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Index, 3Rd Edition. Games and Information Out-of-equilibrium 143, 155n Index, 3rd edition. Games and Information Posterior 55 Prior 54 "41d" indicates that the concept is defined on page 41, Updating 55 "33n" that the entry is in an endnote, and "54p" that the entry is in Benoit-Krishna game 134p a homework problem. Articles and books are indexed separately, Bertrand equilibrium 35n, 343, 367n, 370p in the bibliography. Best reply 19d Best response 19d, 82 This index was prepared by the author, not by a research Bid-ask spread 226 assistant or by the publisher. Bilateral Trading games I, II, III, and IV 309, 321n Bimatrix game 34n Biology 106n, 125, 133n, 289n Action combination 13d Blackboxing 100 Action set 13d Boiling in oil contract 175, 182n Action 13d Boundary 32 Additively separable 130 Bounded set 70 Advantages Bourgeois strategy 128 first-mover 29 Boxed Pigs game 25, 35 last-mover 300 Branch 40d second-mover 37p Bridge card game 85n Adverse selection 161, 211-39 Broadway Game Advertising 289n, 291p I 174 Affiliated variables 338n II 178 Affine transformation 76 Brouwer fixed-point theorem 404 Agent 162d Budget-balancing constraint 202, 207n, 262 Almost always 396, 404-06 Buyout, entry for 386, 392p Almost perfect information 63dn Alternating Offers game 299, 320 Calculus 394, 399, 400 Annuity 395, Capacity constraints 368n, 387, 345 Anonymity condition 271 Cardinal utility 34n, 76 Argmax 394 Certain information 47d Assessment 140 Chainstore paradox 110, 129 Assurance game 35n Cheap talk 75 Asymmetric information 49d,50 Chatterjee-Samuelson mechanism 315 Auctions 323-339 Chicken game 71, 85n categories 324 Closed set 70, 394, 395 common-value 324, 331 Civic Duty game 78 descending 327 Closed-loop 105n Dutch 327 Cloud 44 English 325 Coalition 319n first-price 325 Coalitionproofness 103 open-exit 325 Coarsening 45d private-value 324,330 Coase Conjecture 369n second-price 327,337 Coase Theorem 170 Auditing Game I, II, III 79, 86n Co-insurance 200 Authority 184p Colonel Blotto games 87n Axelrod tournament 151, 156n Combination 395 Combination, strategy 17d, 33n Backward induction 110 Commitment 29, 80, 117, 237p Bagehot model 226 Common knowledge 47d, 62n, 63nd, 158p Bank loans 153, 194, 231 In Entry Deterrence IV and V Bankruptcy constraint 186, 209p Common-value auction 324, 331 Bargaining 295-322, 165, 169 Communication 33, 75, 105, 32 Alternating Offers game 299, 320 Compact set 395 bargaining power 165, 169, 196 Comparative statics 357 Splitting a Pie game 296 Competition constraint 121, 213 take-it-or-leave-it offer 165 Competitive fringe 87n Battle of the Bismarck Sea game 21, 34n Complementary inputs 360 Battles of the Sexes game 28, 35n, 89p, 157p Complete information 50d, 51 Bayes's Rule 55d, 64p Complete robustness 146 Bayesian equilibrium 54 Completely mixed strategy 67d Beer-Quiche game 155n Concave function 395 Behavior strategy 84n Concordant beliefs 47d Beliefs Conditional likelihood 56 Constraints uniform 400 bankruptcy 186, 209p Dollar Auction game 336n competition 121, 213 Domain 396 incentive compatibility 121, 173, 213 Dominance-solvable 23d nonpooling 213 Dominance, stochastic 408 participation 173, 181n, 213, 233n Dominant diagonal condition 361 self selection 213 Dominant strategy 19d Continuous function 395 Dominant-strategy equilibrium 20d Continuous strategies 81, 100 Dominant-strategy mechanism 262 Continuous time 85n Dominated strategy 19d, 61 Continuum 395 Double auction mechanism 311 Continuum of players 69, 85, 303 Double-sided moral hazard 179n Continuum of equilibria 72, 207n, 296, 306 Dry Cleaners game 14 Contractible variable 170 Duelling games 74 Contraction mapping 395 Duopoly 30, 81, 87n, 156p, 340, 367n, 370p Contracts Durable monopoly 362, 369n boiling-in-oil 175, 182n Dutch auction 327, 336 first-best 172d, 246 Dynamic consistency 105n forcing 167 Dynamic game 90 linear 167 pooling 142, 145, 213d Edgeworth paradox 345 second-best 172d Education Game selling-the-store 178, 183p I 268 threshold 167 II-IV 271 Contribution games 77 V 277 Convex function 396 VI 278 Convex set 173, 396 VII 281 Cooperative games 21, 319n Efficiency wage 181n, 185, 205n, 210p, 230 Co-opting 205n Efficient rationing 367n Coordination games 29, 35n, 77 Elmer's Appetite 64p Copayment 200 Emotions 101, 132n Corner solution 72 End node (end point) 40d Correlated strategies 74 English auction 325 Correlated-value auction 324 Entry deterrence 372-392 Correspondence 396 Entry Deterrence game 106p, 134p Cournot model 30, 81, 87n, 156p, 340, 367n, 370p I 93 Cream skimming 224 II and III 139 Credible threat 94 IV and V 147, 158p Cumulative density function 400 Epsilon equilibrium 130n Customer Switching Costs game 123 Equilibrium 18d continua 72, 207n, 296, 306 Dangerous Coordination game 30 epsilon 130n Decision theory 14 existence 70, 225, 281 