humanities

Article Eloquent Alogia: Animal Narrators in Ancient Greek Literature

Tom Hawkins

Department of Classics, The Ohio State University, Columbus, OH 43210, USA; [email protected]

Academic Editor: Joela Jacobs Received: 21 January 2017; Accepted: 27 May 2017; Published: 3 June 2017

Abstract: Classical Greek literature presents a variety of speaking animals. These are not, of course, the actual voices of animals but human projections. In a culture that aligns verbal mastery with social standing, verbal animals present a conundrum that speaks to an anxiety about human communication. I argue that the earliest examples of speaking animals, in Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus, show a fundamental connection with Golden Age tales. Later authors, such as Plutarch and Lucian, look back on such cases from a perspective that does not easily accept notions of divine causation that would permit such fanciful modes of communication. I argue that Plutarch uses a talking pig to challenge philosophical categories, and that Lucian transforms a sham-philosopher of a talking-cock to undermine the very pretense of philosophical virtue.

Keywords: animals; Achilles; Archilochus; fox; Gryllus; Hesiod; Homer; Lucian; pig; Plutarch; Pythagoras; rooster; Xanthus

1. Introduction Aristotle (Politics, 1.2) and Cicero (De inventione, 1.4) both maintained that language forms one of the critical distinctions between humans and beasts (Fögen 2003, 2007). This attitude can even be felt in the Greek adjective alogon (“without logos”), which means not only “irrational” and “without language” but also (as a noun) “animal”.1 Thus, as Gera and Heath have amply demonstrated, in early Greek culture verbal mastery was strongly correlated to social standing (Gera 2003; Heath 2005). Animals, since they lack altogether the capacity for language, demarcate one end of a spectrum that leads toward the masters of persuasive speech, and marginal figures like children, women, foreigners, the uneducated, and those with communicative disabilities are mapped somewhere between these extremes. Verbal animals, therefore, represent a category crisis that demands explanation (Fögen 2003, 2007), and by situating speaking animals in the wider range of classical attitudes we can hear a paradoxically eloquent alogia. The “animal turn” in contemporary literary studies seeks to take the role of animals in literature more seriously, based, in part, on the modern realization that animal (and even plant) communication is far more complicated than had previously been realized (McDonell 2014; DeMello 2013; Plec 2013; Karban 2015; Radick 2007; Diamond 1992; Herman 2016). Yet efforts to study animal narrators constantly bump up against the limits of this project.2 Speaking animals are presented in terms of a uniquely human trait, namely human language (Wolfe 2016), and thus they are constructed via a pathetic fallacy that offers us not a window into the bestial soul but a mirror that reflects how humans

1 In the story of Epimetheus’ botched distribution of animal capacities, for example, Plato says that the dim-witted Titan apportioned all available skill-sets and capabilities among the beasts (ta aloga) while forgetting to reserve any such benefit for humans (Protagoars, 321b–c). 2 See (DeMello 2013) and (Herman 2016) for creative efforts to overcome this problem.

Humanities 2017, 6, 37; doi:10.3390/h6020037 www.mdpi.com/journal/humanities Humanities 2017, 6, 37 2 of 15

