2 May 2012 | Vol. 3, № 16.

From the Editor’s Desk Dear FDI supporters,

Welcome to this week’s edition of the and the European Union’s High Strategic Weekly Analysis. This week, we Representative for Foreign Affairs and begin by examining the contentious issue Security Policy, Baroness Ashton. of accessing the energy resources of the Arctic region. Still on the subject of Next, we report on the Sanitation and energy, we also look at developments in Water for All Partnership and Australia’s decision to join the group. the eastern Mediterranean. We conclude this week’s edition with the Next, we head to South Asia. First, FDI Associate Lindsay Dorman investigates the findings of a new report from the dilemma confronting Russia as it International Land Coalition, investigating what has become known as the contributes to NATO efforts to stabilise Afghanistan, while facing a possible loss of “landgrab” phenomenon. influence in the Central Asian republics to I trust that you will enjoy this edition of the United States. FDI Associate N. Sathiya the Strategic Weekly Analysis. Moorthy provides an update on the latest situation in the and we then Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) analyse the implications of the capabilities Institute Director and CEO of India’s newest long-range missile. Future Directions International

Looking at the Middle East, we consider the prospects for the upcoming “5+1” talks on 23 May. We then move to Burma, following the visits there by Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon

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Race for Arctic Energy Resources Ramps Up

Background

The eight members of the Arctic Council1 are in a race to assert their territorial claims in the region. As energy needs grow, ownership of the area’s vast petroleum resources is becoming increasingly contested. In 2007, Russia planted its flag on the Arctic seabed, sparking a series of conferences, culminating in the Ilulissat Declaration. Although aimed at easing territorial tensions, it may well come to be seen as the beginning of an international power struggle.

In mid-April 2012, The United States Geological Society (USGS) released an updated estimate of the Arctic’s natural resources. Eleven per cent of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves lie within the Arctic Ocean and ten per cent of undiscovered gas reserves. Such substantial deposits of valued resources, and their disputed ownership, are likely to cause significant tensions between energy-hungry states.

Comment

The Arctic is globalising. Russia is rapidly opening up the Arctic to foreign investors, highlighted by last month’s billion dollar deals with Exxon Mobil and Eni of Italy. Royal Dutch Shell has also been given the go-ahead to drill off the coast of Alaska, beginning this northern summer. Britain’s Cairn Energy, currently drilling off Greenland and Norway, has in recent years continually moved north to boost its decreasing oil output. The Arctic Council has an increasingly difficult task in balancing the rights of the sovereign Arctic states and the interests of potential users. China, India, Japan and South Korea, all non-member states, are touted as possible major players in the booming Arctic reserves.

The future of the Arctic involves co-operation, not conflict. The current scramble for the Arctic has not yet turned into a military affair, but Canada and Russia have been increasing their military capabilities in their respective arctic regions. The Arctic Council has an increasingly important role to play in mitigating the risk of suspicion and misunderstanding between states. So far, conflict over national boundaries, such as between Russia and Norway, have been settled without dispute. As energy needs increase, and current energy reserves dwindle, such disputes may be more likely to evolve into substantial security risks.

Production from Arctic reserves is still decades away; the Russian joint venture exploration wells are not projected to reach production until 2020. Until then, huge financial outlays without return are to be expected. The long development phase of such projects dramatically increases the risk of failure. Although agreements, such as BP’s contract with Russian state-run energy giant Rosneft, can end badly, the biggest conflict may indeed be between oil and gas companies, with local peoples bearing the brunt of the fall out. Failures such as BP’s do little to promote peaceful co-operation in the area.

The possible environmental impacts of such developments are an essential consideration, particularly in an area as pristine and ecologically important as the Arctic. Such concerns have long halted development in the United States and Canada. In contrast, there have been

1 Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, United States.

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reports that, in Russia, the boundaries of national parks may be redrawn to accommodate development.

An environmental disaster in the Arctic would have transnational effects and an effective response to an oil spill in such remote areas is unlikely. Estimates suggest that 84 per cent of the time it would be impossible to deploy an emergency response due to high winds, waves and darkness. Thick ice sheets in the Arctic will make a clean-up extremely difficult and little research has been done on this style of clean-up. The costs could dwarf that of the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which has reached $40 billion so far. Before development proceeds, science needs to be able to assess the possible damage of such a spill and companies need to demonstrate that they have the funds and technical ability to handle such a disaster.

