Systemic Risk and the Refinancing Ratchet Effect
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Journal of Financial Economics 108 (2013) 29–45 Contents lists available at SciVerse ScienceDirect Journal of Financial Economics journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jfec Systemic risk and the refinancing ratchet effect$ Amir E. Khandani a,c, Andrew W. Lo b,c,d,n, Robert C. Merton b a Morgan Stanley, New York, United States b MIT Sloan School of Management, 100 Main Street, E62-618, Cambridge, MA 02142, United States c Laboratory for Financial Engineering, MIT Sloan School of Management, United States d AlphaSimplex Group, LLC, United States article info abstract Article history: The combination of rising home prices, declining interest rates, and near-frictionless Received 13 June 2010 refinancing opportunities can create unintentional synchronization of homeowner leverage, Received in revised form leading to a ‘‘ratchet’’ effect on leverage because homes are indivisible and owner-occupants 7 May 2012 cannot raise equity to reduce leverage when home prices fall. Our simulation of the U.S. Accepted 16 May 2012 housing market yields potential losses of $1.7 trillion from June 2006 to December 2008 Available online 20 November 2012 with cash-out refinancing vs. only $330 billion in the absence of cash-out refinancing. JEL classification: The refinancing ratchet effect is a new type of systemic risk in the financial system and does G01 not rely on any dysfunctional behaviors. G13 & 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. G18 G21 E17 R28 Keywords: Systemic risk Financial crisis Household finance Real estate Subprime mortgage 1. Introduction mainly by the value of the underlying real estate. This feature makes the market value of the collateral very important in Home mortgage loans—one of the most widely used measuring the risk of a mortgage.1 To reduce the risk of financial products by U.S. consumers—are collateralized default, mortgage lenders usually ask for a down payment of 10–20% of the value of the home from the borrower, creating an ‘‘equity buffer’’ that absorbs the first losses from home $ The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the price declines. Any event or action that reduces the value of authors only, and do not necessarily represent the views and opinions of AlphaSimplex Group, Morgan Stanley, MIT, any of their affiliates and this buffer, e.g., an equity extraction or a drop in home employees, or any of the individuals acknowledged below. We thank Jim values, increases the risk to the lending institution. Kennedy for sharing his data and Terry Belton, Vineer Bhansali, Peter A number of secular trends over the last two decades, Carr, Conan Crum, Jayna Cummings, Arnout Eikeboom, David Geltner, including the increased efficiency of the refinancing Will Goetzmann, Jacob Goldfield, Ben Golub, Matt Jozoff, Jim Kennedy, Atif Mian, Amir Sufi, Bill Wheaton, Matt Zames, and participants at the process and the growth of the refinancing business, have Market Design and Structure Workshop at the Santa Fe Institute, 2010 made it much easier for homeowners to refinance their Western Finance Association Annual Meeting, and 2010 Bank Structure Conference at the Chicago Fed for helpful comments and discussion. Research support from the MIT Laboratory for Financial Engineering is gratefully acknowledged. 1 See, for example, Danis and Pennington-Cross (2005), Downing, n Corresponding author at: MIT Sloan School of Management, 100 Stanton, and Wallace (2005), Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen (2007), Doms, Main Street, E62-618, Cambridge, MA 02142, United States. Furlong, and Krainer (2007), Bajari, Chu, and Park (2008), Bhardwaj and E-mail address: [email protected] (A.W. Lo). Sengupta (2008a), and Gerardi, Lehnert, Sherlund, and Willen (2008). 0304-405X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.10.007 30 A.E. Khandani et al. / Journal of Financial Economics 108 (2013) 29–45 mortgages to take advantage of declining interest rates, the collateral. Furthermore, the occupant is almost always increasing housing prices, or both. Consequences of these the sole equityholder in an owner-occupied residential trends have been documented by Greenspan and Kennedy property, and moral hazard concerns preclude the owner (2008, p. 120), who observe, ‘‘since the mid-1980s, mort- from reducing leverage by raising incremental capital via gage debt has grown more rapidly than home values, issuing equity to others. resulting in a decline in housing wealth as a share of the These two special features of residential real estate may value of homes.’’ They attribute most of this effect to be viewed as market frictions or institutional rigidities that discretionary equity extractions via home sales, ‘‘cash- create an important asymmetry in the housing market which out’’ refinancing (where the homeowner receives cash does not exist in most financial markets. While a leveraged after the refinancing), and home-equity loans. investor may decide not to incrementally deleverage as In this paper, we focus on a previously unstudied prices decline due to optimistic expectations of a price dimension of risk in the mortgage market: the interplay reversal, indivisibility and occupant-ownership make incre- among the growth of the refinancing business, the decline mental deleveraging impossible, even for those who wish to in interest rates, and the appreciation of property values. reduce their exposure to real estate. Therefore, the only Each of these three trends is systemically neutral or option available to homeowners in a declining market is to positive when considered in isolation, but when they sell their homes, recognize their capital losses, and move into occur simultaneously, the results can be explosive. less expensive properties that satisfy their desired LTV ratio. We argue that during periods of rising home prices, falling The enormous costs—both financial and psychological—of interest rates, and increasingly competitive and efficient such a transaction make it a highly impractical and implau- refinancing markets, cash-out refinancing is like a ratchet. sible response to addressing the issue raised in this paper. It incrementally increases homeowner leverage as real- We propose to gauge the magnitude of the potential risk estate values appreciate without the ability to symme- caused by the refinancing ratchet effect by creating a trically decrease leverage by increments as real-estate numerical simulation of the U.S. housing and mortgage values decline. This self-synchronizing ‘‘ratchet effect’’ markets. By calibrating our simulation to the existing stock can create significant systemic risk in an otherwise of real estate, and by specifying reasonable behavioral geographically and temporally diverse pool of mortgages. rules for the typical homeowner’s equity extraction The potential magnitude of the risk created due to the decision—which satisfy common standards of prudence refinancing ratchet effect is most clearly illustrated though a and good lending practices in the U.S.—our simulation can hypothetical scenario in which all homeowners decide to match some of the major trends in this market over the past keep their leverage at a level generally associated with decade. Based on the calibrated simulation and using a extreme prudence and good lending practices, for example, standard derivatives-pricing model, we construct an estimate a loan-to-value (LTV) of 80% for a conventional fully amortiz- of losses absorbed by mortgage lenders—banks, asset man- ing 30-year fixed-rate mortgage. Suppose the refinancing agement firms, and government-sponsored enterprises market is so competitive, i.e., refinancing costs are so low and (GSEs)—from the decline in real-estate prices and compare capital is so plentiful, that homeowners are able to extract these estimates with the scenario of no equity extractions any equity above the minimum each month. In such an over the same period. Our simulation yields an approximate extreme case, cash-out refinancing has the same effect as if loss of $1.7 trillion from the housing-market decline since all mortgages were re-originated at the peak of the housing June 2006 compared to a loss of $330 billion if no equity had market. When home prices fall, as they must eventually, the been extracted from U.S. residential real estate during the ratchet ‘‘locks’’ because homeowners cannot easily unwind boom. their real-estate positions and incrementally deleverage due Of course, a simple response to the refinancing ratchet to indivisibility and illiquidity. The unintentional synchroni- effect might be to eliminate non-recourse mortgages. If all zation of leverage during the market’s rise naturally leads to mortgages were recourse loans and borrowers had uncor- an apparent shift in regime during the market’s decline, in related sources of income, their income streams would which historically uncorrelated defaults now become highly create an extra level of protection for lenders and, there- correlated. fore, distribute the risk in the mortgage system between Indivisibility and occupant-ownership of residential real- lenders and borrowers more evenly. Instead, current legal estate are two special characteristics of this asset class procedures for foreclosure and obtaining deficiency judg- that make addressing this issue particularly challenging. ments are complex and vary greatly from state to state. The impact of indivisibility can be crystallized by comparing As discussed by Ghent and Kudlyak (2009, Table 1), while an investment in residential real estate with a leveraged home mortgages are explicitly non-recourse in only 11 investment in a typical exchange-traded instrument such as states, in certain populous states with recourse such as shares of common stock. While the latter is subject to both Florida and Texas, generous homestead-exemption laws an initial margin requirement as well as a maintenance can make it virtually impossible for lenders to collect on margin requirement, home mortgages only have a home- deficiency judgments because borrowers can easily shield owner equity requirement that plays a role similar to that of their assets. Nevertheless, the risks and potential losses an initial margin.