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Comment/Observations NPR 18Dec13 Spoe, Related

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Comment/Observations NPR 18Dec13 Spoe, Related Robert E. Feldman, Executive Secretary, And Systemic Resolution Advisory Committee "SRAC" Attention: Comments, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 550 17th Street NW., Washington, DC 20429. Media Contact: Andrew Gray (202) 898-7192 Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] ‘‘Single Point of Entry Strategy’’ in the subject line of the message. RE: Single Point of Entry / 77614-76624 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 243 / Wednesday, Dec 18, 2013 / Notices Guide: Abstract p1; Opening Remarks p2; Preface p2; NPR Comment p10; SRAC Meetings Comment p43; End Comments, Observations related to SRAC meeting discussions and the sector, issues p48; NOTES p51; Appendix p62. Abstract: This is a comment to contribute to the Public Due Process requested in FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION’s (“FDIC”) Notice for Proposed Regulation (“NPR”) related to as characterized in the Dodd Frank Act of 2010 “DFA”, Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions “SIFIs”: the Single Point of Entry Strategy (“SPoE”) in the US and abroad while resolving or “unwinding” a SIFI. Whereas I haven’t supported maintaining the ability for these largest financial institutions to abuse power, and with that power to grow to their size, and therein to many observers and the easily manipulated public, that ability to abuse power is obscured by their size, and thus Too Big To Fail and punishing these SIFIs distracts from correcting abuse of power. Thus I do not support the FDIC’s interest to resolve SIFIs. If ever, this perhaps would be a path, but with significant constraints against foreign buyers/investors and commercial/industrial corporate buyers/investors participating in the later stages. In general, I have not supported the effort to ‘resolve’ SIFIs, nor destabilize them. Nor have I supported failing to regulate them effectively in the manner former to regulatory acceptance for financial innovation. This de facto regulatory framework of allowing the largest financial institutions (which often also are “ISDA” members - International Swaps and Derivatives Association) to engage in the unsafe and unsound practices and products of writing and trading derivatives and Over-the-counter (OTC) contracts without restraint, has existed since before the Gramm, Leach, Bliley legislation in 1999 and in 2000, the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, enabling OTC contracts and derivatives to trade without any regulatory framework at all in existence at that time and for a number of years after that passage of that law. Regulatory, Congressional and Executive Branch support of, and deference to (by not regulating/restraining or disciplining for unsafe and unsound banking products and practices) financial innovation has disserved the US and our Insured Depository Institutions IDIs of all sizes. Nor has support by the Fed of multilateralism at all served the US and with support for multilateralism, in time also came ‘light touch’ ‘regulation. Moreover, the belief mentioned in this NPR by the FDIC of subjecting a SIFI to “Title II” resolution to achieve the furthering of its mission to promote market discipline and maintain financial stability contradicts all the reasons all along – and among these - that it has allowed the largest favored institutions to merge, and enabled the US retail and larger corporate customers and municipalities to enjoy stable banking relationships. Furthermore, the FDIC and Fed both in law and representation to the public, identify themselves as regulators and/or supervisors. Neither however has administered nor enforced effective regulatory discipline all along for perhaps a decade against these largest financial institutions. Additionally, the Fed has thwarted or politically co-opted the FDIC from properly administering enforcement against the prolific derivatives and OTC contract writing. As has been their practice in the past to administer full safety and sound examinations on site by examiners, score the banks not only using off-site quarterly financial filings, but also based on what the examiners found in their annual safety and soundness examinations of IDIs of all sizes, and administering enforcement if and when in breach of regulation including operating in safe and sound condition, such more demonstrates their roles as effective regulators, and more maintains the financial stability and promotes market discipline, because supporting, permitting and giving kid glove treatment to financial innovation is neither safe, nor sound, nor promoting market discipline or financial stability. Because this NPR proposes to seize and expropriate stakeholders’ means and resources to resolve a SIFI, resolution as proposed has appearances of Marxist Vandalism. