REPORT

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA GENERAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL RECORDS: TWENTY-FIFTH SESSION SUPPLEMENT No. 22 (A/8022/Rev.1) UNITED NATIONS New York, 1970

NOTE Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document. The present report was also submitted to the Security Council under the symbol S/9939 and Add.I.

/original: English/ CONTENTS Paragraphs Page Letter of transmittal ...... v I. INTRODUCTION ...... 1 - 6 1 II. REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ...... 7 - 101 2 A. Repirt of 7 October 1969 by the Special Committee to the General Assembly and the Security Council . 7 - 14 2 B. Action taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session ...... 15 - 23 3 C. Consideration of the programme of work of the Special Committee ...... 24 5 D. Commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ...... 25 - 30 5 E. Communication to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1970) ...... 31 - 32 6 F. Question of the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa ...... 33 - 46 8 G. Repressive measures against opponents of apartheid 47 - 51 12 H. Apartheid and sport ...... 52 - 56 14 I. Programme for the observance of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations ...... 57 - 58 17 J. Programme for the observance, in 1971, of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination ...... 59 - 62 20 K. Consultations with the representatives of the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa against the policies of apartheid . 63 - 64 21 L. Work of the Sub-Committee on Petitions ...... 65 - 86 21 M. Work of the Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid ...... 87 - 94 28 N. The situation of certain South African refugees in Lesotho ...... 95 - 98 31 0. Question of joint session of the United Nations organs dealing with questions relating to southern Africa ...... 99 - 101 32 -iii-

CONTENTS (continued) Paragraphs III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE A. Danger of violent conflict in South Africa ..... B. Threat of violent conflict in southern Africa . . . C. Economic and related measures ...... D. Assistance to the liberation movement ...... E. South Africa and southern Africa ...... F. Dissemination of information ...... G. Meetings away from Headquarters and consultations with representatives of the liberation movement, anti-apartheid movements and other organizations concerned with the question of apartheid ...... H. Other recommendations ...... I. General conclusion ...... 102 102 107 112 125 129 131 137 - 14o 141 - 142 143 ANNEXES I. List of representatives ...... II. Review of developments in South Africa since 7 October 1969 ...... IlI. List of foreign diplomatic and other official missions in South Africa and South African missions abroad ...... IV. List of documents of the Special Committee (October 1969-September 1970) ...... -iv- Page -143 - 106 - 11l - 124 - 128 - 130 - 136 . . 101 @**

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 10 September 1970 Sir, I have the honour to send you herewith the report adopted unanimously on 9 September 1970 by the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. This report is submitted to the General Assembly in pursuance of operative paragraph 5 (b) of General Assembly resolution 1761 (xvII), of 6 November 1962, of operative paragraph 2 of General Assembly resolution 1978 A (XVIII), of 16 December 1963, and operative paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV), of 21 November 1969. Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. (Signed) Abdulrahim A. FARAH Chairman Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa His Excellency U Thant Secretary-General of the United Nations New York

I. INTRODUCTION I. The Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa was established by the General Assembly in its resolution 1761 (xvii) of 6 November 1962 with the mandate "to keep the racial policies of the Government of South Africa under review when the Assembly is not in session and to report either to the Assembly or to the Security Council or to both, as may be appropriate, from time to time". Under General Assembly resolution 1978 (XVIII), of 16 December 1963, it was requested to continue to follow constantly the various aspects of the question of apartheid and to submit reports to the General Assembly and to the Security Council whenever necessary. In resolution 2506 B (XXIV), of 21 November 1969, the General Assembly requested the Special Committee: (a) To take additional steps to promote assistance to the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa against the policies of apartheid, in consultation with the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity; (b) To hold consultations with representatives of this movement on various aspects of the question; (c) To take further steps, including the holding of joint meetings with other appropriate United Nations organs, to increase its co-operation and co-ordinate its efforts with such organs; and (d) To continue its co-operation with the specialized agencies and non-governmental organizations concerned with the problems of southern Africa. 2. The Committee is composed of the following eleven members: Algeria, Costa Rica, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines and Somalia. 3. On 26 January 1970, the Special Committee re-elected Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah (Somalia) as its Chairman and Mr. Privado G. Jimenez (Philippines) as Vice-Chairman. It also elected Mr. Uddhav Deo Bhatt (Nepal) as Rapporteur. 4. On 2 February 1970, the Special Committee decided to appoint the representatives of Algeria, Nepal, Nigeria, the Philippines and Somalia as members of its Sub-Committee on Petitions and the representatives of Costa Rica, Ghana, Guinea, Haiti, Hungary and Malaysia as members of its Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid. Mr. Ahmed Oucif (Algeria) and Mi. Yeop Adlan- Rose (Malaysia) were subsequently elected Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Petitions and Chairman/ Rapporteur of the Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid, respectively. 5. Representatives who served on the Special Committee are listed in annex I of this report. 6. On 9 September the Special Committee decided unanimously to submit to the General Assembly and the Security Council the present report on developments since the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

II. REVIEW OF THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE A. Report of 7 October 169 by the SDecial ommitee to thc General Assembly and the Security Council 7. In its report of 7 October 1969 to the General Assembly-/ and the Security Council, 2/ the Special Committee noted that there had been no indication of a willingness by the South African Government to take steps towards the implementation of the United Nations resolutions calling for an abandonment of the policies of apartheid and that instead, the South African Government had continued to challenge the authority of the United Nations and to intensify the applicatio of the inhuman policy of apartheid in the country. 8. It also pointed out that the massive military build-up in South Africa was a grave threat to the peace in the whole of southern Africa since it had emboldened South Africa to defy United Nations resolutions, to intervene militarily against the forces of liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, to assist Portugal in its colonial wars and to threaten independent African States. 9. The Special Committee considered it essential to call attention to the extremely grave threat to the peace which had developed in South Africa and southern Africa; to point out that South Africa had become the bastion of colonialism and racism in the whole area and the principal threat to peace and to the authority of the United Nations; and to warn that urgent and decisive action by the international community was imperative in order to avert the uncalculable consequences of a major conflict in the area. 10. It expressed its conviction that the lines of activity which it had advocated since its inception remained the most appropriate and most effective courses of action by the United Nations and the international community. Those lines of activity were: (a) the embargo on arms to South Africa, economic and related measures against South Africa; (b) the moral, political and material assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for liberation; and (c) the dissemination of information to secure full understanding and support for the efforts directed towards the elimination of apartheid and avert the great threat to international peace and security. 11. The Special Committee, therefore, felt that the United Nations and Member States could make the most significant contribution to the solution of the grave situation in South Africa, and in southern Africa as a whole, by providing effective material assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa in their legitimate struggle for liberation. 1/ Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/7625/Rev.I). 2/ S/9473.

12. It recommended that the General Assembly urge the Security Council to consider the question of apartheid urgently and, as a matter of priority to take effective measures: (a) to secure full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa; (b) to ensure that Governments terminate all loans and technical assistance that they or their private companies extend to the South African Government or South African companies; (c) to promote moral, political and material assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movements in their legitimate struggle; and (d) to encourage States to take the other measures recommended by the General Assembly in order to solve the grave situation in South Africa and in southern Africa as a whole. 13. The Special Committee also considered it essential that urgent and effective steps be taken by the United Nations and Member States to intensify the dissemination of information on the question of apartheid in order to increase international awareness of the liberation struggle against apartheid. 14. It finally pointed out that it was essential that the policies and actions of the South African Government in Namibia and in neighbouring colonial Territories had aggravated the situation in the whole of southern Africa, and that questions relating to South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and the Portuguese Territories, therefore, required to be considered in the southern African context. B. Action taken by the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session 15. After considering the report of the Special Committee, the General Assembly, at its twenty-fourth session, adopted, on 21 November 1969, resolution 2506 (XXIV) endorsing most of the recommendations of the Special Committee. 16. In part A of the resolution, on political prisoners and freedom fighters in southern Africa, the General Assembly condemned the Government of South Africa for its repressive acts against the political movement of the oppressed people of South Africa, and in particular for its enactment of the Terrorism Act of 1967; urged all States and organizations to exert every appropriate effort to secure the unconditional release of all political prisoners and persons subjected to restrictions for opposing apartheid and reiterated that freedom fighters who were taken prisoner in the course of their legitimate struggle for liberation should be extended humane treatment in accordance with the humanitarian principles laid down in the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949. 17. In part B of the resolution, the General Assembly reaffirmed its recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa for the exercise of their inalienable right of self-determination and urged all States and organizations to provide increased assistance to the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa. 18. It further invited all States to take a number of measures including the following: :a, To desist frnm collaboration with the Government of South Africa, by taking steps tc prohibit financial and economic interests under their national jurisdiction frcm co-operating with the Government of South .frica ard companies registered in South Africa;

(b) To prohibit airlines and shipping lines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa and to deny all facilities to air flights and shipping services to and from South Africa; (c) To refrain from extending loans, investments and technical assistance to the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; and (d) To take appropriate measures to dissuade the main trading partners of South Africa and economic and financial interests from collaborating with the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa. 19. The General Assembly also called for a full implementation of the arms embargo instituted by the Security Council and recommended to the Security Council to resume urgently the consideration of the question of apartheid with a view to adopting effective measures, including those under Chapter VII of the Charter, to eliminate the threat to international peace and security posed by the situation. 20. Other resolutions adopted by the General Assembly under other items on its agenda, in which reference was made to the question of apartheid, included the following. 21. General Assembly resolution 2542 (XXIV), adopted on 11 December 1969, contains the Declaration on Social Progress and Development, article 2 of which states the following: "Social progress and development shall be founded on respect for the dignity and value of the human person and shall ensure the promotion of human rights and social justice, which requires: (a) The immediate and final elimination of all forms of inequality, exploitation of peoples and individuals, colonialism and racism, including nazism and apartheid, and all other policies and ideologies opposed to the purposes and principles of the United Nations; (b) The recognition and effective implementation of civil and political rights as well as of economic, social and cultural rights without any discrimination." 22. In resolution 2544 (XXIV), adopted on 11 December 1969, on the programme for the observance in 1971 of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the General Assembly, having designated the year 1971 as International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, considered that it should be observed in the name of the ever- growing struggle against racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and in the name of international solidarity with those struggling against racism and urgently appealed to all States to intensify and expand their efforts at the national and international levels towards ensuring the rapid and total eradication of racial discrimination, including the policy of apartheid, nazism and all of its contemporary forms, as well as other manifestations of racism. 23. In part A of General Assembly resolution 2547 (XXIV), adopted on 11 December 1969, on measures for effectively combating racial discrimination and the policies of apartheid and segregation in southern Africa, the General Assembly appealed to all Governments to contribute more generously to the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and also to voluntary organizations active in providing relief and assistance to the victims of apartheid and racial discrimination in southern Africa. In part B, the Assembly called upon the Government of South Africa to repeal its various discriminatory laws and to rescind immediately the "banning orders" issued under the Suppression of Communism Act against the opponents of apartheid and requested the Secretary- General to set up a unit of United Nations Radio in Africa to produce and broadcast radio programmes to the peoples of southern Africa. C. Consideration of the programme of work of the Special Committee 24. The Special Committee held 21 meetings between 26 January and 9 September 1970, and considered a programme corresponding to its general mandate and to the special tasks assigned to it by the General Assembly in resolution 2506 B (XXIV), adopted on 21 November 1969, as well as in other relevant resolutions. The work and activities of the Special Committee are reviewed below. D. Commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 25. For the fourth consecutive year, the Special Committee decided to promote the observance of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. It did so in the spirit of paragraph 11 of General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) inviting all States and organizations to observe with appropriate ceremonies the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination on 21 March 1970 the tenth anniversary of the Sharpeville massacre - in solidarity with the oppressed people of South Africa. 26. It adopted, on 5 February 1970, an appeal for the observance of the International Day which was addressed, through the Secretary-General, to Member States, the specialized agencies of the United Nations and to the regional organizations. The appeal was also transmitted to a number of non-governmental organizations. 27. In the appeal, the Special Committee pointed out that the need for action on the part of the international community to combat apartheid had never been greater and that the forthcoming observance of the International Day was a fitting occasion for initiating new efforts or intensifying existing ones on behalf of the oppressed people of South Africa. It felt that all States and organizations could make a significant contribution to the elimination of racial discrimination in South Africa and to the legitimate liberation struggle of its people by giving effect to paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) urging all States to provide increased assistance to the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa against the policies of apartheid. 28. The Committee also noted that while the material and humanitarian assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa was of great importance in meeting an immediate and pressing need, more fundamental political action must be taken and, to that end, called on all States and organizations to express their solidarity in the struggle against apartheid by carrying out or promoting the following measures set out in the General Assembly resolution 2506 (XXIV):

(a) To desist from collaborating with the Government of South Africa by taking steps to prohibit financial and economic interests under their national jurisdiction from co-operating with the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; (b) To prohibit airlines and shipping lines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa and to deny all facilities to air flights and shipping services to and from South Africa; (C) To refrain from extending loans, investments and technical assistance to the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; (d) To take appropriate measures to dissuade the main trading partners of South Africa and economic and financial interests from collaborating with the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; (e) To implement fully and scrupulously the provisions of the Security Council resolutions coocerning the embargo on the supplying of arms and other military equipment to the Government of South Africa; (f) To desist from providing the Government of South Africa with technical and other assistance for the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military vehicles; and (E) To exert every appropriate effort to secure the unconditional release of all political prisoners and persons subjected to restrictions for opposing apartheid. 29. The Special Committee held a special meeting at United Nations Headquarters on 20 March 1970 to commemorate the International Day. The Commission on Human Rights associated itself with the meeting. In response to the Committee's invitation to attend the meeting, representatives of most permanent missions to the United Nations, the specialized agencies of the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity were represented at the meeting. After statements by the Secretary-General, the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights, the Chairman of the Committee of Trustees of the United Nations Trust Fund for South Africa and the Chairman of the Special Committee, 3/ the participants observed a minute of silence in tribute to the memory of all victims of racial discrimination and apartheid. 30. Pursuant to a decision by the Special Committee, a report on the Commemoration of the International Day was issued as a document of the Committee (A/AC.115/L.280). E. Communication to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 276 (1970) 31. By a letter dated 12 March 1970, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee established in pursuance of Security Council resolution 277 (-970) of 30 January 1970 requested the Special Committee to provide the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee 3/ Extracts from the statements were reproduced in the report on the ccru-- enoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (A/AC.II5/L.280). with information which might be helpful to it in its work as outlined in its terms of reference. The Ad Hoe Sub-Committee was established to study, in consultation with the Secretary-General, ways and means by which the Council's resolutions on the question of Namibia could be effectively inplemented in accordance with the appropriate provisions of the Charter, in the light of the flagrant refusal of South Africa to withdraw from Naxribia. 32. At its 133rd meetitg, on 31 March 1970, the Special Committee decided to address the following communication to the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee: "Inasmuch as the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee's mandate is to study ways and means of enforcing the Security Council resolutions concerning Namibia, particularly resolution 269 (1969) calling for the withdrawal of South Africa from Namibia, the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa wishes to draw the attention of the Ad Hoc Sub-Committee to the fact that since its establishment it has, in its annual reports to the General Assembly and the Security Council, recommended a number of measures, the implementation of which, it believed, would compel South Africa to abide by the United Nations resolutions calling for the abandonment of apartheid. A list of the Committee's reports containing the recommendations is attached herewith. These recommendations have been reflected in resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the General Assembly on the question of apartheid. "As you may note, the Special Committee has always advocated the implementation by the United Nations of mandatory measures under Chapter VII of the Charter as the most effective way to induce South Africa to abide by the United Nations resolutions. The Special Committee consequently believes that the Security Council would have to resort to such measures to secure the implementation of its resolutions relating to Namibia, particularly to ensure that South Africa withdraws from that territory. "In this connexion it should be recalled that the Security Council has not yet considered the report submitted to it by its own expert Committee established in pursuance of resolution 191 (1964) 'to undertake a technical and practical study and report to the Council as to the feasibility, effectiveness and implications of measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Council under the Charter of the United Nations'. "The Special Committee has repeatedly emphasized the importance of full implementation of the arms embargo against South Africa, and pointed out that the continued military co-operation with South Africa had encouraged the latter to resist the United Nations resolutions corcerning the territory. "It noted in its last report: 'The South African Government has continued the build-up of military and police forces and has announced plans for massive expansion of its military power. It has received assistance from other countries. particularly France which, in spite of the resolutions of the Security Council, has continued to supply South Africa with aircraft and submarines and has assisted in the development of a ground-to-air missile. South African Government spokesmen have also announced plans for milita-y co-operation with other countries in the Southern Hemisphere.

'This massive military build-up is a grave threat to the peace in the whole of southern Africa since it has emboldened South Africa to defy United Nations resolutions, to iitervene militarily against the forces of the liberation movements in Southern Rhodesia, to assist Portugal in its colonial wars and to threaten independent African S-'ates.' "The Security Council should therefore review the question of the provision of arms and military equipment to South Africa with a view to adopting mandatory measures to tighten its arms embargo against Soi:ch Africa and stopping any type of military collaboration with that country "South Africa has not only continued to occupy Namibia illegally, but it has also exported its apartheid policies to that territory and subjected its inhabitants to its vicious repressive laws such as the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act. Namibians have been tried in South Africa under those laws. Urgent action is, therefore, required to secure the release of persons imprisoned for opposition to the policies of apertheid of the authorities in illegal occupation of Namibia. "The South African Government has showed its determination to extend its policy of racial separation and segregation to Namibia by passing, it. June 1968, the Development of Self-Government for Native Nations in South West Africa Act providing for so-called self-governing native nations in Namibia. The Security Council should take the necessary steps to prevent the South African Government from implementing in Namibia such a law and al' other measures of racial separation. "Turning to the economic and financial field, the Special Committee would like to point out that many South African companies in which foreign economic interests are involved operate in Namibia. It is, therefore, essential to end collaboration by such interests not only with companies registered in Namibia but also with companies registered in the Republic of South Africa. "Pursuant to its terms of reference, the Special Committee follows the various aspects of apartheid. It will keep the request of the Ad Hoc Sub- Committee under consideration and provide further information as appropriate." 4/ F. Question of the embargo on the supply of arms to South Africa 33. At the 138th meeting on 24 June 1970, the Rapporteur submitted to the Special Committee a note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa. 5/ In introducing it, he emphasized the phenomenal growth of the military power of South Africa despite the arms embargo instituted by the Security Council. He noted that South Africa had begun a large-scale build-up of its armed forces since 1960, the year of the Sharpeville massacre. In ten years South Africa's military budget had risen from about $60 million to about $380 million thus enabling it to import a large amount of military equipment, 4/ ,,9363 -rd Ccrr.l, arnex III, para. 14. 5/ A/AC.115/L.279 an'7 Corr.l. including several squadrons of aircraft. South Africa had purchased three submarines, developed rockets and missiles, set up a radar network in the north and a second one was being built on the coast. It had also built a second naval base and was planning a third naval base. It had a sizable aircraft industry which was producing 300 military Impala jet trainers and hoped to be able to build warships. The South African Government claimed that its military equipment was worth nearly $3,000 million and that the country was in a position to export some arms. 34. Referring to the scope of the arms embargo, the Rapporteur pointed out that South Africa's suppliers of arms and military equipment had made a distinction between arms for external defence and arms for imposing apartheid, whereas the Special Committee had repeatedly stated that that distinction was not valid and that the arms embargo must be implemented fully. The Committee's position was based on the fact that some of the equipment had been used against opponents of apartheid. When the legitimate struggle for liberation of the people of South Africa had assumed the proportions of guerrilla warfare and the South African authorities conducted other than mere police operations, the validity of certain States' contention that some aircraft, for example, were not for internal repression was questionable. 35. The Rapporteur also drew attention to the great expansion of local manufacture under licences of arms and military equipment. The number of licences acquired by South Africa had been such that General Hiemstra had been able to announce in 1966 that South Africa would shortly be manufacturing 140 types of ammunition and bombs, together with infantry weapons and armour plating equal in quality to that produced overseas. 36. Following the statement by the Rapporteur, the Chairman recalled that when, in 1963 and 1964, the Security Council had adopted resolutions imposing an arms embargo on South Africa, the commitment entered into by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and France had aroused great hopes. It had been thought that, if those four States lent their full co-operation, others would follow their example. 37. The USSR, the Chairman noted, had supported the resolutions unreservedly. The three other countries had pledged not to sell South Africa arms which it could use to reinforce its policy of apartheid. The USSR, however, was the only State of these four States which had discharged its responsibility fully. France had honoured the arms embargo more in the breach than in the observance and, by its actions, had encouraged other European States to break the embargo. In all fairness, it must be admitted that the United Kingdom and the United States had tried to honour their commitment, although they seemed to have regarded as being destined for external defence arms which had, in fact, been used extensively for internal security. Nevertheless, the public commitment of the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom had certainly restricted the supply of arms to South Africa. 38. He also observed that, since the recent elections in the United Kingdom, there had been alarming statements in the press, attributed to the leaders of the Conservative Party, about the stand the new Government would take on the arms embargo and on the type of relations it would wish to establish with the rebel regime in Southern Rhodesia. It would actually be racism to reopen the flow of arms to South Africa, to take a negative stand in international affairs regarding South African racist policies and to give some form of recognition to the racist r~gime in Salisbury. 9. The arms embargo, he said, represented the only tangible measure taken by the international community against South Africa. Any weakening of the embargo would adversely affect not only the struggle of the oppressed people in South Africa, but also the struggle of the populations of Southern Rhodesia, Namibia and the Territories of Angola and Mozambique occupied by Portugal. Should South Africa be permitted to increase its purchase of arms from abroad or to manufacture them itself, some of those arms would be supplied to the rebel r6gime of Southern Rhodesia. 40. The Chairman therefore suggested that the Committee should request the Security Council to review the whole question of the arms embargo in order to take measures to strengthen the embargo. The Special Committee agreed to the Chairman's proposal and deci.9.ed that the Rapporteur's "note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa", together with the texts of the statements by the Rapporteur and the Chairman, should be transmitted to the Security Council with a brief report. 41. Accordingly, at the following meeting,held on 2 July 1970, the Special Committee decided to address a communication to the Security Council bringing tc its attention the question of the arms embargo against South Africa. 6/ In this communication, the Special Committee recalled that, despite the Security Council's arms embargo, the South African Government had continued to receive arms and military equipment as well as spare parts for military equipment from a number of countries, that South Africa had been able to receive licences, technical assistance and foreign capital for a great expansion of the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military vehicles and equipment, and that some countries had continued provision of training for South African military personnel. 42. It noted that the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa in its legitimate struggle against apartheid had resorted to the tactics of guerrilla warfare and the South African Government has responded by "antiterrorists" operations requiring the use of military equipment supposedly provided for external defence. It therefore rejected the distinction drawn by certain Governments between arms which could be used for imposing apartheid, namely, small arms and guns, and sophisticated weapons and equipment ruquired for external defence. Since the South African Government was able to manufacture small arms locally, a ban limited to such arms would defeat the intentions of the Security Council's resolution on the arms embargo. 43. The Special Committee consequently recommended that the Council should review and strengthen the implementation of those resolutions and to that end call upon all States: (a) To implement fully the arms embargo against South Africa, without reservations and restrictive interpretations; 6/ S/9B58 and Corr.l. -10-

(b) To withhold supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the South African armed forces; (c) To cease supply of spare parts for military equipment used by the South African armed forces; (d) To revoke all licences granted to the South African Government or to South African companies for the manufacture of arms, ammunition and military vehicles; (e) To prohibit investment in or technical assistance for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft or other military vehicles; and (f) To cease provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa. 44. The Special Committee concluded by stating that the strengthening of the arms embargo against South Africa was all the more urgent not only because of the repressive policy of the South African Government against the liberation movement of South Africa, but also and more particularly in view of its present actions, namely, its illegal occupation of Namibia, the assistance given to the illegal racist minority r6gime in Southern Rhodesia and the threats it had made against independent African States for their assistance to opponents of apartheid. 45. When the Security Council met from 17 to 23 July on "the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa" it had before it the Committee's communication. The Security Council met at the request of h0 Member States which had asked it to resume the consideration of the question "with a view to examining in particular the situation arising from violations of the arms embargo called for in the Security Council resolutions 181 of August 1963, 182 of December 1963 and 191 of June 1964". 7/ 46. On 23 July, the Security Council adopted resolution 282 '1970) in which it endorsed all the Committee's recommendations as set out in paragraph 43 above. The Security Council expressed its conviction that the situation resulting from the continued application of the policies of apartheid and the constant build-up of the South African military and police forces, made possible by the continued acquisition of arms, military vehicles and other equipment and of spare parts for military equipment from a number of Member States and by local manufacture of arms and ammunition under licences granted by some Member States, constituted a potential threat to international peace and security. It called on all States to strengthen the arms embargo: (a) By implementing fully the arms embargo against South Africa unconditionally and without reservations whatsoever; (b) By withholding the supply of all vehicles and equipment for use of the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa; 7/ s/9867. -11-

.c) By ceasing the suppiy of spare parts for all vehicles and militaryr equipment used by the armed forces and paramilitary organizations of South Africa; (d) By revoking all licences and military patents granted to the South African Government or to South African companies for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft and naval craft or other military vehicles and by refraining from further granting such licences and patents; (e) By prohibiting investment ir or technical assistance for the manufacture of arms and ammunition, aircraft, naval craft, or other military vehicles; (f) By ceasing provision of military training for members of the South African armed forces and all other forms of military co-operation with South Africa; and (g) By undertaking the appropriate action to give effect to the above measures. G. Repressive measures against opponents of apartheid 47. During the year the Special Committee followed the developments concerning the repression of opponents of apartheid and focused attention on the case of the 22 Africans, including trs. Winnie Mandela, who had been tried under the Suppression of Cormunisuct and later detained under the Terrorism Act of 1967. 48. On 25 February, it issued the following press communiqu6: "The decision of the South African authorities to rearrest the twenty-two Africans who had been found not guilty in Pretoria under the Suppression of Communism Act on 16 February 1970 and to charge them of offences under the internationally condemned Terrorism Act on 1967 is convincing evidence of the determination of the South African Government to convict these unfortunate persons at all costs. "The twenty-two Africans, including Mrs. Winnie Mandela, wife of Mr. Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress now serving a sentence of life imprisonment, were charged in October 1969 with being office bearers, members or active supporters of the African National Congress, and furthering the aims of the organization, after being detained for some five months. "The Special Committee was already concerned about the fate of the accused because some of them were tortured during interrogations prior to the trial according to affidavits filed by the defense counsel. Now the Committee fears for their lives not only because they can be detained indefinitely in solitary confinement without trial but also because they can even be sentenced to death if they are convicted under the notorious Terrorism Act. They can be held incommunicado and may not be permittcd to see or communicate with anyone, including their relatives or their legal counsels. "The International Commission of Jurists has described the Terrorism Act as a shocking piece of legislation because 'it abolishes many of the safeguards normally provided in criminal law and procedure to ensure a fair trial and creates an offence which for lack of clarity and for breadth of -12- sccpe must be without parallel'. The crime of 'terrorism' is defined so broadly that it ceases to have any meaningful boundaries. It includes, for example, undergoing any training inside or outside South Africa which coniLd be useful to any person intending to endanger the maintenance of law and order. Attempting, consenting or taking any steps to undergo such training, and inciting, instigating, commanding, aiding, advising, encouraging or procuring another to undergo such training also constitutes terrorism. It goes so far as to declare that any act which embarasses the administration of the affairs of the State constitutes terrorism. The onus of proving that he did not commit or intend to commit such an act is placed on the defendant, a reversal of the normal burden of proof. The Terrorism Act provides for summary proceedings for offences involving the death penalty. Thus the basic procedural safeguards are now being denied the accused whose very lives are at stake. It should be recalled that the United Nations has repeatedly called for the repeal of this obnoxious piece of legislation. "On 21 February, the South African security police was formally accused of assaults, threats and torture by the accused. The accusations were heard in an urgent application before the Supreme Court in Pretoria for an order protecting the twenty-two Africans. "The Special Committee fears for their lives because last year alone, five persons who were detained under the Terrorism Act died in mysterious circumstances. While South Africans have attributed their death 'to natural causes', there has been, in some cases, disquieting evidence to the contrary, including the testimony of a world-renowned expert in forensic medicine who stated that electric shock torture had been used by the South African authorities. "A number of South Africans and Namibians have already been convicted under the Terrorism Act. Indeed, this Act has become one of the most effective repressive measures against the opponents of apartheid. It is obvious that, after failing to secure their conviction under the Suppression of Communism fact, the South African Government is determined to persecute the twenty-two Africans by subjecting them to the provisions of the Terrorism Act. The Special Committee considers that the accused are illegally detained since they are held under a universally condemned law the repeal of which has been requested by the United Nations. It therefore calls for their immediate release. "It decides to ask the Secretary-General to renew his efforts for the unccnditional release of all those opponents of apartheid who are imprisoned or detained under the repressive laws of South Africa as called for by the General Assembly and the Security Council, and to ask him to be good enough to urge the International Committee of the Red Cross to arrange for its representative to see to the welfare of the twenty-two accused while they remain in custody. The Special Committee further decides to transmit this communiqu4 to the Commission on Human Rights for urgent attention at its current session." 49. The Secretary-General drew the attention of the Commission on Human Rights to the text of the communique. 8/ The Commission which was holding its twenty-sixth -E/CN.4/10-5. -13- session considered the case of the 22 detainees under its agenda item entitled "Question of the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including policies of racial discrimination and segregation and of apartheid, in all countries, with particular reference to colonial and other dependent countries and territories". It decided to submit to the Economic and Social Council a draft resolution in which the Council, inter alia, would condemn the trial of the 22 Africans held under the Suppression of Communism Act and further condemn their subsequent re-arrest under the notorious Terrorism Act and would call upon the Government of the Republic of South Africa to release immediately and unconditionally the 22 Africans re-arrested under the Terrorism Act, on 16 February 1970. The draft resolution was adopted as resolution 1501 (XLVIII) by the Economic and Social Council on 27 May 1970. 50. At the 136th meeting, on 8 June, the Chairman informed the Special Committee that the Secretary-General had conveyed to the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross the Committee's request that it should arrange for its representatives to see to the welfare of the detainees while they remained in custody. The President of the International Committee of the Red Cross, he said, had pointed out that authorization to visit prisoners held in police custody under the Terrorism Act had not yet been obtained from the South African Government. There was every indication that the representations of the International Committee of the Red Cross had been unavailing, he added. He proposed that, in view of the apparent inability of the International Committee of the Red Cross to be of help in the matter, the Special Committee should request the Secretary-General to renew his representations to the Government of South Africa with a view to obtaining the release of the detainees and ascertaining that they were alive and that their welfare was being safeguarded. The proposal was accepted by the Special Committee. 51. At the following meeting, the Chairman informed the Committee that the Secretary-General had taken the requested action. Upon his motion, the Committee decided to invite a number of speakers at the special commemorative meeting, to be held at San Francisco to mark the signing of the United Nations Charter, to focus attention on the question of repression in South Africa and on the case of the 22 detainees in particular. The Chairman was authorized to communicate with them. The Committee also transmitted information relating to the case to international organizations of lawyers, churches, students and trade unions as well as to international and regional organizations concerned with human rights. H. Apartheid and sport 52. During the period under review, the Special Committee paid particular attention to the question of apartheid in sport. Three of the petitioners who appeared before it, Mr. Dennis Brutus, 9/ Mr. 10/ and Mr. Abdul Minty 11/ dealt with the same question. 9/ See paragraphs 68-73. 10/ See -rara-raphs 74-77. 11/ See paragraphs 73-0i.

