ANSSI : Guide De Sélection D'algorithmes Cryptographiques
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BLAKE2: Simpler, Smaller, Fast As MD5
BLAKE2: simpler, smaller, fast as MD5 Jean-Philippe Aumasson1, Samuel Neves2, Zooko Wilcox-O'Hearn3, and Christian Winnerlein4 1 Kudelski Security, Switzerland [email protected] 2 University of Coimbra, Portugal [email protected] 3 Least Authority Enterprises, USA [email protected] 4 Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany [email protected] Abstract. We present the hash function BLAKE2, an improved version of the SHA-3 finalist BLAKE optimized for speed in software. Target applications include cloud storage, intrusion detection, or version control systems. BLAKE2 comes in two main flavors: BLAKE2b is optimized for 64-bit platforms, and BLAKE2s for smaller architectures. On 64- bit platforms, BLAKE2 is often faster than MD5, yet provides security similar to that of SHA-3: up to 256-bit collision resistance, immunity to length extension, indifferentiability from a random oracle, etc. We specify parallel versions BLAKE2bp and BLAKE2sp that are up to 4 and 8 times faster, by taking advantage of SIMD and/or multiple cores. BLAKE2 reduces the RAM requirements of BLAKE down to 168 bytes, making it smaller than any of the five SHA-3 finalists, and 32% smaller than BLAKE. Finally, BLAKE2 provides a comprehensive support for tree-hashing as well as keyed hashing (be it in sequential or tree mode). 1 Introduction The SHA-3 Competition succeeded in selecting a hash function that comple- ments SHA-2 and is much faster than SHA-2 in hardware [1]. There is nev- ertheless a demand for fast software hashing for applications such as integrity checking and deduplication in filesystems and cloud storage, host-based intrusion detection, version control systems, or secure boot schemes. -
Implementation and Performance Analysis of PBKDF2, Bcrypt, Scrypt Algorithms
Implementation and Performance Analysis of PBKDF2, Bcrypt, Scrypt Algorithms Levent Ertaul, Manpreet Kaur, Venkata Arun Kumar R Gudise CSU East Bay, Hayward, CA, USA. [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Abstract- With the increase in mobile wireless or data lookup. Whereas, Cryptographic hash functions are technologies, security breaches are also increasing. It has used for building blocks for HMACs which provides become critical to safeguard our sensitive information message authentication. They ensure integrity of the data from the wrongdoers. So, having strong password is that is transmitted. Collision free hash function is the one pivotal. As almost every website needs you to login and which can never have same hashes of different output. If a create a password, it’s tempting to use same password and b are inputs such that H (a) =H (b), and a ≠ b. for numerous websites like banks, shopping and social User chosen passwords shall not be used directly as networking websites. This way we are making our cryptographic keys as they have low entropy and information easily accessible to hackers. Hence, we need randomness properties [2].Password is the secret value from a strong application for password security and which the cryptographic key can be generated. Figure 1 management. In this paper, we are going to compare the shows the statics of increasing cybercrime every year. Hence performance of 3 key derivation algorithms, namely, there is a need for strong key generation algorithms which PBKDF2 (Password Based Key Derivation Function), can generate the keys which are nearly impossible for the Bcrypt and Scrypt. -
Key Derivation Functions and Their GPU Implementation
MASARYK UNIVERSITY FACULTY}w¡¢£¤¥¦§¨ OF I !"#$%&'()+,-./012345<yA|NFORMATICS Key derivation functions and their GPU implementation BACHELOR’S THESIS Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Brno, Spring 2015 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0/ cbna ii Declaration Hereby I declare, that this paper is my original authorial work, which I have worked out by my own. All sources, references and literature used or excerpted during elaboration of this work are properly cited and listed in complete reference to the due source. Ondrej Mosnáˇcek Advisor: Ing. Milan Brož iii Acknowledgement I would like to thank my supervisor for his guidance and support, and also for his extensive contributions to the Cryptsetup open- source project. Next, I would like to thank my family for their support and pa- tience and also to my friends who were falling behind schedule just like me and thus helped me not to panic. Last but not least, access to computing and storage facilities owned by parties and projects contributing to the National Grid In- frastructure MetaCentrum, provided under the programme “Projects of Large Infrastructure for Research, Development, and Innovations” (LM2010005), is also greatly appreciated. v Abstract Key derivation functions are a key element of many cryptographic applications. Password-based key derivation functions are designed specifically to derive cryptographic keys from low-entropy sources (such as passwords or passphrases) and to counter brute-force and dictionary attacks. However, the most widely adopted standard for password-based key derivation, PBKDF2, as implemented in most applications, is highly susceptible to attacks using Graphics Process- ing Units (GPUs). -
