The Moral Philosophy of Aristotle
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THE MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF ARISTOTLE WILLIAM ARCHIBALD SPOONER OF SOUL. Now since the main element in happiness is virtue, we must examine with greater fulness into the nature of virtue. Virtue has ever been the chief concern of true statesmanship : witness for example the legislation of Crete and Sparta. As our own inquiry is a branch of statesmanship, we must examine the nature of virtue as the means whereby man may realize his perfection. But virtue is ' the excellence of the mul ' just as happiness is the activity of the mid. We must therefore in the first place study tht nature of the soul if we would imderstand its excellence. For our present purpose it will be sufficient for us to adopt the main conclusions of Psychology which are discussed in my Public Lectures. There is an admitted distinction of soul into (1) rational, and (2) non- rational : whether that be a profound and real distinction, or only a convenient and notional one, matters not. 1. The non-rational may be subdivided again into (1) nutritive, and (2) emotional ; but the nutritive element may be dismissed from our consideration for the following reasons : (a.) It is common to plants and not characteristic of man, as man, (/9.) It is most active in sleep. (2) The emotional soul is not entirely non-rational, but rather semi- rational It is the seat of the desires and impulses wliich sometimes submit to reason and sometimes are opposed to it. It has not reason in its own right, but yet is capable of * receiving reason ' as a child listens to the counsels of his father. 2. Thus the * rational soul' may be also subdivided into (1) semi- rational or emotional, and (2) purely rational or intellectual. The semi- rational soul is capable of receiving good impressions and forming vutuous dispositions. The intellectual soul has reason in its own right and independently of external influences. Corresponding to this division of conscious soul, is the division of Virtue into emotional (or moral) and intellectual. TEANSLATION. INTRODUCTION. IS THERE A PERFECTION OF MAN, AND HOW CAN IT BE ATTAINED? Argruments from 'Design in Nature' in proof of Human Every art and every step to knowledge, and similarly both every moral act and every decision of the will, Bcems to have some ' good ' or ' purpose ' at which " workTof it aims. Tlie supreme good, therefore, or ' pur- nature and in all pose of all things ' is, as philosophers have well i\ of described it, ' that at which all things aim.* But in the subordinate purposes or ends * of nature there is a certain distinction to be observed. Some ends are simply ' modes of activity,' and others are material results beyond the simple exercise of the faculties ; and where there are material results of any kind reaching beyond the actions, in such cases these results are more important than the activities which produced them. As, moreover, there are many forms of action, and many varieties of art and science, so also are there many ends ' resulting there- from : the end of medicine, for instance, being health ; of ship-building, a ship ; of strategy, vie- """"l tory; of domestic economy, wealth. But where A«cnd,* but these the arts throuprh which these ends are realized, * particular ends * themselves fall under some higher art (as bridle- to 'higher ends.' making and similar functions connected with the manufacture of horse-trappings fall under the general art of Hiding, while Riding, again, and the whole business of war falls under the Master Art of Strategy; and as, in an exactly similar way, other subordinate arts fall under higher arts) " in all such cases, I say, the ends of the Master Arts are more important than those of the subordinate arts, the latter being pursued only for the sake of the former. [But, as regards the principle of subordination, it is immaterial In every art and in every way to knowledge there is some * good * which we Beek to attain. The objects which determine human choice and action are those from which we expect to gain some * good.' Hence some have properly defined the Summum Bonum as ' the good at which all things aim/ This is a universal law : not only things which are moved by conscious thought, aim, by that motion, at some good, but also things which are moved by the laws of nature are led towards the realization of some good end, or purpose, though it be unconsciously, like an arrow shot at a mark. There iiJ thus an ' end ' in every form of moral action or of physical movement. But there is evidently a distinction to be noted in ends.' In some cases the end of action is a material result, as the end of the shipwright's craft is a sliip. In other cases, again, the end of action is further action ; as the end of horse- manship is the practice of riding. Where the * end ' is not action but a material result, in such cases the result is more important than the action. Since, moreover, actions are manifold, the * ends ' of action are correspondingly manifold. The end of the art of medicine is health ; of the shipwright's art. a ship ; of the soldier's art, victory ; of the economic art, wealth. But it frequently happens that many actions and arts fall under some one faculty and art ; when, that is, they are pursued in view and for the sake of that art. For example, the art of saddlery, and the art of horsemanship, and all military enterprise seek the same end as the art of generalship : " they are aU pursued with a view to victory. These minor arts arc. on this account, said to fall under the art of generalship ; and this again is called an architectonic or Master Art in reference to the arts subordinated to it, since it has exactly the same authority as a Master Builder among his workmen. Just as the Master Builder has an eye to the ' form ' of the complete structure, and bids his workmen execute the various works which tend to realize that form, so too the art of Generalship and aU similar Master Arts lay down rules for the subordinate aits from the point of view of the end si)ecial to itself. Thus the bridle-maker, having regard to victory as the measure of his purpose, fashions the bridle to be convenient for the horseman when press- ing forward for victory. Another workman makes the saddle-cloth, and aU such OS arc craftsmen skilled in cavalry equipments keep before them the ultimate purpose of the soldier's life. Soldiers again, cavalry and infantry alike, so dispose and shape their conduct that they may have strength to gain victory. In fine, the end of the art of generalship determines the character of the arts subordinated to it. There is, therefore, an end involved in each one of the arts subordinated to the Master Art. just as a bridle is the end in the art of the bridle-maker, and the practice of riding in the art of horsemanship, and so on in other ways. Yet there is also an end in the Master Art, just as victory is the end pursued in the art of Generalship. Nevertheless the end of the Master Art is better and more esteemed than the minor ends, because, as has been e<q)lained, the ends of the minor arts are pursued only in view of and in relation to the ultimate end. Even though the ends of our actions be not the actions themselves but material results beyond, there is nothing in that to prevent the end of the Master Art (though it be only action) being better and more choiceworthy than even those material results. For example, the end of the bridle-maker's art is a material result, i. a bridle, while the end of the art of generalship is action, t. r. victory ; yet there is nothing to prevent victory being better and more choiceworthy than a bridle. A material result is better than mere action, not universally, but only in case where it is a consummation, as being the completed end of an action ; " since of course the end is always more esteemed than that which is ranged in reference to it. Thus it is that while many arts have but a single end " that of the Master Arts, yet all arts, in their totality, have one ultimate end for the sake of which all other arts are pursued. This supreme and ultimate end has no object beyond itself, but is pursued for its own sake. Otherwise, if there be not some one supreme end, but we are incessantly to pursue objects for the sake of objects beyond ; " if at every moment we are to be pressing forward to ulterior ends in an interminable series, then shall we never attain the object at which we aim. The inference therefore follows, that unless there be a point at which the mind may rest as it is impelled to self-realization, all human striving is purposeless and vain. Universal failure such as that would be a monstrous anomaly, seeing that there is no impulse of nature that is in vain. It is, therefore, a thing of necessity that there should be some one end final and alraolute ; and this end must be the Summum Bonum, and that which is best for man. Surely then the knowledge of this Summum Bonum has a mighty influence on the conduct of life : and if we have it before us as a mark at which, like archers, to aim, shall we not the more readily attain to what is meet " study of 'hu- and right ? If then tlie importance o f this d" of virions knowledoe be so threat, we must strain our en- gradations comes deavours to comprehend, at least m outlme, what of civii Life,' or this Summum Bonum really is, and under which * Politics ' in its of the Sciences or Faculties it falls.