When Gifts Matter: Understanding the Role of Gifting in Solomon Islands Constituency Politics

WHEN GIFTS MATTER: UNDERSTANDING THE ROLE OF GIFTING IN SOLOMON ISLANDS CONSTITUENCY POLITICS

A Comparative study of East AreAre and East Honiara Constituencies

Tony Aruhane Hiriasia

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

School of Government, Development and International Affairs

Faculty of Business and Economics

The University of the South Pacific

March, 2016

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This work would have not been possible without the help of individuals who have given me guidance, assisted me to collect or have provided the necessary data for the writing of this thesis.

Firstly I would like to sincerely thank my supervisor Associate Professor Gregory Fry of the School of Government, Development and International Affairs (SGDIA), University of the South Pacific (USP). He has provided a wonderful guidance during the course of my writing and this work would not have been possible without his insightful comments and critiques. I greatly appreciate his help and time spent editing this work.

I would also like to thank Dr. Allan Max Quanchi from the School of Social Sciences (SOSS) and Dr. Gordon Nanau from the SGDIA in assisting to set me on the right path in the initial stages of this work. I greatly appreciate your input.

I also want to thank Terence Wood for the permission to use information from his database on Solomon Islands election results.

I also want to thank the staff of the Solomon Islands Electoral Commission (SIEC) who assisted by providing me election and other relevant data. Likewise, I want to thank Ray at the Solomon Islands Parliament Library for the access to invaluable information kept at the library. I want to thank all the respondents in East Honiara and East AreAre who had taken the time to fill in my questionnaires. Your views are greatly appreciated.

Lastly, I would like to thank my wife Hilda Foasi Hiriasia and my three children Tony, Paul and Placida for assisting me in so many ways especially as I had mostly worked at home. You have contributed to this work and I am proud that you have stood by me in the course of this writing. This work is dedicated to you.

Thank you and God Bless

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ABSTRACT

The discussion of the corruption and governance problem in Solomon Islands has often been related to a gifting culture assumed to be characteristic of Melanesian politics. Scholars and critics have been divided over the argument that gifting in modern politics derives from the traditional gifting cultures of Melanesian societies. Some scholars relate the poor choice of leaders (especially parliamentarians) to traditional notions of leadership which are assumed to have permeated the adopted political structures and processes. A key feature of traditional politics used as a basis for this argument and assumed to have continued in the modern politics is the well- known practice of wealth distribution in order to maintain political support and loyalty. On the other hand, some scholars argue that the gifting common in modern politics results from the economic realities faced by voters. They argue that in the harsh economic environment of rural constituencies where there is little economic opportunity and activities, voters will always exchange their political loyalty for gifts and incentives they are offered. They therefore argue that the gifting as it happens in modern politics is purely an economic activity.

However, this thesis argues that the influence of tradition and culture on modern politics has been misunderstood by the supporters of the cultural argument as well as those who have maintained an economic argument concerning the gifting practice in modern politics. Using empirical evidence from the study of gift giving and voting in AreAre society and the urban constituency of East Honiara, the thesis argues that while these societies do have a strong gifting tradition, the gifting practice is seldom a means on its own to gain political power and authority. In these contexts where gifting is kin-based and serves as a basis for resource pooling, the gifting practice complements leadership and consolidates the relationship between kin members through interaction. Gifting is therefore the evidence of the kin or existing relationship as opposed to the argument that gifting generates a new political relationship between a giver and the recipient.

It is this aspect of traditional socio-political organization that persists in AreAre and more generally in Solomon Islands contemporary politics and influences political

alliances and voting behaviour. Kin relationships more than gifting determines voting behaviour within these societies.

LIST OF ACRONYMNS

AG Auditor General BSIP British Solomon Islands Protectorate CBSI Central Bank of Solomon Islands CFC Christian Fellowship Church DBSI Development Bank of Solomon Islands EACEast AreAre Constituency EHCEast Honiara Constituency ELC Executive and Legislative Council GC Governing Council MP Member of Parliament PDU Project Development Unit RCDF Rural Constituency Development Fund RCLF Rural Constituency Livelihood Fund ROC Republic of China (Taiwan) SDA Seven Day Adventist SICOPSA Solomon Islands Community and Provincial Special Assistance SIG Solomon Islands Government SIGSCD Solomon Islands Government Support to Constituency Development SINPF Solomon Islands National Provident Fund SSEC South Seas Evangelical Church TLO Temporary Land Ownership

GLOSSARY ara to fence off or block araha chief or leader

arahana chieftainship or leadership arata the term refers to an institution, a plot of land and a group of people. Every AreAre individual is a member of a arata.

Bigman a leader that is common in anthropological literature

hutaa genealogy hutaanikeni genealogy through maternal link

hutaanimane genealogy through paternal link iinoni the individual or person

maitakina the blood and social relationship

Maasina Ruru a movement that began after the World War Two (WWII) whereby leaders (mostly Malaitans) and followers sought self- governance from the British Colonial Government.

Paina big or great painaha leadership.

oohani the grave (shrine) of a common ancestor ri’oanamae

taurihina contribution toward bride-price payment te’ete’e the most sacred site in a arata where the grave of the common ancestor is located. waiara (v) contributing toward events hosted by members of a kin group.

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waiaraha (n) the contribution given to members of a kin group toward important events. wantok the term derives from the English words ‘one’ and ‘talk’ and refers to a group of people who speak the same language. In other contexts, it could refer to Solomon Islanders.

Wantokism giving preference to kin or close associates.

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……….iii ABSTRACT ……….iv LIST OF ACRONYMNS …….....vi GLOSSARY ………vii CHAPTER ONE ………...1 GIFTING AND RESEARCH ………...1 AIM/PURPOSE ………...3 METHODOLOGY/ METHODS ………...6 CASE SELECTION ………...9 ARCHIVAL DATA ……….10 QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLING ……….10 THE THESIS STRUCTURE ……….14 CHAPTER TWO ……….15 THEORIZING SOLOMON ISLANDS POLITICS ……….15 MELANESIAN BIGMAN POLITICS ……….15 LEADERSHIP TYPES IN MELANESIA ……….16 THE ENTREPRENEUR BIGMAN ……….17 KNOWLEDGEABLE LEADER ……….19 WARRIOR LEADER ……….22 MODERN GIFTING AND WANTOKISM ……….24 WANTOKISM ……….25 CLIENTELISM ……….26 WANTOKISM vs. CLIENTILISM ……….27 GIFTING IN SOLOMON ISLANDS MODERN POITICS ……….29 GIFT GIVING AND CORRUPTION ……….30 CORRUPTION-NORMS VS GOALS ……….30 CORRUPTION - PRIVATE VS PUBLIC ……….33 CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY ……….34 GIFTING AND THE RATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES ……….35 GIFT GIVING AND THE CULTURAL APPROACH ……….36

GIFTING AND RATIONAL CHOICE ……….38 DEFINING ‘CULTURAL THESIS’ AND ‘RATIONAL CHOICE’ FOR THE THESIS ……….40 CONCLUSION ……….41 CHAPTER THREE ……….43 KIN AND NOT GIFTS – THE CASE OF EAST AREARE ……….43 AREARE ……….43 AREARE IN POST INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL POLITICS ……….45 SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN AREARE ……….46 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND TENURE AND SOCIALORGANIZATION ……….47 LEADERSHIP (ARAHANA) WITHIN THE TRIBE (ARATA) ……….50 GIFTING IN AREARE ……….51 BIGMANSHIP ON MALAITA ……….51 LAND, AUTHORITY AND GIFTING IN AREARE ……….53 CONCLUSION ……….55 CHAPTER FOUR ……….57 CULTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST AREARE CONTEMPORARY POLITICS ……….57 KIN BASED ALLIANCES ……….57 KIN BASED SOLIDARITY ……….60 KIN BASED AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY ……….62 KIN BASED RESPONSIBILITY/OBLIGATION ……….64 KIN-BASED VOTING MODEL FOR EAST AREARE CONSTITUENCY ……….68 FEATURES OF THE KIN-BASED VOTING MODEL ……….71 HOMEBOOTH POPULARITY ……….71 KIN-BASED POLITICAL RIVALRY ……….76 STRUGGLE OVER STATE RESOURCES ……….78 POLARIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ……….83 IMPREGNABLE POLITICAL UNITS ……….86 CULTIVATING A VOTE BUYING CULTURE ……….94

DUPLICATION OF KIN-BASED POLITICS BEYOND KIN BOUNDARIES ……….96 2014 ELECTION AND A BREAKDOWN OF KIN POLITICS IN THE SOUTH ……….99 CONCLUSION ……...105 CHAPTER FIVE ……...106 NEITHER KIN NOR GIFTS ……...106 EAST HONIARA CONSTITUENCY ……...106 POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HONIARA CONSTITUENCIES ……...109 VOTING POPULATION AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS111 RURAL AND URBAN EXPERIENCES AND CONSEQUENT POLITICAL CULTURE ……...112 SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS IN EAST HONIARA ……...115 PERCEPTION OF GIFTING IN EAST HONIARA ……...116 A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS - EAST HONIARA VS EAST AREARE ……...121 VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN EAST HONIARA ……...122 POLITICAL GROUPS IN EAST HONIARA CONSTITUENCY ……...123 NEEDS AND GROUPING IN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS ……...124 CHURCH AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION IN EAST HONIARA ……...125 ETHNICITY SUBSTITUTING FOR KIN RELATIONSHIP IN EAST HONIARA ……...131 POLICIES, MANIFESTOS AND PARTIES ……...136 RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN EAST HONIARA ……...138 CONCLUSION ……...141 CHAPTER SIX ……...144 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY ……...144 UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT ……...144 THE CULTURAL AND RATIONAL ARGUMENT AND GIFTING ……...147 KIN-BASED POLITICS AND GIFTING ……...149

GIFT OR BRIBE ……...152 LEGAL VERSUS CULTURAL ……...155 POINTS TO CONSIDER ……...156 BIBLIOGRAPHY ……...163 APPENDIX I ……...168 APPENDIX II ……...169 APPENDIX III ……...170 APPENDIX IV ……...171

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CHAPTER ONE

GIFTING AND RESEARCH

It is very common to talk about Solomon Islands politics and to mention terms such as RCDF, solar panels, school fees, boat fares to name just a few. These terms have become the jargon of Solomon Islands constituency politics and allude to the way politics is understood and done in the constituencies. Indeed, over the past decade, Solomon Islands politics (at all levels) is littered with allegations of gifting, vote buying and the use of state resources to attract political support. Although gifting is not new, it has attracted more attention recently (especially from scholars) because of the rapid increase of resources made available to Members of Parliament resulting in an increase of scholarly writings on the impact of gifting on local politics and voting behaviour. In so doing, scholars have adopted two approaches to explain the gifting practice and how it manifests in modern politics. For some, the gifting practice in modern politics derives from traditional and cultural practices characteristic of Melanesian societies. For others, the practice is an economic activity that emerges from the economic realities and hardships faced by voters in the constituencies.

The argument that local leadership structures and practices have had a big influence on local politics and governance is popular among those who approach the study of Melanesian politics and governance from a cultural perspective. Those who support this view often argue that in Melanesia, the adoption of a new political system and practices did not end traditional political organization, practices and values. Proponents of the ‘cultural thesis’ as it is called maintain that aspects of traditional leadership continue in modern politics and foster corruption and contribute significantly to the governance problems of Solomon Islands and, more generally, of all Melanesian states (Dinnen 2008: 58, McLeod 2008: 8). The ‘cultural thesis’ is mainly based on the idea of gifting associated with the Bigman phenomenon. The Bigman phenomenon assumes that traditional Melanesian leaders attain leadership and authority by distributing wealth to followers or supporters which they (followers) reciprocate with loyalty. This aspect of traditional leadership is said to have become a key dynamic of local politics (Dinnen 2008: 58). Supporters of the ‘cultural thesis’

1 therefore view gifting in modern politics as a recurrence of traditional and cultural practice.

Not everyone agrees with that view. Some scholars and critics argue that the local gifting practice is solely an economic activity. Supporters of this view dismiss cultural influence on gifting and political behaviour and see gift exchanges between politicians and voters as based on rational decisions and not on cultural or traditional practices. Proponents of this so called ‘rational choice theory’ have compared the gift giving practice to clientilist relationships and networks. Proponents of the ‘rational choice theory’ therefore view gifting and exchanges in modern politics as vote buying or bribery.

This thesis however argues that both the culturalist and rationalist perspectives misunderstand the political and social meaning of gift giving in traditional as well as contemporary national politics. In so doing, they have misjudged the impact of gifting on political behaviour and on national parliamentary elections. Based on election data, the thesis argues that there are discrepancies with both theories (cultural and rational) as applied to voter behavior in Solomon Islands. For instance, if voters vote in search of benefits and incentives (Wood 2014) then voting behaviour throughout the constituencies would have reflected characteristics of a rational electorate. One such is the convergence of political choice on the strongest givers or more so the incumbent MPs who have access to state resources. This however is often not the case in local elections where results show a very fragmented voter population in many constituencies with almost all candidates getting their share of votes (even those who engage in little gifting) every election. Those who win elections therefore do so on very low vote shares (Wood 2014) meaning that votes are fairly spread out among candidates.

Similarly, election data has also contradicted the argument that offering benefits/incentives potentially generates support as in the Bigman context. For instance, Wood argues in the case of Solomon Islands that”…voter behaviour is based

2 around contingent exchange” (Wood 2014). However, the ability to offer benefits/incentives is not necessarily a criterion for winning votes. Had this been the case, candidates with big campaign budgets should be able to attract significant support across polling stations as people respond to benefits/incentives. Yet, election results (as in the case of East AreAre) show that candidates picked up most of their votes only at their home polling booths and very little beyond that thus alluding to a kin-based political support where candidates only appeal to voters of the same kin group (who are also from the same area). As such, gifting in modern politics resembles the traditional practice more in the kin-based aspect of it. This means that gifting yields better results when it takes place within the kin group. Although candidates, in their attempt to lure voters do give outside their kin bases, such gifts often lack the relationship that can guarantee reciprocity. I therefore propose to argue that kin relationship is more influential than gifting and that it has served as the basis for political organization and alliance in Solomon Islands rural constituencies.

Thus, the central argument of this study is that political affiliation in the rural constituency politics is largely kin-based and it is the relationship rather than gifts that determine who voters align with. In the urban constituencies where kin networks are not common, other factors (churches, ethnic or language groups, and provincial groups) have served platforms for political co-operation. Gifting in this context plays a complementary role, that is, it strengthens the existing bonds between members. For the rural constituencies, this also means that even without gifting, candidates still main kin support during elections. The kin-based support has been evident in the election results.

AIM/PURPOSE

The purpose of this research is to make an in-depth study of the gifting1 practice in Solomon Islands constituency politics and to see the extent to which gift-giving

1 Gifting refers to the practice of exchanges whether in cash or kind between politicians/candidates and voters. Usually the politician or candidate gives to secure the support of the voter during election.

3 affects voter decisions during national parliamentary elections. As such, the research attempts to answer the following question:

How does gift-giving affect the outcomes in the national parliamentary elections?

This central question entails a number of particular questions:

Firstly, is the gifting practice obvious in contemporary politics a recurrence of a traditional practice (as claimed by many)?

Secondly, do national parliamentary election results reflect a gift-giving culture?

Thirdly, how do voters perceive gift-giving in contemporary politics?

Finally, what is the relationship between kinship and voting behaviour?

The first step toward understanding political behaviour in Solomon Islands (and any case for that matter) is to logically link together concepts and behaviour that are evident among the voting population. By doing so, one can explain the voting behaviour of an electorate in a meaningful way that agrees with empirical observation. In this regard, I have developed two arguments (from my observation and knowledge of the studied population) to help explain voting behaviour at the constituency level. In the case of East AreAre, three observable concepts are linked to make sense of political affiliation and voting behaviour. These include, gift giving, kin relationship and political affiliation. I argue that these concepts interact to influence voter decisions and especially who individuals vote for in an election. In the case of East Honiara, the absence of kin relationship (an influential factor in rural constituencies) is substituted by other forms of identity. Therefore, the most popular platforms for political affiliations in the urban context are language groups, provincial groups and church or faith-based groups. Like the rural constituencies, the practice takes place more meaningfully and effectively within these groupings.

Argument One:

i. Because gifts have a different meaning in the socio-political organization in rural Solomon Islands societies, kinship (rather than gift-giving) has more impact on political behavior at the Constituency level. Gifting at the constituency level therefore strengthens existing genealogical and social bonds among kin group members. ii. In the urban constituencies, church groups, language groups and provincial groups have become important platforms for political affiliations.

Argument Two:

i. Political alliances in the rural constituencies are kin-based. Therefore candidates with big and well-coordinated and mobilized kin groups have higher chances of winning elections as opposed to candidates with the biggest spending budgets. ii. Group-based support (church groups, language groups and provincial groups) are important for election success in urban constituencies. Candidates who mobilize these groups for political support have higher chances of winning elections.

The above arguments are based on the assumption that social organization (in the form of kin groups or church, language or provincial groups) has more influence on political affiliation and voting behavior in Solomon Islands constituency politics than gift-giving. Gift-giving in this context is only complementary (strengthening existing social ties or bonds between group members) and when isolated from social organization, gift giving has minimal effect on political behavior (especially the way people vote). For example, in the rural constituencies, if a candidate gives to non- relatives for political support, recipients may not be obliged to reciprocate with political support and can shift allegiance and loyalty if a closer relative stands as a candidate.

I therefore argue that in rural constituencies where the social fabric of societies are still intact and institutions such as extended families and tribal units play an important role in an individual’s life, gifting (although having an important role in the socio- political organization) does not weaken the relationship and bonds between members within a kin group. Such bonds are based not only on genealogical relationships and shared history but also intense interactions between members over a long period of time. Therefore, the bond between individuals will always be more influential on voting behaviour than mere gifting. This is what Lane and Errson (2005: 3) refer to as ‘higher degree of compactness’, a strong bond that results from intense interaction and shared commonalities. In this context, gifting serves more as an evidence of existing relationships as opposed to gifts being incentives for political support.

Similarly, in the urban constituencies, the bond and strong relationship within church groups, language groups and provincial groups are also often utilized for political support and in the case of East Honiara constituency, these grouping play a major role in influencing election results.

METHODOLOGY/ METHODS

The research method is generally qualitative although it has some aspects of quantitative research where statistical data (e.g. election results) are concerned. The fact that the research question calls for the investigation of human behavior means qualitative methods are more suitable. This involves devising the right strategies to collect data and identifying suitable methods that would help distinguish between the necessary and not so useful information. The quality of the collected data is not only helpful for measuring the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable; it also strengthens the research findings giving creditability to the research. For this reason, I adopted a mixture of approaches and methods to collect the appropriate data.

I have adopted a comparative case study approach to look at the practice of gift-giving and its impact on voting behaviour. Usually the best way to understand such a political phenomenon is to look at it in different contexts where assessments and interpretations can be made. These cases however must be carefully selected in order to prove whether the absence or presence of certain stimulus produce particular outcomes. Indeed in a comparative study, the quality of the research depends entirely on the cases chosen (Burnham et.al, 2004:.59).

There are two types of case study approach that can be adopted for comparative research. The first type of case study involves ‘most similar cases’ where the independent variables are as different as possible and other intervening variables are as similar as possible. The other type of case study involves the ‘most different cases’ where independent variables are as similar as possible and the intervening variables are as different as possible. For this comparative case study, I chose the ‘most different cases’ approach. I focus therefore on two different cases, one an urban constituency and the other a remote rural constituency. Although the independent variable (gifts) was the same for both cases, in the East AreAre constituency an intervening variable (kin relationship) was also measured. I refer to kin relationship as an intervening variable because; while I try to assess the impact of gift giving on voting behaviour, other factors (one of which is kinship) also influence the way people vote.

In the case of East Honiara, the change in context means the absence of the intervening variable kin relationship. So while the independent variable2 (gifting) was measured for both cases, the intervening variables (kin relationship) were different. In the case of East Honiara, kin relationship was absent although voters were expected to find other forms of commonalities as platforms for political affiliations, Platforms such as church denominations, language groups and provincial groups were expected to interplay with gifting to influence political affiliation and

2 The independent variable in both cases is gift while the intervening variable is kin relationship. In the case of East Honiara the intervening variable (kinship) is absent and less influential although other commonalities such as ethnicity and churches are very influential during elections. The dependent variable in both cases is voting behaviour.

7 behaviour. Gifting however was expected to be very influential on voting behaviour. The next diagrams help explain the relationships between the variables in the said cases.

Figure 1

Diagram showing Gift and Kinship Ties as independent and intervening variables in the case of East AreAre.

KINSHIP TIES

POLITICAL GIFTING BEHAVIOUR

Figure 2

The diagram below shows the case of East Honiara in the absence of Kinship Ties.

GROUP RELATIONSHIP

GIFTING POLITICAL BEHAVIOUR

In East AreAre as shown in the diagram above, both gifts and kin relationship interact to influence voter behaviour. As earlier stressed, gifts in this context serve to strengthen existing bonds within the kin networks. Their role as incentives or bribes outside this social entity is assumed to be minimal except where individuals are detached from their kin groupings for various reasons. Thus in the case of East AreAre, gifts indirectly influence voting behaviour by strengthening existing bonds within the kin networks. Kin relationship on the other hand directly affects political behaviour particularly political affiliations and the way people vote during elections.

The case of East Honiara is different in that it lacks the social setting of a rural constituency. The absence of strong kin networks in the urban setting was expected to usher in gifting as a very influential factor affecting political behaviour and election outcomes in East Honiara. Intervening variables such as church affiliation, language groups and provincial groups were also expected to influence voting behaviour.

CASE SELECTION

The East AreAre Constituency is an ideal case to measure the impact of both the independent (gifts) and the intervening variable (kinship) on the dependent variable (voting behaviour) in that the traditional fabric and structure of the society are still intact allowing intense interaction among members. In these remote/rural constituencies (as opposed to urban constituencies), socio-political organization centers more on bigger social units such as clans or tribes. Here the social setup conforms more to what Lane and Errson (2005) describe as a high degree of compactness. Therefore the relationship among members rather than gifts (incentives) is expected to affect individual behavior during elections. This challenges the argument that gift-giving has often been the most influential factor in the Solomon Islands national parliamentary elections.

On the other hand, East Honiara constituency (an urban constituency) lacks the social structures that would allow intense interaction among members thus increasing the chances for rational behaviour. Here constituents may not be related as in the case of rural constituencies. The assumption is, the absence of strong social ties and bonds among members (and with the candidate running for an election) lessens the chance for collective actions on the basis of rural kin grouping. Since the individual makes decisions detached and free from the opinion and goals of the kin group, he/she is more likely to make rational decisions. Further, the case of East Honiara in having contrasting conditions to that of a rural constituency allows us to isolate the independent variable (gifts) from other influential relationships (intervening variable).

While the case of Honiara can be studied independently, it provides a more meaningful analysis by serving as a comparative case for East AreAre Constituency.

ARCHIVAL DATA

The initial stages of the research had to do largely with a search of archival sources and online documents. In particular the literature review involved the review of library (print and electronic) sources as well as a search of online journal articles and other published materials. The review did not only help to direct the research but also gave an insight into the theories that relate to the issues discussed in the thesis.

Likewise data from past elections were also collected with particular attention to East Honiara and East AreAre Constituencies. For these constituencies, polling stations data and other relevant information (election petition documents) were collected. These were then analyzed for the disclosure of voting patterns and other relevant interpretations. This is important because whatever empirical observations (especially that which gave rise to the hypothesis) must be proved or disproved by the election results.

QUESTIONNAIRE AND SAMPLING

It is also important to note that trying to understand political behaviour cannot be done by analysis of election data alone. One has to carry out a survey to find the opinion and factors influencing political behaviour of the studied population. For this purpose, a questionnaire (see appendix) containing targeted questions was dispersed through specially trained assistants. For both cases more than a 100 questionnaires were sent out considering a low return rate often associated with questionnaire surveys.

Also in any study of political behaviour, deciding how big the sample3 should be, and what characteristic of the studied population should be included in a sample population, is a matter for careful considerations. Indeed researchers are always confronted with the challenge of deciding a representative sample, one that would reflect the characteristics of the overall population from which the sample is drawn. This is even more difficult since political scientists have differing views about what a representative sample should be (Manheim and Rich, 1981: 86). Despite these differing opinions, sampling has become a tool political scientists find useful when trying to understand the political behaviour or opinion of a population.

A representative sample of the studied populations of East AreAre and East Honiara constituencies should reflect features of the voting populations. The definition of a representative sample for this research therefore follows Manheim and Rich’s definition;

A representative sample is one in which every major attribute of the larger population from which the sample is drawn is present in roughly the proposition or frequency with which that attribute occurs in that larger population (Manheim and Rich, 1984, 86).

Using this definition as a guide, I will discuss the characteristics of the samples in East AreAre and East Honiara constituencies. Firstly, the number of registered voters in the 2010 election was 3995 for East AreAre and 8229 for East Honiara. Thus the decision to distribute 100 questionnaires was clearly not proportional to the overall voter population per constituency. However certain factors were considered in deciding the number of questionnaires to be dispatched and whose opinions should be assessed. The first concerns equal opportunity to participate in the survey. There was no need for a systematic selection to identify who should be included in the survey. This is unnecessary in the case where every individual in a population has a 100% chance of being included in a survey. This happens when the selection of participants

3 Sample in this case refers to a subset of voters that is representative of the voting populations of the studied constituencies. 11 is not based on ‘principal differences’. As highlighted by Manheim and Rich (1981: p.88);

… a representative sample must be one that provides for each of the principal areas of differences to be presented in proportion to its share of the population.

Principal differences in this case means that there is a considerable gap between members of the studied population with regards to income, employment, political party affiliations or other factors that could bring about differences in political opinion and behavior.

In the absence of principal differences, any individual within a population can participate without compromising the fairness of a sample and more importantly the quality of the data collected. In the case of East AreAre, except for a small minority living in urban centers and the capital city Honiara, there is little variation between individuals living in the rural areas when comparing income and employment, party affiliation and so on. These factors are but few examples of principal differences that could have been represented in a sample should they be evident in the overall population

Thus the absence of significant differences between individual cases in a studied population reduces the chances for a biased result and conclusion even if participants are randomly selected. The returned questionnaires were organized according to age groups and educational attainments of individuals. Such data were used to organize individual cases into categories that would enrich findings and conclusions drawn from collected data. Except for the proportional aspect of the selection, the sample population can be said to be representative.

As mentioned above, although ages and educational background were also used to organize individual responses, these factors were not treated as independent variables for the reason that the levels of education and age have had minimal impact on political affiliations as obvious from past election data (this will be discussed more in later chapters). As such, its inclusion as a category was mainly to assess its influence

12 on individual perceptions of gifting although its impact on voting behaviour was anticipated to be minimal.

The returned questionnaires were analyzed in these three categories; (i) those who have reached primary education (ii) those who have reached secondary education and (iii) those with tertiary qualifications. Obviously, the population for each level of education differs in the two cases especially those who have attained a tertiary qualification. East Honiara was expected to have more people with tertiary qualifications than East AreAre. As earlier stated, although these categories are important for enriching data analysis and conclusions, the level of education was not measured as an independent variable. However, such information is undoubtedly useful to see whether the different levels of education also produce differing opinions on gift giving.

Likewise, age categorization is also important as different age groups would have different political experiences and opinions. For instance, when considering respondents over 50 years, they would have lived through various eras of political development which would include experiences under colonialism, early years of independence and the pre and post ethnic tension period. There would also be those who have only known the troubled years and the recovery period. Thus when seen in this light, one could assume that age would contribute to the political opinion of individuals especially the way they view the gifting practice.