Premature forays into the far north may have harmful effects on the environment, local peoples and nation states. As an inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council should be encouraged and facilitated to provide opportunities for dialogue on regional issues. Development should only proceed in this sensitive area through a resilient, well-equipped, impartial authority.

James Ball Research Assistant Northern Australia/Energy Security Research Programme

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Energy Development and Security in the East Mediterranean

Background

Traditionally a transit route, recent energy developments in the eastern Mediterranean suggest the region will increasingly yield greater returns and further energy prospects. Offshore basins adjacent to Cyprus, Egypt, Turkey and Israel, have the potential to significantly alter regional dynamics. Political and security considerations, however, may prevent large-scale development. Most recently, in late-April, this was highlighted by increased tensions in northern Cyprus, between Cyprus and Turkey; a long dormant, although potentially volatile regional flashpoint. Elsewhere, tension between Israel and Lebanon, particularly due to unresolved territorial boundaries, provides additional cause for concern.

Comment

Over the last decade, exploration in the Mediterranean has provided a number of untapped oil and gas fields. While the reserves are unlikely to alter the global hydrocarbon mix, projections suggest the fields have the potential to transform the littoral states from energy importers to exporters. Realisation of this energy potential will bring not only economic benefits for the region, but will also strengthen the geopolitical position of its states, particularly Israel. Noble Energy, an American oil company, suggests that the Leviathan and

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Tamar fields, in Israeli waters, may contain about 30 trillion cubic feet of gas. In today’s terms, this represents reserves worth in excess of $670 billion, or three times the United Kingdom’s remaining reserves. Similarly, in the wider Levant Basin, the US Geological Survey estimates there could be an estimated 122 trillion cubic feet of natural gas, and an additional 1.7 billion barrels of oil.

Importantly, however, for the region’s hydrocarbon sector to remain viable, significant issues must be resolved, particularly border delineation, provision of critical infrastructure and regional security architecture.

The confirmation of energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean, has accentuated ongoing maritime disputes in the region. The land border between Israel and Lebanon was demarcated by the UN in 2000, after the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. Although not officially endorsed by the UN, Israel has extended this demarcation into the sea and has deployed a series of buoys in the Mediterranean. Beirut strongly rejects this extension. It has appealed to the UN to resolve the issue. Iran has also provided support to the Lebanese objections, with its usual rhetoric. Correspondingly, in the north-eastern Mediterranean, attempts by Cyprus to define its boundaries have been thwarted by Turkey, which, in April, took a unilateral decision to explore the territory it claims. Further concerns linger over potential claims by Egypt, particularly in relation to an already approved Israeli- Cypriot deal. The current military council have not made their foreign policy intentions clear, and in an effort to foster support for the flagging transition government, may tackle emotive issues, such as Israel.

Developments in the energy sector are not without risk, which will make transporting hydrocarbons a capital intensive process. Long pipelines will be required to transport oil and gas to potential destinations in the European Union. Yet this raises significant dilemmas, particularly for Israel. Israel has no official diplomatic ties with Lebanon and its relations with Egypt have become tense; a development expected to continue, particularly if the Muslim Brotherhood continues to gain strength. In recent years, Jerusalem’s traditional ally in the region, Turkey, has shifted from support of Israel, towards Lebanon and, a matter of particular concern, Iran. Perhaps unlikely, but never to be discounted in the Middle East, energy terrorism will also feature highly in the concerns of energy companies. In response to these developments, reports in the media suggest that the Israeli Navy is preparing an expansion programme, to permit increased security patrols, with a particular focus beyond its immediate littoral. Monitoring equipment and increased security patrols to ensure security of rigs, terminals and underwater facilities, is projected to cost at least $55 million in the initial stages, rising considerably at production. The upper echelons of the military command have gone on record describing the Levant Basin as ’another front’.

The eastern Mediterranean has a number of historic flashpoints. The Arab Spring and changes to political dynamics have dramatically increased regional tension. Since 2000, Lebanon has suffered from endemic state fragility. Hezbollah continues to cause political instability and targeting Israeli developments would be in line with its previous actions. Further, reports suggest the organisation’s capability has dramatically improved since the 2006 Israel border incursion, through increased Iranian support. Flagging support and pressure from more radical elements within Egypt may also prompt a more hostile policy

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from Cairo towards Israel. Conflict remains a remote outcome, yet opportunities for co- operation are also doubtful. Again, conflict in Cyprus is unlikely, although the tension may be enough to dissuade oil major’s from the large-scale investment required to support development.

