08 Zwarteweg 14

During the Battle of Arnhem Major General Robert Urquhart was cut off from his own forces. He was obliged to hide in the attic at Zwarteweg 14 to await developments. This had a major influence on the further progress of the battle. After lea- ving the landing zones the British were to follow three routes to the Rhine Bridge. A column of jeeps from the Reconnaissance Squadron was sche- duled to reach the objective first, but this unit was halted early on. There- fore Urquhart needed to inform Lathbury of the 1st Parachute Brigade that the 2nd Parachute Battalion, commanded by John Frost, must head for the bridge with all speed. Frost would be taking the southern route via the lower village of Oosterbeek and Onderlangs. He was immediately followed by Lathbury’s HQ. However, when Urquhart arrived there, Lathbury had left to visit Fitch’s 3rd Parachute Battalion, which was following the central route via Utrechtseweg. All this confusion was caused by the inadequate performance of the communications system. Lathbury and Urquhart eventually met up at Fitch’s battalion. On his return journey Urquhart found that the rear of the column was engaged in a skirmish with the Germans which blocked his way back. It was decided that he and Lathbury would remain with the 3rd Parachute Bat- talion and follow it on its advance into Arnhem. Next day – Monday 18 September – Lathbury nevertheless suggested that Urquhart return to his divisional HQ. They both dashed off, but went the wrong way. They ran towards the Germans in Lombok. Lathbury was wounded and hidden in a house in the area, while Urquhart went into hiding in another house. The following day the general was rescued by other British units, and returned to his headquarters.

Urquhart sets off Under fire The advance is halted The advance resumes Urquhart and Lathbury run into Lombok Return to divisional headquarters

Urquhart sets off Communications failed to work properly from the moment of the landings. Therefore Urquhart decided to set off in his jeep to take instructions to his commanders.

Map showing the situation around Zwarteweg in 1944. (Copyright F. van Lunteren)

1 Urquhart looks for Gough On the first day of the Battle of Arnhem it quickly became apparent that the 1st Airborne Division’s communications were not working at their optimum. Later in the afternoon the division commander, Major General Robert E. Urquhart (1901-1989), decided to go by jeep with his chauffer and radio operator to visit the headquarters of the 1st Airlanding Brigade at Duitsekampweg in Wolfheze. This HQ was less than two kilometres from his own. By taking a look for himself he hoped to get a better picture of the situation. At 16.30 Urquhart’s group left the divisional headquarters at the edge of the landing zone near Wolf- heze by jeep, and paid a short visit to the 1st Airlanding Brigade’s brigade HQ. For some reason the brigade commander was not there. But there was news that the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squa- dron had run into a German line of defence north of the Arnhem/Utrecht railway line near Wolfheze. After the war Urquhart wrote: [1] “It was now essential that I make a new plan with the commander of the Reconnaissance Squa- dron (Freddie Gough). Lathbury had to be told that his 2nd Parachute Battalion under John Frost must make a dash for the bridge alone. It was also disagreeable that part of Gough’s unit were intended for work at my HQ, while I now needed him to go into the city for me. No one knew where he was. I left an order telling him that he must contact me immediately, and then I returned to my own HQ. When I got back there was not only was there no news from Gough, it seemed that communications had also failed completely. Short range contact between units was possible here and there, but one was unable to establish any communication with the 1st Parachute Brigade or the out- side world.” Urquhart looks for Lathbury The reason why no contact could be made with the reconnaissance unit was that their radios were tuned to the 1st Parachute Brigade’s radio frequency. Therefore direct communication between divisional HQ and the 1st Airborne Reconnaissance Squadron was impossible. [2] Urquhart decided to catch up with the 1st Parachute Brigade in order to consult with Brigadier Gerald W. Lathbury: [3] “I calculated that Lathbury’s brigade could not yet have reached the bridge in spite of the effi- cient start I myself had witnessed. I had seen a few jeeps depart but most of the men were on foot and they couldn’t have been under way for more than a few hours. I left instructions behind for Gough that he had to reach me at Lathbury’s HQ, which was following in the 2nd Parachute Battalion’s wake on the lower road.” The 1st Parachute Brigade left for Arnhem along three routes. The 1st Parachute Battalion commanded by Lieutenant Colonel David T. Dobie followed the most northern road, Amsterdamseweg. The 3rd Parachute Battalion under Lieutenant Colonel John A.C. Fitch advanced along the middle route – Utrechtseweg. Finally, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Frost’s 2nd Parachute Battalion followed the most southerly route to the bridge – Benedendorpsweg and then the road alongside the Rhine. This battalion was followed by the 1st Parachute Brigade HQ. Urquhart decided to take the southernmost route in his jeep together with a radio operator and driver. He asked his artillery commander, Lieute- nant Colonel Robert G. Loder-Symonds, to accompany him. Loder-Symonds would probably be able to make a note of possible targets and pass them on to his gunners on his return to division HQ. Oddly enough the division commander left without an armed escort of soldiers, either from the 1st Airborne Division Headquarters Defence Platoon or from the small group of the 1st Airborne Recon- naissance Squadron which was at the headquarters. Urquhart’s chauffeur first followed behind the 2nd Parachute Battalion and the 1st Parachute Brigade HQ. It didn’t take long to catch up with the HQ. Urquhart spoke with the brigade major, Major Tony Hibbert, who told him that Brigadier Gerald Lathbury had driven off to the 3rd Parachute Battalion. [4]

