Descriptive Set Theory Second Edition
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NOTES on FIBER DIMENSION Let Φ : X → Y Be a Morphism of Affine
NOTES ON FIBER DIMENSION SAM EVENS Let φ : X → Y be a morphism of affine algebraic sets, defined over an algebraically closed field k. For y ∈ Y , the set φ−1(y) is called the fiber over y. In these notes, I explain some basic results about the dimension of the fiber over y. These notes are largely taken from Chapters 3 and 4 of Humphreys, “Linear Algebraic Groups”, chapter 6 of Bump, “Algebraic Geometry”, and Tauvel and Yu, “Lie algebras and algebraic groups”. The book by Bump has an incomplete proof of the main fact we are proving (which repeats an incomplete proof from Mumford’s notes “The Red Book on varieties and Schemes”). Tauvel and Yu use a step I was not able to verify. The important thing is that you understand the statements and are able to use the Theorems 0.22 and 0.24. Let A be a ring. If p0 ⊂ p1 ⊂···⊂ pk is a chain of distinct prime ideals of A, we say the chain has length k and ends at p. Definition 0.1. Let p be a prime ideal of A. We say ht(p) = k if there is a chain of distinct prime ideals p0 ⊂···⊂ pk = p in A of length k, and there is no chain of prime ideals in A of length k +1 ending at p. If B is a finitely generated integral k-algebra, we set dim(B) = dim(F ), where F is the fraction field of B. Theorem 0.2. (Serre, “Local Algebra”, Proposition 15, p. 45) Let A be a finitely gener- ated integral k-algebra and let p ⊂ A be a prime ideal. -
Calibrating Determinacy Strength in Levels of the Borel Hierarchy
CALIBRATING DETERMINACY STRENGTH IN LEVELS OF THE BOREL HIERARCHY SHERWOOD J. HACHTMAN Abstract. We analyze the set-theoretic strength of determinacy for levels of the Borel 0 hierarchy of the form Σ1+α+3, for α < !1. Well-known results of H. Friedman and D.A. Martin have shown this determinacy to require α+1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, but we ask what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. To this end, we isolate a family of Π1-reflection principles, Π1-RAPα, whose consistency strength corresponds 0 CK exactly to that of Σ1+α+3-Determinacy, for α < !1 . This yields a characterization of the levels of L by or at which winning strategies in these games must be constructed. When α = 0, we have the following concise result: the least θ so that all winning strategies 0 in Σ4 games belong to Lθ+1 is the least so that Lθ j= \P(!) exists + all wellfounded trees are ranked". x1. Introduction. Given a set A ⊆ !! of sequences of natural numbers, consider a game, G(A), where two players, I and II, take turns picking elements of a sequence hx0; x1; x2;::: i of naturals. Player I wins the game if the sequence obtained belongs to A; otherwise, II wins. For a collection Γ of subsets of !!, Γ determinacy, which we abbreviate Γ-DET, is the statement that for every A 2 Γ, one of the players has a winning strategy in G(A). It is a much-studied phenomenon that Γ -DET has mathematical strength: the bigger the pointclass Γ, the stronger the theory required to prove Γ -DET. -
Mathematics 144 Set Theory Fall 2012 Version
MATHEMATICS 144 SET THEORY FALL 2012 VERSION Table of Contents I. General considerations.……………………………………………………………………………………………………….1 1. Overview of the course…………………………………………………………………………………………………1 2. Historical background and motivation………………………………………………………….………………4 3. Selected problems………………………………………………………………………………………………………13 I I. Basic concepts. ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….15 1. Topics from logic…………………………………………………………………………………………………………16 2. Notation and first steps………………………………………………………………………………………………26 3. Simple examples…………………………………………………………………………………………………………30 I I I. Constructions in set theory.………………………………………………………………………………..……….34 1. Boolean algebra operations.……………………………………………………………………………………….34 2. Ordered pairs and Cartesian products……………………………………………………………………… ….40 3. Larger constructions………………………………………………………………………………………………..….42 4. A convenient assumption………………………………………………………………………………………… ….45 I V. Relations and functions ……………………………………………………………………………………………….49 1.Binary relations………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ….49 2. Partial and linear orderings……………………………..………………………………………………… ………… 56 3. Functions…………………………………………………………………………………………………………… ….…….. 61 4. Composite and inverse function.…………………………………………………………………………… …….. 70 5. Constructions involving functions ………………………………………………………………………… ……… 77 6. Order types……………………………………………………………………………………………………… …………… 80 i V. Number systems and set theory …………………………………………………………………………………. 84 1. The Natural Numbers and Integers…………………………………………………………………………….83 2. Finite induction -
Redalyc.Sets and Pluralities