53. After the hearing of Mr. Arthur Ashe on 14 April, the Special Committee issued a press communique on the boycott of South African racist bodies. In introducing the draft of the communiqu6, the Rapporteur recalled that the policy of apartheid practised in South Africa was strictly applied in sports as in all other fields. Consequently all "racial groups'" as defined by the South African Government were compelled to engage in sports separately. As Mr. Brutus had stated, the South African Government had refused to grant Mr. Arthur Ashe permission to enter South Africa to participate in a match with South African white tennis players because "to allow a black man in to play, and perhaps beat, a white man would have been a contradiction of the concept of white supremacy". It was therefore not surprising that the only answer Prime Minister Vorster had found for the widespread protests by opponents of racism against the all-white rugby team that had recently toured the United Kingdom had been to state that "what leftists and liberals want us to do is to play mixed sport in South Africa, and we are not prepared to do that". 54. The Rapporteur stated that the defiant attitude of the South African Government called for appropriate action by the international community and the full implementation of General Assembly resolution 2396 (XXIII) which requested all States and organizations to suspend sporting exchanges with the racist regime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practised apartheid. 55. It was significant, the Rapporteur concluded, that during the campaign for the general election which was to be held the following week, the new ultra-rightwing party of Mr. Albert Hertzog had, in upholding the true Afrikaner creed, condemned the South African Government's policy as being too liberal. Mr. Hertzog's party was against permitting a New Zealand rugby team which included Maoris to visit South Africa. According to press reports, all indications were that the ruling National Party was committing itself to a harder line, considerably to the right of the oppressive course it had followed until now, in order to assuage the fears of the ultra-conservatives and remain in power. 56. The text of the press communique adopted by the Special Committee reads as follows: "I. The recent refusal of the South African authorities to grant Mr. Arthur Ashe, a leading United States tennis player, an entry visa to allow him to contest in the South African Open championships scheduled for MarchApril 1970, has again drawn special attention to the fact that the policy of apartheid is strictly enforced in the field of sport in South Africa. "2. The South African Government's position on the matter was clearly defined by Prime Minister Vorster on 11 April 1967, when he said in the House of Assembly: 'I... want to make it quite clear that from South Africa's point of view no mixed sport between Whites and non-Whites will be practised locally.., and that the other colour groups, the Coloureds, the Indians and the Bantu, practise their sport separately.... If a person, either locally or abroad, adopts the attitude that he will enter into relations with us only if we are prepared to jettison the separate practising of sport prevailing among our own people in South Africa, then I want to make it quite clear that, no matter how important those sport relations are in my view, I am not prepared to pay that price...'. -15-

". Even while it offered to send a multiracial team to the Olympic Games in Mexico in l , in the hope of faining readmission to the International Olympic Games, the South African Governaent firmly maintained that no multiracial sport would be allowed in the country. Members of the South African team were, therefore, to be selected during racially segregated trial games. South Africa was rightly excluded from the Olytapic Games in Mexico. It is hoped that it will not be allowed to take part in subsequent games so long as it continues to violate the international code of no discrimination in sport. "4. Because South Africa refused to comply with the Olympic code of nondiscrimination and persists in imposing apartheid in sport, the Special Committee feels that it is necessary to boycott all South African racist sport organizations. It therefore calls for the strict implementation of General Assembly resolution 2396 (XXIII) of 2 December 3968, requesting all States and organizations to suspend sporting exchanges with the racist r~gime and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practise apartheid. It particularly wishes to draw the attention of the Governments and sport bodies in the United Kingdom and New Zealand to this appeal since in these countries racist sport bodies of South Airica have been able to arrange exchanges despite vigorous protests by opponents of racism. " 5. The Special Committee wishes to conend all Governments which have complied with that resolution and also a number of Governments including those of Kenya, Uganda and Zambia which took a further step in instituting appropriate action against the teams and sportsmen who had violated the boycott. "6. It also commends the various organizations and individuals who have promoted or supported the boycott of racist sport bodies, particularly the anti- apartheid movements and other organizations in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand and other countries. The Cominittee notes with particular appreciation the widespread protests against the all-white rugby team which toured the United Kingdom from early November 1969 to the end of January 1970, and the decision taken last month by the Amateur Athletic Union of Australia to discontinue exchanges of visits between athletes of the two countries. "7. It also notes that the decision taken on 23 March by the Davis CuD Special Committee to ban South Africa from the 1970 competition is valid for 1S70 only. The Special Committee strongly feels that this decision should continue to apply and that the International Lawn Tennis Federation should sever all ties with the South African Lawn Tennis Union, as long as South Africa refuses to agree to multiracial sport in the country and to allow White and non- White South African sportsmen to compete against each other in local South African games. The Special Committee fully supports the proposal adopted by the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa at its recent General Assembly held in Cairo from 24 to 26 March 1970 that the International Olympic Committee should, at its forthcoming session at Amsterdam (7 to 15 May), decide not only to exclude South Africa from the next Olympic Games at Munich but also to expel it from the Olympic Movement." -16-

I. Programme for the observance of the twenty-fifth annive,-sary of the United Nations 57. Following the request of the Committee for the Twenty-fifth Anniversary of the United Nations that the Special Committee should submit the necessary material for the final document or documents to be signed or adopted during the commemorative session of the General Assembly, the Special Committee decided to submit a draft declaration for inclusion in the final document or documents. 58. It considered the text of the draft declaration at four meetings held between 16 June and 8 July. The final text, which was adopted on 8 July, reads as follows: "When the Charter was adopted twenty-five years ago, the peoples of the United Nations declared themselves determined 'to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, land in the equal rights of men and women...' and proclaimed it as their purpose 'to maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace... and to achieve international co-operation in... promoting and encouraging respect for human rights'. Later, having stated that the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family was the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, the United Nations, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed that all human beings were born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone was entitled to all human rights and fundamental freedcms set forth in the Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, coiour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. "In adopting in September 1969 the Lusaka Manifesto on southern Africa which the General Assembly subsequently welcomed and recommended to the attention of all States and all peoples, member States of the Organization of African Unity reaffirmed their support for the principles and purposes of the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. They stated: 'By this Manifesto we wish to make clear, beyond all shadow of doubt, our acceptance of the belief that all men are equal, and have equal rights to human dignity and respect, regardless of colour, race, religion or sex...' "The question of the ricist policies of the Government of South Africa has been under discussion in the United Nations, in one form or another, since the inception of the Organization, but no progress has been made towards the eradication of those policies. For twenty-five years, the United Nations has striven to uphold for all in South Africa the basic hunan and political rights. -17- enunciated in its Charter and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The commitment was taken after the General Assembly had declared from the outset that South Africa's policies of apartheid were in violation of the South African Government's obligations under the Charter. IIt is therefore appropriate that, after a quarter of a century of debates and deliberations, the United Nations should review and reassess the situation and the efforts it has made thus far towards the achievement of its objectives in South Africa. Any assessment of the situation must take into account the overriding factor that the African population and other non-white communities of South Africa must be able to participate freely and on an equal basis in the political life of the territory, in accordance with the principle of self-determination. Without an acceptance and a commitment to the principles of human equality and self- determination, there can be no basis for peace and justice in South Africa and the world at large. IfIn attempting to achieve these objectives, the United Nations has availed itself of all possible procedures within the framework of the United Nations to urge South Africa to abandon its policies of apartheid and to accord to the peoples of South Africa the exercise of their fundamental human and political rights and freedoms. These procedures have included the establishment of a United Nations Good Offices Commission and of a United Nations Commission on the Racial Situation in the Union of South Africa in 1952, direct consultations between the Secretary-General and the Government of South Africa in 1961 and discussions in the various organs of the United Nations. In addition, Member States which maintain diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa have not been able to show any positive results in their reported efforts to persuade that Government to abandon its policies of apartheid. After the failure of these attempts at resolving the situation by bilateral discussions, negotiations and consultations with the South African Government, the General Assembly, in resolution 1761 (XVII) of 6 November 1962 by which it created the Special Committee on the Policies of A_artheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, requested Member States to take various diplomatic and economic measures against South Africa. Since then, it has in subsequent resolutions called for disengagement of States maintaining diplomatic, consular, political, military and economic relations with South Africa. It is the firm belief of the General Assembly that these resolutions, including resolutions 1761 (XVII) and 2506 (XXIV) provide an adequate framework for international action aimed at achieving the objective of the United Nations in South Africa. There has been no progress towards achieving these objectives because a number of Member States with political and economic interests in South Africa have withheld their co-operation in giving effect to those resolutions. itReferring to the situation in southern Africa, Secretary-General U Thant stated: 'There is the clear prospe't that racial conflict, if we cannot curb and finally eliminate it, will grcw into a destructive monster compared to which the religious or ideological conflicts of the past and present will seem like small family quarrels. Such a conflict will eat avTav the -18- possibilities for good of all that mankind has hitherto achieved and reduce man to the lowest and nost bestial level of it,-]'r".nce and h-ttr 'l.I "That warning was opportune since events in southern Africa have pointed to thei, incnt tdnqer c f a violent race conflict; f r, t-, the -i ence of oppression an' repru.ssicn .f white suprenacy 9,v'catrs in tllc rc-icn, the naticnal ]lovei ents of South Africa, Southern Rhc, es, Aa .ola rr,. !4 za- bique, whose liberatticn strur-le has been recognized as legitii-nte by the United Nations have responled with revolutionary action in the struggle. for liberation. "Following the Sharpeville massacre, the Security Council in 1960c declared that the situation in South Africa had led to international continued might endanger international peace and security. In August 1963, it expressed its conviction that the situation was seriously disturbing international peace and security, and called for an arms embargo against South Africa. Despite further deterioration of the situation, the Security Council has not instituted further measures commensurate with the demands of the situation. "It should be recalled that a Group of Experts, established in 1963 by the Security Council to examine methods of resolving the situation in South Africa, 'through full, peaceful and orderly application of human rights and fundamental freedoms to all inhabitants of the territory as a whole, regardless of race, colour or creed', had indicated the ways and means of achieving the United Nations objectives. It had stated: 'All efforts should be directed to the establishment of a National Convention fully representative of the whole population. Such a representative National Convention would consider the views and proposals of all those participating and set a new course for the future.' Following its last session devoted to the question of apartheid, the Security Council, on 18 June 1964, endorsed and subscribed in particular to that main conclusion of the Group of Experts. "The situation as it now exists in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, and calls for appropriate measures, within the framework of Chapter VII of the Charter, to put an end to the policies of a-partheid. These measures are all the more necessary because South Africa is openly challenging the United Nations throughout southern Africa. In Namibia, which it still occupies illegally, it has extended its policies of apartheid; in Southern Rhodesia, it has deployed some of its armed forces in the territory and is helping to defeat the limited sanctions instituted by the Security Council, whilst in the Portuguese colonies, it is assisting in consolidating the rule of a white colonial rdgime through economic and military co-operation. An example of this is the participation of the South African Government in the construction of the politically controversial hydroelectric dam at Cabora Bassa in Mozambique. "Having considered the situation in South Africa in all aspects, the United Nations is convinced that more resolute action should be taken to deal with the intransigency of the South African Government. The various measures that have been advocated by the Security Council and the General Assembly to -19- deal with the problem throughout the years continue to be valid. Special efforts, however, should be made to strengthen the embargo on arms to South Africa and to institute other measures which would increase pressure on the South African Government to abandon its racist policies. To this end all Member States are urged to face up to their responsibilities by taking decisive and resolute action in implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly. "At the same time those involved in the front line of the struggle against apartheid - the liberation movements, the trade unions, the students, the writers, and countless others - must be afforded the full support and assistance of the international community. Until such time as the South African Government is prepared to fulfil its obligations under the Charter, the United Nations is resolved not to relax its efforts in the struggle against apartheid." J. Programme for the observance, in 1971, of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination 59. On 9 March, the Chairman pointed out that pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2544 (XXIV), the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination "should be observed in the name of the ever-growing struggle against racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations and in the name of international solidarity with those struggling a7ainst racism". Consequently, the Special Committee, which wtas primarily concerned with racial discriuination and apartheid, should take an active participatirn in the observance of the International Year. He drew the attention of members to the varicus proposals of the Secretary-General's proposed programme for the observance, 12/ particularly the proposed world-wide seminar to be organized on reasures which should be taken at the national level for the implementation of United Nations instruments aimed at combating and eliminating racial discrimination and for the prcmotion of harmonious race relations. 60. The Special Committee agreed that it should participate actively in the proposed seminar and authorized the Chairman to secure the Ccr-mittee's participation. The Chairman, in a letter dated 11 March, addressed to the Secretary-General, 13/ stated that the proposed seminar "should, of necessity, deal with apartheid and the measures to be taken for its elimination, since apartheid is the most odious form of discrimination confronting the world today" and should be organized in consultation with the Committee. At the 137th meeting, on 16 June, the Chairman informed the Committee that the Secretary- General had 12/ Official Records of t'h General Asscmblv. Twenty-fourth Session. Annexes, agenda item 55, document A/7649. 13/ Circulated under the symbol E/CiT.4/1037. -20- agreed that the seminar should deal with apartheid and measures for its elimination, that the seminar would be organized under the progranne of advisory services in the field of human rig-hts and that all arrangements would be worked out between the Secretary-General and the Goverrmient of Cameroon as the host Government. 61. At its 134th meeting on 14 April, the Special Committee decided to address a communication to anti-apartheid movements and non-governmental organizations concerned with apartheid calling attention to the great importance it attaches to the widest and most effective observance of the International Year, and to concrete action during the year towards the eradication of apartheid, and inviting all the organizations concerned to participate actively in the observance of the International Year by undertaking, in co-operation with other organizations and institutions as appropriate, programmes that would contribute to the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination, particularly apartheid. 62. At the 157th meeting, the Special Committee decided to issue a special message on 21 March 1971, the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, and to organize an appropriate programme of activities for that day, on the occasion of International Year. K. Consultations with the representatives of the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa against the policies of apartheid 63. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) requesting the Special Committee to hold consultations with the representatives of the national movement of the oppressed people of South Africa against the policies of apartheid on various aspects of the question of apartheid, the Committee conferred at Headquarters with Mr. Robert Resha, representative of the African National Congress of South Africa and Mr. Potlako Leballo, Acting President and National Secretary of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa on questions concerning the measures to be taken for the elimination of apartheid and in particular on the question of assistance to the two movements. 64. The Special Committee took into consideration the views expressed by these representatives in formulating the conclusions and recommendations of this report. L. Work of the Sub-Committee on Petitions 65. During the period under review, the Sub-Committee on Petitions held several meetings to consider requests for hearings and communications received from organizations and individuals concerning the question of apartheid and South Africa. It submitted two reports L4/ drawing the attention of the Special Committee to some of the communications. (i) Communications issued as documents of the Special Committee 66. The Sub-Committee decided to issue two communications as documents of the Special Committee: 14/ A/AC.115/L.272 and L.275. -21-

(a) Letter dated 22 February 1970 from Mrs. Ethel de Keyser, Executive Secretary of the Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, transmitting a memorandum on the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique. 15) In the memorandum, the Anti-Apartheid Movement expressed its concern about the projected construction of the dam, examined the scheme and its implications and called upon all international institutions and public opinion throughout the world to oppose the project and ensure its non-completion; and (b) Report on the General Assembly of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, held in Cairo from 24 to 26 March 1970, transmitted to the Special Committee in a communication dated I April 1970 from the South African Non-Racial Open Committee for Olympic Sports, London, 16/ stating that "the Conference was unanimous in its resolve to eradicate all forms of racialism in sport on the Continent of Africa with particular attention to South Africa and Rhodesia". (ii) hearing of petitioners 67. On recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Petitions, the Special Committee heard statements by Mr. Dennis Brutus, President of the South kfrican Ion-P~aiaY Open Committee for Olympic Sports, at the 132nd meeting on 23 March 1970; ir. Arthur Ashe, an American professional tennis player, at the 134th meeting on 14 April 1970; 14r. Abdul S. rqinty, Honorary Secretary of the British 1nti- 4partheid Movement, at the 135th meeting on 20 May 1970; and Miss Mary Benson, a South African-born journalist and writer, at the 136th meeting on 8 June 1970. (a) Hearing of Mr. Dennis Brutus 68. Mr. Dennis Brutus spoke on behalf of the International Defence and Aid Fund of which he was campaign Director, on questions of planning and programming for 1971, which had been designated by the United Nations as the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, and on behalf of the South African Non-Racial Open Committee for Olympic Sports (SAN-ROC) concerning racism in the field of sports. 69. With reference to the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, he emphasized that, if effective action were indeed to be taken in 1971, organizational and planning efforts would have to be started as soon as possible. In that connexion, he suggested that the Special Committee, in co-operation with the Secretary-General and the Division of Human Rights, might undertake a special campaign to activate the many existing bodies currently engaged in a struggle against racism and inform them of the activities envisaged for 1971. To that end, the Special Committee might consider holding a seminar or conference under the auspices of the United Nations at which all such bodies would be represented. That would provide an opportunity for centralized planning of 15/ A/C.115/L.273. action against racism on a global scale. He suggested that it might be possible to persuade the Secretary-General to preside over at least one meeting of such a conference. 70. Turning to the question of racism in sports, Mr. Brutus said that he wished to put forward two basic suggestions. Firstly, the Special Committee should directly approach the Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and New Zealand, the two countries which were the main supporters of racist South African sports bodies, asking them to comply with the requests of the General Assembly regarding racism in sports and to put an end to sports exchanges with South Africa. Secondly, a programme should be devised to co- ordinate existing pressures with a view to ensuring that at least one objective would be realized by the end of 1971, namely, the total isolation of all racist sports bodies in South Africa and their complete exclusion from international sports exchanges. He believed that that end could be achieved during the International Year through concerted action on the part of the international community. The conditions which applied to tennis in South Africa could be taken as typical of the situation in that country in the entire field of sports. Racial divisions were rigorously observed, and a black South African was subject to arrest merely for playing tennis with a white. A number of white South Africans had recently been arrested for playing football with blacks on the grounds that they had been playing in an area restricted to blacks. He had himself been arrested for attending a meeting at which the exclusion of blacks from the South African Olympic team had been under discussion. The most recent case of note in that connexion was that of Mr. Arthur Ashe, who had been refused the right to enter South Africa in order to participate in an "open" tennis tournament. In refusing to grant Mr. Ashe an entry visa, the South African authorities had explained that their decision had been reached as a result of certain statements he had made opposing the policy of apartheid. It was clear, however, that the same thing would have happened to any black man wishing to participate in a South African sporting event open to whites even if he had never uttered a word concerning government policies. The authorities would be undermining the doctrine of white supremacy merely by allowing a black player to compete on terms of equality with whites. Thus, South Africa found itself in a position of desiring to participate in international sports on an equal basis with the other countries of the world, while it violated the code of non-discrimination which governed all international sporting competition. 71. Mr. Brutus recalled that the democratic structure of certain international sports bodies had made it possible to exclude South Africa successfully from international competition; that was the case in regard to football, table tennis and boxing. Despite the lack of any democratic procedure governing the Olympic Games, many countries of Africa, Asia and the socialist world, as well as certain Western countries, had presented a united front at Mexico City in 1968 and had thereby succeeded in forcing the exclusion of South Africa from competition. He felt that a similar demonstration of unity in 1971 could bring about the total exclusion of South Africa from international sports. He further suggested that those countries which had taken a stand by refusing to participate in sporting events with South Africa should go one step further and refuse to compete with those countries which supported South Africa. Sportsmen in such countries should be confronted with a choice between confining their exchanges to a small group of countries and casting their lot with those countries which had decided to present a united front against racism. -23-

72. 1r. Brutus also referred to the question of political prisoners. He said that increased international pressure had at one stage induced the South African Government to admit Red Cross investigators and to make some material improvements in the living conditions of prisoners serving long-term or life sentences. In recent years, however, the international community had not maintained the same level of intensity in its efforts to alleviate the plight of political prisoners. Twenty-two South Africans, including the wife of Nelson Mandela, had recently been charged with subversive activities and had been detained without trial for several months. When the case had finally been brought to court, it had been dismissed, but the twenty-two South Africans had been arrested again on the same day under the "180-day law" and detained without access to their families or lawyers. A further example of the desperate conditions in South African prisons was the case of Imam Abdullah Haron, the leader of the Moslem community in Cape Town, who had been detained under the "18-day law". Four months after his detention, it had been reported that he had died of natural causes on 27 September 1969. At the inquest held in 1970, however, it had been revealed that he had suffered extensive bruises and had been mutilated. The explanation given had been that he had fallen down a flight of stairs. However, it was not inconceivable that he had died at the hands of the secret police. 73. Such were the conditions in South African prisons ten years after the Sharpeville incident he concluded. It was therefore essential for the international community to redouble its efforts to secure the release of South African political prisoners and the total isolation of the apartheid regime. Unless public opinion were mobilized and effective action taken, there irould be many more deaths in South African prisons. (b) Hearing of 1r. Arthur Ashe 74. Recalling that he had recently tried to go to South Africa to take part in a tennis tournament, Mr. Arthur Ashe said that the President of the United States Lawn Tennis Association had personally submitted the request for a visa to the South African authorities, explaining that the trip was purely for sports purposes. He himself had agreed in writing not to make any statements concerning the policies of the South African Government. After repeated appeals had been made on his behalf, the South African Lawn Tennis Union had agreed to his participation in the tournament. In February 1970, however, the South African authorities had announced that they had decided not to grant him an entry visa because of certain statements he had made opposing the policy of apartheid. It was true that he had on many occasions exercised his freedom of speech and made known his feelings about racism. Through the American Committee on Africa he had developed an interest in the various aspects of the life of the blacks in South Africa and had followed the situation closely. 75. He also recalled that,in December 1967, feeling a sense of solidarity with the other black sportsmen who had wished to boycott the Olympic Games at Mexico City, he had discussed with the President of the United States Lawn Tennis Association the question of his participation in the Davis Cup matches. The question had not arisen in 1968 or 1969, since South Africa had been eliminated before the finals. On 23 March 1970, South Africa had been banned from competition -24- by the Davis Cup Special Committee, but it was still a member of the International Lawn Tennis Federation, whose next meeting would be held in July. He hoped that South Africa would be expelled, since national sports associations should be fully representative and not, as in the case of South Africa, representative of a white minority. The major international sports bodies should prevent the perpetuation of the present situation. 76. Replying to questions by members of the Special Committee, Mr. Arthur Ashe said that the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, France, the Federal Republic of Germany and Italy could decide to expel South Africa from the International Lawn Tennis Federation because of their privileged voting status. Pressure should therefore be brought to bear on them to vote in favour of expelling South Africa from the International Federation. Representatives of the countries concerned or private individuals from those countries could raise the question in their national lawn tennis associations and bring pressure to bear on them. The important thing was that the efforts should be made at the highest level by influential people rather than at the lower levels. 77. Mr. Arthur Ashe also felt that if South Africa could be completely isolated, not only in the field of sports, but also in cultural, intellectual and even diplomatic matters, the South African Government might be compelled to revise its policies. (c) Hearing of Mr. Abdul S. Minty 78. Mr. Abdul S. Minty emphasized the need for concrete action against South Africa. He stated that, while it was true that words could lead to action, the increased international condemnation of apartheid had paradoxically been accompanied by an expansion rather than a reduction of South Africa's economic, diplomatic and political links with the rest of the world. During the past decade, the number of South African foreign missions had increased and their personnel had doubled. Not only had South Africa's diplomatic links with its traditional trading partners grown, but it had also established new diplomatic trade and political ties with other countries, such as China (Taiwan), Colombia, Malawi and Uruguay. Although the United Nations had repeatedly called for a total end of trade with South Africa, the latter has never carried on as much trade with as many different countries as at present. During the period 1961-1967, Japan's exports to South Africa had increased by 205 per cent, Italy's by 153 per cent, France's by 135 per cent, those of the Federal Republic of Germany by 113 per cent, those of the United States by 83 per cent and those of the United Kingdom by 71 per cent. South Africa had never been in a better position to withstand the oil embargo, not only because it was receiving more oil and had ample reserve supplies, but also because considerable prospecting for new oil deposits was being carried on in South Africa and Namibia. Although several African countries had prevented South African Airlines from operating in their territory, new air routes had been established between South Africa and certain South American countries, as well as Australia and New Zealand, and established airlines had increased the number of their flights to and from South Africa. The arms embargo was being violated by France and other countries, and there were major loop-holes in its application by those Member States which were observing it. It was therefore true to say that South Africa was now more powerful than it has ever been before. -25-