conceptualize (i.e., create and make knowable through our language) animals. Such an assertion need 3 not deny or even erode the possibility of animal languages or human–non-humanHumanities communication. 2017, 6, 37 2 of 15 Humanities 2017, 6, 37 HumanitiesI 2017 am, 6 confident, 37 that I and the dog, who keeps me company2 of 15 as I write this article,2 of communicate, 15 but as 3 soon as I “report” his words by means of my vocabulary, grammar and personal context,not deny I am or speakingeven erode the possibility of animal languages or human–non-human communication. not deny or even erode the notpossibility deny or of even anim erodeal languages the possibility or human– of animnon-humanal languages communication. or human–non-human3 communication.3 through or for him rather than hearing his voice.4 I am confident that I and the dog, who keeps me company as I write this article, communicate, but as I am confident that I and theI dog,am confident who keeps that me I andcompany the dog, as Iwho write keeps this article,me company communicate, as I write but this as article, communicate, butsoon as as I “report” his words by means of my vocabulary, grammar and personal context, I am Even if the idea of hearing what animals really want to “say” must remain a fantasy, in taking soon as I “report” his wordssoon by as means I “report” of my his vocabulary, words by grammarmeans of andmy vocabulary,personal context, grammar I am and personal context, I amspeaking through or for him rather than hearing his voice.4 speaking through or for himspeaking rather thanliterary through hearing depictions or forhis himvoice. ofrather4 verbal than animals hearing more his voice. seriously,4 we can hope to reach other goals. InEven the if following the idea of hearing what animals really want to “say” must remain a fantasy, in taking Even if the idea of hearing whatEvenpages animalsif the I idea build really of onhearing want the to workwhat “say” animals of must Gera, remain really Heath, wanta fantasy, and to Fögen“say” in taking must (Fögen remain 2003 a ,fantasy, 2007; Gera in taking 2003literary ; Heath depictions 2005 )of to verbal animals more seriously, we can hope to reach other goals. In the following literary depictions of verbal literaryanimals depictions suggestmore seriously, that of verbal speaking we cananimals hope animals more to reach seriously, from other ancient goals. we can Greek In hope the following literature to reach other often goals. engage In the with following Goldenpages AgeI build narratives. on the work of Gera, Heath, and Fögen (Fögen 2003, 2007; Gera 2003; Heath 2005) to suggest pages I build on the work of Gera,pages Heath, I buildI begin and on theFö withgen work (Fögen two of Gera, archaic 2003, Heath, 2007; case-studies: and Gera Fö 2003;gen (FögenHeath a horse, 2005)2003, whoto2007; suggest Gera speaks 2003; prophetic Heath 2005) Homeric to suggestthat hexameters, speaking animals and a from ancient Greek literature often engage with Golden Age narratives. I begin that speaking animals from ancientthat speaking Greekfabular animalsliterature fox, whosefrom often ancient engage voice Greek provideswith literatureGolden an Age ethicaloften narratives. engage example with I begin forGolden human Age narratives. conflict. In I begin thesewith earlytwo archaic examples, case-studies: a horse, who speaks prophetic Homeric hexameters, and a fabular fox, with two archaic case-studies:with a horse, twothe archaic who animals speaks case-studies: are prophetic fully a horse, animalHomeric who and hexameters, speaks their prophetic voices and a derive Homericfabular fromfox, hexameters, an earlier and world a fabular order fox,whose that voice is no provides longer an ethical example for human conflict. In these early examples, the animals are whose voice provides an ethicalwhose example voice provides for human an conflict. ethical example In these forearly human examples, conflict. the Inanimals these earlyare examples, the animals are directly accessible. These animal voices thus have another-worldly authority, andfully their animal speech and works their voices derive from an earlier world order that is no longer directly accessible. fully animal and their voicesfully derive animal from and an earliertheir voices world derive order fromthat isan no earlier longer world directly order accessible. that is no longer directly accessible.These animal voices thus have another-worldly authority, and their speech works differently from differently from the limited and fallible language of humans, thereby setting up a contrast between These animal voices thus haveThese another-worldly animal voices thusauthority, have another-worldlyand their speech auworksthority, differently and their from speech works differently fromthe limited and fallible language of humans, thereby setting up a contrast between the two systems the two systems of communication. I then turn to the later end of antiquity, where a pig and a rooster the limited and fallible languagethe limited of humans, and fallible thereby language setting upof humans,a contrast ther betweeneby setting the two up asystems contrast between the two systemsof communication. I then turn to the later end of antiquity, where a pig and a rooster speak, but only of communication. I then turnof communication.to thespeak, later end but of I onlythenantiquity, turn because to where the they later a pig usedend and of toa antiquity, rooster be human. speak, where The but a pig gimmickonly and a rooster of a talking speak, but animal onlybecause may they have used lost to its be human. The gimmick of a talking animal may have lost its attractions by this because they used to be human.because The attractions theygimmick used ofto byabe talking human. this era, animal The since gimmick may these have of animals lost a talking its attractions speak animal not may by from this have another lost its attractions world but by as thisera, overtly since humanizedthese animals speak not from another world but as overtly humanized voices that provide era, since these animals speakera, not since fromvoices these another animals that wo providerld speak but notas philosophical overtly from another humanized (pig) world voices and but satiricalas that overtly provide (rooster) humanized commentary voices that provide onphilosophical their contemporary (pig) and satirical (rooster) commentary on their contemporary world and earlier Greek philosophical (pig) and satiricalphilosophical (rooster)world commentary (pig) and and earlier satirical on Greek their (rooster) contemporary culture. commentary5 These world later on and their examples earlier contemporary Greek look back world to earlierand earlier models Greekculture. to establish5 These animal later examples look back to earlier models to establish animal voices as a miraculous 5 culture. These later examplesculture. look 5voicesback These to aslaterearlier a miraculousexamples models tolook establish interruption back to animal earlier of voices themode worldls as to a establishmiraculous order, but animal the supernaturalvoices as a miraculous gambitinterruption quickly devolvesof the world order, but the supernatural gambit quickly devolves into a commentary on interruption of the world order, but the supernatural gambit quickly devolves into a commentary on interruptioninto of a commentarythe world order, on but purely the supernatural human affairs. gambit quickly devolves into a commentary purelyon human affairs. purely human affairs. purely human affairs. 2. Houyhnhnmic Prophecy 2. Houyhnhnmic Prophecy 2. Houyhnhnmic Prophecy 2. Houyhnhnmic Prophecy With his divine maternal inheritance, Achilles experiences human emotions atWith a superhuman his divine maternal inheritance, Achilles experiences human emotions at a superhuman With his divine maternal inheriWithtance, his divine Achilles maternal experiences inheri tance,human Achilles emotions experiences at a superhuman human emotions at a superhumanlevel. His mênis (the “rage” that drives the Iliad) is a form of divine, rather than human, anger, and level. His mênis (the “rage” that drives the Iliad) is a form of divine, rather than human, anger, and his level. His mênis (the “rage” level.that drives His mênis the Iliad(the) “rage”is a form that of drives divine, the rather Iliad )than is a formhuman, of divine,anger, andrather than human, anger, andhis grief at the loss of his beloved Patroclus prompts a berserker’s bloodlust few social codes can his grief at the loss of his belovedhis grief Patroclusgrief at the at loss the pr ofompts loss his of beloveda his berserker’s beloved Patroclus bloodlust Patroclus prompts few prompts asocial berserker’s acodes berserker’s bloodlustcan bloodlust few social few codes social cantolerate codes (Muellner can tolerate 1996). Thus, as he grieves for his dead friend it is hardly surprising that he rails tolerate (Muellner 1996). Thus,tolerate as he ((MuellnerMuellner grieves for 1996). 1996 his de).Thus,ad Thus, friend as he as itgrieves he is hardly grieves for hissurprising for de hisad friend dead that heit friend israils hardly it is surprising hardly surprising that he railseven that against he rails Xanthus even and Balius, his horses that had conveyed Patroclus into, but not back from, even against Xanthus and Balius,even against hisagainst horses Xanthus Xanthus that andhad andBalius,conveyed Balius, his Patroclushorses his horses that into, had thatbut conveyed not had back conveyed Patroclus from, Patroclus into, but not into, back but from, notbattle. back The from, surprise, battle. rather, is that Xanthus replies to Achilles’ chastisement with ten hexameter lines battle. The surprise, rather, isbattle. that XanthusTheThe surprise, surprise, replies rather, to rather, Achilles’ is that is thatXanthuschastisement Xanthus replies with replies to Achilles’ten hexameter to Achilles’ chastisement lines chastisement with ten hexameter with ten lines hexameterthat refute the lines hero’s that charge that the horses were somehow negligent in Patroclus’ death and predict that refute the hero’s chargethat that refute therefute horses the hero’s thewere hero’s chargesomehowcharge that negligent the thathorses thein werePatroclus’ horses somehow weredeath negligent somehowand predict in Patroclus’ negligent death in Patroclus’ and predictAchilles’ death andown predictimminent demise at the hands of Paris and Apollo. Homer frames the horse’s words Achilles’ own imminent demiseAchilles’ at theAchilles’ own hands imminent of own Paris imminentdemise and Apollo. at the demise handsHomer at of frames the Paris hands andthe horse’sApollo. of Paris words Homer and Apollo. frames the Homer horse’s frames wordswith the two horse’s divine words interventions: he notes that Hera had granted Xanthus the power of speech with two divine interventions:with hetwo notes divine that interventions: Hera had granted he notes Xanthus that Hera the hadpower granted of speech Xanthus the power of speech 6 with two divine interventions: he notes that Hera had granted Xanthus the power(audêeis of speech, 19.407), (aud andêeis the, Erinyes (Furies) then immediately check his voice (eskhethon audên, 19.418). (audêeis, 19.407), and the Erinyes(audêeis (Furies), 19.407), then and immediately the Erinyes check (Furies) his thenvoice immediately (eskhethon audên check, 19.418). his voice6 (eskhethon audên, 19.418).6 19.407), and the Erinyes (Furies) then immediately check his voice (eskhethon audên, 19.418).These 6lines have long puzzled Homeric commentators, and the relevant issues are difficult to These lines have long puzzledThese Ho linesmeric have commentators, long puzzled and Ho themeric relevant commentators, issues are anddifficult the relevantto issues are difficultresolve. to 7 I follow Johnston’s arguments that this scene pulls together a variety of mythical motifs that resolve.7 I follow Johnston’sresolve. arguments7 I follow thatThese this Johnston’s scene lines pulls have arguments together long puzzled that a variety this scene Homeric of mythical pulls commentators,together motifs thata variety and of mythical the relevant motifs issuesthat are difficult to 7 are only alluded to here (Johnston 1992). Most importantly, she reconstructs a heroic pattern of Hera are only alluded to here (Johnstonare only 1992). resolve.alluded Most to importantly, Ihere follow (Johnston Johnston’s she 1992). reconstructs Most arguments importantly, a heroic that pattern thisshe reconstructs sceneof Hera pulls a togetherheroic pattern a variety of Hera of mythical motifs that are only alluded to here (Johnston 1992). Most importantly, she reconstructs a heroic pattern of 3 For this general concept, see (Plec 2013); for the ancient debate about animal rationality in general, see (Sorabji 1993; 3 For this general concept, see (Plec3 For 2013); thisHera for general the giving ancient concept, debate divinely-sired see (Plec about 2013); animal for speaking rationality the ancient in horsesdebate general, about to see heroes animal(Sorabji rationality 1993; and claims in general, that see the (Sorabji Erinyes 1993; appear Horky 2017); because and ofon the role of talking birds in this ancient debate, see (Sorabji 1993, pp. 80–85) and Horky 2017); and on the roleHorky of talking 2017); birds and inon th theis ancient role of debate,talking seebirds (Sorabji in this 1993, ancient pp. debate,80–85) andsee (Sorabji 1993, pp. 80–85) and (Newmeyer 2017, pp. 66–67). (Newmeyer 2017, pp. 66–67). (Newmeyer 2017, pp. 66–67). 4 I am grateful to the anonymous referee of this article who directed me to Arrian, Cynegeticus 5.2 as an ancient 4 I am grateful to the anonymous4 I refereeam grateful of this to article the anonymous who directed referee me toof Arrian,this article Cynegeticus who directed 5.2 as me an ancientto Arrian, Cynegeticus 5.2 as an ancient parallel for this relationship between an author and his dog. 3 For this general concept, see (Plec 2013); for the ancient debate about animal rationality in general, see (Sorabji 1993; Horky 2017); parallel for this relationship between an author and his dog. 5 parallel forand this on relationship the role of talking between birds an in author this ancient and his debate, dog. see (Sorabji 1993, pp. 80–85) and (Newmeyer 2017 , Though pp. 66–67). the historical disjunction is not strict. (Spittler 2008, pp. 130–40) discusses the example of a talking 5 5 Though the historical disjunctio Thoughn is 4not the Istrict. am historical grateful (Spittler disjunctio to 2008, the anonymous pp.n is130–40) not strict. referee discusses (Spittler of this the 2008,article example pp. who 130–40)of directed a talking discusses me to Arrian, the exampleCynegeticus of a talking5.2 as an dog ancient in the parallelActs of Peter for in relation to classical models. dog in the Acts of Peter in relationdog to in classical thethis Actsrelationship models. of Peter in relation between to an classical author andmodels. his dog. 6 Homer’s Odyssey presents several other moments of animal communication: an eagle that represents 6 Homer’s Odyssey presents 6 several Homer’s 5other ThoughOdyssey moments thepresents historical of animal several disjunction communication: other ismoments not strict. an of (Spittlereagle animal that 2008 communication: represents, pp. 130–40) discusses an eagle the that example represents of a talking Odysseus dog in speaks the Acts in of a dream to Penelope (19.535–50), Odysseus’ dog Argus does not speak, but he lifts his Odysseus speaks in a dream toOdysseus PenelopePeter speaks (19.535–50),in relationin a dream Od toysseus’ classical to Penelope dog models. Argus (19.535–50), does not Od speak,ysseus’ but dog he liftsArgus his does not speak, but he lifts his head, sees through his master’s disguise, and wags his tail at the sight of his long-lost friend (17.291–327), 6 head, sees through his master’shead, disg uise,seesHomer’s throughand wagsOdyssey his his master’s tailpresents at thedisg sight severaluise, of and his other wags long-lost moments his tail friend ofat animalthe (17.291–327), sight communication: of his long-lost anfriend eagle (17.291–327), that represents and Odysseusthe Cyclops speaks Polyphemus addresses his ram (9.446–60) in a manner that may suggest that the animal had in a dream to Penelope (19.535–50), Odysseus’ dog Argus does not speak, but he lifts his head, sees through his master’s and the Cyclops Polyphemus addressesand the Cyclops his ram Polyphemus (9.446–60) in addressesa manner histhat ram may (9.446–60) suggest that in a the manner animal th athad may suggest that the animal had the ability to respond in the past. For the latter scene, see (Fögen 2007, pp. 67–68; Gera 2003, pp. 13–15; disguise, and wags his tail at the sight of his long-lost friend (17.291–327), and the Cyclops Polyphemus addresses his ram the ability to respond in the past.the abilityFor the to latter respond scene, in seethe (Fögenpast. For 2007, the pp.latter 67–68; scene, Gera see 2003,(Fögen pp. 2007, 13–15; pp. 67–68; Gera 2003, pp. 13–15; (9.446–60) in a manner that may suggest that the animal had the ability to respond in the past. ForHeath the latter 2005, scene, pp. 79–84). see Heath 2005, pp. 79–84). Heath 2005,(Fögen pp. 79–84).2007, pp. 67–68; Gera 2003, pp. 13–15; Heath 2005, pp. 79–84). 7 Already the ancient commentaries (scholia vetera) on Homer grappled with these lines. A note on line 407 7 Already the ancient commentaries7 Already (7scholia theAlready veteraancient) the on commentaries ancientHomer commentariesgrappled (scholia with vetera (thesscholia) eon lines. veteraHomer A) onnote grappled Homer on line with grappled 407 these with lines. these A note lines. on line A note 407 ontakes line the 407 time takes to explain the that audêeis implies “having the voice of a rational animal” (λογικοῦ ζῴου φωνὴν takes the time to explain that audêeistakes theimplies time “having to explain the that voice audaudêeis ofêeis a rationalimplies “havinganimal” the(λογικοῦ voice ofζῴου a rational φωνὴν animal” (λογικοῦ ζῴου φωνὴν ἔχοντα) andand anotheranother on 418 alternately proposes that the Furies are involved here because they are ἔχοντα) and another on 418 ἔχονταalternately) andon proposes 418 another alternately thaton 418th proposese alternatelyFuries that are theproposesinvolved Furies arethathere involved thbecausee Furies here they are because areinvolved they here are “overseersbecause they of things are “overseers contrary toof things nature” contrary to nature” (ἐπίσκοποι γάρ εἰσι τῶν παρὰ φύσιν) or because a pronouncement “overseers of things contrary to“overseers nature” (ἐπίσκοποι of things contrary γάρ εἰσι to τῶν nature” παρὰ ( φύσινἐπίσκοποι) or because γάρ εἰσι a τῶν pronouncement παρὰ φύσιν about) or because death hada pronouncement been made. about death had been made. about death had been made. about death had been made. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 3 of 15 their chthonic connections with prophecy. On Johnston’s reading, we should not assume that Hera has just now given Xanthus the power to speak nor that the Furies have done anything more than brought the motivation for this prophesy to an end. They do not, that is, permanently remove Xanthus’ ability to converse in human language. I agree with Johnston’s assessment of the details of this scene, but I add that the Erinyes’ silencing of Xanthus parallels a range of details suggesting that epic bards pitched their tales as coming from a lost era that was closer to a Golden Age (Gera 2003, pp. 18–67). The Erinyes take the horse’s voice, that is, not in a narrow move to deprive Xanthus of his special powers but as one of many indicators that the “there and then” is different from the “here and now”.8 Narratives about the end of a Golden Age tend to draw on a standard set of motifs, such as the separation of divinities from humans, a shortening of the human lifespan, the end of spontaneously produced agricultural bounty, the need for clothing and, most important for our project, the transformation of language. Familiar stories from Genesis make this clear. Adam and Eve must leave the Garden of Eden, where they had interacted directly with God, after an encounter with a talking serpent. Once outside this enclosed paradisiacal space and cast into the wilderness beyond, the world is governed by a different set of rules. Later in Genesis, the cataclysmic flood (a common Near Eastern motif) provides a second cultural rupture that reboots humanity and leaves us with shorter life spans. The theme of language looms most prominently in the tale of Babel, where the unified human language is divided into countless tongues in response to human transgression.9 The end of Golden Age narratives helps construct a familiar pre-modern world in which we no longer live as long as Methusela, and we wear clothes as we work the fields; animals provide us with labor and food; and whereas snakes no longer speak, humans have a wide variety of languages. Augustine even suggests that language as we now understand it is itself a consequence of our expulsion from the Garden: “The explanation for the bodily (corporaliter) uttering of all these words is the nadir of the age and the blindness of the flesh, by which thoughts cannot be seen, with the result that there is this tintinnabulation in the ears” (Confessions 13.23.34).10 Although the details can be changed, the rough opposition between then and now is replayed in Greek sources as well. The wedding of the mortal Peleus and immortal Thetis, which precipitates the entire Trojan saga, shows gods and humans feasting together as a feature of a world that is fading away in Homer’s poems.11 Scodel has shown that the flood narrative has been adapted into the Homeric context through the anticipated deluge that Apollo and Poseidon will orchestrate at the end of the Trojan War to destroy the Achaean wall (Iliad 12.3–35) (Scodel 1982). Both the land of the Cyclopes and Scheria, the home of the Phaeacians, show some signs of being Golden Age spaces, at least until they interact with Odysseus.12 The same idea of a new world ordering appears in Hesiod’s tale of how gods and humans gathered at Mecone and made a new settlement to facilitate communication for the coming era in which mortals and immortals no longer interact directly. This new order came about when the Titan Prometheus (the father of Deucalion, the lone male survivor of the Greek flood) demonstrated the basic sacrificial precedent for burning the well-dressed but inedible portions of an animal to the gods while reserving the seemingly humbler but more nutritive bits for human consumption. Human existence is now framed in terms of our estrangement from the gods and