It is important to note that the number of respondents per level of education (primary, secondary and tertiary) and age group categories is not equal. This however should not undermine the conclusions drawn from analysis of the cases studied as categorization here was only meant to add richness to the analysis and not to measure them as independent variables. Hence the disproportionate figures per category and the number of participants per case are insignificant for the overall conclusions of the survey. As earlier stated, whatever conclusions are drawn from the analysis of cases

13 must be reflected in the election data; hence by triangulating we can verify the accuracy of the analysis.

THE THESIS STRUCTURE

The thesis has six chapters. The first chapter discusses the research question, hypotheses and methods and methodology. The choice of cases and sample population are also discussed in this chapter.

The second chapter deals mainly with past and present discussions of the gift giving practice. The traditional Bigman politics is discussed with particular attention on the traditional entrepreneur, knowledgeable and warrior leaders. This chapter also deals with the concept of gifting and how it has been applied to political behaviour in modern politics and governance.

The third and the fourth chapter focus on the East AreAre case study. Chapter Three mainly gives the background information (both historical and socio-political organization) regarding the East AreAre constituency. The Fourth Chapter discusses the impact of culture on voting behaviour using findings of the survey carried out in East AreAre as well as election data.

The fifth chapter discusses the findings of the East Honiara case study. Like the East AreAre case, the historical as well as the social set up of the constituency is discussed in this chapter. Findings from survey and other related data are also discussed in detail here.

The final chapter contains the summary and conclusions of the cases studied.

CHAPTER TWO

THEORIZING SOLOMON ISLANDS POLITICS

Many of the scholars who have studied the impact of culture and tradition on modern politics argue that in many newer democracies, aspects of informal systems of governance and structures persist in modern government systems. While formal institutions and their functions are defined in constitutions, administrative regulations and laws, judicial structures, public procedures and processes, the informal institutions are based more on implicit and unwritten understandings (Derrick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, 2002). Also, these informal institutions reflect the norms, values as well as features of socio-economic and political organization of these societies. Since aspects of informal systems often merge into formal ones, it is difficult at times to distinguish between these formal and informal characters (Derick W. Brinkerhoff and Arthur A. Goldsmith, 2002). The accommodation of the unrecognized activities of the informal systems in the legislated democratic processes and bureaucratic administration is often viewed as promoting corruption within public offices. When seen in this light, the discussion of poor governance and corruption in the Solomon Islands is therefore a discussion of traditional notions of leadership and how they affect the operations of state institutions and public offices.

This chapter discusses the concept of the traditional Bigman and associated concepts such as gifting and clientilism and how these concepts are applied to modern politics especially in relation to vote buying and corruption. I will also look at the popular definitions of corruption and the problems associated with these (definitions).

MELANESIAN BIGMAN POLITICS

The need to understand political behaviour in Solomon Islands’ contemporary politics necessitates the investigation of culturally entrenched practices that are assumed to be at work in modern political structures. The most prominent of these notions of traditional leadership is that of the ‘Bigman’, a political figure that has been widely

15 discussed in anthropological literatures of Melanesia. The term Bigman emerged in the 1960s and 70s as an accepted label for the type of leader ethnographers encountered in the Melanesian region. As early as the 1930s, those who did field studies in Melanesian societies claimed that the term ‘chief’ and the idea it encapsulates is unsuitable to describe the kinds of leaders found in Melanesian societies. In trying to describe what they deemed as a very ‘unchiefly’ leader, some ethnographers used indigenous names taken from the languages of the societies studied to refer to Melanesian leaders. Hogbin for instance used mwane kama in his discussion of the Kaoka leaders (as cited by Lindstrom 1981: 901) while ngwane inoto was used for a similar type of leader in To’abaita Northern Malaita (Keesing, 1985: 238). There were also others who invented typological labels that tried to escape the inaccurate connotations of the term ‘chief’. These labels that translate closer to the words used to describe leaders in the local languages include headman, centerman, strongman, manager, magnate or even director and executive (Lindstrom 1981: 901). Lindstrom argues that the term Bigman won through as a scientific term mainly because it is a direct translation of a leadership status label in many Melanesian languages (1981: 902). Marshall Sahlins, paper Poor Man, Rich Man, Bigman, and Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia published in 1963 did much to cement the term Bigman into the anthropological lexicon.

LEADERSHIP TYPES IN MELANESIA

The most common figure in Melanesian traditional politics as obvious from earlier ethnographic data is the Bigman who achieves leadership role by distributing wealth. Yet, to refer collectively to all Melanesian leaders as Bigman and assume that they ascend the leadership structure by distributing wealth is misleading. As Lindstrom (1984:p.291) puts it,

Increased attention to the details of power in Melanesia has made it clear that the other bases of Bigman status supplement or rival simple control of material exchange and production.

Keesing also argues that the elevation of the stereo-typed Melanesian political leader has drawn attention away from other leadership roles that exist in the traditional

Melanesian society. Under the Melanesian Bigman model, the ascension to the top of the local leadership structure typically could take one of three routes. The most discussed of these three is the Bigman that attains leadership by accumulating wealth and distributing it to followers thus earning their loyalty and allegiance. On the other hand, there are some societies in Melanesia whose political organization centers on the knowledge and skills of certain individuals. One such is the Warrior leader who utilizes his achievements in warfare to establish his position as a leader. The other is the priest whose knowledge of the sacred and the spiritual world earns him respect among kin and tribesmen (Brown, 1990). The uniting feature of all these forms of Bigmen is that leadership is achieved through reciprocal exchange whether of material, knowledge or skill.

THE ENTREPRENEUR BIGMAN

There are some ‘suit all’ features that generally describe all ‘entrepreneur Bigman’ across Melanesia. The most common feature evident in Bigman literature is that giving paves the way for leadership. The Bigman’s economic ventures are therefore directed toward his political aspirations and the more he gives, the higher his social status elevates. As Ann Chowning (1979) puts it,

‘…the competitions and economic achievements is a Bigman’s road to renown’ (p. 71).

Likewise, John Finch compares the Bigman to the Western capitalist and sees both as achievement-oriented individuals whose positions depend on the clever manipulation of wealth (1997: 123). Figure 3

The road to renown for a Bigman

WEALTH WEALTH RISE IN ACCUMULATION DISTRIBUTION SOCIAL PRESTIGE

Secondly, associated with economic production is a patronage network. The distinctive feature of this network is that the Bigman’s gifts carry obligations thus the exchange is reciprocal (Steward, 1990). As presented by ethnographers, this exchange system appears as a snare that keeps participants in the network under a Bigman’s control. The gifts given to followers are expected to be returned either as a gift or in the form of labour and loyalty. On the other hand the gifts exchanged with a rival Bigman are aimed at challenging his ability to respond. So while at the Bigman level these exchanges are aimed at outdoing each other, at the followers’ level the exchange is aimed at indebting followers to the leader. The Bigman-Follower and Bigman-Bigman relationship is illustrated by the next diagram. One is vertical and asymmetrical and the other is horizontal and assumed to be equal.

Figure 4 The Bigman-Bigman and Bigman-Follower Relationship.

Thirdly, since it results from his own effort, the achieved result of the Bigman is assumed to be personal (Sahlins 1963:3). The Bigman authority is thus seen as temporary and volatile and depends very much on the Bigman’s ability to maintain and sustain his followers and stop them from crossing over to other potential and aspiring competitors. For the Bigman, decline in production means decline in power and influence.

Lastly, it is assumed that the influence of the anthropological Bigman is very limited in terms of geographical territory. In most cases, the Bigman’s authority only extends over a few square miles and mostly over his kin who may live together in a single

18 village or cluster of hamlets. These political units however are autonomous, economically self-governing and equal to others in political status (Sahlins 1963: 287).

KNOWLEDGEABLE LEADER

The possession and control of knowledge considered to be socially valuable can also become a source of prestige and power for the Bigman. Lindstrom (1984: 305) argues that, …In knowledge-based societies, men achieve power through the successful manipulation of information and ideology…

Likewise Simon Harrison (1993: 143) also writes of some prominent men in Ngaing communities as; … one or two prominent men who achieved their position … by mastering their clan’s ritual knowledge..

So what conditions warrant the dominance of the knowledgeable leader? According to Lindstrom (1984: p.295), inequality, whether in material or knowledge, is a pre- condition for the evolution of an exchange system of any sort. He argues that in societies where there is little economic surplus or that all members have an equal access to the means of producing surplus, there is a tendency for mastery of knowledge to dominate the mastery of economy. In her study of the Sepik and Madang regions (1979: 68) Chowning notes;

… in the Sepik and Madang regions of New Guinea egalitarian is so strong that no one is allowed to excel.

Exploring this dimension of leadership, Lindstrom (1984: p.292) argues that in an environment and condition where there exists little economic gap between members, the economic aspect of inequality drops out allowing ritual and knowledge hierarchy to come in. Thus the absence of material surplus and restraining of indebtedness ushers in knowledge as an item for power reckoning. The possessor of esoteric

19 knowledge gains an upper hand extending control over others who depend on that knowledge.

Peter Lawrence (1971, p.80) in writing about the Garia society in New Guinea also points out that the leadership positions are often attained by individuals who possess knowledge that are deemed as sacred and useful for performing rituals. He notes that Bigmen;

…rise to the surface of affairs because their skills in using ritual knowledge-the secret names of the deities who, it is believed invented Garia culture and still preside over it. Because of this knowledge, they have unquestioned authority to take the lead in certain activities (Lawrence 1971: p.80).

Harrison (1989: p.3), in his study of the Avatip people of East Sepik River identifies a similar case. He notes that leadership among these people depends not on wealth but on the control of knowledge. In particular, names of totemic ancestors are closely guided as they are considered the source of all the magic powers of the sub-clan.

These names, which are considered the source of all the magic power of the subclan, are its jealously guarded property and are the personal names borne generation after generation by its members. Many of the names have an esoteric significance, known only to the senior men of the subclan and their close allies and are highly secret real names of the totemic ancestors (Harrison, 1989: 3).

Among Ngaing people, knowledge also forms the base of the material culture. Ngaings believe that deities revealed technical and magical knowledge to the first human beings. This knowledge is important because they are connected to certain deities who control everything from the daily weather to the growth of pigs and crops in the garden (Harrison, 1993: p.143).

Lindstrom (1984: p.293) also talks of the Tennessee Bigmen of Vanuatu not as rich men but more like doctors who control the knowledge of diagnosis and curing, lawyers who know history and use their oratory skills to settle disputes, wise men who generate and validate interpretive judgement, and priests who have the

20 instructions for rituals and ceremonies. According to Lindstrom, this socially valued knowledge can be organized into two categories namely ‘operational knowledge and interpretive knowledge’. Figure 5 shows the types of knowledge or information that come under the two categories.

Figure 5

OPERATIONAL KNOWLEDGE INTERPRETIVE KNOWLEDGE o Secret names o Explanation and management of o Necessary spells meaning o Calendrical systems o Magical paraphernalia necessary for the perceived success of gardening, curing etc… o Medical recipe o Knowledge of genealogy o Knowledge of land plots names, boundaries, history etc.

As clear in the preceding table, the operational knowledge compares more to what we understand as ‘information’. This knowledge is essential for the day to day running and the productivity of a society. Its usefulness therefore adds value to it that can be exchanged for goods, services as well as loyalty and allegiance. Like the entrepreneur who controls wealth hence people, the knowledgeable leader also exercises control over those who depend on the knowledge he possesses.

Also, the extent of authority and influence enjoyed by those who possess valuable knowledge is said to differ from place to place. While in the some societies those who possess knowledge are said to exercise considerable authority and control over members of their society, in others the prestige and authority granted to knowledge possessors are limited. This is the case in societies where economic success

21 determines leadership hence restraining the influence or authority of knowledgeable leaders. On Malaita for instance, while Keesing notes that priests are seen as possessors of sacred knowledge necessary for the link between the society and the supernatural, he also observes that the role of the priest is very limited and his services are only called for during appropriate ceremonies (Keesing, 1985: 247). Chowning also notes this;

…Where the only leaders are religious specialists it is usually reported that their political functions are minimal… (1979: 77). The disadvantages associated with priestly roles (as observed on Malaita) also make the priestly positions less sought after. On many occasions, one has to fulfill particular rituals to ward off the anger of ancestral spirits and there is also the bigger task of acquiring and maintaining knowledge of rituals, magic and genealogies (Keesing, 1985: 240).

WARRIOR LEADER

Those who came into contact with Melanesians in the early days of Whiteman contact also noted the hostility of kin and tribal groups. As Ann Chowning puts it; …Melanesia is notoriously a region of chronic hostile relations between neighbouring political units and… raids were frequent… Most societies are reported to have had a war leader… (1979: 73)

The hostile environment calls for military organization amongst tribes and the ascension of the brave to leadership positions. Ann Chowning (1979: 74) for instance claims that to become a leader among the Mekeo people of New Guinea, an individual who aspires to be a leader has to demonstrate exceptional prowess and establish a feared reputation as a warrior. Likewise, in recently documented cases of the Highlands, it is found that the leadership status of an aspiring leader is also dependent on his reputation as a warrior or killer (Chowning 1979: 74). Thus leadership status of aspiring leaders elevates as they build up reputations as warriors or killers. Not surprisingly, leaders in these societies are referred to as ‘strongmen’ or ‘warriors’.

In his paper ‘Bigman and War in New Guinea’ Paul Sillitoe (1978: 254) explores another side of the relationship between leadership and war in Melanesia. Sillitoe (1978) argues that war in itself is not a means to achieve leadership and authority but rather is a way to strengthen a leader’s position. He states that even in societies where leadership is a product of economic success and achievement, a leader still does not have a firm grip on those within his polity. For this reason, a Bigman has to use force to control his members’ choices and opinions (in his favour) when he foresees situations that are in line with his political agenda or when he sees neighbouring polities and rival Bigman as a threat (Sillitoe, 1978: 254). In such cases, he is likely to manipulate others for war and capitalize on the situation to extend his influence over neighbouring polities.

Chowning also highlights that men who are successful in warfare are also likely to be successful entrepreneurs especially where force is needed to acquire resources needed for exchange or display of a Bigman’s wealth (1978: 73). Such was the case of Kwaisulia, the Malaitan who became wealthy by trading labourers with European recruiters in the late nineteenth century. With the help of firearms obtained from European recruiters, Kwaisulia was able to extend his influence beyond his tribal boundary (Corris: 1970). In some of his exploits, he was said to carry out raids in the ‘mountain’ communities and bring back captives who were then sold to labour traders for western goods and firearms necessary for his display of power.

Another description of the warrior leader is offered by Keesing (1985) in his paper Killers, Bigman and Priests on Malaita. Known as lamo or mwane lamo among the Kwaio people of Malaita, those who follow this path to leadership often show their volatile and aggressive nature very early as boys (p. 250). If lucky to survive till adulthood, an aspiring lamo could then choose to follow the warrior career path either as a warrior leader or a bounty hunter. In many cases, both roles overlap and a warrior leader can engage in bounty hunting if the need for arises. Moreover, although both warriors display similar traits such as courage, ability and aggression to kill, the warrior leader is more likely to maintain order, peace and stability among his group especially during conflicts. He therefore attracts followers who are dependent on his power, patronage and protection (Keesing, 1985:250).

While warrior leaders are common throughout Melanesia, it is often acknowledged that qualities that make good warriors may not be suitable for a successful political career as more peaceful personalities are often favoured. According to Ann Chowning (1978: 74), Mekeo communities in New Guinea make distinctions between the ‘civilian chiefs’ and ‘war chiefs’ on the basis of their ‘aggressive behaviour’.

…The Mekeo say that civilian chiefs should be ‘good and peaceful men’ while ‘war chiefs’ are regarded as ‘bad and dangerous men of anger and physical violence’ who are excluded from civilian activities and ceremonies for fear of their disruptive aggressive behaviour’ (Chowning 1979: 74).

Scholars who studied Melanesian traditional leadership believe that warrior leaders declined mainly due to the pacification carried out by colonial governments in the islands in the first half of the twentieth century. Some even argue that the ascension of entrepreneur leaders or Bigmen was largely due to the abolition of war leaders in colonial pacification programmes (Chowning 1979: p.73). History however has shown that war and conquest always go hand in hand and those who are strong have always exercised some control over the weak.

MODERN GIFTING AND WANTOKISM

Those who have written on Melanesian politics often argue that the gifting in contemporary Melanesian politics resembles the traditional gift giving associated with the Bigman phenomenon where exchanges between a leader and followers are important for maintaining loyalty and support necessary for attaining power and authority. In modern politics, this relationship is more commonly known as wantokism or wantok system, a multi-faceted term that derives from ‘one talk’ or ‘one language’ in the local Pidgin English. Although literally the term implies speakers of the same language, socially it embraces the idea of giving preference to kin or clan members (Moore 2007:197).

Wantokism or wantok system when discussed in relation to Solomon Islands politics and government bureaucracy also connotes corruption, nepotism and the use of public

24 funds and resources for personal as well as the benefits of relatives and close associates. Moreover, when the term is used in electoral politics, it means the exchange of fund and material between politicians and voters in the hope of securing support for elections.

WANTOKISM

Scholars often relate the politician-voter gift exchanges common in modern politics to traditional socio-political organization of Melanesian societies. This dyadic and often asymmetrical relationship well known in anthropological Bigman discourse centers on reciprocal exchange between a leader and followers that generates dependency and loyalty. Proponents of the cultural thesis therefore argue that gifting in modern politics resembles the traditional Bigman gifting. As Michael Morgan notes, Most analyses of the state in Melanesia suggest that pre-existing social forms pervade the state at almost every level (2005: 4)

Sinclair Dinnen echoes a similar opinion; Skilful distribution of resources and manipulation of relationship by modern politicians are reminiscent of older Melanesian leadership strategies (2008: 57) and so is Clive Moore; Wantokism (giving preference to kin) … are basic to local culture… (2007: 197)

Melanesians have also shared this view and use it to describe local politics. Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka of Solomon Islands for instance describes politicians (parliamentarians) as ‘modern version of the traditional Bigman’ and ‘traditional leaders in a modern political system’ (1998: 139). Likewise Joe Ketan a Papua New Guinea anthropologist argues that ‘politics at all levels…are organized along traditional structural lines’ (as quoted by Morgan, 2005).

The practice of giving favour to those who pledge political support and allegiance is not unique to Melanesia. While not exactly the same, the idea of exchanging favour for favour known as quid pro quo is a well-known phenomenon in electoral politics.

Like Melanesia where the gifting practice in contemporary politics is assumed to be rooted in traditional notions of leadership, the exchange of favour for favour in other societies have also been related to similar practices found in these cultures. More commonly known as Clientilism, this dyadic relationship involves a patron and client and is characterized by control from above and dependency on the part of clients. In Melanesia, the relationship between the patron and client is assumedly based on the exchange of wealth for political support.

CLIENTELISM

The increased scholarship on clientelist polities in the 1970s followed a renewed interest in clientelist relationships and its impact on western style public institutions and processes in new democracies that rose up within this period (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 2002:1, De Sousa, 2008:3). Academics are particularly interested in culturally entrenched informal institutions that seem to enjoy more popularity than formal ones. As Luis de Sousa (2008:3) states, these institutions are successfully adapted to democratic institutions and processes.

In the world of growing numbers of fragile or imperfect democracies, in which informal institutions enjoy greater legitimacy than formal ones, it is understandable that the phenomenon catches the attention of academics when associated to democratic practices. It is in their interest to understand both how the actual practice and mental frame of the players in brokerage survive regime transition and successfully adapt to democratic contexts and to what extent this particularistic distribution of public benefits/services is (or is not) compatible with the principles underpinning modern democracy (De Sousa 2008). Scholars have argued that the attempt to make formal institutions work has always been undermined by culturally entrenched informal systems of clientilism or similar patron-client relationships. Although these institutions are unrecognized by public institutions and processes, the fact that they are publicly acknowledged means that they are also hard to remove. Bickerkoff and Goldsmith (2002) highlight this in their paper;

As countries attempt the difficult transition to democracy and open markets, numerous reforms are necessary in the realm of governance. Reformers in developing and

transitioning countries have been reconfiguring their public institutions, trying to build systems that are responsive and accountable to citizens, and that effectively support economic investment and growth… In many cases, informal systems of clientelist and patrimonialism are key contributors to stifling popular participation, subverting the rule of law, fostering corruption, distorting the delivery of public services, discouraging investment and undermining economic progress. Because they are deeply entrenched, seldom authorized or openly acknowledged, and take different forms depending on their context, clientelist networks can be both difficult to detect and to remove (Derick W. Brinkerhoff Arthur A. Goldsmith, 2002:1).

As highlighted in the previous discussion of clientilism, most clientelist relationships develop where there is an economic disparity that gives way for subordination and control based on the limited access to resources. This uneven, hierarchical relationship is the trademark of all clientelist relationships. Luis de Sousa (2008) notes; Clientilism…an ancient form of consented domination by means of reciprocal, yet uneven terms of exchange caused by an unequal access to … resources and political power (de Sousa, 2008).

Hopkins also reiterates another important aspect of the clientelist relationship where; …patrons and clients were tied to durable relationships by a powerful sense of obligation and duty (Hopkin, 2006).

A clientelist relationship is therefore marked by inequality, subjugation, manipulation and individual ownership.

WANTOKISM vs. CLIENTILISM

Ethnographers and those who have written on Melanesia politics often compare the Bigman System or wantokism to clientelist relationships that exist in other societies. In so doing, they have judged the Melanesian gifting as asymmetrical and vertical as would have been in a patron – client relationship. This results in a misunderstanding as well as a distorted view of the local gifting practices where a neopatrimonial aspect is often emphasized (Steeves 1996:132). Jonathan Hopkin (2006) acknowledges this when he writes;

The concept of clientilism creates confusion and controversy because of the wide and diverse range of political exchanges which can be accommodated by the term (Hopkin: 2006:2).

Although all clientelist relationships are assumed to operate in a similar manner, the difference in social structures affects how these relationships manifest. For instance, the feudalistic clientelism in medieval European societies were rational and manipulative because very few owned and controlled land and resources thus subjugating those who 'did not have’ under their control. Melanesian gifting culture on the other hand operates in an environment that does not allow individual or private ownership of land and resource because land and resource ownership in Melanesia is tribal/communal. While tribal or clan leaders hold an important position within these societies, they cannot deny tribal or clan members access to the land or resources. Equal access to land and resources thus reduces the chances for the emergence of an asymmetrical clientelist relationship.

Moreover, traditional gift exchange in Melanesia is not a strategy for attaining leadership but a form of resource pooling. For instance, the AreAre traditional exchange system removes the burden of hosting culturally important events (bride price, mortuary feasts, compensation payments etc.) from the individual to the kin group. As such, reciprocity is not merely ‘paying back’ or rendering oneself subject to the giver but rather it is a shared ownership of responsibility, property, land and resources by members of a kin group. Also, gift exchanges are maintained within a kin group except where marriage ties extend beyond the kin network. Kin relation and social responsibility rather than unequal access to resources therefore forms the basis of the AreAre (and more generally Malaitan) exchange system as opposed to the political emphasis often stressed by many political commentators.

GIFTING IN SOLOMON ISLANDS MODERN POITICS

The introduction of the cash economy in Solomon Islands ushered in an environment that is marked by unequal economic opportunities and political influence. Those who view gifting from a rational perspective see patronage politics as a consequence of this economic divide (Hague 2012) and argue that those with wealth will always exert more influence in local politics. Although this claim is true to an extent, the way wealth and gifting affect political affiliations and behaviour differs according to the different levels of politics (i.e. parliament, province, and constituency). The rational argument however points to economic inequality as a prerequisite for patronage politics. As asserted by Migdal (1988),

Present-day Clientelism thus tends to flourish in insecure political and economic environments, both rural and urban, and is integral to the “politics of survival” for both patrons and clients (Migdal 1988).

This argument is more associated with the constituency politics where there exists little economic opportunities in the rural areas. Some scholars therefore see the economic realities as driving the politics in the rural constituencies (Hague 2012).

At the parliamentary/cabinet level, gifting seems to take place in the manner of the traditional Bigmen. Those with money seem to exert a lot of influence on political choices in this arena especially in luring MPs to the different political camps and coalitions. MPs also bargain for jobs, projects and other benefits for themselves and cronies. As noted by Luis de Sousa (2008) modern gifting does not necessarily happen in cash;

…the means of exchange are of a political/public nature: votes and political support are exchanged for jobs, benefits, career protection, services which the beneficiaries may or may not be entitled to. Because resources are limited and their allocation is a discretionary monopoly of the patron, it is sufficient for him/her to trade the possibility/expectation of being granted a favour.

Likewise, the modern patron is a “…political boss, party leader, government official or political broker” or sometimes he/she is a representative of a bigger network, often working as middle-man (Luis de Sousa, 2008). These networks influence what goes on in institutions such as parliament and other bureaucratic structures and use money to target specific ministries and portfolios that are related to their business interests. For instance, the forestry sector has been a popular target of Asian loggers and has seen a lot of this kind of politics (Kabutaulaka 1998).

GIFT GIVING AND CORRUPTION

The debate over whether the practice of gift giving in contemporary politics is corruption or not (based on cultural and rational interpretation) has been popular among scholars who have written and commented on Melanesian politics. Some scholars have seen gifting as corruption because it violates electoral laws/regulations and the practice undermines good governance. Others have argued that, since gifting derives from local cultural practice, it is quite difficult to condemn. The debate then has been over of which of the two (choosing between a legal and a cultural interpretation) should be adopted especially when dealing with culturally entrenched practices such as gifting in electoral politics. In the light of the difficulty highlighted above, it would be helpful to elaborate on the phenomenon of ‘corruption’ and its relationship to gift giving and more generally the Solomon Islands politics in this section.

CORRUPTION-NORMS VS GOALS

‘Corruption’ is a loaded term with no one definition fitting all contexts. Susan Rose- Ackerman (2006: xiv) highlights some meanings the term has come to accommodate; … a moral category that signifies putrefaction and rot. Commentators use the term to describe aspects of modern life that they find repugnant. They condemn video games that corrupt the morals of the young and bemoan the corruption of politics by pointing to the decline in civic value and public spiritedness. In this broad interpretation, corruption does not necessarily involve a monetary quid pro quo. Rather, a vulnerable group…is at

risk of falling from grace because of exposure to some feature of the environment, be it video games, television shows, sexually alluring human beings or a society’s general lack of grace and deference (Susan Rose-Ackerman (2006: xiv).

The purpose of this discussion is to look at definitions that are relevant to the discussion of politics and more specifically, Melanesian politics. It would however be helpful to start by looking at some basic, acceptable and universal definitions of the term and to relate these (definitions) to the discussion of Melanesian contemporary politics and the gifting practice.

The most basic and popular definition of corruption is the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003:91). This definition however fails to capture a wide range of contexts where corruption can be found. Moreover, the definition favours a more economic interpretation thus sees corruption only as an economic activity occurring in public offices. Yet as evident everywhere, even non- public offices (non-government organizations, private enterprises and religious organizations) as well as other social entities (community and family) can also be subjected to corruption. As acknowledged by Caiden, opportunities for corruption exist everywhere although the degree of corruption may vary. ... But while the opportunities exist everywhere, the degree of corruption varies widely among individuals, public agencies, administrative cultures, and geographic regions (Caiden 2001: 26).

Huntington offers another definition of corruption that has been debated. He defines corruption as;

… behaviour of public officials which deviates from accepted norms in order to serve private ends (Huntington 1989: 377).

Huntington narrows the definition of corruption to mean an act by public officers that deviates from accepted norms of public offices and done for one’s own benefit. Public opinion is therefore seen as important for identification of corrupt acts (actions that deviate from the norms of a group or society). The difficulty however is in

31 choosing whose opinion to use as a standard to measure deviant actions. Scholars who have studied the phenomenon acknowledge that norms of a local community may differ from those imposed by a central authority as a government (Heywood 1997: 25). Judging deviant actions is therefore not that easy and what is considered deviant depends on the side from which one views an act.

