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This article examines different tactics among young, informal traders in “Getting By” at the Urban Periphery: coping with insecurity from a peripheral Everyday Struggles of Informal position in urban life. Such tactics (De Certeau) involve multiple forms of infor- Merchants in Tunisia mal economic practices, such as street vending and cross-border trade. These tactical practices must be seen in light of changing structural conditions, which have resulted in the wake of the revolution that followed the revolts in December 2010 and January 2011. The article analyzes both everyday forms of popular agency as well as their relationship with the govern- ment and the effects of state power. The empirical case studies result from field research in the popular, peri-urban neigh- Johannes Frische borhood of , in the northwest- ern fringes of the Tunisian capital. The The article examines the significance of practices that are situated in the inter- research was conducted between 2012 informal economic practices, e.g. street stices between legality and illegality. As and 2013.1 vending and informal commerce, for these possibilities often avoid state regu- young merchants from Ettadhamen, a lation and control, the article also Peripheries and Marginality: A Conceptual neighborhood situated in the northwest- addresses the ambivalent nature of the Approach ern periphery of the Greater area. It state-society relations that shapes every- Although Loïc Wacquant’s concept of further addresses cross-border trade in day encounters between inhabitants and advanced marginality draws upon insights the Tunisian-Libyan and Tunisian-Algerian state agents, especially the police. from the American ghetto and the French border regions in which some of these banlieue, i.e. zones of urban relegation merchants are indirectly involved. Periph- Keywords: Tunisia; Urban Periphery; within societies of the Global North, sev- eralization therefore does not imply com- State-Society Relations; Post- eral of his outlined dynamics can also be plete socio-spatial exclusion. Peripheries Revolutionary Transformation; Informal applied to urban peripheries in Tunisia. In rather offer important, albeit limited pos- Commerce the case of Ettadhamen, this holds for the sibilities, to acquire resources through territorial containment of lower and mid-

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dle class populations in a peri-urban dis- funds, they often do not have access to where the state’s power and its borders are trict that is insufficiently integrated into the social protection. contested and reconfigured and where national economy and the regular wage Peripheries can also be spaces where informal channels, parallel networks and labor sector. Peripheralization is thus the everyday informal practices take root in transnational economic flows perpetuate effect of a spatially ingrained social order the niches of a dominant socio-political connections with the global world econ- that has been produced through both order that is maintained by powerful social omy (Roitman 195). Albeit on a small scale, uneven economic development and the groups and their interests. Looking at the empirical cases of informal merchants governmentality of the Tunisian state. everyday modes of tactical action, one can in the wake of the Tunisian revolution will While this order was shaped under the discover the creativity of peripheries and demonstrate that informal practices can regimes of Ben Ali and Habib Bourguiba, margins as they not only entail passive sub- persist despite the center’s dominance. it has roots in the colonial period. mission but also employ different forms of Although these informal practices primar- Aside from its spatial dimension, periph- popular agency from below (Bayat, “Mar- ily aim at coping with the insecurities, risks eralization and marginalization have par- ginality” 19). Based on her important study and constraints that result from a periph- ticularly affected specific societal groups. on Favelados in Rio de Janeiro, Janice Perl- eral position, they produce forms of surviv- In a society characterized by deeply man argues that marginality constitutes a alism and self-organization that largely entrenched inequalities, instead of main- myth in the sense that it mistakes system- avoid dominant structures and institutions. taining one homogenous working class, atic exclusion and stigmatization for being Such informal economic practices and the processes of neoliberal restructuring passively marginal (131). By the same token, formal system, which is to a greater extent have produced fragmented forms of pre- she also points out that in spite of system- structured by official rules, exist side by cariousness, social differentiation and atic exclusion, different forms of internal side in Ettadhamen. exclusion. Unemployed youth, female socio-political organization and coopera- household workers, casual informal work- tion, which are based on solidarity, exist in Ettadhamen: Contested Urban Space in ers and street children belong to such the proximity relations between friends the Periphery of Greater Tunis “precarized” groups. They not only face and neighbors in the Favelas (142). Margin- Ettadhamen was created under the rule of unemployment or unstable and precari- alization and peripheralization are not only Bourguiba in 1966 as a public