Derailment of Train 3DM4 Near Manton Dam NT
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Publication Date: March 2009 ISBN 978-1-921602-19-1 ATSB TRANSPORT SAFETY REPORT The Australian Transport Safety Rail Occurrence Investigation RO-2008-006 Bureau (ATSB) is an operationally independent multi-modal Bureau Final within the Australian Government Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government. Derailment of train 3DM4 near Manton Dam NT The ATSB is responsible for 22 April 2008 investigating accidents and other transport safety matters involving civil aviation, marine and rail operations in Figure 1: Wagon CHQY-739C, damaged wagon components and recovery of derailed wagons. Australia that fall within Commonwealth jurisdiction. The ATSB performs its functions in accordance with the provisions of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 and, where applicable, relevant international agreements. ATSB investigations are independent of regulatory, operator or other external bodies. It is not the object of an investigation to determine blame or liability. © Commonwealth of Australia 2009 This work is copyright. In the interests of enhancing the value of the information contained in this publication you may copy, download, display, print, reproduce and distribute this material in unaltered form (retaining this notice). However, Direction of travel copyright in the material obtained from non-Commonwealth agencies, private individuals or organisations, belongs to those agencies, individuals or detached. The detached portion of the train then organisations. Where you want to use Abstract their material you will need to contact At about 05421 on Tuesday 22 April 2008, empty almost certainly passed over the dislodged them directly. southbound manganese ore train 3DM4 derailed coupler that was lying on the tracks leading to the Subject to the provisions of the derailment of four wagons. Copyright Act 1968, you must not four wagons approximately 58 km south of Darwin make any other use of the material in near Manton Dam in the Northern Territory (NT). this publication unless you have the permission of the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. There were no injuries as a result of the FACTUAL INFORMATION Please direct requests for further derailment but there was minor damage to the information or authorisation to: track and rolling stock. Location and Environment Commonwealth Copyright 2 Administration, Copyright Law Branch The investigation found that the draft key on the The derailment occurred on a straight section of Attorney-General’s Department leading end of the 31st wagon had dislodged from 3 Robert Garran Offices track near the 2,696 km mark about 700 m National Circuit the coupler shank, which allowed the coupler to south of the Manton River Bridge on the Central- BARTON ACT 2600 withdraw and fall onto the track. As a result of this Australian Railway (Figure 2). The track is located www.ag.gov.au/cca the train was separated into two portions; 30 adjacent to the Stuart Highway near the Daly wagons that were still coupled to the locomotives Range in rocky undulating terrain, surrounded by and the 14 following wagons which were medium density vegetation. Australian Transport Safety Bureau PO Box 967, Civic Square ACT 2608 Australia 1800 020 616 www.atsb.gov.au 1 The 24-hour clock is used in this report to describe the local time of day, Central Standard Time (CST). Released in accordance with section 2 Also known as ‘Murray Key’, the draft key is a flat steel bar 25 of the Transport Safety Investigation Act 2003 that passes through the underframe, yoke and coupler. Its primary function is to secure the yoke and coupler as a 3 Distance in kilometres from a track reference point INFRA-08416 unit within the underframe. located at Coonamia in South Australia. - 1 - Figure 2: Map showing derailment location drivers rested in the crew van. The drivers work about 70 km south of Darwin, NT. the 1630 km from Darwin to Bootu Creek and return train as a ‘round trip’, resting in the crew carriage at Muckaty while the manganese ore is being loaded. The driver at the time of the derailment had about 30 years train driving and rail operations management experience. Both train drivers were appropriately qualified, assessed as competent and medically fit for duty. History of wagons The CHQY and CHSY series of ballast wagons were manufactured in the United States between 1955 and 1959 and were originally plated as CRDX. All wagons were fitted with Type ’E’ rigid shank Darwin couplers using a draft key to retain the coupler within the yoke and underframe. Initially those wagons were used for carrying cement on the Railway Canadian National rail network. In 2001, 65 of the wagons were shipped to Australia where modifications were made to Manton Dam brakes, bogies, wheelsets, control valves and structural outline dimensions to comply with Australian railway standards. In addition, the The track structure consists of a ballast bed