8 This is not to say, however, that I agree with those who interpret the Erinyes as guardians of the natural order (e.g., (Edwards 1991, p. 285)). There is some evidence for this position in the scholium (ancient commentary) to line 19.418, but that is hardly convincing whereas Johnston’s counterarguments are. 9 Herodotus (2.2–5) preserves a tale about the Egyptian Pharaoh Psammetichus conducting an experiment to discover the original and natural language of humans. Based on the first word uttered by an infant raised in isolation, the Pharaoh concluded that Phrygian is the original human language. 10 All translations are my own. 11 Descriptions of the wedding are preserved at Kypria fr. 3 Davies 1988 = fr. 3 Bernabé 1987, Pindar Pythian 3.86–96, Nemian 4.65–68, 5.22–39, Isthmian 8.46–47, and on the Francois Vase. 12 Both areas are notably fecund and their inhabitants have easier interactions with some divinities, yet both have non-Golden Age traits as well (Vidal-Naquet 1998, pp. 26–27) on Scheria as both an ideal and a typical Greek settlement; (Gera 2003, p. 15) on the land of the Cyclopes as a “halfway golden age world”; see also Plutarch, Gryllus, 986F. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 4 of 15

Humanities 2017, 6, 37 4 of 15 our domination over animals, who come to serve as our food and a means for contacting the gods. Thebits clearestfor human proof consumption. that Hesiod Human was thinking existence in is terms now offramed epochal in term distinctionss of our estrangement appears in his from account the of gods and our domination over animals, who come to serve as our food and a means for contacting the five ages, in which the Golden Age fades to Silver, then Bronze before an age of heroes intervenes, the gods. The clearest proof that Hesiod was thinking in terms of epochal distinctions appears in his and we find ourselves (with Hesiod) in the sad age of Iron (Works and Days, 109–201). The heroes who account of the five ages, in which the Golden Age fades to Silver, then Bronze before an age of heroes became the subject of Homeric poetry thus inhabit a story world that precedes our current degraded intervenes, and we find ourselves (with Hesiod) in the sad age of Iron (Works and Days, 109–201). The age, but they too are separated from the earliest and best eras. What all these stories have in common heroes who became the subject of Homeric poetry thus inhabit a story world that precedes our current isdegraded that they age, present but they a different too are separated system offrom being the inearliest the world, and best in eras. contrast What to all which these stories the current have era mustin common develop is indirectthat they and present imperfect a different means system for communicating of being in the with world, the in divine contrast realm to which through the such structurescurrent era as must sacrifice develop and prayer.indirect and imperfect means for communicating with the divine realm throughIn classical such structures sources, as we sacrifice hear more and aboutprayer. the movement from loquacious humans into the animal realmIn (most classical famously sources, in we Ovid’s hear moreMetamorphoses about the movement), but a few from writers loquacious preserve humans the idea into of the a primordialanimal worldrealm in(most which famously animals in Ovid’s could Metamorphoses speak. Callimachus,), but a few working writers inpreserve Alexandria the idea in of the a primordial third-century BCE,world offers in which one animals example could of thisspeak. in Callimachus, the second poem working of in his Alexandria now fragmentary in the third-century collection BCE, of Iambi (Acosta-Hughesoffers one example 2002 ,of pp. this 152–90; in the Steiner second 2010 poem). The of poemhis now centers fragmentary in an Aesopic collection tale aboutof Iambi an era when(Acosta-Hughes animals could 2002, talk, pp. and152–90; a swan Steiner asked 2010). the The gods poem for acenters release in from an Aesopic aging.13 taleThe about request an era seems towhen have animals been turned could down,talk, and because a swan aasked fox accuses the gods Zeus for a of release ruling from unjustly aging. (without13 The requestdikê). seems In response to tohave this been increasingly turned down, unruly because cacophony a fox accuses of voices, Zeus the of fatherruling unjustly of gods (without and men dikê decides). In response to silence to the animalsthis increasingly and transfer unruly their cacophony voices to humans.of voices, There the father follows of agods listof and jokes men that decides modern to readerssilence the are not wellanimals positioned and transfer to assess, their butvoices the to basic humans. logic There is simple follows enough: a list of the jokes story that explains modern why readers so-and-so are not now speakswell positioned like a dog, to someoneassess, but else the like basic a donkey,logic is simple etc. Years enough: later, the Callimachus’ story explains fellow why Alexandrian, so-and-so now Philo speaks like a dog, someone else like a donkey, etc. Years later, Callimachus’ fellow Alexandrian, Philo (c. 25 BCE-50 CE) told a similar tale, surely inspired, as Acosta-Hughes has shown, by Callimachus’ (c. 25 BCE-50 CE) told a similar tale, surely inspired, as Acosta-Hughes has shown, by Callimachus’ poem (Acosta-Hughes 2002, pp. 175–82). In commenting on the Biblical story of Babel, Philo relays a poem (Acosta-Hughes 2002, pp. 175–82). In commenting on the Biblical story of Babel, Philo relays a tale about a time when animals shared a common language (De confusione linguarum 6–8). This ability tale about a time when animals shared a common language (De confusione linguarum 6–8). This ability to communicate leads to a network of shared values and sympathies, and eventually they raise a to communicate leads to a network of shared values and sympathies, and eventually they raise a collectivecollective voicevoice demandingdemanding immortality immortality for for themselves. themselves. Predictably, Predictably, the the animals animals are arepunished punished by by havinghaving theirtheir sharedshared language splintered. splintered. The The unifie unifiedd political political force force of ofthe the animals animals is neutered is neutered when when theirtheir abilityability toto shareshare their thoughts thoughts and and feelings feelings is istaken taken away, away, and and the the Golden Golden Age Age concludes concludes by by leavingleaving thethe worldworld with voiceless voiceless and and brutish brutish animals animals th thatat have have no noclaim claim to just to justice.ice. Finally, Finally, the thefable fable writerwriter Babrius Babrius (probably(probably working in in Cilicia Cilicia in in the the first first or or second second century century CE) CE) looks looks back back to a tobygone a bygone eraera whenwhen animalsanimals could speak. His His first first prologue prologue sets sets up up this this division division between between thenthen andand now nowby by positingpositing threethree agesages (Gold, Silver Silver and and Iron) Iron) and and then then positioning positioning Aesop Aesop as asthe the unique unique intermediary intermediary whosewhose knowledge knowledge ofof thethe animal world world permits permits him him to to transmit transmit that that lore lore to tous us(Prologue (Prologue 1.5–16, 1.5–16, Perry): Perry): ἐπὶ τῆς δὲ χρυσῆς καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν ζῴων φωνὴν ἔναρθρον εἶχε καὶ λόγους ᾔδει οἵους περ ἡμεῖς μυθέομεν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀγοραὶ δὲ τούτων ἦσαν ἐν μέσαις ὕλαις. ἐλάλει δὲ πεύκη καὶ τὰ φύλλα τῆς δάφνης, καὶ πλωτὸς ἰχθὺς συνελάλει φίλῳ ναύτῃ, στρουθοὶ δὲ συνετὰ πρὸς γεωργὸν ὡμίλουν. ἐφύετ’ ἐκ γῆς πάντα μηδὲν αἰτούσης, θνητῶν δ’ ὑπῆρχε καὶ θεῶν ἑταιρείη. μάθοις ἂν οὕτω ταῦτ’ ἔχοντα καὶ γνοίης ἐκ τοῦ σοφοῦ γέροντος ἧμιν Αἰσώπου. μύθους φράσαντος τῆς ἐλευθέρης μούση. Now, in the Golden age the other creatures, too, had intelligible voices and used words Now, in the Golden age the other creatures, too, had intelligible voices and used words such as we ourselves do in telling each other tales, and their gatherings were among the trees.such asEven we the ourselves Pine and do the in leaves telling ofeach the Laurel other talked, tales, and the Fish their as gatherings it swam chatted were amongwith the the trees. Even the Pine and the leaves of the Laurel talked, the Fish as it swam chatted with

13 Speaking animals are, of course, a commonplace of ancient fables. See (Fögen 2007, pp. 67–68) and 13 Speaking(Gera 2003, animals pp. 207–12 are, of course,). a commonplace of ancient fables. See (Fögen 2007, pp. 67–68) and (Gera 2003, pp. 207–12). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 5 of 15

the friendly sailor, and the Sparrows conversed intelligibly with the Farmer. Everything grew from the untilled earth, and among mortals and gods good fellowship prevailed. That this was so, you may learn and fully understand from wise old Aesop, who has told us fables with his free Muse.