User Controlled Hardware Security Anchors: Evaluation and Designs Dr David Oswald, Prof Mark Ryan, Prof Flavio Garcia the University of Birmingham
User Controlled Hardware Security Anchors: Evaluation and Designs Dr David Oswald, Prof Mark Ryan, Prof Flavio Garcia The University of Birmingham Industry partners: HP Labs, Yubico Why Hardware Security Anchors? 2 Why Hardware Security Anchors? 3 User Controlled Hardware Security Anchors: Evaluation and Designs (1) . WP1: Evaluate the security of available security anchors and Trusted Execution Environments (more later) . WP2: Establishing secure channels between TEE and the user through … – Auxiliary devices – Platform features for secure I/O 4 User Controlled Hardware Security Anchors: Evaluation and Designs (2) . WP3: Enhancing user authentication – Basis: FIDO(2) and U2F – Addressing enrollment and revocation – Authentication policies (e.g. location, …) – Formal modelling and verification . WP4: Demonstrators – TEE implementation – Smartphone app – Authentication token 5 Evaluating the state of TEE security An overview Trusted Execution Environments in a nutshell . Main technologies at present: – Trusted Platform Module (separate chip or firmware) – Intel Software Guard eXtensions (microcode w/ HW) – AMD Platform Security Processor (separate core) – ARM TrustZone (software w/ HW support) – Apple Secure Enclave Processor (separate core, same die) . All provide some form of running code or crypto operations in isolation . Most require cooperation with the silicon/device manufacturer (to different extent) 7 Relevant attack vectors . “Classical” vulnerabilities, e.g. buffer overflows . Microarchitecture (e.g. cache timing, Spectre and -
Playing Defense with PBKDF2: Hashcat and the 1Password Agile Keychain from the Defender’S Point of View a (Rough) Day in the Life of a Defender
Background Announcement and reaction PBKDF2 Bug Millions of guesses per second Playing Defense with PBKDF2: hashcat and the 1Password Agile Keychain from the defender’s point of view A (rough) day in the life of a defender Jeffrey Goldberg Chief Defender of the Dark Arts AgileBits Inc. [email protected] Passwords13 Jeffrey Goldberg Playing Defense with PBKDF2 Background Announcement and reaction PBKDF2 Bug Millions of guesses per second Outline 1 Background AgileBits and 1Password Key derivation 2 Announcement and reaction Announcement Response 3 PBKDF2 Bug 4 Millions of guesses per second PBKDF2 Iterations Other defenses Most promising approaches Jeffrey Goldberg Playing Defense with PBKDF2 Background Announcement and reaction AgileBits and 1Password PBKDF2 Bug Key derivation Millions of guesses per second AgileBits and 1Password 1Password is the flagship product of AgileBits, Inc. In 2005 Dave Teare and Roustem Karimov said, “Wouldn’t it be cool if we could use the OS X Keychain to build a form filler and password manager for ourselves?” 1Password is now extremely popular and runs on OS X, iOS, Windows (and there is an Android reader). Jeffrey Goldberg Playing Defense with PBKDF2 Background Announcement and reaction AgileBits and 1Password PBKDF2 Bug Key derivation Millions of guesses per second Relevant Design Principles Sometimes people’s encrypted data will get stolen. (So we started using PBKDF2 before it was cool) We are willing to say “no” to feature requests (E.g., we don’t have an option for a cascade of AES-Twofish-Serpent) Not open-source, but open about security design (Most relevant for this audience, we’ve provided samples and details to those building crackers.) Demonstrate that “usable security” is not an oxymoron. -
Just in Time Hashing
Just in Time Hashing Benjamin Harsha Jeremiah Blocki Purdue University Purdue University West Lafayette, Indiana West Lafayette, Indiana Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] Abstract—In the past few years billions of user passwords prove and as many users continue to select low-entropy have been exposed to the threat of offline cracking attempts. passwords, finding it too difficult to memorize multiple Such brute-force cracking attempts are increasingly dangerous strong passwords for each of their accounts. Key stretching as password cracking hardware continues to improve and as serves as a last line of defense for users after a password users continue to select low entropy passwords. Key-stretching breach. The basic idea is to increase guessing costs for the techniques such as hash iteration and memory hard functions attacker by performing hash iteration (e.g., BCRYPT[75] can help to mitigate the risk, but increased key-stretching effort or PBKDF2 [59]) or by intentionally using a password necessarily increases authentication delay so this defense is hash function that is memory hard (e.g., SCRYPT [74, 74], fundamentally constrained by usability concerns. We intro- Argon2 [12]). duce Just in Time Hashing (JIT), a client side key-stretching Unfortunately, there is an inherent security/usability algorithm to protect user passwords against offline brute-force trade-off when adopting traditional key-stretching algo- cracking attempts without increasing delay for the user. The rithms such as PBKDF2, SCRYPT or Argon2. If the key- basic idea is to exploit idle time while the user is typing in stretching algorithm cannot be computed quickly then we their password to perform extra key-stretching. -
