Fourth Quarter 2017 Bar Flyer
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Judicial Reform As a Tug of War: How Ideological Differences Between Politicians and the Bar Explain Attempts at Judicial Reform
Bonica & Sen (Do Not Delete) 11/14/2017 1:27 PM Judicial Reform as a Tug of War: How Ideological Differences Between Politicians and the Bar Explain Attempts at Judicial Reform Adam Bonica* Maya Sen** What predicts attempts at judicial reform? We develop a broad, generalizable framework that both explains and predicts attempts at judicial reform. Specifically, we explore the political tug of war created by the polarization between the bar and political actors, in tandem with existing judicial selection mechanisms. The more liberal the bar and the more conservative political actors, the greater the incentive political actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection. (And, vice versa, the more conservative the bar and the more liberal political actors, the greater incentive political actors will have to introduce ideology into judicial selection.) Understanding this dynamic, we argue, is key to both explaining and predicting attempts at judicial reform. For example, under most ideological configurations, conservatives will, depending on how liberal they perceive the bar to be, push reform efforts toward partisan elections and executive appointments, while liberals will work to maintain merit-oriented commissions. We explore the contours of this predictive framework with three in-depth, illustrative case studies: Florida in 2001, Kansas in the 2010s, and North Carolina in 2016. INTRODUCTION ........................................................................... 1782 I. JUDICIAL REFORM BACKGROUND ..................................... 1784 A. Independence and Establishment of American Courts .................................................................. 1784 * Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Stanford University. Email: [email protected]. Web: http://www.stanford.edu/~bonica [https://perma.cc/C5XD-XB5C]. ** Associate Professor, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. -
2011-2012 NC Manual Ch 6 Judicial Branch.Indd
The Judicial Branch North Carolina’s court system had many levels before the judicial branch underwent comprehensive reorganization in the late 1960s. Statewide, the N.C. Supreme Court had appellate jurisdiction, while the Superior Court had general trial jurisdiction. Hundreds of Recorder’s Courts, Domestic Relations Courts, Mayor’s Courts, County Courts and Justice of the Peace Courts created by the General Assembly existed at the local level, almost every one individually structured to meet the specific needs of the towns and counties they served. Some of these local courts stayed in session on a nearly full-time basis; others convened for only an hour or two a week. Full-time judges presided over a handful of the local courts, although most were not full-time. Some local courts had judges who had been trained as lawyers. Many, however, made do with lay judges who spent most of their time working in other careers. Salaries for judges and the overall administrative costs varied from court to court, sometimes differing even within the same county. In some instances, such as justices of the peace, court officials were compensated by the fees they exacted and they provided their own facilities. As early as 1955, certain citizens recognized the need for professionalizing and streamlining the court system in North Carolina. At the suggestion of Governor Luther Hodges and Chief Justice M.V. Barnhill, the North Carolina Bar Association sponsored an in-depth study that ultimately resulted in the restructuring of the court system. Implementing the new structure, however, required amending Article IV of the State Constitution. -
Do Nonpartisan, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections Enhance Relative Judicial Independence? Hon
CORE Metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk Provided by University of North Carolina School of Law NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW Volume 93 Article 5 Number 6 North Carolina Issue 9-1-2015 Do Nonpartisan, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections Enhance Relative Judicial Independence? Hon. Robert N. Hunter Jr. Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Hon. Robert N. Hunter Jr., Do Nonpartisan, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections Enhance Relative Judicial Independence?, 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1825 (2015). Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol93/iss6/5 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1825 (2015) DO NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ENHANCE RELATIVE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?* JUDGE ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR.** Twenty-one states elect appellate judges, while the others use gubernatorial appointment, legislative elections, or merit selection plans.1 In 1996, North Carolina changed its superior court elections from partisan to nonpartisan elections.2 Partisan elections for district court judges were later eliminated in 2001 in lieu of nonpartisan elections.3 By 2004, North Carolina made the same switch to nonpartisan elections for appellate judge seats, along with a voluntary public campaign financing system for appellate judges.4 This Article compares judicial elections before and after the adoption of a nonpartisan, publicly funded election system and concludes that, while public financing was widely utilized by candidates and equalized funding, these changes have only marginally achieved their goals of reducing the influence of outside money, promoting public interest in judicial elections, and enhancing relative judicial independence. -
Biographical Sketches and Bibliographies of the First African Americans on the North Carolina Bench
Campbell Law Review Volume 42 Issue 1 Winter 2020 Article 9 2020 Biographical Sketches and Bibliographies of the First African Americans on the North Carolina Bench Adrienne DeWitt Campbell University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr Recommended Citation Adrienne DeWitt, Biographical Sketches and Bibliographies of the First African Americans on the North Carolina Bench, 42 CAMPBELL L. REV. 81 (2020). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Campbell Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law. DeWitt: Biographical Sketches and Bibliographies of the First African Ame Biographical Sketches and Bibliographies of the First African Americans on the North Carolina Bench ADRIENNE DEWITT* INTRODUCTION ................................................................................. 81 ALEXANDER-RALSTON, ELRETA MELTON .............................. 83 BEA SLEY ,CHERI .......................................................................... 87 BIGG S, LORETTA ........................................................................... 89 CHE SS, SA M M IE ........................... :................................................. 91 DUNCAN, ALLYSON K .................................................................. 94 ERW IN , RICHARD C ...................................................................... 97 FR Y E , HE -
Money, More Problems Fleeting Victories for Diversity on the Bench
ASSOCIATED PRESS/ERIC GAY PRESS/ERIC ASSOCIATED More Money, More Problems Fleeting Victories for Diversity on the Bench By Michele L. Jawando and Billy Corriher October 2015 WWW.AMERICANPROGRESS.ORG More Money, More Problems Fleeting Victories for Diversity on the Bench By Michele L. Jawando and Billy Corriher October 2015 Contents 1 Introduction and summary 4 The problem 7 Methodology and results 11 Elections in which diverse incumbents were voted off the bench 11 Ohio 13 Texas 14 Wisconsin 16 Alabama 17 North Carolina 20 Recommendations 24 Conclusion 26 Appendix 43 About the authors and acknowledgments 44 Endnotes Introduction and summary As America winds down its celebration of the 50th anniversary of the Selma-to- Montgomery March and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the country continues to reflect on the progress made toward racial and political equality. One cannot help but recognize the crucial role the judiciary played and continues to play in achieving this progress, whether it was the U.S. Supreme Court declaring “sepa- rate is not equal,” as it did in Brown v. Board of Education,1 or the more recent decision in Shelby County v. Holder, which struck down a key provision of the Voting Rights Act.2 While the role of the federal judiciary and the decisions it metes out are often examined, far less focus and study is directed to the role of state courts and their impact and influence on ordinary citizens. Even less is known about who sits on these courts and their backgrounds, both personal and professional. While our courts are supposed to be fair arbiters of justice for all, communities are forced to wrestle with the fact that their judicial benches are filled with people who are not representative of their constituents.