Two MYSTICAL MATERIALISM
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
Load more
Recommended publications
-
Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, and the Ostensible End of Marxism: the Poverty of Theory Revisited
Critical Theory, Historical Materialism, and the Ostensible End of Marxism: The Poverty of Theory Revisited BRYAN D. PALMER Summary: This essay notes the extent to which poststructuralism/postmodernism have generally espoused hostility to historical materialism, surveys some representative examples of historical writing that have gravitated toward the new critical theory in opposition to Marxism, and closes with a discussion of the ironic evolution of a poststructurally inclined, anti-Marxist historiography. Counter to the prevailing ideological consensus that Marxism has been brought to its interpretive knees by a series of analytic challenges and the political collapse of the world's ostensibly "socialist" states, this essay argues that historical materialism has lost neither its power to interpret the past nor its relevance to the contemporary intellectual terrain. It is now a decade-and-one-half since Edward Thompson penned The Poverty of Theory: or an Orrery of Errors, and ten times as many years have passed since the publication of Marx's The Poverty of Philosophy.1 Whatever one may think about the advances in knowledge associated with historical materialism and Marxism, particularly in terms of the practice of historical writing, there is no denying that this sesquicentennial has been a problematic period in the making of communist society; the last fifteen years, moreover, are associated with the bleak end of socialism and the passing of Marxism as an intellectual force. Indeed, it is a curious conjuncture of our times that the -
KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING to IDEALISM Idealism As a Philosophy
KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO IDEALISM Idealism as a philosophy had its greatest impact during the nineteenth century. It is a philosophical approach that has as its central tenet that ideas are the only true reality, the only thing worth knowing. In a search for truth, beauty, and justice that is enduring and everlasting; the focus is on conscious reasoning in the mind. The main tenant of idealism is that ideas and knowledge are the truest reality. Many things in the world change, but ideas and knowledge are enduring. Idealism was often referred to as “idea-ism”. Idealists believe that ideas can change lives. The most important part of a person is the mind. It is to be nourished and developed. Etymologically Its origin is: from Greek idea “form, shape” from weid- also the origin of the “his” in his-tor “wise, learned” underlying English “history.” In Latin this root became videre “to see” and related words. It is the same root in Sanskrit veda “knowledge as in the Rig-Veda. The stem entered Germanic as witan “know,” seen in Modern German wissen “to know” and in English “wisdom” and “twit,” a shortened form of Middle English atwite derived from æt “at” +witen “reproach.” In short Idealism is a philosophical position which adheres to the view that nothing exists except as it is an idea in the mind of man or the mind of God. The idealist believes that the universe has intelligence and a will; that all material things are explainable in terms of a mind standing behind them. PHILOSOPHICAL RATIONALE OF IDEALISM a) The Universe (Ontology or Metaphysics) To the idealist, the nature of the universe is mind; it is an idea. -
A Cardinal Sin: the Infinite in Spinoza's Philosophy
Macalester College DigitalCommons@Macalester College Philosophy Honors Projects Philosophy Department Spring 2014 A Cardinal Sin: The nfinitI e in Spinoza's Philosophy Samuel H. Eklund Macalester College, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors Part of the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Eklund, Samuel H., "A Cardinal Sin: The nfinitI e in Spinoza's Philosophy" (2014). Philosophy Honors Projects. Paper 7. http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/phil_honors/7 This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy Department at DigitalCommons@Macalester College. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Macalester College. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A Cardinal Sin: The Infinite in Spinoza’s Philosophy By: Samuel Eklund Macalester College Philosophy Department Honors Advisor: Geoffrey Gorham Acknowledgements This thesis would not have been possible without my advisor, Professor Geoffrey Gorham. Through a collaborative summer research grant, I was able to work with him in improving a vague idea about writing on Spinoza’s views on existence and time into a concrete analysis of Spinoza and infinity. Without his help during the summer and feedback during the past academic year, my views on Spinoza wouldn’t have been as developed as they currently are. Additionally, I would like to acknowledge the hard work done by the other two members of my honors committee: Professor Janet Folina and Professor Andrew Beveridge. Their questions during the oral defense and written feedback were incredibly helpful in producing the final draft of this project. -
Descartes' Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View
R ené Descartes (1596-1650) is generally regarded as the “father of modern philosophy.” He stands as one of the most important figures in Western intellectual history. His work in mathematics and his writings on science proved to be foundational for further development in these fields. Our understanding of “scientific method” can be traced back to the work of Francis Bacon and to Descartes’ Discourse on Method. His groundbreaking approach to philosophy in his Meditations on First Philosophy determine the course of subsequent philosophy. The very problems with which much of modern philosophy has been primarily concerned arise only as a consequence of Descartes’thought. Descartes’ philosophy must be understood in the context of his times. The Medieval world was in the process of disintegration. The authoritarianism that had dominated the Medieval period was called into question by the rise of the Protestant revolt and advances in the development of science. Martin Luther’s emphasis that salvation was a matter of “faith” and not “works” undermined papal authority in asserting that each individual has a channel to God. The Copernican revolution undermined the authority of the Catholic Church in directly contradicting the established church doctrine of a geocentric universe. The rise of the sciences directly challenged the Church and seemed to put science and religion in opposition. A mathematician and scientist as well as a devout Catholic, Descartes was concerned primarily with establishing certain foundations for science and philosophy, and yet also with bridging the gap between the “new science” and religion. Descartes’ Influence in Shaping the Modern World-View 1) Descartes’ disbelief in authoritarianism: Descartes’ belief that all individuals possess the “natural light of reason,” the belief that each individual has the capacity for the discovery of truth, undermined Roman Catholic authoritarianism. -