79. M"Ir. Minty felt that effective action should be taken on two urgent issues, namely the situation of 22 detainees in South Africa and the situation arising from the increasin7 military collaboration with South Africa. With regard to the 22 political leaders now detained in South Africa, he suggested that the Special Committee should ask the Security Council to mnake certain that the lives of those individuals were not in jeopardy and should request the Secretary-General to send a jurist or other eminent person to South Africa to establish that they were alive and well. Referring to the military collaboration with South Africa, Mr. Minty stated that, within the past few years, South Africa had established naval links with countries in South America and, in 1971, its navy was due to take part in joint exercises with Argentine warships. There was speculation that South Africa and Portugal, together with Argentina and Brazil, intended to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the British Conservative Party had suggested the conclusion of a South Atlantic defence treaty which would also include the United Kingdom. There was also a possibility that NATO would enter into a military arrangement with South Africa. A proposal by a former British Prime Minister to put the Cape sea route under the protective wing of NATO appeared to have won substantial support in Western military circles. The British Anti- Apartheid Movement was concerned about those developments, because they seemed to indicate increasing military collaboration with South Africa. It hoped that the Security Council would draw attention to them and adopt a resolution calling for a far-reaching arms embargo which would eliminate certain loop-holes in the arms embargo. 80. idr. Hinty also stated that the Cabora Bassa Dam project in Tete Province in Mozambique, which was designed to facilitate the settlement of a million white immigrants after the removal of the 24,000 Africans now living there, should not receive support, first, because the dp.. would strengthen the white r~gimes in southern Africa by establishing a line of defence against the advance of African liberation and, secondly, because Rhodesia would be a major beneficiary of the project not only as a recipient of electric powerbut also as a supplier of building materials. Action taken by the Swedish Government had led to the withdrawal of the Swedish Company ASEA from ZAMCO, the South African-based consortium which was building the dam, and the Italian Government, which had originally agreed to provide export credits worth £20 million for materials, had now reversed that decision and withdrawn from the project. In the United Kingdom, the Anti-Apartheid Movement was exerting pressure on Barclay's Bank to desist from providing financial support to one of the companies bidding for work on the dam. It hoped that the Security Council would consider that matter also, especially in view of its decision concerning the application of sanctions against Rhodesia. 81. Finally, after informing the Committee of the activities that were organized in the United Kingdom against apartheid in sport, Mr. Minty stated the views of his movement that South Africa's policies posed a threat to world peace. The policies of apartheid, he said could no longer be considered in isolation from the policies pursued in other Territories which upheld the doctrine of white supremacy. The entire world had a responsibility to help the liberation movement in southern Africa. If the ultimate outcome of the present situation wrere a racial holocaust, it would not be the fault of the liberation movement; the responsibility -26- would lie with the white minority which was seeking to maintain itself in power in South Africa and with those Western countries which supported it. If the West feared to impose sanctions because of the painful impact they might have, it should bear in mind what the consequences of a major racial conflict would be. (d) Hearing of Miss Mary Benson 82. Miss Mary Benson stated that "torture by mind-breaking" and other less subtle forms of torture had become a custom in South Africa and that over the years more and more people had suffered. In 1963, one man had died while detained in solitary confinement; in 1964, two more had died and, in 1966, another two. All had allegedly been suicides. In 1967, two had died, one an alleged suicide, the other "an unknown man who had died on an unknown date of causes unknown". In 1968, one had died, allegedly by suicide, and in 1969, seven men had died. In 1963, the phrase "torture by mind-breaking" had been coined by 1r. Hamilton Russell, a former member of Parliament and a leader of the Progressive Party in South Africa. he had been describing the new law introduced by the then Minister of Justice, John Balthasar Vorster: detention without charge or trial for ninety days, renewable. In 1965, the period had been doubled to 180 days, renewable. And in 1967, under the Terrorism Act, indefinite detention without charge or trial had been introduced. Dr. Barend van Niekerk, a senior lecturer in law at the University of the Witwatersrand, had spoken of the Terrorism Act as an "institutionalization of cruelty". Others had described it as a licence to torture. 83. Miss Benson said that few details were available regarding the 15 known deaths since 1963. It was certain, however, that all those men had died while their lives had been under the absolute control of the Security Police. In South Africa, under the Terrorism and BOSS Acts, the President, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, the Attorney-General and the State Prosecutor were simply rubber stamps for the Security Police. It was the Security Police that decided whom to arrest, whom to accuse and whom to call as witnesses. 84. She recalled that 56 weeks had elapsed since the day in May 1969 when 17 men, five women and an unknown number of prospective witnesses had been imprisoned by the Security Police in a case which had become of international concern. One of the detainees was Mrs. Winnie Mandela - wife of Nelson Mandela, the African National Congress leader, who was serving a life sentence on Robben Island. Also detained were two women who, called as witnesses by the State, despite the torture and threats and despite certain prison sentences if they defied the court, had refused to give evidence against their friends. It was impossible to find out what had been happening to the 24 prisoners since February. Their attorney had tried in vain to obtain information, but the Security Police did not reply. A desperate attempt by 15 relatives to secure a court order restraining the police from assault and torture had failed. The judge had ruled that the matter was not urgent. 85. Miss Benson maintained that Major Swanepoel and his team of the Security Police had become experts at the statue torture, which consisted of forcing the victim to stand in one place, awake, for days on end - an almost infallible technique for breaking people in such a way that no mark was left on them. A refinement had now been added to that torture: the victim was forced to balance on bricks. There was something peculiarly obscene about Major Swanepoel and his team. It was not as if they were dealing with great leaders, with militants or freedom fighters. The case of the 22 centred on a small group who, through leaflets and attempts to gather clothes ana cash for families of political prisoners, had been desperately struggling to keep a spark of protest and of humanity alive. But with BOSS, with the Terrorism Act, the Security Police had to justify their existence. The unknown number of victims was but one aspect of the "brutalized society which connived with a brutal r~gime in applying brutal measures" against the non-white people of South Africa. Those words had been used by Mrs. Jean Sinclair, President of the Black Sash women in South Africa, to describe the destruction of lives, of families and of homes that were facts of life in that country. Her words were a reminder that, along with the many who suffered, there remained a tiny handful who never ceased to protest, right inside 3outh Africa. One of those protesters was Joel Carlson, attorney for the 22 and many others. In a speech to students in Johannesburg in April, he had said that inaction and silence were tantamount to approval. To know that the evil existed and to do nothing was soul-destroying. 86. In conclusion, she expressed the hope that when the 22 were released or charged, they would continue to make ever more insistent demands on behalf of the others,who were helplessly silenced in solitary confinement. She felt that it was vital that the Committee should keep up the pressure and that so long as there was a single political prisoner in South Africa, a single person suffering under apartheid, it should make known the abhorrence felt by the outside world. The Committee must be encouraged by the fact that the protest which had been voiced could not have been heard without the pressure which the United Nations had already brought to bear on the Government of South Africa. M. Work of the Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid 87. The Sub-Committee on Information on Apartheid held a number of meetings to carry out its task as defined last year by the Special Committee, taking into consideration the relevant provisions of General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) of 21 November 1969. 88. It held consultations with the Unit on Apartheid on the Unit's publications programme for the year. On 19 February, the Sub-Committee adopted a list of articles and studies on the basis of proposals submitted to it by the Chief of th! Unit on Apartheid, with the understanding that new topics for articles and/or s;udies could be added to it in the course of the year. On 9 March, the Special Cmmittee endorsed the list as finally proposed by the Sub-Committee, and agreed hat a series of studies on (a) military relations between South Africa and .ts main trading partners and (b) South Africa air and maritime relations with other States, should also be undertaken. 89. On 19 June, the Sub-Committee heard a progress report by the Chief of the Unit on Apartheid on the Unit's publications programme, and held further consultations with him. During the year, the Unit on Apartheid published the following issucs of its series entitled "Notes and documents": -28- - Banishment of Africans in South Africa No. 2/70 - Trial of 22 Africans for activities of African National Congress An African sentenced to seven years under the Terrorism Act More South Africans served with Banning Orders for opposition to Apartheid Note on persecution of members of the legal profession in South Africa No. 3/70 - Sharpeville - ten years later No. 4/70 - A decade of repressive legislation in South Africa No. 5/70 - Statement by the Chairman of the Special Committee on Apartheid - H.E. Mr. Abdulrahim Abby Farah (Somalia) to the United Nations Correspondents Association on 26 February 1970 Christian Election Manifesto NUSAS opposes racial discrimination in sport South Africa bans United Nations publication World against apartheid No. 6/70 - "Native Reserves" in South Africa No. 7/70 - Special Committee on Apartheid hears Mr. Dennis Brutus No. 8/70 - Special Committee on Apartheid observes International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and tenth anniversary of Sharpeville massacre United Nations funds for aiding victims of apartheid and other southern Africans African Editors' Roundtable and Regional Conference of Non-Governmental Organizations, Addis Ababa, 17-21 February 1970: recommendations concerning apartheid World against apartheid No. 9/70 - Chief Albert J. Lutuli: statements and addresses - II No. 10/70 - Trade union rights in South Africa No. 11/70 Special Committee on Apartheid calls for boycott of South African racist sport bodies and invites organizations to plan programmes for international year against racism No. 12/70 This is apartheid Facts and figures on South Africa Apartheid day by day Some pertinent statements No. 13/70 - Apartheid and education -29- No. 1/70

No. 14/70 No. 15/7o No. 16/70 No. 17/70 No. 18/70 No. 19/70 No. 20/70 This is apartheid - II Apartheid day by day More facts and figures on apartheid World against apartheid - Arbitrary detention in South Africa and its implications - Student movements in South Africa - Statement by Mr. S. Abdul Minty, Honorary Secretary, Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, before the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid, 20 May 1970. On arms embargo, detainees, sports boycott etc. Military build-up in South Africa: review of recent developments - South Africa's "Terrorism Act" - Special Committee on Apartheid again expresses concern over detainees in South Africa Circumstances of some leading South African trade unionists - Capital punishment in South Africa In addition, the Unit on Apartheid published the following special articles: May 1970 June 1970 June 1970 July 1970 Albert John Lutuli by the Rt. Rev. R. Ambrose Reeves The Freedom Charter Bram Fischer - an Afrikaner against Apartheid Christianity and apartheid by Dr. J. Verkuyl 90. At the 139th meeting of the Special Committee, on 2 July, the Chairman of the Sub-Committee suggested that a study on air communications to and from South Africa would be very useful to the Committee considering that, in General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV), the Assembly had invited all States to prohibit airlines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa, and to deny all facilities to air flights to and from South Africa. The Special Committee agreed that such a study should be undertaken by the Secretariat and that it should provide information on the volume and value of passenger and freight traffic, on the effect of the implementation of the above- mentioned provisions of Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) on the South African economy, especially on tourism and on the impact on countries providing facilities to air flights to and from South Africa. 91. The Sub-Committee held consultations with officials of the United Nations Office of Public Information (OPI) on the activities to further the dissemination of information on apartheid, particularly on the radio and audio-visual programmes and also on the proposed United Nations radio station for southern Africa. 92. The Sub-Committee was informed that the Office of Public Information had consulted the Organization of African Unity about the proposed radio station and that the Assistant Secretary-General for the Office planned to hold further consultations with the Organization of African Unity in Addis Ababa during a scheduled tour of some African countries. The officials of the Office of Public -30- Information explained that it was their understanding that the United ITations would not set up its own radio station and that an African State would be requested to lease a trans]Aitter to the United Nations for up to one and one-half hours daily for broadcasting prograrmles proluced by the office of Public Infornation. 93. The Sub-Committee was also informed that: (a) The Office of Public Information had sent a radio officer on an extensive tour of Africa. He had recorded a series of interviews with many people, including refugees from some southern African countries, and produced four special feature programmes upon his return to New York; and (b) The Office of Public Information had also completed a 20-minute film on apartheid which it would distribute widely. It had planned to send another film crew to Africa in the near future to make another film on apartheid. 94. The Sub-Ccmnittee assisted the officers of the Special Committee in their consultations with the United Nations Correspondents' Association on 26 February, on the question of dissemination of information on apartheid. It also exchanged views with Mr. Frank Ferrari, Vice-President in charge of external relations of the African American Institute, New York, with regard to the means of promoting greater awareness of the evils and dangers of apartheid in the United States. N. The situation of certain South African refugees in Lesotho 95. At the 135th meeting,on 20 May, the Chairman called attention to communications which he had received from representatives of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa alleging that arrangements had been made for the extradition to South Africa of certain South African political refugees, members Of the Congress, who were in Lesotho. The Special Committee decided that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees should be invited through the SecretaryGeneral to conduct an investigation and report his findings to the Committee. It also authorized the Chairman to approach the Lesotho Permanent Mission to the United Nations with a view to ascertaining the facts about the situation of the refugees in question. 96. At the following meeting on 8 June, the Chairman reported that he and representatives of certain African States had met with the Minister of Works and the Permanent Representative of Lesotho. The Minister had assured them that his Government would never hand over to the South African authorities bona fide refugees. The Government of Lesotho was in the process of drawing up an extradition treaty with South Africa, but that treaty would affect only criminals and would definitely not apply to political refugees. There were about 400 refugees in Lesotho, but many were not registered. Some refugees had disregarded warnings by the Government of Lesotho not to meddle in political affairs of the country, and had actively involved themselves in domestic politics. Consequently, the Government of Lesotho had been obliged to declare about 10 of them persona non grata. It had asked the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to inquire whether another African State would be prepared to receive them. The Government of Lesotho was prepared to facilitate the transfer of the ten refugees and had permitted representatives of the International Red Cross and the United Nations -31-

High Commissioner for Refugees to visit them. The Government of Lesotho had also extended an invitation to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity to visit Lesotho to look into the situation. 97. In a communication addressed to the Secretary-General, dated 8 July, in connexion with the request for information by the Committee, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees stated that his Office was giving close and continuing attention to the problems of refugees from South Africa who were in the neighbouring countries. His representatives for southern Africa had been in Lesotho, where a number of South African refugees, including those about whose situation the Special Committee was concerned, had been held in detention. His representative had been able to visit the detainecs and had talked freely with them. Moreover, the Chief of the Public Information Service of the Prime Minister's Office had reaffirmed to his representative, at the express wish of the Prime Minister himself, his Government's position in the matter, stressing that it had never been the intenticn -f the GovcrnmEnt -f Lesotho to deport the refugees in question. This had been confirmed on several occasions by the Prime Minister himself, in particular in a cable addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity and in a radio address broadcast on 25 May 1970. On the basis of those declarations and by the attitude which it had taken in practice, it seemed clear that the Government of Lesotho had no intention of returning the refugees to their home countries against their will. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees would continue to concern itself with the situation of the refugees,particularly with a view to their release and to their eventual resettlement in another country, and had remained in constant contact with the nutboritits of L- sotho to that end. 98. Mr. P.K. Leballo, Acting President of the Pan Africanist Congress of South Africa, subsequently informed the Committee that five of the detainees had been sent to Zambia through the good offices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, and, by arrangement with the African Liberation Committee of OAU, would be admitted in the United Republic of Tanzania. The Government of the United Republic of Tanzania had agreed to accept another group of five of thf :etainees, but the South African authorities had refused to grant them transit visas. 0. uestion of joint session of the United Nations organs dealing with questions relating to southern Africa 99. In a letter dated 12 March 1970 addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia 17/ the Chairman of the Special Committee recalled that, in General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV), the Special Committee was requested to take further steps including the holding of joint meetings with appropriate organs of the United Nations, to increase its co- operation and co-ordinate its efforts with such organs. That request, he pointed out, had been made following the recommendation made by the Special Committee in its last report that a joint session of the United Nations organs with competence on the southern African questions be held, during 1970, to consider the interrelationships of the problems of southern Africa and propose measures for greater co-ordination and more effective action. The 1/ A/AC.O9/348. -32-

Committee's recommendation had been based on its view that it was essential to emphasize that the policies and actions of the South African Government in Namibia and in the neighbouring colonial Territories had aggravated the situation in the whole of southern Africa, and that the questions relating to South Africa, Namibia, Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Territories, therefore required to be considered in the context of southern Africa. The Chairman concluded by expressing the belief of members of the Special Committee that a joint session of the three main bodies dealing with southern African questions should be convened as soon as possible. 100. Following an exchange of letters between the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the President of the United Nations Council for Namibia, members of the bureaux of the three organs held three meetings to discuss matters relating to a joint session of the three organs. Following the last meeting,held on 26 August, the officers of the three bodies issued a press communique in which it was stated, inter alia, that the bureaux of the three bodies concerned with southern Africa had agreed to hold a joint session at United Nations Headquarters, to take place, tentatively, on 10 and 11 September. However, it was later decided by the bureaux to postpone the session until after the recommendations of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity and the conference of non-aligned States were received. 101. It was also stated in the press communique that the joint session would serve primarily as a forum for a general exchange of views on matters of common interest to the three bodies. In the light of the outcome of this session, future sessions and their agendas would be decided upon. It was recalled that the proposal to hold the joint session had been made in accordance with General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) requesting the Special Committee on Apartheid to take further steps, including the holding of joint meetings with appropriate organs of the United Nations, to increase its co-operation and co- ordinate its efforts with such organs, and General Assembly resolution 2521 (XXIV), relating to the special programme of activities of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in connexion with the tenth anniversary of the Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and requesting the Special Committee, "in its preparation of a draft declaration or a suggested programme of action for consideration at the special commemorative meeting, to co-operate as appropriate with other United Nations bodies concerned". -33-

III. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOM1NDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE A. Danger of violent conflict in South Africa 102. In resolution 2506 B (XXIV), adopted on 21 November 1969, on the question of the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa) the General Assembly noted with concern that the Government of South Africa had continued to intensify and extend beyond the borders of South Africa its inhuman and aggressive policies of apartheid and that those policies had resulted in violent conflict. It expressed the conviction that the policies and actions of the Government of the Republic of South Africa were contrary to the obligations of a Member State and constituted a grave threat to international peace and security. 103. During the period under review the South African Government has continued to subject the leaders of the oppressed people of South Africa and the militant opponents of apartheid to its repressive laws, particularly the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act of 1967. Under the latter Act, 20 Africans charged with "terrorist" activities because of their legitimate opposition to apartheid are being tried, facing a minimum sentence of five years' imprisonment and a maximum penalty of death. 13/ Under the provisions of the same Act, many persons have been held incommunicado, without trial. Evidence has shown that the South African Security Police has subjected a number of those detained under the Suppression of Communism Act and the Terrorism Act to harsh treatment, brutality and torture. 104. The Special Committee notes that by continuing to apply its repressive legislation designed to suppress demands for social, economic and political changes accepted elsewhere in the world as normal, the South African Government has shown its determination to close all avenues of peaceful change in the country. 105. The South African Government has not only continued to persecute the opponents of its policies, but it has pursued the widest and severest application of the measures of racial separation and segregation, thus heightening racial bitterness and increasing the danger of violent conflict inside South Africa. 106. The threat of a violent racial conflict is all the more serious since, in view of the rejection by the South African Government of the Peaceful means advocated by the United Nations for an equitable settlement of the situation, the oppressed people of South Africa and their liberation movement are now convinced that their inalienable rights and freedoms recognized in the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights can be achieved only through armed struggle and underground activities. L For details, see annex II below. -34-

B. Threat of violent conflict in southern Africa 107. It should be recalled that the South African Government has been deploying its armed forces on the northern borders of Namibia in the Caprivi Strip and on the northern borders of Southern Rhodesia and that it has sent some units of these forces in Southern Rhodesia to combat the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and South Africa. Engagements have taken place during the year, the most publicized oneoccurring at Victoria Falls airport, when the freedom fighters ambushed a detachment of the South African forces. 19/ The South African Government has committed itself to the military support of the white minority r6gime of southern Africa. Early this year, the South African Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that his country was co-operating with its neighbours in Africa to maintain "law and order throughout southern Africa". "This explained the presence of members of the South African Police Force in Rhodesia where they were preventing the infiltration of terrorists from the north", he said. 20/ Moreover, South Africa has threatened the security of the neighbouring independent States for their support of the opponents of apartheid. The Special Committee wishes to point out that the aggressive policies of South Africa have heightened tensions in the whole of southern Africa. It therefore reiterates its warning that the situation constitutes a serious threat to peace and security in the area. 10B. The South African Government has been encouraged to carry out its aggressive policies by the assistance it had received in building up its military and police forces. In transmitting a note on the military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa 21/ to the Security Council, the Special Committee emphasized the phenomenal growth of the military power of South Africa despite the arms embargo instituted in 1965 and 1964 by the Security Council. It rejected the distinction drawn by States which had contributed to the military build-up in South Africa between arms for internal repression or enforcement of the policies of apartheid and arms for external defence. The Special Committee maintained that some of the arms and military equipment supposedly supplied to South Africa for its external defence had been used against the liberation movements of southern Africa. 109. The Special Committee notes with satisfaction that the Security Council, in adoping resolution 282 (1970) on 23 July 1970, has expressed its concern about the situation arising from the violations of its arms embargo and has endorsed all the Special Committeets recommendations for strengthening the embargo. However, it notes with regret that three permanent members of the Council abstained during the voting on that resolution. These three members were France, which had been the main supplier of military equipment to South Africa since the arms embargo was instituted in 1963; the United Kingdom, which had announced its intention to export to South Africa "certain limited categories of arms, so long as they are for maritime defence directly related to the security of the sea routes" around southern Africa, and which declared itself unable to support the resolution because "the wide-ranging nature of /provisions strengthening the arms embarg27 would conflict with existing commitments"; and the United States, 19/ The Cape Times, 23 January 1970. 20/ Southern Africa, London, 10 January 1970. 21/ A/AC.115/L.279 and Corr.l. -35- which stated that the provisions of the resolution went beyond the limits to which the Governmnrit of the United States of America could commit itself. 110. The Special Committee further regrets that the members of the Security Council could not agree to make their new decision mandatory. It concurs with the Security Council that "the extensive arms build-up of the military forces of South Africa poses a real threat to the security and sovereignty of independent African States opposed to the racial policies of the Government of South Africa, in particular, the neighbouring States". Should these States take the necessary measures to head off this threat, the United Nations would be confronted in southern Africa with an arms race with incalculable consequences for world peace and security. President Kaunda of Zambia has warned that "we will not sit idly by and watch the West arm the South Africans, who have made their intentions clearly known". 111. Against the background of South Africa's racist policies and the political climate in the whole of southern Africa, the Special Committee considers that the situation in southern Africa is fraught with danger and that the South African military build-up constitutes a serious threat to international peace and security. It is therefore essential that the United Nations should have enough vision to stave off this threat before world peace and security are irremediably endangered in southern Africa. The Security Council has recognized in resolution 2B2 (1970) that the situation resulting from the continued application of the policy of apartheid and the constant build-up of the South African military and police forces made possible by the continued acquisition of arms, military vehicles and of spare parts constitutes a potential threat to international peace and security. In the view of the Special Committee, the situation is sufficiently grave to merit measures of a mandatory character under the Charter of the United Nations. C. Economic and related measures 112. In addition to a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa, Member States should take other appropriate action commensurate with the situation. The General Pcse:bly has repeatedly called for the sever'nce of economic relations with South Africa. However, as Mr. Sean Gervasi, senior research officer in economics, Institute of Commonwealth Studies, Oxford University, has shown in a study. prepared at the request of the Committee, 22/ that many countries have increased their trade with South Africa and foreign capital has continued to flow to that country in abundance. 113. The study shows that the United Kingdom has rewained ')uth Africa's main trading partner. However, South African trade uith other countries has reached a very high level and is of considerably greater importance. Trade with Japan, the United States of America and the Federal Republic of Germany alone is now approximately 20 per cent greater in value than trade with the United Kingdom. 25/ According to the latest available statistics the United Kingdomas the main trading 22/ United Nations publication, Sales No.: F.70.It.K.8. 23 Ibid., para. BB. -36- partner of South Africa, has purchased one third of South African exports and has supplied about 25 per cent of its imports. The United States, as the second most important trading partner, has supplied 20 per cent of South Africa's imports. The Federal Republic of Germany and Japan rank third and fourth, respectively, as major trading partners. 24/ By far the most important increases in trade with any individual country have been with Japan. In 1964, Japan's imports from South Africa amountedto $US 118 million. By 1968 they had risen to a value of 'US 286 million. 25/ 114. In his study Mr. Sean Gervasi stated: "None of South Africa's principal trading partners need that country's goods or markets in anything like the same sense. Imports and exports are crucial to the functioning of the South African economy. And trade, especially trade in capital goods, is concentrated among a few countries... Neither the United Kingdom nor the United States nor West Germany, however, really depends on the South African trade to the same degree. For each of these countries, and for South Africa's other trading partners, trade with South Africa is a very small fraction of the total... It cannot possibly be said that the South African trade is crucial to economic activity in any of the developed countries." L6/ 115. With regard to investments, the study reveals that, in 1966, they were distributed as follows: 57 per cent from the United Kingdom, 13 per cent from the United States, between 3 and 5 per cent from France and a similar amount from Switzerland and the Federal Republic of Germany. ?7/ The figures for foreign investments for 1968, which are the latest available, show that total foreign liabilities reached a level of $S 6,416 million in 1968; this represents an increase of approximately 65 per cent over the year 1966, when foreign liabilities were valued at $US 3,906 million. It follows that foreign investments in South Africa have increased at a rate of roughly 5 per cent per year during the 196os. This is higher than the rate of increase of domestic investment in many countries which are investing in South Africa. L/ Since the rise in foreign liabilities is due to increasing direct investment, the majority of foreign investors are in fact participating directly in the economic activity of South Africa. 116. The Special Committee wishes to point out that those States which are involved in economic and trade relations with South Africa are contributing to the consolidation of the apartheid regime through their economic co-operation and that their investments yield high rates of return because of the cheap labour made possible by the policies of apartheid, particularly the exploitation of the non-white workers. 2/ Ibid., para, 113. 2/ Tbid., para. 115. 2/ Ibid., para. 118.