Proponents of the cultural thesis maintain that the practice of gifting (between parliamentarians and voters) derives from cultural practices and will always deviate from the norms of introduced and modern political institutions and structures. Such scenarios present cases where the above definition of corruption is inadequate to justify allegations of corruption since what is seen as wrong in one context may not be judged as such in another. This is always true where imported foreign systems or structures and associated values and norms clash with norms and values of a host culture or society.

While the cultural hypothesis has been challenged by many scholars, it nonetheless shows the importance of cultural contexts especially in understanding how people perceive a particular concept or practice. According to Anderson and Tverdova (2003: 93);

Culture provides a lens for how people view the world, motives for human behaviour, criteria for evaluating actions and more generally, orientations to action, all of which are learned during cultural socialization. If a country's cultural context predisposes people to view corruption as acceptable practice and therefore relatively benign, measures of corruption may not coincide with how people in different cultural settings respond to corrupt political practices.

Those who support the cultural thesis therefore argue that culture influences the way people look at the world, how they do things and even how they behave in politics.

CORRUPTION - PRIVATE VS PUBLIC

The definitions of corruption discussed so far assert norms that guide public conduct as a base for defining corruption. Moreover, these definitions highlight a division between public and private roles of an individual. The private life (like the public) also has norms and values that guide individual conduct and behaviour. As such, when one’s private responsibilities spill over into public offices; there is a tendency for a clash between the norms that guide both (public and private) spheres of life. This infiltration of private responsibilities into public offices is also considered as corrupt (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 91).

In many cultures though, a person’s public and private life is often intertwined and what one does in a public role may also have repercussions in one’s private life. Such is the case of Melanesian wantokism; the phenomenon that is often used to explain the actions of those who hold public offices in granting favours to relatives or close associates, and also of receiving favours in return. While on the surface this portrays a picture of a simple arrangement that could easily be discarded if an individual wishes not to yield to the pressure from relatives or friends, the consequence of failing private responsibilities (in the context of Melanesia) goes further than that. In many instances, this could result in rejection or even detachment from important social entities such as tribes or clans. Considering that these groups form the basis for social organization and land and property ownership in Melanesia, private responsibilities attached to these institutions (and their members) are also important to the individual.

The relationship within the wantok system or network is therefore more important than just the exchange of favours or gifts. Where individuals ignore or neglect their responsibilities as members, they are likely to be isolated from tribes and kin networks. One can therefore lose access to the tribal/kin co-operations and resource pooling often offered by kin networks. Haque (2012:7) highlights this fear of detachment when he writes that;

Continued servicing of kinship obligations ensures ongoing membership in the kin group, and therefore access to a basic social insurance mechanism and land within the village for themselves and their descendants.

Therefore, maintaining one’s connection to the kin network may call for the accommodation of private responsibilities in public offices.

It is also important to note that in Melanesia, the exchange of favours confirms a relationship or symbolizes the existence of one. Such a relationship cannot be confined only to one’s private life but the evidence of such relationship must also manifest in public roles. Yet in modern political and government institutions, there is always an advocacy for the separation of the private and public roles. As such, when an individual maintains private responsibilities in public offices, the public interest is said to be threatened by personal interest and hence corruption.

CORRUPTION AND DEMOCRACY

To discuss corruption in politics is therefore to describe a relationship between the state (public) and private actors (Rose-Ackerman 1999: 113). As often the case, both state officials and private actors can be equal participants in corruption and the demands or goals of those involved are likely to determine the impact of corruption on a society or state. It is for this reason that many argue that corruption is a feature of modern democracy and the presence of corrupt practices often undermines democratic principles (Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 92). As Heywood acknowledges;

The effects of corruption are especially disruptive to democracies; by attacking the principles on which democracy rests-notably, the equality of citizens before institution (that is the idea that individuals should be treated with fairness and respect by government officials) and the openness of decision making (that is crucially, accountability) (1997: 5).

In many cases, this results in people having little faith in political processes or a decline in support for democratic political institutions (Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 92). Again Heywood argues that; …corruption contributes to the delegitimation of political and institutional systems in which it takes root. It is for this reason that political corruption is rightly a central focus of concern in contemporary democracies (1997: 5).

On the contrary, in societies where practices that are deemed corrupt (e.g. gift giving) are culturally acceptable, there is a tendency for people to respond differently and to accept corruption. This is especially true in cases where cultural interpretations favour gift exchanges or clientilist relations and so people (and especially those who are recipients of favour) are less likely to oppose or to restrain corruption (Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 92).

Some scholars even argue that in the politics of bureaucracy, corruption has a good side to it. This view of corruption is promoted through theories such as ‘functional theory’ that highlight some benefits of buying and selling of political favours especially where it helps to avoid bureaucratic red tapes and enhances the functions of political machinery (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003: 93). It is also assumed that corruption, and more specifically direct payment to public servants, helps bring about efficiency in government institutions where public officers are given incentive which helps maximize their performance. Thus many argue that corruption of this form does not only help to overcome a lot of unnecessary bureaucratic obstacles but also results in higher economic output which is good for a government and the state (Anderson and Tverdova 2003: 93).

GIFTING AND THE RATIONAL AND CULTURAL APPROACHES

Having discussed traditional gifting, Clientilism, wantokism and corruption, it would be helpful at this point to discuss the two dominant approaches that have been used by scholars, academics and those who have studied Melanesian politics to explain gifting

35 in of Solomon Islands’ contemporary politics and more generally Melanesia. These two approaches; the ‘cultural’ and the ‘rational choice’ have served either to explain, justify or condemn the practice. However, the biased representation of political behaviour either as the result of cultural influence or rational decision has prompted many to argue that a single approach (based on culture or rational choice) is inadequate to explain how people behave in different contexts and under different circumstances.

GIFT GIVING AND THE CULTURAL APPROACH

In their paper Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action, Muller and Opp (1986: 471) present an interesting case that questions the validity of Rational Choice argument as an explanation for all political behaviour. The case concerns participation of citizens in rebellious collective actions where the rational individual has a choice either to participate or remain uninvolved and becomes a free rider (he/she stands to lose more by participating). In such rebellious collective action, the individual would enjoy public goods (once the rebellion is successful) even if he/she does not participate. The rational individual would therefore choose to remain inactive (become a free rider) and reap the public benefit rather than bear the personal cost associated with participation. Yet history has shown that average citizens do take part in rebellious (sometimes in great numbers) collective actions (which is non- rational) rather than opting to be ‘a free rider’ (which is rational) (Muller and Opp 1986: 472). This example therefore goes to show the inadequacy of the ‘rational choice approach’ to explain all political behaviour.

Lane and Errson (2005: 2) in their book Culture and Politics argue that when human behaviour is rooted in altruism and value (as in the above example), a cultural approach offers a better explanation than a rational choice approach. The altruistic behaviour may in turn be a product of history, culture and shared commonalities that offer a sense of identity for individuals and groups and hence shape the way they do things and behave. This can further influence their political behaviour which also generates significant differences in terms of democracy, governance, policy making,

36 election results and so on (Lane and Errson 2005: 40). Mamadouh (1997) echoes a similar sentiment in her paper ‘Political culture: a typology grounded on Cultural Theory’ when she writes;

The concept of 'political culture' reminds us that in each state there is a specific way of doing politics and that it is related to its cultural background (Mamadouh, 1997:18).

Also, proponents of the cultural thesis often argue that people do not enter politics as blank slates but have political orientations that comprise knowledge, attitude, values and expectations (Kweit and Kweit, 2005: 61). These orientations influence the way individuals behave in politics likewise political processes and the functioning of political systems. This is more commonly known as ‘political culture’, a term that encapsulates the learnt political attitude, values and beliefs that influence the behaviour of individuals. ‘Political culture’ therefore means the political way of life of a people and more specifically the relationship between attitudes and values of people and its impact on the performance of a government.

The understanding of the concept ‘political culture’ differs from place to place. In the case of Solomon Islands for instance, the political developments over the past three decades have never brought the people closer to the government or the state. The average Solomon Islander is so disoriented from the state or government that for many, the government or the state has become irrelevant. The ‘political culture’ as known in the Solomon Islands therefore compares more to the category of ‘Parochial Political Culture’ identified by Almond and Verba (1963) in their studies of political cultures in Western democracies. In this type of culture, citizens are rarely aware of a central government likewise their existence is largely unaffected by decisions made by a national government.

So basically, proponents of the cultural thesis seek to understand the relationship between culture and the performance of a government. Culture can therefore be treated as a factor (independent variable) that affects government stability or

37 instability (dependent variable). Because culture influences political behaviour, culture can also be said to affect government stability or instability. Those who embrace the cultural thesis therefore argue that the kind of government a country has is determined by its culture.

GIFTING AND RATIONAL CHOICE

Although the proponents of the ‘cultural approach’ argue that ‘rational choice’ fails to explain political behaviour that is oriented in altruism and value, not all political behaviour can be attributed to altruistic behaviour and value. As highlighted in the preceding discussion on the cultural approach, altruism is a product of shared history, commonalities, social organization and intense interaction between individuals of a social group. Lane and Errson (2005) describe the strong bond and relationship within such groups as a ‘high degree of compactness’. Yet not all political activities take place within such an environment. For example, in the case of Solomon Islands (and more generally Melanesia), where a political relationship is developed outside of the kin group, the environment may lack the relationship that can suitably be described as ‘high degree of compactness’. As such, where there is no strong bond to guide the behaviour of individuals, there is a tendency for other factors to influence political behavior, in particular incentives and gifts.

Also, proponents of the ‘rational choice theory’ have argued that in many instances, actions that are often deemed to be cultural (collective actions of a cultural group) do have rational dimensions to them. The collective action of a kin group to support a candidate for instance could be motivated by group benefits and incentives. Tobias Hague (2012) in his paper ‘The Influence of Culture on Economic Development in Solomon Islands’ asserts that;

While culture may influence behaviour, it is abundantly clear that the behaviours that development practitioners are most concerned about are strongly encouraged by pervading material incentives... (Hague, 2012: 3).

Moreover, in the context of Solomon Islands where social organization centers on larger social units such as the clans or tribes and the individual is an inseparable part of these entities, the line between the goals of the individual and those of the kin or larger group is very blurry. While within the kin group the individual may behave altruistically (prioritizing collective goals above personal ones), the collective action of the group is always rational if indeed by rationalism we refer to the maximization of interest. For this reason, it may be quite difficult to rule out rational behaviour even when the individual seems to acting in the interest of others.

Rationalists also claim that the economic realities determine the choices people make. Again Tobias Haque (2012) in writing about the case of Solomon Islands argues that;

Voter behaviour in Solomon Islands reflects the broader economic context. Most Solomon Islanders support themselves through subsistence production. Eighty-five per cent of Solomon Islanders live in rural areas. Cash-economy opportunities are limited, concentrated around a very small number of cash crops, and sensitive to changes in global commodity prices. He claims that in such a harsh economic environment, it would be unrealistic not to expect voters to be more concerned about their immediate needs; … the detrimental behaviours described (rational behaviour)... could more usefully be explained in terms of the material incentives facing individuals (Haque, 2012:3).

So Haque like other proponents of the ‘rational choice theory’ believes that individuals make their political choices based on their needs as opposed to relationship and a strong sense of altruism (promoted by the ‘cultural theses’). In so doing individuals will seek to maximize their benefits when given the opportunity. Those who support the ‘rational choice theory’ therefore see all political choices as rational even when it appears to others as cultural or non-rational. The argument of the ‘rational choice theory’ is illustrated in the diagram Figure 6.

Figure 6 The ‘rational choice’ argument and how it affects the stability or instability of the government

NEEDS

INCENTIVE/ RATIONAL POLITICAL GIFTS INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOUR

STABILITY OR INSTABILITY OF GOVERNMENT

DEFINING ‘CULTURAL THESIS’ AND ‘RATIONAL CHOICE’ FOR THE THESIS

Having discussed the premise of the ‘cultural thesis’ and ‘rational choice theory’, I wish explain how these two concepts are used throughout the thesis. The ‘cultural thesis’ as used throughout the thesis generally refers to the idea that gifting in modern politics derives from traditional notions of leadership. The use of ‘cultural or traditional gifting’ in the case study of East AreAre has however been narrowed to mean the gifting that is based on kin relationship. Although from other perspectives the practice assumes the nature of ‘rational choices’, it is different in that gift giving is not the sole reason for the alliance between a candidate and a voter but gifting is the evidence of that relationship. Without any existing relationship, gifts carry little meaning for recipients and in the case of East AreAre; such gifts will not foster any serious political relationship and loyalty.

On the other hand, ‘rational choice’ as used in the thesis and particularly in the case of East AreAre constituency politics refers to the gift exchanges that take place between candidates/politicians and voters who are not blood related. In the context where the

40 traditional gifting is only practiced within kin networks, where political relationship outside of the kin group results from gifting, such relationship can be said to have been influenced by rational decision. As such, the reference to ‘rational choice’ in the context of Solomon Islands constituency politics basically means political relationships developed outside the kin groups and based on gifting.

CONCLUSION

Various concepts and theories have been used to describe political practices and behaviour in Melanesia. Some of these theories support the ‘cultural thesis’ that sees culturally entrenched practices as recurring in modern politics. In Melanesia the traditional Bigman phenomenon has been used to explain gift-giving in modern politics. Scholars have compared the Melanesian gift giving practice with similar clientelist practices found in other cultures. Yet while the other clientelist relationships develop out of economic disparity common in societies, the Melanesian traditional gifting practice is a form of resource pooling that helps individuals fulfill social obligations such as hosting marriage ceremonies, mortuary feasts, bride-price payment and similar events common in Melanesian societies. In the Melanesian context where land and resource ownership are communal, the limited access to land and resources that have been the reason for subjugation and control in medieval societies does not exist. In this regard, it would be misleading to say that Melanesian gifting is a form of clientelism.

While others support the cultural hypothesis, there is another side of the argument that sees Melanesian gifting as corruption. This argument comes from those who see individuals as existing in two worlds, the private life and public life. Proponents of this view argue that granting of favour common in Melanesian societies is only appropriate outside public offices individuals may hold. When such practices permeate public offices, they are likely to contradict rules and norms that guide the operations of public offices. Yet in many societies there is a tendency for both lives to overlap and private responsibilities are often accommodated in public offices. As always the case, when this happens, it is often argued that the norms guiding public

41 offices are likely to be violated. The problem however is that the norms of a host society may not necessarily match the norms of public institutions. Thus if the definition of corruption has to do with actions that deviate from the norms of public institutions then there will definitely be arguments about what is corrupt and what is not.

CHAPTER THREE

KIN AND NOT GIFTS – THE CASE OF EAST AREARE

Although it has always been claimed that politics at the constituency level in Solomon Islands revolves around money and gifts, empirical evidence and election data points to other factors as being more influential in deciding election outcomes. These factors are often overlooked in studies on gifting in contemporary politics. One of the most influential but less discussed factors is kinship or kin relation. A major reason for this oversight is that the understanding of gifting in higher levels of leadership like the Parliament and Cabinet (which is often based on money), is often posited as pertaining across local constituencies. But these are very different social settings with very different political behaviour.

Having said that, it would be wrong to dismiss gifting from the politics of the constituencies. In fact, gifting plays an important part in the politics of the constituency by complementing kin relationships. Through gift exchanges, existing social and biological ties within the tribe, clan or extended family are strengthened. It is the social and biological bond (strengthened by gifting) rather than mere gifts that are more influential in the political alliances of the constituency.

In this chapter, I will discuss the East AreAre case and how gifting and kin relationships interact to influence the way people vote for candidates. I will review the traditional notion of gifting in AreAre (and on Malaita). This will include a discussion on the relationship between leadership based on land tenure and the role of gift giving in the traditional AreAre society.

AREARE

The term AreAre serves as the name of a region, the name of a group of people who occupy that region and the name of the language they speak. The AreAre region

43 occupies most of the southern end of the island of Malaita (Marapaina) and the northern end of Small Malaita (Maramasike). AreAre speaking people however are not confined to this particular region of Malaita. AreAre speakers can also be found on the eastern part of Guadalcanal known as the Marau Sound as well as the northern part of Makira (San Cristobal) known as Arosi. These scattered settlements of AreAre people resulted from early inter-island raids and migrations probably dated around the mid-1800s.

Figure 7

The East AreAre Constituency marked in the southern part on the main island of Malaita. Note that the Small Malaita is a separate constituency. See Appendix I for Solomon Islands electorates.

EAST AREARE

Source: Geographical Information Unit-SIG

Prior to the early 1900’s the AreAre people lived in small hamlets mostly inland and where they still have connection to the land. While there were already settlements along the coast by this time, the political activities associated with the colonial government and later the Masina Ruru had contributed to the expansion of the coastal villages. For instance, the initiative by the colonial government to collect tax led to the setting up of tax collection centers along the coast. The tax collection centers like

Takataka, Manawai and others expanded both in size and population as a result of this initiative.

During the Second World War (WWII) the Masina Ruru movement again encouraged mass migration to the coastal villages. The movement was started by AreAre leaders who had had contact with the American soldiers as labour corps during the war. Starting in 1944, the movement was already spreading to other islands by the following year. As part of the movement, villages were re-organized and communities were encouraged to engage in collective economic activities such as coconut plantations and the farming of other cash crops. While the movement was later suppressed and dissolved by the colonial government (and leaders sent to prison), it had nonetheless succeeded in establishing bigger settlements along the coast and more importantly instilled a desire for self-governance among the AreAre leaders and people.

At its core, the Maasina Ruru movement was aimed at getting Malaitans to govern themselves and to use their own kastom to pass judgments and allow for its relevant use in their native courts. The important thing that was born out of the movement and proved significant for later developments in governance and politics was the step taken by the colonial government to include Solomon Islanders in the Executive and the Legislative Council formed in the 1960s to replace the former Advisory Council. These reforms culminated in national independence on July 7th 1978.

AREARE IN POST INDEPENDENCE NATIONAL POLITICS

The AreAre region is divided into two constituencies with the East AreAre constituency stretching from Olomburi in the northern end to Sawarokau in the south and the West AreAre constituency stretching from Afutara at the northern end to Maka in the south. The constituencies are further divided into wards with each constituency having two wards. The wards elect their members to the Malaita Provincial Assembly (MPA) that is responsible for governing the province.

Since independence in 1978, the East AreAre constituency has elected only five members to the constituency seat. The first was Sir Peter Kenilorea who held the constituency seat from 1978 to 1991 when he resigned to join the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA) as Director. A by-election was held for the vacant seat that year and Edward Huniehu was elected as the new Member of Parliament. Two years later (in 1993), he was re-elected in National General Elections and held office until 1997. In the 1997 election Dickson Warakohia won the constituency seat only to be replaced by Edward Huniehu in 2001 election. He then held onto the constituency seat until his death in 2009. The seat was again contested in 2010 election and won by Andrew Hanaria only to be ousted in a petition in 2012. A by-election was held that year (2012) and the seat was won by Andrew Manepora’a. He won the seat again in the 2014 election and is the current Member of Parliament. In the short history of East AreAre politics, only two candidates have dominated the parliamentary seat each spending an average of 13.5 years in parliament.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION IN AREARE

In order to understand political behaviour in AreAre contemporary politics, one needs to look at the individual and his/her position within larger social units such as the extended family and clan or tribe as well as leadership structures within these institutions. Like other Melanesian societies, AreAre puts emphasis on membership of bigger social units. This relationship is not only important for land and property ownership but also determines alliances for events such as feasts, marriages, other communal activities and political organization. In contemporary politics and especially in the politics of the constituency, alliances and political groupings are usually founded on these bigger social units.

The relationship between the individual and the extended family, clan or tribe is shown in the diagram below. The biggest land unit (hence grouping) is the iirora (represented by the yellow background). The iirora is further divided into smaller

46 units known as arata. There are usually three or four arata in iirora and most of the social and political organization is done at the arata level. Hence arata is the foundation of the AreAre kinship system and the point at which every individual acts. See Figure.8 below.

Figure 8

The diagram shows the relationship of ‘iinoni’ (person/individual) to a ri’oanimae common ancestor.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LAND TENURE AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The Figure.8 shows the arata or the larger unit of which the iinoni or individual is a member. Although the concepts of clan or tribe translate more closely to the idea represented by the term arata, these terms also fail to capture the whole meaning of the concept of arata. Given that the concept of arata is essential for understanding socio-political organization in AreAre, the term needs further clarification.

Firstly, the land tenure system in AreAre uses the concept of canoe to organize the different plots of land, tribes and people into a meaningful whole. Thus in AreAre the term used for canoe is iirora which is also the same term used for the biggest land unit. The term arata literally refers to a section within a canoe likewise arata in AreAre land tenure also refers to sub-divisions within a bigger plot of land. Figure. 9 demonstrates how the concept of canoe is applied to the land tenure system in AreAre.

Figure 9

The concept traditional canoe as applied to land tenure

While arata identifies a sub-division within the iirora or bigger land unit, arata also serves as an institution for social and political organization within the bigger iirora. This is where the concept of clan or tribe translates more closely to the arata. Yet to apply the concept of tribe to arata without any connection to a plot of land is not appropriate in AreAre. As opposed to the western idea that tribe could only refer to a group of people, the term arata combines both ideas of a related group of people and the land they own. The term arata therefore could be used interchangeably for a tribal plot of land and the social unit (tribe) that owns it. Thus socio-political organization is intertwined with land ownership in AreAre.

Further, in AreAre, every arata has a ri’oanimae or common ancestor. There are 13 generations from the ri’oanimae (common ancestor) to the iinoni or individual (in the present or 14th generation). Each individual (making up the 14th generation) traces his/her connections through the preceding generations (13 generations) to the ri’oanimae or a common ancestor. This relationship going through the preceding generations to the ri’oanimae is known as hutaa or genealogy. Every person who is connected to a plot of land is expected to know or recite the hutaa or genealogy. Thus every plot of land in AreAre starts with a ri’oanimae (as the common ancestor of the land) and goes down through fourteen generations to the present. An individual can trace his or her hutaa or genealogy through hutaanimane (paternal) or hutaanikeni (maternal). The iinoni or individual can be a member of several arata depending on the origins of preceding generations. Moreover, the recitation of the hutaa or genealogy is very important not only for knowing one’s connection to a plot of land and property but also knowing others within the tribe. Known as maitakina or relationship, an individual’s life within the arata is strongly attached to the people within this circle.

The concept of maitakina therefore emphasizes the idea of belonging to a bigger group. The term maitakina derives from the word taki or to tie. Thus the concept of maitakina in AreAre refers not only to a relationship (often biological) but a ‘bound relationship’. In such a relationship, the iinoni is tied to others in the arata through his/her ‘blood’ or biological connections within the hutaa. Hence the iinoni or individual is ever conscious of those around him/her likewise his/her life fades into the life and affairs of the bigger group. The iinoni therefore becomes part of a network and ceases to exist as an individual but has become part of a whole, firstly of the uruha or family and arata or tribe (Note that in AreAre there is no distinction between the nuclear and extended family). The concept of maitakina or relationship as known within the arata affects every area of the individual’s life including personal decisions.

The organization within the arata as explained above is indeed a network often utilized to collectively address needs and fulfill the responsibilities of individuals

49 within the arata or clan/tribe. Such an arrangement leaves little room for individual ownership and independence. Although it may have been acquired by individuals, property belongs to the extended families or tribe. On the other hand, important social events such as bride payment and important feasts are no longer the responsibility of the individuals but every member within the extended family and arata. The maitakina as known within the arata would be what many commentators refer to as an exchange network often associated with Bigman politics although its political use is often exaggerated.

LEADERSHIP (ARAHANA) WITHIN THE TRIBE (ARATA)

It is also important to note that leadership positions within the arata are hereditary. Since the land tenure system is patrilineal and agnatic, these positions are often inherited by the na’onawera mane (eldest son) of the hutahuu or the male line descending from the ri’oanimae or common ancestor. Referred to as araha (chief) or arahana (chieftainship), the concept attached to the term relates first and foremost to a land title within the arata and secondly to a political position.

The concept of arahana could be better understood if I further discuss the term araha and associated concepts. The noun araha derives from the verb ara meaning ‘to fence off’ or ‘to surround’. For instance, the phrase ‘arahonosia’ means ‘to fence off or surround’ by making a kind of boundary around something. The term araha as related to the arata therefore means ‘the keeper or custodian’ of the arata (a plot of land and those who own it). When seen in this light, the political functions of araha are secondary to his land related duties (as the custodian or protector of the land).

Having said that, one must not make the mistake of stripping the araha of political functions. In earlier discussions about social structure and land tenure, I have asserted that social organization and land tenure in AreAre are intertwined or inseparable in that, socio-political organization is based on the tenure system and when we refer to

50 arata, we are speaking of a plot of land and a group of people simultaneously. So by inheriting the position of araha within the arata, an individual takes on the role of a custodian of the land and a leader over those who own it.

Socio-political organization in AreAre as discussed here differs from that which is often associated with traditional Bigman politics. Since it is connected to land tenure, it also means that leadership positions within these societies are hereditary as opposed to the Bigman argument of achieved leadership positions. Likewise the absence of an internal framework that supports independence and individual ownership also removes the need for Bigman competition for leadership positions.

GIFTING IN AREARE

Contrary to the argument that traditional Melanesian politics revolves around gift giving, the AreAre socio-political organization as seen here is based more on the land tenure system and resource/property ownership. This brings into question the relationship often forged between gifting as known in contemporary politics and traditional gift giving practices associated with the Bigman phenomenon. In this regard, social and political organization in the AreAre kin system lacks the internal framework that supports political competition often asserted as the basis for traditional Bigman gifting. Since important leadership positions as arahana or chieftainship are hereditary, there is no need for aspiring leaders to compete against each other. Moreover, tribal or communal ownership of land and property also removes the internal structure that encourages control and manipulation as in clientilist relationships and the typical Bigman politics.

BIGMANSHIP ON MALAITA

In the light of the contradictions highlighted above, there exists a need to review traditional gift giving in AreAre in order to assess the impact of the practice on voting

51 behaviour as known in contemporary politics. A better understanding of the traditional practice would enlighten our assessment of gifting and how we align it with established arguments common in literature about Melanesian politics. Furthermore, such an understanding would help in knowing how notions of traditional leadership are impacting voter behaviour in contemporary Solomon Islands politics.

Although across Melanesia leadership is said to be achievement-based and assumed to be similar, it is not unusual to find hereditary leadership as obvious in some reported case of Malaita. Keesing (1985) for instance points out a chiefly system resembling that of Polynesia in Solomon Islands in AreAre region and on Small Malaita. Similar systems of power were also found among the Lau speakers of Northern Malaita (p.238). As noted by Keesing, there are also cases where the lines between the achieved and hereditary titles are also blurred. He refers to the case of the wane initoo of Baegu of Malaita. While the office of the wane initoo is strictly hereditary, the successor to the title also holds the rights to grant permission for the use of land and other tribal properties. This puts the wane initoo in a strategic position that can be exploited for consolidating economic as well as executive power (as cited by Keesing 1985: 239).

Ross who studied the Baegu people also notes a relation between the terms cognate and ngwane inoto in the Baegu language of Tobaita (Keesing 1985: 238). He states that both terms (cognate and mgwane inoto) refer to the hereditary senior steward of lineage land. The wmane inoto who inherits the leadership title in Baegu is also the steward of the land. Ross observes that the office of the mwane inoto is strictly hereditary and possible candidates behave as if they are of a higher class than others.

In discussing the mwane baitaa (Bigman) of Tobaita, Ross concludes that the line between both achieved and hereditary leadership is blurred and not clearly defined (as cited by Keesing 1985, p.238). He attributes this to the strategic positions occupied by hereditary leaders who also use their privileged positions to strengthen their

52 leadership role. The mwane inoto who holds the primary rights to land and property can easily make use of his position to strengthen his economic and political standings.