Red de Revistas Científicas de América Latina, el Caribe, España y Portugal Sistema de Información Científica Gustavo Fernández Díez Sets and Pluralities Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, vol. IX, núm. 19, 2009, pp. 5-22, Universidad El Bosque Colombia Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=41418349001 Revista Colombiana de Filosofía de la Ciencia, ISSN (Printed Version): 0124-4620 [email protected] Universidad El Bosque Colombia How to cite Complete issue More information about this article Journal's homepage www.redalyc.org Non-Profit Academic Project, developed under the Open Acces Initiative Sets and Pluralities1 Gustavo Fernández Díez2 Resumen En este artículo estudio el trasfondo filosófico del sistema de lógica conocido como “lógica plural”, o “lógica de cuantificadores plurales”, de aparición relativamente reciente (y en alza notable en los últimos años). En particular, comparo la noción de “conjunto” emanada de la teoría axiomática de conjuntos, con la noción de “plura- lidad” que se encuentra detrás de este nuevo sistema. Mi conclusión es que los dos son completamente diferentes en su alcance y sus límites, y que la diferencia proviene de las diferentes motivaciones que han dado lugar a cada uno. Mientras que la teoría de conjuntos es una teoría genuinamente matemática, que tiene el interés matemático como ingrediente principal, la lógica plural ha aparecido como respuesta a considera- ciones lingüísticas, relacionadas con la estructura lógica de los enunciados plurales del inglés y el resto de los lenguajes naturales. Palabras clave: conjunto, teoría de conjuntos, pluralidad, cuantificación plural, lógica plural. Abstract In this paper I study the philosophical background of the relatively recent (and in the last few years increasingly flourishing) system of logic called “plural logic”, or “logic of plural quantifiers”. -
Games in Descriptive Set Theory, Or: It's All Fun and Games Until Someone Loses the Axiom of Choice Hugo Nobrega
Games in Descriptive Set Theory, or: it’s all fun and games until someone loses the axiom of choice Hugo Nobrega Cool Logic 22 May 2015 Descriptive set theory and the Baire space Presentation outline [0] 1 Descriptive set theory and the Baire space Why DST, why NN? The topology of NN and its many flavors 2 Gale-Stewart games and the Axiom of Determinacy 3 Games for classes of functions The classical games The tree game Games for finite Baire classes Descriptive set theory and the Baire space Why DST, why NN? Descriptive set theory The real line R can have some pathologies (in ZFC): for example, not every set of reals is Lebesgue measurable, there may be sets of reals of cardinality strictly between |N| and |R|, etc. Descriptive set theory, the theory of definable sets of real numbers, was developed in part to try to fill in the template “No definable set of reals of complexity c can have pathology P” Descriptive set theory and the Baire space Why DST, why NN? Baire space NN For a lot of questions which interest set theorists, working with R is unnecessarily clumsy. It is often better to work with other (Cauchy-)complete topological spaces of cardinality |R| which have bases of cardinality |N| (a.k.a. Polish spaces), and this is enough (in a technically precise way). The Baire space NN is especially nice, as I hope to show you, and set theorists often (usually?) mean this when they say “real numbers”. Descriptive set theory and the Baire space The topology of NN and its many flavors The topology of NN We consider NN with the product topology of discrete N. -
Topology and Descriptive Set Theory
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Elsevier - Publisher Connector TOPOLOGY AND ITS APPLICATIONS ELSEVIER Topology and its Applications 58 (1994) 195-222 Topology and descriptive set theory Alexander S. Kechris ’ Department of Mathematics, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA Received 28 March 1994 Abstract This paper consists essentially of the text of a series of four lectures given by the author in the Summer Conference on General Topology and Applications, Amsterdam, August 1994. Instead of attempting to give a general survey of the interrelationships between the two subjects mentioned in the title, which would be an enormous and hopeless task, we chose to illustrate them in a specific context, that of the study of Bore1 actions of Polish groups and Bore1 equivalence relations. This is a rapidly growing area of research of much current interest, which has interesting connections not only with topology and set theory (which are emphasized here), but also to ergodic theory, group representations, operator algebras and logic (particularly model theory and recursion theory). There are four parts, corresponding roughly to each one of the lectures. The first contains a brief review of some fundamental facts from descriptive set theory. In the second we discuss Polish groups, and in the third the basic theory of their Bore1 actions. The last part concentrates on Bore1 equivalence relations. The exposition is essentially self-contained, but proofs, when included at all, are often given in the barest outline. Keywords: Polish spaces; Bore1 sets; Analytic sets; Polish groups; Bore1 actions; Bore1 equivalence relations 1. -
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS and GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Introduction Generic Absoluteness Principles Assert That Certai