The wisdom of fables, that is, comes to us from a different era of discourse, and whereas Homer and Hesiod claim to access privileged information via the inspiration of the divine Muses, Callimachus and Babrius set up Aesop as the historical intermediary node of communication. Callimachus, Philo and Babrius provide an outline for understanding the end of the Golden Age in terms of a transformation of language that explains why communication—among humans but also between the realms of animals, humans and gods—is so difficult. The fantasy of a time when such communication was simpler and more straightforward speaks to a deep human anxiety about limitations of language. To return to the case of Xanthus, as the Erinyes silence the speaking horse, we can recognize one more epoch-ending moment. On this reading, it makes perfect sense that the horse speaks in an oracular mode. A speaking animal in this context does not replace human voices (as, for example, the mock-epic Battle of Mice and Frogs, which substitutes animals for Homeric characters), rather it gives the impression of a Golden Age moment of communication. The voice is, therefore, not uniquely equine either, since the information Xanthus gives could have been provided just as well by a passing eagle or come through the medium of a human prophet, a divine epiphany or an animal sacrifice.14 The layering of temporal frames within which Xanthus’ lines ring forth makes this particularly poignant, as the greatest figure of the heroic age hears a last Golden Age communication. Achilles learns that his own demise draws near, while we realize that we stand at a double separation from such clarity of communication and understanding. Animals no longer speak, and Xanthus’ unexpected Homeric eloquence derives not from his horseness or his animality but, rather, from the entire complex of Golden Age idealizations against which the human condition is framed.

3. What Does the Fox Say? Whereas Homer and Hesiod emerge from a panhellenic story-telling tradition in contact with the Near East, Archilochus, remembered as the seventh-century BCE “inventor” of iambic (and sometimes also elegiac) poetry, speaks with a voice localized in the Aegean islands (especially Paros and Thasos). Archilochean iambos conjures a strikingly un-heroic world that contrasts sharply with the beauty and nobility of Homer. The scurrility for which he was later reviled, however, seems not to have been out of place in the archaic and classical eras. Indeed he was frequently remembered as one of the preeminent early poets (“second only to Homer”), which makes it all the more lamentable that his corpus survives today in a hodge-podge of papyrus scraps and quotations by later authors.15 Legends about his life coalesce around a scenario in which an older Parian named Lycambes had promised to give his daughter Neobule to him in marriage. When Lycambes reneged, Archilochus retaliated with such a vicious barrage of poetry that Lycambes and his daughters hanged themselves in shame. Whatever kernel of truth may lie beneath the accreted layers of elaboration, this story provides an ideal etiology for one aspect of archaic Greek iambos, namely its power to launch blistering verbal attacks upon a personal enemy. A prominent feature of Archilochean invective is the incorporation of fables (not yet associated with Aesop at this early date) in which animals speak, and these voices offer a starkly different kind of eloquent alogia.

14 This is not to say that the role of the horse is irrelevant here. Horses have close connections with heroes, making the former an apt choice for communicating with the latter. The Greek fabular economy of animal types was rich and complex, but that is a matter of medium. In this case, the aptly chosen medium of the horse delivers a message that is not, in itself, in any way equine. 15 Dio Chrysostom (Orations 33.11–12) is the most overt in putting Archilochus on par with Homer. For a detailed assessment of the ancient pairing of the two poets, see (Lavigne 2016). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 6 of 15

Humanities 2017, 6, 37 7 of 16 The poem that has most plausibly been connected to the rupture between Archilochus and

LycambesHumanities 2017 begins, 6, 37 by setting the conflict in front of the Parian community (fr. 172 West): 7 of 16