Design and Analysis of Password-Based Key Derivation Functions
Design and Analysis of Password-Based Key Derivation Functions Frances F. Yao1 and Yiqun Lisa Yin2 1 Department of Computer Science City University of Hong Kong Kowloon, Hong Kong Email: [email protected] 2 Department of Electrical Engineering Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544 Email: [email protected] Abstract. A password-based key derivation function (KDF) – a func- tion that derives cryptographic keys from a password – is necessary in many security applications. Like any password-based schemes, such KDFs are subject to key search attacks (often called dictionary attacks). Salt and iteration count are used in practice to significantly increase the workload of such attacks. These techniques have also been specified in widely adopted industry standards such as PKCS and IETF. Despite the importance and wide-spread usage, there has been no formal security analysis on existing constructions. In this paper, we propose a general security framework for password-based KDFs and introduce two security definitions each capturing a different attacking scenario. We study the most commonly used construction H(c)(ps) and prove that the iteration count c, when fixed, does have an effect of stretching the password p by log2 c bits. We then analyze the two standardized KDFs in PKCS#5. We show that both are secure if the adversary cannot influence the pa- rameters but subject to attacks otherwise. Finally, we propose a new password-based KDF that is provably secure even when the adversary has full control of the parameters. 1 Introduction 1.1 Background and Motivation Cryptographic keys are essential in virtually all security application. -
Vulnerability of RSA Algorithm
Vulnerability of RSA Algorithm Aleksandra V. Markelova Information Security Department Bauman Moscow State Technical University Moscow, Russia [email protected] Abstract—This paper is dedicated to ROCA-vulnerability that Google, HP, Lenovo and Fujitsu released updates for their was detected by scientists from Masaryk University, Czech. Their software products susceptible to this attack. investigation offers low-cost algorithm of factorization of RSA module for special type of keys generated by some widely used Recall that the public key of the RSA algorithm is a pair cryptographic library. They proposed a practical factorization (n, e), where n is the product of two large primes and gcd(e, method for various key lengths including 1024 and 2048 bits. (n))=1. Private key is number d such that ed=1(mod (n)). This attack requires no additional information except for the Some implementations also store prime divisors of n as part of value of the public key and does not depend on a weak or a faulty the private key. random number generator. We examine the possibility of modification of type of keys to embed the trapdoor with universal Thus, RSA requires two large random primes p and q, that protection into key generator. In some cases we can design can be obtained by generating a random candidate number Secretly Embedded Trapdoor with Universal Protection in the (usually with half of the bits of n) and then testing it for generator of RSA key. This problem is serious and relevant for primality. If the candidate is found to be composite, the all closed (so-called black-box) implementations of cryptographic process is repeated with a different candidate. -
Lab 3B Hashing Implementation This Lab Outlines Some Implementations for Hashing Methods
Lab 3b Hashing Implementation This lab outlines some implementations for hashing methods. A LM Hash The LM Hash is used in Microsoft Windows. For example for LM Hash: hashme gives: FA-91-C4-FD-28-A2-D2-57-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE network gives: D7-5A-34-5D-5D-20-7A-00-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE napier gives: 12-B9-C5-4F-6F-E0-EC-80-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE Notice that the right-most element of the hash are always the same, if the password is less than eight characters. With more than eight characters we get: networksims gives: D7-5A-34-5D-5D-20-7A-00-38-32-A0-DB-BA-51-68-07 napier123 gives: 67-82-2A-34-ED-C7-48-92-B7-5E-0C-8D-76-95-4A-50 For “hello” we get: LM: FD-A9-5F-BE-CA-28-8D-44-AA-D3-B4-35-B5-14-04-EE NTLM: 06-6D-DF-D4-EF-0E-9C-D7-C2-56-FE-77-19-1E-F4-3C We can check these with a Python script: import passlib.hash; string="hello" print "LM Hash:"+passlib.hash.lmhash.encrypt(string) print "NT Hash:"+passlib.hash.nthash.encrypt(string) which gives: LM Hash:fda95fbeca288d44aad3b435b51404ee NT Hash:066ddfd4ef0e9cd7c256fe77191ef43c Web link (Prime Numbers): http://asecuritysite.com/encryption/lmhash No Description Result 1 Create a Python script to determine the LM “Napier” hash and NTLM hash of the following words: “Foxtrot” B APR1 The Apache-defined APR1 format addresses the problems of brute forcing an MD5 hash, and basically iterates over the hash value 1,000 times. -