Finally, the rising geopolitical importance of the eastern Mediterranean may prompt extra- regional players to enter the theatre. Reinforcing this, in 2011, Iran sent two naval vessels through the Suez Canal, through the Mediterranean to dock in Syria. Preoccupied presently with well-documented social unrest, the Syrian navy also has the potential to project power into the Sea. Unrest elsewhere, particularly in Libya, has brought European Union naval vessels into the fray. While not necessarily aggressive in themselves, long-term naval deployments may increase tension, and certainly could add another dimension to developments in the Mediterranean.

Given Israel’s considerable regional power and projection capability, conflict and significant security challenges remain only a moderate concern; yet, that may be enough to dissuade large-scale investment. Consequently, dialogue between all stakeholders is imperative.

Liam McHugh Manager Northern Australia & Energy Security Research Programmes [email protected]

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Russia’s Afghanistan Bind

Background

Russian President Vladimir Putin stated recently that the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was a relic of the Cold War, notwithstanding that it was in Russia’s interests to continue to support the alliance’s presence in Afghanistan, and assist in maintaining stability in the war torn country.

Comment

Russia appears to be caught in something of a bind. On the one hand, desperately wanting to retain influence and integrity in the Central Asian Republics (CARs) of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, all of which formed part of the former Soviet Union and also comprise part of Russia’s so-called “near abroad”, while, on the other hand, supporting NATO in its commitment in Afghanistan.

A crucial component of this complex situation is the Northern Distribution Network, which commences with a rail link from Latvia through Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan and then continues by road through Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan into Afghanistan.

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Russia is currently negotiating a deal with the United States to open up a transit hub in the Volga River city of Ulyanovsk, for equipment and goods flowing out of Afghanistan. For both parties this would be a remarkable achievement – should it transpire – given that relations between the two countries have not always been favourable, even after the March 2009 perezagruzka (reset) agreement.

It also comes at some risk for Putin, who has recently commenced his third presidential term. Both his political opponents and allies may construe it as a loss of sovereignty, even though the Kremlin has made a concerted effort to allay fears that this new facility is not a NATO base; no NATO personnel will be stationed there.

To emphasise the point, Russia’s ambassador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, has stated that the deal is not being “done for a friend” and is a commercial transaction in Russia’s national interest.

Russia is abundantly aware that this action will decrease the reliance of the United States on the CARs. If not limited in scope, it would allow Washington a deep footprint in the region, something Russia would not find comfortable in its own sphere of influence. It must be said, however, that the CARs would see it as a counterbalance to Russian influence. The US base at Manas, in Kyrgyzstan, is one that Russia would like to see closed as soon as possible.

Despite drugs from Afghanistan ending up in Russia, Moscow has tried to play spoiler to the US counter-drug programme in the CARs. It sees that programme as part of a plan to cement the US presence in Central Asia. Some may argue that the Great Game of the nineteenth century is being played out again, with America replacing Great Britain.

Russia’s concerns with Afghanistan, and with the US on Russia’s periphery, are set against Moscow’s serious concerns over US plans to station ballistic missile defences in Poland, Romania, Turkey and Israel, all under the guise of countering Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Russia sees this action as a rerun of the containment policy that the US employed against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In retaliation, Moscow has threatened to base tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad, which borders Poland.

Whatever happens in Afghanistan after 2014, Russia will continue to play a significant role in the stability of the region, notwithstanding its own internal problems. Other strategic issues that arise will have to be handled with supreme care, lest the perezagruzka reset button become peregruzka, or overcharged.

Lindsay Dorman FDI Associate

About the Author: Lindsay Dorman lectured in International Relations at the South Perth Learning Centre from 2009-11. He was Honorary Secretary of the United Nations Association of Australia (WA Division) from 1999 to 2005. He has a Masters Degree in International Relations from Curtin University.

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Maldives: Democracy, Back In Transition Mode?

Background

With the People’s Majlis, or Parliament, clearing President Mohammed Waheed Hassan’s vice-presidential nominee, Waheed Deen, after the “majority” Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) group stayed away, the Indian Ocean archipelago seems to be back in democratic transition, for the second time in three years. A new element has been added this time, with a National Inquiry Commission (NIC) probing the circumstances surrounding the resignation of then MDP President Mohammed Nasheed and his succession by Vice-President Waheed. The Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group has given the Waheed Government four weeks in which to make the probe team credible.