117. Until such time as the Security Council imposes effective mandatory sanctions against South Africa, the Special Committee believes that the international community should institute other measures which would have some impact on the South African economy. In this respect, the Special Committee takes note of the measures called for by the General Assembly in Pv ragraphs 5, 8 and 10 of resolution 2506 B (XXIV) and recommends that all States and international agencies be asked to comply with their provisions. It should be recalled that Member States were invited: (a) To desist from collaborating with the Government of South Africa by taking steps to prohibit financial and economic interests under their national jurisdiction from co-operating with the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; (b) To prohibit airlines and shipping lines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa and to deny all facilities to air flights and shipping services to and from South Africa; (c) To refrain from extending loans, investments and technical assistance to the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa; and (d) To take appropriate measures to dissuade the main trading partners of South Africa and economic and financial interests from collaborating with the Government of South Africa and companies registered in South Africa. 118. The specialized agencies of the United Nations and other international organizations were also urged in General Assembly resolution 2506 B (XXIV) to refrain from extending facilities to banks and other financial institutions providing assistance to the Government of South Africa and to companies registered in South Africa, and to withhold the benefit of international co-operation from the Government of South Africa so long as it persists in its policies of apartheid. 119. With regard to the request that all States should prohibit airlines registered in their countries from providing services to and from South Africa and deny all facilities to air flights to and from South Africa, the Special Committee has arranged for a study to be made providing information on the volume and value of passenger and freight traffic, on the effect of the implementation of the aforementioned provision of resolution 2506 B (XXIV) on the South African economy, especially on tourism and on the impact on countries providing facilities to air flights to and from South Africa. 120. The Special Committee notes that the South African Government has endeavoured to make its racial policies internationally acceptable and that its efforts have resulted in visits to Malawi, Portugal, Spain and France by Prime Minister Vorster. 29/ The Prime Minister who made personal contact with the heads of Government of Portugal, Spain n nd France, felt that his tour had been highly successful and stated the following: 29/ For details, see annex II, below. --38- II think, candidly, that the general climate has improved. I have high hopes of growing understanding for South Africa's position and domestic politics - high hopes that the world will come to realize that there can be co- operation as between nations and States regardless of the domestic policies of such States. I think it is high time that the world realized this. I am an optimist." 30/ 121. As far back as 1962, the General Assembly, in furtherance of its policy of peaceful persuasion, recommended that Member States should sever diplomatic relations with the Government of South Africa until such time as it abandons its racist policies. Since its establishment in 1963, the Special Committee has repeatedly advocated the severance not only of diplomatic but of consular and commercial relations with South Africa. Despite the General Assembly resolution and the recommendations of the Special Committee, the Special Committee notes with concern that, as shown in annex III below, a great number of States which had diplomatic or consular relations with South Africa before the original boycott was recommended by the General Assembly in its resolution 1761 (xvII) have continued to maintain such relations. Since 1962, although a number of countries have responded positively to the General Assembly resolution, the Special Committee notes that a number of other Member States have established new relations with South Africa, namely, Iceland, Malawi, New Zealand and Paraguay. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly issue another request to Member States to refrain from continuing or establishing such relations. 122. The Special Committee notes with satisfaction the fact that South Africa is increasingly being isolated in the field of sports, 51/ particularly its exclusion in March from the 1970 Davis Cup Tennis Tournament, its expulsion in May from the Olympic Movement by the International Olympic Committee, the cancellation of the all-white Springbok cricket tour of Great Britain and, in August the suspension for two years of its membership of the International Amateur Athletic Federation. This has been due to the pressure from anti-apartheid movements, trade unions, churches and other organizations and individuals. In view of this, it is regrettable that the New Zealand authorities have allowed the New Zealand national rugby team - the "All Blacks" - to undertake a tour of South Africa despite the opposition mounted by anti-apartheid groups. The Special Committee recommends that the General Assembly should reiterate the request it had made in resolution 2396 (XXIII) that all States and organizations should suspend sporting exchanges with the racist r6gime of South Africa and with organizations or institutions in South Africa which practice apartheid. 123. The Special Committee notes that, in its consideration of "the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa" in July, the Security Council limited itself to the discussion of the question of the arms embargo. It feels that a comprehensive consideration of the question of apartheid is overdue and should be undertaken as a matter of priority with a view to taking effective measures along the lines advocated above. 30/ Southern Africa, London, 20 June 1970. 31/ For details, see annex II below.

124. In his sixth special report on the application of the Declaration concerning the policy of apartheid of the Republic of South Africa, submitted to the International Labour Conference at its fifty-fourth session, the Director-General of the International Labour Organisation called for the abandonment of the practice of apartheid in the labour field "for reasons both of justice and of economic logic". The Special Committee feels that the ILO shculd initiate concrete action to trin, about the desired change. To this end, it recorends that, as part of its programme for the observance in 1971 of the International Year for Action to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination, the International Labour Organisation should consider the possibility of convening an international conference of all trade unions in order to decide on a concerted programine of action against apartheid. D. Assistance to the liberation movement 125. In resolution 2506 B (XXIV) of 21 November 1969, the General Assembly reaffirmed its recognition of the legitimacy of the stru6.1e of the oppressed people of South Africa for the exercise of their inalienable 5Aights of self-determination and urged all States and organizations to provide increased assistance to the national movement of the oppressed people of South A,'frica against the policies of apartheid in the light of the recommendations cf the Special Conmittee. In those recommendations, Member States were requested to assist the liberation movement: (a) By contributing food, clothes, medicine and educational material or by making financial grants; (b) By providing facilities to the liberation movermient to disseminate information on their legitimate struggle to the people in South Africa and in other countries; (c) By providing travel documents and employment and educational opportunities to refugees from South Africa. 126. Consultations with the representatives of the liberation movement of South Africa and the Organization of African Unity have convinced the Special Conmittee that such material assistance is urgently needed and that a greater number of States should commit themselves to providing it. The Special Committee considers that it is incumzbent on the international community to assist in appropriate ways the legitimate struggle of the people of South Africa. It therefore recommends that all States and organizations should be requested to provide material assistance to the oppressed people of South Africa and their movement for liberation either directly or through the Organization of African Unity. 127. The Special Committee recommends that part of the assistance to the liberation movement should cover technical training in various fields and the provision of printing and other equipment that would enable it to conduct an effective information campaign. It invites the United Nations Educational and Training ?rogramiae for Southern Africa to take into account the educational needs of the %ovement in preparing its programme for 1971. -40-

128. In order to follow the efforts of the international community and assess the needs of the liberation movements, it rmight be appropriate further to request i~eiabe States to report on the assistance that they provide. E. South Ai-rica and southern Africa 129. The Special Cormmittee wishes to call attention Lo the fact that South A- frica has continued to challenge onenly the United lations throughout southern Africa and that in so doing, it is striving to consolidate a bloc of white supremacist r4giLies in southern i frica. The South African Government has refused to comply with the Security Council's decision demanding its withdrawal from hamibia and has extended to the international Territory the policies of apartheid. It has supported iilitarily the white minority r6gimle of Southern Rhodesia and has given that regihLe sufficient economic as'sistance to defeat the limited sanctions instituted by the Security Council. South Africa is also cormitted to assisting the Portuguese colonial re'gime in 1lozwibique and Angola to resist any change in the status quo. Its participation in the construction of the hydro-electric dam at Cobora Bassa in iiozambique is part of a long-tern economic and political scheme aimed at consolidating a bloc of white minority r~gimes in southern Alrica. 1SO. The Special Committee therefore wishes to call attention once again to the main role played by South Africa in resisting all efforts towards the liberation of southern Africa and reiterates its view that it is necessary to consider the questions relting to South Africa, Nalibia, Southern Rhodesia and Portuguese Territories in the southern African context. It recomends that the United Eations organs dealing with the questions of southern Africa should co-operate more closely in order to consider the interrelationships of the problems confronting the United Lations in southern -frica and assist the organization in taking more effective action. F. Dissemination of information 131. The determination of the South African propaganda aimed at making the policies acceptable to countries that are maintaining political and economic relations with South Africa and to the international cormiunity should not be minimized. An insidious propaganda campaign involving a substantial budget and the services of propaganda specialists and supported by foreign business interests has resulted in a situation about which Prime .iinister Vorster was so confident that he could speak of the "growing understanding for South African position and domestic politics" after his goodwll tour of ialawri, Portugal, Spain and France. The Special Coiiittee therefore wishes to emphasize once again the great importance it attaches to the dissemiination of infonation on apartheid as an essential means to enlighten public opinion on the evils of apartheid and on the efforts of the international coizmunity in dealing ith the situation. 132. The Special Cozttee considers it necessary that studies be undertaken of South .frica propaganda and the miachinery for such propaganda in the countries concerned, as well as of appropriate measures to counteract iL. The findings of such studies should be made available to national comittees established in accordance with General ;sseably resolution 2596 ( &II), anti-apartheid -41- organizations or other non-govcrn.ental organizations comitted to the struggle against apartheid. The Special Committee recoymnends that, in the meantimie, the General tssembly should appeal to all States to intensify their scrutiny of, and taze appropriate icasures in line with their domestic la.rs against, the operations of all organizations whi'ch act as overt and covert lobbies for South African and pro- apartheid propaganda. In this connexion,sufficient attention should be devoted to the activities and operations of the South African Foundation, South African Tourist nssociation and the South i frican Lirways in various cou-itries. 133. While considering that all mass media should be used in the international campaign against aDartheid, the Special Committee recommends a wider use of radio prograi.Les. It recoriuiends, in particular, that: (a) The Secretary-General continue to ma:e arrangements to provide all the necessary material, as often as required, to ie:iber States willing to provide facilities on their national broadcasting systems for prograjmmes on apartheid. and that more States be invited to provide such facilities; and (b) States which can broadcast towards So-uth ifrica be requested to provide facilities on their national sLations for broadcasts by the liberation movelents of South Africa; (c) The Special Committee further recommends that the United Nations should adequately assist the Organization of iafrican Unity in undertaking regular broadcasts on aLartheid to South - frica and to southern nfrica as a whole. 134. The Special Coumiittee also recoimmends that the Secretary-General continue to promote wider dissemination of information on apartheid through other means, in particular through the publications of the Office of Public Information and the Unit on Wid. hile these publications should cover a wide range of subjects, special attention should be given to dissemination of information on: (a) Apartheid in practice; (b) -Resistance against al~areid; (c) Foreign involvement in South Africa; and (d) International capaign against aartheid. The Committee considers it highly desirable that such publications should appear in as many languages as possible. 5. e Sp cial Co~mittee feels that in order to review adequately the implc.entation of the United Nations resolutions on the question of apartheid, it will have to commission certain special studies on The extent of the involvement in South Africa of various I ember States. It irill continue to pay particular attention to the involvement of the States which main-tain military, political and economic relations with South Africa and will particularly need country studies of the economic relations of the main economic and trading partners of Sou-t-h .frica. Having regard to the increasing reports of new trade relations being established between South %f'rica and various other countries, studies of the relations between (a) South i-frica and Latin America, (b) South Africa and the rest of ifrica and (c) South Africa and insia, wvill be required to place the involveiient of the co-utries concerned in proper perspective. In view of the South ikfrican great dependence on oil and the activities of' South Africa in the field of oil research, a study on the supply of oil to South Africa and the feasibility and consequences of an embargo on oil against South tifrica rill also be useful. 156. The Special Cormittee values highly the co-operation of the International Labour Oranisation (ILO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 'Organization (UnESCO) w.ith regard to the dissemination of information on apartheid. The Comiittee is not aware of any activities of this nature having been undertalhen by other specialized agencies during the year. It recommends that they should be invited to increase their participation in the international campaign against apartheid. The Special Comittee suggests that UTLSCO be requested to bring up to date its report on Apartheid: Its Effects on Education, Science, Culture and Information, published in 1967,and to extend its scope so as to cover the effects of the racial lairs that have been applied to Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. G. ±ieetings away from Headquarters and consultations with representatives of the liberation movement, anti -apartheid movements and other organizations concerned iith the question of apartheid 137. The Special Comittee has in the past found it necessary and valuable to hold a session awray from Headquarters and to send sub-cormittees or delegations on missions abroad to cons-ult with representatives of the South i-frican liberation movement and appropriate organizations in fulfilment of its mandate. 138. Uhile it believes that full sessions away from Headquarters will not be required for 1971, the Special Committee, within the framework of its international cam.paign against apartheid, feels that it is necessary to maintain close and active contacts with various groups. Budgetary provisions should therefore be made for a sub-comittee of not ore than three -mebers to visit in 1971 some capitals of countries which are the main economic partners of South Africa or places where anti-apartheid oveents have been established. In this respect, the sub-conittee would take into account the findings and conclusions of the regional studies entioned in paragraph 135 above. 139. Furthermore, the Special Coymittee notes that 1971, designated as the International Year ta Combat Facisn and Racial Discrimination, will be imarked by many important events. One of them is the proposed seminar at Yaound6, Cai.-eroon. 2,/ L.mperience has shown that it is desirable for the Special Comimittee to be represented in such seminars. Some provisions would therefore be required for at least one or two members of the Corii ttee to attend the Yaound6 seminar and one other such gathering during the International Year:. ./ See paragraphs 59, 60 and 73.

140. The Special Corumittee held valuable consultations with representatives of the liberation iiovoiuent of Soutlh Africa at Headquarters in 1970. The experience having been extremely useful in its work, the Special Committee believes that it will also benefit from consultations with representatives of the anti-apartheid movements. It therefore recomnmends that soe budgetary allocation be icade for not more than two aenbers of the liberation movement and the anti-apartheid organizations to visit United Nations Headquarters in 1971 for consultations. 11. Other recommendations 141. The Special Comui ittee has taken note of the assurances given by the 1iinister of 7or5ks of Lesotho that his Governient would under no circumstances extradite political refugees from South A-frica who have sought political asylun in his country. The Special Comittee attaches the greatest importance to matters relating to the safety and well-being of refugees from South jifrica and therefore *u.rges the countries neighbouring South Africa to continue to accord these unfortunate persons all protection consonant with international practice and lair. 1i2. The Special Committee feels that its title is unduly ciibersome and recommends t1at it should be shortened to read "Special Coimittee on Apaitheid'f. I. General conclusion 343. In conclusion, the Special Coimittee wishes to reaffirmi its conviction that the sturggle of the non-white people of South Lfrica for equality and justice czn be successful if States Members of the United Nations take strong and resolute tction in support of that struggle. The lack of progress is attributable to two nain factors: the intransigence of the Government of South -Africa, coupled with -he unco-operative attitude of those States which continue to maintain diplomatic, coi.sular, econoic, commercial and ilitary relations with the racist r~gine. On th-1 occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, the Special Ccrmiittee expresses the fervent hope that, in conformity with their coimmitments to the objectives and principles of the United Nations, these liember States willl re-ex:aine their policies in relation to the Governmnent of South Africa and demonstrate by deeds their condemnation of apartheid. _..4 4-

ANNEX I LIST OF REPRESENTATIVES ALGERIA Representative Alternate Representative Mr. Hadj BenabdelKader AZZOUT Mr. Ahmed OUCIF COSTA RICA Representative Alternate Representative Representative Alternate Representatives Mr. Luis DOBLES SANCHEZ Mrs. Emilia BARISH Mr. Richard Maximilian AKWEI Mr. James E.K. AGGREY-ORLEANS Mr. Benjamin GODZI GODWYLL GUINEA Representative Alternate Representative Representative Alternate Representatives Mr. El Hadj Abdoulaye TOURE Mr. BoulaKov DIABATE Mr. Mr. Mr. Mr. Marcel ANTOINE Raoul SICLAIT Alexandre VERRET Leonard PIERRE- LOUIS HUNGARY Representative Alternate Representatives Mr. KAroly CSATORDAY Mr. Lgszl6 PINTER Mr. Janos VARGA MALAYSIA Representative Alternate Representative Mr. Yusof ARIFF Mr. Yoep ADLAN-ROSE Representative Alternate Representatives Major-General Padma Bahadur KHATRI Mr. Uddhav Deo BHATT Mr. Govinda Dev. PANT GHANA HAITI NEPAL

NIGERIA Representative Alternate Representatives Mr. E.O. CGBU Mr. Olajide ALO Mr. J.O. EDREMODA PHILIPPINES Representative Alternate Representatives Mr. Privado G. JIMENEZ Mr. Emilio D. BEJASA Mr. Federico TIONGSON SOMALIA Representative Alternate Representative Mr. Abdulrahim A. FARAH Mr. Hassan Kaid ABDULLEH

ANNEX II* REVIEW OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 7 OCTOBER 1969 CONTENTS Paragraphs Chapter 1 - 16 17 - 111 22 - 35 23 - 27 28 - 35 36 - 54 55 - 80 81 - 95 Page 49 52 52 52 54 55 58 62 I. INTRODUCTION ...... II. MEASURES OF RACIAL SEPARATION AND DISCRIMINATION ...... A. New legislation ...... (i) The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) ...... (ii) The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No. 19 of 1970) B. Implementation of the Group Areas Act...... C. Removal of Africans: "The tent town of Morsgat" D. Implementation of the Immorality Act ...... E. Establishment of the Coloured Persons' Representative Council and rejection of apartheid by the Coloured community ...... III. REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST OPPONENTS OF APARTHEID .... A. Political trials ...... B. Prison conditions and ill-treatment of prisoners C. Harassment of opponents of apartheid ...... IV. MILITARY AND POLICE BUILD-UP ...... A. Expansion of military and police forces ...... B. Guided missile production ...... C. Acquisition of arms and military equipment ..... D. Manufacture of arms ...... E. Military co-operation with other States ...... V. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS BOYCOTT AGAINST APARTHEID ...... A. Rugby ...... B. Tennis ...... C. Cricket ...... D. The Olympic Games ...... 112 - 143 112 - 120 121 - 130 131 - 143 144- 176 146 - 151 152 - 157 158 - 162 163 - 170 171 - 176 177 - 295 185 - 213 214 - 236 237 - 281 282 - 295 * Originally issued under the symbol A/8022/Add.l. 96 - ill 64

CONTENTS (continued) Paragraphs Page VI. SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA ...... A. Continued military intervention in Southern Rhodesia. B. Closer co-operation with Portugal in Angola and Mozambique ...... 296 - 309 299 - 301 302 - 309 -48- Chapter

I. INTRODUCTION 1. The Government of South Africa has continued, during the past year to implement its apartheid policies and to apply its repressive legislation against the opponents of apartheid, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions. It has enacted new laws of racial separation and discrimination, notably the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No. 19 of 1970); continued the implementation of the earlier legislation causing misery to tens of thousands of families; and ruthlessly harassed opponents of apartheid. 2. A general election was held on 22 April 1970 ith the participation of white voters only. 1/ The date of the election was advanced because of the split of a verkrampte (narrow-minded) group under the leadership of Dr. Albert Hertzog from the ruling National Party to form the Herstigte Nasionale Party. The latter did not win a single seat in the election and the N tional Party was returned to power though with a reduced majority. 2/ 3. The Government interpreted the results of the election as a mandate to continue its policies of apartheiO. Prime Minister Vorster declared that his Government would not cease to pursue with determination its fundamental policy of "separate development" and that no pressure from whatever source, or whatever nature, would force it to abandon that policy. 3/ 4. The statements made in July in the House of Assembly by members of the new South African Government indicated that further intensification of apartheid was the Government's answer to its reverses in the general election. Cabinet Ministers announced that there was to be no relaxation of apartheid policies or of their implementation. The Sunday Times (Johannesburg)-of 26 July noted: "They are behaving as if nothing has happened to make them change their policies, modify the implementation of the legion of harsh laws on the statute book, or show a little common sympathy for the man in the street or compassion for the under-privileged. They are beating the same old drums again and chasing up the same old hares." 5. While thus persisting in oppression of the non-white majority in the country, the Government has sought to pursue more actively the recent "outward-looking" foreign policy aimed at consolidating a southern African bloc, securing the 1/ The very limited franchise which the Coloured people enjoyed in the Cape Province was abolished in 1968. jj/ The National Party lost eight seats to the United Party. The results of the election were as follows: National Party - 117 United Party - 48 Progressive Party - 1 3/ Southern Africa, London, 2 May 1970. -49- goodwill of certain African and other States, and countering international isolation. In pursuance of this policy, Prime Minister Vorster visited Malawi, Southern Rhodesia, Portugal, Spain, France and Switzerland in May and June. These visits, it may be noted, involved not only the first visit by a South African Prime Minister to an independent African Statebut also the first visit abroad by any South African Prime Minister since 1961. 6. During these visits, Prime Minister Vorster held discussions with the President of Malawi and went to Lilongwe to see the utilization of the South African loan of 8 million rand for the construction of the new capital. In Southern Rhodesia, he held discussions with the illegal Smith regime condemned by the international community. 7. In Portugal, he held discussions with the President and Prime Minister. A joint communique issued at the end of the conversations indicated that the discussions "took place in an atmosphere of perfect understanding and will contribute to tightening the friendly links between the two countries". In a statement on 5 June, Mr. Vorster indicated agreement on continued co-operation between the two countries in southern Africa against alleged "communist" aggression. 8. In Spain, Prime Minister Vorster met with the Chief of State and the Foreign Minister, though the three-day visit was described as a strictly private visit and no official communique was issued. 9. In France, he met with the Prime Minister and told the press that matters of mutual interest in many fields had been discussed. The visit to Geneva was devoted to a conference of South African ambassadors in Europe. 10. Commenting on his tour of Portugal, Spain and France, Mr. Vorster said at a press conference in Geneva that in making personal contact with the heads of Governents of the three countries, his tour had been highly successful. He added: "I think, candidly, that the general climate has improved. I have high hopes of growing understanding for South Africa's position and domestic politics - high hopes that the world will come to realize that there can be co-operation as between nations and States regardless of the domestic policies of such States. I think it is high time that the world realized this. I am an optimist". 4/ On his return to South Africa, Mr. Vorster said that he was more than ever convinced that South Africa need not fear world isolation. "We are", he declared, "not as isolated as our enemies try to make out". 5/ 11. Despite the ruthless repression at home and the active diplomacy abroad, opposition to the policies of apartheid has continued to grow in South Africa and internationally. 12. Illustrative of continued underground activity in South Africa were reports that leaflets of the African National Congress and Urnkonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) had been scattered on 14 November 1969 simultaneously in Cope Town, 4/ Southern Africa, London, 20 June 1970. 5/ Ibid., 27 June 1970. -50-

Port Elizabeth, East London and Johannesburg. At the same time, a tape recorder from the roof of the non-white section of the Cape Town railway station broadcast slogans of the ANC. 6/ 13. In mid-August, anti-Government leaflets issued by the African National Congress were scattered by small explosive devices in major South African cities. The Hinister of Police, Mr. S.L. Muller, conceded that this was an indication that "undermining elements" were still active in South Africa. "The public must not think that the dangers are a thing of the past. It is something with which we will just have to live", he said. 7/ 14. Internationally, the boycott of racist sports teams from South Africa involving demonstrations by tens of thousands of people in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ireland and other countries indicated a growing abhorrence of apartheid even in countries maintaining diplomatic and economic relations with South Africa. 15. These were followed by world-wide governmental and public protests against breaches of the arms embargo against South Africa instituted by the Security Council in 1963-1964. The international concern was reflected in the Security Council resolution adopted in July 1970, calling for a strengthening of the arms embargo. 16. These significant following chapters. developments during the past year are reviewed in the 6/ CaDe Times, 15 November 1969; Rand Daily Mail, 15 and 17 November 1969; The Post, Johannesburg, 16 November 1969. The leaflets were reported to have been printed on airmail paper and to have contained photographs of Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela, and instructions on how to make a bomb. 7/ The New York Times and The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 15 August 1970. -51-

II. MEASURES OF RACIAL SEPARATION AND DISCRIMINATION 17. During the year under review,the South African Government has relentlessly extended the implementation of its policy of racial separation and segregation. 18. Further thousands of non-white families have been up-rooted from their homes and communities under the Group Areas Act. In its attempts to speed up the removal of so-called "black spots" from the ever-expanding areas designated white, the Government has pressed on with its policy of "endorsing out" African families to locations and camps lacking the barest minimum facilities. A big increase in convictions for pass offences was recorded. 19. In December 1969, the Government issued an edict denying African doctors and other professional men consulting rooms and offices in urban African townships. 20. New legislative measures, aimed at whittling away the few remaining rights of the African population and leading to further racial bitterness, were enacted by the all-white Parliament. Of these, the two most controversial and worthy of note are: The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) and the Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No. 19 of 1970). 21. On the other hand, the Government held elections for the Coloured Persons' Representative Council, advertised as an example of its interest in promoting self- government for the non-white population. When the groups accepting or acquiescing in apartheid were defeated by the Coloured voters, it reversed the results of the elections by nominating the defeated candidates to the Council and appointing one of them as Chairman. A. New legislation 22. The South African Parliament adjourned its first session this year on 27 February 1970 in preparation for the General Election on 22 April. During the 20- day session, however, Parliament enacted two highly controversial laws, both of which have drastic implications for the future of race relations within the Republic. Both laws had originally been introduced in 1969, but were postponed until this session. (i) The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act (No. 26 of 1970) 23. It will be recalled that the official policy of the South African Government is to divide the territory of South Africa into different areas based on racial classifications. Thus Africans,who comprise 68 per cent of the total population of South Africa, are presumed to be legal and permanent residents of African reserves or "Bantu homelands", which cover les3 than 13 per cent of the area of the country. However, those Africans whose labour is required in the rest of the territory, the so-called white areas, are permitted to reside there; any other Africans in those areas are "surplus" or "redundant" and are subject to being "endorsed out" to their "homelands". Even Africans legally permitted to remain in the white areas enjoy few legal, political, social or economic rights, and the -52-

Government has stated that it intends to remove the last of these rights. The Minister of Bantu Education, Mr. Botha, stated in the House of Assembly during the debate on the Citizenship Act: "I am going to remove all and every one of them." 24. In terms of the above Act, designed to bind every African legally and constitutionally to his own people, Africans will be granted certain rights in their homelands to compensate for the loss of rights in the white areas. For example, every African will henceforth be a citizen of a "self-governing Bantu area"' or "one or another Territorial Authority area". All Africans will be affected, whether or not they actually live in the homeland. The decision of the Minister as to which homeland an African belongs to will be final and without recourse. The African granted such citizenship may then "exercise such franchise rights in that area and enjoy all other rights, privileges and benefits and be subject to all the duties, obligations and responsibilities of citizenship", according to the terms of the Act. 9/ 25. Government supporters claimed that the Act is a vital step in the economic and political future of the Africans, aimed at fostering identification between each African and his people by tying him to his territorial homeland. They claimed further that the step towards citizenship will gradually lead to the disappearance of the word "Bantu" and that it will be replaced by names defining nationhood such as Xhosa, Tswana and the like. And finally, that the Act will in practice aid any African who wants to go to and set up business in a homeland for. as citizens, it is their right to do so. 26. Critics of the Government claimed that the Act is but another instance of the policy of "divide and rule", splitting the multi-racial South African people into different racial groups and sub-groups, and setting up separate national units to institutionalize these artificial divisions. In fact, only 35 per cent of the Africans affected by this legislation live within the territorial boundaries of their so-called homelands, and the vast majority of those outside have few if any ties with the homelands. Africans have, on the whole, been understandably reluctant to move to their homelands which are unable to support economically their present numbers. Of the African population living inside the homelands, many are there involuntarily; they have been expelled from the cities in accordance with the Governmentts policy. On many occasions, South African churches, (including the Dutch Reformed Church, a supporter of the Government) have condemned the consequent migrant labour for its detrimental effects on the African family situation. 27. In 1969, when the Bill was first debated, the South African Institute of Race Relations had warned that it was arousing great anxiety among Africans, particularly amongst urban Africans, who feared that,in order to get a job, they 8/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 24 February 1970, col. 1941. 9/ Section 2(4) of the Act adds, however: "... a citizen of a territorial authority shall not be regarded as an alien in the Republic" and he will "remain for all purposes a citizen of the Republic and shall be accorded full protection according to international law by the Republic". -53- might have to apply in the homelands and that this might affect the urban residence of their families. The Institute went on to say: "It is difficult to see what purpose the Bill will fulfil other than to symbolize in a new document that the Government regards all Africans as aliens." 'ii) The Bantu Laws Amendment Act (No. 19 of 1970) 25. This Act empowers the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development, by simple publication of a notice in the Gazette, to prohibit "the performance of work by or the employment of a Bantu in a specified area, in a specified class of employment, in a specified trade, or in the service of a specified employer or class of employers." It will whittle away still further the job security and the attendant residential rights available to those Africans who have "qualified" for residence in the white areas under the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act of 1945. 29. The Act also makes provision for the local urban authority, with the consent of the Minister, to remove or abolish any location, African village or African hostel; to remove any African illegally remaining in such location, village or hostel after its removal or abolition; to be himself removed with his personal effects to any other place "whether within or outside the area of jurisdiction of such urban local authority.': ll/ Furtherthe Act goes on to stipulate that an African so removed "shall be detained thereat for such period and perform thereat such labour as may be prescribed by the law in terms of which such rural village, settlement, rehabilitation scheme, institution or place was established." 12/ 30. The Bill was rushed through Parliament. Dr. Koornhof stated on 20 February that the Bill had become necessary to "stop up small cracks which are appearing in the /-abour/ wall" caused by Africans working alongside whites in certain jobs. This would lead to friction between the races, he said. Challenged by Mrs. Suzman (Progressive Party) to give one example of friction caused by whites and Africans working together, Dr. Koornhof said the Act was aimed at preventing friction before it occurred. 13/ 31. When asked by an Opposition member why Africans performing the jobs were considered to be potential causes of friction, but not Coloured people and Indians, Dr. Koornhof replied: "I am dealing with Bantu typists and nothing more ... Coloured typists do not fall under my department." 14! On 23 February, however, he stated: " ... we will most certainly do everything in our power to ensure that owing to social reasons which may create problems and also owing to possible racial friction which could be created in the process, no Coloured or Indian will be appointed to the position from which a Bantu has been removed., 15/ lO/ New York Times, 10 April 1969. 11/ Section 5, amending the Bantu (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act, No. 25 of 1945, 12/ Section 6. 13/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 20 February 1970, col. 1616. 14/ Ibid., col. 1623. 15/ bid., col. 1693.