2 Seeing that the column had come to a halt because the 2nd Parachute Battalion had encountered opposition up ahead, Lieutenant Colonel Loder-Symonds took the opportunity of discussing things with Major Dennis Munford. Munford commanded one of his artillery batteries and accompanied brigade HQ as artillery observer. Urquhart wanted to contact Lathbury as quickly as possible, so bade farewell to Loder-Symonds who later made his own way back to division headquarters. Urquhart’s driver headed back to Heelsum at speed and then drove along Utrechtseweg. It wasn’t long before they reached the 3rd Parachute Battalion column. Brigadier Lathbury later recalled the general’s arrival: [5] “The enemy were still firing on a portion of the road (…) from the north and A Coy – who had arrived about 18.00, were ordered to send a patrol to investigate the thick country just north of the road. About this time the Div. Comm. appeared in a jeep and was shot at at the same point. He said he was expecting Major Gough and part of the recce squadron to move up that road and it was decided we would both wait till he arrived.”

Under fire Shortly afterwards, the crossroads where Lathbury and Urquhart were talking to Lieutenant Colonel John Fitch (commander 3rd Bn) came under German mortar fire. Urquhart’s jeep was hit and his driver seriously injured. The radio was undamaged but failed to work properly. Neither could division headquarters be reached using Lathbury’s radio. Taking the same road back to division HQ was now out of the question because the 3rd Parachute Battalion’s rearguard had come under attack. The re- armost company was ordered by radio to beat off the German attack and rejoin the rest of the battalion. Urquhart was not happy with this discovery. He was now unable to return to his headquarters: [6] “In the gathering dusk we made slow progress along the main road. The reports coming back from the head of the column were far from favourable: the leading company had contact with the enemy and were held up close to the Hartenstein hotel on the outskirts of Oosterbeek. Alt- hough it irritated me that everything was going so slowly it was comforting to know that I was aware of the battle situation, even though I was not at division headquarters. (…..) Nevert- heless, it was a worrying thought that I no longer knew what was happening in the other sec- tors.”

The advance is halted At about 19.30 Brigadier Lathbury decided to halt the advance after consultations with Lieutenant Co- lonel Fitch. [7] Darkness had fallen and the 3rd Parachute Battalion had not come much further than Oosterbeek, about six kilometres from the centre of Arnhem. A villa at the western edge of Ooster- beek was chosen as battalion headquarters. Deputy battalion commander Major Alan Bush and a private were ordered to follow ‘C ’Company which, two hours earlier, had attempted to bypass the German opposition via Bredelaan and a road running parallel to the railway line. They were required to pass on the order to Major Lewis to halt his company’s attempt, too. [8] An hour later they returned with the news that they had seen only dead Germans. So it appeared that a northern route was still possible. [9] At 21.30 hours radio contact was made with brigade headquarters. Brigadier Lathbury spoke to Major Hibbert, who told Lathbury that the southern route was cleared of opposition. Hibbert suggested that the 3rd Parachute Battalion should follow brigade headquarters, but Lathbury rejected this. They would take the southern route next morning. Shortly afterwards contact was again lost. [10]