In the above mentioned cases, those who hold the offices of the Bigman are also stewards or custodians of the land. This indicates that their positions are not achieved; rather leadership positions pertaining to land ownership are often passed down to male cognates or the eldest son on the paternal side. Secondly, this indicates that gifting on Malaita does not conform to the typical Melanesian Bigman pattern (Sahlins, 1963) and like AreAre; the socio-political structures within these societies are interconnected with land tenure and property ownership. Although the nature of this relationship differs from place to place, hereditary leadership structures are pre- dominant on Malaita.

LAND, AUTHORITY AND GIFTING IN AREARE

Although ethnographers such as Ross, Hogbin and Keesing recorded hereditary titles within the island, these titles were never seriously discussed in the context of land ownership and property rights. This concept of leadership puts emphasis on human connection to land ownership not only to justify the origin of one’s authority but also to define who should be governed under that authority. The arata (land and people within it) in this case serves as the place where a leader’s authority is exercised and validated. Hence Sahlins (1963: 287) is correct when he says that a Bigman’s influence extends over a relatively small area and in AreAre this would be the arata. Beyond the arata, this authority is unrecognized lacking the connections (to land) necessary for validation or legitimacy of authority. In AreAre, this connection is important for without it there exists no authority.

The authority of the leader thus manifests mainly in fulfilling his role as the custodian of the land. The link between the leader and land provides the physical avenue where that authority is exercised and validated. Similarly, the link provides a supernatural

53 or divine connection between a leader and the deity of the land. Hence in AreAre land tenure, the most important and sacred site in the arata or plot of land is the grave site of the ri’oanimae or common ancestor. Known as te’ete’e or oohani ri’oanimae (grave site of a common ancestor), an araha or chief also justifies his authority and office by his ability to enter and offer sacrifices within this restricted area without misfortune befalling him. This strong spiritual aspect of leadership renders the authority of inherited offices as having divine mandate or power. Such an authority cannot be bargained nor earned through human effort. Therefore the title, like all titles based on land ownership is strictly hereditary and need not be justified by gift giving.

This is not to say that AreAre culture lacks a gifting practice. AreAre does have a gifting practice but unlike the Bigman concept of gifting, the gifting practice serves a social and economic purpose rather than a political one. This concept of gifting is known as waiaraha (or taurihina, this term applies more to contribution toward bride- price) in AreAre. The term waiaraha translates more as ‘contribution’ than ‘gift’ and it shows how AreAre people perceive gifting. Waiaraha or taurihina (as known in bride-price payment) is in fact contributions collected from members of the extended family and tribe toward the hosting of a feast or payment of a bride. Although kin members are not compelled to waiara or to give, the expectation that everyone should participate renders the practice compulsory.

A major reason why every kin member is obliged to waiara (or give) is because waiaraha or contributions toward occasions such as mortuary feasts, bride price payments and other similar events will be reciprocated at a later date when the giver hosts a similar event (note this only takes place within the kin group). Those who do not actively participate in such events are often isolated and bear the financial burden of hosting such events alone. Hence every kin member contributes resources to events hosted by individual members irrespective of social standing within the group. The gifting practice is both vertical and horizontal (occurring between kin members) as opposed to the clientelist top-down arrangement.

When seen in this light, the concept of waiaraha (or gifting) in AreAre is comparable to the concept of resource pooling where parties put together resources to host an event, solve a problem or address a need. The social and economic aspects of the practice are therefore more important than the political ones.

Figure 10

The vertical and horizontal reciprocal exchange between leaders and followers in AreAre.

ARAHA (CHIEF)

KIN MEMBER KIN MEMBER

Gift exchanges in AreAre have few implications for determining positions of hereditary leaders. Rather, exchanges serve more as a mechanism for engagement between the leader and his people and among the people. By engaging in ‘gifting’ with his people, a hereditary leader justifies his presence, ability and authority thus commanding respect and co-operation which are essential for the legitimacy of authority. Without a legitimate authority, a hereditary title holder is unlikely to have a big influence over his people. While gifting is essential and practiced among kin group members, it has a specific purpose and so serves as complementary virtue that can help a hereditary leader establish his authority and affirms his position (or in its absence loses his influence).

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, three things are worth highlighting. Firstly, as evident in the discussion about leadership and land tenure in AreAre, authority or painaha (deriving from the word paina or big or more appropriately ‘bigness’) as known in AreAre is based on land ownership. This concept of authority renders leadership as immobile or confined by the boundaries of the arata; that is one’s authority is only recognized

55 where the authority belongs or in the arata. This concept of leadership cannot be created or moved where it does not belong. Beyond the arata, a leader lacks the connection that is necessary for the validation of authority which lies in the power to grant or allow usage of land and properties. Hence it is common to hear statements like, ‘osu na’ana’a, mako ‘o mao’ or ‘do not talk/speak, this is not your land’. The connection to a land and the right to properties therein validates and legitimates the authority of the araha or chief.

Secondly, it would be difficult for people belonging to a particular ‘arata’ to accept the authority or leadership coming from outside or another arata. This counters the argument often promoted in Bigman literatures where the ability to accumulate and distribute wealth is the key to attaining leadership and authority in Melanesia. Yet in the case of AreAre, gifts given outside the arata or the right geographical territory has little implications for aspiring leaders. When seen in this light, gifts are only meaningful where they belong.

Finally, as evident from preceding discussions, authority and leadership as known in modern politics that is alienated from land and property is new and foreign. In such cultural context, it is quite difficult to convince people to form political alliances with someone from outside the arata or kin area. Where there is no connection between the people and a leader or aspiring leader (as in the context of AreAre), there is always mistrust.

CHAPTER FOUR

CULTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST AREARE CONTEMPORARY POLITICS

In the preceding discussions on the relationship between land tenure, leadership and socio-political organization in AreAre, the impact of culture on AreAre contemporary politics is more obvious in the use of extended family and the clan or tribe as platforms for political organization and alliance. Therefore the arguments generated at the beginning of this research support kin relationship rather than gifting as the basis for political organization and alliance at the constituency level. For this purpose, it is useful to revisit the arguments.

The first argument asserts that because gifts have a different meaning (see above discussion) in the socio-political organization in rural Solomon Islands societies, kin relationship (rather than gift-giving) has more impact on political behaviour at the constituency level. Gifting in the constituency politics strengthens existing biological and social bonds among kin group members rather than creating the new political relationships. The second argument, building on the first asserts that since elections are kin-based (or group-based as in the case of Honiara), candidates with bigger kin support have higher chances of winning elections as opposed to the candidates with the biggest spending budgets. In the light of the above arguments, I will discuss aspects of traditional socio-political organization that persist in East AreAre contemporary politics in this chapter.

KIN BASED ALLIANCES

Firstly, as obvious from the above hypotheses, kin relationship is still a very dominant feature of political organization and alliance in East AreAre. This can be attributed to the fact that the traditional structures on which the rural society functions are still intact. In particular, social organization in rural areas is still very much based on land ownership and rights. For instance, one would find that people live where

57 they are only connected to the land. People originating from the same arata or plot of land are likely to live together in villages also located on the arata or tribal/clan land (note that arata connotes both a plot of land and the tribe that owns it). In the case where people in a village are not from that particular arata or tribal plot of land, they live under the custody or guardianship of land owners.

The fact that people only reside where they belong generates an attachment to the land (arata) and those coming from it. This sense of allegiance is often translated into political support in contemporary politics and voting. This concept of allegiance compares to nationalism or regionalism (identifying with language groups or even dialect groups) at a higher level although in this context, it concerns a much smaller geographical area (often one or more villages). Those from a particular arata or clan/tribe will be loyal to candidates coming from the same arata or at the least the same villages.

The loyalty as found in the kin group developes from what Hague and Harrop (2001: 88) call ‘deep learning’). In their studies of culture and political behaviour, Hague and Harrop (2001, p.88) argue that ‘basic political loyalties are formed when young’ (2001, p.88). According to their primacy model, the knowledge acquired and attitude and behaviour developed at younger ages will serve as a framework for interpreting behaviour in adulthood (p.88). In the context of AreAre, the up-bringing within the extended family and the clan that every child experiences may also be the basis for the strong bond developed among kin or extended family members in adulthood. As earlier stated, this alliance forms the basis for political organization in AreAre and does not easily succumb to gifts.

Such strong alliances and loyalty is not unique to AreAre but is observed elsewhere in the Solomon Islands. For instance Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka states in his book chapter titled ‘Deforestation and politics in Solomon Islands’ (1998);

Political allegiances are based around kinship and tribal group before extending to the wider community. In elections the foundation for political support is kinship and tribal groups (p.133).

Data from my recent survey (2012) carried out among constituents of East AreAre, also strongly supports kin group as the basis for political alliance during elections. In the survey, respondents were given seven reasons why they supported candidates in the past. These reasons included gifts, relative, qualification, religion, party policy, promises and experience. They were asked to make three choices and have them ranked from the first to the third choice. Out of the 65 analyzed questionnaires, 38 or 58.4% of the respondents confirmed having supported candidates to whom they are related. The majority of these respondents have also identified ‘relative’ as their first ranked choice. Taking into account that a lot of respondents did not have relatives running in that election, this portion of respondents was quite significant. This indicates that everyone that had a relative running as candidate would have chosen ‘relative’ as the (first, second or third) reason for aligning with a candidate. See Figure.11 below.

Figure 11

The graph shows factors influencing voting behaviour

45 40 35 30 25 20 NUMBER OUT OF 65 15 10 NUMBER OF RESPONDENTS 5 0

REASONS FOR SUPPORT

Also note that most of the candidates who stood for the East AreAre seat in past elections have attained higher qualifications and have vast civil service experiences. This means that voters although may have aligned with kin candidates based on relationship could also use these factors as the reasons for their choice.

KIN BASED SOLIDARITY

The second aspect of AreAre culture that persists in contemporary politics is the solidarity within a kin group that strengthens the kin support base against external influence. Although the strong bond among members is largely based on biological ties, the solidarity and relationship within the kin group is developed over a period of time through resource pooling and social co-operations. This resembles Lane and Errson (2005) ‘high degree of compactness’. The strong bond and loyalty among members renders the kin group as ideal for co-operation and support and also impregnable.

Moreover, the existing framework for co-operation within the kin group is ideal hence often utilized for political support and alliance especially by candidates from within the kin group who run in elections. Building on the strong bond and relationship among kin members, kin support bases are always strengthened to resist non-kin members or candidates from other arata or tribe. Likewise, gifting within the kin group helps maintain loyalty and solidarity.

In contrast, gifts coming from outside the kin group lack the bond that can translate gifts into a meaningful and lasting relationship. As such, although recipients may accept gifts coming in from outside the uruha (family nuclear or extended) or arata (clan/tribe), they are not obliged to reciprocate by giving political support. As earlier highlighted, gifting is only meaningful where it belongs; within the kin group.

For instance, evidences given in court for the Civil Case 343 of 2010 (election petition Alick Ha’apio vs Andrew Hanaria, 2010 election winner), reveals that many of the gifts handed out to voters were not reciprocated with political support (a lot of gift recipients did not vote for the candidate). In some instances gifts were retrieved from recipients after it was established that they did not vote for the candidate (as expected).

There is the added fact, largely undisputed and certainly unexplained, of some of the recipients of MP3 players having them recovered by persons acting on behalf of the Respondent (Andrew Hanaria)...it was confirmed by at least one witness that when it was established the recipient did not vote for Respondent the gift was retrieved (HC-SI Civil Case 343 of 2010).

Likewise, in the gifting cases recorded, most of the recipients of cash and goods (MP3 players and solar panels) handed out during the campaign period were relatives who were also supporters.

The Respondent does not dispute he handed out some cash, nor does he dispute his campaign managers handed out solar panels and MP3 players. What is said in general terms by the Respondent is the cash and other items were handed out in accordance with custom and /or to close family members or supporters (Civil Case 343 of 2010).

Thus, recipients of gifts were mostly family and extended family members (who were also supporters). This indicates that even candidates contesting elections are also aware of the fact that gifts achieve little outside the kin group and candidates would rather spend resources consolidating kin support base than invest where it yields very little result.

This however is not to say that political candidates do not give outside the kin support base. While they do give, recipients are carefully chosen (mostly those who are detached from their kin group) and amounts of gifts rarely match what is often invested to maintain kin support. Again as evident in the Civil Case 343 of 2010, bigger gifts such as solar panels were given mainly to close family members and

61 supporters while MP3 players and smaller amounts of cash ($50.00, $100.00 etc.) were handed out during campaigns in areas beyond the kin base territory.

Knowing that gifts achieve little outside the kin group, political candidates give sparingly outside their own kin support bases because of the uncertainty of its impact on voting behaviour. When gifts of considerable amounts are given to individuals outside the kin group, the support and allegiance is definite. I refer to this style of gifting as selective giving where recipients of gifts are often carefully selected. The task of identifying gift recipients outside the kin base territory falls on the campaign managers who work directly with the people. In extreme cases (especially where kin groups do not have a member running as candidate), campaign managers also have their own followings and often use them to bargain with candidates for goods and services.

KIN BASED AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMACY

Thirdly, as I have earlier mentioned, the leadership concept that is based on land tenure as in the case of AreAre is confined by the territory of the arata (tribal land) or cannot be extended over other arata or land and people. As such, a leader’s authority and power is only valid and recognized where it belongs (within the bounds of a particular arata). Beyond this territory the idea of someone from another arata (tribe or land) extending his authority over non-kin members is always not welcomed.

In the case of East AreAre contemporary politics this may mean that candidates would find it difficult to lure voters or supporters from other arata or tribes (even when they use gifts to do so). In the absence of a strong bond as known in a kin group or arata (tribe), the trust and loyalty needed to validate and maintain authority and power is missing. Hence in East AreAre, candidates are likely to maintain support only where they have kin connections and this (support) support weakens beyond the kin territory.

This pattern of kin based authority and influence is obvious in the 2006 election results shown below (Figures 12 and 13), where the two candidates from the extreme ends of the constituency have their results graphed and compared. From both graphs, one could identify where each candidate exerts the most influence (where most of his votes are). For instance, the vote count for candidate Edward Huniehu (from Manawai) picked up mostly at Manawai, Tariuna and Nariao’a. Although he had an advantage over Abraham Namokari in that he won the constituency seat and held office in two previous terms (1993 and 2001), the vote count outside his kin support base shows little influence outside his kin territory.

Figure 12

Vote Count per Polling Station for Edward Huniehu in 2006 Election 250

200

150

100

Number of Ballots 50

Polling Stations

Figure 13

Vote Count per Polling Station for Abraham Namokari in 2006 General Election 180 160 140 120 100 80 60

Number of Ballots 40 20 0

Polling Station

The vote count for candidate Abraham Namokari (from Hunanawa) as shown in the previous chart reveals a similar pattern of influence. He picked most of his votes at Tawanaora, Potani’u, Hunanawa and Sawarokau. One can easily identify the major areas of influences per candidates by looking at the rise and fall of the vote counts for polling stations. Likewise, home polling booths are more obvious as they (home polling stations) usually have the highest vote count. In the case of Abraham Namokari, he had very little or no influence at all beyond Tawanaora (see above graph).

KIN BASED RESPONSIBILITY/OBLIGATION

The fourth feature of AreAre tradition and culture that persists in contemporary politics is the view of gifting or gift giving as an obligation or responsibility. As earlier discussed, waiaraha or resource pooling in AreAre is not enticement for political support but rather the contributions of leaders as well as kin members toward events hosted by a member of the arata or tribe. Everyone that has a connection to a tribe or clan is expected to pool resources together whenever the need for arises.

Although the kin-based gifting is not compulsory, it takes on the nature of responsibility and obligation among kin members.

This perception of gifting may also mean that people do not see gifts in modern politics (between the politician/candidate and voters) as wrong or unacceptable but rather as part and fulfillment of a leader’s role. This view of gifting is obvious in my survey of East AreAre voters where forty of the sixty-five (61.5%) respondents saw gifting as legal and acceptable. This however did not result from an unawareness of laws governing gifting in elections as the survey also shows that 57% of the respondents were aware of the illegality of the practice. Moreover, 73.8% of the respondents also knew and understood the legislative roles of Parliament Members. See Figure 14.

Figure 14. Table showing the different perceptions of gifting

CATEGORIES A – F (NB. SEE TABLE FOR NUMBER OUT OF 65 CATEGORIES) RESPONDENTS

A. GIFTING SEEN AS RESPONSIBILITY OF MP 31 47.6%

B. GIFTING SEEN AS LEGAL, ACCEPTABLE AND 40 61.5% GIFT

C. AWARENESS OF ELECTORAL LAWS BANNING GIFTS 37 57%

D. AGREE WITH BAN OF THE PRACTICE 34 52.3%

E. KNOW AND UNDERSTAND ROLE OF MP 48 73.8%

F. PARTLY UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF MP 7 10.7%

These figures (as discussed above) indicate that the dominant view of gifting has a lot to do with socialization. According to Hague and Harrop (2001, p.88), childhood

65 learning (deep learning) provides a kind of framework for interpreting information acquired in adulthood. Although individuals may modify views and behaviour developed during childhood, it is unlikely that they will transform these outlooks secured when young (Hague and Harrop, 2001:88). In East AreAre, the majority therefore maintain a traditional view of gifting (where gifting is obligatory and everyone is contributes to social events) in modern politics.

This is more obvious when looking at the different levels of education and its impact on individual perception of gifting. In the case of AreAre, education has done little to change the way people view gifting. For instance, of the twenty-three respondents who have had secondary education, sixteen (about 70%) of them viewed gifting as acceptable. Likewise fourteen out of the twenty one respondents who have had tertiary education, agreed with the gifting practice and saw it as acceptable and legal. See the next chart.

Figure 15

Graph showing the number of respondents who agree and disagree with gifting with levels of education attained.

18 16 14 AGREE 12 10 DISAGREE 8 6 4 2 0 PRIMARY SCHOOL SECONDARY SCHOOL TERTIARY EDUCATION

As Hague and Harrop (2001) have argued, although individuals may acquire new knowledge and experiences (and in this case through education) during childhood, the learning and experiences have not changed the perceptions they developed at younger ages (p.88). Hence exposure to gifting practice in the AreAre tradition and culture at

66 earlier ages would have cemented individual’s understanding of gifting which also means that the majority would see the practice as acceptable and as a responsibility.

The variations among the different age groups and their views of gifting are also worth noting. For instance, in the case of East AreAre, the gifting practice is obviously popular among those below the age of 30 years. Those within this age category have grown up in a period where gifting in contemporary politics has taken a new turn. In particular, funding such as the Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF) given annually by the Republic of China (Taiwan) to Members of Parliament have promoted and consolidated the new role Members of Parliament have recently come to enjoy. Voters have begun seeing parliamentarians as distributors of development fund and resources rather than legislators. This in turn promotes a new understanding of elections as a struggle to control state-owned resources.

Figure 16

Chart shows age categories and the number of respondents who agree and disagree with gifitng

20 18 16 14 12 AGREE 10 DISAGREE 8 6 4 2 0 18 - 25 years 26 - 30 years 31 - 40 years 41 - 50 years 51 -years and above

KIN-BASED VOTING MODEL FOR EAST AREARE CONSTITUENCY

Having explained aspects of AreAre culture that persist in contemporary politics, I will now discuss voting behaviour among East AreAre constituents from past election data. I will relate this discussion to the cultural and rational choice argument as applicable to the case of East AreAre constituency. I have also formulated a model to help arrange the different voting behaviour into a meaningful whole. This is to align the theories and arguments discussed in chapter one and two to voting behaviour as obvious in past elections.

In the literatures on Melanesian political system, political behaviour has been explained either in the light of the cultural thesis or rational choice theory. Although the cultural argument has been right to a certain extent, it has promoted the distribution of wealth as the major factor affecting voter behaviour. The emphasis of gifting has therefore overshadowed other elements of socio-political organization that influence individual decisions. On the other hand, gifting (especially the response of recipients to gifts) is also explained by many as the result of economic reasoning and the fact that an individual will always choose to maximize benefit when he/she is offered incentive. While gifting has been seen by many as one of the factors influencing voting behaviour, there is little attempt made to distinguish between gifting within and gifting outside the kin group. This distinction is important in order to understand how the practice affects voter behaviour within and outside of the kin group.

Obviously, kinship has been the foundation of political organization in Solomon Islands, although it has received little attention from scholars. Again as Kabutaulaka asserts,

In elections the foundation for political support is kinship and tribal groups (p.133).

In contemporary AreAre (and Malaita) politics, the kin-centered alliances (rather than Bigman patronage networks) is used as a mechanism for political organization and

68 support at the constituency level. Here the build-up of supporters around a candidate is always formed along kinship lines and consolidated through gifting (see previous discussions). The ‘kin-centered alliance model’ (Figure 17) attempts to explain how kinship and gifting work together to influence political alliance and voting behaviour in the East AreAre constituency.

Figure 17 Kin-Based Voting Model

At the center of a political grouping is the candidate or aspiring leader (marked brown). The candidate has immediately around him, a group of kin or clan/tribal relatives making up GROUP A. In the case of the AreAre (or Malaitan) extended family concept (and arata), kin members could spread over two or more villages. The loyalty of this group is basically based on kin relationship and enhanced and consolidated by gifting or other interactive experiences. Where the candidate actively participates in social events (bride price payment, mortuary feasts etc.) within the kin group, the support base is likely to be broader and stronger. On the other hand, where a candidate fails to fulfill social obligations within kin group, the support base is likely to be smaller and weak. Events such as pride-prize payment, marriage ceremonies or communal projects are seen as obligations of kin group members.

Thus, while political alliance in this case is built on kinship, gifting enhances and consolidates this relationship (Gifts in this case must not be confused with patronage Bigman gifting because here everyone is obliged to give or participate and not necessarily the leader showering down gifts on followers).

The next level of alliance (GROUP B) comprises those who align themselves with candidates based on rational choice. In this case, the plural voting system heightens the need to make careful choices based on acquired information. Those who make up this group either have no closer kin candidate to align with or are for some reasons detached from their kin grouping. The decisions made by these individuals are economical and hence rational.

The third level of alliance GROUP C comprises people whose decision is based on ideology, party policy and beliefs. At times such alliance is religiously motivated (those who share religious belief) or attracted to a candidate’s qualification and work experience.

The fourth level of alliance GROUP D are the victims of what is commonly known as the ‘devil’s night’. These are voters who are won over into a camp a day or two or even few hours before election more often by been given money or materials. The majority of people within this group would likely be those who have little attachment within their kin group. Such alliance is unplanned and reflects little reasoning. Gifts given to this group are therefore very small amounts of cash and items and their numbers are always quite small.

FEATURES OF THE KIN-BASED VOTING MODEL

HOMEBOOTH POPULARITY

In the East AreAre Constituency, the kin-based alliance model is likely to be duplicated across the constituency with candidates having their groups of supporters around them. As such the model is likely to generate a voting pattern where a candidate would pick up most votes at polling stations within their kinship territories and less votes in further polling stations. The candidates with the biggest kin base support and consistent pockets of supporters across the constituency have high chances of winning an election. On the contrary, candidates who may have broad kin- based support but little support beyond their kin bases have slim chances of winning an election.

A study of the election data of 2006 and 2010 East AreAre elections shows voting behaviour that conforms to the kin based alliance model. The following chart (Figure 18) shows the four highest scores for the East AreAre 2006 Election with the different colours representing different candidates. As obvious across the constituency, a candidate would emerge from the rest at particular polling stations and then recede and or even disappear in polling stations further from his home. This pattern is repeated across the constituency.

Figure 18

2006 East AreAre Election-Top Four Candidates according to Polling Stations

300

250

200

150 Edward Huniehu Michael Ahikau 100 Dickson Warakohia 50 Abraham Namokari 0

The 2010 Election result (see next graph) also reflects a pattern similar to 2006 result although three new candidates are included in the top five. Interestingly, two candidates who remain from the previous election maintain a voter support similar to that in the previous election. The inclusion of new candidates does not alter the voter pattern obvious from the previous result and indicates an established voting behaviour.

Figure 19

2010 East AreAre Election- Five Highest Scores according to Polling Stations

350

300 Andrew Hanaria Keniasina 250 Alick Toki'I Ha'apio 200 Andrew Manepora'a 150 Abraham Namokari

100 Michael Ahikau

When we look at individual cases, each candidate has a kin-based territory where he would collect most of his votes. Support would then decline beyond this territory. Some candidates however have maintained small pockets of voters across the constituency. As stated above, chances of winning an election depends on the size of the kin-based support and the ability to in maintain small pockets of supporters across the constituency.

The following two charts focus on individual scores of the two candidates with the highest votes in the 2006 Election. Unlike other contestants, both candidates maintain consistent pockets of voters across the constituency which obviously sets them above the rest.

Figure 20

Vote Count per Polling Station for Edward Huniehu in 2006 Election 250

200

150

100 Number of Ballots Ballots Number of 50

Polling Stations

The kin-based support for Edward Huniehu stretches over five polling stations (Foulofo, Muki, Manawai, Tari’una and Honoa). He also maintains a consistent count of small pockets of supporters across the constituency and at Potani’u at the southern end where he has maternal ties. These small pockets of voters are key to winning the election accounting for about 30% of the total votes (882) he receives. Likewise, of the four highest scores, Edward Huniehu has the biggest kin-based votes (626).

The next chart shows the vote count for Michael Ahikau in the 2006 elections. The result also reflects a similar voting pattern although his kin based support only encompasses three polling stations (See Figure.21). His highest votes are collected at Masupa and Maniaha (which are his home polling booths) and also Potani’u (where he has maternal links). Like Edward Huniehu, Michael Ahikau also maintains consistent pockets of supporters across the constituency.

Figure 21

Vote count per polling station for Michael Ahikau in the 2006 Election

300

250

200

150

100 Number of Ballots 50

Polling Stations

While every candidate is likely to have the backing of their kin groups, the pockets of scattered voters always make the difference for winners. This is obvious when we compare the results for other candidates with that of Edward Huniehu and Michael Ahikau for the 2006 elections. For instance, Abraham Namokari’s result (ranked fourth) in the 2006 election result shows very little consistency beyond his kin-based territory. Although his kin support is quite substantial and encompasses four polling stations (Tawanaora, Potani’u, Hunanawa and Sawarokau), the lack of support beyond his kin-based territory means he could not compete with those who maintain consistent support across the constituency. See Figure 22.

Figure 22

Vote Count per Polling Station for Abraham Namokari in 2006 General Election 180 160 140 120 100 80

Number of Ballots Number of 60 40 20 0

Polling Station

Thus the election results, as presented above, tend more toward a kin-based rather than gift-influenced voting. The voting pattern indicates a strong kin-support base for candidates. Candidates who ran in 2006 election also maintained a similar (or better) voter support in 2010 election despite new candidates coming in.

KIN-BASED POLITICAL RIVALRY

In kin-based politics of East AreAre, although the competition on the surface belongs to candidates, it is really a competition between the kin-based political units. This is not to say that kin groups identify or choose candidates to run in elections. While sometimes this might be the case, usually initiatives to contest elections are those of individuals. But once a candidate indicates his or her wish to contest, kin members are likely or on many occasions are obliged to support him or her. This builds up the support base so essential for winning an election in East AreAre.

Considering that the kin based networks are very useful and often activated for collective political actions, the need to maintain good relationship within the kin group and remain part of the kin networks is still a priority for individuals. The kin- based co-operations that are important for hosting important social events can also be translated into political support for intending candidates. At most times, voters identify with those within the kin circle with whom they share ties and land and resource ownership. The solidarity and strong relationship within this group is often utilized for political support.