32. In April 1970, the Government listed five job categories from which Africans would in future be barred. They are shop assistants, typists, receptionists in doctors' consulting rooms, telephone operators, and bartenders serving whites. 16/ 33. By closing employment opportunities in these fields, the Government hopes that these Africans will be forced to move back to their homelands. For once Africans have been prohibited from their jobs, they will fall into the category of "surplus Bantu" and they may then be deported to the reserves. 34. Dr. Koornhof, however, assured the House of Assembly on 12 February that the new bill would not affect residential rights. "I wish to state (this) categorically and with the greatest emphasis." 17/ 35. Mr. A. Kumalo, Chairman of the Kwa Thema, Springs, Advisory Board, commented as follows on the provisions of the Act: "Dr. Koornhof, who has always claimed to be a friend of the African people, has shown us today who he is. He is no friend of the African people... Dr. Koornhof wants us to go to the homelands to starve.' 18/ B. Implementation of the Group Areas Act 36. In reply to a question from Mrs. Helen Suzman, Mr. Coetzee, Minister of Community Development, told the South African Parliament on 17 February 1970 that 1,318 white families, 68,897 Coloured families, 37,763 Indian families and 899 Chinese families had become "disqualified" in terms of various Group Areas proclamations. Of these, 1,196 white, 34,240 Coloured, 21,939 Indian and 64 Chinese families had already been resettled in other areas. 37. Mrs. Suzman, commenting on these statistics, said that they showed that less than 1.5 per cent of the families affected by the application of the Group Areas Act were white. 19/ She continued: "... and I can remember that when the Act was introduced in 1950, the then Minister of the Interior, Dr. Donges, said that equal sacrifices would be required from all sections .... "It is quite clear from these figures - and, indeed, it has been clear for years - that the overwhelming burden of inconvenience and loss caused by the implementation of the Group Areas Act has been borne by the non-whites.... " 16/ Government Gazette, No. 2679 of 3 April 1970. The date on which the proclamation will be put into effect has not yet been determined, but the Government has stated that it will be implemented. See Government Gazette, No. 2767 of 7 August 1970, for declaration of that intention. 17/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 12 February 1970, col. 927. 18/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 7 April 1970. 19/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 21 February 1970. -55-

39. Mrs. Suzman contended that even in terms of the Act, and even when slum clearance was involved, it was not necessary to move whole settled communities like District Six in Cape Town and Fordsburg in Johannesburg. The areas could have been renewed and left to their original inhabitants. She further said: "But the truth of the matter is that white greed has motivated much of the implementation of the Act, so that the best business and residential sites could be handed over to the whites." 20/ 39. In reply to another question from Mrs. Suzman, the Minister of Bantu Administration and Development stated that 119,693 Africans had been removed from "black spots" and isolated "scheduled or released areas" since 1943. Twenty- nine "black spots" and eighteen scheduled or released areas - originally scheduled for African occupation - had now been eliminated. 21/ 40. Mrs. Suzman commented: "One's mind boggles at the thought of how many people still have to be shunted around before the 311 remaining "black spots" are removed and before the Nationalists' obsession for racial tidiness has been satisfied." 22/ 41. Another Opposition member of the South African Parliament had claimed,in December 1969,that more than 1,100,000 South Africans of all races had been forced to leave their homes and businesses because of the Group Areas Act. 23/ Mr. Eric Winchester, the United Party M.P. for Port Natal, bitterly attacked the Act as well as the Department of Community Development. He had made a three- year detailed study of the Act and the Department of Community Development at work, and had, on many occasions, called for a commission of inquiry into the matter. 42. Mr. Winchester stated that by May 1967, more than 1,000 group areas had been proclaimed and that by September 1963, more than 1,100,000 people of all races had been uprooted from their homes. It was also estimated that 2 million Africans would have to be resettled and rehoused in Natal Province alone during the next five to ten years. 24/ 43. The uprooting of Indians and Coloured persons from Zululand in Natal Province illustrates how the Group Areas Act continues to be enforced relentlessly. 44. The Coloured people and Indians have been living in Zululand since the nineteenth centurv. In November 1969, the South African Goverrment announced new group areas proclamations under whose terms occupation of Zululand north of the Tugela River was to be restricted to Africans and whites. 25/ It was reported that the Cabinet decision followed in the wake of concerted Nationalist pressure over a period of several years. 26/ 20/ Ibid. 21/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 13 February 1970. 22/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 21 February 1970. 23/ Cape.Times, 3 December 1969. 24/ Ibid. 25/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 23 November 1969. 26/ Ibid. -56-

45. The Coloured people and Indians were staggered at the new Government proclamations as they would be deprived of their homes, their future and their share in the area's projected prosperity. 46. On 28 November, representatives of the Indian and Coloured communities condemned the move, describing it as "unfair, un-Christian and an example of the misery of separate development". 27/ 47. A member of the South African Indian Congress, Mr. G.M. Singh, said that the removal of Indians from Zululand would disrupt the industries in which they were employed. Indians and Coloureds formed the backbone of the building industry, especially at the essential artisan level. 43. He also stated: "Indians have lived in Zululand since 1860 and I feel that they should be allowed to remain in that area without restrictions" 49. On the other hand, Senator R. Cadman (United Party), former M.P. for Zululand, saw in the projected removal a key step in the process of establishing a sovereign Zulu State. He yarned, however, that unless there were a wholesale consolidation of African reserves and consequent "wholesale shifting" of the white population, that aim could never be realized. 50. The reproclamation for white occupation of two group areas in the Claremont and Landsdowne sections of Cape Town was also widely condemned. 51. Mr. R.F. Hurley, Chairman of the Cape Western region of the Progressive Party, described it as a shock to many thousands of Coloured people miho have lived in these areas for generations. In a statement issued on 17 November 1969, Ir. Hurley said: "These areas were originally proclaimed for white ownership - but not occupation - in the notorious 1961 proclamations. The recent proclamation now makes provision for occupation by the White Group and for both ownership and occupation by whites of another area not attended to in 1961." Mr. Hurley continued: "The area proclaimed in Landsdowne was first settled by Coloured people at the turn of the century and has been developed by Coloured private enterprise into a desirable residential home ownership area. Europeans have been intruding into this area during the past 20 years. "As usual, it is the Coloured group who are called on to make sacrifice in the interests of a crazy ideology bent upon separating people willy-nilly from each other. The Coloured people have developed these areas and made them viable only to find that, as usual, covetous white eyes have fallen on their handiwork and they are to lose what they have wrought. 27/ Ibid. -57--

"To crova it all, the proclamation is made at a time when there is already a desperate shortage of housing for the Coloured people, when tens of thousands are already under threat of removal in places like District Six and Claremont." 28/ 52. In spite of the hardship and human tragedies which have flown from racial segregation, the Government has expressed the hope that its resettlement programme would be completed within seven years. 53. This indication was given bythe State President during his speech when he opened Parliament on 17 July 1970. 54. He said, inter alia: "The provision of housing for the lower-income aroups of the population was such and the development of proclaimed residential areas for the separate population groups took place at such a rate that the intended development may be completed within seven years, when all communities will have been settled in satisfactory circumstances in their own residential areas."29/ C. Removal of Africans; ;'The tent town of Morsi-at' 55. The South African Government continued to remove Africans from their homes and communities to "resettlement areas" in pursuance of its policy commitment to rid many parts of the country of so-called "black spots". 56. In October 1969, 300 African families were moved to the Morsgat settlement, 28 miles from Swartruggers in the Transvaal. The Rev. Father Cosmas Desmond described Morsgat as one of the "three worst settlements in the country". 30/ 57. After a visit there in March 1969, Father Dcimond wrote: "I almost had to hack my way through the bush even to see the tents. The whole area was thick with bush and in between there were hundreds of tents. It was impossible to judge how many they were because of the density of the bush but the local inhabitants said there were about 500 families and the last plot occupied was numbered 543" 31/ 58. On 25 October 1969 a team of reporters from the Rand Daily !ail, who had been investigating conditions there, wrote: "There are well over 300 families at present camping on the makeshift site. They have no prepared sanitary facilities. There is no health clinic (the nearest is at Swartruggers, the' bus fare R 1.10 ($L.54) return; average wage for breadwinners R 3 to R 4 ($4.20 to $5.60) a week. The single water tank supplying the entire community has a layer of green slime floating on the surface: the families have complained of severe stomach disorders". 28/ Cape Times, 17 November 1969. 29/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 17 July 197O, col. 14. 30/ Rev., Cosmas Desmond, The Discarded People, p. 117. 31/ Ibid. -58- 59. The team of reporters summed up their impressions of Morsgat as follows: "Poor, often non-existent, facilities; unhealthy and degrading living conditions; additional costs eroding wages that are already far too low; the enforced break-up of families. These are the morale shattering hardships responsible for a comment that is heard again and again in Morsgat: 'We have been thrown away'". 60. On 28 October,a group of churchmen and laymen issued a statement condemning the inhumanity of apartheid. They said: "Morsgat is the latest example of the injustice and inhumanity of the policy of apartheid. It joins the notorious names of Limehill, Stinkiwater and Klipgat in contributing to our shame. "The Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration boasted earlier this year that the Government had resettled 900,000 Africans since 1959. How many of these people have been subjected to such conditions as prevail at Morsgat? "It is tragic when people suffer through no fault of their own. But it is disgraceful when so many defenceless people are made to suffer as a result of the deliberate policies and actions of the government department which claims to be responsible for their welfare." 32/ 61. In a statement on the same day, the Christian Institute stated that the tent town of Morsgat was not an isolated removal but "one in a vast resettlement programme which was a logical consequence of the ideology of apartheid". 33/ 62. The statement continued: "The removals are the price the poor and defenceless have to pay in a country divided into group areas. But while we treat human beings like pawns on a chess board, these removals become the black spots on our national conscience". 54/ 63. On 29 October, some students mounted an exhibition of photographs of Morsgat at the University of Witwatersrand. Posters were displayed and fact sheets on the tent town distributed. They also collected money to provide relief for residents of the tent town. 155/ 64. Mrs. Eleanor Anderson, wife of a Johannesburg business director, was fined in November for trespassing in the Morsgat resettlement area. 65. She told the Rand Daily Mail on 28 November 1969: "I am interested in the resettlement of Africans because I would hate somebody to come to me and say tyou've got to get out and move elsewhere'." 32/ Rand, Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 28 October 1969. 35/ Ibid. 34/b1 id, 35/ Ibid. _-59-

66. She had gone with her son to "see what was going on there ... There was no sign saying we could not enter and, as we approached, an African smiled a greeting and swung open the gate for us. This welcome was deluding". 36/ She had not applied for a permit "because I knew I wouldn't get near the place if I was refused one, 67. On the other hand, the Deputy Minister of Bantu Administration and Education, Dr. Koornhof, claimed that the Government exerted no pressure on the 300 families to move to Morsgat. He added that 200 houses were being built and some new appropriation for further accommodation was expected in the new financial year (1970). 37/ 68. In its annual report released in October 1969, the South African Institute of Race Relations stated that African individuals and families, subject to pressure by officials, were agreeing to leave Cape Town for settlement elsewhere in the Republic, even when they did not wish to do so and were legally entitled to stay. 38/ 69. In December 1969, it was reported that the Bantu Administration Department' had stepped up its removals of the Africans in the urban areas to the homelands.370. In November, 2,172 people were sent away from Johannesburg alone, some under police escort and in handcuffs. This meant that 70 Africans were forcibly removed daily, a phenomenal increase of 20 over the 1968 figure of 50 daily removals. 71. According to The Star, the Africans were first sent from various places, including prisons, to the Newlands Police Station. Thence they were moved to Johannesburg station, where they received free tickets for the journey to the homelands. 72. In December 1969, the Black Sash Organization charged in a report that there was a concerted effort to endorse as many African women and children as possible out of the Johannesburg area. The report went on: "One can only assume that the reason for this harsh policy is to ensure that the children of these women, many of them born in Johannesburg and thus entitled to remain here, cannot be left here without their mothers. They are forced to leave with them, thereby forfeiting their rights of domicile under the Urban Areas Act." 4,0/ 6/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 29 November 1969. 7/ Ibid. 38/ Cape Times, 9 October 1969. The Institute and the Black Sash jointly run an office to assist Africans and other non-whites with laws on movement and employment. 39/ The Star. daily, Johannesburg, 10 December 1969, 40/ Ibid., 18 December 1969. -60-

73. Stating that some of the African women had been arrested, the report added that it was difficult to have a reversal once a person had been endorsed out. "The procedure conforms with the State policy of ensuring that in the future all labour in the urban areas will consist of migrant workers. Under all sections of the legislation women and children suffer most." 4l/ 74. The Black Sash further stated that another method used to reduce the number of Africans in the urban areas was the refusal to issue reference books to teenagers unless they had "irrefutable proof" that they have lived continuously in the area since birth. The same applied to those who, on the loss of their reference books, applied for duplicates. 75. The report concluded: "Many people have no other area to which they are entitled to go and obtain a book. They are in constant danger of arbitrary arrest and, no matter how they try, they cannot get their position regularized. 42/ 76. Illustrative of the inhuman policy of "endorsement out" is the case of Tr. Sam Vilakazi, an elderly widower who had lived and worked in Johannesburg for over 44 years. 77. In April 1967, he had lost his job. Upon presenting himself as a job-seeker in the labour registration office in Johannesburg. he was endorsed out of the area to Paulpietersburg where he was born. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner there re- endorsed him back to Johannesburg. He was told that he could not be accepted because he and his parents had lived as squatters on a farm in the district. 78. Mr. Vilakazi returned to Johannesburg. For nearly three years he lived there on the sufferance of a temporary permit. He was homeless. He was not allowed to work and had to depend on what his unmarried daughter, a domestic servant, could give him. He was again endorsed out of Johannesburg on 17 November 1969. He stated: "I don't mind going to Paulpietersburg, but I am worried that I will have to live in separation from my children. I also don't have money to build myself a new home." 79. In other instances, the policy of endorsing out has meant the break-up of long- contracted marriages between South African and foreign blacks. One of these victims was Mr. Everett Bakana. The Cape Times had the following editorial on this case: "As reported yesterday Everett Bakana who married his wife Miriam by church ceremony in 1944 and has lived in the Cape'with her since 1946, must now say goodbye to both her and his five children. This splitting of blach families, particularly by fostering migrant labour is nothing new. It has become part of the pattern of separate development. But familiarity with the situation does not lessen the heartache, the emotional punishment endured by the victims, or sociological evils which are attendant upon husbands without women and children without fathers. Any lingering doubts about the official attitude towards this ideological inhumanity were dispelled earlier this year when the Deputy Minister of Planning, Mr. Froneman, referred to African wives and children as $superfluous appendages'. i/ Ibid. 42/ Ibid.

"Technical jargon is a favourite device for whitewashing official actions which cause human suffering. To call a wife a wife, and a child a child, can be embarrassing. While separate development appears to be as much the separation of husbands and wives as the separation of blacks and whites, the wedding pledge that couples make to stay together 'till death us do part' becomes meaningless. It is the Government which is doing rather too much parting these days." 43/ 80. In January 1970 alone, 1,2'0 Africans were charged with being in an exclusive white suburb of Cape Town without permission for longer than 72 hours. Over 800 charges were also made against Africans who did not have reference books. 44/ D. implementation of the Immorality Act 81. Hundreds of persons have been harrassed, arrested, tried and convicted under the Immorality Act, another pillar of the' apartheid system, which prohibits sexual intercourse between whites and non-whites. 82. Replying to a question by Mr. L.F. Stofberg, the Minister of Justice, Mr. C.P. Pelser, told Parliament on 6 February 1970 that 1,640 persons had been convicted for contraventions of the Immorality Act between 1 July 1965 and 30 June 1968. Stating that statistics for 1968/69 were not yet available, he added that no statistics relating to the number of suspended sentences were kept. 455/ 83. The following cases illustrate not only the methods the police use in order to get convictions, but also the depths of misery, humiliation and broken lives which follow in the train of many such convictions. 84. Mr. W.J. Scheepers, a Bantu Affairs Commissioner, was reportedly arrested when an African schoolmistress to whom he had made amorous advances proved to be a police decoy. She invited him to her room and no sooner were they undressed than she signalled a policeman hiding nearby. Sergeant P. Ras of the morals squad came into the room, took a picture of the couple and arrested Mr. Scheepers. 46/ 85. During the trial of Mr. Scheepers, the Public Prosecutor disclosed that another official of the Bantu Affairs Department had been found guilty of t"attempting to commit immorality" and jailed for three months. Mr. Scheepers and the other man were dismissed by the Department. 86. Miss Barbara Simpson, daughter of a Scottish father and a Mauritian mother, and Mr. Walter Lynch, the white father of her five children, were charged in March 1970 with contravention of the Immorality Act. 43/ Cape Times, 6 December 1969. 44/ Ibid.., 14 March 1970. 45/ House-of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 6 February 1970 col. 423. (However, Mr. S. Uys, a South African journalist, wrote in the Long Island Press of 17 December 1969 that 3,177 were charged under the Immorality Act in 1969.) 46/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 8 November 1969. -62-

87. According to an account by Mr. Lynch, police squad cars visited their home in Jeppe after midnight. He said: "They nearly battered the door down and at one stage there must have been 25 policemen in the house. They searched everywhere." 47/ 88. Miss Simpson was nine months pregnant. She was arrested and kept in police custody. She gave birth to her youngest son two days after she wias released from prison. 89. Both Mr. Lynch and Miss Simpson appeared in court 16 times. They pleaded not guilty. 90. Miss Simpson stated while giving evidence in her defence that she and Mr. Lynch had met when she was 27 and since then they had been living together. She continued: "We have always lived among whites and had been accepted by whites. We have five children. The youngest is two months old." 48/ 91. Mr. Horwitz, the Prosecutor, asked the court to convict the couple, adding that this was "an unfortunate type of case". However, he urged the court to deal with the law of the country and not to yield to moral or other kinds of sympathy. He further said: "(Miss) Simpson was reluctant to admit or deny that she is white. Our country is run on a system whereby the races are separated." 49/ 92. On 19 June 1970, Mr. H.S. Bostnan, Magistrate of the Johannesburg Regional Court, found the couple not guilty. He stated that Miss Simpson was generally accepted as white, even though she was Coloured in appearance. In terms of the Immorality Act, she fell under the definition of white. 93. He further said: "But the matter does not end there. In terms of the Immorality Act, a white person is defined as any person who by appearance is obviously white or is generally accepted and reputed to be white. "Both Lynch and Simpson and a witness they called testified that Simpson was generally accepted as white. The court therefore finds that Simpson falls in the definition of a white because she is generally accepted as a white. They are found not guilty." 50/ 94. However, the court verdict of acquittal does not seem to have ended the nightmare for the couple. Mr. Lynch, a carpenter, has already lost his job. "I am sure it was because of the case. Now we want to leave Johannesburg and I will get a new job in the country. We want to start a new life." 51/ 95. The Opposition United Party has demanded a full-scale commission of inquiry into the working of the Immorality Act. The South African Institute of Race Relations announced its support for the proposal because of the "tremendous amount of suffering that is being created" by the Act. 47/ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 21 June 1970. 48/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 11 June 1970. 49/ Ibid. 50/ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 21 June 1970. 51/ Ibid. -63-

E. Establishment of the Coloured Tcrsons' Renresentative Council and rejection of anartheid by th Colourel community 96. It may be recalled that the Coloured Persons' Representative Council Amendment Act (1968) provided for the replacement of the Council for Coloured Affairs (constituted in 1964 and exercising limited advisory functions) with a Coloured Persons' Representative Council composed of 40 elected and 20 nominated members. The Act extended the franchise to all Coloured persons, male and female, 21 years and over. 97. Elections to the Coloured Persons' Representative Council were held on 24 September 1969. 98. The main parties which contested the election were the Federal Party and a coalition of the Republican, Conservative and National Parties, which sunported apartheid, and the Labour Party,which opposed apartheid. Acceptance or repudiation of apartheid became the crucial issue in the elections. 99. Although the Prohibition of Political Interference Act of 1968 had stipulated, among other provisions, that no person from one population group should assist any person who belongs to another racial group in electoral campaigns, 52/ the Nationalist Party press openly sided with the pro-apartheid parties during the campaign. Die Burger, for instance, stated: "It could be an ill day for the Coloureds and relations between white and brown if those people (the anti-apartheid Labour Party) were to get the majority in the election. They have nothing else to offer but a return to ... the bitterness which the old system brought about, only in a much worse degree ... 100. The Labour Party, however, won a clear majority of 26 of the 37 seats contested. The strength of the other parties was as follows: Federal Party, 11 seats; National Coloured Peoples Party, 1; Republicans, 1; and Independents, 1. 53/ 101. The breakdown of votes in all constituencies was as follows: 54/ Labour 140,631 Federal 87,751 Republican 21,693 National 17,759 Independent 13,351 Conservative 3,865 52/ Cape Times, 2 August 1969. 53/ Southern Africa, 11 October 1969. Three Federal Party candidates had been returned unopposed before the elections. The successful Independent candidate eventually declared for the Federal Party. 54/ Cape Times, 11 October 1969. A total of 573,985 persons had registered to vote: 256,957 votes were cast in the election. -64-

102. In an editorial, the Cape Times declared: "The rejection by the Coloured people of apartheid and all its works has been total, brutal and devastating. Seldom has an unsavoury political manoeuvre boomeranged so dramatically on its authors." 55/ The editorial continued: "The figures of actual voting devastate the Nationalist claim that the Coloured people as a whole welcome the idea of being kraaled off into a separate racial group, economically, politically and socially inferior as a matter of principle. But the figures tell only part of the story. There has undoubtedly been a boycott movement in operation, the successor to the boycott which made a farce of the earlier Coloured Affairs Council. Nationalist apologists will no doubt try to ignore the evidence of hostile boycott. But even at its best it only means that Coloured men and women care so little about the joys of separate development that they couldn't be bothered to vote." 56/ 103. The Government's point of view was indicated at a constituency meeting at Ceres by Mr. Lourens Muller, Minister of Police and of the Interior. He conceded that, if the Labour Party got control of the Coloured Council, "things will be more difficult that otherwise"'. He added: "I must honestly say that a large percentage (of the Coloured people) did not know what it was all about. The Labour Party undoubtedly had a Freat attraction for them. But in general they are still children in politics.' 57/ 10h. The Nationalist press echoed this position. Thus, in an editorial, "Dagbreek en Landstem", said that the Coloured person is "in many respects still a child in politics" and, "like a juvenile, he used his new freedom to voice his protest against authority". 58/ A commentator of the Government-run South African Broadcasting Corporation claimed that the Labour Party had won "two-thirds" of the seats because of a four-way split in the pro-apartheid vote and that, in the total vote, 55 per cent was for pro-separate development and 45 per cent against. 59/ 105. Mr. M.D. Arendse, leader of the victorious Labour Party, stated on 25 September that, since the Coloured population had rejected apartheid in its entirety, the South African Government should reassess the political situation as it affected the Coloured population. 60/ In a statement on 26 September, 55/ Cape Times, 26 September 1969. 56/ Ibid. 57/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 58/ Cape Times, 29 September 1969. 59/ 27 September 1969. Southern Africa, London, 11 October 1969. It should be noted in this connexion that the Cape Chairman of the National Coloured Peoples' Party stated that his party supporters did not vote for the Government's apartheid policies. He added: "The Coloured people who voted for us did not vote for a continuation of the Group Areas policy, for job reservation, inferior salaries, social discrimination and for the sort of pushing around that white nationalism demands." Cape Times, 11 October 1969. 60/ Cape Times, 26 September 1969. -65-

Mr. Arendse called upon the Government to "do the honourable thing by appointing nominated members on a fair basis, in accordance with the popular support indicated by the results". He contended that if the Government were to "appoint Federal Party supporters for the 20 nominated seats, it will prove to the world that this 'separate parliament' is a farce". 6I/ 106. The Covernment, in complete disregard of Coloured opinion, filled the Coloured Personst Representative Council with supporters of its policies. Of the 20 nominees appointed on 7 October, thirteen were members of the pro-apartheid Federal Party who had contested the elections and been rejected by the electorate. Mr. Tom Swartz, national leader of the Federal Party, was appointed Chairman of the Council. During the elections,Mr. Swartz had come out third in his own constituency by polling only 1,677 votes, whereas the Winner, Mr. M. Jhannes (Labour), had 5,652 votes and the Republican Party candidate had polled 1,753. 62/ 107. Mr. Marais Viljoen, Minister of Coloured Affairs, justified the nomination of Federal Party members by the claim that the pro-apartheid parties had polled more votes than the Labour Party. The Coloured Persons' Representative Council, he said, was an extension of the Government's policy of separate development and would be the instrument for promoting the positive implementation of that policy. It was desirable, his statement continued, that the strongest party which had committed itself to supporting separate development, should be given an opportunity to form a united front for conducting the affairs in the Council. 63/ 108. Dr. Jan Steyler, leader of the Progressive Party, issued a statement on 8 October expressing his "utter disgust at this latest shabby trick terpetrated by the Nationalist Party on the Coloured community". He further said: "The reason for the Government move, given by the Minister of Coloured Affairs, that the total number of votes cast for the three pro-Government parties ... exceeded those gained by the Labour Party's points to the double standards of the Nationalists. "The Minister, Mr. Viljoen, seems to have conveniently forgotten that the Nationalist Party came to power in 1948 with only 36 per cent of the vote and did not achieve a majority of votes until 1958. In the 10 years the Nationalists ruled with a minority of votes, did they ever suggest that they should relinquish power to the party for which the majority of the votes had been cast ...". 64/ 61/ Ibid. 62/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 8 October 1969. 63/ Cape Times, 8 October 1969.. The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 8 October 1969. 64/ Cape Times, 9 October 1969. -66--

