DOCSLIB.ORG

Oklahoma's Make My Day Law

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Oklahoma's Make My Day Law Tulsa Law Review Volume 23 Issue 3 Spring 1988 Oklahoma's Make My Day Law Donna Smith Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Donna Smith, Oklahoma's Make My Day Law, 23 Tulsa L. J. 533 (2013). Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/7 This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Smith: Oklahoma's Make My Day Law RECENT DEVELOPMENT OKLAHOMA'S "MAKE MY DAY" LAW I. INTRODUCTION On April 30, 1987, Governor Henry Bellmon signed into law Oklahoma House Bill No. 15111 which contained the controversial "Make My Day" law.2 This new law expanded Oklahoman's right to use deadly force to protect their homes from intruders. In addition, the law provides immunity from civil liability.3 The law changed hundreds of years of self-defense in the home or defense of dwelling law in order to protect the sanctity of the home. Although Oklahoma's "Make My Day" law addresses both nondeadly and deadly force, the following dis- cussion of the law will be generally limited to the use of deadly force and, therefore, the defense of justifiable homicide. II. DEFENSE OF DWELLING-HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT A cursory look at the development of self-defense and defense of dwelling law provides a background for examination of Oklahoma's pre- vious and present law in this area. The doctrines of self-defense and de- fense of dwelling have evolved over hundreds of years. An innocent person's right to defend himself from an unlawful attack is well estab- fished. The exact boundaries of this right to defend against an attack inside or outside the home, however, are not easily defined. The diffi- culty in defining the limits of self-defense and defense of dwelling reflects the innumerable fact patterns under which the issue can arise, as well as the confusing development of this area of the law.4 1. H. 1511, 41st Leg., 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West). 2. Id. The bill was nicknamed the "Make My Day" bill early in its history. See Okla. Legis- lative Reporter, March 20, 1987; 'Home is Castle'BilIFiled in Oklahoma Senate, NEw GUN WEEK, Feb. 27, 1987, p. 2. 3. H. 1511, 41st Leg., 1987 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 205 (West). 4. See Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335 (1921). The Court stated that "historical mis- takes" may be part of the law of self-defense. Id. at 343. Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1987 1 Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 23 [1987], Iss. 3, Art. 7 TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23:533 A. Early English Law Under the early English law regarding use of deadly force in self- defense, the defender was justified in the use of deadly force only when committed in execution of the King's law.5 In other situations when an innocent person killed another in self-defense, the defender was convicted of homicide but was often automatically pardoned. 6 The early English law of self-defense included the requirement that the degree of force used by the defender could not be greater than the threat of the attacker as reasonably perceived by the defender.7 The early English law of self- defense further required that a defender was justified in using deadly force against an attacker only when he had retreated "to the wall."8 In 1532, England enacted a statute codifying the common law, but failed to address the duty to retreat.9 Perhaps because the statute was silent regarding the duty to retreat, confusion still reigned in this area. The English courts split in their application of the duty to retreat under the new statute. Some courts required an innocent victim to safely re- treat from a murderous attack, while others imposed no such duty.10 The law and the courts continued to require, however, that the amount of force used by the defender be proportionate to the force used by the attacker. I I Somewhat different rules developed with regard to use of deadly force to defend one's dwelling. In early England, the castle was seen as a sanctuary from danger. The protection it offered was jealously protected by the law.12 The duty to retreat was not imposed when the defender was warding off an assault upon the castle. 13 Early English law reflected 14 the high regard for the castle as a refuge. 5. Beale, Retreatfrom a MurderousAssault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567, 567-68 (1903). 6. Id. at 568; W. WALSH, OUTLINES OF THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW 373-74 (1923). 7. Comment, CriminalLaw-Lovers and Other Strangers: Or, When Is A House a Castle?