fail to comport with such customary law. 4 Consider, can have direct impact on the scope of application of § 7 (1) for example, the provision of § 7 (1) (4) VStGB. 5 The con- (4) VStGB. The legislator explains that references of this type are meant to allow for further rights-enhancing deve- lopments of customary international law to be reflected in the * The author is a Research Fellow at the Cluster of Excel- 7 VStGB. This may indeed be a valid aim, however, it must be lence “Formation of Normative Orders” at the Goethe Uni- noted that such references appear inconsistent with one of the versity Frankfurt am Main. He would like to thank Prof. Dr. basic principles of German criminal law, namely the principle Dr. h.c. Andreas von Hirsch , Rebecca Schmidt , Maya Hat- that there shall be no punishment without prior legal enact- sukano , and Astrid Hammacher for their editorial comments ment (nulla poena sine lege). This principle is enshrined not and for their help with the translation. only on a constitutional level (art. 103 [2] of the Grundgesetz 1 See BGH JZ 2010, 960 (criminal trial procedure against [GG – the German constitution]), but also very prominently Ignace Murwanashyaka, presumed leader of the “Forces in sub-constitutional law (§§ 1 and 2 of the German Strafge- Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda“ [FDLR]); annota- setzbuch [StGB – Federal Crime Code]). Thus, the situation tion: Safferling , JZ 2010, 965. gives rise to the question of whether the application of cus- 2 See Günther , in: Beulke/Lüderssen/Popp/Wittig (ed.), Das Dilemma des rechtsstaatlichen Strafrechts, Symposium für Bernhard Haffke zum 65. Geburtstag, 2010, p. 79. in einem Gebiet aufhält”; “Verstoß gegen eine allgemeine 3 Jähnke , ZIS 2010, 463 (467). Regel des Völkerrechts“); § 9 (1) VStGB (“völkerrechtswid- 4 See for this aspect: Kuhli , Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch und rig”); § 9 (2) VStGB (“völkerrechtswidrig”); § 10 (1) Sen- das Verbot der Strafbegründung durch Gewohnheitsrecht, tence 1 (2) VStGB (“Schutz […], der Zivilpersonen oder 2010, passim. zivilen Objekten nach dem humanitären Völkerrecht gewährt 5 Apart from § 7 (1) (4) VStGB it is: § 7 (1) (5) VStGB wird”); § 11 (1) Sentence 1 (2) VStGB (“Objekte […], solan- (“Folge völkerrechtlich zulässiger Sanktionen”); § 7 (1) (9) ge sie durch das humanitäre Völkerrecht als solche geschützt VStGB (“Verstoß gegen eine allgemeine Regel des Völker- sind”); § 11 (1) Sentence 1 (5) VStGB (“unter Verstoß gegen rechts”); § 7 (1) (10) VStGB (“aus anderen nach den allge- das humanitäre Völkerrecht”). meinen Regeln des Völkerrechts als unzulässig anerkannten 6 See Kuhli (fn. 4), p. 119. Gründen”); § 8 (1) (6) VStGB (“Person, die sich rechtmäßig 7 See BT-Drs. 14/8524, p. 22 (regarding § 7 [1] [10] VStGB). _____________________________________________________________________________________ ZIS 4/2012 124 Punishment Based on Customary Law? _____________________________________________________________________________________ tomary international law – pointed to by written law – can The principle of complementarity enshrined in the Rome still be seen as punishment under lex scripta. This again leads Statute takes into account a number of considerations: First, to the issue of whether such references should be permissible the territorial sovereignty of the state where the criminal – which shall be discussed in part IV below. Before embar- offence is committed, as well as the personal jurisdiction of king on this subject, however, preliminary explanations are the offender’s and the victim’s home state are respected. 11 called for – first, on the VStGB in general (part II), followed Second, states which, through the respective legislative acts, by an examination of the provision of § 7 (1) (4) VStGB (part have declared themselves competent and which succeed in III). capturing the offender, should be given the opportunity of carrying out their own criminal proceedings. 12 The concept of II. The Völkerstrafgesetzbuch a decentralized global criminal justice, moreover, is based on 1. International Law as Background realistic considerations about the capacity of the International Criminal Court – which will only be able to prosecute a frac- The VStGB entered into force on 30 June 2002. It was deve- tion of all offences against international law. 13 Although the loped in close connection with the Rome Statute of the Inter- Rome Statute does not contain a general 14 obligation (which national Criminal Court (ICC), which in turn was ratified by would hardly be politically realizable) for member states to a large part of the international community at the Rome Con- punish their citizens for the offences it establishes,15 a state ference on 17 July 1998, and entered into force on 1 July which adapts its criminal law provisions to the norms of the 2002 – one day after enactment of the VStGB in Germany. Statute acts in line with its spirit. 16 The Rome Statute relies On 11 March 2003, the International Criminal Court took up on a positive stance towards international criminal law as work at The Hague. well as a policy within individual states to avoid the prosecu- The creation of this court represents a turning-point in the tion of their own citizens by an international court. 17 development of international criminal law, the ICC being the This is the background against which the German VStGB first international criminal court whose jurisdiction is not was passed. It constitutes an adaptation of German criminal limited to a certain period of time or a certain conflict zone. law to the Rome Statute 18 in respect of the principle of com- However, this wide jurisdiction does not mean the ICC has plementarity and is hence aimed to avoid possible prosecu- primary competence. The punishment of serious crimes against tion of German soldiers by an international court. 19 The en- international law shall primarily remain a responsibility of actment of the VStGB is meant to ensure Germany’s own each state. 8 To that effect, paragraph 10 of the preamble of ability to prosecute offences for which the International Cri- the Rome Statute as well as art. 1 (2) state that the ICC “shall minal Court could intervene. However, in order to avoid ca- be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions”. Ac- pacity overload in German criminal justice, § 153f of the cording to this principle of complementarity, the International German Strafprozessordnung (StPO – German Federal Code Criminal Court has, as a matter of principle, no jurisdiction of Criminal Procedure) provides for special possibilities of over crimes which are also being tried by a national court, or dismissing cases dealing with offences under the VStGB. 20 for which the proceedings have been finally concluded by such a court. Art. 17 of the Rome Statute, however, contains an exception to this principle, namely that when the state in question is unwilling and unable seriously to investigate and 11 BVerfG NJW 2011, 2569 (2569). prosecute a certain crime. 9 In this context, unwillingness 12 Stahn , EuGRZ 1998, 589.
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