This is comparable to ‘identity politics’ where a group sharing a common identity or identifying with a common cause translates these similarities into political unity and support. The identity politics is a common phenomenon also found in developed states where people of similar races have the tendency to group together against opposing groups or parties. For instance, in a study of race and voting behaviour in the State of Atlanta in the United States, Charles S. Bullock (1984) notes that;

… When race is highly salient, voters consider no member of the opposite race preferable to a candidate of their own. In this situation, the proportion of the vote won by black candidates will be a linear combination of black turnout and the percent of the registered electorate which is black (Charles S. Bullock III, 1984:p. 239).

Likewise, in analyzing the Los Angeles 1969 mayoralty election, Joel Lieske and Jan William Hillard note that; Racial identity also appears to have been a decisive factor in the 1969 mayoralty election in Los Angeles.

While the kin based identity common in East AreAre politics is comparable to race politics or the politics of identity elsewhere, the basis for identity and unity in this case is the uruha ( both nuclear and extended family) or arata (clan or tribe). As evident during elections, when this kin identity is translated into political unity and support, what we have on the ground is a group of different kin groups competing against each other.

Also, the unity and support known within a kin group can be further divided between two or three candidates from the same group who run in elections. In such cases, the one who builds stronger bond with group members is likely to be favoured. Such was the case between two cousins Michael Ahikau and Jerry Haipora (not included in the above chart) in the 2006 East AreAre constituency seat. While both candidates shared the same home polling station and from the same kin group, their results were very contrasting. For instance, Michael Ahikau polled 247 voters at the Masupa polling station while Jerry Haipora polled only 10 votes at the same polling station (2006 Election Data). The result shows another dimension of kin-based voting where voters distinguish between candidates from the same kin grouping based on popularity within the kin group.

The internal rivalry as discussed above is often exploited by opposing candidates. In order to weaken the support of a strong contender, other candidates (and most especially the one who tries to retain the seat) are likely to assist another person from the same kin group to run against a kin member. While the internal division weakens a particular party, opposing groups capitalize on the division.

STRUGGLE OVER STATE RESOURCES

An upsurge in kin-based political rivalry in the past decade can be related to the frustrations over the unfair distributions of resources among constituents. Although there has been a tremendous increase in the state resources that are made available to the constituencies through the Member of Parliament, the biased distribution means that the majority misses out on these resources. Also, since support during elections is always the decisive factor for financial or material assistance, the distribution of resources (entrusted to parliamentarians) is likely to be selective considering only those who have pledged political support during elections. This has not only fueled frustration but has also seen an increase in the number of candidates who run in the elections as discontented groups try to remove current holders of the privileged position.

The nature of the kin-based politics is one of an economic struggle among kin groups over the access to and control of state resources. A dominant kin group that maintains political unity could hold on to power as long as kin alliance and other support bases are consolidated and maintained. This has been the case in the past decade and half where the late Edward Huniehu held the seat for four terms. The grip on power also means a grip on state resources accessible to the holder of this privileged position. Elections have therefore become economic competitions or struggles over state resources although this is fought along kinship lines.

The kin-based political and economic rivalry (which is not unique to East AreAre) is often heightened by the economic conditions in rural constituencies where public services are poor and there is little economic opportunity. As such, for supporters, winning an election may mean the payment of school fees, financial assistance or getting household needs and benefiting from project funding. For winning candidates, this could even be the beginning of new business endeavors that would not have been possible without coming to parliament.

So how much is at stake that warrants kin competition? In order to have a fair understanding of the nature and scale of the economic and political rivalry at the constituency level, one needs to get a picture of how much is available to the holder of the constituency seat. While the proceeding discussion is not meant to make a detailed financial analysis on some of the funds available to parliamentarians, the inclusion of figures here would help us get an idea of how much money parliamentarians have been getting and why constituency seats are quite attractive and are always competitive.

One of the major source of funding available to Members of Parliament is the well- known Rural Constituency Development Fund (RCDF) that has been made available to parliamentarians (and has also been misused) since its introduction in 1989 (known then as Solomon Islands Community and Provincial Special Assistance-SICOPSA) (Report on Constituency Development Funds Bill 2013). This particular fund has

79 been increased by about tenfold since 2007 from only SBD$600 000 to SBD$5 998 000 by 2013 putting a lot of public fund into the hands of Parliamentarians (see graph below). The lack of strict monitoring on spending and acquittal for the fund means that Parliamentarians can use it as they wish.

Figure 23

Increase of RCDF from 2007 to 2013 7000000

6000000

5000000

4000000 Increase of RCF 3000000 Amount in in SBD Amount 2000000

1000000

0 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

The Rural Constituency Development Fund is not the only funding available to parliamentarians. Other funds include the Rural Constituency Livelihood Fund (RCLF) that amounts to SBD$1.5 million per annum and SIG Support to Constituencies Development (SIGSCD) that amounts to SBD$1.08 million yearly. There are many other kinds of funding that are dispersed through line ministries and are also at the discretionary of the Member of Parliament. Parliamentarians and especially those who are in the government have also been accessing other government funding for infrastructure development and essential services. They (parliamentarians) do so by registering businesses and then applying for funding and while they use their positions to influence relative decisions. This has been the trend in the past decade and statistics has shown that parliamentarians are taking to properties and shipping as popular options for investment (see table on next page).

For instance, in 2012 the East AreAre constituency (under the leadership of Member of Parliament Andrew Manepora’a) also attempted to follow other constituencies by purchasing a vessel. The business prospect however did not eventuate when the government failed to allocate the necessary funds. Other constituencies that have already started shipping businesses are Small Malaita Shipping (Small Malaita Constituency) that was started during Alex Bartlett’s term in parliament and the Bikoi Shipping that was started during AugustineTaneko’s term in parliament. Steve Abana who is the current MP for Fataleka Constituency on Malaita has also started a shipping service during his time in parliament.

The ownership of these vessels purchased with constituency funds has been a major concern (and has been questioned in the past) because there are no government policies that regulates the approval of shipping projects involving purchase of vessels (Report on Constituency Development Funds Bill 2013). In more recent business endeavors, the total government spending for shipping grants from 2012 to 2014 amounted to SBD$36.6 million most of which had gone to Members of Parliament as grants for shipping projects (Report on Supplementary Appropriation Bill 2014, Island Sun, 29 August 2014). Similarly, the government allocation for constituency shipping projects in 2013 alone amounted to SBD$21.6 million. Although this funding was received in December 2013, most of the new vessels are yet to be purchased or the use of the funding explained. Indeed parliamentarians have shown little seriousness about acquitting and reporting on these funds. See table below.

Figure 24 Table showing government funding for shipping projects in 2013

(Report on the 2013 Supplementary Appropriation Bill 2014).

RECIPIENT ORDER DATE OF EXPLANATION CONSTITUENCY TOTAL PAYMENT SMALL MALAITA 3,000,000: 00 12/04/2013 Cost of vessel for Small Malaita RENNEL/BELONNA 2,600,000: 00 12/04/2013 2013 Shipping grant SOUTH VELALA 3,000,000: 00 12/20/2013 Cost of vessel for South VELA Vella shipping project EAST MAKIRA 3,000,000: 00 12/23/2013 Shipping grant

NORTH MALAITA 3,000,000: 00 12/31/2013 Purchase of vessel for North Malaita SAVO/RUSSEL 3,000,000: 00 12/31/2013 Transfer of remaining bal. from SIG Rural to NTF MALAITA OUTER 3,000,000: 00 12/31/2013 Purchase of new vessel for ISLANDS Malaita Outer Islands- shipping grant EAST 3,000,000: 00 12/31/2013 general maintenance and GUADALCANAL repair-MV Solomone EAST CENTRAL 700,000: 00 12/31/2013 Maintenance and repair- GUADALCANAL MV Kangava

The figures provided above indicate the financial packages that make constituency seats very attractive and often zealously contested. However, constituency funding and shipping projects as discussed above are but a fraction of the government spending for development and services. As earlier stated, there are numerous other sources that have been accessed by MPs and cronies. With so much at stake, parliamentarians use their positions to access these funding and use them for private investments and consolidating voter support.

Moreover, the need to amass resources calls for much of an MP’s time and energy. This in turn diverts attention away from their legislative role to that of the managers and distributors of constituency resources (and opportunists who await chances to extort public funds). This has shown in parliament meeting attendances over the last term. For instance, from 2010 to 2014, a portion of the House attended less than half of the parliament meetings for that term (Transparency International-Solomon Islands, www.islandsun.com.sb – 9th Sep, 2014). Obviously, financial return rather than parliamentary role has become the motivation not only for individual candidates to go into parliament but also to have the backing of their kin groups in the running for the constituency seat.

POLARIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS

From the outset, I have argued that most candidates bank on the support of kin folks to get into parliament. In this regard, the support and voting pattern in East AreAre politics also has a lot to do with resources distributions and financial assistances. The voting pattern and resource distribution go hand in hand and therefore polarize financial assistance and development projects throughout the constituency. Again, as highlighted in our earlier discussion of kin based support, gift giving that takes place within the kin group derives from the traditional gifting practice. Such gifting is based on biological and social ties and its purpose is to pool resources toward events hosted by kin members. In so doing, kin members do not only distribute the financial burden but also strengthen the relationships and bonds within the kin group.

Likewise, in modern politics members also pool their support or votes around a candidate. If the candidate wins the seat, he or she then reciprocates their support by allocating resources that are available to him or her. Given that resource distribution in the kin based polities is likely to reflect patterns of political support, it (resource distribution) will also be biased. For the unfortunates who often miss out on distribution of resource, the only option to get a piece of the pie is to have a candidate run in the election. This has been one of the reasons why a lot of candidates ran for the parliament seat in the past elections; they were representatives of discontented groups or factions.

Furthermore, since winning candidates are not independent actors but belong to the kin groups, failure to meet group expectations may also mean failure to return in the next election. This again has been the reason why Parliamentarians become hell-bent in accessing state owned resources and distributing it among supporters. This aspect of constituency politics accounts for a high incumbent turnover inherent in Solomon Islands politics.

As highlighted above, losing candidates and their groups would definitely be overlooked and miss out on resource distribution. This often results from the polarization of resources where resources and development projects are likely to be shared only among supporters. For example, if a candidate from the northern part of the constituency wins the seat, the distribution of most development projects and available resources is likely to be concentrated in that part of the constituency for that term. Resource distribution is therefore clearly defined by political support.

In the case of East AreAre constituency, the polarization of resources is clearly evident in the allocation of major development projects in the past. For example, the hydro-power projects built in East AreAre during the terms that Edward Huniehu held office (1991, 1993, 2001 and 2006) were concentrated in the northern end of the constituency, his main support area. The first hydro-power project was built at Manawai during Mr. Huniehu’s term from 1991-1996 (East AreAre Constituency Development Profile and Action Plan, 1999: p.16). Again three more hydro projects were built at Rae’ao, Nariao’a (polling station for Rae’ao is also Nariao'a) and Masupa (incomplete) during his terms from 1998 to 2009. When we compare the hydro-power project locations with the 2006 election result, it is obvious that all hydro-power projects (except that of Masupa; home to some of the strong contenders) were built in areas where he had strong kin and voter support. See the following graph. Note that locations of hydro-power projects are identified by red bars.

Figure 25

The graph shows 2006 Election result for Edward Huniehu. The lighter bars mark polling stations with hydro-power projects. Note that Rae’ao village shared the same polling station with Nariao’ and the two villages have hydro powers stations.

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In other projects (carried out under Project Development Unit-PDU) implemented during Edward Huniehu’s term from 1991 to 1996, a total of SBD$172 754 of project money was invested in Foulofo, Muki, Manawai and Rae’ao (all villages are at the northern end of the constituency). Likewise, projects implemented in the northern part of the constituency through the Development Bank of Solomon Islands (DBSI) within the same period 1991-1996 were valued at SBD$56 500. In contrast, projects implemented under PDU in the southern part of the constituency (Masupa, Rara) within the same period only amounted to SBD$28 393 (AreAre Development Plan, 1999) and a single furniture project that was funded at Masupa under the DBSI projects.

As obvious from the above data, most of the projects implemented during Edward Huniehu’s term in Parliament were concentrated in the northern part of the constituency (where his main support for elections was). Resource distribution in

East AreAre as such is tied to the pattern of political support where areas with strong voter support are likely to receive the bulk of available resource and funding.

IMPREGNABLE POLITICAL UNITS

I have argued that it is the identity based on kin membership that is often translated into political unity and support. The implication is that a kin-support base when intact (most probably maintained through strong interaction and gifting) proves impregnable. Hence a candidate with a broad and strong kin base is likely to hold on to the constituency seat for a long time. A case in point was Edward Huniehu who was elected in 1991, lost the seat for one term in 1997 and was re-elected in 2001 and then re-elected again in 2006 until his death in 2009. In the 2006 election data presented in the next chart, Huniehu’s estimated kin-based votes was 71% of the total votes4. His strong hold was at the northern end of the constituency (Manawai, Olomburi and Rae’ao Nariao’a and nearby polling stations). His maternal ties in the southern end also meant picking up considerable votes at the southern polling stations (Potani’u and Hunanawa). Similarly, kin based votes made up more than half of every candidates’ vote count (see Figure 26). As obvious from the chart, the size of the kin support base influences the overall standing of each candidate (except for the case of Abraham Namokari who had a broad kin based support but little support beyond the kin base territory).

4 In AreAre where land is tribally owned, people mostly settle where they are connected to the land (through genealogy or marriage). This is important to have access to farming grounds and resources. This also means that people at a particular polling station are mostly relatives belonging to the same arata or tribe (Note that villages and hence polling stations are located in tribal areas). Kin networks can also extend over two or three villages. When a candidate attracts votes at his home polling booth and nearby ones, these voters would be his relatives and in the case that voters are non-kin (such cases are quite rare), they are likely to act in the interest of their host or land owners.

Figure 26

The four top candidates in 2006 election with a distinction made between kin-based and non-kin votes for each candidate

1000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 Edward Huniehu Michael Ahikau Dickson Warakohia Abraham Namokari

Kin-based votes Non-kin votes

The next chart (Figure.27) shows similar information for 2010 election. It depicts the five top election scores and distinguishing between kin based votes and non-kin votes. The graph shows that only two candidates (Abraham Namokari and Michael Ahikau) remained from the previous election (2006). Both candidates also maintained a similar voter support pattern for the two (2006 and 2010) elections. In the case of Abraham Namokari, he had increased his kin based votes in 2010 elections although he still remained unpopular beyond his kin based territory. The kin bases however, remained largely unchanged despite candidates coming in and going out.

Figure 27

The 2010 election result for the five top candidates with a dstinction made between their kin-based votes and non-kin votes

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0 Andrew Hanaria Alick Toki Ha'apio Andrew Abraham Michael Ahikau Manepora'a Namokari kin-based votes" non kin votes

Also interesting was the vote count for Andrew Hanaria and Alick Ha’apio for the 2010 election. For both candidates, their election results differed to some extent from the typical East AreAre voting pattern. Unlike other candidates where the kin based votes would make up most of their vote count, both candidates seemed to collect considerable votes beyond the kin territory. In the case of Andrew Hanaria, he had worked hard through campaign managers to collect as many votes as he could beyond his kin territory. The absence of Edward Huniehu had also worked in his and other new comers’ favour as established voter strong holds scattered. Despite that, the kin based support was still his highest votes for polling stations.

Alick Ha’apio on the other hand ran under the banner of the former Member of Parliament as the endorsed candidate for replacement of Edward Huniehu. The strategy partly worked and saw him scoring the second highest in the election. While he did manage to collect votes from strong holds of the former parliamentarian, he did not command the same influence to see him win. Nonetheless, the strategy favoured

88 him as a strong candidate and won him considerable support across the constituency. His highest votes per polling station were still kin based though (refer to Figure 29).

Despite the variations highlighted above, the overall indication is that candidates maintain their following during each election likewise the voter support for each candidate is still largely made up of kin-based votes and secondly non kin votes that vary for each candidate. The kin-based votes are likely to remain the same in different elections although it has a tendency to decrease when popularity wanes and new competitors come in. Such was the case of Dickson Warakohia who had won the election in 1997 and declined to the third place in the 2001 and 2006 elections. The decline in his support could be attributed to the frustration among supporters who had received little assistance (in material and cash) from the Parliamentarian during his term. However, it is also important to know that Dickson Warakohia became Member of Parliament during the years of the internal conflict (1998-2003) when militants were squandering state resources and government revenue collection was at an all-time low.

The consistent voter build up around each candidate is also obvious when we look at the support for each candidate over the past elections. In another table of data on the next page, the total vote count for some of the most popular candidates who ran in elections are traced from 1992 bye-election to the 2010 election in order to compare and see the consistency in voter support for each candidate over the entire period.

Figure 28

Table showing election results for popular candidates from 1992 to 2010.

CANDIDATES 1992 1993 1997 2001 2006 2010

Edward Huniehu 558 909 570 804 882

Dickson Warakohia 678 719 489

Michael Ahikau 795 726 628

Abraham Namokari 497 792

Total Votes 1214 1753 2274 3585 3366 4611

Although the vote counts for each candidate fluctuated between elections, there was a degree of consistency for individual candidates over the entire period. Edward Huniehu for instance, maintained a consistent support in 1993 (909), 2001 (804) and 2006 (882). His decline in 1997 was due to the entrance of two strong candidates Andrew Hanaria and Dickson Warakohia who ran in the 1997 (the latter who won the 1997 election shared maternal link to where Edward Huniehu who had his strong kin based support at the northern end of the constituency). The increase in overall voter registration and turn out in 2001 had also seen both Dickson Warakohia and Edward Huniehu increase their votes in that election.

When we compare the overall voter turnout with the number of votes received by individual candidates we realize that although the overall voter turnout increased over subsequent elections, it did not significantly affect the vote count for each candidate. This was true for Edward Huniehu; the longest running candidate. Despite an overall voter increase (an increase of 280%) from 1993 to 2010, there was no such vote increase on the part of the candidate and indeed his average vote count for the entire period was 791 votes. Considering that his highest vote count was 909 and the lowest

90 was 570 for that period, the average of 791 indicates a very stable voter support from 1993 to 2006 (see Figure. 29).

Figure 29

Graph shows the total voter turnout since 1991 and elections results for Edward Huniehu up until the 2006 election.

1991 1993 1997 2001 2006 2010

Vote Count for Candidate Total Vote Turnout

The same can be said of Dickson Warakohia. He maintained consistent support for 1997 (678) and 2001 (719) elections until his support declined in 2006. Likewise, Michael Ahikau maintained consistent support for 2001 (795), 2006 (726) and 2010 (628) elections. Like Edward Huniehu (see above), the increase in overall voter turnout did not affect the vote count for Michael Ahikau in any significant way shown by an almost non-fluctuating blue line (see graph below). However, despite maintaining a consistent voter support up until 2010, his popularity was slowly waning as shown by the downward slope of the blue line.

Figure 30

Graph shows the total voter turnout since 2001 and elections results for Michael Ahikau from 2001 to 2010 election.

5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2001 2006 2010

Vote count for candidate Overall Voter turnout

The impregnable political grouping that characterizes East AreAre politics is also evident when we compare the results and voting pattern for the two candidates Abraham Namokari and Michael Ahikau who ran in the 2006 and 2010 elections. As obvious from the graph below showing Abraham Namokari’s election results, the pattern of support for both elections remained largely unchanged although his (Abraham Namokari’s) kin based votes increased dramatically in 2010. This increase could be attributed to an increase in voter registration in constituency for the year 2010 and also the absence of Edward Huniehu in that election. Although Andrew Hanaria collected considerable votes at Tawanaora and Potani’u polling stations (in 2010), vote count for Abraham Namokari in the southern polling stations still remain high (see Figure. 31).

Figure 31

The graph shows 2006 and 2010 Election results for Abraham Namokari. Note that the general voting pattern of kin based votes and isolated pockets of voters outside the kin bases is obvious in here. 350

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2006 Election Result 2010 Election Result

The consistent voter support and voting pattern is nowhere more obvious than in Michael Ahikau’s results for 2006 and 2010 elections. Except for a minor increase in the kin based votes and small variations beyond the kin territory, the support pattern for Michael Ahikau largely remained unchanged (see Figure.32). The consistency reflects maintained groups of voters, coming with him into each election. The core of this support group comprises kin-based votes. While additions or deductions were made at different elections, the core or kin support as well as the general voter behaviour remained largely unchanged.

Figure 32

The graph shows 2006 and 2010 Election results for Michael Ahikau. Note that voting pattern was similar for both elections.

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2006 Election Results 2010 Election Results

The analysis of the consistency of voter support and voter behaviour patterns point to the kin groupings and alliances as strong and impregnable. The pattern as observed from the graphs indicates that each candidate was able to maintain the same group of supporters each election.

CULTIVATING A VOTE BUYING CULTURE

Although the kin-based alliance model seems to minimize gifting in East AreAre politics, it has indeed cultivated a vote-buying culture. The dominance of impregnable kin-centered alliances built around every candidates makes winning an election very difficult. The best chance is to collect as many of the isolated voters by giving them financial or material incentive. Since every candidate would be competing for the loose voters, their value seems to increase in response to the

94 demand. A lot of these voters even put up their ballot on the voter market during the campaign period usually through power brokers or campaign managers.

Comparing the next two graphs, the 2010 results departed to certain extent from the typical voting pattern of East AreAre constituency in that the winner and the runner up collected a bigger portion of the votes outside the kin territory. For instance, the kin-based vote for the winner of 2006 election (Edward Huniehu) was almost 80% of his total votes. On the other hand, kin-based vote for the winner of the 2010 election has dropped to 63%. The case was the same for the runner up (Alick Ha’apio) of 2010 elections where 47% of his total votes were collected beyond the kin base.

Figure 33 The graphs show the top two candidates for 2006 and 2010 elections

1000 1200 1000 800 256 800 368 436 600 286 600 400 400 626 632 200 440 200 511

0 0 Edward Michael Andrew Alick Huniehu Ahikau Hanaria Ha'apio

Kin-based votes Non-kin votes kin-based votes non kin votes

The overall implication is that while the kin based politics is still strong and intact, the spaces beyond kin groups are open to the influences of gifting. Since every candidate would go in with the support of their kin groups, candidates need to secure support from voters beyond their kin territory. This they do by buying these scattered pockets of voters or where resources are not enough, they are given promises of future assistances. Having nothing to lose, these pockets of voters are likely to sell their votes to candidates who are willing to buy votes

The dominant view among voters is that the kin group, extended family and immediate family members will benefit from a winning candidate. Therefore, voters who are not aligned with kin candidates tend to demand payment for their votes before elections. Here, non-kin voters see the casting of votes for candidates (with whom they have no alliance) as paving a way for others to benefit. Hence, without the guarantee that they will benefit from their votes after election, the non-kin voters demand that the value of their ballot be given to them before election. This (among other reasons) has accounted for votes collected beyond kin territories.

As highlighted earlier in our discussion of the kin based voting model, there are usually some voters who for various reasons are disconnected from their kin groups. Being isolated, these voters pursue their individual goals rather than working with kin members toward a collective goal. In this case their choices are rational having no altruistic nature to it since the individual is making decisions outside of the confines of a collective goal. These isolated voters often put their ballots up for sale during the campaign period and more specifically the devil’s night. These isolated voters have also contributed to cultivation of a vote buying culture now becoming common in the East AreAre Constituency.

DUPLICATION OF KIN-BASED POLITICS BEYOND KIN BOUNDARIES

I have earlier mentioned that the key to winning elections in East AreAre is to maintain a consistent support across the constituency. This is where campaign managers or power brokers play an important role and election success depends on how well kin support is duplicated by campaign managers and influential supporters. In such cases, people indirectly support a non kin candidate through campaign managers or influential supporters. This practice accounts for the votes an MP collects outside his/her kin territories. The success of gifting beyond the kin territory is therefore dependent on campaign managers and influential individuals and how well they rally support from their kin or relatives. As earlier stated, without a foundational relationship, gifts are not binding.

In the 2014 East AreAre election, the results have reflected a good co-ordination of non-kin support by campaign managers and supporters. For example, Alick Ha’apio who ran in the 2010 election did not contest the 2014 but instead supported Andrew Hanaria. Alick Ha’apio’s influence in the northern part of the constituency played a key role in rallying support for Andrew Hanaria. Again, voters were not necessarily supporting Andrew Hanaria but had done so through their allegiance to Alick Ha’apio. Such support is again kin based, not built around the candidate but built around a campaign manager or an influential supporter. In the following graphs we can compare Andrew Hanaria’s 2014 election result for northern polling stations and Alick Ha’apio’s 2010 result for the same polling stations.

Figure 34

This chart shows Andrew Hanaria's polling station results in 2010 elections. The darker bars show the votes he received in the nothern part of the constituency. 250

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Figure 35

This chart shows Alick Ha'apio's vote count for 2010 election. The red bars show the votes he received in the nothern part of the constituency. 250

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Figure 36

The vote count for Andrew Hanaria in 2014 election. Note that his support pattern for the polling stations in the nothern part of the constituency resembled Ha'apio's 2010 election result.

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It is also interesting to see that Andrew Hanaria had maintained his 2010 kin based votes in the southern part of the constituency. This again proves the argument that kin

98 groups are quite hard to infiltrate by non kin candidates. With Ha’apio’s kin based votes making up for his unpopularity in the northern part of the constituency, Andrew Hanaria was able to put up a strong contest in the 2014 election.

2014 ELECTION AND A BREAKDOWN OF KIN POLITICS IN THE SOUTH

One of the most remarkable aspects of kin-based politics is its stability which can only be penetrated in the absence of a strong kin candidate. As obvious in past election results, kin networks were so stable that the support patterns for major candidates almost remained the same for two or three elections; a period of six to ten years. Such support patterns also did not change even with the inclusions of new candidates. See Figure.37 with results for candidates traced over a period of time and compared with the total voter registration of the constituency.

Figure 37

Voter support for Michael Ahikau over three elections from 2001-2010. Notice that the voter support remained almost the same over the period.

5000 4500 4000 3500 3000 2500 2000 1500 1000 500 0 2001 2006 2010

Vote count for candidate Overall Voter turnout

Figure 38

Voter support for Edward Huniehu over two decades. Note that the decline was in 1997 when he lost the seat. Otherwise he maintained an almost stable voter support base since 1993.

1991 1993 1997 2001 2006 2010 Vote Count for Candidate Total Vote Turnout

It is noticeable from both graphs that despite an increase in the total voter registration over the periods shown, the support for candidates remained relatively the same. This meant that candidates maintained their followings from one election to another. Also, despite many allegations of gifting during past elections, candidates picked up most votes at home polling stations and very little beyond that. As with rural constituencies, voting patterns do not reflect a response to gifting. Had this been the case, there would be uniform voter behaviour across all polling stations where voters would react to gifting.

Having said that, the practice may yield results where kin groups do not have strong candidates running in elections. That has been the case in the southern part of the East AreAre Constituency since the 2012 by-election. In the 2006 and 2010 elections, Abraham Namokari was the only contender in that part of the constituency and had commanded very strong support in the most southern polling stations (Sawarokau, Hunanawa and Potani’u) as far as Tawanaora polling station. As can be seen in Figure.39, his popularity was confined to this area and he had attracted little support beyond his kin base.

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Figure 39

2006 and 2010 election results for Abraham Namokari 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0

2006 Election Result 2010 Election Result

Since the 2012 by-election, the southern polling stations were without a kin candidate. With no one to associate with, the polling stations had opened up for non kin candidates mostly the current MP (Andrew Manepora’a) from the northern end (Manawai) of the constituency. This was obvious in the 2014 election where the incumbent MP (Andrew Manepora’a) had done well in the southern polling stations. This would not be possible had there been a kin candidate in that area. Indeed Andrew Manepora’a won the election because of the strong support in the southern polling stations. Compare his result for 2010 election (Figure.40) with his result for 2014 election (Figure.41) and see the differences with and without a kin candidate in the southern polling stations (Refer to Appendix III for the 2014 result).