- Privilege of Non-Retreat in the Home Held Inapplicableto Legal Co-Occupants--State V.Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724 (Fla. 1982), 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 465, 467 (1983) [hereinafter Castle Doctrine]. 8. Comment, Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri: In Search of Castles, 50 UMKC L. REv. 64, 66 (1981) [hereinafter Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri]. 9. Id.; see also 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 478-79 (1968). 10. Dwelling Defense Law in Missouri,supra note 7, at 66-67. 11. 3 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 12 (1883); 4 STEPHENS' COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 38 (W. Winder & L. Warmington eds. 1950). 12. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 223 (1898). In discussing the right of habitation, Blackstone stated that, "the law of England has so particular and tender a regard to the immunity of a man's house, that it styles it his castle, and will never suffer it to be violated with impunity ...... IdL 13. Castle Doctrine, supra note 7, at 467-68. 14. 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (1604); see also Comment, Is a House a Castle?, 9 CONN. L. https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol23/iss3/7 2 Smith: Oklahoma's Make My Day Law 1988] "MAKE MY DAY'" LAW B. American law 1. Criminal liability for defense of dwelling American courts and legislatures adopted and codified the English law in the area of self-defense. The duty to retreat when threatened with a deadly assault was adopted by some states.15 Others adopted what came to be called the "true-man" rule holding that retreat was unneces- sary to justify homicide committed in self-defense.' 6 All states, however, adopted the rule that deadly force could be used only when the defender believed that death or serious bodily injury was threatened.17 Some jurisdictions held that the homicide was justified when that belief was honest, 18 while other jurisdictions required a rea- sonable belief.19 REv. 110, 114 (1976) (characterizing early English defense of habitation law as allowing deadly force to defend any intrusion on the home). The Semayne's Case stated: That the house of every one is to him as his castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose; and although the life of man is a thing pre- cious and favoured in law; so that although a man kills another in his defence, or kills one per infortun', without any intent, yet it is felony, and in such case he shall forfeit his goods and chattels, for the great regard which the law has to a man's life; but if thieves come to a man's house to rob him, or murder, and the owner of his servants kill any of the thieves in defence of himself and his house, it is not felony, and he shall lose nothing. Semayne's Case, 5 Coke 91, 77 Eng. Rep. 194, 195 (1604). The two classifications of homicide recognized in England are reflected in the court's language. For homicide in self-defense, the de- fendant was required to forfeit his goods. Homicide in defense of the home, however, was justified and the defendant lost nothing. For a discussion of homicide in self-defense and justifiable homicide, see Green, The Jury of the English Law of Homicid 1200-1600, 74 MICH. L. REv. 413, 428-44 (1976). 15. King v. State, 233 Ala. 198, 171 So. 254 (1936); State v. Donnelly, 69 Iowa 705, _, 27 N.W. 369, 370 (1886); State v. Cox, 138 Me. 151, -, 23 A.2d 634, 641-42 (1941); State v. Dettmer, 124 Mo. 426, _, 27 S.W. 1117, 1119 (1894); State v. Abbott, 36 N.J. 63, _, 174 A.2d 881, 884-86 (1961); State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, -_, 87 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1955). An early Alabama court upheld jury instructions that embodied the rationale behind the duty to retreat. "'In the system [of self-defense] so established no balm or protection is provided for wounded pride or honor in declin- ing combat, or sense of shame in being denounced as cowardly. Such thoughts are trash, as com- pared with the inestimable right to live.'" Springfield v. State, 96 Ala. 81, _ I1 So. 250, 252 (1892). 16. Brown v. U.S., 256 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1921); People v. Hecker, 109 Cal. 451, -, 42 P. 307, 313 (1895); Enyart v. People, 67 Colo. 434, -, 180 P. 722, 723-24 (1919); Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80, 84 (1877); Burgess v.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • What's Reasonable?: Self-Defense and Mistake in Criminal and Tort