Humanitiesπάτερ 2017 Λυκάμβα, 6, 37 , ποῖον ἐφράσω τόδε; 7 of 16

τίς σὰς παρήειρε φρένας ἧιςπάτερ τὸ πρὶνΛυκάμβα ἠρήρησθα, ποῖον; νῦν ἐφράσω δὲ δὴ τόδεπολὺς; πάτερἀστοῖσιτίς σὰς Λυκάμβα παρήειρεφαίνεαι, ποῖον γέλως φρένας ἐφράσω. τόδε; ἧις τὸ πρὶν ἠρήρησθα; νῦν δὲ δὴ πολὺς Fatherτίς σὰς Lycambes, παρήειρε what φρένας have you schemed?! Fatherἀστοῖσι Lycambes, φαίνεαι γέλως what have. you schemed?! ἧιςWho τὸ πρὶνhas taken ἠρήρησθα away ;your νῦν δὲwits, δὴ πολὺς Who has taken away your wits, WhichFatherἀστοῖσι Lycambes,once φαίνεαι were sound?what γέλως have .Now you before schemed?! the citizens Which once were sound? Now before the citizens FatherYouWho seem Lycambes,has taken completely away what your ridiculous.have wits, you schemed?! WhichYou seem once completelywere sound? ridiculous. Now before the citizens Very littleWho is has certain taken about away the your reconstruction wits, of this poem, but it seems to go on to mention a broken You seem completely ridiculous. Veryoath littleWhich(fr. 173 is oncecertainWest) were before about sound? introducing the reconstructionNow before a fable the (ainos ofcitizens this, cognate poem, with but ainigma it seems or to “riddle”) go on to about mention a fox a and broken oathanVery eagle, (fr. littleYou 173 who isseem West) certain struck completely before about up a introducing thefriendship ridiculous. reconstruction (fr. a fable 174 of (Westainos this). ,poem, cognateThis fablebut with it later seemsainigma became to goor onassociated “riddle”) to mention aboutwith a brokenAesop a fox and anVeryandoath eagle, was (fr.little 173 whowidely is West)certain struck known before about up throughout a introducing friendshipthe reconstruction antiquity, (fr.a fable 174 ( West).ofainos but this ,presumably cognatepoem, This fable but with it laterArchilochus’ seemsainigma became to or go “riddle”) associatedversionon to mention wasabout with not aa foxexactlybroken Aesop and and wasoaththean eagle,same widely (fr. 173 aswho knownthoseWest) struck later before throughout up retellings. aintroducing friendship antiquity,Nonetheless, a(fr. fable 174 but ( ainos Westthe presumably bits, ).cognate This of this fable with poem Archilochus’ later ainigma that became survive or “riddle”) version associated accord was about with with not a the foxexactly Aesop basic and the sameanplotand eagle, thatwas as those the widelywho eagle later struck known broke retellings. up throughoutfaith a friendship with Nonetheless, the antiquity, fox,(fr. 174snatched the Westbut bits presumably). ofup This thisits kits,fable poem and Archilochus’later that gave became survive them version associatedas accord a meal was with to with nother the exactlyeagletsAesop basic plot (fr. 175 speaks of “bringing an unlovely meal to unfledged children” who seem to be in a nest). As thatandthe same thewas eagle widelyas those broke known later faith retellings. throughout with the No fox,netheless,antiquity, snatched thebut bitspresumably up of its this kits, poem andArchilochus’ that gave survive them version accord as a mealwas with not to the herexactly basic eaglets theplot fox that curses the eagle its fate, broke the eagletsfaith with somehow the fox, fall snatched to the ground up its kits,where and they gave are them gobbled as a up meal by tothe her bereft eaglets fox. (fr.the 175 same speaks as those of “bringing later retellings. an unlovely Nonetheless, meal tothe unfledged bits of this children” poem that who survive seem accord to be with in a nest).the basic As the (fr. 175Most speaks commentators of “bringing associate an unlovely details meal of tothe unfledged legend of children” the broken who marriage seem to beagreement in a nest). with As foxplot curses that the its eagle fate, thebroke eaglets faith with somehow the fox, fall snatched to the ground up its kits, where and they gave are them gobbled as a meal up to by her the eaglets bereft fox. specificthe fox curses themes its infate, the the fable eaglets (Steiner somehow 2010; fall Irwin to the 1998; ground Hawkins where 2008) they are“Father” gobbled Lycambes, up by the thebereft older, fox. (fr. 175Most speaks commentators of “bringing associate an unlovely details meal of the to legendunfledged of the children” broken marriagewho seem agreement to be in a nest). with specificAs loftier,Most figure commentators stands for the associate eagle, since details both of tu thern theirlege ndbacks of onthe a brokenpre-established marriage plan agreement. Archilochus with themesthe fox curses in the its fable fate, (theSteiner eaglets 2010 somehow; Irwin fall 1998 to ;the Hawkins ground where2008) they “Father” are gobbled Lycambes, up by the bereft older, fox. loftier, playsspecific the themes part of in the the fox fable (which (Steiner he does 2010; in Irwin other 1998; poems), Hawkins who is 2008) jilted “Father” but ultimately Lycambes, finds the a path older, to figureMost stands commentators for the eagle, associate since both details turn theirof the backs lege onnd aof pre-established the broken marriage plan. Archilochus agreement playswith the specificrevenge.loftier, figure themes And stands the in thewhole for fable the animal (Steinereagle, narrativesince 2010; both Irwin hinges turn 1998; their on Hawkins thebacks role on 2008) ofa pre-eschildren, “Father”tablished the Lycambes, expected plan. Archilochus thegoal older, and part of the fox (which he does in other poems), who is jilted but ultimately finds a path to revenge. loftier,outcomeplays the figure ofpart any stands of themarriage forfox the(which in eagle, ancient he since does Greek bothin other tuculture.rn poems), their By backs whogoing on is abackjilted pre-es onbuttablished his ultimately promise plan finds .to Archilochus marry a path his to And the whole animal narrative hinges on the role of children, the expected goal and outcome of any playsdaughterrevenge. the toAndpart Archilochus ofthe the whole fox and (which animal thereby he narrative does depriving in other hinges the poems),poet on of the future who role isoffspring, of jilted children, but Lycamb ultimately the esexpected acts finds like goalthea path eagle. and to marriage in ancient Greek culture. By going back on his promise to marry his daughter to Archilochus revenge.outcomeWithin Andof thisany the framework,marriage whole animal in we ancient find narrative two Greek moments hinges culture. onwhen Bythe goingthe role fox ofback speaks. children, on First,his thepromise in expected fr. 176 to West, marry goal most andhis and thereby depriving the poet of future offspring, Lycambes acts like the eagle. outcomereadersdaughter agree toof Archilochusany that marriage the fox, and alreadyin thereby ancient mourning depriving Greek the culture.the losspoet of ofBy its future going kits, offspring, says back to on itself: Lycamb his promisees acts tolike marry the eagle. his WithinWithin thisthis framework,framework, we we find find two two moments moments when when the the fox fox speaks. speaks. First, First, in fr. in 176 fr. 176West, West, most most daughterὁρᾶις to ἵν Archilochus’ ἐστὶ κεῖνος and ὑψηλὸς thereby πάγος depriving, the poet of future offspring, Lycambes acts like the eagle. readersreaders agree agree thatthat thethe fox, already mourning mourning the the loss loss of of its its kits, kits, says says to toitself: itself: Within τρηχύς this τε καὶframework, παλίγκοτος we find; two moments when the fox speaks. First, in fr. 176 West, most readersἐνὁρᾶις τῶιagree ἵν κάθηται’ thatἐστὶ theκεῖνος, σὴν fox, ἐλαφρίζωνὑψηλὸςalready mourningπάγος μάχην, the loss of its kits, says to itself: τρηχύς τε καὶ παλίγκοτος; ὁρᾶιςDo you ἵν see’ ἐστὶ where κεῖνος that ὑψηλὸς high crag πάγος is, , ἐν τῶι κάθηται, σὴν ἐλαφρίζων μάχην τρηχύςsheer and τε καὶunapproachable? παλίγκοτος; ἐνThereDo τῶι you it κάθηται see[presumably where, σὴν that ἐλαφρίζωνthe high eagle] crag si is,μάχηνts making fun of your assaults. Do you see where that high crag is, sheer and unapproachable? NothingDosheer you that andsee the where unapproachable?fox can that do—accusing, high crag is, cursing, grieving, pleading—influences the eagle, safe at its Theresheer it and [presumably unapproachable? the eagle] sits making fun of your assaults. inaccessibleThere it elevation, [presumably just as the Lycambes eagle] sits remains making sa funfe from of your the complaints assaults. of Archilochus. It may be thatNothing asThere the that foxit [presumablythe recognizes fox can do—accusing,the the ineffectiveness eagle] sits cursing,making of su fungriech approaches, ofving, your pleading—influences assaults. she comes up with the a eagle, more safepowerful at its NothingNothingstrategy.inaccessiblethat thatFr. elevation,177 thethe West foxfox can (again, just do—accusing, as assumedLycambes to cursing,remains cursing,be spoken griesa grieving,fe byving, from the pleading—influences fox)the pleading—influences complaintsis a prayer toof Zeus:Archilochus. the theeagle, eagle, Itsafe may safeat itsbe at its that as the fox recognizes the ineffectiveness of such approaches, she comes up with a more powerful inaccessibleinaccessibleὦ Ζεῦ, elevation,πάτερelevation, Ζεῦ just, just σὸν as as μὲν Lycambes Lycambes οὐρανοῦ remains remains κράτος sa, safefe from from the the complaints complaints of Archilochus. of Archilochus. It may It may be be strategy. Fr. 177 West (again, assumed to be spoken by the fox) is a prayer to Zeus: thatthat as as theσὺthe δ foxfox’ ἔργ recognizesrecognizes’ ἐπ’ ἀνθρώπων the the ineffectiveness ineffectiveness ὁρᾶις of of su suchch approaches, approaches, she she comes comes up upwith with a more a more powerful powerful strategy.strategy.λεωργὰὦ Ζεῦ Fr.Fr., 177πάτερ177 καὶ WestWest θεμιστά Ζεῦ (again,(again,, σὸν, σοὶ μὲν assumed δὲ οὐρανοῦ θηρίων to to be beκράτος spoken spoken, by by the the fox) fox) is isa prayer a prayer to toZeus: Zeus: ὦὕβριςσὺ Ζεῦ δ’, ἔργπάτερτε καὶ’ ἐπ Ζεῦδίκη’ ἀνθρώπων, σὸνμέλει μὲν. ὁρᾶιςοὐρανοῦ κράτος, λεωργὰ καὶ θεμιστά, σοὶ δὲ θηρίων Oσὺ Zeus, δ’ ἔργ father’ ἐπ ’Zeus, ἀνθρώπων you who ὁρᾶις wield heaven’s power, ὕβρις τε καὶ δίκη μέλει. λεωργὰYou look καὶ upon θεμιστά the affairs, σοὶ δὲ of θηρίων humans, BothOὕβρις Zeus, reckless τε father καὶ and δίκηZeus, lawful, μέλει you .whoand thewield beasts’ heaven’s power, OTransgressionsYou Zeus, look father upon Zeus, theand affairsyou justice who of are humans,wield your heaven’s concern. power, BothO Zeus, reckless father and Zeus, lawful, you and who the wield beasts’ heaven’s power, These Youlines look stake upon three the claims, affairs when of humans, we focus on the role of the speaking animal. First, Archilochus YouTransgressions look upon theand affairsjustice ofare humans, your concern. here Bothreverses reckless a point and made lawful, by Hesiodand the inbeasts’ Works and Days, which claims that Zeus gave justice (dikê) to Both reckless and lawful, and the beasts’ humansThese Transgressionslines but stake not to three “fish, and claims, beasts justice andwhen are winged yourwe focus concern. birds” on th(276–80), e role of who the eatspeaking one another animal. as First,part of Archilochus the natural Transgressions and justice are your concern. Thesehere reverses lines stake a point three made claims, by Hesiodwhen we in Worksfocus onand th Dayse role, which of the claims speaking that animal. Zeus gave First, justice Archilochus (dikê) to herehumans reverses but not a point to “fish, made beasts by Hesiod and winged in Works birds” and (276–80), Days, which who claims eat one that another Zeus as gave part justice of the ( naturaldikê) to humans but not to “fish, beasts and winged birds” (276–80), who eat one another as part of the natural Humanities 2017, 6, 37 7 of 15

These lines stake three claims, when we focus on the role of the speaking animal. First, Archilochus here reverses a point made by Hesiod in Works and Days, which claims that Zeus gave justice (dikê) to humans but not to “fish, beasts and winged birds” (276–80), who eat one another as part of the natural order.16 Earlier in that same poem, Hesiod had told a fable about a hawk and a nightingale, and that inset tale, directed specifically to “kings who understand” (202), suggested that might makes right both among animals and humans. With his later comment about the uniquely human relevance of justice, however, he shows the limitations of thinking of animals as models for people. As a symbol, the hawk appears in the poem as a representative of human rapacity, but as a bird, its domination of the nightingale has no ethical valence whatsoever, since matters of justice are absent from the animal realm. Animals are incorporated into a human ethical discourse only to be excluded as animals from ethical concerns or included only inasmuch as they offer a taxonomy of human types. Second, by reversing Hesiod’s separation of humans and animals in terms of justice, Archilochus makes a strikingly different move—one that encourages fantasies about how animals might have been conceptualized differently had Archilochus, rather than Hesiod, emerged as the canonical poet. Archilochus’ (fox’s) presentation of a Zeus concerned for animal justice allows us to return to the relationship between his poem’s framing narrative (about Lycambes and, presumably, the ruptured marriage pact) and the inset fable. As Payne has already noted, the fox’s claim establishes a sympathetic continuity between human and animal (Payne 2010, p. 35). Archilochus’ anger at Lycambes exists on the same spectrum as the fox’s anger at the treacherous eagle, and this encourages us to evaluate the human and animal scenarios on similar terms. If it is natural and unobjectionable for the fox to eat the eagle’s offspring, then such a response should be acceptable in Archilochus’ reaction to Lycambes. The story that Lycambes and his family committed suicide thus balances the conclusion of the fable. Whereas Hesiod’s denial of justice to animals makes the hawk’s treatment of the nightingale ethically different from an unequal power dynamic among humans, Archilochus creates a scenario in which human justice can be informed by non-human behavior. The fox’s eating of the eaglets becomes both ethically justified and driven by an impassioned need for revenge. If Archilochus’ fable elides the differences between him and the fox, we find two apt comparisons in Trojan War mythology. Near the end of the Iliad, as Achilles and Hector face off, the latter suggests a plan that the eventual victor should respect the corpse of the defeated enemy. To this Achilles responds that there can be no such agreements between lions and humans or between wolves and sheep (22.261–67). Moments later Hector lies dying, and he begs Achilles to grant him proper burial. Achilles wishes that “my fury (menos) and spirit (thumos) could prompt me to chop you up and eat your flesh raw” (346–47), and he predicts that Hector’s corpse will be devoured by dogs and birds (335–36 and 348). We hear no speaking animals in this scene, but we find the limits of Achilles’ rage, since he cannot quite become animal to actually ingest his enemy, a job he leaves to scavenging birds and dogs who will eat Hector’s flesh but without Achilles’ animus. Later, in an episode not preserved in Homer but related in Euripides’ Hecuba, Hector’s mother, Hecuba, reaches her breaking point after the fall of Troy as she is forced to face horror upon horror enacted upon her children. When she hears that her youngest son Polydorus has been killed by a former ally, she takes vengeance on her enemy’s children. In the outcome, the ghost of her son tells her that she will be transformed into a dog (1265) and her final resting place will be known as “Bitch’s Tomb” (1271–73). Franco has shown how this fate represents a fitting emblem of Hecuba’s relentless focus on defending her children, a trait closely associated with a maternal canine instinct in early Greek literature (Franco 2014, pp. 108–18).17

