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Privacy, Security, and Digital Inequality

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Privacy, Security, and Digital Inequality Privacy, Security, and Digital Inequality MARY MADDEN Privacy, Security, and Digital Inequality: How Technology Experiences and Resources Vary by Socioeconomic Status, Race, and Ethnicity 09.27.2017 MARY MADDEN Summary of Findings Among the many dimensions of digital inequality is the unequal distribution of the risks and resources associated with online life. Americans with lower levels of income and education are acutely aware of a range of digital privacy-related harms that could upend their financial, professional, or social well- being. And these concerns are often accompanied by low levels of trust in the institutions and companies that these Americans rely on to be responsible stewards of their data. At the same time, there are significant racial disparities when looking at privacy-related concerns; in particular, foreign- born Hispanic adults stand out for both their privacy sensitivites and their desire to learn more about safeguarding their personal information. Yet, many of those who feel most vulnerable to data-related harms also feel as though it would be difficult for them to find the tools and strategies needed to better protect their personal information online. These are among the key findings of a newly-released survey conducted by the Data & Society Research Institute and supported by a grant from the Digital Trust Foundation. The nationally representative survey was fielded in November and December of 2015 among 3,000 American adults, including an oversample of adults with annual household incomes of less than $40,000. The survey provides new insights into the privacy and security experiences of low-socioeconomic status (low-SES) populations and aims to contribute to a deeper understanding of their technology-related behaviors and beliefs. Data & Society Research Institute www.datasociety.net Understanding the Privacy and Security Experiences of Low-SES Populations 2 Americans with lower levels of income and education express heightened concerns about their informational and physical privacy and security. The survey includes a range of questions about various digital privacy and security concerns. For each of these questions, those living in households with annual incomes of less than $20,000 per year are considerably more likely to say that they are “very concerned” about the possibility of these harms when compared with those in households earning $100,000 or more per year: • 60% of those in the lowest-income households say the loss or theft of financial information is something they are “very concerned” about, while just 38% of those in the highest-earning households say the same. • 52% of those in the lowest-earning households say that not knowing what personal information is being collected about them or how it is being used makes them “very concerned,” compared with 37% of those in the highest-income households. • 48% of those in the lowest-income group say they are “very concerned” about becoming the victim of an internet scam or fraud, while just 24% adults in the highest-earning group report this. • 38% of those in the lowest-income households say they are “very concerned” that they or someone in their family may be the target of online harassment, while only 12% of adults in the highest-earning households report this level of concern. Variations by education level are also pronounced, with those who have less than a high school degree expressing roughly the same level of concern as those earning less than $20,000 per year. In addition, the digital privacy and security concerns that low-income Americans express often overlap with the daily challenges of coping with physical or financial insecurities—whether that means dealing with violence in one’s neighborhood or finding enough money to cover basic expenses for their families: • 56% of the lowest-income group say they are “very concerned” about not being able to access or afford the healthcare they or their family needs, while only 21% of adults in the highest-earning group report this as a major concern. Similarly, 56% of those with less than a high school degree are “very concerned” about losing access to healthcare, while just 24% of college graduates share this level of concern. • 48% of the lowest-income group say they are “very concerned” about losing their primary source of income, while just 19% of adults in the highest-earning group report this. Likewise, 47% of those with less than a high school degree are “very concerned” about losing their primary source of income, while just 19% of college graduates share this level of concern. Data & Society Research Institute www.datasociety.net Understanding the Privacy and Security Experiences of Low-SES Populations 3 Privacy and security concerns, by annual household income % of all adults who are "very" concerned about the following issues, by annual household income 60 Annual household Having your financial 50 income info lost or stolen 42 33 Less than $20,000 38 $20,000-39,999 Not knowing what info 52 $40,000-74,999 is being collected 44 about you or how it is 37 $75,000-99,999 35 being used 37 $100,000 or more Not being able to 56 access or afford the 45 34 healthcare you or your 24 family needs 21 48 Being the victim of an 35 26 Internet scam or fraud 23 24 48 Losing your primary 38 source of income, such 28 as your job 18 19 38 Being unfairly targeted 31 20 by law enforcement 15 16 36 Becoming a victim of 29 violent crime in the 15 area where you live 11 12 38 You or someone in your 25 familiy being the target 18 of online harrassment 8 12 Source: Data & Society Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic Status Populations Survey, November 18-December 23, 2015, including an oversample of adults living in households earning less than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish (Total n=3,000 U.S. adults age 18 and older). Foreign-born Hispanic adults, who already lack many resources, feel exceptionally vulnerable online and offline. Beyond broad variations in income and education, this report examines the experiences of different racial and ethnic groups. It also includes a new analysis of Hispanic adults that considers their nativity, Data & Society Research Institute www.datasociety.net Understanding the Privacy and Security Experiences of Low-SES Populations 4 comparing those born in the U.S. with those born in other countries.1 In particular, foreign-born Hispanic adults, who are currently among the lowest-earning and least-educated groups in the U.S., stand out in a number of ways. While 73% of foreign-born Hispanic adults report household incomes of less than $40,000 per year, just 38% of whites report the same. The share of black adults (59%) and U.S.-born Hispanics (62%) in that income category is comparable, but the groups report drastically different educational experiences. Fully 50% of foreign-born Hispanic adults have not completed high school, while just 16% of black adults report this. By comparison, 11% of U.S.-born Hispanics say they have less than a high school degree, and only 8% of whites say this. Foreign-born Hispanic adults report the lowest levels of income and educational attainment Among various racial, ethnic, and nativity groups, the % at each income and eduation level $40,000 22 or more 33 31 55 Less than 73 $40,000 59 62 38 White Black Hispanic (US) Hispanic (FB) 9 18 17 College grad 33 19 Some college 34 35 22 HS grad 30 Less than HS 32 36 28 50 16 8 11 White Black Hispanic (US) Hispanic (FB) Source: Data & Society Privacy and Security Experience of Low-Socioeconomic Status Populations Survey, November 18-December 23, 2015, including an oversample of adults living in households earning less than $40,000 per year. Interviews were conducted in English and Spanish (Total n=3,000 U.S. adults age 18 and older). It is within this context of limited resources that foreign-born Hispanics are navigating their own use of technology amid a variety of daily worries that are not front-of-mind for most Americans. The range 1 According to Pew Research Center data from 2015, Hispanics accounted for 17.6% of the total U.S. population. Among adult Hispanics, 47.9% are foreign-born. For a more detailed statistical portrait, see: http://www.pewhispanic.org/2017/09/18/facts-on-u-s-latinos/#share-foreign-born Data & Society Research Institute www.datasociety.net Understanding the Privacy and Security Experiences of Low-SES Populations 5 of concerns they express about their financial, informational, and physical security suggest a climate of vulnerability that extends across a number of critical areas in their lives. In particular, the intensity of these concerns often stands in stark contrast to the worries expressed by U.S.-born Hispanics and white adults in our sample. In most cases—though not all—foreign-born Hispanic adults are also significantly more likely to report strong concerns than black adults. Among the largest gaps: • 65% of foreign-born Hispanic adults say they are “very concerned” about becoming a victim of violent crime in the area where they live. That compares with 41% of black adults, 32% of U.S.-born Hispanics, and just 12% of white adults expressing this level of concern about crime in their neighborhoods. • 62% of foreign-born Hispanic adults say they are “very concerned” about being unfairly targeted by law enforcement, compared with 32% of U.S.-born Hispanics and only 13% of whites. In this case, black adults share a comparable level of concern: 54% say they are “very concerned” about law enforcement targeting them unfairly.
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