Decision tree 14 fully revealing 213, 246 Deductible 200 implausible 91, 143 Density 400 multiple 18 Derivatives, calculus 394, 399, 400 Pareto-dominant 28, 37p Descending auction 327 partially revealing 213 Determinants 399 Equilibrium concept 18d Deviation 33n coalitionproof 103 Differential games 87n dominant-strategy 20d Dimensionality condition 114, 131n evolutionarily stable strategies 125d, 135p Direct incentive-compatible mechanism 315 iterated dominance 23d, 118 Disagreement point 297 maximin 116 Discontinuity Nash 26d, 36p, 54, 100 Discoordination games 37p, 77 perfect bayesian 140d, 155 Discount factor 406 sequential 140d Discount rate 406 Stackelberg 30, 83, 87n, 106n Discounting 73, 299, 406-08 subgame perfect 91d, 137 in bargaining 301 trembling-hand-perfect 139 in the Folk Theorem 113 Equilibrium outcome 18 Distribution 400 Equilibrium path 89d exponential 400 Equilibrium refinement 28 lognormal 400 forward induction 158p Equilibrium strategy 18 Durable Monopoly 362 Evolutionary dynamics 128 Education I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII 268, 271, 277, 278, 281 Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) 125d, 135p Entry for Buyout 386 Exemplifying theory 2 Expensive Talk 157p Existence of equilibrium 70, 225, 281 Follow the Leader I, II, III Exotic refinements 155n The Free Rider Problem in Takeovers 378 Expected externality mechanism 316, 321n General 2x2 game 75 Expected utility 48, 63n Government Procurement 255 Expensive Talk Game 157p Grab the Dollar 73, 135p Exponential distribution 400 Greenmail to Attract White Knights 381 Extensive form 40d, 94, 155n Hawk-Dove 127 Extrinsic uncertainty 74 The Hotelling Location Game 354 The Hotelling Pricing Game 350 Fairness 101, 298 Insurance Game I , II, III 197, 222 Fat-cat effect 390n The Iteration Path Game 25 Finer information partition 45d Lemons I, II, III, IV 215, 218 First-best Limit Pricing as Signal Jamming 285 contract 172d, 246 Matching Pennies 88p outcome 182p The Minimax Illustration Game 116 First-mover advantage 29 Modeller's Dilemma 27 First-order condition approach 173, 181n Nuisance Suits I, II, III 96 First-order stochastic dominance 408 Patent Race for a New Market 374 First-price auction 325 Patent Race for an Old Market 376 Fixed-dash theorem 403 Phd Admissions 144 Focal point 31-33, 36n, 89p The Png Settlement Game 59 Folk Theorem 112d, 120, 131n The Police Game 86n Follow the Leader game Predatory Pricing 383 I 39 Product Quality 119 II 49 Production Game I, II, III, IV, V, VI,VIa,VII 164, 169, III 51 211, 242 Forcing contract 167 Repossession Game I, II, III 194 Ford, Henry, wages 23 The Salesman Game 244 Forgiving strategy 152 Splitting a Pie 296 Forward induction 158p The Swiss Cheese Game 24 Free rider problem 378 Testing 232 Fully insured 197 Underpricing New Stock Issues 283 Fully revealing equilibrium 213, 246 The Utopian Exchange Economy Game 126 Function 396 The War of Attrition 72 Functional forms 400 The Welfare Game 67 Gang of Four 149 Game theory Generically 396, 404-06 history 1-2, 6-7n, 51 Good news 409 method 2 Government Procurement game 255 Game tree 15, 40d Grab the Dollar game 73, 135p Games--in general Greek alphabet 395 cooperative vs. noncooperative 21 Greenmail 380 zero- vs variable-sum 25d, 34n Grim strategy 111d, 135p Games--specific games Groves mechanism 261, 264n Alternating Offers 299, 320 Auditing Game I, II, III 79, 86n Harsanyi doctrine 53, 62 Battle of the Bismarck Sea21, 34n Harsanyi transformation 51, 63n Beer-Quiche 155n Hawk-Dove game 127 Benoit-Krishna 134p Hidden actions 161 Bilateral Trading I, II, III, IV 309, 321n Hidden knowledge 161, 179n, 241 Boxed Pigs 25, 35 Hold-up potential 193 Broadway Game I, II 174, 178 Hotelling models 350 Chicken 71, 85n Civic Duty 78 Imperfect information 47d, 63n Colonel Blotto 87n Imperfectly separating equilibrium 213 Cournot Game 81 Implicit function theorem 358 Customer Switching Costs 123 Implementing mechanism 241 Dangerous Coordination 30 Incentive compatibility 121, 173, 213 Discoordination 37p Incomplete information 50d, 51, 97 Dollar Auction 336n Incomplete information folk theorem 151d Individual rationality constraint 181n Minimax strategy 114d Infimum 394 Minimax Theorem 116 Infinite-horizon model 119, 130n Minimax value 114d Infinitely repeated game 119 Mixed extension 67d Information partition 45d Mixed strategy 66-81, 237p, 287 Information set 43d the payoff-equating method 71 Informational rents 248, 260 correlated strategies 74 Informed player 162 versus randomizing 80 Innovation 372, 390n Modeller's Dilemma game 27 Insurance 46, 99, 182n, 196, 222, 230, 235n, 237p Monitoring 86n, 207p, 208p Insurance Game Monotone likelihood ratio property 181n I and II 197 Monty Hall Problem 64p III 222 Moral hazard 132n, 161-210 Intensity rationing 345d, 367n Moral
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