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Figure 40

2010 election result for Andrew Manepora’a. Note his support in the southern polling stations when compared with 2014 election was very small.

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Figure 41

The 2014 election result for Andrew Manepora'a. Note his support in the southern polling stations (Tawanaora, Potani'u, Hunanawa and Sawarokau) increased dramatically.

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There are two things that are most obvious from the above graphs. Firstly the pattern of kin support (represented by blue bars) for Andrew Manepora’a in the northern polling stations for the two elections remained the same. He however had increased

102 his votes in these polling stations in the 2014 election mainly because of the absence of a kin competitor (Alick Ha’apio competed with him in 2010 election) in this part of the constituency. Secondly, his support in the southern polling stations increased dramatically from the previous election. This is a deviation from the typical kin based politics of East AreAre.

The 2014 election result and especially that of the southern polling stations strongly confirms the argument for kin based politics. This case however supports this argument from another dimension. Since political affiliations are kin based, the absence of a strong kin candidate means that kin groups/networks could open up for gifting and non kin candidates. In the case of the East AreAre southern polling stations, voters opted to support the incumbent MP mostly because of financial and material incentive and assistance. See picture below.

Figure 42 Andrew Manepora’a (front left) handing assistance to representatives of Tarapaina Parish where most of the voters in the southern polling stations are members.

Source: East AreAre Politics

Also, the change as seen here does not signal any major shift in the East AreAre constituency politics. As can be seen in the rest of the 2014 election result, the kin politics remained very much the same. For instance, kin support for Andrew

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Manepora’a in the northern polling stations did not differ much from his 2010 election result (see Figure 40 and 41). Likewise Andrew Hanaria had retained his kin support in the central and southern part of the constituency while his support in the northern polling stations increased because of Alick Ha’apio’s support. Edward Ronia and John Harunari (the other two contenders) also only picked up kin votes with little or nothing beyond kin territories. So except for the southern part that was without a kin candidate, the kin politics was still intact in the 2014 election (see Figure 43). This indicates that the support pattern will revert to the usual kin based affiliations if a strong kin candidate runs in the southern part in the next election (2018).

Figure 43

East AreAre 2014 election. Note that Edward Ronia and John Harunari very little votes beyond home polling stations.

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300 Andrew 250 Maneporaa Andrew Hanaria 200 Edward Ronia 150 100 50 0

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CONCLUSION

In discussing gifting in AreAre and Malaitan politics, there is a tendency to use common Bigman arguments to describe political behaviour in these contexts. While Malaitan societies do have a strong gifting tradition, the gifting practice is seldom a means on its own to gain political power and authority. In these contexts where leadership is hereditary and male agnates dominate leadership roles, gifting serves a more social purpose than a political one. Gifting therefore complements leadership and consolidates relationship between kin members through interaction. It is this aspect of traditional socio-political organization that persists in AreAre contemporary politics and influences political alliances and voting behaviour during elections.

Voting behaviour in AreAre constituency politics therefore reflects a kin based alliance in that kin groups pool their votes around a candidate (who also comes from the same kin group) during an election. These networks of kin based alliances are important for winning an election. However, this does not mean that kin based votes alone are sufficient to win elections. Since each candidate would go into elections with a kin based support, those who pick up consistent pockets of votes outside the kin territory are likely to win elections.

The kin based alliances are also impregnable being founded on biological and social ties and serving other purposes beside elections. Traditionally, such alliances are used for pooling of resources among members of a kin group especially toward hosting special events. In contemporary politics, the kin alliances are utilized for political support during elections. Moreover, in East AreAre, elections have taken on the nature of a struggle to control state owned resources. Since the struggle is between kin groups who back particular candidates, it is quite common for resource distribution among constituents to be biased and polarized (depending on who wins an election).

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CHAPTER FIVE

NEITHER KIN NOR GIFTS

I have stated right from the outset that social structure and organization plays a very important role in political behaviour. While in the preceding chapter I have discussed certain features of political participation and behaviour in the East AreAre constituency, these aspects of remote constituency politics cannot be posited across urban constituencies that have different social settings. In the urban context, factors that have been very influential in rural constituencies could be the least at work. For example, kinship or the use of kin networks for political support is absent in the urban setting.

In the absence of kin networks, churches and ethnicity have become important platforms for political alliance in urban constituencies such as East Honiara. Those from the same churches are likely to group together around a candidate with the same religious background. Likewise those from the same region or province are likely to pool support around candidates of the same region and province. Obviously, factors influencing political alliances and affiliations change according to context. As such, in order to have a general understanding of the gifting and political behaviour in the Solomon Islands, one can only compare extreme cases and draw conclusions from the differences and similarities. It is in this regard that I have selected East Honiara as a comparative case for East AreAre.

EAST HONIARA CONSTITUENCY

The city of Honiara started as an American military camp during World War Two. The purchase and settlement of the area by westerners however began as far back as 1886 when traders Thomas Garvin Keely, John Williams and Thomas Woodhouse acquired the land from Point Cruz to Tenaru from Uvothea of Lungga, Allea of Manago and his son Manungo for 60 pounds (Moore 2012, Encyclopedia of Solomon Islands). These areas were later leased to and remained under the lease agreements of

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Levers Pacific Plantations Limited until the Second World War when it became a site of fierce battles between the Japanese forces and the Americans (1942-1945).

The use of Honiara as a colonial administrative centre began in 1942 when Martin Clement (a protectorate officer) began sharing accommodation with allied forces at Lunga. Following World War Two and largely due to the devastation of Tulagi, the colonial government permanently moved their headquarters to Honiara in 1946. The location between Mataniko and Point Cruz was selected as the site for the new headquarter. At that time this area already accommodated buildings and other facilities built by the American forces.

The population of Honiara began to grow rapidly in the 1950s and by 1959 Honiara had 3, 534 residents. Both the European and the Chinese populations also increased within this period and by 1965, the European population had reached 635 and the Chinese population 414 (Moore 2012, Encyclopedia of Solomon Islands). The population of indigenous Solomon Islanders in Honiara also increased dramatically as a result of migration into what was becoming the capital of Solomon Islands. The bulk of the labourers working in Honiara at that time was drawn from Malaita, a trend that was to continue into independence and has been the root of anti-Malaitan sentiment on Guadalcanal.

The population of the new capital also increased due to migrants seeking medical and better education opportunities in Honiara. It was now getting common for relatives who sought medical assistance or better education in Honiara to settle with family or extended family members who resided there. To accommodate the ever increasing population of Honiara, the government began building housing estates inland. The Vura Housing Estate for instance was among the government estates that were started in the late 1960s. Other housing estates were later developed at Tuvaruhu, Vara Creek, Mbokonavera and other areas as the town boundary was extended (Moore 2012, Encyclopedia of Solomon Islands).

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Squatting was by now becoming a problem due mainly to inadequate housing or as an appealing option for low wage earners. In the former case, although employers provided accommodations for workers, these were often inadequate for family members and relatives who joined them. For instance, there were a lot of employees who were given single quarters and having brought in their families, these accommodations became inadequate. Many therefore opted to build temporary, semi-permanent or even permanent houses beyond the town boundaries to accommodate their large families.

People also opted to live in the squatter settlements in order to have enough space for gardening as the little wages paid by employers were often not enough to support bigger families in town. Those who settled in ‘squatters’ therefore lived a semi-rural and urban life going back and forth between wage earning and crops and vegetable farming during free times to complement supplies obtained from shops. The rapid expansion of these squatter settlements was also spurred by the introduction of the Temporary Occupation Leases (TOL) that allowed occupants to pay a small amount of money as rent.

Major ‘squatters’5 that sprang up on the town boundaries reflected the origins of the first occupants, having being named after the home villages back on other islands or carrying names in languages of the pioneers. On the eastern part of the town, squatter settlements like Matariu, Fulisango and Feraladoa tell much about the Malaitan occupants who first settled in these areas. Although migrants from other islands could also be found within these squatter settlements, the population was predominantly Malaitans. This has been a major factor influencing election outcomes up to today.

5 Informal or unregulated settlements in Honiara are commonly known as ‘squatters’. Mostly found on the town boundary, they also offer very good accommodations. The land titles in this area are mostly held on a temporary basis although title holders can apply to formally acquire the title of the area occupied.

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POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THE HONIARA CONSTITUENCIES

The preparation for independence brought about the restructuring of the government and the inclusion of indigenous Solomon Islanders in the Executive and Legislative Council (ELC), the Governing Council (GC) (1970) and the Legislative Assembly (LA) in 1974. Honiara being host to most of government institutions became the capital of the British Solomon Islands Protectorate (BSIP). The capital was also given a representative seat in the Executive and Legislative Council, the Governing Council and later in the Legislative Assembly.

In 1967 when the first direct election was held, the Honiara seat was contested by three candidates and the election was won by William Ramsay, Manager of the BSIP Ports Authority at that time (Moore 2012, Encyclopedia of Solomon Islands). The 1970 election was again contested by three candidates and Peter.J.Salaka won the seat with 57% of the total votes cast (Wood 2012, Solomon Islands Election Results).

The 1973 election saw a 100 percent increase in candidacy with a total of 6 candidates running for the Honiara seat. Despite the doubling of candidates contesting the election that year, the number of voters only increased by 17 percent from the previous election. The sitting Member of the Legislative Assembly, Peter Salaka lost the seat to Ashley Wickham who won with 54 percent of the total votes.

A more important change took place in 1976 election. The Honiara town was divided into two constituencies namely the East and West Honiara. This was probably done for administrative purposes as the total voter turnout remained almost the same for 1973 and 1976 elections. The total voters for 1973 election was 1882 while the total for the 1976 election for both constituencies was 1974 voters, an increase of only 92 voters. The West Honiara Constituency seat was contested by four candidates that year and Nathan Wate won the seat with 30 percent of the total votes. The East

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Honiara Constituency seat was contested by three candidates and Bartholomew Ulufa’alu won the seat with 60 percent of the total votes cast.

In contrast, the 1980 election saw a dramatic increase in voter registration and turnout for both constituencies. For instance, the total vote cast for East Honiara constituency was 1492, an increase of 48 percent. The West Honiara constituency seat also saw an increase in voter turnout from just 972 in 1976 to 1687 voters in 1980, an increase of more than 73 percent. A total of 3179 votes were cast in 1980, an increase of 1205 votes from the previous election.

The increases in voter registrations over subsequent elections reflected the increasing migrations into Honiara. Squatter settlements expanded quickly as more people sought better health, education and employment opportunities in Honiara. By 1997, Honiara was further divided into three constituencies with a total of 11102 voters casting votes in the three constituencies that year, a significant increase since the election in 1967. Thirteen years later in 2010, a total of 24505 people voted in the election, again more than a 100 percent increase since 1997. See chart below.

Figure 44

Number of voters per election year for Honiara since 1967

30000

25000

20000

15000

10000 Number of Voters

5000

0 1967 1970 1973 1976 1980 1984 1989 1993 1997 2001 2006 2010

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VOTING POPULATION AND SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

Large portions of the voting population in the East Honiara constituency live within the squatter settlements on the town boundary. These settlements are predominantly Malaitan and bear names such as Matariu (which is Malaitan and also one of the first settlements on the town boundary), Feraladoa (fera being house or home and ladoa meaning being stacked in Malaitan languages) and Fulisango (named after a village in Central Malaita) and therefore reflecting the origins of those who first settled in these areas. On the most eastern end there are also Malaitan settlements such as Lau Valley (predominantly Lau people from Malaita) or other settlements made up of settlers from other parts of Malaita. Similarly new settlements of Malaitans, mostly those who were displaced during the ‘ethnic tension’ also sprang up in the most eastern end of Honiara especially on land that was once under the lease titles held by Levers Plantations Limited.

It is also important to note that although squatter settlements in Honiara take the label ‘squatters’ probably because they are unregulated settlements, some (if not all) of these squatters also offer very good accommodation. In fact a lot of accommodations within the squatter settlements is of the same quality as those in the suburbs or even better. This means that employees (both high and middle wage earners) especially those in the private sectors also rent accommodations within these settlements (note that government workers only rent accommodation where landlords hold proper land and property titles). There are others who reside within these settlements who commute to work daily. Although dominated by Malaitans, the settlements also attract a mixture of people from other parts of the country.

Given the vastness of squatter settlements in East Honiara and the dominance of Malaitan populations within the settlements, a large portion of the voting population would also be squatter dwellers and Malaitans. On the other hand, the suburbs; mostly Vura, Naha, Kukum and East Kolaridge area have a mixed population with

111 people from different parts of the country living within these areas either in rented accommodations or their own homes.

RURAL AND URBAN EXPERIENCES AND CONSEQUENT POLITICAL CULTURE

Before analyzing the results of the survey, I will briefly discuss two different experiences that largely affect the way people see the politics and the government which in turn influences how they behave politically. These experiences, which are relevant for explaining political behaviour in East Honiara (and rural constituencies), relate to the centralized political system Solomon Islanders have adopted and how they have been governed under that system. In a way these experiences have formed two distinctive ‘political cultures’ although the definition of the concept here differs to an extent from the concept of ‘political culture’ as defined by Almond, Verba and others (Almond and Verba, 1986: p.13, Elazar, 1970: p.8).

According to Almond, political culture is ‘the pattern or individual attitudes toward politics’; a definition he later modified with Verba to accommodate 'particular distribution of patterns of orientation toward political objects among members of the nation' (1986: p.13). Another definition by Daniel Elazar sees political culture as "the particular pattern of orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded" (1970: p.109). Political scientists therefore generally agree that the concept of political culture refers to the ‘norms and values that relate to a political system’.

Moreover, since political systems, cultures and factors affecting politics differ from place to place, every society can be said to have its distinctive political culture shaped by different circumstances and experiences. For instance, the circumstances around the development of American political cultures were very different to those of third world countries. As argued by Elazar, American political cultures are said to be product of migrations in that each migrating group had its own ethnic identity,

112 religious practices and cultural values (J. Elazar, 1970, Morgan and Watson, 1991, p.33).

In Solomon Islands, the rural and the urban contexts offer two different experiences for citizens. For those in the rural constituency, the isolation from the activities of the central government characterizes their experience. As Geoffrey White (2007) rightly states,

It is arguable that the region’s newly independent governments never succeeded in establishing a strong presence in rural communities (White, 2007: p. 4).

Since the government is only active and its presence felt mostly in the urban centers, the individual in the rural area is unaware and knows little of the operations of the government of the day. To him or her, the central government is something that exists in the capital city with little relevance to his/her life.

In addition, having been detached from a central government, the Member of Parliament plays a more important role in the life of the individual. The performance of an MP thus becomes the performance of the government but measured mostly by his/her participation in the affairs and needs of the kin and support groups. So as long as the MP actively participates in the rural kin networks and support bases, the government is judged as alright. Moreover those who are outside the kin groups and support bases have a far worse experience than those within given that they are likely to miss out on resource distribution. In this view of government, politics is simplified to a personal relationship and connection to the MP.

So basically, in the ‘rural culture’, voters being isolated from the central government understand the government more through the participation of an MP in local kin networks and related activities. His/her plans and actions center more on the needs and activities of kin groups and support bases than fulfilling his constituency (neglecting the rest of the constituency to concentrate on support bases) as well as national duties. In the ‘rural culture’ the MP is seen as a connection between local kin networks and government resources.

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The experience of the urban voter or constituent differs in some ways from that of the rural constituent. In some ways the urban individual is immediately affected by the policies and the operations of the government of the day. Unlike the rural constituent who sees the performance of the government through the participation and activities of the individual MP, the urban constituent tends to relate his or her experiences to the decisions and policies of the government. This is because the general performance by the government especially in public service delivery will be felt by everyone, whether you are a supporter or non-supporter of the MP. However, this does not mean that the urban constituent (who is a supporter of the MP) is likely to condemn the MP for poor performance. Since he/she may be benefiting from the personal relationship and connections with the MP, the individual is more likely to isolate the performance of the government from that of the MP and criticisms are likely to be targeted at the government rather than the individual MP. As it is in the rural culture, the MP also becomes the link between the ethnic groups, churches and provincial factions and the government resource pools.

Both the ‘rural and urban cultures’ described above have one thing in common. In both cultures the performance of the MP is assessed by voters not on how he/she is performs parliamentary roles but how he/she maintains relationship with voters and support groups. This kind of relationship (between the voters, MP and Government) has aspects of what Daniel Elezar calls the ‘individualistic culture’. In his study of political culture and American societies, Elezar describes politics as a market place and political participation is about pursuing personal goals. As Virginie D. Mamadouh (1997, p.18) describes it;

According to the individualistic political culture, the democratic order is a marketplace. Private concerns are emphasized. Community intervention is limited. Government is restricted to the necessary activities that make the marketplace work. Political participation is about private interest. Politics is a business. Political parties serve as 'business corporations' coordinating individual enterprise in the political arena. Politicians are interested in office as a means of controlling the distribution of favours and rewards of government. Politicians are professionals, committed to 'giving the public what they want.

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Likewise, in the ‘rural and urban culture’ of Solomon Islands, the interest of voters also dominates the political agenda of MPs. However, in this context, the business- like relationship and interactions, takes place within pre-existing structures or institutions such as the kin, church or ethnic groups. Outside of these pre-existing networks, there is little or no business at all between the MP and voters. Therefore only those within these networks are likely to benefit from an MP’s term in parliament (refer to my discussion in chapter five on polarized resource distribution). Moreover, even if an MP decides to extend relationships and interactions beyond these networks (kin, churches, ethnic groups etc.), at most times this often fails to develop into sustainable relationships that will benefit the political aspirations of an MP. This makes it even harder for MPs to invest resource in relationships that yield little returns especially for the next election.

Overall, the roles of MPs are similar to Mamoudah’s description of politicians in the ‘individualistic culture’ above where politicians act as distributors of resources. Being the link between government resource pools and the networks he or she is part of, the MP’s time in parliament is spent harnessing resources and whatever he/she could lay hands on and channeling it back into these networks and support bases. This definitely draws away an MP’s attention from his/her national duties and roles. However, the more efficiently they do that, the more likely they will retain their seats in the next election.

SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS IN EAST HONIARA

At the end of 2012 I conducted a survey on gifting in East Honiara constituency. The survey was aimed at finding out how the East Honiara constituents perceive or understand gift-giving practices during elections or a parliamentarian’s term in office. A hundred questionnaires were analyzed and the data used to draw conclusions about the view and political behaviour of the East Honiara constituents. These data were also compared with election results to make sense of the affiliations to different factions within the voting population.

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A similar questionnaire as the one used for East AreAre rural constituency in Malaita was used to get the view of constituents in this urban setting. A portion of the survey was conducted in the suburbs mainly in the Naha and Vura areas and another part of it was spread over the squatter settlements. The analysis therefore reflects an overall finding of the different sections within the voting population in East Honiara. It must also be noted that a lot of respondents who held various jobs and were interviewed lived in rented or their own accommodations in the squatter areas. It is not surprising therefore to find that the majority of the respondents in East Honiara were employed and have had formal education beyond primary school. See next chart.

Figure 45

RESPONDENTS ACCORDING TO THE HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINED

PRIMARY SCHOOL SECONDARY SCHOOL TERTIARY EDUCATION

32.6% 34.8%

32.6%

PERCEPTION OF GIFTING IN EAST HONIARA

Of the hundred questionnaires analyzed for East Honiara, there was a strong indication that education and information may have had a significant influence on those who condemned the gifting practice. In the survey, respondents could either agree or disagree with the gifting practice. During analysis, these answers were checked against respondents’ answers to related questions that sought to find out their understanding about the roles of MPs and laws banning gifting during elections. For instance, out of the 54 respondents who disagreed, 94.4 percent admitted knowing about electoral laws banning gifting during elections. A further 92.5 percent (of

116 these) also saw the practice as corrupt and illegal. So for those who disagreed with the practice in the case of East Honiara, there was strong evidence that this had resulted from acquired knowledge and information about the electoral processes and roles of MPs.

On the other hand, the impact of knowledge and information on the 46 respondents (in East Honiara) who agreed with the gifting practice was quite the opposite. For instance, out of the 46 respondents, 40 or 87 percent admitted knowing about electoral laws banning the gifting practice. Yet 93.4 percent of these respondents saw the gifting as legal and acceptable. Those who agreed were therefore assumed to have maintained a traditional view of the practice despite having adequate knowledge about gifting and its tendency to violate electoral laws and processes. This was further evident in the 71.7 percent who saw gifting as a responsibility of an MP; thus comparing parliamentary roles to that of traditional leaders in local leadership structures.

In the case of Honiara, there is also a tendency for people with higher education to condemn the practice than those who dropped out of primary school. For example, of the 76 respondents who attained secondary and tertiary education, 46 or 60.5 percent of them condemned the practice of gifting. On the other hand, of the 24 respondents that dropped out at primary school, 16 agreed (and 8 disagreed) with the practice seeing it as acceptable. That was 66.6 percent of those who dropped out at primary school. Obviously, there was a co-relation between the level of education and the number of people who agreed or disagreed with the gifting practice. The data as analyzed assumes that knowledge and information could have been one of the reasons why more of those who have attained secondary and tertiary education tend to condemn the practice in East Honiara Constituency. See Figure 46 on the next page.

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Figure 46

East Honiara respondents agreeing and disagreeing with gifting arranged according to the highest education attained.

HIGHEST EDUCATION ATTAINED AGREE DISAGREE TOTAL

PRIMARY SCHOOL 16 8 24

SECONDARY SCHOOL 16 22 38

TERTIARY 14 24 38

TOTAL 46 54 100

Having said that, how do we explain the varying impacts of acquired knowledge and information in both constituencies? Why did the more informed portion of East AreAre Constituency respond differently to their counterparts in East Honiara? Is there an overarching factor that determines the impact of information and knowledge on perception in these two different contexts? In the light of these questions, it is obvious that the impact of education on popular view is relative to political culture or is further dependent on political cultures (as described in the ‘rural’ and ‘urban culture’). Mehran Kamrava has argued that,

...the formulative role of political culture in shaping popular views and sentiments regarding the political process cannot be overlooked (1995: p.695).

The relationship between acquired information/knowledge and political culture is obvious when we compare the survey result for East AreAre with that of East Honiara (See the graph below). In East AreAre constituency, 44 of the 65 respondents have attained secondary or tertiary education yet 68 percent of them saw the practice as legal and acceptable. Moreover, 57 percent of the total respondents in East AreAre claimed to have been aware of electoral laws banning gifting. A further 73.8 percent

118 admitted to knowing the roles of MPs (these roles were stated in questionnaire). The majority of respondents in these two categories had therefore maintained a traditional view of leadership despite having adequate knowledge to distinguish between parliamentary role of MPs and responsibilities of traditional leaders. This view of gifting is also common among East Honiara respondents. Although a bigger portion of those who attained secondary and tertiary education in East Honiara condemned the practice, a still significant number of respondents saw the practice as acceptable.

The best way to understand the impact of education and acquired information on responses in both constituencies is therefore to see education and knowledge/information against the broader context of political culture. In this regard, although education has become an important factor that shapes popular views, its effect on the way people view gifting or politics vary according to their experiences. Where constituents are detached from the central government and the individual is largely unaware of government operations and policies and decisions (as in the case of East AreAre), acquired knowledge and information would have had little effect on those who maintain a traditional view of gifting (due their upbringing and political experiences).

On the other hand, where people experience on daily basis consequences of government policies and decisions, acquired knowledge and information could be instrumental in shaping their views or political behaviour. The influence of education on the individual perception therefore depends on one’s experiences and understanding of the political system (political culture). This explains the reason why people in the same constituency could view gifting differently (mostly based on individual experiences and understanding of the political system).

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Figure 47

Chart showing level of education and the constituents who agree and disagree with gifting in East AreAre

18 16 14 12

10 AGREE 8 DISAGREE 6 Number of Respondents 4 2 0 PRIMARY SCHOOL SECONDARY SCHOOL TERTIARY EDUCATION

Figure 48

Chart showing level of education attained and respondents who agree and disagree with gifting in East Honiara

15 AGREE DISAGREE 10

0 PRIMARY SCHOOL SECONDARY SCHOOL TERTIARY SCHOOL

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS - EAST HONIARA VS EAST AREARE

In comparing the responses to questionnaires in East Honiara and East AreAre, we note that an area of difference includes the increase in the choice of religion or denomination as a factor for choosing a candidate in the East Honiara constituency. In East AreAre, only 12.5 percent of respondents admitted considering religion or denomination as a factor for consideration. On the other hand, 36 percent of the East Honiara respondents admitted considering religion or denomination when choosing a candidate, a factor that has been reflected in past election results.

There is also a difference in people’s view of kin support during elections. In East AreAre almost 60 percent of the respondents admitted considering kin relation as a factor for choosing a candidate while only 30 percent of the East Honiara respondents agreed with kin relation as a factor for choosing an election. In the case of East AreAre, this may not necessarily mean that respondents had voted for kin candidates in past elections. Rather it reflects a dominant perception among voters especially in seeing kin relationship as an important part of the individual’s life. By contrast, in East Honiara, there is a tendency for voters to substitute ethnicity (those coming in from the same island province) for kin relationship which is often absent in the urban setting.

An obvious similarity in both constituencies is the choice of qualification as a popular factor for choosing a candidate. In East AreAre, 64 percent of the respondents saw qualification as an important factor to consider when choosing a candidate and likewise in East Honiara 77 percent. I have stressed in my discussion of East AreAre (Chapter Four) that since the candidates running may have attained tertiary qualification (many being well qualified), respondents although they have made choices based on other factors (mostly kin relation) are likely to say they have also considered education as part of their choice. Likewise, respondents always pick on qualification as a factor for consideration most probably because it adds credibility to their choices.

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Figure 49

Factors affecting voter behaviour in East Honiara

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

VOTING BEHAVIOUR IN EAST HONIARA

Having discussed popular views regarding gift giving practice in East Honiara, I will now discuss voting behaviour as evident in the constituency over past elections. I expected East Honiara being an urban constituency to be different from rural constituencies (and in particular East AreAre) especially with voting behaviour during elections. This assumption was based on the fact that most of the urban communities are a mixture of people from different ethnic and cultural backgrounds who either work or settle in Honiara. The absence of close family or tribal bond (which is often seen as the basis for political affiliation in the rural Solomon Islands) was anticipated to give way to gift giving (rational behaviour) as a reason for political affiliation and grouping.

However, election and empirical data revealed that other factors have also been very influential in shaping voting behaviour in East Honiara. Where kinship ties are

122 missing, people find other common grounds for alliance. Two very popular platforms for alliance are religion and ethnicity. The former manifests more in the form of Christian denominations especially those with big congregations in the eastern part of the city. The latter on the other hand manifests along language groups and in some areas those who come from the same province. So although in my opening argument (discussed in Chapter One) gifting was expected to play an important part in shaping voter behaviour in East Honiara, other factors have emerged as also very influential and warrant discussion.

POLITICAL GROUPS IN EAST HONIARA CONSTITUENCY

Since alliances and affiliations in urban constituencies are influenced by many factors, it is quite hard to attribute political behaviour to a particular factor. However, it is clear that political groupings in East Honiara are likely to form along the needs of the different factions within the voting population; church groups and congregations, ethnic groups (mostly people from different regions of an island province or people coming from the same province) and those who support sound policies and ideologies.

There is also a tendency for many of these factors to overlap in a support group. For instance, while people of a particular church denomination may have supported a candidate, the majority of these supporters could also be from the same region of an island or the same province. Again in the East Honiara Constituency, it is quite difficult to attribute the support given a candidate to a particular factor since he/she may have attracted votes from different sections within a voting population based on different things.

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NEEDS AND GROUPING IN SQUATTER SETTLEMENTS

One of the factors that have been influencing voting behaviour in East Honiara is the needs of the different sections of the constituency. Voters often group and align with those who have the same needs or interest. This is common among squatter dwellers given that most settlements were unplanned and often lacking some of the basic services like piped water, electricity or proper road access. While the needs of different communities may vary, I have included a few here to give an idea of various needs that often influence political affiliation and alliance in East Honiara.