program ous employment conditions. They are a curse but also as an opportunity where that provided social housing for rural also positioned on the margins of the excluded groups can survive and over- migrants and was given the name otherwise solid social security system in come economic constraints (Bayat, “Mar- al-taḍāmun (“solidarity”). Between 1975 Tunisia (Destremeau; Ben Cheikh 2). ginality” 14). The constitution of the mar- and 1984 it witnessed considerable popu- Since they lack both formalized employ- ginal or the peripheral does not lation growth due to the influx of intra- ment conditions and a sufficient and necessarily follow the logic of total exclu- urban migrants who came from the stable income, which would allow them sion (Yúdice 214). Despite their marginal- Medina and from gourbivilles (“spontane- to make contributions to social security ized positions, peripheries are often sites ous agglomerations”) inside the city of

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Tunis (ARRU 24). This development was in republic’s zones d’ombre (“shadow the already existing networks in the neigh- contrast to the situation of older informal zones”) and the integration of marginal- borhood (Allal 59). They temporarily neighborhoods that had come into being ized, shaʿabī (“popular”) classes. However, adopted a policing function in an effort to through rural exodus. It was thus the result despite significant infrastruc­tural improve- control the neighborhood’s unsafe condi- of a redistribution of populations within ments, problems such as unemployment, tions. Ever since the fall of the regime the capital (Laroussi 45). Most of these crime, insufficient housing, and the socio- enforcement of both security measures residential migrants (56.4 percent) were spatial segregation of the neighborhood and public services that should be pro- also former rural migrants who originated not only persisted but rather increased vided by local authorities such as the from northwestern Tunisia, a traditional (ARRU 55). police and the municipality have been agricultural region, which contains the In 2012, the population of Ettadhamen in neglected. Self-organization and local High Tell Mountains along with Beja, Jen- the was 142,000 while networks, for example organizations douba and Le Kef as the most important the surrounding neighborhoods Douar belonging to the Salafi movement, consti- cities (Chabbi, “L’Habitat spontané” 25; Hicher and Mnihla counted 157,000 tute parallel structures of social regula­ tion “Une Nouvelle forme” 90; “Urbanisation inhabitants. In total, these three neighbor- and control. Clashes between young, spontanée” 181). In view of this historical hoods comprised 300,000 inhabitants, unemployed people and security forces background, Ettadhamen serves as an which made it one of the most populated have given Ettadhamen the label of a law- example for the proliferation of “fringe peri-urban agglomerations in North Africa less zone where control mechanisms by urban communities” (Ali and Rieker 3) (Chabbi, “Une Nouvelle forme” 168). In state agents and institutions are whose members were situated in the January 2011, it was one of the first neigh- limited (Belhassine). However, since peripheries of larger cities negotiating borhoods within the capital where mobi- August 2013, when the organization Ansar and reproducing the rural-urban nexus lizations of youth, most of whom were al-Sharia was classified as a terrorist (2). In the late 1970s, the insecure condi- unemployed, targeted local police sta- group, security measures have been rein- tions of habitation in the neighborhood tions. The protests also entailed acts of forced and several activists belonging to prompted the Tunisian state agencies to pillage and sabotage. The three major the militant branch of the Salafi move- implement a number of urban planning industrial sites and the maison des jeunes ment have been arrested.2 projects that aimed to regulate real estate (“youth center”) were burned down by Ettadhamen is predominantly a residential and improve infrastructure. These projects protesters. Moreover, a number of stores area due to modest infrastructure and lack were partially financed through a credit were looted and destroyed. However, in of industrial production (ENDA 12). Spatial from the World Bank (Chabbi, “Pratiques the aftermath of the protests, local youth segregation and the proliferation of infor- et logiques”). Ettadhamen and Douar took responsibility for security in the mal housing structure through illegal sub- Hicher were the priority zones of these neighborhood by organizing local com- divisions did not favor the attraction of policy efforts that now put a greater mittees. These informal patrols called lijān economic investments. Therefore, as pub- emphasis on the development of the shaʿabiyya (“popular committees”) used lic sector jobs were inaccessible for the

