A Brief History of Bank Capital Requirements in the United States Joseph G

Total Page:16

File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb

A Brief History of Bank Capital Requirements in the United States Joseph G Number 2020-05 February 28, 2020 A Brief History of Bank Capital Requirements in the United States Joseph G. Haubrich* Modern capital requirements can appear to be overly complex, but they reflect centuries of practical experience, compromises between different regulators, and legal and financial systems that developed over time. ThisCommentary provides a historical perspective on current discussions of capital requirements by looking at how the understanding of bank capital and the regulations regarding its use have changed over time. When Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr founded What Is Bank Capital? their rival banks in the 1780s, their charters required At a simple level, a bank’s capital is the stock or equity put them to hold capital, but the rules were far simpler than up by the bank’s owners. The bank then takes in deposits or the hundreds of pages of regulations facing today’s banks. other debt liabilities and uses the debt and equity to acquire assets, which means mainly making loans, but they also buy Today’s rather complicated (some would say arcane) branches, ATMs, and computers. In fact, a rough picture rules may look less arbitrary if viewed as the outcome of of a bank is that it takes in capital and deposits and makes a centuries-long lived experience in a changing financial, loans. So this logic also means the capital, or equity, is the legal, and political landscape. This Commentary provides difference between the value of the assets and the value a historical perspective on current discussions of capital of the liabilities. As such, capital can act as a buffer: If the requirements by looking at how the understanding of loans don’t pay off, the value of the equity gets reduced, bank capital and the regulations regarding its use have but there will (might?) still be enough assets to pay off the changed over time.1 depositors so the bank doesn’t get closed down. And if the loans do well, the capital owners get to keep the profits after paying the interest due to the depositors. Joseph G. Haubrich is a senior economic and policy advisor at the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. The views authors express in Economic Commentary are theirs and not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System or its staff. Economic Commentary is published by the Research Department of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Economic Commentary is also available on the Cleveland Fed’s website at www.clevelandfed.org/research. To receive an e-mail when a new Economic Commentary is posted, subscribe at www.clevelandfed.org/subscribe-EC. ISSN 2163-3738 DOI: 10.26509/frbc-ec-202005 This may sound a bit esoteric, but the ideas should be level of capital, which often depended on where the bank familiar to every homeowner.2 To purchase an asset (the was headquartered: Section 7 of the National Banking Act home) the buyer puts up some of his or her own money of 1864, for example, prescribed $50,000 for places with a (the equity) and borrows the rest (the mortgage). If the population of 6,000 or less. State regulations differed both as house appreciates in value, the owner can sell it and make a to capital levels and population, with Maryland at one time profit after paying off the mortgage (the debt). If the house having seven categories and Nebraska eight (Grossman, depreciates, the equity acts as a protective buffer for the 2010, p. 236).3 lender: As long as the house price falls less than the value of Early capital requirements showed more similarity to their the equity, the owner will get enough money from a sale to modern counterparts than readily meets the eye, however. pay back the mortgage. While the law prescribed a minimum level of capital, Because banking is such an important part of the economy, bank charters also restricted bank liabilities to a multiple regulators have established minimum required levels of of capital. Of course, mathematically, requiring 10 percent bank capital, generally requiring more capital if the bank capital is the same as limiting liabilities to being 10 times is larger or is riskier, though exactly what counts as capital capital. This was a restriction on liabilities, not assets (as these days, and how size and risk are measured, becomes capital ratios are phrased today), but the logic of double- quite complex. entry bookkeeping makes a limit on liabilities also a limit on assets. This identity never really held, however, because Early Capital Requirements deposits were often exempted and not counted against the The intricacies of modern capital requirements appear liability limit. It seems that Hamilton and the other bank less tangled when viewed as the outgrowth of centuries founders assumed deposits would be specie, a usage and an of practical experience, of compromises between different assumption that did not last.4 regulators, and of legal and financial systems