One of the major needs of squatter settlements is better road access from the main roads. Some of these access roads (and even paths) include steep concrete stairs from the main roads that run along the ridges to the settlements in the valleys. This has been used by candidates to lure support during elections and mainly to attract group votes from these areas. Some of the candidates who ran in past elections had promised to build accesses to the squatter settlements in East Honiara, in particular Feraladoa, Fulisango and surrounding areas.

Further east along the Border areas, piped water has been the major campaign bait. Voters within this area had supported candidates in past elections hoping they would address the water need in this area. Candidates had promised to get water piped to the area or give other alternatives such as water tanks. Despite so many promises been made to address this particular need, the water problem in this area still remain unsolved and will continue to be utilized by politicians during campaigns.

Another lure that has been used and has attracted support from voters in squatter settlements is the promise by candidates to liaise with responsible authorities to transfer land titles to individuals who own houses in these areas. Given that all land in the squatter areas are held on temporary leases (Temporary Land Ownership-TLO), this particular issue and the promise of land title transfers appeals to all individuals

124 who own homes and properties in these areas. As opposed to the different needs of various sections of the community that could be pursued collectively, this particular promise is aimed at getting the support of individual voters and had been a major reason for affiliations with candidates in past elections.

Moreover, different factors affecting political behaviour could also overlap. For instance, people from one part of Malaita (e.g. either Kwara’ae or Lau) could reside together in a particular squatter settlement, all of whom could be from the same denomination and they could also share the same needs. Settlements like Lau Valley; mostly Lau people from Malaita and the majority likely to be from the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) or Kobito; mostly Kwara’ae from Malaita and majority likely to be from South Seas Evangelical Church (SSEC) have these overlapping aspects. In such cases, one would find all these factors influencing the decisions and voting behaviour of people.

CHURCH AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION IN EAST HONIARA

Voters in East Honiara and more generally Solomon Islands (and some rural constituencies) also align along religious lines. In a country where the population is predominantly Christian, religious affiliations manifest more along the different Christian denominations. If a person of a particular Christian denomination stands as a candidate, he/she may attract the support of voters of the same Christian background. In some constituencies, candidates are elected sorely based on the church they belong to.

Before making an in-depth analysis of religious affiliations in East Honiara politics, I will briefly discuss similar but more advanced examples of religious affiliations in developed countries as well as Solomon Islands just to put the East Honiara case into perspective. Religious affiliations in East Honiara politics is similar to religious affiliations found in politics elsewhere except that in this case, it happens among

125 various Christian factions or denominations. It is similar in that voters of the same Christian denomination pool support around candidates who hold the same religious beliefs. In the United States for instance, Catholics make up about twenty five percent of the voting population and have played an important part in American politics. The 2011 statistics show that the US House of Representatives and the Senate had a significant number of Catholics and they eclipsed others in both houses standing at 132 and 24 respectively (William D’Antonia, 2011, http://ncronline.org. Oct. 24, 2011). Studies also show that Republicans are more religious than Democrats and are likely to attract more support from the Catholic voters than the latter. A major argument for this has to do with the support of Republicans to uphold core morals that centers on human sexuality and family life.

Similarly, religious affiliation in Solomon Islands politics (and in particular East Honiara) has also been ideological with voters supporting candidates who share the same religious beliefs and values. Religious affiliations of this nature are more common at the constituency level and in some cases it surpasses other forms of political affiliations. Candidates are often prominent church leaders or candidates that are backed by well-known church figures. The support of this nature is likely to cover congregations of the same denomination over a large area and could be very influential in determining election outcomes.

An advanced example of religious affiliation could be found in the North New Georgia constituency of Western Province. Although this is a remote constituency, political affiliation in this area is solely church based and done within the Christian Fellowship Church (CFC). Job Dudley Tausinga who is the son of the founder of CFC had been the Member of Parliament for this constituency since 1984 only to be ousted in the 2014 election. His defeat resulted from a withdrawal of religious support resulting from his excommunication from the church.

In the North Malaita Constituency, Reverend Michael Maeliau who is a dominant South Seas Evangelical Church (SSEC) leader in that region had also drawn support

126 from his congregations in past elections. In the 1993 election, he won the North Malaita seat and although he failed to secure the seat in the two elections that followed and had stopped contesting, he still maintains his influence in the area. This was evident when he returned to politics in 2014 as a Malaita Provincial Assembly member winning one of the ward seats in North Malaita.

Reverend Maeliau was able to draw support from members of what is called the ‘estates’, a term used for a communal business venture he initiated in the SSEC communities under his influence within the constituency. Although the business initiative is an important part of the communal setup, the foundation of the ‘estate’ is ideological. That is, members of the estate are also followers of Maeliau’s teaching which is not accepted by mainstream SSEC. In politics, members of the ‘estates’, become his supporters.

In East Honiara, although religious affiliations are maintained along denominational lines, candidates do not have direct control over the various church congregations within the constituency as in the cases described above. In the above examples, since voters are members of establishments initiated by the candidate or those close to him, support in this case has the nature of voter coercion. In contrast, religious affiliations in East Honiara are much freer with congregations having more freedom to choose their preferred candidates. The trend however is that, voters often align with candidates of the same religious background.

Two factors are also important for understanding religious affiliations in East Honiara. Firstly, the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) and the South Seas Evangelical Fellowship (SSEC) have big congregations in this part of the city. This means that their support could be significant for a win in the constituency elections. Secondly, these congregations are concentrated in large settlements especially on the town boundary. This also means that they can make collective choices on who to support in an election.

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In past elections, evidence and electoral data show that political affiliation around major candidates in East Honiara was also partly church based although voters also attracted votes based on ethnicity, sound policies and other factors. While the SSEC support may be insignificant, isolated and not very obvious, the SDA support for candidates of the same denominations was significant, well-coordinated and had been crucial for major election victories in the past. For instance, since 1984, the only candidate from other denominations to have won the Honiara Constituency seat was late Bartholomew Ulufa’alu (1989 election) who was a Catholic. The rest were candidates who had the backing of SDA congregations within East Honiara Constituency. The list includes John Maetia Kaluae, Charles Dausabea, Simeon Bouro and Douglas Ete.

Even in recent elections, the support of SDA voters for candidates of the same religious background was obvious. In the graph below, vote counts for the five highest candidates for East Honiara in 2006 (2006 election was chosen because polling stations were labeled) were graphed for polling stations located among big congregations of SDA and SSEC voters. It must be noted that even though not all voters in these polling stations were members of either SDA or SSEC, the majority of voters within the vicinities of these polling stations definitely belonged to either church. For instance, most voters who cast their votes at the Kukum SDA Primary School belonged to the Fishing Village across the road who were also members of the Kukum SDA Church or SDA members who lived around Kukum and nearby residential area. Likewise, Kukum SSEC polling station also accommodated SSEC congregation and SSEC voters within the Kukum residential areas. The same could be said of the other two polling stations.

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Figure 50

Vote count for the following candidates at church polling stations

350

300

250 FULISANGO SSEC 200 SSEC KUKUM 150 LAU VALLEY SDA

100 KUKUM SDA

NUMBER OF NUMBER VOTES 50

0 DAUSABEA BOURO RONIA MANIMU DONGA CANDIDATES

Although the above scores were only part of the overall result, they undoubtedly show the support candidates had drawn from members of the same congregation. Dausabea and Bouro especially had maintained support among SDA congregations across the constituency (although that fluctuated in polling stations). For instance, Dausabea picked his highest votes at Lau Valley SDA polling station and attracted significant support at the Kukum SDA polling station. He was also popular among voters of the KG VI polling station where SDA congregation around Burns Creek area voted. Obviously, in the 2006 election, church affiliations played an important part especially for the winner, Charles Dausabea.

Religious affiliations in East Honiara could also be rational. It is rational in that voters of particular congregations may have supported a candidate based on things they would want done for that congregation. This may range from small projects such as musical instruments to major building projects. Therefore, where religious affiliations are based on the likely returns a congregation is going to get for their

129 votes, it is possible for the support of this nature to be obvious among particular congregations, especially candidates with the highest chances of winning.

Such was the case of Charles Dausabea and Simeon Bouro in the 2006 East Honiara election where both had drawn significant support from congregations at Kukum SDA Church, Lau Valley and the SDA congregation in the Burns Creek area. While both candidates had the support of the SDA voters in East Honiara, their popularity varied among the different SDA congregations. For instance, Dausabea (who won the 2006 election) was very popular among the Lau Valley congregation and SDA voters within Burns Creek area although his support declined at the Kukum SDA. Likewise Bouro was very popular among Lau Valley voters although his support declined among other SDA congregations. The congregational support in this case was selective and reflected biased support for particular candidates, assumedly based (among many other factors) on anticipated returns for a congregation. See next graph.

Figure 51

Graph showing vote counts for Dausabea, Bouro and Donga at three polling stations that hosted large SDA congregations.

450 400 350 300 KGVI MARKET 250 LAU VALLEY SDA 200 150 KUKUM SDA 100 50 0 DAUSABEA BOURO DONGA

This rational aspect of voting behaviour is further shown in the way the SDA support converges on Dausabea and Bouro. This in itself is a characteristic of rational behaviour where voters narrow down choices to possible winners. Although there were few SDA candidates that ran in the 2006 election, voters chose between those

130 who have the highest chances of winning. So while the major platform for alliance was the church, voters still discriminated among candidates based on their chances of winning. This was clear when we look at candidates like Robert Wale Feratalia who is a prominent SDA church leader and popular among SDA congregations in Honiara. Yet the only major support he got from any SDA congregation was at Lau Valley. While he collected his highest vote at this polling station (42), it was only about 20 percent of what Dausabea and Bouro got at the same polling station (186 and 192 respectively.

Having said that, the religious aspect of these affiliations should not be downplayed and this has shown where candidates of other denominations failed to secure votes among these congregations. This has also reflected well in the case of Dausabea in that he drew support from congregations that were predominantly Lau ethnic group despite being from Kwara’ae. Although rationalism was undoubtedly part of these affiliations, religion has been the first level of affiliations for many voters in East Honiara.

ETHNICITY SUBSTITUTING FOR KIN RELATIONSHIP IN EAST HONIARA

In the absence of kin relationship in urban politics and in East Honiara, people still tend to group together based on other commonalities such as religion and ethnicity. The latter has also been very influential in shaping political alliance in East Honiara. Voters identify together based on ethnicity or in this case those coming from a particular region in a province or those from the same province.

The affiliation to ethnic groups in politics is also not unique to Solomon Islands. Even in the politics of developed countries like Canada or the United States, ethnicity has always been mobilized by candidates for political support. In these contexts, voters align with ethnic groups such as African American, Hispanic and other minority communities (Stacey Ann Wilson, 2012: p.2). In a study of race and ethnic

131 voting behaviour among African Americans in United States, Charles S. Bullock (1984) notes that; … voters support only candidates with whom they share a racial tie. When race is highly salient, voters consider no member of the opposite race preferable to a candidate of their own. (Charles S. Bullock III, 1984:p. 239).

Where people of different races or ethnic backgrounds make up a voting population, there is a tendency for voters to group together based on identity or shared traits. In the case of the Solomon Islands, ethnicity is defined more along the line of language. Those who speak the same language (and share a particular culture) are said to belong to an ethnic group. Examples are the Kwara’ae, AreAre or Kwaio languages or more broadly the people of Malaita.

Although the geographical area is small, Solomon Islands also has a lot of languages which means a lot of ethnic groups. Moreover, languages are so diverse that villages a few kilometers apart could be speaking totally different languages. While on one hand this has become an obstacle to the attempts to instill a sense of national identity in a country that is socially and culturally fragmented, on the other hand it gives identity and unity to particular groups of people especially in multi-ethnic environments such as urban centers. This identity is nowhere more obvious than in the squatter settlements where people who speak the same language also often group together in big numbers.

The concept of grouping together based on the same language is more commonly known as ‘wantokism’ or ‘wantok system’ (see earlier discussions on wantokism). In the absence of kin networks, this (wantoks) has become an important platform for alliance and co-operation in the urban setting. In East Honiara, these language or ‘wantok’ groups are often mobilized for support during elections. At most times the call for support comes from candidates of the same ethnic or language group although candidates from other ethnic groups can also capitalize on these groupings. The affiliations in ethnic politics can take place at two levels. Firstly, voters of the same language group can identify with a candidate who speaks the same language or of the

132 same ethnic group. For example, Kwara’ae voters may also support a Kwara’ae candidate. Secondly, where ethnic groups do not have candidates contesting an election, alliances may be formed at a much higher level where voters group together to support a candidate of the same province. For instance, Malaitans are likely to support Malaitan candidates.

In the East Honiara constituency, ethnic based affiliations are more common in the squatter settlements on the town boundary beyond the suburbs of Vura and Naha. Squatter settlements in this part of the city extend over a very big area. Also, the population is predominantly Malaitan with significant populations of Kwara’ae, Kwaio and Fataleka settlers.

Perhaps the popularity of ethnic alliances in this area could be attributed to two things. Firstly, these squatter settlements are replicas of rural communities in urban setting. Most of the people living together in parts of these squatter settlements are likely to come from the same areas or even villages on Malaita. Also a big part of the population is unemployed, self-employed (mostly selling local produces at the market) or low wage earners and partly depends on subsistence agriculture to supplement daily food supply. The lifestyle and social organization within these communities are reminiscent of rural villages. The majority of settlers therefore live a rural lifestyle in an urban setting. Where kin relationship (an essential part of rural communities) is absent, ethnicity has replaced it as the new platform for co-operation and social networking.

Secondly, unlike other parts of the constituency where churches are very active and play an important role in collective decisions and political alliances, here churches fail to have a similar influence on its members. What manifested here is a character of conservative SSEC churches where politics is often seen as a ‘dirty thing’ in which churches should not be involved. In areas where churches leaders are conservative, one would find churches having little involvement in politics and voters are likely to align on other platforms such as ethnicity.

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In the next graph, I have taken the results of polling stations that would otherwise have reflected religious support and in particular support for SSEC candidates. These polling stations are in squatter settlements in the part of East Honiara I have described above and have big SSEC congregations. The population is also predominantly Kwara’ae people as well as a significant population of Kwaio settlers and other Malaitan ethnic groups. The five candidates shown below are all Malaitans from different ethnic and language groups. Dausabea is from Kwara’ae, Bouro and Donga from Lau, Ronia from AreAre and Manimu from North Malaita. These are major language groups on Malaita and had been used by candidates for political support in past elections.

Figure 52

Graph showing the five top candidates vote counts in 2006 elections at Kobito1, Kobito 2 and Kobito 2 Rest House, polling stations with predominantly SSEC voters.

300

250

200 KOBITO 2 CHURCH

150 KOBITO 2 REST HOUSE

100 KOBITO 1 CHURCH NUMBER OF NUMBER VOTERS 50

0 DAUSABEA BOURO RONIA MANIMU DONGA CANDIDATES

As obvious from the graph, the vote counts in these predominantly SSEC polling stations show little evidence of voting along religious or denominational lines (note that the polling stations are SSEC churches). For instance, when we look at Kobito 2 Church, votes at this polling station was fairly distributed among all candidates and except for the case of Donga, little distinction was made between Dausabea, Bouro,

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Ronia and Manimu as has been obvious in the church based polling stations we looked at earlier.

The other two polling stations Kobito 2 Rest House and Kobito 1 Church showed very contrasting results. At the Kobito 1 Church polling station, Dausabea had drawn a significant support from the voters of this polling station. This definitely was not church-based because as obvious from church based voting at Lau Valley, Kukum SDA, Kukum SSEC and Fulisango SSEC polling stations, Dausabea, Bouro and Donga had done better among SDA congregations while Ronia and Manimu performed poorly among the SDA congregations. The same could be said for polling stations with big congregations of SSEC voters where Ronia and Manimu attracted significant support and Dausabea, Bouro and Donga were unpopular. So although the voting population at the Kobito 1 and 2 polling stations were largely SSEC, voter behaviour here reflected little SSEC support for candidates of same religious background.

In particular, Dausabea had out-performed everyone at these three polling stations. Thus, the obvious reason for his success here was ethnic or ‘wantok’ support. As earlier stated, the majority of voters in the Kobito 1 and 2 settlements are Malaitans with a large Kwarae population. Other polling stations within the vicinity also reflected similar ethnic based support. For instance, at Christ The King School (within the same vicinity), Dausabea collected 198 votes when the runner Bouro up collected only 62 votes.

Other candidates had also drawn similar or ethnic-based support in this area. Where Dausabea had attracted support from areas with big Kwarae population, others had also drawn support from areas within the same vicinity with significant population of other ethnic groups. For instance, the Bible Way polling station and Green Valley COC School polling station is not far from the Kobito 1. However, this particular area is dominated by Fataleka settlers and Manimu got the highest votes here. It was also likely that Bouro and Ronia had also drawn support from ‘wantoks’ living in this

135 area or capitalized on other dominant groups without a strong candidates. Overall, voters in this particular part of the constituency seemed to have taken place along ethnic lines than other forms of affiliation.

POLICIES, MANIFESTOS AND PARTIES

Although political affiliations based on party policies and ideologies are not very common in Honiara constituencies and more generally in Solomon Islands, a portion of the voters do respond to party policies and sound ideologies. It is obvious however that party politics is generally weak or absent not only at the constituency level but also in parliament. This weak party politics shows in the number of candidates running as independents every election. In 2010 for instance, about 70 percent of candidates ran as independents (Wood, 2014: p.2) and in 2014 election, more than half of the house who won seats in Parliament were independent candidates. The little enthusiasm shown toward party politics especially by politicians is also often reflected by voters at the constituency level.

In the case of East Honiara constituency, political affiliation based on policies and party manifestos may surface among the more informed and the working class especially those in the formal sector. But as highlighted above, it is highly unlikely that voters would consider voting for a party (hence members or party candidates) based on their manifesto. In the context where party advocacy and support is weak, voters are likely to align with individuals who campaign on sound ideologies and are assumed to be good leaders because of reputable public service, qualification and work experience. Support in this case often comes through an individual’s ability to convince voters during campaigns especially through what a candidate preaches. Although voters may respond to the individual and not a party, it nonetheless shows that a portion of the voting population is receptive to sound policies and ideas.

This was the case of 2006 election and the support Edward Ronia received in these areas (see Figure.53). He had attracted big support in suburbs such as Vura, Naha and

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Kukum residential areas. Similar alliances could also be seen in institutions such as the Solomon Islands National University Campuses (all of which are located in East Honiara), schools and the communities associated with them (parents, guardians etc.). This kind of support is reflected in the graph below that shows the results for the top five candidates at polling stations in the suburbs of Vura, Naha and residential areas closer to the town center.

Figure 53

The following graph shows results for the school polling stations

600

500 Pavillion Mbua Valley School 400 Vura School 300 Naha School Saint Nicholas 200

100

0 Dausabea Bouro Ronia Manimu Donga

The polling stations shown in the graph above are within the main suburbs of Vura, Naha and toward the center of the city. Most of the voters here are government employees or others working in the formal sector. The voting population therefore is different from other parts of the constituency that were discussed earlier. This was reflected in the voter behaviour where candidates like Charles Dausabea and Simeon Bouro although had maintained significant support throughout these areas also declined in popularity. On the other hand, support for Edward Ronia and George Manimu picked up in this area. Ronia in particular had performed outstandingly at

137 some polling stations. For instance, at the Saint Nicholas Polling Station (which is in the centre of the town), Ronia polled 107 votes of the 206 votes cast.

Ronia’s popularity within these areas could be attributed to his outstanding career in the Public Service. He had held managerial positions with various public institutions such as the Solomon Islands National Provident Fund (SINPF), Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI) and the Ministry of Finance (as the Auditor General). At a time when economic recovery was a priority and parliament often lacked leaders with public credibility, his intention to run for parliament was welcomed by many especially the more informed portion of the voting population. This reflected well in the support he received at these polling stations.

RATIONAL BEHAVIOUR IN EAST HONIARA

Returning to my discussion (in Chapter Two) on the expectation that gifting should influence voter behaviour in the absence of kinship, the past election results for East Honiara did not reflect a very rational electorate despite being expected to do so. Although gifting was undoubtedly practiced prior and during election periods, because it had been done so within the domains of church denominations and ethnicity, it was quite difficult for election results to reflect rational behaviour. As such political alliances within domains such as churches or ethnic groups reflected more in the results than gifting or rational behaviour. I have included the 2008 bye- election to show a result that was influenced by gifting or rational behaviour (as the dominant factor).

In 2008, the East Honiara Constituency held a by-election for a replacement for Charles Dausabea. The by-election followed the conviction of Dausabea in court and his sentencing to more than six months imprisonment which disqualified him from being a Member of Parliament. The vacant seat was contested by 26 candidates and won by Silas Milikada, a businessman from the Western part of the Solomon Islands.

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The next graphs compare the result for Silas Milikada in the 2008 with that of Charles Dausabea in 2006 to highlight the difference in voting pattern across the polling stations.

Figure 54

Graph showing total voter turnout and vote count per polling station for Silas Milikada, winner of 2008 East Honiara by-election

600 VOTE 500 COUNT FOR MILIKADA 400 TOTAL 300 VOTE TURNOUT 200 NUMBER OF NUMBER VOTES 100

0 1 3 5 7 9 1113151719212325272931333537 POLLING STATIONS

Figure 55

Graph showing total voter turnout and vote count per polling station for Charles Dausabea, winner of 2006 East Honiara election

600 VOTE COUNT 500 FOR DAUSABEA 400

NUMBER NUMBER OVERALL 300 VOTER TURNOUT 200

100

0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 POLLING STATIONS

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The 2008 by-election showed a very different voting pattern for most of the polling stations in East Honiara. The favorite and winner of the election (Silas Milikada) had drawn a consistent support across all polling stations. This kind of support is more characteristic of a rational conscious electorate and it is quite interesting that certain factors that had been important for victories in previous elections were absent. One for instance was that he (Silas Milikada) was not a Malaitan and the only one not of Malaitan origin to have won the seat since it was created in 1984. This in itself is important as it shows that alliances were not based on ethnicity or a provincial identity. Moreover, there was also no indication of biased religious support since the overall voter response was the same across polling stations.

When we compare both graphs, it is clear that Milikada’s vote count per polling station was consistent with the overall voter turnout as opposed to Dausabea’s support that was inconsistent across polling stations, high in some places and low in some when compared with overall voter turnout for polling stations. On the other hand, Milikada was getting an average of about 30 percent of polling station votes. For instance, for the first three polling stations he got 25, 28 and 28 percent of the total polling station votes and about 30 percent of the total votes for the first 10 polling stations. So although the votes did go up or down in some places, he maintained a consistent support throughout all polling stations. This could be seen in the overall result where he also got 32.4 percent of the overall voter turnout in the election.

The support for Milikada therefore indicates that a single factor had influenced voter behaviour and incidents surrounding his elections pointed more to rational behaviour across the constituency. This could be attributed to certain campaign tactics employed during the campaign period. One was the payment of outstanding school fees which secured the support of parents and guardians. This was an area that appealed to a lot of voters in the East Honiara Constituency. Presented with an opportunity to ease their financial burden (and the uncertainty of MP support in the remaining two years of that parliamentary term), many had chosen to exchange their support for the payment of fees.

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The overall voter behaviour (for the constituency and all candidates) on the other hand reflected the uncertainties ushered in by the sudden vacation of the constituency seat by Charles Dausabea following the court decision. Supporters of the disqualified MP found them looking for a new candidate to align with and the entrance of other candidates to contest the seat also changed established support bases. Moreover, knowing that the new MP would only take up the vacant position for the remaining two years, voters were also looking for an alliance that would be most profitable to them for the last part of the term. Some therefore switched alliances and supported candidates who offered or promised more. For instance, Simeon Bouro who was the runner up in the past election (2006 election) lost half his voters (probably to Milikada and Manimu) and dropped from 1252 votes in 2006 to 699 votes in 2008. On the other hand George Manimu who was fourth placed in the 2006 election gained more support and was elevated to the second place in the 2008 by-election (Wood 2012, Solomon Islands Election Results).

It would be helpful at this point to view the result in the light of the argument I developed to explain voting behaviour in East Honiara Constituency. In my discussion of the case studies in Chapter One, I have touched on the approach adopted for the research and the independent and intervening variables that would be measured in the cases identified. In the case of East AreAre, while ‘gifting’ was the independent variable measured, the intervening variable ‘kinship’ has been the dominant factor influencing voter behaviour. On the other hand, in East Honiara, the intervening variable (kinship) was assumed to be missing and voters were expected to make rational decisions free of the influences of kin networks. In the light of past election results, the election of Silas Milikada and especially his support base in the 2008 by-election was the only one that reflects rational behaviour.

CONCLUSION

In concluding the chapter on East Honiara, two things are worth stressing. Firstly, the experiences of voters in this urban constituency are different from voters in rural

141 constituencies. Due to the detachment between the central government and rural population, the decisions of the government of the day and associated consequences are not immediately felt in the rural areas and so it has little relevance to daily programmes and activities of the rural constituents. In fact the impact of the government’s decision on their daily life is so insignificant that the average rural person has little awareness of a central government. As such, the Member of Parliament has become the government for many due to his immediate contact and involvement with the people. The governments’ performance is therefore measured by the activities of the Member of Parliament with little reference to the central government.

On the other hand, voters in urban constituencies and especially Honiara constituencies are likely to align their experiences (especially those that are related to poor service delivery) with government performance. For them, their daily experiences whether good or bad results from the policies and the decisions of the government. However, since supporters of MPs could have benefited from their alliance the MP, supporters are likely to isolate the performance of the MP from the weaknesses of the government of the day whom they hold accountable poor service delivery. In this scenario, although the government may be weak and have offered little public goods and services, supporters of an MP are likely to re-elect him or her based on individual connections.

One must also note that the impact of the individual experiences on voting behaviour takes place within a broader context of church affiliation, ethnicity and other influential factors. In the urban constituency of East Honiara, church denominations and ethnicity have been the overarching factor for political affiliation and alliances. While a candidate who does little for the supporters is likely to be replaced, this will be done first among candidates of the same denomination or ethnic background. In the history of East Honiara constituency, the different candidates who had won the constituency seat were able to capitalize on these two important platforms; church congregations (SDA) and ethnic groups (Malaitans).

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Finally, in the case of East Honiara, the different parts of the constituency respond differently to candidates. While suburbs and residential areas toward the center of the city are likely to respond to sound policies and good public service records, the outskirts are more likely to respond to church denominations and ethnicity. Given that big congregations of SDA voters and Malaitan squatter settlers are in the eastern part of Honiara, these two factors have been the most influential in deciding election outcomes in East Honiara.

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CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY

In the previous chapters, I have discussed the concept of gifting and how it has manifested in Solomon Islands’ modern politics and especially the cases studied (East AreAre and East Honiara). This helps to answer the major question raised at the beginning of the thesis and that is, how gifting affects voting behaviour and outcomes of national parliamentary elections. In this chapter, I will summarize major findings and discussions covered in the previous chapters. This will include a summary on rational choice and gifting, kin-based politics, people’s perception on bribe and corruption and the legal and cultural explanation of the practice. Also, I will begin this chapter by discussing the importance of knowing the context in which gifting takes place as an important step toward knowing how the practice affects voting behaviour and electoral politics.

UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT

A very important point for understanding gifting in Solomon Islands contemporary politics is to know the context in which it takes place. Without this knowledge it would be difficult to understand the dynamics of the Solomon Islands constituency politics and the impact of the practice on voting behaviour. So often authors or scholars offer very shallow explanations of voter behaviour thus misjudging the implications. For instance, there is this assumption that those who have a lot of money to give away will always attract a large following because voters chose to support those who offer benefits/incentives. Yet at most times, gifting yields results only when done within kin groups (or in some cases, established networks such as churches or ethnic groups). That means kin members will likely reciprocate gifts with political support while there is no guarantee that gifts would bring in votes from non- kin voters.