wagons were fitted with a remote ballast door having a minimum depth of 150 mm supporting operating system that replaced the original prestressed concrete sleepers spaced at manually operated system. They were initially approximately 700 mm centres. The continuously used for transporting and the laying of ballast in welded 50 kg/m rails are fastened to the sleepers Victoria, between Melbourne and Wodonga and using resilient clips. later assisted with ballasting operations in the On the morning of the derailment the weather was Northern Territory during the construction of the fine and clear with a minimum overnight Alice Springs to Darwin railway. temperature of 24.8 degrees Celsius recorded at Late in 2005, the wagons were converted to the Darwin weather station. bottom discharge hoppers and have since been Freight train 3DM4 used to transport manganese ore for the OM (Manganese) Ltd project between Bootu Creek to Train 3DM4 is a regular bulk mineral service the East Arm Wharf near Darwin, NT. Wagon operated by Genesee & Wyoming Australia (GWA) modifications included blocking the outer chutes, under contract for Freight Link Pty Ltd (Freight removing outer doors, adjusting the control Link). The train runs empty from Berrimah circuits and door sequences to enable the (Darwin) to Muckaty where manganese ore from discharge of ore between the rails. No the Bootu Creek Mine is loaded. It then returns modifications were made to the draft keys and north to Darwin for unloading at the Darwin East retainer pin assemblies. Arm Wharf. Muckaty is 815 km south of Darwin. Occurrence Train 3DM4 comprised three locomotives (ALF19 leading, CLF6 and VL352 trailing), a crew On the morning of the derailment, both drivers accommodation carriage and 40 empty CHQY and booked on for duty at 0415. The drivers noted CHSY ore wagons. The length of the train was that EDI Rail and Pacific National employees were 582 m and the gross weight 1378 tonnes. Train carrying out the routine air brake tests and 3DM4 was crewed by two drivers while two relief mechanical inspections on train 3DM4. At 0447 - 2 - GWA transport (train) control authorised the The distance between the separated portions of train’s departure from the Berrimah Terminal. the train was about 300 m. Where the train had stopped, the adjacent terrain made it difficult for The driver reported that after leaving Berrimah, he people to walk beside the track so the driver brought the train up to the track speed of 95 asked the co-driver to assist him with piloting the km/h and recalled the train was handling train backwards to within 50 or 60 m of the normally. A routine journey was then experienced separated section of the train. until the train was in the vicinity of the Manton River bridge, about 1 hour from Darwin. At this point the train was coasting down the grade on ANALYSIS the approach to Manton River bridge at about 100 km/h (slightly over speed). After passing over On 22 April 2008, investigators from the the bridge and up the next rise, the train started Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) were to slow. At about the same time the driver noticed dispatched to investigate the derailment site near a decrease in brake pipe air pressure and a build Manton Dam.. Investigators were advised that the up of locomotive brake cylinder air pressure. front section of the train (30 wagons) had Realising that the train may have parted, he departed the derailment site and was travelling released the locomotive brakes and briefly south towards Katherine. The remaining damaged poweredup. This action was intended to stretch and derailed wagons, rolling stock components the train and keep the front and rear portions and damaged track were examined and apart if indeed his suspicions of the train parting photographed on site. were correct. The train came to a stop at approximately 0545 in a distance of about The derailment site was located on a straight 1300 m. section of track with a slight rising grade. Damaged components from railed and derailed Post occurrence wagons were spread along the track corridor for approximately 350 m. The co-driver alighted from the locomotive and walked back along the train to find out why the Within the separated rear portion of the train (14 brake pipe air had been lost. Meanwhile, the wagons) the second, third, eighth and thirteenth driver remained with the locomotive and wagons had derailed. All wagon underside attempted to contact GWA transport control via components suffered moderate to significant satellite telephone. As contact with transport damage, including brake rigging, hopper doors, control could not be made on the first attempt, bogies and wheel flanges. the driver contacted the GWA Depot Co-ordinator Inspection of rolling stock indicated that the in Darwin at 0550 to advise that the train had failure of the coupler on the 31st wagon, come to a stop due to a loss of brake pipe CHQY 739C, was the likely initiator of the pressure and he would advise again when further derailment.