109. On 8 October the Department of Community Development refused permission to the Labour Party to hold a post-election meeting in Cape Town City Hall. The next day the party was refused permission to hold a mass protest rally at the City Park Sports Ground. 110. The Coloured Persons' Representative Council was of Coloured Affairs, Mr. M. Viljoenj on 20 November. envisaged that the Council would eventually become an added: inaugurated by the Minister In his statement, he all-elected body, and "When that will happen naturally depends largely on the way in which you discharge the present responsibilities which have been placed on your shoulders." 65/ 111. The first session of the Council lasted for two days. The Council unanimously adopted a Labour Party motion asking the Government to pay Coloured professional staff and public servants the same wages their white counterparts received. 66/ The Government has so far ignored this motion. L5/ Cape Times, 21 November 1969. 66/ Ibid., 22 November 1969. -67- III. REPRESSIVE MEASURES AGAINST OPPONENTS OF APARTHEID A. Political trials 112. The South African Government has continued to try opponents of apartheid under its repressive and arbitrary legislation in defiance of world opinion. In the period under review, more persons were brought to trial under the internationally condemned Terrorism Act 67/ and the Suppression of Communism Act. 68/ 113. Twenty Africans, including 15 men and 5 women, were charged under the Terrorism Act in June 1970 in the Pretoria Magistrate's Court. 69/ One of the accused, Mr. Benjamo Sello Ramotse, stated that he had been held in detention since 16 June 1968; he alleged that he had been arrested in Botswana by Rhodesian forces and was, therefore, brought within the jurisdiction of the court in violation of international law. 70/ 114. The other 19 accused were among 22 who had been detained incommunicado under the Terrorism Act in May-June 1969, and charged in October under the Suppression of Communism Act. On 16 February 1970, Mr. Simon Bakker, the presiding justice, found them not guilty and ordered them discharged. The accused were immediately detained incommunicado once again under the Terrorism Act, until widespread international concern and protests by students, university professors and theologians, led to their being formally charged again in June 1970. Three others - Mr. Nanko Paulus Matshaba, Mr. Victor Emmanuel Mazitulela and Mr. Livingstone Mancoko - were released after over a year in detention. 115. The indictment against the 20 Africans was filed on 3 August 1970. They were charged with being members of banned organizations, such as the African National Congress and the South African Communist Party, and conspiring to 67/ Act No. 83 of 1967. 68/ Act No. 44 of 1950. 69/ The accused were Mr. Samson Rathshivande Ndou; Mr. David MotauMrs. Winnie Mandela Mr. Hiengani Jackson MahlauleMr. Elliott Goldberg Tshabangu; Miss Joyce Nomafa Sikhakhane; 1r. Lawrence Ndzanga; Mrs. Rita Anita Ndzanga; Mr. Joseph Sikalala; Mr. David Dalton Tsetetsi; Mr. George Mokwebo; Mr. Joseph Chamberlain Nobanda; Mr. Samuel Solomon Pholotho. Mr. Simon Mosikare; Mr. Douglas Mtshetse Mvembe Miss Venus Thokozile Mngoma; Miss Martha DhlaminiP Mr. Owen Msimilele Vanga and Mr. Peter Zexforth Magubane. Cape Timeq, 16 December 1969. 70/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 24 August 1970. -68- overthrow the South African Government. The prosecution alleged that the accused had undergone training in guerrilla warfare, had prepared and distributed pamphlets designed to incite a violent uprising against the State and had committed or encouraged other persons to commit sabotage. They were also accused of encouraging others to murder persons who had testified against the African National Congress and the Communist Party or who had supplied information to the police. It was stated that the background to the charges was that some of the defendants had conspired in 1961 to "prepare to commit acts of violence to bring about the overthrow of the State" and that the plan which had been put into effect in 1961 was "still in force". / The defence team argued at the opening of the trial on 24 August 1970 that the accused had already been acquitted of most of the charges against them and that, therefore, to proceed with the charges was to make their present prosecution "oppressive, vexatious and an abuse of the process of court". 7/ 116. Earlier, in September 1969, six Africans, charged under the Terrorism Act, pleaded guilty to attempted murder and were each sentenced in Pretoria to three yearsT imprisonment, two years of which irere suspended for three years. Three of the accused were acquitted: two men died before the trial opened on 9 September. U/ The accused, Simon Monnakgotla, Marks M..onnakgotla, Elisha Monnakgotla, Lucas Monnakgotla, Alexander Monnakgotla, Anna Dichiba, Herman Mooi, Elliot Molome and Cyril Joel Mokwana, were all members of the Bakubung tribe. They were alleged to have conspired to upset the rule of law and order by terrorist activity and, alternatively, to have assaulted the Chieftainees of the tribe following unrest over the removal of the tribe. L4/ 117. On 30 September 1969, 21 of the 26 Victoria West Africans charged with sabotage and being members of the illegal organization Poqo were acquitted in the Cape Town Supreme Court. Charges against the remaining five had already been dropped during the trial for reason of insufficient evidence. 11r. Justice Theoron, in delivering the verdict of not guilty, noted that the evidence of the five witnesses was so conflicting as to be unacceptable. -U/ He found further that there was a reasonable possibility of a conspiracy on the part of the State witnesses and the police spy (identified only as agent X54) in order to implicate certain of the accused falsely. 6/ Acquitting all the accused, the judge sttted: "It made one shudder to think that someone with the line 7 The New York Times, 4 August 1970. 72/ The Star. daily, Johannesburg, 24 August 1970. Nineteen of the accused were acquitted by Mr. Justice Viljoen on 14 September 1970. The trial against Mr. Ramotse is to be resumed at a later date. , / See paras. 127 and 128 of the report. _L/ Cape Times, 11 September 1969. _5/ Ibid., 2 October 1969. / Cape Times, 2 October 1969. -69- of thought and mentality of X5h could be placed in the position where, as a police witness, he could have an interest in the arrest of members of the public." 77/ 118. On 10 December 1969, in Pietermaritzburg, Mr. Donald Sifiso Mathangela, a 26-year-old African from Malawi, pleaded guilty to the charge of terrorism and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. He was found guilty of having undergone military training in China, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Republic of Tanzania and the United Arab Republic from 1962 to 1966. The court ordered that the identity of the State witness, on whose testimony much of the prosecution had relied, be withheld. Mr. Justice Jenning, in passing sentence on Mr. Mathangela, stated that the accused had been convicted of a crime so seriously regarded by the legislature that it had prescribed the death penalty, but found in mitigation that he had not left South Africa with the intention of undergoing military training. However, the judge said, it counted against Mathangela that he was a foreigner who had "conspired with others with the avowed purpose of overthrowing the established Government in South Africa". 78/ 119. In April 1970, Mr. Cameron Madikizela, a Johannesburg African attorney, was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment by a Johannesburg Regional Court magistrate for political offences. He had been charged with leaving the country without a valid document, breaking the conditions of his banning order by leaving the Johannesburg magisterial district to which he had been confined and failing to report to the police in compliance with his banning order. 79/ 120. Mr. Robin Phillip Cranko, a lawyer, pleaded guilty on 5 December 1969 to 30 contraventions of a banning order issued in 1967 under the Suppression of Communism Act. Mr. Cranko had been required under the banning order to report to the police station every day except Sunday between 6 a.m. and midday. He explained that his work as a real estate agent had made it very difficult to report to the police in the mornings. He was sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment, with all but 10 days conditionally suspended. 80/ B. Prison conditions and ill-treatment of 2risoners 121. On numerous occasions, the Special Committee has expressed grave concern over the fate of persons gaoled under the South African security legislation. Torture at the hands of the security police has become the regular feature of political prisoners in South Africa. In the period under review, several cases of alleged brutality have once again been brought to light. These are briefly noted below. 77/ Ibid. On 27 February 1970, in answer to a question raised in Parliament, the Minister of Police, Mr. S.L. Muller, stated that no charge of perjury would be brought against police agent X54. Mr. Muller went on to state: "Because if a judicial officer has doubts about the credibility of a witness in any particular case, it does not necessarily follow that such a witness has committed perjury." The Minister declined to say whether the services of this police agent had been terminated. "It would be prejudicial to the safety or interests of the Republic to disclose the required information concerning a police or security matter.' House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 27 February 1970, col. 2085. 78/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 11 December 1969. 79/ Ibid., 4 April 1970. 80/ Ibid.. 6 December 1969. -70-

122. On 20 February 1970, relatives of Mrs. Winnie Mandela and 21 other detainees under the Terrorism Act filed an urgent application in Pretoria against the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Police, ordering them to produce the detainees in order to give evidence of alleged assaults made on them. The detainees had been held in solitary confinement, without access to counsel, clergy or family and without recourse to the courts for several months. The application also requested that the authorities be ordered to desist from further assaults. Affidavits were read in court, which alleged that the detainees had been beaten and had been forced by the Security Police to remain standing for days, in order to elicit information and selfincriminating evidence. In the sworn statements submitted to the court, the detainees alleged that they had been made to stand on two bricks for hours on end, holding a brick above their heads. Mrs. Rita Ndzanga alleged that a white policeman had stood on a chair, picked her up by the hair and let her fall on to a gas pipe. She alleged that during her interrogation she had been beaten. 81/ The application was, however, turned down by the judge. 82/ 123. A public inquest was held into the death in detention of the Imam Hadj Abdullah Haron, following allegations of torture. Mr. Haron had been the editor of the Moslem News and in that capacity had frequently criticized racial discrimination in South Africa as being contrary to Islamic teaching. He was detained on 28 May 1969 and was reported to have died on 27 September. A police spokesman stated the following day that death appeared to have been due to "natural causes". 83/ 124. At the inquest, a State pathologist, Dr. T.G. Schwar, testified that a post mortem examination showed, inter alia, a broken rib and 26 bruises on the Imam's body. Major Dirk Genis and Detective J.F.P. van Wyk, who were conducting the investigation of Mr. Haron, stated that the Imam had slipped and had fallen on a flight of steirs, after a period of interrogation, a week before his death. Medical evidence showed that all the injuries could not have been caused by a fall and, further, that some of the bruises were more recent than others. 125. The presiding magistrate at the inquest, Mr. J.S.P. Kuhn, found on 10 March 1970 that death was due to a decreased flow of blood to the heart, a likely contributing cause being injury. "A substantial part of the said (injury) was caused by an accidental fall down a flight of stone stairs. On the available evidence, I am unable to determine how the balance, thereof, was caused." 84/ 126. In response to a public outcry at the circumstances regarding the Imam's death, the revelation of the deaths of at least 14 other detainees in recent years and the inconclusive findings of the above inquest, it was announced that an 81/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 21 February 1970. 82/ Counsel for the State, arguing against the granting of the defence motion, gave notice that, in future, the State would oppose such applications for court restraining orders, as consent had been construed by the overseas press in the past as constituting proof that such assaults did in fact take place. Cape Times, 20 February 1970. 83/ See Officinl Records of the General Assembly. Twenty-fourth Session, Su- plement No. 25 (A/7625/Rev.l-), paras. 158-162. 84/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 11 March 1970. -71- additional police investigation was ordered. Twelve weeks later, Colonel M.C. Lamprecht stated that the investigation will take "a little while still. 85/ 127. Mr. Jacob Monnakgotla, one of the ten accused in a Pretoria terrorism trial, was reported to have died as a result of "natural causes" on the night before the trial opened. His death was confirmed by police sources on 10 September 1969. 86/ No inquest was held. 128. It was also revealed by the Minister of Justice that Mr. James Lenkoe, who was found to have died by suicide, 87/ was detained along with 37 other BaKubeng tribesmen, in conjunction with the same alleged offence. 88/ 129. The hazardous effects of long periods of solitary confinement on prisoners and detainees have been a source of serious concern since the passage of the 90- day law in 1963, succeeded by the 180-day law of 1965 and the indefinite detention provision of the Terrorism Act of 1967. 130. Recently the case of Mr. Paulus Matshaba, one of the detainees under the Terrorism Act, has focused attention on the matter once again. Mr. Matshaba was released from Weskoppies Mental Hospital on 23 June 1970. A psychiatrist, reporting on Mr. Matshaba's mental condition after his release, stated: "... (There are) subtle elements in his functioning which do not appear to have been impaired. 71He is hesitant and uncertain in manner and speech. He admits to memory disturbance, especially for recent events (which is consistent with the possibility of his recently having received electro-convulsive treatments in hospital). iFor instance, he cannot remember the circumstances of his admission to hospital, nor the abnormal behaviour he was supposed to have shown at that time. People at the hospital told (Mr. Matshaba) that he behaved in a mad way when first admitted and that he refused food and medication. ... "Mr. Matshaba at present seems to me to be in need of help ... He feels depersonalized. He lacks assurance and confidence. He has to be helped to rediscover himself. "He responded to me as if I were interrogating him - remaining quiet, defensive and expressionless in demeanour. Withdrawal and passivity seem to be important defences against the undoubted destructive effects of solitary confinement and Mr. Matshaba still shows these features. 85/ Ibid., 11 June 1970. 86/ Cape Times, 11 September 1969. 87/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/75/Rev.l), paras. 150-154. 88/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 13 February 1970, cols. 959-960. -72-

"Perhaps psychotherapy and renewed contact with the world will mitigate some of the ravaging effects on the personality of solitary confinement." 89/ C. Harassment of opponents of apartheid 131. The Government of the Republic of South Africa continues to harass and silence the opponents of apartheid, through arbitrary repressive measures. 132. One of these measures is the issuance of banning orders under the Suppression of Communism Act. In terms of the above Act, the Minister of Justice has wide and arbitrary powers to prohibit any person from attending "gatherings" and to prohibit the publication of any statement made by that individual. In addition, the banned person may be prohibited from teaching or participating in trade union or political activities, and subjected to various other restrictions. The banned person has no opportunity to defend himself or right of appeal to courts. More than 300 persons are known to be affected, according to lists published periodically in the Government Gazette. 133. An extremely restrictive form of banning order is the "house arrest" order, by which the Minister of Justice may order an individual confined to his or her flat. Over hO persons are now under such orders. 90/ 134. Mr. Ivan Schermbrucker and Mr. Eli Weinberg were served with house arrest and banning orders immediately after their release from prison in April 1970. They had each served five-year sentences under the Suppression of Communism Act. Each is confined to his home from 6 p.m. to 7 a.m. during the week and from 6 p.m. Friday to 7 a.m. Monday. 91/ Both Mrs. Schermbrucker and Mrs. Weinberg had been placed under house arrest orders earlier. 135. Another form of restriction is the refusal of the Government to grant passports to enable persons to travel overseas. The Minister of the Interior revealed in Parliament that 153 persons of all races had been refused passports for the year ending 31 December 1969. In addition, 27 persons had left the Republic on permanent departure permits (exit permits), in terms of which they are automatically classified as "prohibited immigrants" and may be prosecuted on their return. 92/ 136. Mr. Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, leader of the Pan Africanist Congress, was refused an exit permit to enable him to leave the country. Mr. Sobukwe had been under house arrest in Kimberley, since his release in May 1969 after nine years' 89/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 26 June 1970. 90/ The Deputy Minister of Justice stated in the House of Assembly, on 28 February 1969, that 41 persons were under 12-hour house arrest and that one was under 2k-hour arrest (Hansard, col. 1575). Mr. Robert Mar--alioc Sobukwe was put under 12-hour house arrest in May 1969. House arrest and banning orders against Mr. Richard Triegaardt, in effect since June 1965, were withdrawn in November 1969. 91/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 16 April 1970. 92/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 24 July 1970, col. 362. -73- imprisonment. He had intended to take up a research and lecturing fellowship in the United States. 93/ Earlier, Mr. Sobukwe was refused permission to attend the consecration of his brother, as Anglican bishop in Johannesburg, on 16 November 1969. 94/ 137. Mr. Athol Fugard, the South African playwright of international repute, was refused a passport to enable him to travel to America, to attend the staging of his play, "Boesman and Lena", in New York. Mr. Fugard said that he saw the passport refusal as an "intimidatory" gesture. He went on to say: "I think they use this like banning and house arrests, to purge the country of 'undesirable' elements. I think they would like me to take a one way exit visa, but I will not do it." 95/ 138. The Government also revealed that the following number of persons were served with deportation orders during 1969: 96/ Non-whites : 125 Whites : 101 Total : 226 139. The Government has revoked the passport of Father Albert Danker, a Roman Catholic priest in Durban. No reasons were given for the action. Father Danker is reported to have been widely respected for his work among people of all races in Souch Africa. 97/ 140. Father David Shanahan, a Roman Catholic priest from Ireland, who had been working in South Africa, was ordered out of the country by the Department of the Interior. He told the press: "I have preached a lot on forgiveness and on unjust laws, like the pass laws. I told my parishoners that in the eyes of the church, they were not morally bound to obey unjust laws and that they were not morally wrong if they told a lie to avoid any penalty under an unjust law." 98/ 141. Mr. Spellman September, an African lay Methodist preacher, who is over 8o years old, was endorsed out of Middelburg, Cape, where he had lived for 4o years, because he was classified as a "security risk'. On 2 June 1970, he was ordered by the authorities to leave with his wife within 24 hours. They were sent to Sada resettlement camp. 93/ Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 2 July 1970. 94! Ibid., 5 November 1969. 95/ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 7 June 1970. 96/ House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 21 August 1970, cols. 2265-2266. 97/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 14 November 1969. 98/ Rand Daily Nail, Johannesburg, 22 August 1970.

142. The Rev. Sydney Barnes, Methodist minister of Middelburg, described the event as a shock and a disgrace. "My investigations revealed that the reason for this move was that Mr. September was considered by the authorities to be a security risk, because his son is soon to be released fronj jail. "Because of the sins of the son, a father, at the end of his life, is punished." 99/ 143. Five African delegates to a multi racial seminar of the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), held at Stellenbosch on 5 December, were arrested in a police raid and charged with illegal attendance. An official statement, issued by the acting president of NUSAS and signed by the heads of member delegations, stated that the authorities showed no intention of allowing South African students to run their own affairs. The statement went on to warn: "This can only strengthen the resolve of NUSAS, as manifested at this seminar, to oppose Nationalist authoritarianism, by working for a just society, in which students can run their own affairs and not be discriminated against on racial grounds." 100/ 9/ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 21 June 1969. 1OO/ Cape Times, 6 December 1969. -75-

IV. MILITARY AND POLICE BUILD-UP 144. The bystematic build-up of South Africa's military and police forces, initiated ii. 1960, has continued unabated during the period under review. In the White Paper o. Defence submitted to Parliament on 25 April 1969, the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, announced a five-year plan for the expenditure of 1,647 million rand ($2,306 million) for defence. 145. In the White Paper, Mr. Botha noted that since 1960, R660,325,000 @us 924,455,000) had been spent on armaments, of which about R254 million US 355.6 million) constituted expenditure on aircraft. The total assets of the Defence Force were reported to amount to R2,000 i'UIS 2,800 million). 101/ A. Fxpansion of military and police forces 146. The White Paper on Defence, tabled in Parliament by the Minister of Defence, reveals that the Republic would concentrate heavily on strengthening and expanding its maritime defence. The Government plans to provide complete cover for South Africa's coastal waters and a large part of the interior. Some major developments in this connexion may be noted: (a) A synchro-lift dock at Simonstown to handle submarines and smaller surface ships is already under construction. It is described as "the most modern of its kind", 102/ (b) A new R14.4 million ("US 20.2 million) tidal basin and submarine base will be built at Simonstown; (c) A fleet of fast coastal patrol craft will be acquired; (d) A large number of aircraft will be purchased; (e) A R12 million ( rUS 16.8 million) world-wide communications radio network at Westlake near Muizenberg will replace the old Cape Naval Radio. The project will provide South Africa with the most up-to-date radio communications equipment. It will also enable that country to keep in touch with merchant shipping movements as a link with South Africa - Commonwealth world-wide communications, as well as with naval craft. The Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, said at the opening ceremony at Westlake on 24 April 1969, that this would be done on a "24-hour, 365-day a year basis". !L/ 101/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 26 April 1969. 102/ Cape Times, 25 April 1969. IL5i Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 25 April 1969. -76- 147. The Government also reported that considerable progress had already been made with the first of five chains of the Decca navigational aid system, which would provide radar cover for the entire coast. 148. The effectiveness of the commando unit in unconventional (guerrilla) warfare, is also to be increased. 149. Greater emphasis will be placed on the local manufacture of weapons and ammunition in an attempt to circumvent the arms embargo imposed by the Security Council in 1965. 150. Salary scales for extra non-commissioned officers and privates in the permanent force have been increased in an attempt to alleviate the shortage of men in these forces, according to the Minister of Defence. L3j/ 151. A first step is also being taken in the military training of girls. It was announced in March 1970 that 130 girls would receive a training course in unarmed combat when the military training centre of the Department of Civil Defence is opened in George, Cape Province, in 1971. The training would include the use of light firearms. Members of the Defence Force and Police would assist in the training and in all probability army personnel would instruct the girls in telecommunications, machine maintenance and other techniques, L05 B. C-uided missile production 152. It will be recalled that, in May 1969, Mr. P.W. Botha announced that "Cactus", an all-weather surface-to-air missile system against low-flying aircraft, had been developed jointly by South Africa and France, with joint funding by the two Governments. The missile is known as "Crotale" (rattlesnake) in France. 153. The system was tested in the Bordeaux area of France in June 1969 and the South African Defence Minister, Mr. P.W. Botha, said in Paris on 10 June 1969 that the test was very satisfactory. He said that the success of the test warranted "the launching of local production of the system in South Africa".lO_/ 154. Paricipants in the project are the South African Council for Scientific and Industrial Research; Compagnie Electronique Thompson Houston and Hotchkiss Brandt, a French company responsible for ground equipment; and Engins Matra, a French company responsible for the development and manufacture of the missile, including rockets. The total cost of development has been estimated at R20 million ($Ug 2P million). 107/ 155. Mr. P.W. Botha stated on his return to South Africa that the first battery of Cactus anti-aircraft missiles would be delivered to South Africa in 1971. 1-/ Cape Times, 3 May 1969. 105/ Southern Africa, London, 28 March 1970. / and Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 11 June 1969. !1/ News Check, 23 January 1970, p. 213. -77-

156. Negotiations would take place with Thomas Houton regarding manufacture in South Africa. Although Cactus had been developed in association with the French Government, he said that South Africa had control of the missile. 128/ 157. The University of Stellenbosch announced in December 1969 the initiation of a post-graduate course in rocket engineering at the beginning of 1970, in co- operation with the National Institute for Defence Research of the Council for Scientific and Industrial Research. Personnel from the rocket propulsion division of the Institute, which developed the motor for the South African military rocket, would serve as instructors for some of the courses. 109/ C. Acquisition of arms and military equipment 158. The White Paper on Defence, introduced in Parliament on 24 April 1969, disclosed that certain overseas countries were continuing to supply South Africa with military aircraft. Many of the aircraft, including the supersonic Mirage fighter-interceptor squadrons and the Super-Frelon helicopters, came from France. Light reconnaissance aircraft for coastal patrols, heavier transport aircraft, additional helicopters for naval ships and a number of medium-size helicopters were on order. The White Paper noted: "As far as equipment is concerned, the purchases over the past few years have also contributed to a more favourable position. Although there are still some shortages, these will be eliminated in the near future." 110/ 159. The Minister of Defence, speaking before the South African Air Force Association in Johannesburg, disclosed: "New and modern aircraft and equipment have been acquired, are on firm order, or are included in plans for future orders. We have, or will shortly have, aircraft for maritime reconnaissance, day-fighter aircraft for support of ground force, all-weather aircraft, various types of helicopters, light reconnaissance planes, communication aircraft and bombers." ll/ 160. Deliveries of the Transall C-160 freight and troop carriers to the South African Air Force began in January 1970. South Africa had ordered nine of these aircraft, which operate from semi-prepared surfaces. It is manufactured by Transporter Allianz, a French-German combine formed in 1959 and including esserschmitt-Bolkov-Blohm Gmbb, Nord Aviation and VKF-Fokker Gmbh. A team of South African pilots were reported to have visited the Federal Republic of Germany in 1969 for training. 112/ 108/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 14 June 1969. 10_2/ Southern Africa, London, 15 December 1969. A12 Cape Times, 25 April 1969. i1/ Southern Africa, London, 21 February 1969. 112/ Cape Times, 21 January 1970. -78-

161. It may be recalled that South Africa had ordered three Daphne-class deep- diving submarines from France, at a cost of about 8 million rand (&ll.2 million) each. 162. The submarines carry 12 torpedoes and have a radius of 3,000 miles at 7 knots. 113/ The first of the three submarines, Maria van Riebcack, a highperformance craft of 700 tons, equipped with 12 torpedoes and capable of a maximum speed of 16 knots, was handed over on Friday, 24 July 1970, at Lorient, France, but crashed soon after it was handed over. D. Manufacture of arms 163. The White Paper disclosed that the Republic was locally manufacturing many items useful in the munitions arsenal, including army lorries, armoured vehicles, all ammunitions, electronic systems and weapons. 164. The Republic of South Africa had reached such a degree of military preparedness, the Minister of Defence, Mr. P.W. Botha, said in Pretoria on 6 may 1969, that the possibility of prohibiting the importation of certain weapons was being investigated. He went on to say that special attention had to be given to the desirability and possibility of manufacturing armaments in South Africa. Many organizations in friendly countries, he said, were interested in the development of strategic industries in South Africa. 114/ 165. He announced in September 1969 that the Armaments Board had arranged with the firm of Musgrave and Sons (Pty.) Ltd., to manufacture sporting rifles at Douglas Valley, near Bloemfontein. The Government would provide the capital and machinery and production would start as soon as the machinery arrived. Manufacture of 0.303 rifles was expected before the start of the next hunting season. As soon as the right equipment was available, the firm would start manufacturing 0.22 rifles and shotguns. It was hoped that a pistol would also be manufactured in the future. 115/ 166. On 7 November 1969, the South African Armaments Board signed an agreement with Yarrow and Co., shipbuilders of Glasgow, for a hydrographic surveir ship at a cost of over 5 million rand ($7 million). The vessel would be similar to the 2,898-ton Hecla class designed and built for the Royal Navy by Yarrow and Co.; clearance was reported to have been obtained from the Governmant of the United Kingdom. 116/ 167. A three-man technical team from the South African Navy arrived in the United Kingdom to follow the construction, which was expected to take from two to two-anda-half years. 117/ 113/ Cape Times, 21 January 1970. 114/ Ibid., 30 January 1969. 115/ The Star, 20 September 1969. 116/ Cape Times, 21 October 1969; The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 8 November 1969. 117/ Cape Times, 21 November 1969. -79- iiA. In December 16,", the first operational naval vessel built in South Africa the 256-ton torpedo-recovery ship Fleur - was reported to have completed her trials and to have been commissioned. The vessel was built by Lorman Long, of Durban. 118 169. In February 1970, Mr. P.W. Botha announced in the South African House of Assembly that the Government would assume full technical responsibility for the munitions factory at Somerset West, about 30 miles from Cape Tornm, as a result of negotiations with African Explosives and Chemical Industries. 1 170. He claimed in March 1970 that South Africa was capable of producing armour-plate equal to the best in the world and would shortly be producing as many as 140 types of amnunition and bombs. He stated: "We are capable of manufacturing the whole range of infantry weapons, and our electronics industry has been developed to satisfy most of the needs of our armed forces." 120/ E. Iilitary co-oneration .rith other States 171. Since South Africa signed the agreement to purchase three submarines from France, officers and ratings cf the South African Navy have been sent to that country, where they are given extensive training on land and in the submarines at Toulon, France, for about two years. One group arrived in France in March 1969. A second group of i9 arrived in October 19 f. "ore than 150 South African submarine crew 'cmbers ire retorted to be training in Toulon. 121/ 172. In October-November 1969, a South African Navy squadron of five ships (one frigate, one helicopter-destroyer, two coastal minesweepers and one replenishment tanker) visited three ports in Angola (Luanda, Lobito and Mossamades) during a training cruise of three-and-a-half weeks. 122/ 173. A training frigate of the Argentine Navy, A.R.A. Libertad, arrived in Cape Town on 24 February 1970 on a five-day courtesy visit. The commanding officer, Captain Emilio E. Massera, called on the South African Minister of Defence and 'inister for Foreign Affairs. 121/ 174. A l,00-ton training barquentine of the Colombian Navy, A.R.C. Gloria, arrived in Cape Town on 30 March 1970 on a five-day goodwill visit. 124/ 118/ Southern Africa, London, 1 December 1969. 119/ South African Digest, Pretoria, 20 February 1970. 120/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 9 March 1)70. 121/ The New York Times, 24 July 1970. 122/ Cape Times, 13 October 1>). 123/ Itid. 124/ Ibid. -80-