3 The advance resumes Not until five hours later, after a short rest, did the 3rd Parachute Battalion resume the advance, turning off towards Oosterbeek-Laag (the lower village) with the intention of then following Beneden- dorpsweg. Most of the jeeps were in the rearguard, while Urquhart and Lathbury walked up ahead with the leading section of the column. About 07.00 hours on Monday morning they heard that ‘A’ Company and the greater part of HQ Com- pany had been unable to keep up the pace and had taken a wrong turning. Only a group of sappers, ‘B’ Company, an anti-tank gun with crew and a few staff officers remained. [11] The vanguard was already at the Rijnpaviljoen and reported that there was no opposition, but they were nevertheless called back. A number of houses in Utrechtseweg were chosen as places to wait for the rearguard to catch up. Short radio contact was established with ‘C’ Company and Major Lewis reported that they had entered Arnhem via the railway line. He requested extra ammunition and Lieute- nant Colonel Fitch promised that this would be brought along as soon as ‘A’ Company and HQ Compa- ny had rejoined the battalion. [12] Around midday came a radio report from ‘A’ Company. Lathbury wrote later about this: [13] “This was done about 12.30 and it was discovered that they were not across the railway, but together with 2 coys of 1 Bn, were staging an attack on the area of “De Brink” and south of it (………….) it came as something of a shock to find that the enemy was so strong just west of us. Lt. Col. Fitch emphasized to Major Dennison, CO A Coy, that it was vital he should reach us, as he had with him two carrier loads of reserve ammunition, badly needed at the bridge.” All communications fail It was 14.30 before Lieutenant Herbert Burwash arrived with some 40 men from ‘A’ Company and the 3rd Battalion Defence Platoon. Approximately 10 soldiers from the 1st Parachute Battalion had also come along with them, and two Bren carriers fully laden with ammunition. [14] Canadian Lieutenant Leo Heaps and Dutchman Charles Labouchère – a member of the Resistance – were in one of the carriers. Heaps told the general that he was missed: [15] “Urquhart tried to get in touch with his command post using our radio, without success. He gave me various messages for his deputy division commander, Brigadier P.H. (Pip) Hicks, and his operations officer Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mackenzie. In return I gave him my account of the situation as I had seen it. Urquhart ordered me, correctly as it turned out later, not to push on to the bridge: his messages for the divisional staff were much more important.” Brigadier Lathbury has totally different recollections of the meeting: [16] “The G.O.C. [Urquhart] was able to get a message through to Div. HQ on the officer’s set. He had put up a very fine effort in reaching us at all and had made an unsuccessful effort to get ammunition to the bridge. He said he would renew the attempt after dark.” That evening the following entry was made in the division diary: [17] “2330 – (…………….) GOC and Comd 1 Para Bde reported with 2 Para Bn near br 7476.” This entry is incorrect seeing that Lathbury and Urquhart were with the 3rd Parachute Battalion, not the 2nd. Strangely enough no mention was made in the division HQ diary of Urquhart’s return from his visit to the 1st Airlanding Brigade on Sunday afternoon. Neither is there any mention of the radio contact he had with the division HQ signallers at 15.00 hours on Monday afternoon. The absence of the head of the intelligence service, Major Hugh P. Maguire, might have had something to do with this. Maguire was involved in an emergency landing in England on Sunday afternoon and didn’t arrive at Arnhem until Monday afternoon. One of his tasks was to keep the war diary. After Burwash’s arrival and the departure of Heaps and Labouchère the march to the bridge resumed. Lieutenant Colonel Fitch and Brigadier Lathbury had already decided to advance to the bridge along the railway line, as ‘C’ Company had done. The remainder of ‘A’ Company and the Battalion Defence Platoon under Lieutenant Burwash led the way, but at the end of Mauritsstraat they were held up by mortar and heavy machinegun fire from Germans who were dug in alongside the railway line.[18]

4 Urquhart and Lathbury run into Lombok Lathbury suggested to Major General Urquhart that they should try to get back to division HQ where they could exercise more control over the fighting, rather than remain with the 3rd Para- chute Battalion. Captain William Taylor, Lathbury’s intelligence officer who had accompanied him, went with them. But instead of heading west they sprinted off in the wrong direction. A platoon commander, Lieutenant James A.S. Cleminson, shouted that they were running straight towards the German positions. Realizing they were unable to hear him Cleminson raced after them. Utrechtseweg before 1940. Right-front Hulkesteinseweg, and left-centre Oranjestraat, exit onto Utrechtseweg. In the background is the Onderlangs/Bovenover fork. (Photo col- lection Gelders Archive, folder 35/32, negative B 234/2)

