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A History of Qualia Topoi DOI 10.1007/s11245-017-9508-2 A History of Qualia Daniel C. Dennett1 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2017 Abstract The philosophers’ concept of qualia is an artifact made on behalf of One True God. What could be more of bad theorizing, and in particular, of failing to appreciate obvious? [2001, p. 1] the distinction between the intentional object of a belief (for What they are doing, pretty clearly, is availing them- instance) and the cause(s) of that belief. Qualia, like Santa selves of a familiar way of speaking and writing that is not Claus and the Easter Bunny, have a history but that does not so much “sociological” or “anthropological” as “literary”: make them real. The cause of a hallucination, for instance, A history of Odysseus or Paul Bunyan or Santa Claus could may not resemble the intentional object hallucinated at all, be an entirely creditable work of scholarship and explanation and the representation in the brain is not rendered in special written by someone who knew full well, and was happy to subjective properties (qualia). acknowledge, that their topic was a fictional character, not a real person. When the topic is God, however, there is a Keywords Qualia · Intentional objects · Causes · long established tradition of eschewing that acknowledg- Humphrey · Nicholas ment, out of sincere agnosticism (perhaps, in a few cases) or diplomacy or even fear of ostracism. We can highlight this convenient and familiar silence by contrasting it with Dawk- Several authors have written books about the history of God. ins’ (2006) forthright—and shocking to many—description Are they asserting the existence of God, or talking about the of the God of the Old Testament as “the most unpleasant idea of God or the concept of God? Or what? Karen Arm- character in all fiction [my emphasis].”1 We know where strong (1993), a former nun, published A History of God: Dawkins stands. Jehovah, thank goodness, is just a fictional The 4000-Year Quest of Judaism, Christianity and Islam in character, not a real supernatural Lord and Master. 1993. It seems that she may be an atheist, but she doesn’t When it comes to speaking and writing about qualia, say. Rodney Stark (2001), a sociologist of religion, opens there is a similar ambiguity, which I long ago attempted to his 2001 book, One True God: Historical Consequences expose, but my joking title, “Quining Qualia” (1984), appar- of Monotheism with a passage that brandishes the same ently misled many into thinking that I wasn’t really saying ambiguity: that qualia were as fictional as leprechauns (about which All of the great monotheisms propose that their God books could be written, of course)—or if I really meant it, works through history, and I plan to show that, at least I was obviously wrong. (“What could be more obvious?”) sociologically, they are quite right: that a great deal of history—triumphs as well as disasters—has been 1 See Dan Barker’s (2016) detailed and scholarly book inspired by it, God: The Most Unpleasant Character in All Fiction, which glee- * Daniel C. Dennett fully cites the biblical verses supporting Dawkins’ verdict that this [email protected] character is “jealous and proud of it; a petty, unjust, unforgiving control-freak; a vindictive, bloodthirsty ethnic cleanser; a misogynis- 1 Center for Cognitive Studies, Tufts University, Medford, tic, homophobic, racist, infanticidal, genocidal, filicidal, pestilential, MA 02155, USA megalomaniacal, sadomasochistic, capriciously malevolent bully.” Vol.:(0123456789)1 3 D. C. Dennett For more than 30 years philosophers and cognitive scientists What should we say, then, about the intentional objects have continued to insist that they knew what they were talk- of normal, veridical beliefs and perceptions? Normally, if I ing about when they talked about qualia, and knew that they believe there is a red apple on the table in front of me, my were perfectly real. In fact, they often assert, it is the undeni- belief is caused by a red apple in front of me. The apple able existence of qualia that makes the Hard Problem hard! exists, and is red, and is the indirect, distal cause of my According to those who think this way, I wasn’t explaining belief. (It causes events in my eyes and visual cortex which consciousness in 1991, I was trying to explain it away. Haha. cause me eventually to go into the mental state of believing It is time to stop joking, and take this way of speaking seri- that there is a red apple in front of me.) That belief is not red ously, and see how it can beguile very good thinkers (or their or round or juicy; it is about something red and round and readers) into missing an opportunity to make real