Comment

The last time the Maldives went through a similar phase, the nation ushered in multi-party democracy after 30 years of one-person rule under President . He was elected for six successive terms of five years each, under a constitutional scheme that provided for only a single candidate in national elections. That is firmly in the past, yet, the Nasheed resignation has left a situation of instability. His subsequent charges of a coup-cum- conspiracy, involving some in the uniformed services and “discredited sections” of the polity, and the fact that fresh presidential polls are still a year or so away, in November 2013, have all given rise to the question of whether democracy is really back in transition mode in the Maldives.

No-one has contested the constitutionality of President Waheed’s ascension, legally or otherwise. It has even been argued that the multi-party system, minus the MDP, may have lent the government an element of mainstream consensus, even after President Nasheed ejected two allies that had lent their second-round support to him in the 2008 polls. Their support facilitated his election with a majority vote of over 50 per cent, which he had lacked with his 25 per cent share of the first round vote. Yet, the MDP’s demand for early presidential polls as a compromise solution to a political stalemate, and the inevitability of presidential elections next year, have made for a “lame-duck” government, devoid of constitutional licence.

Adding to the insecure nature of the Waheed Government, are perceptions of a multi- cornered contest for the presidential poll, when it is held. That is likely, at least in the first round, before greater consolidation and polarisation can take place, based mostly on the numbers game, as it was in 2008. Indications are that most of the political parties forming and supporting the Waheed Government, are keen to contest the presidential poll. Any movement towards that situation could expose the internal contradictions that are inevitable in schemes of that nature. The MDP still remains the “majority group” in Parliament, with 31 members, despite two by-election defeats since President Nasheed’s resignation on 7 February and the purported cross-over by one party member. That may not

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help matters, however, when it comes to contesting the legitimacy of the government within the Majlis, particularly if the ruling coalition were to fall apart on some important issues.

The Waheed leadership has declared its intention to step aside and restore President Nasheed, without elections, if the NIC finds substance in his allegations. Otherwise, the President’s camp will stick to presidential polls only when due. In the case of a “hung verdict”, it hopes fresh negotiations will offer a way out. Against this background, new hope has been added by the willingness with which stake-holders have helped revive the All-Party Roadmap talks, initiated at the instance of visiting Indian Foreign Secretary Ranjan Mathai.

In particular, the MDP, which had contested the numerical supremacy of the government side at the all-party talks, is now convinced that conclusions should be based on a consensus approach. How far each stakeholder, particularly the MDP, would contribute towards the consensus process through compromise, would determine the success of the Roadmap talks. Any intervening initiative by the international community, indicating support for the MDP’s known position on power transfer could encourage the MDP and discourage the rest from proceeding with the talks. Already, the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) has served a four-week notice on the Waheed Government to make the probe credible, but that has only led to demands for the Maldives to walk out of the organisation.

Leading the pack in reviving talk of a Maldivian pull-out from the Commonwealth is former President Gayoom, whom the MDP has repeatedly dubbed the brain behind the political conspiracy and the police/military mutiny. For now, President Waheed, an international civil servant with the UN before returning to his country and taking up politics, has denied all suggestions of such a pull-out, but further internationalisation of what essentially is a domestic issue, still could cause more problems than solutions for the Maldives, which is ill- equipped to handle situations of this kind, other than within the country.

N. Sathiya Moorthy FDI Associate

About the Author: The writer is a Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Chennai Chapter of the multi-disciplinary Indian policy think-tank, Observer Research Foundation, headquartered in New Delhi.

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Implications of India's Long-Range Missile Capabilities

Background

As the latest addition to India’s expanding arsenal, the launch of the Agni-5 long-range missile on 19 April is another step forward in the diversification of India’s nuclear strike capabilities. While India celebrates its technological achievement, the development of a

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nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile, with an estimated range of 5,000 kilometres or 3,100 miles, is likely to intensify strategic competition between Pakistan and China, which have viewed these developments with reservation.

Comment

Although senior Indian officials publicly say that the Agni-5 is for deterrence purposes only, India has a clear rationale behind the missile’s development, which is to: demonstrate its expanding strategic strike capabilities, impress the world’s major powers that possess intercontinental missiles and deliver a strong message to Pakistan and China.

As a nation that has reportedly doubled the size of its nuclear arsenal within the last ten years, the Agni-5 is the latest addition to India’s nuclear-capable weapon systems, adding to its existing missile and aircraft deliver systems.