16 As noted by Corrêa (Da Cunha Corrêa 2007, pp. 112–13). For the fullest treatment of animals in Archilochus, see (Da Cunha Corrêa 2010). 17 Gregory emphasizes the darker side of this association when she notes that “Hecuba has become morally indistinguishable from the dog whose shape she is destined to assume” (Gregory 1999, p. xxxiii). For an excellent treatment of Hecuba’s revenge narrative, as well as a succinct overview of the history of scholarship on this topic dating back to the Renaissance, see (Mossman 1995, pp. 164–203). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 8 of 15

Whereas Achilles cannot quite cross into an animal savagery, Hecuba behaves like “a bitch protecting her pups” (Semonides, fr. 7.34–36 West), and this brings her to the point of being something other than human, what Kovacs has described as an “extraordinary force, at once sub-human and super-human, bestial and divine” (Kovacs 1987, p. 109).18 Archilochus uses his animal fable and the words of the fox to do something similar: within his poem he assimilates his lust for revenge to that of the fox and thereby normalizes his murderous intent via the just practices of animals as authorized by Zeus. At the conclusion of the fable we return to the world of human voices, but the speaking fox demonstrates that human passion is both regulated by the dictates of justice while also being extended and normalized through the example of the animals’ conflict. As a final comment on the fox’s voice, we can return to the comparison between animal voices and sacrifice. Hesiod’s Prometheus shows that sacrifice was established at the moment when gods and humans ceased to eat together, the moment, that is, when face-to-face communication ended. A new social order goes hand-in-hand with a new approach to food and animals, and sacrifice becomes an imperfect substitute for direct communication between humans and divinities. At a moment of crisis and despair, the Archilochean fox prays, and his prayer (another postlapsarian stop-gap) is answered. Later versions of the fable, such as Aesopica 1 (Perry 1952) and the Latin version of Phaedrus (1.28), say that the eagle snatched a bit of smoldering sacrificial meat from an altar and that this hot morsel set the birds’ nest ablaze, causing the unfledged eaglets to fall to the ground, where the fox gobbled them up. Although the surviving Archilochean fragments are so incomplete that we cannot be certain of all the details, several words suggest that this basic pattern was to be found in his poem as well. The fox’s ability to speak derives from a Golden Age past, but whereas Xanthus speaks with divine authority and inspiration, the fox serves as an idealized model of life beyond the Golden Age. The fox’s prayer works, since it leads directly to a violation of sacrificial practice (food on an altar is for the gods) and divinely sanctioned retribution. The fabular animal’s voice can do what human prayer intends, namely to convey mortal concerns directly to the divine realm and to prompt a direct response. Prayer does not always work that way for humans, and thus the fox’s voice (like that of Achilles’ horse) suggests the fantasy of a world in which contact with the divine is direct and efficacious. This pattern inside Archilochus’ poem parallels the legendary efficacy of his poetry in human society as attested by the legendary suicide of the Lycambids.

4. Happy as Pig in Mud We now jump nearly a thousand years from Archilochus’ archaic milieu to a time when Rome exerts stable control over Greece and imperial trade routes foster communication across a huge swath of cultures. Earlier examples could, of course, be adduced, but by sampling cases of talking animals from the early and late extremities of the classical Greek world, we can find a broad vista of attitudes and approaches to this narrative device. As we will see, furthermore, imperial Greek authors frequently returned to material drawn from much earlier eras. One such example comes from Plutarch (c. 46–120), the prolific Boeotian biographer, essayist, civil servant and Middle Platonist philosopher. Within his collection of shorter works known as the Moralia, we find a brief, and probably fragmentary, dialogue typically known as Gryllus, also titled “On the Fact that Unreasoning Creatures Use Reason”. This longer title plays on the oxymoron that animals (ta aloga, “the things lacking logos”) by etymological definition lack logos, which means both “reason” and “voice”, even though the text presents a speaking pig arguing on behalf of its own intelligence. As often with humorous texts, how we assess that pun will frame what we take away from this essay, which can be understood as anything from pure frivolity to a serious case for animal intelligence in stark contrast to Stoic thinking.

18 Franco speaks of Hecuba’s “uncontrollable wrath”, which calls to mind Achilles’ ferocious return to battle after the death of Patroclus (Franco 2014, p. 110). Hecuba’s delimitation of human boundaries participates in a network of themes that Ringer studies throughout Euripides’ corpus (Ringer 2016). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 9 of 15

Plutarch sets the stage at a very particular moment in mythical history. Odysseus is speaking with Circe in a manner that suggests that he has already saved his own crew from her magic and that we are toward the end of his first and longer stay on the island or, perhaps better, during his brief visit on his return from the Land of the Dead. The latter seems to be suggested in the text’s opening statement from the hero: “I think that I’ve learned and remembered these things” (985D), which presumably refers to the information that Circe had sent Odysseus to learn from the dead seer Tiresias. This abrupt beginning immediately transitions into Odysseus’ real interest, namely whether or not Circe has any Greeks among the menagerie of “manimals” living in her yard whom he might save. He expects, reasonably enough, that he would gain even greater renown if he were to bring home anyone who has been living in thrall as a beast under her magical spell. Circe acknowledges that there are quite a few Greeks and gives Odysseus a chance to persuade them to leave with him. To facilitate this exchange, she calls forth one pig, whom she dubs Gryllus (“the grunter”), who will speak on behalf of the others. Odysseus makes his pitch to the pig and is immediately rebuffed. Gryllus says that he and the others live a life of plenty and would hate to become once again human, that “most wretched of all animals” (986D). Odysseus responds with the observation that Gryllus seems to have lost not only his human form but also his intelligence (dianoia). This quip looks back to a detail in the Odyssey where Homer specifies that Circe transformed the outward appearance of Odysseus’ crew into pigs in every detail but they retained their human minds (noos, 10.239–40). Konstan stresses the point that Gryllus must be considered either completely porcine or (far preferable) completely human in the appearance of a pig, because ancient Greek thinking did not include a concept of an actual hybrid nature. That is to say that even hybrid creatures, such as centaurs, do not exhibit “a split within the rational function itself, which would take the form of a double identity,” on the model of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde (Konstan 2010–2011, p. 373). Yet this point seems to be perfectly clear already in the Homeric scene and Plutarch’s rebooting of it: neither author presents a pig but, rather, a human who is living in a boarish guise and lifestyle.19 For the purposes of this volume, this might seem to disqualify Gryllus from our discussion, yet since I am beginning from the assumption that we never hear actual animal voices in these texts, we are on much the same footing as we were with Achilles’ horse and Archilochus’ fox: we are hearing a human or divine or Golden Age voice projected into an animal body. In contrast to our archaic examples, however, Plutarch makes this more explicit. The question then remains, what can we make of this later example of a ventriloquized voice? The dialogue plays out like a defense of the ethical capacities of animals in contrast to human shortcomings, and Newmeyer is among those who find in these arguments a strong case in favor of the existence of animal rationality (Newmeyer 2017, pp. 66–67; Newmeyer 2006). Gryllus discusses the primary virtues in succession, working through courage (andreia), moderation (sôphrosunê) and prudence (phronêsis), and in each case he argues that animals fulfill these human ideals naturally and effortlessly, whereas humans require enormous amounts of effort and training even to approximate their bestial counterparts. Yet as Konstan shows, the concept of virtue within the classical and post-classical Greek philosophical vocabulary exists separately from those capacities that a being fulfills naturally, by physis (Konstan 2010–2011, pp. 375–76).20 That is to say that if an animal naturally displays what humans would call courage, then this cannot be an example of the courageous virtue, since it is not a learned or reflective behavior but is, rather, reflexive and automatic. More modern observational studies of animal behavior complicate this picture significantly in ways that leave exceptional human capacities in serious doubt, but from the perspective of Plutarch’s era, it seems unlikely that Gryllus could be read as pushing a serious proposition about animal rationality, the necessary prerequisite for the idea of animal virtue. Yet this circular system of exclusion that

19 This point is picked up by Spencer, who depicts Gryllus as happy to remain a pig because of his preexisting character: “Let Grill be Grill and have his hoggish mind” (Faerie Queene, 2.12.87). 20 Pre-classical, pre-philosophical virtue (aretê) by contrast, was inborn and therefore not a matter of training but of birth. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 10 of 15 privileges human definitions at every turn does not necessarily exhaust the possibility of hearing an important message in this animal voice.21 If animals cannot be virtuous, there remain two possible reasons for thinking of them as beings worthy of moral consideration. One idea, raised by Plutarch in another text (On the Eating of Animals) and endorsed by various thinkers throughout the classical era (most famously by Pythagoras and most thoroughly by Porphyry, the third-century Neoplatonist) posits that animals and humans exist within the same cycle of metempsychosis. If an animal contains the soul of my dead parent, then that animal deserves serious moral consideration and should not be eaten or mistreated.22 This theme is peripheral to Gryllus’ arguments, but if Plutarch was angling for a serious reconsideration of attitudes toward animals, he may have taken up different aspects of this larger project in separate texts. What may, however, be implicit in Gryllus’ strategy, is the idea that without any philosophical rigor animals have developed a manner of living that is superior even to a philosophically informed human existence.23 As Newmeyer puts it, “[in Gryllus], as in De sollertia animalium [On the Intelligence of Animals], Plutarch is suggesting that physis and reason, or λóγoσ (logos), are not incompatible, but are rather to be seen as equally responsible for guiding the actions of animals”(Newmeyer 2006, p. 37). Plutarch, often quite stark in his disdain for Stoic principals, may have used Gryllus to show that even if we find the pig’s philosophy to be problematic, animals exert a different but valid kind of ethical claim upon humans. Plutarch, then, presents animals not as rational creatures (since their seemingly virtuous behaviors are the result of instinct) but, rather, as creatures who inhabit something like a Golden Age frame of existence in the here and now, in which desires are aligned with capacities and needs in such a way that virtue itself is irrelevant. Just as Adam and Eve initially had no shame at their nakedness and Greek mythology recalls an era when humans and divinities shared easy and direct interactions, Plutarch’s animals have no need for virtue to achieve a good life. Virtue and philosophy, like sacrifice and prayer, are postlapsarian means for attempting to return to an idealized (perhaps hypothetical) primitive state. We need not assume that Plutarch had any real commitment to the idea that such an era actually existed for his philosophical point to carry weight. Gryllus tells us not that animals are philosophers but, rather, that animals have no need to take up philosophy (whether they could ever do so or not). As he, a human in pig form, speaks to us, we do not hear the voice of a pig—only another voice delimiting the human experience through a pathetic fallacy that maintains a human exceptionalism in response to our inability to communicate more directly with the gods we believe to be above us or the animals we assume to be beneath us. The problem with Gryllus’ voice, that is, may have less to do with animals and more to do with the shortcomings of human communication that cannot adequately account for the position of Plutarch’s pig. As Gryllus says, “if you do not think it appropriate to call this rationality (logos) and thought, then look for a better and more fitting word for it” (991F).