Lathbury in Alexanderstraat 135 They now entered a network of small streets on the east side of Oranjestraat. While they were at- tempting to cross a street Lathbury received a bullet in the back. The other three dragged him into the first house at the corner of Alexanderstraat (number 135). A German appeared in the doorway and was immediately shot dead by Lieutenant Cleminson and Major General Urquhart. It seemed that Lathbury had been temporarily paralyzed by a bullet which had entered close to the spine, and he was taken down to the cellar. The occupants of the house, a middle-aged couple, promised to get him to the hospital. [19] The Germans in the Lombok district, where the British officers now found themselves, were extra alert because earlier that day Dutch prisoners had been released from the Koepelgevangenis. They wore khaki-coloured overalls and because of this they were also shot at by the Germans. Although most of them escaped a few were killed in Alexanderstraat and Zwarteweg. Urquhart in Zwarteweg 14 The appearance of the German at the front door just after they had taken Lathbury inside was reason enough for the three officers to decide to push on. They continued their journey through the back garden, but now it had more the aspect of an escape. Lieutenant Cleminson later recalled: [20] “Not surprisingly, the Germans thought they had us in a trap and surrounded the block of houses and started to beat it like a pheasant drive. The General, Intelligence Officer and myself got into another house and, again very courageously, the Dutch showed us the way up into the attic, shut the attic door, and swore to the Germans, who of course searched the house, that we had never been there.” The house was Zwarteweg 14, home of Anton and Anna Derksen and their children Jan and Hermina. [21] A few hours later, as dusk was falling, Urquhart was keen to make another attempt to reach division headquarters. Cleminson and Taylor managed to persuade him otherwise. Shortly afterwards a German self-propelled gun stopped in front of the house, so now any thought of a fresh attempt had evaporated.

Return to divisional headquarters

At approximately 6.30 the following morning (Tuesday 19 September) soldiers of the 11th Parachute Battalion turned up. They drove the Germans back and the three officers immediately left their hiding place. In their haste to leave they left behind a Sten gun. [22] Lieutenant James Cleminson said his goodbyes and went in search of the 3rd Parachute Battalion. Lieutenant Eric Clapham, an officer from the 1st Airlanding Anti-Tank Battery, took Captain Taylor and Major General Urquhart to division HQ, where they arrived at about 07.25 hours. [23] Although he had sent messages through the day before, Urquhart was greeted as if he had risen from the dead. . Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mackenzie, one of his staff officers, met him with the very meaningful greeting: [24] “We had already assumed, general, that you had gone for good.”

5 Notes to top

[1] Robert E. Urquhart, De Slag om Arnhem (Leiden 1964) 51 [2] Niall Cherry, ‘Urquhart and Lathbury; a tale of two commanders’, Ministory No.80 in: Nieuwsbrief No. 92 Vereniging Vrienden van het Airborne Museum, December 2003. [3] Urquhart, De Slag om Arnhem, 51. [4] Martin Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 128. [5] Brigadier Gerald W. Lathbury, Operation Market. Story of 1st Parachute Brigade, November 1944. [6] Urquhart, De Slag om Arnhem, 60. [7] Brigadier Gerald W. Lathbury, Operation Market. Story of 1st Parachute Brigade, November 1944.. [8] Ibid. [9] Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 136 [10] Ibidem. [11] Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 171. [12] War Diary 3rd Parachute Battalion, 18 September 1944, http://www.pegasusarchive.org/ arnhem/war_3rdBatt.htm. [13] Lathbury, Operation Market. Story of 1st Parachute Brigade, November 1944. [14] Ibidem. [15] Leo Heaps, De gans is gevlogen (Bussum 1976) 41. [16] Lathbury, Operation Market. Story of 1st Parachute Brigade, November 1944. [17] War Diary 1st Airborne Division Headquarters, 18 September 1944, http:// www.pegasusarchive.org/arnhem/war_divhq.htm. [18] Theodoor A. Boeree, De Slag bij Arnhem (Ede 1948) 91. [19] Cherry, ‘Urquhart and Lathbury; a tale of two commanders’. [20] Ibidem. [21] Cornelius Ryan, Een brug te ver, (New York 1974) 348 [22] Urquhart, De Slag om Arnhem, 95. [23] Middlebrook, Arnhem 1944: The Airborne Battle, 194. [24] Urquhart, De Slag om Arnhem, 97.