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 1 3/21/2014 0:16 AM Psoras: Comment/Observations NPR 18Dec13 SPoE, related Dear Chairman Gruenberg, Executive Secretary Feldman, et al including SRAC: Thank you for accepting my comments regarding NPR Single Point of Entry “SPOE”/ 76614 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 243, 18Dec13 http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/pr13112.html http://www.fdic.gov/news/board/2013/2013- 12-10_notice_dis-b_fr.pdf. Thank you also for extending the deadline for comment to 20 March 14. I appreciate this although ah, while reading through this NPR, it’s been interesting to review and deliberate about the nature of legislation, regulation and supervision on this sector over the last 30 years, since before Garn St. Germaine Act (1982) during the era of Paul Volcker while he was Chair of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and on a mission to end double –digit inflation that had occurred in the US after the 2nd Arab Oil Embargo and President Carter’s balanced budget. As an administrative note, terms such as ‘resolving’ go undefined in this NPR. For the purposes of any, and all appropriate stakeholders intending to provide comment for the public Due Process, there should be a “Definitions” page or section, which often the FDIC (unless I’m thinking of Congress and legislation) includes. Via links, the history and nature of “Resolutions” from beginning to end also should be outlined and referencing regulation and/ or statute where that already exists for FDIC to use and history of use. There is nothing like that in this NPR, leaving people with NO context to understand resolutions in any form. Perhaps the FDIC is assuming that any question about such subject matter will either have the commenter do their own research and/or only be an expert in these matters embodied in this NPR. Additionally although many conversations probably have been had discussing last December's Systemic Risk Advisory Council “SRAC's proceedings (11 Dec 12 and 10Dec13), please share these comments also with the SRAC private sector members. While providing comment on the NPR about SPoE and related multilateral dialog, in the later part of this Comment letter, I will comment referencing some of the content in those SRAC meetings. See pages 44,45. My comments narrative style will begin with a Preface for 8 Pages, then beginning on p. 10, I will track my comments based on the NPR beginning on FR pg76615, SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION, BACKGROUND. Preface: Additionally while providing comment on this NPR, I am hoping to bridge some recollection gaps that may exist perhaps among some of the SRAC members, as well as FDIC senior staff, and public involved in these processes. I provide this as part of the effort to achieve the better end for those involved with this new policy matter of, if necessary, ‘resolving’ banks characterized as Too Big to Fail (“2B2F”) also known as Systemically Important Financial Institutions “SIFIs” or “C-CAR” (Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review) banks or “Covered Companies” according to Title I of DFA. In the US since after the Civil War there have been banks which have enjoyed significant favor (“Teflon”) largely because who, or rather which influential American(s) and foreign royal and wealthy families own them in one form or another. Since the Federal Reserve Act was signed into legislation in 1913, the Fed has facilitated the veil of protection that the large financial institutions enjoyed and still enjoy. The Fed operates as a form of pass-interference for these banks’ self-interests and those of their very wealthy domestic and foreign owners. A number of people in Congress however were not impressed with the Fed. As an organization it violated the framework established by the founders who avoided establishing and permitting institutions demonstrating abuse of power, including obstructed oversight on its activities, practices and decisions and outcomes from those. The Fed’s backers overtime also after obtaining legislation to anoint the Fed as regulator for ‘Bank Holding Companies”, also obtained legitimacy to approve and protect its domination as a regulator with regard to bank mergers one could suggest was for concentrations and abuse of power not available under state charters and commerce at that time. Whereas the Fed infrequently denied large banks buying each other and merging in spite of anti-competitiveness, regardless of when it would and had forced divestitures of branches to reduce a banking market concentration of merged parties, the Fed has fostered and facilitated 2B2F (NOTE 1). In the short and long run presumably our endeavor is to enable the US financial sector to achieve better operating health and true stability, rather than instability, inflate/collapse, etc. I also mention material I observed about FDIC resolutions which one will find among my comments opposing Basel III adoption (NOTE 2, 3). 2 3/21/2014 0:16 AM Psoras: Comment/Observations NPR 18Dec13 SPoE, related I repeat and urge the importance that regulators and our economy placed on, and regulate for sound commercial banking practices, of operating in a condition of safety and soundness. In the US even what we consider our 2B2F banks, and generally without direct government support, operate for the entire public and private sector economy, not only for small deposit account holders, when all depositors up to $250,000 of their deposits by law are owed deposit insurance protection.
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