that developed over time. In Hamilton and Burr’s day, banks were required Exempting deposits effectively made the capital requirement to hold capital, but the rules were far simpler then than a rule that specie backed bank notes and for that reason, today (table 1). In the nation’s earliest years, capital most Hammond (1985) argues that these restrictions actually often meant the specie—gold or silver—originally contributed represented a different type of bank regulation, namely, a by the bank’s organizers to get it started. (Hammond, 1985, reserve requirement. Where a capital requirement specifies p. 134) Unlike today’s capital requirements, which are set the amount of capital that a bank must hold, a reserve in terms of a specified fraction of assets (perhaps adjusted requirement specifies the amount of liquid assets that the for risk), back then the law required a minimum absolute bank must hold. This makes the early capital requirement Table 1. Summary of Capital Regulations Time period Capital regulation 18th and early 19th century Banks chartered by states. Banks required to have a minimum level of capital to start. Rules vary by state. National Banking Era, 1864 National banks created; starting capital depends on location of bank. Deposits become more important. 20th century Comptroller considers capital-to-deposit ratio, following states. New Deal lists capital adequacy as requirement for Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) coverage. Post–World War II In 1950s, capital only one component of supervision; risk of assets considered. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (ILSA) requires supervisors to create capital requirements. United States implements Basel I in 1989; explicit risk-weighted assets. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) creates prompt corrective action. 21st century: Basel and Basel II, 2007, creates standardized and advanced approaches. Dodd–Frank Act Basel II and Dodd–Frank Act create capital conservation buffer (CCB), countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB), supplemental leverage ratio (SLR), and global systemically important bank (GSIB) surcharges. Stress tests: Dodd–Frank Act Stress Tests (DFAST) and Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR). 2 that banks hold a certain amount of gold relative to an asset ratio of better than one-tenth capital to total their liabilities look a lot like a reserve requirement. The assets—New Deal legislation had listed adequate capital restrictions soon explicitly required that banks hold a as a prime criterion for deposit insurance eligibility. In fraction of liabilities as specie, which made it a classic 1942, quantitative criteria were effectively suspended to reserve requirement. Gradually, deposits became more aid in the war effort by bank supervisors not wishing to important than bank notes, which eventually disappeared, restrain banks’ purchase of Treasury securities (Orgler leading to today’s reserve requirements, where banks must and Wolkowitz, 1976). The question returned after the hold a certain amount of cash or reserves with the Federal war, however, with the comptroller’s office looking at the Reserve as a fraction of their deposits. ratio of capital to what it termed risk assets, that is, assets excluding cash and government bonds, a very early form The early capital requirements also took the idea of of “risk-weighted assets” that became important later on. capital as a buffer stock very seriously, as equity at times By 1952 the Federal Reserve Bank of New York created had double, triple, or even unlimited liability (Grossman, an explicit formula for weighting different assets by their 2010, p. 237). That meant that if the bank suffered losses, risk, and in 1956 the Board of Governors adopted a similar the equity holders would have to pony up more money. ABC (Analyzing Bank Capital) model. The trend was not Furthermore, capital did not have to be “fully subscribed” monotonic, however, as in 1962 the comptroller, on the before a bank opened: Section 14 of the National Bank Act urging of banks, de-emphasized formulas (Hahn, 1966) of 1863 required just half the capital to be paid in before and even in the 1970s maintained that capital ratios were operations could commence. This created the distinction only one part of a suite of tools for assessing bank health between authorized and paid-up capital. The remaining (Tarullo, 2008). Furthermore, the different regulators had “uncalled’” capital served as an additional buffer in case different definitions of what counted as capital. Capital of losses. An individual might subscribe for, say, $1,000 ratios were used as a supervisory instrument, but the legal of capital, pay in $500 with specie, and remain liable for authority to enforce capital limits was at best unclear. The the additional $500 if the bank had need of it. If the stock Federal Reserve lost a court battle in 1959 when it tried to had double liability, the individual might then be asked to revoke Federal Reserve membership on the basis of capital contribute another $1,000.5 problems (Orgler and Wolkowitz, 1976).