UNIVERSALLY BAIRE SETS AND GENERIC ABSOLUTENESS TREVOR M. WILSON Abstract. We prove several equivalences and relative consistency re- 2 uBλ sults involving notions of generic absoluteness beyond Woodin's (Σ1) generic absoluteness for a limit of Woodin cardinals λ. In particular,e we R 2 uBλ prove that two-step 9 (Π1) generic absoluteness below a measur- able cardinal that is a limite of Woodin cardinals has high consistency 2 uBλ strength, and that it is equivalent with the existence of trees for (Π1) formulas. The construction of these trees uses a general method for building an absolute complement for a given tree T assuming many \failures of covering" for the models L(T;Vα) below a measurable car- dinal. Introduction Generic absoluteness principles assert that certain properties of the set- theoretic universe cannot be changed by the method of forcing. Some pro- perties, such as the truth or falsity of the Continuum Hypothesis, can always be changed by forcing. Accordingly, one approach to formulating generic ab- soluteness principles is to consider properties of a limited complexity such 1 1 as those corresponding to pointclasses in descriptive set theory: Σ2, Σ3, projective, and so on. (Another approach is to limit the class ofe allowede forcing notions. For a survey of results in this area, see [1].) Shoenfield’s 1 absoluteness theorem implies that Σ2 statements are always generically ab- solute. Generic absoluteness principlese for larger pointclasses tend to be equiconsistent with strong axioms of infinity, and they may also relate to the extent of the universally Baire sets. 1 For example, one-step Σ3 generic absoluteness is shown in [3] to be equiconsistent with the existencee of a Σ2-reflecting cardinal and to be equiv- 1 alent with the statement that every ∆2 set of reals is universally Baire. -
Vanishing Cycles, Plane Curve Singularities, and Framed Mapping Class Groups
VANISHING CYCLES, PLANE CURVE SINGULARITIES, AND FRAMED MAPPING CLASS GROUPS PABLO PORTILLA CUADRADO AND NICK SALTER Abstract. Let f be an isolated plane curve singularity with Milnor fiber of genus at least 5. For all such f, we give (a) an intrinsic description of the geometric monodromy group that does not invoke the notion of the versal deformation space, and (b) an easy criterion to decide if a given simple closed curve in the Milnor fiber is a vanishing cycle or not. With the lone exception of singularities of type An and Dn, we find that both are determined completely by a canonical framing of the Milnor fiber induced by the Hamiltonian vector field associated to f. As a corollary we answer a question of Sullivan concerning the injectivity of monodromy groups for all singularities having Milnor fiber of genus at least 7. 1. Introduction Let f : C2 ! C denote an isolated plane curve singularity and Σ(f) the Milnor fiber over some point. A basic principle in singularity theory is to study f by way of its versal deformation space ∼ µ Vf = C , the parameter space of all deformations of f up to topological equivalence (see Section 2.2). From this point of view, two of the most basic invariants of f are the set of vanishing cycles and the geometric monodromy group. A simple closed curve c ⊂ Σ(f) is a vanishing cycle if there is some deformation fe of f with fe−1(0) a nodal curve such that c is contracted to a point when transported to −1 fe (0). -
Chapter 1 Logic and Set Theory
Chapter 1 Logic and Set Theory To criticize mathematics for its abstraction is to miss the point entirely. Abstraction is what makes mathematics work. If you concentrate too closely on too limited an application of a mathematical idea, you rob the mathematician of his most important tools: analogy, generality, and simplicity. – Ian Stewart Does God play dice? The mathematics of chaos In mathematics, a proof is a demonstration that, assuming certain axioms, some statement is necessarily true. That is, a proof is a logical argument, not an empir- ical one. One must demonstrate that a proposition is true in all cases before it is considered a theorem of mathematics. An unproven proposition for which there is some sort of empirical evidence is known as a conjecture. Mathematical logic is the framework upon which rigorous proofs are built. It is the study of the principles and criteria of valid inference and demonstrations. Logicians have analyzed set theory in great details, formulating a collection of axioms that affords a broad enough and strong enough foundation to mathematical reasoning. The standard form of axiomatic set theory is denoted ZFC and it consists of the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms combined with the axiom of choice (C). Each of the axioms included in this theory expresses a property of sets that is widely accepted by mathematicians. It is unfortunately true that careless use of set theory can lead to contradictions. Avoiding such contradictions was one of the original motivations for the axiomatization of set theory. 1 2 CHAPTER 1. LOGIC AND SET THEORY A rigorous analysis of set theory belongs to the foundations of mathematics and mathematical logic. -
Linear Subspaces of Hypersurfaces