progress juicy. Nor are the proximal causes of that belief red or round on consciousness. or juicy. The intentional object of the belief is a red apple in I will use Nicholas Humphrey’s essay “The Invention of front of me, not the idea of a red apple in my mind, and this Consciousness” (this issue) to demonstrate what I mean. I is a belief that I can express by speaking of that apple or by agree with, and have been instructed by, most of what Hum- reaching out, grabbing it and taking a bite (while ignoring phrey says in this essay. I may in fact agree with everything the unripe apple beside it, etc.). There is little harm in the here except some of his expository tactics and choice of ordinary practice of simply identifying the intentional object language, which I think court misunderstanding by being of a true belief, perception or other mental state with the real overly diplomatic, giving illusory comfort to those whose object that plays the—typically indirect—stabilizing causal views he is in fact subverting vigorously. role in the creation and maintenance of that mental state, as long as we remember that when the intentional object is fictional—non-existent, hallucinated, fantasized—there is 1 What are Intentional Objects Made of? no role for a substitute real object, an inner real object that “has all the same properties” to be among the more proximal The non-committal way of speaking exemplified by Arm- causes of the mental state. There is a role for a system of strong and Stark is de rigueur when our topic is what Bren- stabilizing internal representations, but they represent the tano (1874) called intentional objects. According to myth, properties of the fictional object in roughly the same way the Ponce de Leon was searching for the Fountain of Youth— sentences of a novel represent the properties of a fictional something that doesn’t exist. Since there is no known factual character. Seeing a real red apple for real does not require basis for that myth, let’s consider a slightly less famous, the brain to render a “directly seen” phenomenal/subjective but historically impeccable, case: Sir Walter Raleigh con- red apple that intervenes between the piece of fruit and the ducted several expeditions in search of El Dorado, the city belief. Hallucinating a red apple doesn’t require an inner of gold, in South America. One could write a book about rendering either. El Dorado, full of scholarly truth, and never get around to I have learned that this is a very counter-intuitive idea acknowledging to the reader that it doesn’t actually exist. for most people to accept. It sure seems that when one hal- The book would be about real things—real people and real lucinates a red apple, this must involve the real existence (in brains (or minds, if you like), real treks, real books and con- some “dimension” or “arena” that might not be physical) of versations, real maps, real con artists and impostors, real something that is (in some perhaps special, subjective sense) disappointments. And while it is true that Raleigh really red and round, an object created in the mind by whatever it is had an idea in his mind of El Dorado (we might say, loosely that creates hallucinations. It is that object, that phenomenon speaking), that mental state was not the object of his quest. that one is talking about when one talks about the contents He already had it! He wasn’t seeking an idea in his mind; of one’s conscious experience. I am insisting that this is a he was seeking a city. And what was El Dorado made of? mistake, not the indubitable deliverance of introspection and Marble? Gold? Adobe? It—the intentional object—wasn’t reflection. What you are doing when you make this mistake made of anything. A fictional object can be truly said to is confusing the intentional object of your belief with the “have” plenty of properties—real properties: Santa’s coat is proximal cause of your belief. You are “authoritative” about red, and his beard is white, and his belly is large and round the intentional object of your belief in the same way a nov- (properties I have, too—except for the red coat). El Dorado elist is authoritative about the characters in her novel, but “had” whatever real properties Raleigh believed it had; it you have precious little access to, or knowledge about, the didn’t exist, but Raleigh was so convinced that it existed he proximal cause[s] of those beliefs. was prepared to devote a large portion of his life to finding If asked why I say there is a red apple in front of me, I it. This non-existent (“intentionally inexistent”) El Dorado can reply, sincerely, that I see it with my own eyes, right was the intentional object of some of Sir Walter Raleigh’s now.
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