    Do Not Delete 12/15/2010 10:20 PM WHAT’S REASONABLE?: SELF-DEFENSE AND MISTAKE IN CRIMINAL AND TORT LAW by Caroline Forell∗ In this Article, Professor Forell examines the criminal and tort mistake- as-to-self-defense doctrines. She uses the State v. Peairs criminal and Hattori v. Peairs tort mistaken self-defense cases to illustrate why application of the reasonable person standard to the same set of facts in two areas of law can lead to different outcomes. She also uses these cases to highlight how fundamentally different the perception of what is reasonable can be in different cultures. She then questions whether both criminal and tort law should continue to treat a reasonably mistaken belief that deadly force is necessary as justifiable self-defense. Based on the different purposes that tort and criminal law serve, Professor Forell explains why in self-defense cases criminal law should retain the reasonable mistake standard while tort law should move to a strict liability with comparative fault standard. I. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................... 1402 II. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE ................................................... 1403 III. THE PEAIRS MISTAKE CASES .................................................. 1406 A. The Peairs Facts ..................................................................... 1408 B. The Criminal Case .................................................................. 1409 1. The Applicable Law ........................................................... 1409
    [Show full text]
  • A History of the Law of Assisted Dying in the United States
    SMU Law Review Volume 73 Issue 1 Article 8 2020 A History of the Law of Assisted Dying in the United States Alan Meisel University of Pittsburgh, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr Part of the Health Law and Policy Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Legal History Commons Recommended Citation Alan Meisel, A History of the Law of Assisted Dying in the United States, 73 SMU L. REV. 119 (2020) https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol73/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu. A HISTORY OF THE LAW O F ASSISTED DYING IN THE UNITED STATES Alan Meisel* TABLE OF CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION ........................................ 120 II. TERMINOLOGY ........................................ 120 III. HISTORY OF THE LAW OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE . 123 A. THE LAW S O F SUICIDE AND ATTEMPTED SUICIDE ..... 124 B. THE LAW O F ASSISTED SUICIDE ....................... 125 IV. THE MODERN AMERICAN LAWS OF HOMICIDE, SUICIDE, ATTEMPTED SUICIDE, AND ASSISTED SUICIDE ................................................. 125 V. EUTHANASIA AND ASSISTED SUICIDE FOR THE TERMINALLY ILL ...................................... 127 A. NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY ...... 127 B. THE RENEWAL OF THE DEBATE, POST-WORLD WAR II ............................................... 129 C. THE EFFECT OF MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND THE “RIGHT TO DIE” ...................................... 130 D. THE “RIGHT TO DIE” AS A TRANSITIONAL STAGE TO ACTIVELY HASTENING DEATH ........................ 132 VI. THE GULF BETWEEN THEORY AND PRACTICE . 135 A. PROSECUTION OF LAY PEOPLE .......................
    [Show full text]
  • Felony Murder -- Homicide by Fright David A
    NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 44 | Number 3 Article 16 4-1-1966 Criminal Law -- Felony Murder -- Homicide by Fright David A. Irvin Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation David A. Irvin, Criminal Law -- Felony Murder -- Homicide by Fright, 44 N.C. L. Rev. 844 (1966). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol44/iss3/16 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 Criminal Law-Felony Murder-Homicide by Fright X, in committing armed robbery of a tavern, fires a warning shot into the ceiling to show he means business. Y, a customer in the tavern and one of the intended victims, has a heart attack and dies. May X be convicted of first degree murder? In State v. McKeiver,1 a New Jersey Superior Court, applying its felony- murder statute,2 held that this situation was sufficient to support an indictment for first degree murder. This note will attempt to examine the felony-murder rule, its purpose and the validity of this extended application. At common law the felony-murder rule was simply that a homi- cide resulting from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony was designated as murder.' Today, the rule, as generally codified in this country, is that a murder4 committed in the perpetra- tion or the attempted perpetration of one of the "dangerous" felonies5 designated by statute is a first degree offense.' There are '89 N.J.