LINEAR SUBSPACES OF HYPERSURFACES ROYA BEHESHTI AND ERIC RIEDL Abstract. Let X be an arbitrary smooth hypersurface in CPn of degree d. We prove the de Jong-Debarre Conjecture for n ≥ 2d−4: the space of lines in X has dimension 2n−d−3. d+k−1 We also prove an analogous result for k-planes: if n ≥ 2 k + k, then the space of k- planes on X will be irreducible of the expected dimension. As applications, we prove that an arbitrary smooth hypersurface satisfying n ≥ 2d! is unirational, and we prove that the space of degree e curves on X will be irreducible of the expected dimension provided that e+n d ≤ e+1 . 1. Introduction We work throughout over an algebraically closed field of characteristic 0. Let X ⊂ Pn be an arbitrary smooth hypersurface of degree d. Let Fk(X) ⊂ G(k; n) be the Hilbert scheme of k-planes contained in X. Question 1.1. What is the dimension of Fk(X)? In particular, we would like to know if there are triples (n; d; k) for which the answer depends only on (n; d; k) and not on the specific smooth hypersurface X. It is known d+k classically that Fk(X) is locally cut out by k equations. Therefore, one might expect the d+k answer to Question 1.1 to be that the dimension is (k + 1)(n − k) − k , where negative dimensions mean that Fk(X) is empty. This is indeed the case when the hypersurface X is general [10, 17]. Standard examples (see Proposition 3.1) show that dim Fk(X) must depend on the particular smooth hypersurface X for d large relative to n and k, but there remains hope that Question 1.1 might be answered positively for n large relative to d and k. -
A List of Arithmetical Structures Complete with Respect to the First
View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE provided by Elsevier - Publisher Connector Theoretical Computer Science 257 (2001) 115–151 www.elsevier.com/locate/tcs A list of arithmetical structures complete with respect to the ÿrst-order deÿnability Ivan Korec∗;X Slovak Academy of Sciences, Mathematical Institute, Stefanikovaà 49, 814 73 Bratislava, Slovak Republic Abstract A structure with base set N is complete with respect to the ÿrst-order deÿnability in the class of arithmetical structures if and only if the operations +; × are deÿnable in it. A list of such structures is presented. Although structures with Pascal’s triangles modulo n are preferred a little, an e,ort was made to collect as many simply formulated results as possible. c 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. MSC: primary 03B10; 03C07; secondary 11B65; 11U07 Keywords: Elementary deÿnability; Pascal’s triangle modulo n; Arithmetical structures; Undecid- able theories 1. Introduction A list of (arithmetical) structures complete with respect of the ÿrst-order deÿnability power (shortly: def-complete structures) will be presented. (The term “def-strongest” was used in the previous versions.) Most of them have the base set N but also structures with some other universes are considered. (Formal deÿnitions are given below.) The class of arithmetical structures can be quasi-ordered by ÿrst-order deÿnability power. After the usual factorization we obtain a partially ordered set, and def-complete struc- tures will form its greatest element. Of course, there are stronger structures (with respect to the ÿrst-order deÿnability) outside of the class of arithmetical structures. -
The Infinite and Contradiction: a History of Mathematical Physics By
The infinite and contradiction: A history of mathematical physics by dialectical approach Ichiro Ueki January 18, 2021 Abstract The following hypothesis is proposed: \In mathematics, the contradiction involved in the de- velopment of human knowledge is included in the form of the infinite.” To prove this hypothesis, the author tries to find what sorts of the infinite in mathematics were used to represent the con- tradictions involved in some revolutions in mathematical physics, and concludes \the contradiction involved in mathematical description of motion was represented with the infinite within recursive (computable) set level by early Newtonian mechanics; and then the contradiction to describe discon- tinuous phenomena with continuous functions and contradictions about \ether" were represented with the infinite higher than the recursive set level, namely of arithmetical set level in second or- der arithmetic (ordinary mathematics), by mechanics of continuous bodies and field theory; and subsequently the contradiction appeared in macroscopic physics applied to microscopic phenomena were represented with the further higher infinite in third or higher order arithmetic (set-theoretic mathematics), by quantum mechanics". 1 Introduction Contradictions found in set theory from the end of the 19th century to the beginning of the 20th, gave a shock called \a crisis of mathematics" to the world of mathematicians. One of the contradictions was reported by B. Russel: \Let w be the class [set]1 of all classes which are not members of themselves. Then whatever class x may be, 'x is a w' is equivalent to 'x is not an x'. Hence, giving to x the value w, 'w is a w' is equivalent to 'w is not a w'."[52] Russel described the crisis in 1959: I was led to this contradiction by Cantor's proof that there is no greatest cardinal number.