Recommended publications
  • Basel III: Post-Crisis Reforms
    Basel III: Post-Crisis Reforms Implementation Timeline Focus: Capital Definitions, Capital Focus: Capital Requirements Buffers and Liquidity Requirements Basel lll 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 1 January 2022 Full implementation of: 1. Revised standardised approach for credit risk; 2. Revised IRB framework; 1 January 3. Revised CVA framework; 1 January 1 January 1 January 1 January 1 January 2018 4. Revised operational risk framework; 2027 5. Revised market risk framework (Fundamental Review of 2023 2024 2025 2026 Full implementation of Leverage Trading Book); and Output 6. Leverage Ratio (revised exposure definition). Output Output Output Output Ratio (Existing exposure floor: Transitional implementation floor: 55% floor: 60% floor: 65% floor: 70% definition) Output floor: 50% 72.5% Capital Ratios 0% - 2.5% 0% - 2.5% Countercyclical 0% - 2.5% 2.5% Buffer 2.5% Conservation 2.5% Buffer 8% 6% Minimum Capital 4.5% Requirement Core Equity Tier 1 (CET 1) Tier 1 (T1) Total Capital (Tier 1 + Tier 2) Standardised Approach for Credit Risk New Categories of Revisions to the Existing Standardised Approach Exposures • Exposures to Banks • Exposure to Covered Bonds Bank exposures will be risk-weighted based on either the External Credit Risk Assessment Approach (ECRA) or Standardised Credit Risk Rated covered bonds will be risk Assessment Approach (SCRA). Banks are to apply ECRA where regulators do allow the use of external ratings for regulatory purposes and weighted based on issue SCRA for regulators that don’t. specific rating while risk weights for unrated covered bonds will • Exposures to Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) be inferred from the issuer’s For exposures that do not fulfil the eligibility criteria, risk weights are to be determined by either SCRA or ECRA.
    [Show full text]
  • Reducing Procyclicality Arising from the Bank Capital Framework
    Joint FSF-BCBS Working Group on Bank Capital Issues Reducing procyclicality arising from the bank capital framework March 2009 Financial Stability Forum Joint FSF-BCBS Working Group on Bank Capital Issues Reducing procyclicality arising from the bank capital framework This note sets out recommendations to address the potential procyclicality of the regulatory capital framework for internationally active banks. Some of these recommendations are focused on mitigating the cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement, while maintaining an appropriate degree of risk sensitivity. Other measures are intended to introduce countercyclical elements into the framework. The recommendations on procyclicality form a critical part of a comprehensive strategy to address the lessons of the crisis as they relate to the regulation, supervision and risk management of internationally active banks. This strategy covers the following four areas: Enhancing the risk coverage of the Basel II framework; Strengthening over time the level, quality, consistency and transparency of the regulatory capital base; Mitigating the procyclicality of regulatory capital requirements and promoting the build up of capital buffers above the minimum in good economic conditions that can be drawn upon in stress; and Supplementing the capital framework with a simple, non-risk based measure to contain the build up of leverage in the banking system. The objective of these measures is to ensure that the Basel II capital framework promotes prudent capital buffers over the credit cycle and to mitigate the risk that the regulatory capital framework amplifies shocks between the financial and real sectors. As regulatory capital requirements are just one driver of bank lending behaviour, the proposals set out should be considered in the wider context of other measures to address procyclicality and reduce systemic risk.
    [Show full text]
  • Financial Risk&Regulation
    Financial Risk&Regulation Sustainability in finances – opportunities and regulatory challenges Newsletter – March 2021 In addition to the COVID-19 pandemic, last year has been characterized by a green turnaround that involved the financial sector as well. Sustainability factors are increasingly integrated into the regulatory expectations on credit institutions and investment service providing firms, as well as new opportunities provided by capital requirement reductions. In addition to a number of green capital requirement reductions, the Hungarian National Bank (MNB) recently issued a management circular on the adequacy of the Sustainable Financial Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) applicable from March 10. In our newsletter, we cover these two topics. I. Green Capital Requirement Discount construction the real estate should have an energy for Housing rating of “BB” or better. In course of modernization the project should include at least one modernization In line with the EU directive and in addition to the measure specified by the MNB (e.g. installation of “green finance” program of several other central solar panels or solar collectors, thermal insulation, banks, MNB also announced its Green Program facade door and window replacement). In the in 2019, which aimed to launch products for the case of a discounted loan disbursed this way, the Hungarian financial sector that support sustainability, central bank imposes lower capital requirement on and to mobilize the commercial banks and disbursing institutions, if the interest rate or the APR investment funds. All this is not only of ecological (THM) on the “green” loan is at least 0.3 percentage significance: under the program, banks can move points more favourable (compared to other similar towards the “green” goals by reducing their credit products).