Among Indian strategic planners there is an influential school of thought, who firmly believe, that India must develop world-class military strike capabilities and project the symbolism of a major world power. This, they believe, will provide greater international recognition and further strengthen its case to obtain a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

Senior Indian officials are also wary of China’s power and influence and its ability to thwart India’s regional ambitions, especially in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region. However remote, India also appears to be increasingly concerned about the possibility of a two-front war with Pakistan and China, which has provided added impetus to developing sophisticated military capabilities.

Although the Indian Government has tried to downplay the Agni-5 and portray it as a defensive weapon, Indian defence analysts and the media pointed out the weapon’s significance is to give India strategic parity against China.

The fact India deliberately chose not to inform China of its intention to launch the new missile, is indeed revealing given that all other permanent members of the UN’s Security Council were reportedly told. Officially, China’s response has been reserved and tempered. ‘China and India are both emerging powers. We are not rivals but co-operative partners. We should cherish the hard earned momentum of co-operation,’ stated Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Liu Weimin.

Chinese state media, however, has adopted a different tone accusing India of downplaying the missile’s capabilities, claiming it has an actual range of up to 8,000 km. Similarly, as reported in BBC News, the editor of the Chinese Military Magazine, asserted that: ‘Without an adequate tank corps and a heavy-duty land force with adequate heavy weapons, it [India] can hardly become a so-called “China killer” by relying solely on nuclear weapons.’ More disparagingly, quoting Gao Zugui of the Institute of International Strategic Studies, the South China Morning Post, reported: ‘Despite giving a little support, it was right in saying that if it really wants to become a great nation, each of its families should have a toilet first.’

Furthermore, Pakistan’s response to the launch of the Agni-5 was immediate and forthright. Within days after India launched the Agni-5, Pakistan test-fired the Hatf IV Shaheen-1A, its latest nuclear-capable intermediate-range ballistic missile. Although the range of the new

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missile was not announced, it is speculated to have a range of 2,000 km or 1,240 miles. As emphasised by Lt. Gen. Khalid Ahmed Kidwai, the Pakistani commander overseeing the nation’s nuclear command, Pakistan legitimised the launch, claiming: ‘The improved version of Shaheen-1A will further consolidate and strengthen Pakistan's deterrence abilities.’

Although China has not responded with gestures of hostility, it may choose to respond more subtly as it continues to pursue ways and means to counterbalance India, including the development of its own military capabilities. At this stage, what impact the Agni-5 may have on China’s strategic and defence policy is difficult to interpret, but it is likely that China will look to strengthen further its strategic ties with Pakistan and other Indian Ocean countries that surround India’s immediate neighbourhood.

The sentiment provided an article in the Pakistan Observer on 30 April, is perhaps more illustrative of how either Pakistan or China may choose to respond in the long-term. ‘Neither Beijing nor Islamabad will stand idly by as India arms itself. It could lead to an Asian arms race similar to that witnessed during the Cold War’.

Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe Manager South and West Asia Programme [email protected]

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Iran: New Talks or More of the Same?

Background

In addition to the programmed talks with the six world powers in Baghdad on 23 May, Iran has proposed engaging the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in a new round of talks.

Opinion is divided over whether this new round will lead to an outcome that conclusively supports Iranian claims that it has no interest in developing a nuclear weapons capability.

Comment

Iran’s senior delegate to the IAEA indicated that talks will take place in Vienna on 13-14 May. According to him, the talks will focus on ‘resolving questions’ about Tehran’s intention to develop a nuclear weapon.

To date, the IAEA has not been convinced of Iran’s statement that it has no intention of developing such weapons. Inspectors have been denied access to certain sites and have recently claimed that satellite images support the contention that an apparent clean-up of the Parchin military complex is underway. Iranian officials deny such claims, stating that it is not possible to remove radioactive traces.

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Regardless of their intentions, both sides have a history of publicly doubting each other. The IAEA regularly accuses Iran of not addressing the nuclear weapons issue. Tehran, on the other hand, blames the IAEA for focussing on intelligence reports, often produced by anti- Iranian Western powers, which, it says, seek to publish misleading and inaccurate information.

Iranian leaders must also take some comfort from the recent apparent rift between Israel’s political leadership and senior representatives of its defence and intelligence community, particularly over the effectiveness of independent air strikes and likely repercussions.

Equally, however, Iran’s leadership must be increasingly concerned over the diplomatic and economic pressures that are set to expand as sanctions continue to bite.