    [Show full text]
  • Criminal Law - Felony-Murder - Killing of Co- Felon William L
    Louisiana Law Review Volume 16 | Number 4 A Symposium on Legislation June 1956 Criminal Law - Felony-Murder - Killing of Co- Felon William L. McLeod Jr. Repository Citation William L. McLeod Jr., Criminal Law - Felony-Murder - Killing of Co-Felon, 16 La. L. Rev. (1956) Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/lalrev/vol16/iss4/21 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at LSU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Louisiana Law Review by an authorized editor of LSU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XVI Orleans is denied constitutional jurisdiction to establish paternity in civil cases as well as in prosecutions under R.S. 14:74 by the present decision, a constitutional amendment will be neces- sary if it is desired that the juvenile court exercise jurisdiction over such cases.24 Regardless of whether an adequate civil rem- edy is provided or the criminal procedure is revised to meet the Supreme Court's objection, it is important that some procedure be made available to impose the burden of supporting the illegitimate offspring of known fathers on those parents rather than on a welfare agency of the state. Jack Brittain CRIMINAL LAW - FELONY-MURDER - KILLING OF CO-FELON In the retreat from a store at which they had committed armed robbery, two felons were pursued by the proprietor, who fatally shot one of them. The surviving felon was indicted under the felony-murder statute. The lower court sustained the de- fendant's demurrer to the evidence, and the Commonwealth ap- pealed.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 11: Homicide
    Chapter 11: Homicide Chapter Overview: Chapter eleven discusses the fourth category of crime against the person, criminal homicide. This is considered to be the most serious of all criminal offenses. There are four different types of homicide: justifiable homicide, excusable homicide, murder, and manslaughter. Criminal homicide is divided into murder and manslaughter, with the distinction being the presence or lack of malice. Murder can include a broad group of crimes, such as depraved heart murders, which is a killing caused by an extreme level of negligence on the part of perpetrator, and felony murder, which is killing that takes place during the course of another felony crime. There are also separate distinctions within the terms murder and manslaughter that serve to identify different levels of crime. Manslaughter is divided into voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter involved a heat-of-the-moment decision made without malice. Involuntary manslaughter results from a criminal degree of negligence and in some states, like Florida, can also include categories like vehicular manslaughter. Murder is also divided into two categories: first-degree murder and second-degree murder. The distinction between the two that makes first-degree murder the most serious is that it includes premeditation and deliberation. This means that the perpetrator took time to consider his or her decision to commit the act for some length of time prior to the murder. This chapter also addresses important questions such as when human life begins and ends. Due the limits of medical science, common law utilized the rule that a person could not be criminally responsible for the murder of a fetus unless the child is born alive.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 18 SELF-DEFENSE 18.01 GENERAL PRINCIPLES Overview
    Chapter 18 SELF-DEFENSE § 18.01 GENERAL PRINCIPLES [A] Overview Every state in the United States recognizes a defense for the use of force, including deadly force, in self-protection. Indeed, one court has observed: It is difficult to the point of impossibility to imagine a right in any state to abolish self defense altogether, thereby leaving one a Hobson's choice of almost certain death through violent attack now or statutorily mandated death [or life imprisonment] through trial and conviction of murder later.1 If a state legislature were to abolish the defense of self-defense, it might very well violate the United States Constitution. 2 Most issues regarding the application of defensive force arise in the context of homicide and attempted murder prosecutions. Therefore, this chapter primarily focuses on the question of when deadly force may be used in self-defense. [B] Elements of the Defense At common law, a non-aggressor is justified in using force upon another if he reasonably believes such force is necessary to protect himself from imminent use of unlawful force by the other person.3 Specifically, however, deadly force is only justified in self-protection if the actor reasonably believes that its use is necessary to prevent imminent and unlawful use of deadly force by the aggressor. 4 1 Griffin v. Martin, 785 F .2d 1172, 1186 n.37 (4th Cir. 1986), aff'd en bane and op. withdrawn, 795 F.2d 22 (4th Cir.1986). 2 See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S._, 128 S.Ct. 2783 (2008) (holding that the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution provides an individual the right to possess a firearm, and to use that weapon for traditional lawful purposes, including self-defense within the home); see also Eugene Volokh, State Constitutional Rights of Self-Defense and Defense of Property, 11 TEx.
    [Show full text]
  • Self-Defense Without Imminence
    ARTICLES SELF-DEFENSE WITHOUT IMMINENCE Fritz Allhoff* ABSTRACT The doctrine of self-defense allows that otherwise criminal force can be justi®ed so long as the actor reasonably believes its use necessary to protect against imminent and unlawful attack. Supposing that the force is necessary to dispel the attack, why the further requirement that the attack is imminent? The restriction precludes the use of force which, ex hypothesi, is the only way that the actor could defend himself. This Article surveys and critiques the rationale for the imminence requirement, arguing that it should be jettisoned in favor of a more expansive conception of self-defense. While the focus is on domestic law, the paper concludes by gesturing towards implications for international law as well, particularly with regards to preventive war (i.e., war against non-imminent threats). I. IMMINENCE AND NECESSITY Self-defense has long been taken to justify an otherwise illicit use of force. William Blackstone, characterizing the eighteenth-century common law of England, provided: [I]f the party himself, or any of these his relations, be forcibly attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force; and the breach of the peace, which happens, is chargeable upon him only who began the affray. For the law, in this case, respects the passions of the human mind; and ... makes it lawful in him to do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain. It considers that the future process of law is by no means an adequate remedy for injuries accompanied with force; since it is impossible to say, to * Fritz Allhoff, J.D., Ph.D., is a Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Western Michigan University.