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majority, the neighborhood Ettadhamen- 27.8 percent were self-employed as arti- However, to the Tunisian regime tolerating had already witnessed the sans or small merchants, and 20.3 percent informal commerce also implied control- dispersion of informal activities and ser- were employed in commerce (Interna- ling it. Since the ruling family clan of the vices by 1980. By 1995, a rising number of tional Alert 11). Moreover, the informal Trabelsi was keen on siphoning off profits households had invested in commercial economy plays a significant role in Ettad- for itself, the Tunisian authorities occasion- activities. Many transformed one room of hamen (Lamloum and Ben Zina 15). Like in ally intervened. The municipal police in their house into an economic establish- many other popular neighborhoods infor- Tunis would carry out raids against street ment for a particular kind of activity, mostly mal commercial activities are connected vendors and confiscate their products or commerce-related. Most of the retail to translocal circuits and flows of eco- take away scales from merchants selling stores and commercial establishments are nomic goods that extend to other areas fruits and vegetables if they were not will- now concentrated around the main and markets in the country. ing to pay bribes. Ibrahim, a 23 years old streets, 105th Street, 106th Street, Ibn The police in Ettadhamen tolerate these retail trader working in the store of his par- Khaldun Street and the road leading from activities, which are illegal in terms of state ents on 105th Street in Ettadhamen refers Tunis to . 105th Street is character- regulations, and turn a blind eye towards to the situation prior to January 14, 2011: ized by a great number of informal side the fact that these informal vendors do not Q: How did the authorities deal with streets and ambulant vendors who mostly hold the proper licenses to legalize their independent commerce before the come from the vicinity. They predomi- business (Police officer). One of the rea- revolution? nantly sell vegetables, fruits, decor, house- sons why the state, to a great extent, toler- A: Commerce was allowed, but the Tra- hold equipments, electronic appliances ated informal economic activities, specifi- belsi family intervened in it. They were and friperie (very cheap, second-hand cally informal commerce, before the the big ones who delivered all kinds of clothing which is distributed in bales). Tunisian revolution in 2011, can be seen in goods to the other small merchants. Local clients frequently buy from these its determination to depoliticize and They were the ones who imported vendors because they can negotiate appease poor populations in order to these kinds of goods. From China. cheaper prices. The small stores primarily contain social unrest (Meddeb, “La Tunisie” They also demanded bribes (rashwa). offer low-value goods of modest quality 73). Although informal practices under- First they were the ones who sold you that are suitable to the resources of the mined the rule of law and bureaucratic their goods. And then they would also low-­income strata in a popular neighbor- norms, they were mostly in accordance demand bribe money. They were big hood. If casual labor has regressed, com- with the logic of the police state and the traders. We didn’t deal with them di- merce activities have greatly increased in security order. As Béatrice Hibou points rectly. The police demanded the bribes the neighborhood, especially among the out, the state’s laissez-faire approach was every month. (Ibrahim) younger generation. According to a 2014 one of the disciplinary techniques of The revolution brought about a greater survey among 714 youth aged between power that was deeply entrenched in the degree of freedom in public life. The 18-34 from Douar Hicher and Ettadhamen, patronage-system under Ben Ali (187). retrenchment of the security apparatus

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allowed for the expansion of informal itants from Ettadhamen as they work to Economic Survival in Face of State Control commerce as the enormous spreading of make a living (al-maʿīsha) and to secure in Everyday Life street vendors, many of them very young, their economic survival at the urban The situation of street vendors in in public places, e.g. squares, big avenues periphery. At the same time, they point to Ettadhamen, like in other neighborhoods and around mosques, demonstrates (Ben the ambivalent relationship with the state, and informal markets of the city, has Mahmoud). Controversial discussions in particular its local manifestations such always been highly insecure, especially about how to regulate the informal econ- as the municipality (al-baladaiyya), fiscal under the regime of Ben Ali. Informal omy have been occurring ever since the authorities (qabāḍa māliyya), the police vending circuits are widespread across fall of the regime in January 2011 and the (al-ḥākim) or the employment center the city since they allow for the circulation beginning of the political transition pro- (maktab al-tashghīl). At the local level of of perish­able foodstuffs such as fruits and cess that followed. While most state offi- peripheral areas, the boundaries between vegetables or low quality goods, for exam- cials see informality as a necessary evil, state and society are often more porous ple cheap clothing and household equip- tradesmen from the formal sector com- and permeable (Mitchell), which may lead ment, which the formal circuits cannot plain about the negative effects on their to both immediate conflict and mediation. easily provide at such localities. While own businesses; although, they some- Despite the fact that they occupy marginal street vending is often practiced without times benefit from the informal distribu- positions and belong to a marginalized any kind of formalization or licensing and