175. The South African Department of Defence disclosed in March 1970 that between the closing of the Suez Canal in July 1967 and the end of 1969, 195 warships and 139 fleet auxiliaries of the United Kingdom and other nations had made use of South African ports. 125/ 176. A British newspaper carried a report, in July 1970, saying that the Netherlands had told South Africa that two Netherlands warships visiting Cape Town might leave, unless their white and non-white crews received equal treatment. It added that a Royal Netherlands Navy official had said that the South African Government promised that non-whites would be treated as whites provided they wore their uniforms. 126/ 125/ Southern Africa, London, 21 March 1970. Of these, 168 warships and 124 fleet auxiliaries were British. 126/ The Times, London, 21 July 1970. -81-

V. INTERNATIONAL SPORTS BOYCOTT AGAINST APARTHEID 177. Since the last report of the Special Committee, the international sports community has taken very significant steps to boycott racist teams from South Africa. 178. The all-white South African rugby team's tour of Britain between November 1969 and January 1970 was marked by massive protest demonstrations against apartheid. 179. In January 1970, the South African Government refused to grant a visa to Arthur Ashe, the black American tennis player, to take part in the "South African Open". Subsequently, on 23 March 1970, South Africa was excluded from the Davis Cup tennis tournament in 1970. 180. South Africa was barred from participation in World Cycling Championships in March 1970. 181. On 15 May 1970, the International Olympic Committee voted to expel South Africa from the Olympic movement. This made South Africa the first country from which the Olympic movement, since its revival, has had to withhold its recognition. 182. During 1970, South Africa was also barred from competing in the World Gymnastics Championships and excluded from the World Netball Tournament. Combined pressure from the Government of the United Kingdom, the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, trade unions, churches and other bodies forced the cancellation of the all-white Springbok cricket tour of Britain in June 1970. 183. On the other hand, despite opposition by anti-apartheid groups and many other national organizations, the New Zealand national rugby team - the All Blacks undertook a tour of South Africa, one of the few major international sporting exchanges for that country. 184. Reacting to imminent isolation in international sports, a number of South African sportsmen and sports organizers openly called upon the Government to relax its rigid racist sports policies. These and other major developments are reviewed in the following chapters. A. Rugby 185. An all-white South African rugby team, which toured Britain from early November 1969 to the end of January 1970, became the target of massive protest demonstrations. 186. Following the "D'Oliviera affair" of 1968, the movement for sports boycott of South Africa developed rapidly in the United Kingdom. An organization known as the "Stop the Seventies Tour" Committee was formed in September 1969 primarily to protest against the South African Cricket Tour scheduled for 1970. This Committee, -82- together with the Anti-Apartheid Movement, spearheaded widespread opposition to any sports relations between the United Kin-dom and South Africa. The rugby tour bcca:ae the first target of their protests. 127/ 187. On 3 November, Prime Minister Vorster said in an interview on the BBC programme "Panorama" thit in spite of public protests against the rugby tour, South Africa would not deviate from her traditional sports policies. 188. He claimed that the various races in South Africa had always played sport separately. fl-o what the leftists and liberals want us to do is to play mixed sport in South Africa, and we are not prepared to do that". 128! 189. On 5 November 196q, the South African team was scheduled to play against an Oxford University side in the first of the 25 matches of the tour. But that first game was cancelled owing to a combination of pr=ssure, widespread protests and threats of violent demonstrations by all sections of the University including the students and faculty, as well as by trade unions, churches and political movements. 12/ 191. On 6 November, the Springboks played their first game at Leicester. Over 1,000 demonstrators made an effort to burst en masse through heavy police cordons guarding the grounds; some 300 demonstrators broke through linked- armed policemen into the field and the match was interrupted for a short while. The protesters chanted anti-apartheid slogans and clapped their hands all through the match. 130 191. That set the pattern of protests against the rugby tour as virtually every other engagement of the Springboks attracted massive demonstrations. Demonstrations occurred both inside and outside the grounds where the matches were played. The rugby clubs sponsoring the matches were obliged to pay for extra police protection. The deployment of policemen, together with extensive barbed-wire fortifications, was reported to have given some playing grounds the air of battlefields. 192. On 26 November, an estimated 4,:'00 anti-apartheid demonstrators consisting of students, trade unionists and clergymen took part in a protest march from the City Centre to Manchester's City Stadium. 127/ Anti-Apartheid News, London, October 1969. 128/ Cape Times, 3 November 1969. 129/ Among those in opposition to the tour were 22 South Afrfcan stulents at Oxford University. In a joint letter to The Times of London, they wrote that "apartheid had not been forced upon sports organizations in South Africa against their will". The vast majority of them all happily practised discrimination before the Government forced them to do so. Describing apartheid as "dehumanizing and callous",they added that it had "as its only rationale the determination to maintain white supremacy". Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 7 November 1969. 130/ Daily Telegraph, London, 19 December 1969. -83-

193. Perhaps the worst confrontation of the tour occurred at Swansea, where antiapartheid activists from Cardiff and Swansea universities were involved in what were described as "vicious clashes" with the police and supporters of the tour. Mr. Chris de Broglio, an official of South African Non-Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-RCC),gave the following account of the incident. "Young demonstrators were savagely beaten by the vigilantes after having been allegedly forced on to the pitch by another group of vigilantes from behind. Some demonstrators were actually thrown back into the crowd of eager rugby fans for more rough treatment. A police inquiry was set up to examine the role of the police and to hear complaints.'131/ 194. Not all the protest demonstrations ended in violence, however. The largest demonstration, which took place during a match at Twickenham on 19 November, was peaceful. Between 5,000 and 10,000 pickets joined a half-mile protest march from Twickenham station to the rugby ground. 195. Mr. Peter Hain, explaining the reasons for the demonstrations, said: "Our plans are not limited to the game itself, however, and what happens should amount to an effective, non-violent anti-apartheid demonstration". 196. It was estimated that the tour cost the British tax payer £58,000 (£50,000 from public funds and £8,000 from the rugby clubs) to maintain the ring of security round the playing grounds. It was further estimated that about 20,000 policemen, an average of 750 for every match, were mobilized to protect the matches and ensure that they took place. 197. When the Springboks visited Ireland in continuation of their tour, there were effective protests with the active participation of trade unions. Trade union boycotts in the hotel in which they stayed interrupted telephone communications and curtailed other services. Round-the-clock demonstrations were held outside their hotel. 198. The Cape Times of 2 February noted: "The rugby tour also fccuscl attention and attacks on South Africa's race policies like nothing since Sharpeville and the unsettled early sixties." 199. On 24 June 1970, the New Zealand national rugby team, the "All Blacks", began a 24-match tour of South Africa. 200. It was the first exchenge between the two countries since 1967, when controversy over the acceptability of Maori players on the "All Blacks" side had led to a suspension of a scheduled tour of South Africa. 201. The 1970 "All Blacks" tour was undertaken against a background of mounting opposition in New Zealand against South Africa's racialism in sport. 202. The Citizens' Association for Racial Eq,'ality has launched nation-wide protests against the tour since 1968 through public meetings, marches, discussions, 131/ Chris de Broglio, South Africa: Rris' ii Sp~rt (London, Christian Action Publications, 1970), p. A pamphlet of te International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. -34- petitions and demonstrations. 132/ In furtherance of the campaign, a national convention of representatives of all groups opposing the "All Blacks" tour of South Africa met in February 1970 to co-ordinate the protest campaign. 135/ 203. The South African Government tried to counter the protests by assurances concerning treatment of New Zealanders of Maori descent. 204. On 13 March, the South African Consul-General, Mr. Peter Philip, assured members of the Rotary Club in New Zealand that the "All Blacks" and their supporters would be well received in his country. He stated: "Segregation in South Africa does not apply to people who are not a permanent part of the population. The only status we recognize is that of a New Zealander and it does not matter a damn whether he is a Maori or Pakeha (white)". 154/ 205. In a communiqu6 issued on 16 April the Special Committee on Apartheid drew attention to the United Nations General Assembly resolution of 1968 requesting all States and organizations to suspend sporting exchanges with South Africa and with organizations there which practise apartheid. In urging that the resolution should be strictly implemented, the Special Committee singled out Britain and New Zealand as two countries where "most sports bodies of South Africa have been able to arranCe exchanges in spite of vigorous protests by opponents of racism". 206. However, the New Zealand Government. despite public protests, refused to ban the tour. On 16 April, Prime Minister Xeith Holyoake stated thkA t New Zealand had abstained from voting on the General Assembly resolution of 1968 on apartheid. 207. He added: "If there had been an opportunity to vote on that paragraph independently, New Zealand would have voted against it... that would have been consistent with the Government's policy of non-interference in the affairs of sports bodies".l1.5/ 208. On 17 April Mr. Matthew Rata, a Maori Labour Opposition member, presented a petitition opposing the "All Blacks" tour of South Africa to the New Zealand House of Representatives. The petition, signed by 4,700 persons, also asked the Government "to strongly advise sporting bodies against travelling to Rhodesia and South West Africa which are under administrations declared illegal by the United Nations". i 6/ It also urged that it should be clearly stated that any team of New Zealanders which intended to participate in sport against the countries which violated the principle of racial equality -were doing so as individuals and not as ambassadors or representatives of New Zealand. 157/ 152/ Richard Thoripson, "The All White All Blacks" i:n Rce Today, London, June 1970. L The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 5 February 1970. 1 Cape Times, 13 March 1970. 12/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 17 April 1970. 126/ Ibid. I Ibid. -8 -

209. Despite the protests, the "All Blacks" team proceeded on the tour in June 1970. The team included three players with Maori blood and one part-Samoan. 130/ 210. Having suffered exclusion from most international sporting events in 1970, the South African sports administrators greeted the tour of the "All Blacks" with great relief. Nevertheless, the tour provoked some racial incidents. 211. One of the first games played by the visiting "All Blacks" was at Kimberley. They won 27-3. At the end of the game some non-white spectators streamed into the field and started to cheer Bryan Williams, the part-Samoan member of the "All Blacks". A white spectator struck and felled one of the non-whites, sparking off "one of this country's ugliest racial incidents on the sporting fields". 1,9/ Within minutes there was a racial clash aggravated by bottles thrown onto the field from the stands. Before police restored order, several people had been injured. Among them was an eleerly white man who was taken to hospital with head injuries. 140/ 212. During another match played at Upington, the thousand non-white spectators were reported to have been noisy, shouting "Going Going Going"(the name of one of the Maoris in the visiting side) during most of the game. 213. In related developments some Australian rugby players have declared that they would not play against South Africans in future if apartheid in sports continued. 141,/ B. Tennis 214. Mr. Arthur Ashe, the 26-year-old black American tennis player, applied to contest in the South African Open Championship scheduled for early 1970. The South African Lawn Tennis Union accepted his entry,but the Government refused him a visa. This action ultimately resulted in the suspension of South Africa from the Davis Cup. 142/ 215. In an address to the Women's National Democratic Club in Washington on 6 November 1969, 1vr. Ashe had indicated that he intended to persist in his efforts to play in South Africa and "put a crack in the racist wall down there". He said: "As P member of the United States Davis Cup Team, they would accept me, li7,/ Mr. Richard Thompson, a prominent opponent of the tour, noted: "There are reports of' an informal understanding between the two rugby bodies that any Maori players included in the All Black team will not be too dark. The All Black team will, in the official South African view, consist only of New Zealanders and amongst the New Zealanders there may be some of 'Maori blood' as there have always been in the past. The kind of Maori players excluded in the past remain excluded." Race Today, London, June 1970. _9/ The Guardian, Manchester, 29 June 1970. 140/ Ibid. 141/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 25 May 1970. 142/ For a detailed review of developments in this connexion, see the hearing of Ir. Ashe by the Special Committee (A/AC.115/SR.154). .-86- let me play tennis, let me stay at their hotels, drink at their water fountains,... but, as an individual, just Arthur Ashe, they won't even accept my visa". 143/ 216. On 3 December, Mr. Frank W. Waring, the Minister for Sport and Recreation, alleged: "Mr. Ashe obviously does not intend to come to South Africa to play tennis but to engage in political activity." He added that Arthur Ashe had shown an "outright unfriendly and threatening attitude toward South Africa" by some of his actions and statements. 144/ 217. On 5 December, Arthur Ashe denied that his desire to go to South Africa was "not to play tennis but to engage in political activity" and warned that turning down his application for a visa would have "profound implications". 145/ 218. Mr. Ashe's application for a visa was reportedly supported by the Department of State of the United States of America. 219. A number of sports administrators in South Africa called for limited multi- racialism for international sporting events. They included Mr. Alf Chalmers, President of the Lawn Tennis Union, Mr. Jack Cheetham, the President of the Cricket Association, Mr. Matt Mare, Chairman of the Athletic Union and Mr. Cyril Geoghegan, Chairman of the Amateur Cycling Union. 146/ 220. Mr. Ashe applied to the South African consulate in New York on 15 December 1969 for a visa. Speaking at a news conference thereafter, he reiterated his desire to visit South Africa "to play tennis, and only to play tennis, although it is natural that I have a desire to see the country first-hand, too". 147/ 221. His application for a visa, he continued, was based "on the reciprocal condition" that his entry in the tournament would be accepted and his visa "approved as an American citizen, not as a Davis Cup member... I come not to expound my political beliefs about South Africa, but simply to play my best possible tennis... I feel I am bending over backwards to be fair about this. Although it can be construed as a new position, it is actually intended to be a clarification of policy on my part". 148/ 222. On 28 January 1970, the Government refused to give a visa to Mr. Ashe to compete in the South African Open Tennis Championships. A government statement declared that Ashe would, however, be permitted to play in South Africa as a member of the Davis Cup team if the team's schedule so warranted. 149/ 223. Mr. F.W. Waring ascribed the Government's decision to what he described as Mr. Ashe's "general antagonism toward South Africa". 143/ Cape Times, 7 November 1969. 144/ Reuters, 3 December 1969. 145/ The New York Times, 6 December 1969. 146/ Cape Times, 12 December 1969. 147/ The New York Times, 16 December 1969. 148/ Ibid. 149/ Ibid., 29 January 1970. -87-

224. The South African Governments barring of Mr. Ashe aroused adverse reactions in the United States and in other countries and convinced many of the need to reappraise sports relationships with that country. 225. A spokesman for the United States Department of State regretted the ruling, adding that permitting Mr. Ashe's entry would have helped South Africa in its international sports relationships. 226. Citing the action as a "clear case of racial discrimination", Mr. Alastair B. Martin, President of the United States Lawn Tennis Association, called for South Africa's expulsion from international tennis. 227. Congressman Charles Diggs, Chairman of the United States Houee of Representatives Sub-Committee on Africa, who had himself been refused a visa to visit South Africa in 1969, said: "I expected the racist South African r4gime to do this to Ashe. I'm renewing my demand to the State Department that Gary Player and other white South Africans be denied entry to the United States in retaliation . 150' 228. r. George Houser, Executive Director of the American Committee on Africa in New York, stated that his organization was urging the United States to admit only those sportsmen who made public statements repudiating apartheid. He predicted that the decision against Ashe would give world sporting bodies "no further excuse to maintain existing ties with the Republic ".151/ 229. In other world-wide reactions, Mr. Thomas Newnham, spokesman for New Zealand's Citizens Association for Racial Equality, urged his country "to wash its hands of racist sports at once". 230. Mr. Cliff Drysdale, a South African tennis player, said "I think the decision is a disaster for South African sport, and I think it is a very high price to pay for whatever reason the Government has for turning him down". 152/ 231. Another tennis player, Mr. Abe Segal stated: "We can forget about tennis now.... This would have been a great break for South African sport if they let Ashe in for 14 days". 193/ 232. A special meeting of the Davis Cup nations was held in London on 23 March 1970, at the request of the United States Lawn Tennis Association, to consider South Africa's suspension for practising racial discrimination. 154/ At the end of the meeting, it was announced that South Africa had been excluded from the Davis Cup competition in 1970. 235. According to press reports, Mr. Robert Colwell of the United States had been South Africa's principal accuser. Among reasons advanced for that country's 150/ gje Times, 29 January 1970. 151,/ Ibid. 152/ Ca Tm s, 29 January 1970. 155/ Ibid. 154/ The Times, London, 9 February 1970. -88- exclusion were: the acceptance of partheid; the refusal of other countries to play against South Africa (Romania in 1968 and Poland and Czechoslovakia in 1969); and the possibility of disorder and demonstrations. 155/ 234. Mr. Ashe described the exclusion of South Africa from the Davis Cup as "a pretty sad but just decision'. The Associated Press quoted him as having also said: "I would rather see South Africa change its ways instead of seeing them excluded from the Davis Cup competition. As they didn't change their ways, I suppose this is the only possible outcome.... It is unfortunate that politics are a part of any sport in any country because of the human factor." 156/ 235. Only the South African male tennis players were affected by the decision of 23 March 1970. Consequently three nations withdrew their players from the 1omen's Federation Cup tennis tournaments in May 1970, in protest against South African participation. They were Hungary, Israel and Poland. 157/ 236. The International Lawn Tennis Federation, however, at its annual meeting in Paris in July, defeated a motion to expel South Africa from world tennis by a large majority. The related m3tion to exclude South African women players from the Federation Cup tournament was accordingly abandoned. 158/ C. Cricket 237. On 11 December 1969 the Test and County Cricket Board of the United Kingdom unanimously confirmed, despite wide public opposition, a previous decision that the South African cricket team (the Springboks) should tour Britain in the summer of 1970. 238. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement, in a statement, described the decision as "an affront" to the growing number of people who "reject British collaboration with apartheid sport". It added: "It is also an affront to the 81 per cent of South Africa's population, denied the right to represent their country abroad. The decision will have serious repercussions throughout the Commonwealth, not in sport alone." 159/ 155/ The Guardian, Manchester, 24 March 1970. 196/ Associated Press, 24 March 1970 (dispatch from Melbourne). 157/ Rssociated Press, 20 May 1970. L98/The Star weekly, Johannesburg, 11 July 1970. Mr. B. ReaySecretary of the International Lawn Tennis Federation, later disclosed to the press that the official figures in the vote against the motion were 172 to 56. It should be noted that certain members of the ILTF (Australia, the United Kingdom, France and the United States) have weighted votes. The rules of the ILTF require a four fifths majority for expulsion. 159/ Cape Times, 12 December 1969. -89-

239. But Mr. Peter Hain, Chairman of the "Stop the Seventies Tour Committee", expressed his conviction that his organization could "get the tour cancelled" and, failing that, "we'll have it interrupted". 160/ 240. On 15 December, Mr. Jack Cheetham, President of the South African Cricket Association (SACA), attempted to counter opposition to the tour by stating that the criterion for selecting his country's team to tour Britain would be by merit and not the colour of any player's skin. 161/ 241. Commenting on the foregoing, an official of the non-racial South African Cricket Board of Control expressed his doubts about how the relative merits of White and Non-White cricketers could be determined since both groups played cricket under different conditions. He added that Mr. Cheetham "can make good his promise of fairness only by admitting non-White players to competition with Whites in this country". 162/ 242. On 12 February 1970, the Cricket Council of Britain gave its approval to the South African Cricket tour. The tour was, however, curtailed. Instead of the original schedule of 28 matches on 23 grounds over a four-month period, the new programme envisaged 12 matches on 8 grounds (which could be most easily protected) lasting 11 weeks. 163/ 243. In announcing the decision, Mr. Billy Griffith, Secretary of the Cricket Council, also disclosed that an artificial pitch with a matting cover would be laid on each of the designated grounds and would be used to complete any scheduled game in the event that demonstrators damaged any turf wicket. 244. Meanwhile, opposition to the tour spread rapidly. In December, Mr. Raymond Wiper, Chairman of the Scottish Committee of Young Socialists, was quoted as saying that his group 'would like the Government to examine the whole question afresh now that the MCC have decided to go ahead with their invitation for next summer's South African crieket tour". 164/ 245. By the end of January 1970, some of the grounds where the Springboks were scheduled to play were defaced with slogans. A trench was dug in the wicket at Cardiff. Various protest groups were reported to be responsible for those actions. 165/ 246. Mr. Peter Hain announced in February that about 200,000 persons were expected to take part in demonstrations during the tour. He said: "We got involved in rugby tours as a sideshow. We have learned our lessons and know the tactics that will be used against us." 166/ 160/ Ibid. 161/ Ibid., 16 December 1969. 162/ Cape Times, 16 December 1969. 163/ London Times, 13 February 1970. 164/ Cape Times, 16 December 1969. 165/ Anti-Apartheid News, London, June 1970. 166/ The Times, London, 13 February 1970. -90-

247. The Bishop of Woolwich, the Rt. Rev. David Sheppard, a former Test Cricketer who had participated in some demonstrations during the rugby tour, said: "'Fewi if any, members of the MCC Council live in areas of racial tension and they do not understand what deep feelings are raised by this tour of a racially selected team... the tour will take place under siege conditions." 167/ 248. The controversy about the tour was echoed in the British Parliament. Answering questions by several members, the Home Secretary, Mr. James Callaghan, conceded that the tour raised substantial difficulties "because substantial numbers of people are opposed to playing games against South Africans .... ' He further said that the tour would impose a severe strain on the police, who would also be likely to be greatly diverted from 'other duties to which the House would wish them to devote their attention". 249. Meanwhile a number of cricketers - including Peter Laver, Lancashire medium-fast bowler, Brian Davis, a West Indian Test batsman for Glanongan County Cricket Club and Mushtag Mohammed, a Pakistani Test all-rounder - declared they would not play against the racially selected South Africans. They accordingly asked their clubs to release them from their contracts during the days scheduled for matches against the Springboks. 250. Besides the withdrawal of some players, the summer tour was threatened by the enormous difficulty of protecting the grounds. 251. Throughout the United Kingdom the campaign against the Springboks cricket tour grew from strength to strength. Those who came out strongly in opposition to the tour included the National Executive Committee of the Labour Party, the Liberal Party Council, the United Nations Association of the United Kingdom and the British Council of Churches, as well as several trade unions. 252. Pressure against the tour also came from the West Indian community which formed the West Indian Campaign against Apartheid Cricket. Some refugees from South Africa living in Britain were reported to have indicated that they would not only demonstrate, but would go as far as disrupting the matches. 253. On 21 April, the Trade Union Congress threw its weight behind those who wanted the tour cancelled by urging its 9 million members to boycott the tour. 254. Even though the National Union of Journalists defeated a motion which requested its members to refuse to give coverage to the tour, Granada television announced that it would not cover the matches. The Television Technicians Union called upon its members to black out the tour. 168/ 255. On 20 April, ministers from 28 churches, all members of the British Council of Churches, unanimously decided at a conference at Hoddesdon, Hertfordshire, to urge their flocks of 10 million members to boycott the tour. By a vote of 38 to 31, they also decided to join in peaceful demonstrations against apartheid. 169/ 167/ Ibid. 168/ Anti-Apartheid News, London, June 1970 169/ The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 21 April 1970. -91-

256. In a counter-development, on 25 April, a fund was launched by supporters of the Springboks cricket tour. The organizers appealed for contributions to a £200,000 fund to help meet the security costs of the South Africans' cricket tour. 170/ 257. On the other hand, further pressure to cancel the tour came from the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, which warned in April that 13 African Cormonwealth nations would uithdraw from the Commonwealth Games in Edinburgh if the South African cricket tour went ahead. 171/ 258. Recognizing the adverse effects the proposed tour could have on community relations in Britain and the continued existence of the Commonwealth, some Britcns launched the Fair Cricket Campaign on 3 May 1970. The Chairman of the Campaign was David Sheppard and the Vice-Chairman, Sir Edward Boyle. 172/ 259. The question of the tour was once again raised in Parliament on 11 May, when Mr. Peter Shore, Minister without Portfolio, appealed to the Cricket Council to reconsider its decision. The Cricket Council, however, issued a statement confirming its invitation to the all-white South African team. 175/ 260. On 14 May, Parliament devoted three hours to an emergency debate on the question. While some speakers emphasized "law and order", others laid equal stress on the effect the South African tour would have on the Commonwealth Games, and on Commonwealth and race relations in the long run. 261. It was widely expected that the expulsion of South Africa from the Olympic movement on 15 May, the growing protest in the United Kingdom and the view expressed by the Prime Minister, Mr. Harold Wilson, and a number of his Ministers that the Cricket Council was unwise to insist on its invitation to the South Africans. .,ould persuade the Council to change its mind. 262. However, the Cricket Council again decided on 18 May that the tour should proceed as planned. Mr. Billy Griffith, Secretary of the Cricket Council, read a statement to the press on 1) May that the Council had taken into account "matters of a public and political nature" and that it considered these matters "to be the responsibility of the Government, who are best equipped to judge and act upon them." 1 263. The Council further declared that the tour would be the last all-white South African tour. The Council, the statement continued, "had informed the South African Cricket Association that no further test tours between South Africa and this country will take place until South African cricket is played and teams are selected on a multiracial basis in South Africa. 175/ 170/ The Guardian, Manchester, 24 June 1970. Thirty eminent sportsmen, clerics and peers were approached to lend their names to the £200,0Ct appeal fund. But shortly after the announcement of the appeal, Lord Montgomery of Alamein said he had refused to allow his name to be used as a supporter of the appeal. The Bishop of Bradford described the appeal as "most unwise" and said the MCC should have cancelled the tour. 171/ The Guardian, Manchester, 24 April 1970. 172/ Anti-Apartheid News, London, June 197C. 173/ Southern Africa, London, 16 May 1970. 174/ The New York Times, 20 May 1970. 175/ The Times, London, 20 May 1970. -92-

264. The Chairman of the Royal Commonwealth Society, i'r. F.H. Tate, sent a statement to the Cricket Council expressing the concern of the Society over the decision. He said: "The issues at stake now go far beyond the field of sport. Also involved are race relations in this country and, through them, the whole network of multi-racial co-operation which is the strength of the Commonwealth. Behind this again lies the very principle of human equality which has been the basis of Britain's policy in the evolution of the Commonwealth and the conduct of international relations." 176/ 265. On 21 May 1970, Mr. James Callaghan, the Home Secretary, met the leaders of the Cricket Council and, on behalf of the Government, requested them to withdraw the invitation to the South African team. 266. He said: "!e have had particularly in mind the possible impact on relations with other Commonwealth countries, race relations in this country and the divisive effect on the community. I have taken into account, too, the position of the police. There is no doubt as to their ability to cope with any situation which might arise, but a tour of this nature could mean diverting police resources on a large scale from their essential ordinary duties." 177/ 267. The next day the Cricket Council announced that it was asking South Africa "with deep regret" to cancel the tour. It said that it felt it had "no alternative" but to accede to the Government's request. 178/ 268. Many sports and political leaders from different parts of the world reacted favourably to the cancellation of the tour. 269. Kenya's sports authorities and India's Education Minister announced that both countries would now compete in the Edinburgh Commonwealth Games in July. Mr. Abraham Ordia, President of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, said in Lagos, Nigeria, that the cancellation was good news. Mr. Peter Short, Secretary of the 'est Indies Cricket Board of Control, also welcomed the decision. 270. The British Anti-Apartheid Movement said: "The result will be recognizel as a defeat for apartheid; as such it will be welcomed by the majority of South Africans who live under race discrimination and will prove an inspiration in their continuing resistance to apartheid." 79/ 271. But some South African sportsmen and administrators called for a national conference to discuss the future of South African sports. 272. On 24 May, Mr. Dennis Gamsby, the Springboks' wicket-keeper, called upon the Government to set up a commission to investigate ways of introducing racially integrated sports. 1/ Southern Africa, Lcndon, 25 May 197T. L77/ The New York Times, 22 May 1970. 178/ Reuters, 22 May 197r. 1 The S tar, weekly, Johannesburg, 25 May 1970. -93-

273. He said: "I know that mixed sport is against the tartheid policy, but the time has come when we must surely try to figure out a way in which we can allow mixed sport to be played in South Africa." 1.80/ 274. Dr. A. 2Pcher, captain of the South African cricket team, said: "Wle must broaden our outlook to adjust to the era in which we live. To me it is not a question of ma1in. concessions to appease demonstrators but what is good for South African sport in 1970 and in the future." Ii/ 275. The Pollock brothers, both famous cricketers, also added their voices in support of multiracia. teans in South African sport. 276. Significantly, Die Beeld, which supports the Nationalist Party, suggested in its main 1cding article on 24 May, that it was desirable for the Government to adopt a new approach in its sports policy. It asked whether South Africa should not have a "closer look at itself and ask: Am I also not a little guilty for what has 1~ prned?" 1821' 277. But the South African Government showed no willingness to change its attitude. 27'-. In a radio broadcast to mark Republic Day, Prime Minister Vorster claimed that if the choice were between taking part in international sport and preserving the South African apartheid system, the majority of South Africans would conclude that they had no choice in the matter. 279. He alleged: "But it is clear to you, as it is to me, that what is happening at the moment is that Communists and Afro-Asians are blackmailing various countries to refuse to play with us. And, of course, they are not motivated by sport, to serve the interests of sport; what they really want to do is to exert physical pressure on us through sport." 183/ 280. The Minister for Sport and Recreation, Mr. Frank Waring, issued a policy statement at the end of May rejecting integrated sport in South Africa. He said: "It is now abundantly clear to all that sport is being employed by anti-South African political organizations in order to bring Sruth Africa to her knees." He rejected out of hand any conference or commission to introduce multiracial sports. 2.1 After the press and many sports figures accused the Government of "running sport", however, the Minister conceded that private groups could hold a conference about miultiracial sport without government participation or approval. 124' 12_0 The New York Times, 24 May 1)70. 1/Ibid. 15-'=2/ The Times, London, 26 Lay 1970. l/ Band Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 2 June 1970. 114,/ The New York Times, 25 July I)70.