5. The Philosopher King of the Farmyard Lucian of Samosata (part of the Roman province of Syria) was born about the time that Plutarch died and he himself probably expired near the beginning of the third century, though we know extremely little about his life. Like Plutarch, Lucian left us a large body of work, but his satirical and playful style contrasts sharply with that of his predecessor.24 This difference can be seen clearly in

21 This idea is paralleled in the work of Levinas, for whom a dog named Bobby played an important role in helping him develop his theory of ethics emerging from the reciprocal obligations implicit in looking into the face of another. Yet even though Bobby spurred Levinas in this direction, the philosopher never granted an important ethical subjectivity to non-human animals (Plant 2011). 22 On Plutarch and vegetarianism, see (Newmeyer 2006, pp. 85–102) and (Newmeyer 1995). 23 Such a position is associated with the opinions of Diogenes the Cynic. Plutarch’s contemporary Dio Chrysostom makes this particularly clear (Oration 6.13–33 and 10.16). (Sorabji 1993, p. 161) likens this possibility to Greek narratives about noble barbarians, such as Anacharsis the Scythian. 24 The best overarching studies of Lucian’s corpus are (Bompaire 1958; Branham 1989;N í Mheallaigh 2014). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 11 of 15

Lucian’s Cock (alternately titled The Dream, though this can cause confusion since he has another text by that name), which may respond directly to Plutarch’s Gryllus.25 If Lucian did not intentionally model Cock on Gryllus, then they at least share the same basic narrative ploy. Whereas the earlier work began with Odysseus setting up an interview with one of Circe’s surprisingly opinionated pigs, Lucian’sHumanitiesCock 2017, opens6, 37 with a bleary-eyed cobbler hollering at his early-crowing rooster, who turns12 of out16 to have been Pythagoras in a former life. Both texts thus orient themselves in terms of early Greek lore, to have been Pythagoras in a former life. Both texts thus orient themselves in terms of early Greek both feature a human discoursing with a speaking farm animal who used to be human, and in both lore, both feature a human discoursing with a speaking farm animal who used to be human, and in cases the animal comes off much better in the exchange. Yet Lucian’s reworking of the human–animal both cases the animal comes off much better in the exchange. Yet Lucian’s reworking of the human– conceit serves a more deconstructive purpose in questioning the pristine and primitive authority that animal conceit serves a more deconstructive purpose in questioning the pristine and primitive animates most ancient examples of speaking animals. authority that animates most ancient examples of speaking animals. TheThe texttext beginsbegins with Micyllus the the cobbler cobbler cursin cursingg his his rooster rooster for for awakening awakening him him so early, so early, since since hehe was was inin thethe midstmidst of an amazing dream dream that that he he was was as as rich rich as asCroesus. Croesus. When When the therooster rooster responds responds inin human human voice,voice, itit takestakes the cobbler cobbler several several minutes minutes to to get get his his head head around around what what is going is going on. on.There There ensuesensues aa discussiondiscussion about the rooster’s rooster’s experience experiencess living living in invarious various human human and and bestial bestial guises guises and and thenthen a a demonstration demonstration of the vani vanityty of of human human wealth. wealth. The The latter latter po pointint accords accords well well with with Harmon’s Harmon’s commentcomment thatthat this this is is a a“Cynic “Cynic sermon sermon in praise in praise of poverty” of poverty” (Harmon (Harmon 1915, p. 1915 171),, and p. 171), to some and extent to some extentthis is this surely is surely correct. correct. Yet we Yet can we hear can heara comp a complementarylementary theme theme about about the Golden the Golden Age Ageas we as pay we pay attentionattention toto thethe rooster’srooster’s blending of of animal animal and and philosophical philosophical voices. voices. AsAs thethe roosterrooster speaks, Micyllus reacts reacts with with shock shock and and terror terror (2, (2, Harmon): Harmon): Micyllus: Ὦ Ζεῦ τεράστιε καὶ Ἡράκλεις ἀλεξίκακε, τί τὸ κακὸν τοῦτό ἐστιν; ἀνθρωπίνως ἐλάλησεν ὁ ἀλεκτρυών. Cock: Εἶτά σοι τέρας εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον, εἰ ὁμόφωνος ὑμῖν εἰμι; Micyllus: Πῶς γὰρ οὐ τέρας; ἀλλ’ ἀποτρέποιτε, ὦ θεοί, τὸ δεινὸν ἀφ’ ἡμῶν.

Micyllus: O O Zeus Zeus of of Portents Portents (terastios (terastios)) and and Hercules Hercules the theAverter! Averter! What What evil is evil this? is this?The rooster Thespeaks rooster like aspeaks human!? like a human!? Cock: Why Why do do you you think think it’s it’s a aportent portent (teras (teras)) if I ifam I am homophonous homophonous to you? to you? Micyllus: How How could could it it not not be be a aportent portent (teras (teras)?)? Please, Please, o gods, o gods, avert avert this this disaster disaster from from us! us!

TheThe word word terasteras (and the the cognate cognate adjective adjective terastiosterastios) refers) refers most most directly directly to any to sort any of sort monster, of monster, but by but bythis this era era encompasses encompasses anything anything marvelous marvelous that conf thatounds confounds expectations expectations or, in a or, grander in a grander sense, the sense, thenatural natural order. order. The latter The latterseems seemsto be appropriate to be appropriate in this case, in thisand case,I have and elsewhere I have analyzed elsewhere a similar analyzed adiscussion similar discussion in the picaresque in the picaresque Life of AesopLife about of Aesopthe applicabilityabout the of applicability the word teras of theto the word situationteras toin the which Aesop, born a mute slave, begins to speak (Hawkins 2016, pp. 261–63). In both texts, the situation in which Aesop, born a mute slave, begins to speak (Hawkins 2016, pp. 261–63). In both texts, possibility that the acquisition of speech might be a teras prompts reflection on the boundaries of the possibility that the acquisition of speech might be a teras prompts reflection on the boundaries of personhood. If language (or at least complex grammatical language) is a unique attribute of humans, personhood. If language (or at least complex grammatical language) is a unique attribute of humans, and if human society is organized in terms of a hierarchy of language mastery, then speaking animals and if human society is organized in terms of a hierarchy of language mastery, then speaking animals and mute slaves who become loquacious similarly call attention to the principles around which the andcosmos mute has slaves been whoorganized become (whether loquacious in terms similarly of a progressive call attention transgression to the principles or a conservative around which thestatement cosmos of has normative been organized boundaries (whether). The cock in termsnext chides of a progressiveMicyllus for transgressionnot knowing his or Homer a conservative well statementenough and of normativepoints to the boundaries). passage discussed The cock above next in chides which Micyllus Xanthus,for Achilles not knowing’ horse, does his Homer not just well enoughspeak but and utters points prophesies to the passage in hexameters. discussed26 The above combined in which effect Xanthus, of the cobbler’s Achilles’ reference horse, does to a teras not just 26 speakand the but evocation utters prophesies of an old in hexameters.tale in which aThe hors combinede speaks effectwith ofdivine the cobbler’s authority reference reiterates to the a teras andimpression the evocation that the of voice an old of the tale rooster in which signals a horse a supe speaksrnatural with intervention divine authority into the reiteratesnormal cosmic the impression order. that theYet voice that order of the soon rooster begins signals to fray a supernaturalas Micyllus responds intervention by recalling into the a story normal of metamorphosis cosmic order. (3). OnceYet upon that a ordertime, a soon man beginsnamed toAlectryon fray as Micyllus (“Cock”) respondsbecame friends by recalling with Ares a story and ended of metamorphosis up working (3). Onceas the upon god’s a lookout time, a manwhenever named he Alectryon and Aphrodite (“Cock”) had becamea fling behind friends Hephaest with Aresus’ and back. ended On one up workingsuch occasion, Alectryon fell asleep at his post, the lovers were caught, and Ares turned his friend into an alectryon as punishment. The narrative pattern of a human becoming an animal while retaining certain traits (the rooster is still the lookout who sounds the alarm but now never oversleeps) is 25 A point advanced by (Wälchi 2003, pp. 230–37). The best study of this text remains that of (Helm 1906, pp. 322–36). 26familiarAelian (2nd–3rdenough, c. but CE), in who this wrote case the we largest see that compendium the cosmic of animal order lore of fromthe gods antiquity, is predicated includes Xanthus on nothing as one of the morefew examplesthan soap-opera of talking animals.drama Heof excuseslust and Homer retribution. on the grounds The ofcock poetic folds license, himself but in theinto same that passage divine chastises plan the backwards Egyptians for believing in the reality of a talking (and two-headed!) lamb (On the Nature of Animals, 12.3). when he reports that he had entered the cycle of mortal existence long ago as a punishment by Apollo