tion networks as well. Since May 2011, the population, the actors are capable of provides a source of income for those who official policy of the government aims to developing informal tactics that use the are unqualified and do not have a chance curb informal activities due to their nega- few economic opportunities available in a to find a regular and formal job, it involves tive effects on the productive sectors and spatially segregated and economically rel- the risk of facing controls by the munici- the price level (SlateAfrique). On August egated neighborhood at the periphery. pality police.3 The French expression for 26 2011, the ministry of the interior passed Furthermore they draw from access to street vendors vendeurs à la sauvette a resolution that banned illegal street local networks of solidarity based on kin- (“vendors on the run”), which is widely vending starting in September 2011. Any ship, friendship and vicinity. The high used in Tunisia, alludes to this risk and the street vendor selling goods would be significance of work as a fundamental need to run away from the police. The forced to pay a fine (Gamha). However, social value and as an obligatory source of account of Abderrahim shows the severe restrictive laws and regulations are often revenue explains why many young people impact of such controls on the livelihood not implemented on the ground. resort to informal activities, even if the of a self-employed, informal merchant. absorptive capacities of the informal Being the son of a construction worker Everyday Struggles of “Getting By:” Indi- economy are thereby increasingly from a town in northern Tunisia, he went to vidual Cases stretched. primary school until the age of 14. He then The following cases are meant to illumi- quit school and started searching for a job nate the everyday struggles of local inhab- due to financial constraints within the fam-

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ily. However, he could only find jobs as a money: “What else can I do if not this kind are the reasons for this changed policy ʿāmil yaumī (“casual laborer”) and was of work? Where can I work if not here? vis-à-vis street vendors: unemployed most of the time before he Why did they come to disperse? It’s not Because of the economic situation, started working as a painter. One of his reasonable” (Abderrahim). Afterwards, the state does not persecute them colleagues put him into touch with a pri- Abderrahim was compelled to start from very much. Unemployment has incre- vate company employing 45 workers. scratch again and spend his savings on ased after the revolution. It’s better Abderrahim obtained a permanent acquiring new equipment and new they do street vending than stealing employment contract, but it did not goods. He mentioned that since the things. There are priorities and there include social security benefits. Through regime collapsed, there were no more are concessions. The state allows for this job, he earned a monthly salary of raids by the municipality police. However, intiṣāb fauḍawī (“street vending”), so 480 DT—slightly above the SMIG4—for it has become much more difficult for him that crime and thefts won’t increase in working eight hours per day.5 However, to make a living through this activity the country. Before the revolution the- when he became exhausted through this because of an overall higher price level re was more control on street vending. kind of hard, physical work he searched in the country and because of a decrease It was part of the suppressive regime for an alternative. He invested the savings in profit margins. Abderrahim’s case under Ben Ali. All the people had to be from his job (500 DT) into the creation of shows how visible informal practices, afraid of the police. (Ibrahim) a street vending business for selling fruits. which take place openly in public space Every other day he rented an informal and which the authorities usually tolerate, Between Control and Laissez-Faire: Stakes transport car and went to the wholesale can at certain instances be subdued by and Risks of Cross-Border Trade market in Bir Qasʿa in the southern sub- controls and repressive measures. His While the majority of street vendors do urb of the capital , where he perspective also reveals that local not hold a permit and thus occupy a com- bought peaches, bananas, apples and actors consider these practices, which pletely informal status, most of the retail almonds in order to sell them on a public are illegal according to official law, as traders usually possess both a license square near Ettadhamen. However, he legitimate or licit for the simple reason from the municipality for their store and a always feared controls by the authorities that they constitute their sole source of permit for paying taxes. However, the which, before January 2011, regularly income. Therefore, the degree of tol- goods they commercialize are often not interfered in this kind of informal, non- eration by the authorities has increased formally acquired but rather originate licensed street vending. The police of the since the regime’s collapse. Controls, from informal circuits that are connected municipality came four times to disperse bribe extortions, dispossessions and to trans-local networks of cross-border his vending stall and confiscate his goods other repressive measures have been trade and smuggling. The merchants from and scales. Knowing that the police reduced but have not completely van- popular neighborhoods in the periphery sometimes accepted bribes he unsuc- ished. Ibrahim, the retail trader on of Greater Tunis—among them street ven- cessfully tried to stop them by offering 105th Street, explains what he thinks dors, ambulant vendors and retail trad-

