The Year 1989 Was an Uncomfortable One for Hafez Al-Assad, Who Was in His 19Th Year As President of Syria. in Lebanon He Faced T

1990

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The year 1989 was an uncomfortable one for Hafez al-Assad, who was in his 19th year as president of Syria. In Lebanon he faced the ‘war of liberation’ launched by General Michel Aoun, backed to the hilt by an Iraq seeking revenge against its old adversary. On the regional level, Syria found itself increasingly isolated within an Arab world that was grouping itself into formal politico-economic blocs. In the Arab-Israeli peace process, Assad was upstaged by Palestine Liber- ation Organisation (PLO) Chairman Yasser Arafat whom he had long tried to undermine. Arafat’s peace initiative, and the intifada in the occupied territo- ries, meant that Syria was pushed to one side in the search for a settlement. On the economic front, the oil sector continued to give grounds for cheer, but there werestillsomedeep-rootedeconomicproblems.

IraqPunishesSyriaviaLebanon It was only to be expected that once Iraq’s hands were freed by the Gulf War cease-fire agreement, which took effect on 20 August 1988, it would seek to inflict punishment on Syria which had supported Iran during the war. The two countries, ruled by rival wings of the Ba’ath Party, have long pursued a vendetta that has turned into a personalised feud between Assad and Iraq’s President Saddam Hussain. The cease-fire meant that one of Syria’s main justifications for maintain- ing the alliance with Iran – that it could use its influence with Tehran to help bring about peace in the Gulf – was no longer valid. For Syria, however, the Iranian card was too valuable to sacrifice readily. Even after the Gulf cease-fire the Iranian con- nection continuedto give Syria additional room for manoeuvre in the Middle East- ern arena, and a vital consideration was Iran’s influence within Lebanon and the need for Damascus to maintain a working relationship with it there. Lebanon, however, proved to be a convenient arena for Saddam Hussain in which to prosecute his campaign against Syria. Damascus regards Lebanon as being of crucial strategic importance. It is a possible staging point for an attack by Israel, and Syria has no wish to see it partitioned into confessional statelets which could prove a security threat and also stir up confessional strife in Syria itself. Syria’s direct and costly involvement in Lebanon started in 1976 when it sent its troops there in support of the Maronites, to counter the threat of a

PLO-leftist victory. Over time it came to ally itself with various Muslim factions. But the years of involvement in Lebanon failed to bring about the long-term constitutional changes that Syria seeks, and the unity of the country, which Syria claims it wishes to preserve, was thrown into doubt. It was probable that were the Syrians to withdraw, Lebanon would collapse into anarchy. It could not be denied, however, that the behaviour of Syrian troops in Lebanon left a lot to be desired, and aroused the resentment of various sections of the popula- tion. The protracted crisis Syria faced in Lebanon in 1989 could be traced back to the fiasco of the presidential election the previous summer. Syria had hoped to see a successor elected to Amin Gemayel who would be sympathetic to the views of Damascus, and ready to start the process of reform. After a fruitless search by the Syrians for a compromise candidate acceptable both to them- selves and to at least some important sections of the Maronites (the group that will ultimately have to cede some of their traditional privileges in any programme of reform), there was surprise when Syria came out in support of the seventy-eight year-old pro-Syrian former president Suleiman Franjieh, who was anathema to the Lebanese Forces (LF) and other Maronite quarters. A first attempt to hold the ballot on 18 August failed when Christian deputies stayed away and a quorum could not be achieved. Before the second attempt to stage a ballot, Syria dropped its support for Franjiya in favour of Mikhael Daher, a law- yer and parliamentary deputy from a Syrian-controlled area of northern Leba- non. Syria was supported by the USA in its promotion of Daher, but his candidature was vehemently criticised by Christian militias and by the Leba- neseArmy. Despite talks between President Gemayel and President Assad on its eve, the second ballot, set for 22 September, failed like the first when a quorum couldnotbeachieved.

SyriaBrokersAmal-HezbollahAccord On 22 September 1988, Gemayel’s term ended, and his final act as president was to issue a decree appointing the army commander, General Michel Aoun, as prime minister at the head of a military government. The Muslims saw the ap- pointment of Aoun as a constitutional coup, and the three Muslim generals also named as members of Aoun’s government refused to serve in it. The government of Salim al-Hoss declared that it was the legitimate government, and in this was supported by Syria. By the end of September, Iraq was reported to be supplying the LF with arms, and the following month Iraq was the first country to come out in public support of Aoun. To Syria’s consternation, it was followed inthisby Libya,Damascus’long-timesupporter.