The outcome of the IAEA talks, therefore, will be viewed with great interest, to determine if a possible breakthrough is likely or if the results will reflect the lack of success that characterised previous talks.

Major General John Hartley AO (Retd) Institute Director and CEO Future Directions International

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UN Chief and EU Foreign Affairs Boss Complete Burma Visits

Background

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has completed a landmark visit to Burma, designed to encourage the further removal of international sanctions as reforms continue in the formerly isolationist South-East Asian country. Also in Burma was the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Baroness Ashton, who met with Aung San Suu Kyi.

Comment

Mr Ban became the latest in a string of high-profile visitors to Burma, conducting a three-day visit to the country from 30 April-2 May. Mr Ban addressed the Burmese parliament in the remote capital, Naypyidaw, on the first day of his visit; becoming the first foreign dignitary to address the combined houses of the parliament. Despite Mr Ban’s presence, the seat won by Aung San Suu Kyi remained vacant, as her National League for Democracy party – the overwhelming victor in the 1 April by-elections – protested the requirement to “safeguard” the constitution drawn up by the military government in 2008. The NLD ended its boycott the following day, to ‘fulfil the wishes of the people.’

In addition to meeting with President Thein Sein, Mr Ban also met with Lower House Speaker Shwe Mann, the Speaker of the Lower House of the Burmese Parliament, who carries great influence within the government, and with Railways Minister, Aung Min, who is overseeing the government’s peace negotiations with ethnic rebel armies.

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Another recent high-ranking visitor was the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton, who was in Burma from 28-30 April. Baroness Ashton discussed the lifting of sanctions, opened an EU liaison office in Rangoon and met with Ms Suu Kyi, Shwe Mann and Htay Oo, who is Secretary-General of the military- backed Union Solidarity and Development Party that dominates the country’s parliament.

The visits come at an opportune time for President Sein, as he looks to consolidate his position with a Cabinet reshuffle to promote reformers at the expense of longstanding hardliners. Mr Ban described the changes under Thein Sein as ‘an unprecedented opportunity’ and called on all parties to be more flexible in resolving the deadlock and preventing the country from regressing.

The security of President Sein’s position and the trajectory of reforms cannot yet be taken for granted, particularly while uncertainty surrounds the role of former leader, Senior General Than Shwe. Although apparently enjoying a quiet retirement, it would seem likely that General Shwe continues to take a close interest in government policy. Leading Than Shwe protégées and hardliners hold many key posts in the government and have reportedly disagreed with President Sein on a number of issues.

The visits by leading international dignitaries, and the relaxing of Western sanctions, will strengthen President Sein’s position and help to reduce Burma’s dependence on long-time ally, China. Although not happy to see influence lost, Beijing has been aware for some time of the need for stability in its neighbour, with which it shares a long and porous border. Burma’s nascent return to the international fold and the government’s ceasefires with rebel groups, go a long way towards achieving that stability.

Leighton G. Luke Manager Indian Ocean Research Programme [email protected]

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Australia to Join ‘Sanitation and Water for All’ Partnership

Background

Ministers from developed and under-developed countries recently held a meeting in Washington, as part of the Sanitation and Water for All Partnership. The talks focussed on delivering improved access to clean water and sanitation for the world’s poor. Australia has announced its intention to become a member of the Partnership, as well as providing additional aid for its water, sanitation and hygiene programme.

Comment

On 20 April, UNICEF and the World Bank played host to a high level development meeting, featuring ministerial delegations from 40 developing countries, as well as international

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donors. The event took place under the Sanitation and Water for All (SWA) framework, designed to accelerate efforts toward achieving universal water security. The SWA is a ‘partnership of governments, donors, civil society and multilateral organisations’, whose aim is to ensure ‘that all people have access to basic sanitation and safe drinking water’.2 Every two years, Finance Ministers from developing countries meet with the Development Ministers of donor countries, to discuss strategies for improving access to water and sanitation. The partnership’s primary objective is to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) by the target year of 2015.

Adequate sanitation and clean water are recognised as development imperatives by Australia, which was represented at the meeting by Peter Baxter, Director-General of AusAID. Australia’s aid policy, with the strategic goal of saving lives, prioritises safe water and sanitation access as a means of improving the public health of countries in need. By utilising its proficiency in the water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) sector, Australia is well- placed to assist global water security efforts by providing knowledge and financial support. Following April’s SWA meeting, Foreign Minister, Senator Bob Carr, announced that Australia will join the SWA partnership to collaborate more closely with foreign actors. Furthermore, the Australian Government has committed $870 million over the next four years for WASH activities globally.