    [Show full text]
  • Revised Standards for Minimum Capital Requirements for Market Risk by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (“The Committee”)
    A revised version of this standard was published in January 2019. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.pdf Basel Committee on Banking Supervision STANDARDS Minimum capital requirements for market risk January 2016 A revised version of this standard was published in January 2019. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.pdf This publication is available on the BIS website (www.bis.org). © Bank for International Settlements 2015. All rights reserved. Brief excerpts may be reproduced or translated provided the source is stated. ISBN 978-92-9197-399-6 (print) ISBN 978-92-9197-416-0 (online) A revised version of this standard was published in January 2019. https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d457.pdf Minimum capital requirements for Market Risk Contents Preamble ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 5 Minimum capital requirements for market risk ..................................................................................................................... 5 A. The boundary between the trading book and banking book and the scope of application of the minimum capital requirements for market risk ........................................................................................................... 5 1. Scope of application and methods of measuring market risk ...................................................................... 5 2. Definition of the trading book ..................................................................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Commercial Bank Examination Manual, Section 3000
    3000—CAPITAL, EARNINGS, LIQUIDITY, AND SENSITIVITY TO MARKET RISK The 3000 series of sections address the super- asset quality (see the 2000 series major head- visory assessment of a state member bank’s ing), the CELS components represent the key Capital, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to areas that examiners review in assessing the market risk (CELS). In addition to the review of overall financial condition of the bank. Commercial Bank Examination Manual May 2021 Page 1 Assessment of Capital Adequacy Effective date November 2020 Section 3000.1 PURPOSE OF CAPITAL financial crisis by helping to ensure that the banking system is better able to absorb losses Although both bankers and bank regulators look and continue to lend in future periods of eco- carefully at the quality of bank assets and nomic stress. In addition, Regulation Q imple- management and at the ability of the bank to ments certain federal laws related to capital control costs, evaluate risks, and maintain proper requirements and international regulatory capi- liquidity, capital adequacy is the area that trig- tal standards adopted by the Basel Committee gers the most supervisory action, especially in on Banking Supervision (BCBS). view of the prompt-corrective-action (PCA) pro- vision of section 38 of the Federal Deposit Applicability of Regulation Q Insurance Act (FDIA), 12 U.S.C. 1831o. The primary function of capital is to fund the bank’s Regulation Q applies on a consolidated basis to operations, act as a cushion to absorb unantici- every Board-regulated institution (referred to as pated losses and declines in asset values that a “banking organization” in this section) that is may otherwise lead to material bank distress or failure, and provide protection to uninsured • a state member bank; depositors and debt holders if the bank were to • a bank holding company (BHC) domiciled in be placed in receivership.