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ers—usually acquire these smuggled of goods loaded at the point of purchase for smuggled goods have risen consider- goods at local markets such as Sidi that passed through the border post, Ras ably and border controls have intensified Boumendil or Melassine in Tunis. Some Jedir, was estimated at 467.47 millions due to the proliferation of the illegal also travel to markets in cities close to the DT (Ayadi et al. 17). As for the Tunisian- arms trade.7 Therefore, his family prefers border, for example Ben Guerdane near Algerian border region, smuggling has to purchase the merchandise in Algeria the Tunisian-Libyan border and greatly increased since 2011, in particular or from the informal market in Kasserine. near the Tunisian-Algerian border.6 At the trafficking of Algerian fuels which are Ibrahim explains how the authorities reg- these markets they purchase cheap mer- approximately ten times cheaper than ulate this form of retail trading business chandise that is mostly produced in Tunisian fuels (21). and how he deals with police controls: China and Southeast Asia (Meddeb, Ibrahim refers to this ambivalent legal Q: Do you have a permit for this store? Courir ou mourir 36). In 1988, the open- situation of commercializing goods that A: Yes, we have one. A ruḫṣa (“license”) ing of the frontier between Libya and originate from cross-border trade in the from the municipality and a batinda Tunisia at the border posts, Ras Jedir and case of his parents’ retail business. When (“permit”) for paying taxes. We pay Dhhiba, considerably accentuated the he was 23, he successfully passed the taxes on the income. I give you an exchanges of both economic goods and baccalaureate exam and pursued his example. If your income is 2,000 DT you human beings between the two coun- studies at the University of La . pay a percentage of it as a tax on your tries. This holds in particular for the activ­ After three months of studying, he quit income. The police of the municipality ities of ambulant merchants, which has university because he was unsatisfied or the price control can ask: “Do you led to an explosion of informal com- with the studying conditions and the low have a license and bills?” If not, they merce in the Tunisian-Libyan border value of the certificate that would have confiscate your goods, saying that they region (governorates of Medenine and left him with poor job perspectives. are stolen because there is no what we ) due to the importation of Instead, he started working in a retail call legal origin. They are considered cheap manufactured products into store on one of the major avenues in stolen or smuggled goods. That’s why Tunisia (tobacco, electronic devices, car Ettadhamen, which is owned by his par- you need the bills. If you buy goods equipment, beauty products, household ents, and sold household equipment and from over there [Algeria] you ask them equipment, decor, clothing). Having decor materials to local clients from the for a bill. The police waits at the cus- arrived on Tunisian soil, the goods are neighborhood. He points out that before toms. If you don’t have bills they later distributed by wholesalers via the Tunisian revolution he went to acquire demand bribes from you. And the bills extensive networks to informal markets— the goods in Ben Guerdane. However, don’t even have any value. You bring so-called souk libya—all across the coun- since the civil war in Libya in 2011 and the back the bills for two things. The other try (Boubakri 242-43). These cross-bor- resulting deterioration of security condi- one is the murāqaba iqtiṣādiyya (“eco- der exchanges can reach outstanding tions in the border regions, the supply of nomic control”) of the store. Someone monetary value. In 2013, the annual value available goods has decreased, prices from customs comes here and carries

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out a control. They ask for the bills for less about opposing state regulation in Ettadhamen, describes how such trips to different goods. So you have to give general and rather more about the Ben Guerdane are arranged and how he them the bills. If you don’t have a bill demand for the right to have an alterna- organizes his trading activity: they will assume that the goods are tive to the state’s monopoly (49). This, For buying the products, I always went either stolen or smuggled. (Ibrahim) however, also implies that the border is to Ben Guerdane. The first time I went As Ibrahim insinuates, false documenta- not a marginalized, segregated space but there was for three days. I went together tion can be used as a means to give infor- rather a source of revenue and subsis- with the other merchants, with a group. mal practices the appearance of legality. tence in the country’s peripheries (44). They rent a car, they go there and come Similar to wholesale traders, who possess It is often not easy to distinguish between back. Everyone spends the money he or formal enterprises and deal with huge the different actors involved in the net- she has and brings back