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An obvious problem with a lot of the discussions on gifting is that authors often compare the gifting practice in the Solomon Islands with the Bigman depiction of Melanesian leadership which does not operate in practice. In so doing, they have rendered voters as being bound to givers through gifts. Yet, in the constituency politics of Solomon Islands, acceptance of gifts should not be translated as political support. If everyone who accepts gifts renders political support, the biggest givers will always win elections, which is not always the case in Solomon Islands constituency politics. Again as highlighted above (and in my earlier discussion of gifting in AreAre), gifting outside of domains such as kin groups often lack the bond and responsibility that can turn gifts into a meaningful and binding relationship.

It is also important to note that the relationship within kin groups as mentioned above is not clientilist (as often portrayed). A clientilist relationship is a dyadic, unbalanced and manipulative relationship that is based on the unequal access to resources. Those who have resources are likely to exert control over those who are dependent on these resources. The recipient in a clientilist relationship is therefore bound to the giver or resource owner through gifts or benefits. In the absence of gifts/benefits, there is no relationship. In contrast, the relationship within the kin network is based on blood relationship, social bonds and communal ownership of land and resources. This kind of relationship (being based on blood and social ties) is not established or removed by the presence or absence of gifting. However, gifting among members can strengthen these ties and for leaders, it can give legitimacy to their authority.

As echoed throughout my discussions of kin based gifting, the traditional gifting is an avenue for financial co-operation where financial burdens are distributed among members of a kin group. It is associated more with practices such as bride price payments, compensations, mortuary feast and other events that call for financial co- operation among kin members. As such, the kin group has become the most popular platform for co-operation and resource pooling. It is this use of kin groups for co- operation that transpires into modern politics. Tarcisius Tara Kabutaulaka (1998) highlighted this in his book chapter titled ‘Deforestation and politics in Solomon Islands’ (1998);

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Political allegiances are based around kinship and tribal group before extending to the wider community. In elections the foundation for political support is kinship and tribal groups (p.133).

The kin based support is also obvious in John Cox’s discussion of North Vella constituency. In discussing the case of North Vella constituency in the 2014 election, John Cox (2015) noted that other candidates running against Milner Tozaka the incumbent MP were all; … based in ward 9 (one of the wards in the constituency) meaning they would most likely split the votes in that ward between them, leaving Tozaka with the advantage in ward 10 (Cox, 2015).

The implication here is that those in ward 9 would most likely pick their votes in that ward and when there are more candidates running, the share of votes each gets will be smaller. Obviously, in the kin-based politics of Solomon Islands, geography matters because kin groups are located on kin-owned land or territories. At most times, political support is likely to be confined within these kin-based territories. It is for this reason that candidates from other parts of a constituency find it difficult to secure support beyond kin boundaries.

The aspects of kin-based politics signify the importance of knowing the context of Solomon Islands politics. Without this knowledge, it would be difficult to understand factors affecting human relationships and behaviour. As often is the case, such factors (i.e. kin relationship, marriage ties), that are very influential in political affiliation and behavior are usually overlooked or less regarded because authors often lack an in-depth understanding of the society. As a result, because the economical aspect of the gifting practice is often over-emphasized and distorted; the impact of gifting on political behaviour is also often exaggerated.

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THE CULTURAL AND RATIONAL ARGUMENT AND GIFTING

The recurrence of a traditional gifting culture and its impact on voting behaviour at the constituency level has been over emphasized in literature on contemporary Solomon Islands politics. This has resulted from two things. Firstly, since the traditional gifting practice has been misunderstood (it has been portrayed as a clientilist relationship) as a mechanism for attaining authority, gifting in contemporary politics is also seen as accomplishing similar result. Many political commentators therefore see gift giving as the main driver of the constituency politics of Solomon Islands.

Secondly, by comparing traditional Melanesian gifting culture to clientilist relationships in other societies (especially that of medieval Europe), the local gifting practice is seen solely as resulting from unequal power and unequal access to resources. Individual behaviour is therefore explained as based on ‘rational’ decision-making, where voters seek to maximize their gain or benefits from running candidates.

As I have argued in the case of East AreAre, gifting as associated with kin networks is an alternative for resource pooling and co-operation. The traditional gifting practice is not a product of inequality and manipulative or authoritarian style of leadership (as often assumed); these are concepts that contradict the purposes of traditional kin organizations.

While many political alliances and affiliations in Solomon Islands contemporary politics do reflect aspects of rational decision making, rationality has been overstated as the only reason for political affiliation in Solomon Islands politics (Haque, 2012). In so doing, the discussion of political affiliations and gift-giving in contemporary politics has been isolated from kinship, land and property ownership systems. These are institutions that form the basis of socio-political organization in traditional Melanesian societies and hence provide the contexts in which Melanesian gifting is

147 meaningfully practiced. The isolation of Melanesian gifting from these important institutions renders the practice only as a rational and clientilist activity. As James Scott states, proponents of the rational choice theory therefore reduce all social actions to rational actions however irrational or non-rational actions may appear.

What distinguishes rational choice theory … is that it denies the existence of any kinds of action other than the purely rational and calculative. All social action, it is argued, can be seen as rationally motivated, as instrumental action, however much it may appear to be irrational or non-rational (Scott, 2000: p.2).

Also, proponents of ‘rational choice theory’ often ignore many aspects of Solomon Islands constituency politics that do not conform to characteristics of a rational conscious electorate. One for instance is the failure of the single plural electoral system to converge on two candidates according to Duverger’s Law. This should be a normal aspect of a rational conscious electorate where rational voters only align with potential winners thus converging people’s choice on two candidates or parties. Moreover, although there had been many allegations of gift-giving by candidates and the claim that political affiliations were based on rational choices, many past election results (especially those of rural constituencies) tended more toward kin-based affiliation than rational behaviour. Therefore, proponents of rational choice theory often see a relationship between acceptance of gifts and anticipated political support when indeed a lot gifts accepted may not be reciprocated with political support.

Finally, on many occasions, the less fortunate candidates seemed to have done better than those with big financial spending during campaigns. A good example was the ousting of former Solomon Islands Prime Minister Gordon Darcy Lilo in the 2014 election. This again implies that not all recipients of gifts vote for givers although they may have accepted gifts from candidates.

Joseph Ketan (2004) of Papua New Guinea in writing about the Hagen politics says something similar;

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The use of cash…is a major factor in elections, but it must be used cleverly because handouts do not automatically open eyes or win votes (p: 343).

Likewise, in the context of constituency politics of Solomon Islands, acceptance of gifts should not be translated as political support. The assumption that gifts would always bring votes had been the cause of frustrations in past elections where candidates did not receive the anticipated votes as measured by gifts given.

KIN-BASED POLITICS AND GIFTING

In the light of the preceding discussions, the view of gifting as promoted by Haque (2012) and proponents of ‘rational choice theory’ only reflects a shallow understanding of the gifting culture and kinship alliance in Solomon Islands. In many writings on the gifting practice in Melanesia, the kin network has been portrayed as a corrupt institution tailored for the political agenda of the privileged few. The use or abuse of this institution for political purposes has led many to believe that kin networks are meant to serve the agenda of politicians. Kin networks are therefore often portrayed as having a short life span and are only useful for pursuing political goals. The line of argument pursued in this thesis starts from a very different premise. As highlighted by White (2007) kin networks;

…provide a highly stable network of social ties that afford a kind of security net as well as networks useful in everyday economic activity (White 2007, p.3).

Kinship is therefore the most important relationship that influences voter behaviour in the Solomon Islands constituency politics and especially in rural constituencies. In fact the recurrence of cultural practices in modern politics has less to do with gifting (this can be distorted and abused) but more to do with the use of kinship for collective action (political support). The kin-based political affiliation can therefore be said to be cultural and a recurrence of the traditional use of kin networks for co-operation.

In a lot of discussion on gifting in contemporary Solomon Islands politics, kin networks have been sidelined because authors or scholars have portrayed relationships

149 within kin groups as clientilist. I have stated in the preceding chapters that the relationship within kin networks is based on the biological (blood) and social ties (developed over years of interactions) as opposed to unequal power and unequal access to resources. The nature of a kin relationship determines the way people behave especially toward other kin. In this context, an individual’s life hence decision making is intertwined with others in the network. The individual position therefore cannot be untied or undone. In AreAre it is known as maitakina deriving from the verb taki or ‘to tie or bind’. The term maitakina reflects how AreAre people (and more generally Melanesians) understand the relationship within a kin group; a lasting relationship. On the other hand, the clientilist relationship is a product of choice and one’s circumstances (whether one is poor or in need). Therefore an individual is free to choose his/her associations and this is mostly based on rational decisions. If indeed the relationship within political groupings in AreAre constituency politics is clientilist, the voting pattern for East AreAre elections would have differed greatly from the one that has emerged in past elections.

There is also a big difference between the Western and the Melanesian concepts of kinship. The Western concept of kinship may only refer to a group of people who are biologically and socially related. The Melanesian concept of kinship on the other hand encompasses not only the relationship between people whether biological or social but also their connection to kin land and resources, taboos, rituals, code of conducts, associated responsibilities and so on. Simply put, kin members are tied together in all areas of life including modern politics.

A strong aspect of the Melanesian kin relationship is the tribal or group ownership of land, resources and material (as opposed to individual ownership). The bond that binds people together (maitakina in AreAre) also binds resources and property into a pool accessible to everyone. However, contributing into this pool is everyone’s responsibility. It is for this reason that gifting is seen as a responsibility and everyone is expected to give when the need arises.

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In the context of modern politics, because kin members pool votes, they also lay claim to the resources MP accesses. The concept of tribal or collective ownership thus also transpires into this arena of life. This is not necessarily seen as gifting because what is shared with kin and relatives does not take on the form of incentives or inducements. Moreover, for non-kin constituents the MP being a leader is still expected to give. For them, this responsibility is attached to the position and not the individual. However, non-kin constituents are likely to miss out on resource distribution.

Gifting in Melanesia is based on established relationships within kin groups. While gifting helps maintain and consolidate kin networks, it is the relationship/bond between kin members that is the most important and gifting takes place as a result of it. This also implies that whenever gifting takes place outside the kin networks, gifts are not binding. Recipients are therefore not obliged to return gifts/favours. This is the case in modern politics where a lot of gifts given outside kin groups are less likely to be reciprocated.

The understanding of gifting and shared ownership as described here shows strongly in my survey of East AreAre and East Honiara constituencies. Many of those who were interviewed agreed with gifting because they think that they have the right to resources available to MPs. Even for non-kin constituents, the idea of collective ownership is still very dominant. Seeing the MP as their representative, people expect to have a share of the resources he/she lays hands on. In practice though, the resources MPs access is mostly confined within kin and support networks.

CHURCH, LANGUAGE GROUP AND PROVINCE-BASED SUPPORT

In urban constituencies, church groups, language groups and provincial groups have become the platforms for political alliance and support. These groupings form the base of a candidate’s support and the bigger the base, the higher the chances of winning. Like rural constituencies, success in urban constituencies as we have seen in

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East Honiara depends on how well these groups are coordinated and mobilized. In East Honiara the most common ones are church denominations and ethnic groups or provincial groups. These domains have become the major platforms for political affiliations and gifting takes place more meaningfully within these groupings. This is the reason why past election results do not reflect the evidence of a rational conscious electorate where possible winners attracted substantial and consistent support across all polling stations. Rather these domains at a much higher level overshadow other factors (church groups and ethnic groups) affecting voting behaviour across the constituency.

GIFT OR BRIBE

Overall, my findings through questionnaires and interviews suggest that voters generally see gifting as a social obligation or responsibility. I have earlier touched on the concept of shared ownership and how it translates as responsibility in traditional social organization likewise modern politics. This has always been the case where gifting is seen as an avenue for resource pooling and kin members are expected to contribute toward events hosted by other kin. The failure to contribute is seen as failing one’s obligation toward other kin members. Thus in this context, gifting is a responsibility and at most times an obligation.

This notion of gifting also transpires into modern politics where constituents see gifting as a responsibility of the MP. For kin members, an MP is not only a leader but also a kin and relative. Being a leader, they expect an MP to be concerned about their needs and affairs. Being a kin or relative they share ownership with him/her. Likewise, for the majority, gifting being a responsibility is not condemnable. However, gifting being a responsibility of a leader should not be biased. As such, the major concern over gifting in rural constituencies has more to do with the biased distributions rather than its legality. In the case of the East AreAre survey for instance, most of those who condemned the practice did so out of frustrations over resource distribution and not because they saw the practice as illegal.

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This explains the reason why people do not condemn the practice despite having knowledge of the laws and regulations banning gifting during elections. My survey of East AreAre voters for instance (carried out at the end of 2012 and early 2013), shows that 57 percent of respondents admitted knowing about electoral laws and regulations. Yet, 61 percent of respondents agreed that the practice is acceptable and whatever given is a gift and not bribe. In the case of East Honiara 93 percent indicated an awareness of electoral laws banning gifting during elections. This however is not reflected in election results in that political affiliations fall more into groupings such as church, ethnic or provincial groups. Considering that gifting is only meaningfully practiced where there are established relationships and networks, loyalty within church groups, ethnic groups or provincial groups would likely be maintained through gifting.

Moreover, the response in the East AreAre survey reflected to a greater extent Hague and Harrop’s (2001) ‘deep learning theory’. Hague and Harrop (2001) argue that although individuals may modify views and behaviours developed during childhood (as they learn and acquire new information), it is unlikely that they will transform the outlooks secured when young (2001: 88). In East AreAre constituency, respondents although may have attained new knowledge and information through education still maintain a traditional view of gifting. This is evident where half of those who attended secondary and tertiary education agreed with gifting despite having knowledge of electoral laws that ban the practice.

There is also little evidence that education and acquisition of new knowledge and information weakens people’s affiliation and loyalty to these groups. Likewise, there is little evidence that knowledge of electoral laws and regulations changes people’s view of gifting. The indication is that; since gifting is an inseparable part of kin relationship and co-operation, people do not look at gifting as an isolated practice but something that is tied to the collective activities of kin networks. Since co-operation within a kin network is not illegal, related practices such as gifting are also not illegal and more so, not a bribe.

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The dispute between the legality and illegality of gifting is therefore one of context. If we take the case of an East AreAre voter for instance, he/she does not see gifting as an act detached and isolated from the relationship within kin networks and collective activities of members. In this context, gifting being an aspect of kin co-operation is not illegal but rather it serves as the evidence of the relationship between people. On the other hand, there are others who do not applaud the corporate activities of kin networks. For electoral administrators and opponents of the cultural thesis, gifting is a separate and condemnable act violating electoral laws and breeding bad governance. For this group, the problems caused by the practice outweigh the good intentions and co-operation within kin networks.

So here we have the same practice being viewed from two different angles. From one angle, gifting is viewed as the evidence of an established relationship while from the other; it is a bribe, an act of corruption violating electoral laws. Thus the dispute over the legality or illegality of gifting rests much on whose side one chooses to see the practice.

In the case of AreAre, people’s understanding of gifting also shapes how they define the practice in modern politics. Because gifting is the evidence of an established relationship, gifts given within the kin group or tribe is not seen as bribery or corruption. Such gifts are validated by the biological and social relationship between the giver and recipient (even if it is given during campaign period). On the other hand, a gift given outside kin relations lacks the bond that validates a cultural interpretation and thus is seen as bribery or corruption.

A similar view of gifting is also explained by Joe Ketan in his discussion of cash gifting in Hagen politics of Papua New Guinea (2004: p.343). In the Hagen context, Ketan notes;

“Cash must be given within the context of historical relations and personal networks. In other words, cash given within the ‘moral community’ of a candidate can be

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justified as honouring social obligation, while cash given outside such a boundary can be construed as bribery…”

Generally, in the Melanesian context, the distinction between a gift and a bribe depends on the recipient. Where the recipient shares blood and kinship ties with the giver, gifts can be justified as the evidence of that relationship. In the absence of such ties, gifts become inducements to lure support and hence are a bribe.

As expressed throughout my discussion, relationship more than perception affects voting behaviour at the constituency politics of Solomon Islands. This is evident in studied cases (East AreAre and East Honiara), where the majority of voters fall into established groupings such as kin, churches, ethnic and even provincial groups. Indeed people’s perceptions do not really affect their affiliations to these groupings. Even when individuals disagree with gifting, this has to do with biased distribution of resources rather than the illegality of the practice.

LEGAL VERSUS CULTURAL

While gifting is often justified and applauded as a cultural practice (based on the relationship between the giver and recipient as among kin group members); critics of the cultural thesis often argue that the intentions for gifting in politics and its impact on governance are more important factors to consider than relationship. They argue that the primary goal of political candidates is to influence voter decisions irrespective of the kind of relationship shared by the giver and recipient. Likewise the impact of gifting on voter behaviour and the tendency of the practice to violate electoral laws is the same whether the recipient is a kin or not. Therefore, for the critics of the cultural thesis, gifting should be assessed based on the intention of the giver and the violation of electoral laws.

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The Samoan Chief Justice Sapolu and Justices Slizer and Shepherdson have expressed their concern about the use of gifting for corrupt purposes in an election petition judgement of 2006;

…But gifts made during and in the run up to an election in the guise of culture and tradition…are capable of corrupting both culture and the nation (as cited by Chetwyn, 2011).

Likewise Judge Chetwyn (Solomon Islands) in his judgment of the Aliki Toki Ha’apio vs Andrew Keniasina Hanaria case of 2011 agrees that a person’s corrupt intentions could reflect in his/her actions; …a corrupt intent can be inferred from a person’s actions, by what he does (Chetwyn, Civil Case 343). Former Nigerian President Olosegun Obasanjo (1999-2007) has also raised a similar sentiment; I shudder at how an integral aspect of our culture can be taken as a basis for rationalizing otherwise despicable behaviour (as quoted by Larmour 2007).

So for the critics of the cultural thesis, it is the violation of the electoral laws and not the cultural aspect of gifting that matters. They therefore argue that cultural practices are often used for the purposes of corruption rather than being the cause of corruption (Larmour, 2007: 1).

POINTS TO CONSIDER

I would like to conclude the thesis by highlighting the some of the findings that I see as important and worth considering either for further studies or policy development. This is because a study is only worth doing if the findings can be used to solve problems related to the area of research. Also, I have stated at the beginning of the thesis that to address the problems associated with the election of incompetent leaders into parliament; we have to know factors influencing voting behaviour of people

156 especially at the constituency level. Likewise we have to find ways to address these problems. It is in this regard that I want to share some lessons learnt from the research that I consider helpful to address problems related to governance and gifting in Solomon Islands politics.

Firstly, there is little evidence that expressed opinions or views are really translated into practice during elections. This means that despite people expressing disagreements with gifting and voting along kinship lines, they (constituents) still vote for kin candidates during elections. Likewise, there is little evidence that an awareness of electoral laws and regulations instills fear of gifting (as an unlawful practice) and that such awareness changes people’s view about the practice. Moreover, there is also little evidence (especially in the case of East AreAre) that education and acquisition of new knowledge and information about good governance and politics weakens people’s affiliation and loyalty to kin groups and other established groups.

In her paper National elections and women candidates in Solomon Islands: Result from the people’s survey (2012, p.11), Christine McMurray also highlights the inconsistency between expressed opinions in surveys and the actual election results. Although the area of interest differs, it nonetheless confirms my finding that expressed opinions are not always translated into practice. For instance, in making reference to popular opinions about women and parliament, McMurray writes;

The People’s Survey data show community perceptions of elections and women candidates that appear to be at variance with the usual outcomes of Solomon Islands elections. In particular, it seems that the majority of respondents believe that elections are confidential, support the concept of women as leaders and parliamentarians, say they would vote for a good woman candidate and support the concept of reserved seats for women. Focus group discussions confirmed a common view that women candidates would probably perform better than male candidates because of their stronger focus on the family and living conditions (RAMSI, 2009). When the 2007 People’s Survey results were released in Solomon Islands, the high percentages saying they believe there should be women in Parliament and they would vote for a woman candidate were greeted with surprise. At that time, the chaos that

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followed the 2006 election and the failure of all 25 women candidates to win office in that election were still very much in mind.

Likewise she also highlights the variations between respondents’ views of gifting and election results. People’s Survey data also indicate that vote buying is often resented or regarded with cynicism, votes are often bought cheaply and many parliamentarians are perceived as not honouring their promises. It is therefore somewhat surprising that vote buying still seems to be such an effective strategy for candidates (See APPENDIX IV).

While our views on the impact of gifting on voting behaviour vary, I do agree with her on the point that election results do not always reflect the expressed opinions of people. I have highlighted in the case of East AreAre that a lot of disagreements with gifting do not result from a dislike of the practice, rather they have to do more with the unfair distribution of gifts.

Secondly, it is also obvious from my findings that majority value their relationship with kin groups over the state/government. The kin group being immediate to the people plays a more important and tangible role in the lives of voters than the state (which is a far off thing). Thus at most times, the loyalty to kin groups often override the loyalty to the state. As Ketan (2004) rightly states in the case of PNG, …it is their primary kin group that they owe their first loyalty to, not the state.

Similarly, in the Solomon Islands, the first level of political affiliation is always at the kin group (Kabutaulaka, 1998, p.121-153).

Thirdly, voters never really developed a broader view of their problems or experiences in that individual experiences are never aligned with or seen against the performance of a government. For instance, the lack of proper infrastructure or basic services (health, education, transport) in the rural areas is never aligned with the performance of the government of the day. This is common where the state or government has not really made its presence known in or relevant to the lives of its people. Again Geoffrey White points out that;

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…the region’s newly independent governments never succeeded in establishing a strong presence in rural communities (2007: p. 4).

Likewise, Bill Standish (1996: 319-320) in writing about PNG societies notes that;

…these societies are increasingly isolated from the state, which is irrelevant to their needs…

In the absence of the state, people never see their circumstances or experiences as outcomes of government policies and decisions. Thus, the happenings in the higher echelons of political leadership have little relevance to their lives.

Thirdly, because the kin group is always the platform for political alliances and affiliations, selections of leaders/parliamentarians are at most times in line with the criteria of the kin groups rather than that of the state or parliament. This means that qualification, work experience and sound policies may not be the most attractive campaign points during elections. Rather, leaders are chosen on who is likely to serve the interests of the kin group or in the case of urban constituencies; church, ethnic or provincial group. This goes to show that Solomon Islanders (and in particular East AreAre constituents) have developed their own view and definition of a good parliamentarian, good governance and politics and this may not necessarily be in line with popular political views.

In concluding this section, I will discuss some of the challenges that need addressing. Firstly, a major challenge is for institutions such as the political parties to win over the confidence of voters. This is important to weaken the kin-based political affiliations common in Solomon Islands constituency politics. Given the key role kin networks play in the lives of individuals, other institutions that compete for the allegiance and loyalty of voters have to work hard to win over the voter confidence. As Geoffrey White rightly says, the kin networks serve as a ‘security net’ and people fear finding themselves outside the security net. The fear of alienation and insecurity binds individuals to the kin group making them strong and impregnable. The key therefore

159 is for institutions such as political parties to offer an alternative that can loosen the hold of kin groups on voters.

Also, since the patronage system often discussed in the discourses of Solomon Islands constituency politics is kin-based (except for the cases of urban constituencies), the input of resources by MPs only adds to the resource pool but may not necessarily increase the voter base. When seen in this light, it is the relationship that gives birth to the gifting practice or the patronage system and not the other way around. Because the input of resources may not affect (increase or decrease) the size of the kin-based support in any significant way, it can also be equally argued that a withdrawal of resources (RCDF, projects etc.) will not affect kin based political affiliations in any big way. This is because the withdrawal of resources may not remove or weaken the framework for co-operation and alliances within kin networks.

In the case of East AreAre, this easily shows in past election results. In the 1993, 2001 and 2006 election that Edward Huniehu won, his results ranged between 804, 909 and 882 respectively. His average score for these elections was 865 and despite some fluctuations, the voter support was consistent for this period (12 years). Similarly, when we look at Michael Ahikau’s support for 2001 (795), 2006 (726) and 2010 (628), there was also no major increase or decline for the three consecutive elections he ran in therefore reflecting a steady or consistent support.

The election data suggests that although Edward Huniehu has had access to government resources/finances for over a decade, this privileged position contributed little to his kin or support base. When seen in this light, the assumption that withdrawal of resources from the MP will weaken patronage networks may not be true. Moreover, because the exchange system within kin networks is meant to distribute financial burdens among members, the withdrawal of resources will lead to a decline in the resource pool available to kin members which ushers in the need to co-operate and hence strengthen the kin networks.

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Another challenge is the need to breed and foster a new kind of political culture where the state or government becomes relevant to the lives of constituents and the latter is motivated to take an active and positive role in governance and politics. So far the claim of the state to have legitimacy over its people is not evident on the ground. Because the government or the state plays so insignificant role in the lives of the average constituent (especially rural dwellers), citizens show little concern for the government that is voted into power likewise assuming no responsibility for the kind of government that is in place. For them, the implications of their political choices go as far as their Member of Parliament. Constituents have therefore failed to align their political choices and behaviour with the government of the day.

Some have suggested the way to establish this link is through constitutional reform and the change to a federal state system (Mae, 2010). This is based on the assumption that the current centralized system allows little power to trickle down to the lower level of governance (province, wards and communities) thus incapacitating the lower institutions of governance and disabling them from delivering services to the people. Others have also suggested a change of the electoral system. This stems out from the need to weaken the position of MPs who have in a way become middle agents between government resource pools and kin and support groups.

Finally, the major challenge is to make MPs perform their parliamentary role as opposed to that of resource and project distributors they are currently performing. Although a lot of elected MPs are capable of performing their legislative and national duties, the fact that they are usually voted in by their kin and support groups makes them only eager to fulfill the wishes of their supporters and thus guarantee their come back in the next election. For many MPs, this has shifted their focus from their parliamentary duties to that of resource and project distributors.

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Solomon Islands like other new democracies is pulled between two political forces; that of adopted government system and structures and the local leadership structures, institutions and notions of leadership. Although the state claims legitimacy over its people, local institutions and structures have enjoyed more popularity and influence than the state. Likewise, rather than yielding to the demands of the introduced and imposed system of governance, the local institutions have persisted in modern politics and have (to an extent) influenced governance and electoral processes.

We have particularly seen the resilience of kin groups and networks in modern politics as kin-backed candidates compete to get hold and maintain the much coveted constituency seats. Because the one who holds the constituency seat is likely to control associated benefits, elections have also become an avenue where kin groups severely contest the right to control the resources and finances that are available to the constituency. As such, the basis for political alliance and affiliation in the constituency politics is not mere incentives and bribes as often assumed but rather political affiliations are largely based on kin relationship and social ties. For this reason, although there have been a lot of allegations of gifting in the constituency politics, election data shows that gifting has had insignificant effect on political alliance and voting behavior in the rural constituencies.

Finally, because good governance and economic development are intertwined, unless the government or state is seen as a source of economic security, it’s (the state/government) claim on legitimacy over its citizens will be like the rain that falls on the roof without wetting or quenching the thirst of those beneath it. So far the MP has occupied the place of a water tank outside the house that collects the rain water and supplies the occupants. Those who are connected to the MP receives their supply of water while others who are not connected miss on what the MP supplies. Occupants therefore understand their supply of water as far as the tank outside and ignore the fact that the tank too gets its supply from elsewhere. Their only concern is to maintain the tank and their link to it because as long as water keeps coming out of the tap, for the occupants, everything is okay and there is no need for change.

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APPENDIX 1

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APPENDIX II

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APPENDIX 111

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APPENDIX IV

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