    [Show full text]
  • Proceedings of the Homicide Research Working Group Meetings, 1997 and 1998
    T O EN F J TM U R ST U.S. Department of Justice A I P C E E D B O J C S F A V Office of Justice Programs F M O I N A C I J S R E BJ G O OJJ DP O F PR National Institute of Justice JUSTICE National Institute of Justice Research Forum Proceedings of the Homicide Research Working Group Meetings, 1997 and 1998 1997: Policy, Practice, and Homicide Research 1998: Bridging the Gaps: Collaborations on Lethal Violence Research, Theory, and Prevention Policy U.S. Department of Justice Office of Justice Programs 810 Seventh Street N.W. Washington, DC 20531 Janet Reno Attorney General Raymond C. Fisher Associate Attorney General Laurie Robinson Assistant Attorney General Noël Brennan Deputy Assistant Attorney General Jeremy Travis Director, National Institute of Justice Office of Justice Programs National Institute of Justice World Wide Web Site World Wide Web Site http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij Proceedings of the Homicide Research Working Group Meetings, 1997 and 1998 May 1999 NCJ 175709 Jeremy Travis Director Findings and conclusions of the research reported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. The National Institute of Justice is a component of the Office of Justice Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime. Table of Contents 1997: Policy, Practice, and Homicide Research......................................1 Discussion 1997 Keynote Kick-Off: What Works? David Kennedy...............................................................3 Building Bridges Between Research and Practice: Youth Violence Prevention Rich Rosenfeld and Troy Miles Anthony Braga, David Kennedy, and Tito Whittington Don Faggiani and Colleen McLaughlin.............................................4 Bridging the Gaps for the Virginia “Cradle-to-Grave” Homicide Project Colleen R.
    [Show full text]
  • Laws: How the Modern NRA-Inspired Self-Defense Statutes Destroy
    Cleveland State Law Review Volume 64 Issue 3 Article 10 6-1-2016 Standing Up to "Stand Your Ground" Laws: How the Modern NRA- Inspired Self-Defense Statutes Destroy the Principle of Necessity, Disrupt the Criminal Justice System, and Increase Overall Violence Daniel Sweeney Cleveland-Marshall College of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev Part of the Law Commons How does access to this work benefit ou?y Let us know! Recommended Citation Daniel Sweeney, Standing Up to "Stand Your Ground" Laws: How the Modern NRA-Inspired Self-Defense Statutes Destroy the Principle of Necessity, Disrupt the Criminal Justice System, and Increase Overall Violence, 64 Clev. St. L. Rev. 715 (2016) available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol64/iss3/10 This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact [email protected]. STANDING UP TO “STAND YOUR GROUND” LAWS: HOW THE MODERN NRA-INSPIRED SELF-DEFENSE STATUTES DESTROY THE PRINCIPLE OF NECESSITY, DISRUPT THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, AND INCREASE OVERALL VIOLENCE DANIEL SWEENEY ABSTRACT A majority of states have enacted “Stand Your Ground” laws. Proponents argue that such laws enhance the important right of self-defense. In application, however, “Stand Your Ground” laws have had a negative impact on society. First, “Stand Your Ground” laws ignore the common-law element of necessity that traditionally provided a check on unreasonable self-defense.
    [Show full text]
  • Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground Instead of Retreat
    University of Baltimore Law Forum Volume 48 Number 1 Article 4 10-1-2017 Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground Instead of Retreat Alicia M. Kuhns Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons Recommended Citation Kuhns, Alicia M. (2017) "Why Maryland Should Stand Its Ground Instead of Retreat," University of Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 48 : No. 1 , Article 4. Available at: https://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol48/iss1/4 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. COMMENT WHY MARYLAND SHOULD STAND ITS GROUND INSTEAD OF RETREAT By: Alicia M. Kuhns* I. INTRODUCTION In the United States, a majority of states do not require one faced with the threat of death to attempt a retreat before defending themselves.' These states employ stand your ground laws which bar the prosecution of individuals who use deadly force against a deadly aggressor without first attempting to retreat.2 A minority of states, including Maryland, enforce a duty to retreat instead of stand your ground.3 Under a duty to retreat, a defendant may not successfully claim self-defense if he could have safely retreated, but failed to do so, before using deadly force against a deadly attacker.4 However, the line between stand your ground and duty to retreat is not clear cut.5 Doctrines, such as the English common law's Castle Doctrine, have blurred the line on when retreat is required.6 As a result, many states have expanded the traditional Castle Doctrine to apply to guests, cohabitants, places of business, etc., making the rule of retreat more obsolete.
