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Φ ISBN 978-2-88931-293-1 1 The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education This book aims at six important conceptual tools developed by philosophers to address the meaning of ethics. The author develops each particular view in The Value of Critical Knowledge,Education Ethicsand Critical Value of The a chapter, hoping to constitute at the end a concise, interesting and easily readable whole. These concepts are: 1. Ethics and realism: elucidation of the distinc- Philosophy 1 tion between understanding and explanation – the lighthouse type of normativity. 2. Leadership, antirealism and moral psychology – the lightning rod type of normativity. 3. Bright light on self-identity and positive reciprocity – the reciprocity type of norma- tivity. 4. The virtue of generosity and its importance for inclusive education – the divine will type of normativity. 5. Ethical education as normative philosophical perspective. The Value of Critical Knowledge, The normativity of self-transformation in education. 6. Aesthetics as expression of human freedom and concern for the whole world in which we live, and which lives in Ethics and Education us. We share an artistic presence in communities of practice, and across wider human circles, and finally seek to unite in the celebration of friendship and humanity across Philosophical History Bringing Epistemic boundaries in a philosophical garden. and Critical Values to Values Ignace Haaz Ignace Haaz Since 2012, Ignace Haaz has contributed to release over 190 books on ethics, theology and philosophy as Globethics.net Publications Manager across 14 Series in 7 languages and Series Editor. As ethics online library executive, he is also developing online library collections on applied HaazIgnace ethics for Globethics.net, currently focusing in particular on education. Previously Ignace received a Doctorat ès Lettres from the University of Geneva and taught ethical theories as Doctor Assistant at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Fribourg (Switzerland). Globethics.net The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education Philosophical History Bringing Epistemic and Critical Values to Values “Education is another sun to those who are educated” Heracleitus of Ephesus, Fragment 134. The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education Philosophical History Bringing Epistemic and Critical Values to Values Ignace Haaz Globethics.net Philosophy Series No. 1 Globethics.net Philosophy Director: Prof. Dr. Obiora Ike, Executive Director of Globethics.net in Geneva and Professor of Ethics at the Godfrey Okoye University Enugu/Nigeria. Series editor: Dr Ignace Haaz, Managing Editor. Globethics.net Philosophy Series 1 Ignace Haaz, The Value of Critical Knowledge, Ethics and Education: Philosophical History Bringing Epistemic and Critical Values to Values Geneva: Globethics.net, 2019 ISBN 978-2-88931-292-4 (online version) ISBN 978-2-88931-293-1 (print version) © 2019 Globethics.net Assistant Editor: Samuel Davies Proofreading: Tiffany Hemecker Cover design: Michael Cagnoni Globethics.net International Secretariat 150 route de Ferney 1211 Geneva 2, Switzerland Website: www.globethics.net/publications Email: [email protected] All web links in this text have been verified as of June 2019. The electronic version of this book can be downloaded for free from the Globethics.net website: www.globethics.net. The electronic version of this book is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License (CC BY- NC-ND 4.0). See: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/. This means that Globethics.net grants the right to download and print the electronic version, to distribute and to transmit the work for free, under the following conditions: Attribution: The user must attribute the bibliographical data as mentioned above and must make clear the license terms of this work; Non- commercial. The user may not use this work for commercial purposes or sell it; No derivative works: The user may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. Nothing in this license impairs or restricts the author’s moral rights. Globethics.net retains the right to waive any of the above conditions, especially for reprint and sale in other continents and languages. TABLE OF CONTENTS Introduction ........................................................................ 9 1 Ethics and Realism: Elucidation of the Distinction between Understanding and Explanation ...................... 15 1.1 Introduction ................................................................................. 15 1.2. The Ethical Norm as a Lighthouse .............................................. 18 1.3 Kant as Precursor of Dilthey’s Comprensive Psychological Philosophy of the Mind ...................................................................... 19 1.4 Self-Understanding: Anthropological Foundation of Psychology and Psychopathology ........................................................................ 22 1.5 Conclusion .................................................................................... 26 1.6 Bibliography ................................................................................. 29 2 Leadership, Anti-realism and Moral Psychology ....... 31 2.1 Realistic Ethical Leadership, Anti-realism and the Apology of Innocence: Introduction of Ethical Normativity as a Lightning Rod ............................................................................. 31 2.2 Realism and Antirealist Leadership Based on the Unconscious Internal Drive ..................................................................................... 42 2.2.1 Irony in Innocence: Liberation from Narrow Expertise ........ 54 2.3 Genealogical Perspective: The Drive for Power as Condition for any other Passion ......................................................................... 58 2.3.1 Redefining Power as a Decent Standard .............................. 60 2.4 References ................................................................................. 111 3 The Bright Lights on Self Identity and Positive Reciprocity ....................................................................... 121 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 123 3.2 “Hate is to be conquered by Love”: Shared Competencies vs Integrity ........................................................................................... 132 3.2.1 Spinoza’s High Standard of Personal Values ...................... 136 3.2.2 Ethics of Sustainability: An Immanent Onto-Metaphysical Foundation .................................................................................. 138 3.3 Spinoza’s Realistic Principle of an Ethic of Competency and Sustainability: Reflecting on the Real Formal Causes ............... 139 3.3.1 The Monistic Notion of Identity Related Mutual Recognition vs the Transformative Model .................................. 143 3.3.2 Enlargement of Spinoza’s Realistic Reciprocal Interactions: the Politeness Theory............................................. 144 3.4 Conclusion ................................................................................. 145 3.5 Bibliography .............................................................................. 147 4 R. Descartes’ Virtue of Generosity and its Importance for Inclusive Education ................. 151 4.1 Exemplarity Based Education: Trusting Some Passions as Admiration or Wonder ................................................................ 151 4.2 Esteem Based Education: a not so Admirable Direction Model of Education: Generosity as a Focus ..................................... 154 4.3 Generosity Related Carthesian Corpus ...................................... 157 4.4 Conclusion ................................................................................. 166 4.5 Bibliography .............................................................................. 167 5 Ethical Education as Normative Philosophical Perspective ....................................................................... 171 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................... 171 5.2 Philosophical Models of Knowledge Acquisition Based on Capacities/Merit and the Perspective of Innate Ideas ................ 173 5.3 The Great Global Paradigm Shifts Challenging Higher Education: Cognitive and Ethical Values Acquisition and Sharing ... 187 5.4 Self-directed Individual Education as Motivating Ground for Common Good and Social Education ......................................... 191 5.5 Social Education and the Point of View of the Rights: Cultural Rights and Africa ................................................................ 194 5.5.1 Extract of the Main Definitions of Cultural Rights Regarding Education .................................................................... 197 5.5.2 Annex .................................................................................. 200 5.6 Bibliography ............................................................................... 200 6 Conclusion: The Aesthetics of a Philosophical Garden ............................................................................. 205 6.1 Garden Virtues and Garden Vices.......................................... 209 6.2 A Garden Based Space out of the Agora................................ 216 INTRODUCTION “Why should I be ethical?” is the central philosophical question we are trying to address. In order to answer, we could first clarify
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