In 2010, the international community successfully met the MDG target of halving the number of people without access to safe drinking water, five years ahead of schedule. Despite this notable achievement, 780 million people worldwide are still without access to clean water. Moreover, 2.5 billion people lack access to suitable sanitation. At the current rate of progress, the latter objective is unlikely to be met until 2026. Barriers to obtaining universal and sustainable sanitation and clean water arise from a lack of political prioritisation, weak sector capacity to develop and implement effective plans and strategies, and uncoordinated and inadequate investment. The slow progress in improving sanitation standards is having significant negative impacts on the health of the global poor, particularly children.

Multilateral initiatives such as these are vital in combating global water insecurity. The SWA works in partnership with the World Bank and the African Development Bank, as well as NGOs and sectoral institutions, to attain its objectives. Over the next two years, the pledges made by donors at the recent meeting will provide an additional 60 million people with improved drinking water sources and 80 million people with access to improved sanitation. Australia’s contribution, over the next four years, will see clean water access afforded to 2.5 million people in Africa, East Asia and South Asia. A further two million people globally will gain access to improved sanitation. Australia’s role of imparting funds and expertise is crucial to international efforts toward achieving universal water security.

Jay Vella Research Analyst Global Food and Water Crises Research Programme [email protected]

2 http://www.sanitationandwaterforall.org/

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“Landgrab” Report Highlights Failings

Background

Earlier this year, the International Land Coalition released the report, Land Rights and the Rush for Land. It was the culmination of three years of research into the “landgrab” practice and highlights the outcomes and responses that are required by governments. It argues that the poor are bearing disproportionate costs, but reaping few benefits because of poor governance.

Comment

The report suggested that there will be no let-up in demand for land, particularly for African land. Yet, small landholders are missing out on the investment because of inadequate land rights protection. The report suggests that ‘the challenge is to stop dispossession and land allocations that do not serve a genuine public interest, to legally recognise the rights of the rural poor and to steer towards more equitable models that give a key role to existing land users.’

A Land Matrix, also being constructed by the International Land Coalition, shows that land deals under consideration or negotiation worldwide amounted to 203 million hectares between 2000 and 2010 – equivalent to over eight times the size of the United Kingdom.

It is not all about food security, however.

An estimated 78 per cent of the land acquired is for ‘agricultural’ purposes but, strikingly, three-quarters of that is for biofuels. Mineral extraction, industry, tourism and forest conversions make up the remaining 22 per cent of land deals.

Africa is the main target, accounting for 134 million hectares of reported deals. A new driver for this demand is the carbon offset market.

The report suggests that because of the inadequate protections in place, more work needs to be done in developing international human rights laws, which protect the rural poor and the environment. States need to ratify treaties setting human rights standards.

The report correctly identifies significant failings in land rights in developing countries and the opening this provides for exploitation by the élites within the target states. What is more difficult, is finding a solution to the current, inadequate situation.

For report summary, click HERE.

Gary Kleyn Research Manager FDI Global Food and Water Security [email protected]

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What’s Next?

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon completes his visit to Burma today.

United States Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano finishes an official visit to New Zealand today. Ms Napolitano met with Prime Minister John Key and other ministers during her time in Wellington.

US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is scheduled to visit Bangladesh and New

Delhi on 5 May.

Indian Finance Minister Pranab Mukherjee will visit Bangladesh on 5-6 May and Bangladeshi Foreign Minister Dipu Moni travels to India on 6-7 May.

The New Zealand Defence Force is hosting 35 US Marines and 41 US Army personnel for Exercise Alam Halfa, a joint exercise to be held in Palmerston North, Waiouru and Napier that continues until 6 May. The US personnel are exercising with 1,500 personnel of the New Zealand Army’s 1st Brigade in what

is the two countries’ first traditional military exercise on New Zealand soil since the mid-1980s.

The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies is holding an international conference on large-scale agricultural investments on 11 May in Hamburg. More details at: [email protected]

The World Congress on Water, Climate and Energy will be held in Dublin,

Ireland from 13-18 May. For more information: http://iwa-wcedublin.org/

Any opinions or views expressed in this paper are those of the individual author, unless stated to be those of Future Directions International.

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