26 Aelian (2nd–3rd c. CE), who wrote the largest compendium of animal lore from antiquity, includes Xanthus as one of the few examples of talking animals. He excuses Homer on the grounds of poetic license, but in the same passage chastises the backwards Egyptians for believing in the reality of a talking (and two-headed!) lamb (On the Nature of Animals, 12.3). Humanities 2017, 6, 37 12 of 15 as the god’s lookout whenever he and Aphrodite had a fling behind Hephaestus’ back. On one such occasion, Alectryon fell asleep at his post, the lovers were caught, and Ares turned his friend into an alectryon as punishment. The narrative pattern of a human becoming an animal while retaining certain traits (the rooster is still the lookout who sounds the alarm but now never oversleeps) is familiar enough, but in this case we see that the cosmic order of the gods is predicated on nothing more than soap-opera drama of lust and retribution. The cock folds himself into that divine plan when he reports that he had entered the cycle of mortal existence long ago as a punishment by Apollo for an unspecified crime (16). As he recounts his existential journey from disembodied spirit to Euphorbus (who helped Hector kill Patroclus at Troy) to Pythagoras to Aspasia (the concubine and advisor to Pericles) to Crates the Cynic and, after many intervening steps, to Mycillus’ rooster, the cock does away with a host of other pretensions too. Ajax was not so impressive, Helen’s beauty had faded long before the Trojan War, and Patroclus was merely an average warrior (17). Of more immediate interest to Micyllus, the famous Pythagorean prohibition against eating beans was nothing more than a publicity stunt (18). By this time, the game is up for Micyllus, who begins to laugh at the stupidity of all those who had believed the philosopher’s hokum (18–19).27 Lucian’s text concludes with the philosophical truism that a simple life is superior to the greed and anxieties of the rich. But that message must be evaluated in terms of the speaker. The Pythagorean cock has shown himself to be nothing more than a huckster until he finally learned through experience (rather than theory) to value an unprepossessing lifestyle. Pythagoreanism is no more believable than a talking rooster, and whatever Micyllus learns through their conversation is the product of basic but careful observation of human society. Furthermore, the gods are no nobler than the shameless philosopher or the greedy cobbler, and so the animal voice that seems to derive from a Golden Age is just the rationalizing trick of a satirist eager to debunk the lies and fictions that distract us from paying better attention to the pragmatic realities of life.28 Whereas Plutarch had used an animal voice to test the boundaries of anthropocentric philosophy, Lucian uses the same narrative pattern to call into question earlier Greek tradition at points where it admitted tales of superhuman or supernatural experience. The satirical humor of Lucian’s attack on that tradition also comes to subsume his own text and its bestial narrator. His absurdist approach scours away the nonsense, leaving a realist foundation for human culture. Do away with that fantasy and rid the world of charlatans like Pythagoras. Realize that virtue is to be framed in terms of the world as we know it. Animals don’t talk, metempsychosis is silly, and the gods are as corrupt as we are!

6. Conclusions I have argued that many speaking animals in Greek literature emerge from a utopian system of thinking that idealizes a pristine Golden Age past in contrast to a degraded present, and I conclude by pushing this idea in three ways. First, an ancient skolion or drinking song taps into the same anxiety about communication but without any historical model. The song, preserved by Athenaeus, includes these lines: “If only we could see what sort of person each is, split open his chest and examine his mind (noos), then close him back up and know with an undeceiving mind (phrên) that he’s your friend” (15.694d–e)29 The sentiment attests to the frustration that results from expecting communication—whether among humans or between humans and non-humans—to be free from deception or misunderstanding. Most of the examples above deal with a similar issue by positing a lost world that can be accessed through special means (much like cutting open your friend’s chest

27 Lucian takes aim at Pythagoras on various occasions. The supernatural tales about him—from his many reincarnations to the legend that his thigh was made of gold—made him an easy target for the satirist’s pen. For more on Lucian’s engagement with Pythaboras, see (Marcovich 1988, pp. 174–77). 28 This is part of a Lucianic pattern of destabilizing canonical figures that Andrade presents in terms of an ethnic interchange between Greece and Syria (Andrade 2013, pp. 269–70). 29 Euripides has characters express this same idea at Electra 367–90, Hippolytus 925–27, and Medea 516–19. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 13 of 15 in hopes of truly knowing him). This skolion achieves a similar effect to those speaking animals but without drawing upon contrasting time frames or emphasizing the role of language (though the failure of human language is implicit in the skolion’s message). Secondly, the speaking animals need not have been animals at all, since Greek literature knows various speaking plants and, more rarely, inanimate objects that can serve the same narrative function. An apt example can be heard from the speaking prow of the Argo (Apollonius, Argonautica 1.526–27), Jason’s ship on his quest to find the Golden Fleece. Athena outfitted the ship with this timber, which came from the sacred whispering oak of Zeus’s oracular shrine at Dodona. Plutarch knows a legend that the sanctuary at Dodona had been established by Deucalion and Pyrrha, the only survivors of the Greek flood narrative (Life of Pyrrhus, 1). Dodona thus has a close connection with the antediluvian past, and the oracle continues to provide access to the divine world which has been lost in the flood. Beyond this, sailing is often presented as the technology that marks the end of the Golden Age, and the Argo is regularly depicted as the first ship ever to sail the seas ((Jackson 1997); (Romm 1996, pp. 129–30). On this tradition, then, the cutting of timber to build the first ship, which renders the sea a means of connecting rather than separating people, stands for the ambivalent legacy of technology, and the speaking prow of the Argo serves much the same function as Achilles’ talking horse. Animals may provide the most obvious and common medium through which Greek writers ventriloquized Golden Age voices, and the Greek imaginary included a complex set of associations that made particular animals apt choices at particular moments, but other options were available. Finally, whereas I have presented the evidence for speaking animals mostly in synchronic terms, I end with a comment about the impact of historical change. Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus all composed in a world that did not yet know much about writing or rational philosophy. Plutarch and Lucian, by contrast, worked in the highly literate and cosmopolitan stability of the Roman Empire. Obviously a host of factors shape the cultural developments between the early and later boundaries of the classical world, yet one in particular seems relevant to this topic. Whereas our earliest Greek sources depict divine forces behind everything from diseases to weather, early classical thinkers (especially the so-called pre-Socratic philosophers and Hippocratic medical writers) proposed new theories of causation that emphasized natural processes over divine interventions (Holms 2010). If the gods bring plague (Iliad 1) and storms (Odyssey 5), then animal bodies can serve as conduits for communications from the divine realm, such that a horse or the prow of a ship can suddenly become loquacious. As natural sciences began to challenge the idea of divine causation, animals increasingly came to be understood through the observation and systemization we find in Aristotle, who, for example, drew a distinction between animal voice (phonê) and language (logos, Politics 1253a).30 Although this suggestion requires further analysis, it is reasonable to suspect that Plutarch and Lucian present human voices in animal bodies (in contrast to the speaking animals in Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus), because they lived in an era when updated perspectives on authoritative traditions put a new spin on the idea that animals might speak with a voice from the Golden Age. Plutarch elsewhere engaged with naturalistic examples of actual animal communication, especially among birds, but although these cases are critical to debates about the rational capacities of animals, they are wholly different from the idea of a talking pig (On the Cleverness of Animals, 972f–973e). Thus, Circe’s animals and a reincarnated Pythagoras speak in more overtly human ways. The gods no longer choose to speak through animal bodies. Instead, authors use animals who speak as humans as literary stylizations to advance new and varied humanistic ideas.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest, though he does occasionally talk to animals.

30 (Ax 1978, 1986) study these and related Aristotelian terms in detail. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 14 of 16 survivors of the Greek flood narrative (Life of Pyrrhus, 1). Dodona thus has a close connection with the antediluvian past, and the oracle continues to provide access to the divine world which has been lost in the flood. Beyond this, sailing is often presented as the technology that marks the end of the Golden Age, and the Argo is regularly depicted as the first ship ever to sail the seas ((Jackson 1997); (Romm 1996, pp. 129–30). On this tradition, then, the cutting of timber to build the first ship, which renders the sea a means of connecting rather than separating people, stands for the ambivalent legacy of technology, and the speaking prow of the Argo serves much the same function as Achilles’ talking horse. Animals may provide the most obvious and common medium through which Greek writers ventriloquized Golden Age voices, and the Greek imaginary included a complex set of associations that made particular animals apt choices at particular moments, but other options were available. Finally, whereas I have presented the evidence for speaking animals mostly in synchronic terms, I end with a comment about the impact of historical change. Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus all composed in a world that did not yet know much about writing or rational philosophy. Plutarch and Lucian, by contrast, worked in the highly literate and cosmopolitan stability of the Roman Empire. Obviously a host of factors shape the cultural developments between the early and later boundaries of the classical world, yet one in particular seems relevant to this topic. Whereas our earliest Greek sources depict divine forces behind everything from diseases to weather, early classical thinkers (especially the so-called pre-Socratic philosophers and Hippocratic medical writers) proposed new theories of causation that emphasized natural processes over divine interventions (Holms 2010). If the gods bring plague (Iliad 1) and storms (Odyssey 5), then animal bodies can serve as conduits for communications from the divine realm, such that a horse or the prow of a ship can suddenly become loquacious. As natural sciences began to challenge the idea of divine causation, animals increasingly came to be understood through the observation and systemization we find in Aristotle, who, for example, drew a distinction between animal voice (phonê) and language (logos, Politics 1253a). 30 Although this suggestion requires further analysis, it is reasonable to suspect that Plutarch and Lucian present human voices in animal bodies (in contrast to the speaking animals in Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus), because they lived in an era when updated perspectives on authoritative traditions put a new spin on the idea that animals might speak with a voice from the Golden Age. Plutarch elsewhere engaged with naturalistic examples of actual animal communication, especially among birds, but although these cases are critical to debates about the rational capacities of animals, they are wholly different from the idea of a talking pig (On the Cleverness of Animals, 972f–973e). Thus, Circe’s animals and a reincarnated Pythagoras speak in more overtly human ways. The gods no longer choose to speak through animal bodies. Instead, authors use animals who speak as humans as literary stylizations to advance new and varied humanistic ideas.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest, though he does occasionally talk to animals. Humanities 2017, 6, 37 14 of 15 References

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