    [Show full text]
  • The Welfare Cost of Bank Capital Requirements
    THE WELFARE COST OF BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS Skander Van den Heuvel1 The Wharton School University of Pennsylvania December, 2005 Abstract This paper measures the welfare cost of bank capital requirements and finds that it is surprisingly large. I present a simple framework which embeds the role of liquidity creating banks in an otherwise standard general equilibrium growth model. A capital requirement plays a role, as it limits the moral hazard on the part of banks that arises due to the presence of a deposit insurance scheme. However, this capital requirement is also costly because it reduces the ability of banks to create liquidity. A key result is that equilibrium asset returns reveal the strength of households’ preferences for liquidity and this allows for the derivation of a simple formula for the welfare cost of capital requirements that is a function of observable variables only. Using U.S. data, the welfare cost of current capital adequacy regulation is found to be equivalent to a permanent loss in consumption of between 0.1 to 1 percent. 1 Finance Department, Wharton School, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, USA. Email: [email protected]. The author especially thanks Andy Abel and Joao Gomes for detailed comments and suggestions, as well as Franklin Allen, John Boyd, Marty Eichenbaum, Gary Gorton, Stavros Panageas, Amir Yaron and seminar participants at the FDIC, the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Reserve Banks of Philadelphia and San Francisco, the NBER Summer Institute, the Society for Economic Dynamics and Wharton, for helpful suggestions. Sungbae An, Itamar Drechsler and Nicolaas Koster provided excellent research assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • MNB Bulletin July 2009
    MNB Bulletin JULY 2009 MNB Bulletin July 2009 The aim of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank with this publication is to inform professionals and the wider public in an easy-to- understand form about basic processes taking place in the Hungarian economy and the effect of these developments on economic players and households. This publication is recommended to members of the business community, university lecturers and students, analysts and, last but not least, to the staff of other central banks and international institutions. The articles and studies appearing in this bulletin are published following the approval by the editorial board, the members of which are Gábor P. Kiss, Róbert Szegedi, Daniella Tóth and Lóránt Varga. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the offical view of the Magyar Nemzeti Bank. Authors of the articles in this publication: Dániel Homolya, Erika Leszkó, Zsuzsa Munkácsi, Klára Pintér, György Pulai, Lóránt Varga This publication was approved by Ágnes Csermely, Péter Tabák, András Kármán. Published by: the Magyar Nemzeti Bank Publisher in charge: Nóra Hevesi H-1850 Budapest, 8-9 Szabadság tér www.mnb.hu ISSN 1788-1528 (online) Contents Summary 4 Dániel Homolya: The impact of the capital requirements for operational risk in the Hungarian banking system 6 Erika Leszkó: Rounding is not to be feared 14 Zsuzsa Munkácsi: Who exports in Hungary? Export concentration by corporate size and foreign ownership, and the effect of foreign ownership on export orientation 22 Klára Pintér and György Pulai: Measuring interest rate expectations from market yields: topical issues 34 Lóránt Varga: Hungarian sovereign credit risk premium in international comparison during the financial crisis 43 Appendix 53 MNB BULLETIN • JULY 2009 3 Summary DEAR READER, The Magyar Nemzeti Bank (MNB) is committed to making easier, a large number of fears were voiced in relation to its central bank analyses dealing with various topical economic introduction.
    [Show full text]
  • In Defence of Var Risk Measurement and Backtesting in Times of Crisis 1 June, 2020
    In Defence of VaR Risk measurement and Backtesting in times of Crisis 1 June, 2020 In Defence of VaR Executive Summary Since the Financial Crisis, Value at Risk (VaR) has been on the receiving end of a lot of criticisms. It has been blamed for, amongst other things, not measuring risk accurately, allowing banks to get away with holding insufficient capital, creating over reliance on a single model, and creating pro-cyclical positive feedback in financial markets leading to ‘VaR shocks’. In this article we do not seek to defend VaR against all these claims. But we do seek to defend the idea of modelling risk, and of attempting to model risk accurately. We point out that no single model can meet mutually contradictory criteria, and we demonstrate that certain approaches to VaR modelling would at least provide accurate (as measured by Backtesting) near-term risk estimates. We note that new Market Risk regulation, the Fundamental Review of the Trading Book (FRTB) could provide an opportunity for banks and regulators to treat capital VaR and risk management VaR sufficiently differently as to end up with measures that work for both rather than for neither. Contents 1 Market Risk VaR and Regulatory Capital 3 2 Can VaR accurately measure risk? 5 3 Regulation and Risk Management 10 4 Conclusion 13 Contacts 14 In Defence of VaR 1 Market Risk VaR and Regulatory Capital Market Risk VaR was developed at JP Morgan in the wake of the 1987 crash, as a way to answer then chairman Dennis Weatherstone’s question “how much might we lose on our trading portfolio by tomorrow’s close?” VaR attempts to identify a quantile of loss for a given timeframe.