the products. quantities of imported goods, retail trad- works of cross-border trade, i.e. mer- There are some people who organize ers partially operate in informally. Their chants, traffickers, transporters, carriers, trips to Ben Guerdane – people who businesses are formalized, but they fre- consumers or simple travelers. In the case offer you a bus and a driver to bring you quently engage in informal practices such of the merchants from Ettadhamen many there for a special sum. I paid 40 DT. as irregular acquisitions of goods, non- of them are part of the numerous street Roundtrip. I got to know these mer- declaration and tax evasion (Laroussi 182). vendors, small, itinerant traders and oc- chants here in Hay Ettadhamen. For Informal activities related to cross-border casional merchants with modest finan- going to Ben Guerdane, you leave in trade constitute both regional border cial means called fourmis (“ants”) (Med- the evening and you arrive there the economies and the networks of distribu- deb, Courir ou mourir 59; World Bank 4). morning after. You go to the big market tion and consumption of goods that reach These small merchants travel individually over there, and you buy your goods. I across the republic. They are situated in an or as part of an organized group trip to always bought furniture, electronic interstice between legality and illegality.8 informal markets in the Tunisian-Libyan devices, appliances that you need for Cross-border trade is considered legiti- border region, where they carry out their houses, for example stereo systems, mate in the eyes of the actors involved, purchases (Meddeb, “Courir ou mourir” cooking systems, ovens, microwaves, who use it as a means to assure their 55). At these markets, they can seize sometimes also washing machines. All khobza (“daily bread”), their economic spontaneous opportunities for lucrative the things that you need for the house. security and a decent standard of living sales offers. They mostly buy electronic People would give me money and ask (Meddeb, Courir ou mourir 43). Although devices, household equipment or cloth- me to bring back something for them, cross-border trade represents, for the ing. The latter can be divided into fripes for example a washing machine. When- majority, an economy of “getting by” and and high quality, fashionable prêt-à-por- ever I went I made a list of the things coping with insecurity rather than financial ter outfits, which are sold on the souk lib- that I needed to bring back. A friend or accumulation, it may also offer the chance ya for relatively attractive prices. Usama, a a neighbor would come and tell me: to achieve social upward mobility. It is thus thirty years old ambulant merchant from “Buy me a washing machine or a micro-

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wave.” I brought them the things and road. Sometimes they even stop you in integration under unequal terms. Periph- they paid me afterwards. I buy the wash- . (Usama) eries bear some potential to gain ing machine for 60 DT and I sell it for As Usama points out, controls and bribe au ton­ omy and acquire resources, even if 100 DT. Of course, I bought other things extortions have decreased since the in most cases these potentials are very lim- at the same time, for example clothing. regime collapsed. Personalized exchange ited. This holds true for those local street I keep those goods in the house. I went relations based on a clientelistic rapport and ambulant vendors in Ettadhamen, many, many times to Ben Guerdane. between transporters or smugglers and who circulate across the urban system of More than thirty times. (Usama) state agents minimize the risk of having to Tunis or who travel to border regions in These kinds of commercial trips also bear face imposed penalties. The interaction order to seek opportunities for purchasing the risk of getting caught in controls by between small merchants and state agents merchandise. Such potential opportuni- the police, by customs or by the garde na- is ambivalent. Rather than following gen- ties, however, come with high risks and tionale. Under the regime of Ben Ali, the eralized, pre-defined rules, it is a negoti- new constraints as these merchants have organizers of these group journeys had to ated bargain that results from face-to-face to struggle with decreasing profit margins, legitimate such trips through licenses ob- encounters. On the side of the authorities limited capital for investment and controls tained from local cells of the ruling single it involves both a strategy of laissez-faire by police and customs officers. party RCD (Meddeb, Courir ou mourir as well as moments of control and inter- The informal practices that inhabitants 174). Those who travelled without any vention in order to partially reinstate state from Ettadhamen engage in are situated form of legalization needed to be pre- power. In the interactions among mer- on the margins of legality; the limited pared to bribe police and custom agents. chants, transporters and smugglers per- degree of state intervention in Ettadha- Usama recalls: sonal connections are built through men or the porosity of the borders to Before, I always had to pay bribes on repeated transactions in order to foster Libya and Algeria can be seen as repre- the way back to Tunis. All the merchants trust and overcome the risk of being senting the peripheralization of state have to pay. They