D. The Olympic Games 282. As a result of combined pressure fror many countries, as well as from the South African Non-Racial Committee for Olympic Sport (SAN-ROC), South Africa had been banned from the Olympic Games in 1964 and 1968. 185/ 283. On 15 May 1970, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Congress, meeting in Amsterdam, voted by 35 to 28, with 3 abstentions, to "withdraw recognition" from South Africa on the grounds of racial discrimination. 186/ 284. Presenting the case for South Africa's expulsion, Mr. Abraham Ordia of Nigeria and Mr. Jean-Claude Ganga of the People's Republic of the Congo, President and Secretary, respectively, of the Supreme Council for Sport in Africa, reportedly submitted eight well-documented charges. Among the charges were: that the allwhite South African Olympic Games Committee was far from independent of the Government's pressures; that blacks have never been guaranteed places on South African sports federations; and that whites denied non-whites equal sporting terms and disallowed them from multiracial competitions. 187/ 285. South Africa's representative, Mr. Braun, in his rebuttal, claimed that the white South African Olympic body was doing all it could under the circumstances and that equal, if separate, federations were available to the blacks. 286. In the words of an eyewitness, nobody came to South Africa's defence. "It seemed sad but totally unanimous." 188/ 287. Mr. Ordia later told the press: "It is nothing to be happy about. They (the South Africans) are Africans; they are my brothers. I want to compete with them. I want to invite them to Nigeria. I want to invite them to the Pan-African Games. But for God's sake, let them change. If this is the medicine that will let them live, then this will not be in vain." 189/ 288. The news of South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic movement was greeted with shock in that country. The Minister for Sport and Recreation, Mr. F. Waring, was reported to have described the expulsion as "a shock and a disappointment". The Star, Johannesburg, predicted that "expulsion sounds the death knell" for international sports for South Africa. 190/ 289. A Cape Coloured person was, however, quoted as saying: "This should give all the whites more of a realization that they are out of line with the rest of the 185/ See Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-third Session, agenda item 31, document A/7254; and ibid, Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/7625/Rev.l). 186/ Retters, 15 May 1970. 187/ Sunday Times, London, 17 May 1970. 188/ Ibid. 189/ Cape Times, 25 May 1970. 190/ Washington Post, 18 May 1970. -95- world. Nobody did anything to South Africa before, and the Government could say to the whites, 'What the hell you worried about, man? We are a strong government. We look after you!' Now maybe the whites will remember that there are other forces in the world." 290. The South African press speculated that South Africa's international sport was doomed to dwindle as a result of the expulsion. However, as the president of the IOC pointed out to the press on 15 May, each international sports federation has complete jurisdiction to decide for itself whether or not South African all- white sporting bodies would continue to enjoy affiliated status. l1')2 291. Meanwhile, the exclusion of all-white South African sportsmen from more and more international sport events has led to a growing demand for a relaxation of the Government's sports policies. 292. Mr. Gertz Scholtz, lecturer in physical science at Potchefstroom University, who described himself as a Nationalist, a staunch Calvinist and a firm supporter of apartheid condemned those policies as "inflexible and unrealistic" and "unjust and unfair'. 293. In an interview with the Sunday Times, he was quoted as saying: "In arguing South Africa's case at many of these informal discussions (during a tour of Europe) I soon realized that there are certain aspects in our present policy which cannot be justified or even defended. "If we continue to practise racial discrimination in sport on an international level the international community has a reason to criticize us and if we do not comply, suspend us and to terminate our membership." 1,3 294. The New York Times commented on 27 May: "The international sports community is proving more effective than the international political community in letting the Republic of South Africa know that its policy of racial separation is repugnant and rejected by the outside world. There are new indications that the message is getting across to the average South African through the back door of sports." 295. The editorial concluded: "The athletes, of course, know something that the Government refuses to recognize. Sports competition is a test of individual ability and team unity, not of skin colour. Apartheid on and off the field, in the long run, will have to become a losing game." Ibid. The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 16 May 1970. Once South Africa loses its affiliation in any sport, it may no longer make, or receive overseas visitors in that game. 153/ Sunday Times, Johannesburg, 14 June 1970.

VI. SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 296. During the year under review, the South African Government has continued to intervene in Southern Rhodesia and to collaborate with the forces of the illegal regime in Salisbury against the forces of the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and South Africa, thus increasing the danger of violent conflict in southern Africa. It has shown its determination to consolidate a southern African bloc of white supremacy by increasing its economic co-operation with the other white minority regimes of the area, in particular by contributing to the realization of the Kunene River development scheme in Angola and the Cabora Bassa Dam project in Mozambique. 297. One of the main factors contributing to the growing threat to international peace and security in southern Africa has been the military build-up in the Republic of South Africa. President Kaunda of Zambia pointed out on 11 December 1969 that it was the military capacity given to the South African Government that had enabled it "to spare considerable military resources to rebel Rhodesia and the Portuguese forces in Angola and Mozambique". President Kaunda warned that "we will not sit idly by and watch the West arm the South Africans, who have made their intentions clearly known. They have not only threatened to attack us. They have in fact, encouraged others to do so. Already, equipment supplied by Britain, France and the United States has been used against us by the allies of South Africa." 298. The consolidation of the southern African bloc is one of the main purposes of the new "outward-looking" policy of the South African Government, in pursuit of which Prime Minister Vorster, during this year, made his first visits abroad to Malawi and Southern Rhodesia, as well as certain European countries. The South African Government aspires, thereby, to secure acceptance of its internal policies and to end its isolation. ,. Continued military intervention in Southern Rhodesia 299. A number of engagements have occurred in Southern Rhodesia between the freedom fighters of Zimbabwe and South Africa determined to achieve their legitimate rights and the "security forces" of South Africa and the illegal r6gime in Salisbury. The engagements,which were among the most violent since the armed struggle started three years ago, have resulted in a number of casualties on both sides. It was reported in January 1970 that more than 170 nationalists had so far lost their lives and a large number captured, whereas 15 nerbers of the security forces, includin- South Africins, had bt~en killed and a number of others wounded. 124/ 500. Emboldened by the military support it was receiving from South Africa, Mr. Ian Smith. the leader of the rebel r4gime in Salisbury, warned the Zambian Government that it faced retaliation if it continued actively to support Afriran L Southern Africa, London, 51 January 1970. -97- nationalist guerrillas. He declared: "The Zambian Government has full knowledge of these activities and cannot escape responsibilities for incidents directly resulting from its co-operation with terrorists." 195/ The Times of London commented on 'I January that Mr. Smith's statement "may well reflect South Africa's growing concern for security along the borders of its sphere of influence". Replying to the threat from the Salisbury regime, the Zambian Minister of Home Affairs denied that his country was in any way responsible for the situation. Any clashes with the forces of the illegal r~gime of Southern Rhodesia, he said, were "the direct result of the oppression exercised on the majority of people in Rhodesia". lqi 301. The South African Government's commitment to support Southern Rhodesia has been nsde clear by the visit of Prime Minister Vorster to Rhodesia in May. The visit, the South African Financial Gazette commented on 29 May, "provided a public demonstration of the strength of the ties of friendship between the two countries, while it also afforded Mr. Vorster the opportunity to show the world that to all intents and purposes, his Government recognizes Rhodesia". Later, in July, 1r. Tan Smith visited Pretoria. B. Closer co-oneration with Portural in An-ola and iHozambique 302. In order to consolidate a bloc of white minority r~gimes of southern Africa, South Africa has continued its close economic co-operation with Angola and Mozambique. With fishing and mining interests in both Angola and Mozambique, South Africa was in 1969 the third most important investor in the two Territories, with an investment of R2.65 million ($3.71 million). 197/ Its trade with Angola has trebled within three years; in 1969 Angola's imports from South Africa were worth R7.3 million ($10.2 million) (up from R2.4 million or $3.3 million in 1966) while South Africa took R3.5 million ($4.9 million) worth of Angolan products, mainly coffee. 198/ 303. The two most important projects of co-operation between South Africa and the Portuguese administration are the Kunene River development scheme in Angola 199/ and the Cabora Bassa Dan project in Mozambique, 200/ which fit into the South African plan for a vast power grid for the whole of southern Africa. 304. According to the South African Financial Gazette of 8 May 1970, the Kunene River irrigation and hydro-electric scheme, a joint South African- Portuguese enterprise, which will provide power and water for vast areas in southern Angola and Namibia, will involve six hydro-electric power stations, costing a total of some R235 million ($329 million). The biggest of these hydro- electric stations, 195/ The Guardian, Manchester, 30 January 1970. 1961/ Southern Africa, London, 7 February 1970. 197/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 11 July 1970. 198/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 4 July 1970. 199/ See c'fficil Records of the Gejneral Assenbly, 2ventv-fourth Sessic, Supl. nt "nt . 25, (/7<25/cv1), nr:2s. 27O-284. 200/ Ibid., paras. 285-292. a R50 million ($70 million) installation at the Runedra Falls, is already under construction with L.T.A., a South African company, playing a major contracting role. 305. The Cabora Bassa dam, which is to be the biggest hydro-electric dam in Africa and the fifth largest in the world, is to be built by the South African-led international consortium called ZAMCO. The consortium originally included South African companies, as well as companies from France, tho Federl -epublic of Oernany, Swe den, Italy and Portual, but the Swredish and Italirn cn rinius have withdrlmn fro- the2 project followin,- protests by -inti-ararthuit or'-,nizations n.! r,_rscntations by the Govcrn u.nt of ZLribi to the Governments conc:rn,-d. 3C6. It has been reported that on behalf of the independent States of East and Central Africa, President Kaunda of Zambia had called for a complete withdrawal of international support for the Cabora Bassa Dam project on the ground that although ostensibly economic, the project was in reality designed to spread South African military power further north. Having invested so much money in the project South Africa would have to send troops to defend it, President Kaunda was reported to have said. He also recalled that the Ca*bora Bassa scheme would provide a base for an estimated 1 million new white settlers in Africa. 201/ 307. South Africa has already granted a P20 million ($28 million) credit guarantee to the South African concerns involved in the project. This credit guarantee was reported to be the largest ever made by South Africa. 202/ Preliminary work on the scheme has already started. It has involved bush-clearing and the transplanting of a number of Africans living in the area. It was announced in March 1970 that an examination of the complex economic, social and political problems involved in the transplanting of thousands of families had been completed and a plan approved for community development in areas suitable for farmers and cattle raising. 20' / Some 600 workers - Portuguese, Rhodesians, South Africans, French and Italians have already created an urban area on the Songo plateau near the Cabora Bassa gorge. 204/ 308. Speaking at a dinner given in his honour by the Portuguese Prime Minister, during his visit to Portugal in June, Prime Minister Vorster called for continued co-operation between Portugal and South Africa in the defence of southern Africa against "communist aggression" and said that the Kunene River and Cabora Bassa projects "serve as testimony of our determination to co-operate in the interests of all the peoples of southern Africa". He said that South Africa shared Portugal's distress at the hardship caused by the "subversion" in Angola and Mozambique and paid tribute to the "sacrifices of Portugal's sons in their brave fight". 205/ According to a report in Le onde, the talks which Mr. John Vorster and his '.inister for Foreign Affairs had hel!;, vth the Porturuese leaders had dealt not only with the threat of withdrawal or foreign investmentb from the Cabora P.ssa ar but also with the military situation in the Caprivi Strip in Namibia. 206/ 309. In a communiau6 published at the end of the visit, it was stated that "the conversations took place in an atmosphere of perfect understanding and will contribute to tightening the friendly links existing between the two countrie'. 207/ 201/ Southern Africa, London, 30 May 1970. 202/The Star, daily, Johannesburg, 8 December 1969. 20/ Southern Africa, London, 28 March 1970. 204/ The Star, weekly, Johannesburg, 13 June 1970. 209/ The Cape Times, Johannesburg, 6 June 1970. 206/ Le Monde, Paris, 7-8 June 1970. 207/ Southern Africa, London, 15 June 1970. --99-

ANNEX III LIST OF FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC AND OTHER OFFICIAL MISSIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA AND SOUTH AFRICAN MISSIONS ABROAD The following list shows the names of countries which had diplomatic, consular and other official missions in South Africa in 1962 and the situation as it existed in 1969 following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII) and various recommendations of the Special Committee calling for the severance of all relations with South Africa. (Countries underlined are those currently maintaining relations with South Africa.) a/ 1962 1969 Official South African Official South African missions in missions accredited missions in official missions South Africa to the country South Africa accredited to the country Argentina Australia Austria Belgium Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Consulate in Cape Town Embassy Government Trade Commissioner in Johannesburg; Consulate in Cape Town Legation Honorary Consuls in Cape Town; Durban and Johannesburg Embassy ConsulatesGeneral in Johannesburg and Cape Town; Honorary Consuls in Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Windhoek, Walvis Bay Honorary Consul (vacant) Legation ConsulateGeneral in Cape Town Embassy Government Trade Commissioners in Johannesburg and Cape Town Charg6 d'affaires (Legation); Consulate-General in Cape Town Honorary Consul in Durban Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Honorary Consul in Johannesburg (G.G. 1720 of April 1967) Legation Embassy Honorary Consulate in Johannesburg (G.G. 2033 of April 1968) Embassy Foreign Trade Service Office in Buenos Aires Embassy Information Office in Canberra; Foreign Trade Service Office in Melbourne Embassy Immigration Office in Vienna; Foreign Trade Service Office in Vienna; Honorary representative in Innsbruck Embassy Information Office in Brussels; Immigration Office in Brussels; Foreign Trade Service Office in Brussels Embassy (G.G. No. 2022 of 22 March 1967) Legation Foreign Trade Service Office in Rio de Janeiro; Honorary representative in Sao Paulo Embassy Information Office in Ottawa; Foreign Trade Service Office in Montreal Honorary representative in Santiago -101- Legation Embassy Bolivia Brazil Canada Chile

1962 1969 Official South African Official South African missions in missions accredited missions in official missions South Africa to the country South Africa accredited to the country China Colombia Costa Rica Czechoslovakia Consulate-General in Johannesburg Honorary Consul in Johannesburg Honorary Consul in Johannesburg Consulate-General in Johannesburg Denmark Consul-General and Vice-Consul (Trade) in Johannesburg; Honorary Consul in Cape Town and Durban; Honorary Vice-Consuls in East London, Port Elizabeth and Windhoek ConsulateGeneral ConsulateGeneral in Johannesburg (G.G. 85? of July 1964) Consulate-General Closed b/ Consulate closed as of 12 August 1963 (G.G. 613 of September 1963) Vice-Consul in Johannesburg Consulate Honorary ViceConsul in Windhoek Honorary representative in Copenhagen Dominican Republic El Salvador Federal Republic of Germany Finlend Honorary Consul in Johannesburg Honorary Consul in Cape Town Embassy Consiunates in Johannesburg, Cape Town and Windhoek; Honorary Consuls in Port Elizabeth, East London and Durban Chargg d'affaires Consul-General in Pretoria; Honorary Consuls in Cape Town, Durban and Johannesburg; Honorary Vice-Consuls in Port Elizabeth and Walvis Bay Embassy ConsulateGeneral in Hamburg Legation Embassy Legation Embassy Consulates-General in Hamburg and Munich; Information Office in Cologne; Immigration Offices in Cologne, Hamburg and Munich; Foreign Trade Service Offices in Cologne and Hamburg; Honorary representatives Dusseldorf, Hanover and Munich Chargf d'affaires Honorary representative in Helsinki (G.G. 194T of January 1968) -102-

1962 1969 South African missions accredited to the country Official missions in South Africa South African official missions accredited to the country Embassy Commercial Counsellor in Pretoria; Consulate-General in Johannesburg; Consul (Trade) in Johannesburg; Consulates in Cape Town and Durban; Honorary Consular Agents in East London, Port Elizabeth and Walvis Bay Embassy Honorary Consul-General in Cape Town; Honorary Consuls in Durban and Port Elizabeth Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Information Office in Paris; Immigration Office in Paris; Foreign Trade Service Office in Paris Embassy Immigration Office in Athens; Foreign Trade Service Office in Athens; Honorary representative in Salonica France Greece Iceland Honorary Consul in Johannesburg Legation Consul-General in Johannesburg Embassy Consulates in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Durban; Vice-Consul (Trade) in Johannesburg; Honorary Consular Agents in Port Elizabeth and East London Consul-General in Pretoria Consulate-General in Johannesburg Honorary Consul in Johannesburg Trade Commissioner in Dublin Embassy Consulate-General in Milan Consulate-General in Tokyo ConsulateGeneral in Beirut Legation Embassy Consulate in Pretoria (G.G. 947 of February 1965) Embassy Consulate-General in Milan; Information Office in Rome; Immigration Offices in Rome and Milan Foreign Trade Service Offices in Rome and Milan; Honorary representative in Milan Consulate-General in Tokyo; Foreign Trade Service Office in Tokyo Consulate-General in Beirut Embassy Charg6 d'affaires (G.G. 1947 of January 1968) Official missions in South Africa Consulate in Johannesburg (G.G. 2166 of 27 September 1968) Ireland Israel Italy Japan Lebanon Liberia Luxembourg Malawi Embassy Legation -103-

South African missions accredited to the country Official missions in South Africa South African official missions accredited to the country Honorary Consul in Mexico E)lbassv Consulates-%enertl ii Care Town and Johannesbur: Honorarv Consuls in Durban, Bloemfontein and Windhoek; Honorary Vice-Consuls in Port Elizabeth and East London Consulate-General in Cape Town; Honorary Consuls in Durban, Johannesburg and Pretoria; Honorary Vice-Consuls in East London, Port Elizabeth, Windhoek and Walvis Bay Honorary Consul-General in Cape Town; Honorary Consuls in Johannesburg and Durban Embassy nsulateGeneral in Rotterdam ConsulateGeneral in Oslo Consulate (G.G. 1993 of February 1968) Embassy Consulate Honorary Consul in Cape Town (G.G. 458 of January 1963) Imb as sy Information Office at The Hague; Immigration Office at The Hague; Foreign Trade Service Office at The Hague; Honorary representative in Rotterdam Consulate-General in Wellington; Information Office in Wellington Honorary representative in Oslo Honorary representative in Panama Paraguay Honorary Consul-General (G.G. 1256 of October 1965) Honorary Consuls in Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Johannesburg Honorary Consul in Cape Town Embassy Consulate-General in Johannesburg; Consulates in Cave Town and Durban; Honorary Vice-Consuls in East London, Port Elizabeth and Luderitz Embassy ConsulatesGeneral in Luanda and Lourengo Marques Embassy Embassy (G.q. 2269 of November 1969) Embassy Consulates-General in Luanda and Lourengo Marques; Information Offices in Lisbon; Immigration Office in Lisbon; Foreign Trade Service Offices in Luanda and Lourenqo Marques; Honorary representative in Las Palmas and Oporto Official missions in South Africa M'exicno Monaco Netherlands New Zealand Norway Panana Peru Philippines Portugal

South African nissions accredited to the country Official missions in South Africa 1969 South African official missions accredited to the country Rhodesia (illegal regime) "Accredited Diplomatic Representative "Accredited diplomatic representative"; Information Office in Salisbury; Foreign Trade Service Office in Salisbury Sain Sweden Switzerland Thailand United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland United States of America Embassy Consulate-General in Cape Town Legation Honorary Consuls in Cape Town, Durban, Johannesburg, Port Elizabeth and Windhoek; Honorary Vice-Consul in East London Embassy Consulate-General in Johannesburg; Consulatc in Cape Torn; 11onorarv Consular Agents in Windhoek and Durban Honorary Consul in Durban Embassy Trade Commissioners in Pretoria, Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town Embassy Consulates-General in Johannesburg and Cape Town; Consulates in Durban and Port Elizabeth Embassy Legation ConsulateGeneral in Gothenburg Embassy ConsulateGeneral in Zurich Embassy Trade Commissioners in Hong Kong Embassy Consulates-General in New York, New Orleans and San Francisco; Information Office in New York; Customs Information Office in New York Embassy Legation Embassy Embassy Embassy Embassy Foreign Trade Service Office in Madrid; Honorary representative in Barcelona Legation Foreign Trade Service Office in Stockholm; Honorary representative in Gothenburg Embassy Information Office in Berne; Immigration Office in Berne; Foreign Trade Service Offices in Berne and Geneva; Honorary representative in Zurich Embassy Consulate-General in Hong Kong; Information Office in London; Immigration Office in London; Foreign Trade Service Offices in London and Hong Kong Embassy Consulates-General in New York, New Orleans and San Francisco; Information Offices in New York, San Francisco and Washington; Foreign Trade Service Offices in Washington, New York and San Francisco; Honorary representative in Houston Consulate in Cape Town Consulate in Montevideo Consulate-General in Johannesburg (Foot-notes on following -105- ConsulateGeneral in C-pe Town (G.G. 1155 of June 1965) Consulate closed as of 3 August 1963 (G.G. 613 September 1963) page) Embassy Honorary representative in Montevideo Official missions in South Africa Uruguay Yugoslavia

(Foot-notcs to preceding table) a/ Source: South African Diplomatic List (Pretoria, July 1968) supplemented by official Government Gazettes (G.G.) from January 1963 to June 1970. (The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in reply to a question in Parliament on 24 July 1970 about the number of States with which the Republic had some form of diplomatic or interstate relations, the names of such States, and the form of the interstate representation in each case, said: "The Republic maintains formal diplomatic, consular or trade representation, either reciprocally or unilaterally, with 46 States. Details are contained in the published list of the Department of Foreign Affairs. Besides these countries, the Republic maintains diplomatic relations without accredited representation with a further 19 countries. For obvious reasons, it is not advisable to specify them." House of Assembly Debates (Hansard), 24 July 1970, col. 363.) b/ Periodic changes in diplomatic relations and representation are noted in the Government Gazettes, but it would appear that not all such changes are noted. For example, Costa Rica closed its honorary consulate after the adoption of General Assembly resolution 1761 (XVII), but the breaking of diplomatic relations was not publicized in the Gazettes in this particular instance, though with respect to other Member States, the change was duly noted. The list, therefore, may be incomplete, based as it is on official South African sources only. -106-

ANNEX IV LIST OF DOCUMENTS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE (October 1969-September 1970) A/7625, S/9473 A/AC.115/L. 269 A/AC.115/L. 270 A/AC.115/L.271 A/AC. 115/L. 272 A/AC.115/L.273 A/AC.115/L. 274 A/AC. 115/L. 275 ST/PSCA/Ser.A/1O (Sales No.: E.70.II.K.8) A/AC.115/L.277 A/AC. 115/L. 278 A/AC.115/L. 279 and Corr.1 A/AC. 115/L. 280 A/AC. 15/SR. 12614 6 Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of Apreid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa (7 October 1969) presented to the General Assembly and to the Security Council (Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty- fourth Session, Supplement No. 25 (A/7625/Rev.1)) Thirty-sixth report of the Sub-Committee on Petitions Letter dated 8 October 1969 from the Reverend Canon L. John Collins, President, Defence and Aid Fund, London, addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee Letter dated 8 October 1969 from Mr. Abdul S. Minty, Honorary Secretary, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, transmittin9 a study of South Africa's defence strategy Thirty-seventh report of the Sub-Committee on Petitions Letter dated 22 February 1970 from Mrs. Ethel de Keyser, Executive Secretary, the Anti-Apartheid Movement, London, addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee, transmitting a memorandum on the construction of the Cabora Bassa Dam in Mozambique Communication dated 1 April 1970 from the South African Non-Racial Open Committee for Olympic Sports, London Thirty-eighth report of the Sub-Committee on Petitions Industrialization, Foreign Capital and Forced Labour in South Africa Statement by Mr. Abdulrahim A. Farah, Chairman of the Special Committee, at the 138th meeting, on 24 June 1970 Statement by Mr. Uddav Deo Bhatt, Rapporteur of the Special Committee, at the 138th meeting of the Committee, on 2A June 1970 Note on military forces and equipment of the Republic of South Africa Report on the commemoration of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Summary records of the Special Committee -107-