2018 Research Projects for CS727
2018 Research Projects for CS727 Each of you will chose a topic for your research project from the list below. Alternatively you can propose a topic of your choice, as long as it relates to the aims of the course and the lecturers approve your choice. Email the lecturers on or before Thursday March 22nd with your top 3 choices of project (subject line in email: "CS727 Rresearch Project"). The lecturers will allocate the projects and tell you on or before Thursday March 29. Projects comprise: • A report of 10 pages max (any format will do). 16 marks. • An oral presentation (15 mins + 10 min questions/discussions) to be done in the second part of the semester. 7 marks. • One example question on your project that could be used in the final exam. There is no particular template or style for the project or presentation. Projects will be due on Friday of week 11 (May 25th). Presentations will take place on weeks 8-12. There will be no lectures on weeks 6 and 7. During those weeks you should work on your projects and presentations, and get feedback from the lecturers on your projects and presentations. Students should attend all the talks, if possible. We will keep a record of attendance. The topics in the talks are part of the course material and can be examined in the final exam. Student talks will not be recorded, and student project reports will not be given to the other students. Audience members will complete a review form for each presentation. Each member of the class will be allocated a topic for them to aske a question after the talk. -
Digital Identity Management
Digital Identity Management An AIT White Paper These days people wish to move both freely and safely; to cross borders swiftly with secure access controls without hindrances; to make transactions payments or access governmental services through quick and convenient proof of identity. We are addressing here the major issues the security discipline and processes. All the above come with new regulations initiated by the European Commission as the new GDPR (General Data Protection Rules). Introduction Identity Management (IDM) is the organisational key process for identifying, authenticating and authorising individuals or groups of people to access applications, systems or networks by associating user’s rights and restrictions with established identities. The managed identities can also refer to software processes that need access to organisational systems. Authentication It is widely agreed that the first step of action for verifying the identity of a user or process is through the control access and proof of identity (authentication). To establish this process three main categories (factors) are used: Figure 1. Three different authentication factors, source: AIT Something you know Knowledge factors are the most commonly used form of authentication. The user is required to prove knowledge of a secret to authenticate him. A “password” is a secret word or string of characters that is used for user authentication. Variations include both longer ones formed from multiple words (a passphrase) and the shorter, purely numeric, Personal Identification Number (PIN) commonly used for ATM access. Traditionally, passwords/PINs are expected to be memorised. Something you have Possession factors ("something only the user has") have been used for authentication for centuries, in the form of a key to a lock. -
The State of IT Security in Germany 2018 the STATE of IT SECURITY in GERMANY 2018
The State of IT Security in Germany 2018 THE STATE OF IT SECURITY IN GERMANY 2018 2 THE STATE OF IT SECURITY IN GERMANY 2018 | FOREWORD Foreword Our modern, high-tech society depends on the functio- In its 2018 report on the state of IT security in Germany, nal integrity of information technologies and commu- the BSI has presented a well-founded and comprehen- nication systems, effective infrastructure and a secure sive overview of the threats facing our country, our supply of energy. These systems are the foundation for people and our economy in cyberspace. Above all, how- technical progress and economic development in our ever, it illustrates the successful and indispensable efforts country. the BSI undertakes on our behalf. Germany, its residents, businesses and governmental agencies remain in the As such systems grow more complex and all the areas crosshairs of those looking to carry out cyberattacks. of our information society become more interconnect- Taking on these challenges and devising rapid, efficient ed, however, the risks posed by disruptions and attacks responses to the latest dangers in cyberspace remains from within Germany or abroad are increasing as well. the central task of the BSI and its employees. Threats in cyberspace are highly dynamic, and cyber attacks are becoming more adaptive and professional. Both IT systems and the methods used to attack them are constantly evolving at a rapid pace. The Federal Government takes seriously its responsibili- ty to ensure security also in cyberspace by maintaining a framework of IT security laws, pursuing a cybersecurity strategy and strengthening the relevant agencies.