give a sum of money cheated. power, which thereby allows for the prolif- to the custom service, so that they let eration of informal practices positioned in you pass with your goods. Each time a Conclusions an interstice between legality and illegal- sum like 300 DT. For all of the mer- The case studies have illustrated multiple ity. The relation between the state or its chants. Me, I pay something like 50 DT tactical modes of how informal merchants local manifestations and the informal mer- each time, sometimes 100 DT. It hap- from Ettadhamen cope with insecurity at chants are ambivalent. They may shift from pens on the road from Ben Guerdane the urban periphery. They point to both one moment to another when external to Tunis. Because when you leave Ben challenges as well as possibilities to turn conditions change and arrangements are Guerdane, you don’t talk to the custom constraints into opportunities. Peripheral- disturbed. Despite a weakening of the service. The patrols stop you on the ization, therefore, does not imply a com- state apparatus in the wake of January plete socio-spatial exclusion but rather an 2011, it is far from being powerless as its

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Johannes Frische agents continue to occasionally intervene are willing to abide by the law, but they ble option if it does not entail a total loss in informal practices. Since 2013 the coun- contest specific modes of power exertion of autonomy and deprivation of vital studied Middle Eastern Studies, History try has actually witnessed a gradual rein- (controls, confiscations, bribe extortions) opportunities, which semi-legal practices and Religious Studies at the Universities forcement of security measures, especially or demand the re-adjustment of legal reg- in peripheral areas can offer. of Leipzig (Germany), Santa Barbara in the border regions. Even the most sub- ulations, so that they can carry out prac- These microscopic social struggles over (USA) and Damascus (Syria). In October ordinated actors of the informal economy, tices that they consider to be licit in view access to resources, although not directly 2011, he joined the graduate program young ambulant merchants or street ven- of their material conditions. In particular, linked to moments of open protest, con- Critical Junctures of Globalization at dors, who conceive state power at times when these conditions are put at risk, sub- stitute an everyday socio-spatial context in Leipzig University. His dissertation as absent, inert, arbitrary or repressive, still jectivities of dissent and even social unrest the urban peripheries from which local project examines informal economic interact in their everyday circulations with are likely to occur. For many informal mer- micro-politics can emerge. practices of urban youth in Tunisia. the state’s local representatives and chants, inclusion into the formal system His research interests focus on youth, agents. Informal merchants do not neces- can be desirable if it provides access to transnational migration and informality. sarily refuse its authority in principle. Many social protection. However, it is only a via- email: [email protected]

Notes 3 According to a survey by 5 In July 2012, the SMIG 6 Unlike Ben Guerdane 7 Smuggling of both narcotics the Tunisian Association for was 320 DT (Business near the Tunisian-Libyan and arms existed already 1 The data of this article Management and Social News). According to a study border or Kasserine near the before January 14th but consists of semi-structured Stability (TAMSS) and the conducted by TAMSS and Tunisian-Algerian border the has increased considerably qualitative interviews, which Global Fairness Initiative GFI with 1,203 informal neighborhood Ettadhamen, since that time, because I conducted with informal (GFI), nearly 70 percent workers from different situated in the northwestern controls by police, custom workers and merchants in of independent, informal regions in Tunisia, more than periphery of the Greater officers and garde nationale Ettadhamen in June and workers do not hold a two-thirds (72.5 percent) of Tunis area, does not rank have loosened or even July 2012. More recent license, and only 8 percent the households of informal among the most significant disappeared in some areas developments cannot be declared that they pay taxes workers earn a monthly centers for smuggling of the border regions taken into account in this (municipal or other taxes) income of less than 600 DT, circuits. However, several (International Crisis Group article. (Global Fairness Initiative 42). 15 percent earn between 600 informal merchants are 15). and 799 DT, 22.3 percent directly or indirectly involved 2 Salafis are part of local, 4 Salaire minimum between 400 and 599 DT, in informal transport and ––› territorialized networks of interprofessionnel garanti 35.7 percent between 200 distribution networks. The the neighborhood (ḥūma), (“minimum wage”). and 399 DT and 14.4 percent smuggling of illegal goods which play an important earn less than 200 DT (Global such as drugs and arms is not role in organizing informal Fairness Initiative 13). dealt with in this article. commerce. Due to space constraints, however, their role cannot be addressed in detail here.

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ISSN: 2196-629X http://doi.org/10.17192/ meta.2015.5.3521

Middle East – Topics & Arguments #05–2015