    [Show full text]
  • FELON's RESPONSIBILITY for the LETHAL ACTS of OTHERS Norval Morris T
    [Vol. 105 THE FELON'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE LETHAL ACTS OF OTHERS Norval Morris t Far from shrinking under protracted criticism, the felony-murder rule has recently demonstrated a tendency to expand. In particular, courts in Pennsylvania and California have greatly extended the scope of this doctrine. Though their purpose of deterring the commission of certain felonies is commendable, the means selected appears to be socially unwise and is based on reasoning not free from substantial analytic and historical errors. Throughout the Anglo-American system of criminal justice, those who engage in certain felonies and kill the subject of their felonious designs, or those who kill while forcibly resisting lawful arrest, may be convicted of murder. Where, however, death is caused by the retaliatory or defensive action of a victim of an intended felony, or by a police officer or other person assisting him, the criminal responsibility of the felon for that death is less clear. In such circumstances an innocent bystander, a policeman or one of the felons may be killed by an act of justified resistance to the felony or by an act intended to prevent the criminal's escape. Are the felons, by virtue of their felony, murderers? Likewise, if during the course of a felony one of the felons from extraneous motives kills one of his fellow conspirators, the criminal liability of the surviving conspirators, other than the actual killer, is uncertain. Decisions in Pennsylvania and California have held the surviving felons guilty of murder in the first degree in all the above situations. It is proposed to review these cases, to search out the suggested basis of liability, and to urge the repudiation of this extension of the felony- murder rule.
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 200 - Crimes Against the Person
    CHAPTER 200 - CRIMES AGAINST THE PERSON HOMICIDE SECTION 200.010 “Murder” defined. SECTION 200.020 Malice: Express and implied defined. SECTION 200.035 Circumstances mitigating first degree murder. SECTION 200.040 “Manslaughter” defined. SECTION 200.050 “Voluntary manslaughter” defined. SECTION 200.060 When killing punished as murder. SECTION 200.070 “Involuntary manslaughter” defined. SECTION 200.080 Punishment for voluntary manslaughter. SECTION 200.090 Punishment for involuntary manslaughter. SECTION 200.120 “Justifiable homicide” defined. SECTION 200.130 Bare fear insufficient to justify killing; reasonable fear required. SECTION 200.140 Justifiable homicide by public officer. SECTION 200.150 Justifiable or excusable homicide. SECTION 200.160 Additional cases of justifiable homicide. SECTION 200.180 Excusable homicide by misadventure. SECTION 200.190 Justifiable or excusable homicide not punishable. SECTION 200.200 Killing in self-defense. SECTION 200.210 Killing of unborn quick child; penalty. SECTION 200.240 Owner of animal that kills human being guilty of manslaughter under certain circumstances; penalty. SECTION 200.260 Death resulting from unlawful manufacture or storage of explosives; penalty. BODILY INJURY SECTION 200.275 Justifiable infliction or threat of bodily injury not punishable. MAYHEM SECTION 200.280 Definition; penalty. SECTION 200.290 Instrument or manner of inflicting injury immaterial. SECTION 200.300 Injury not resulting in permanent injury; defendant may be convicted of assault. KIDNAPPING SECTION 200.310 Degrees. SECTION 200.320 Kidnapping in first degree: Penalties. SECTION 200.330 Kidnapping in second degree: Penalties. SECTION 200.340 Penalty for aiding or abetting. SECTION 200.350 Where proceedings may be instituted; consent is not defense. SECTION 200.357 Law enforcement officer required to take child into protective custody if child in danger of being removed from jurisdiction.
    [Show full text]