    [Show full text]
  • Capital Valuation Adjustment and Funding Valuation Adjustment Claudio Albanese, Simone Caenazzo, Stéphane Crépey
    Capital Valuation Adjustment and Funding Valuation Adjustment Claudio Albanese, Simone Caenazzo, Stéphane Crépey To cite this version: Claudio Albanese, Simone Caenazzo, Stéphane Crépey. Capital Valuation Adjustment and Funding Valuation Adjustment. 2016. hal-01285363 HAL Id: hal-01285363 https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01285363 Preprint submitted on 9 Mar 2016 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Capital Valuation Adjustment and Funding Valuation Adjustment Claudio Albanese1,2, Simone Caenazzo1 and St´ephaneCr´epey3 March 9, 2016 Abstract In the aftermath of the 2007 global financial crisis, banks started reflecting into derivative pricing the cost of capital and collateral funding through XVA metrics. Here XVA is a catch-all acronym whereby X is replaced by a letter such as C for credit, D for debt, F for funding, K for capital and so on, and VA stands for valuation adjustment. This behaviour is at odds with economies where markets for contingent claims are complete, whereby trades clear at fair valuations and the costs for capital and collateral are both irrelevant to investment decisions. In this paper, we set forth a mathematical formalism for derivative portfolio management in incomplete markets for banks.
    [Show full text]
  • Basel-Ii-Iii-Capital-Framework.Pdf
    CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS BASEL II/III CAPITAL DEFINITION AND PILLAR I FRAMEWORK January 2020 2 Table of contents ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 4 1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................... 5 1.1 Authority ......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.2 Purpose ........................................................................................................................................... 5 1.3 Overview ......................................................................................................................................... 5 1.4 Minimum Capital Adequacy Requirement ......................................................................................... 6 1.5 Regulatory Reporting Requirements ................................................................................................. 6 1.6 Commencement ............................................................................................................................... 6 2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION ............................................................................................................... 7 2.1 Treatment of Significant Minority Investments ................................................................................
    [Show full text]
  • Amendments to Capital Planning and Stress Testing Requirements for Large Bank
    FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM 12 CFR Parts 217, 225, 238, and 252 Regulations Q, Y, LL, and YY; Docket No. R-1724 RIN 7100-AF95 Amendments to Capital Planning and Stress Testing Requirements for Large Bank Holding Companies, Intermediate Holding Companies and Savings and Loan Holding Companies AGENCY: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board). ACTION: Final rule. SUMMARY: The Board is adopting a final rule (final rule) to tailor the requirements in the Board’s capital plan rule (capital plan rule) based on risk. Specifically, as indicated in the Board’s October 2019 rulemaking that updated the prudential framework for large bank holding companies and U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations (tailoring framework), the final rule modifies the capital planning, regulatory reporting, and stress capital buffer requirements for firms subject to “Category IV” standards under that framework. To be consistent with recent changes to the Board’s stress testing rules, the final rule makes other changes to the Board’s stress testing rules, Stress Testing Policy Statement, and regulatory reporting requirements, such as the assumptions relating to business plan changes and capital actions and the publication of company-run stress test results for savings and loan holding companies. The final rule also applies the capital planning and stress capital buffer requirements to covered saving and loan holding companies subject to Category II, Category III, and Category IV standards under the tailoring framework. Page 1 of
    [Show full text]
  • Hungary's Banking Sector: Achievements and Challenges
    A Service of Leibniz-Informationszentrum econstor Wirtschaft Leibniz Information Centre Make Your Publications Visible. zbw for Economics Várhegyi, Éva Article Hungary's banking sector: achievements and challenges EIB Papers Provided in Cooperation with: European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg Suggested Citation: Várhegyi, Éva (2002) : Hungary's banking sector: achievements and challenges, EIB Papers, ISSN 0257-7755, European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg, Vol. 7, Iss. 1, pp. 75-89 This Version is available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/44814 Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen: Terms of use: Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Documents in EconStor may be saved and copied for your Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden. personal and scholarly purposes. Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle You are not to copy documents for public or commercial Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich purposes, to exhibit the documents publicly, to make them machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen. publicly available on the internet, or to distribute or otherwise use the documents in public. Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, If the documents have been made available under an Open gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort Content Licence (especially Creative Commons Licences), you genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. may exercise further usage rights as specified in the indicated licence. www.econstor.eu Hungary’s banking sector: Achievements and challenges 1. Introduction Hungary is generally considered one of the best performing transition countries, having been successful in achieving macroeconomic stabilisation and in creating a market-driven economic system (see, for instance, Fischer and Sahay, 2000; and Weder, 2001).
    [Show full text]