Quantum Logical Causality, Category Theory, and the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead
Quantum Logical Causality, Category Theory, and the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead Connecting Zafiris’ Category Theoretic Models of Quantum Spacetime and the Logical-Causal Formalism of Quantum Relational Realism Workshop Venue: Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) Chair for Philosophy (building RAC) Raemistrasse 36, 8001 Zurich Switzerland January 29 – 30, 2010 I. Aims and Motivation Recent work in the natural sciences—most notably in the areas of theoretical physics and evolutionary biology—has demonstrated that the lines separating philosophy and science have all but vanished with respect to current explorations of ‘fundamental’ questions (e.g., string theory, multiverse cosmologies, complexity-emergence theories, the nature of mind, etc.). The centuries-old breakdown of ‘natural philosophy’ into the divorced partners ‘philosophy’ and ‘science,’ therefore, must be rigorously re- examined. To that end, much of today’s most groundbreaking scholarship in the natural sciences has begun to include explicit appeals to interdisciplinary collaboration among the fields of applied natural sciences, mathematics and philosophy. This workshop will be dedicated to the question of how a philosophical-metaphysical theory can be fruitfully applied to basic conceptualizations in the natural sciences. More narrowly, we will explore the process oriented metaphysical scheme developed by philosopher and mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947) and Michael Epperson’s application of this scheme to recent work in quantum mechanics, and the relation of these to Elias Zafiris’s category theoretic model of quantum event structures. Our aim is to give participants from various fields of expertise (see list below) the opportunity to exchange their specialized knowledge in the context of a collaborative exploration of the fundamental questions raised by recent scholarship in physics and mathematics. -
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to Our Second Lecture on Personhood and Identity
PHI 110 Lecture 2 1 Welcome to our second lecture on personhood and identity. We’re going to begin today what will be two lectures on Rene Descartes’ thoughts on this subject. The position that is attributed to him is known as mind/body dualism. Sometimes it’s simply called the dualism for short. We need to be careful, however, because the word dualism covers a number of different philosophical positions, not always dualisms of mind and body. In other words, there are other forms of dualism that historically have been expressed. And so I will refer to his position as mind/body dualism or as Cartesian dualism as it’s sometimes also called. I said last time that Descartes is not going to talk primarily about persons. He’s going to talk about minds as opposed to bodies. But I think that as we start getting into his view, you will see where his notion of personhood arises. Clearly, Descartes is going to identify the person, the self, with the mind as opposed to with the body. This is something that I hoped you picked up in your reading and certainly that you will pick up once you read the material again after the lecture. Since I’ve already introduced Descartes’ position, let’s define it and then I’ll say a few things about Descartes himself to give you a little bit of a sense of the man and of his times. The position mind/body that’s known as mind/body dualism is defined as follows: It’s the view that the body is a physical substance — a machine, if you will — while the mind is a non-physical thinking entity which inhabits the body and is responsible for its voluntary movements. -
As Recursive Self-Prediction: Does a Deterministic Mechanism Reduce Responsibility?
1 'Free Will' as Recursive Self-Prediction: Does a Deterministic Mechanism Reduce Responsibility? George Ainslie 11,09 To appear in Poland, Jeffrey and Graham, George, Addiction and Responsibility. MIT This material is the result of work supported with resources and the use of facilities at the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center, Coatesville, PA, USA. Advances in brain imaging have revealed more and more about the physical basis of motivated behavior, making the age-old dispute about free will and moral responsibility increasingly salient. Science seems to be delineating chains of causality for feelings, choices, and even beliefs; but if all mental life is strictly caused by prior events, and those by still earlier events in a chain extending back before birth, how can individuals be held responsible for their actions? Most people feel that they originate their actions (Nadelhoffer et.al., 2005) and will readily give opinions about whether particular circumstances make an action blameworthy or not (Monterosso et.al., 2005); but when philosophers take the chain of causality explicitly into account they generally distance themselves from these direct introspections, holding for instance that blame is just a way of assuaging instinctive resentment (Strawson, 1962/2003) or a threat to manipulate people’s motives (Dennett, 1984, pp. 131-172). I come to this subject with a behavioral science rather than a philosophy background, but the free will dispute looks to this outsider like something that recent empirical findings might resolve. The dispute is age old because of a fundamental conundrum. We insist on the truth of each of two propositions, the compatibility of which is far from obvious, perhaps absurd: 1. -
Is Plato a Perfect Idealist?
IOSR Journal Of Humanities And Social Science (IOSR-JHSS) Volume 19, Issue 3, Ver. V (Mar. 2014), PP 22-25 e-ISSN: 2279-0837, p-ISSN: 2279-0845. www.iosrjournals.org Is Plato a Perfect Idealist? Dr. Shanjendu Nath M. A., M. Phil., Ph.D. Associate Professor Rabindrasadan Girls’ College, Karimganj, Assam, India. Abstract: Idealism is a philosophy that emphasizes on mind. According to this theory, mind is primary and objective world is nothing but an idea of our mind. Thus this theory believes that the primary thing that exists is spiritual and material world is secondary. This theory effectively begins with the thought of Greek philosopher Plato. But it is Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646–1716) who used the term ‘idealism’ when he referred Plato in his philosophy. Plato in his book ‘The Republic’ very clearly stated many aspects of thought and all these he discussed from the idealistic point of view. According to Plato, objective world is not a real world. It is the world of Ideas which is real. This world of Ideas is imperishable, immutable and eternal. These ideas do not exist in our mind or in the mind of God but exist by itself and independent of any mind. He also said that among the Ideas, the Idea of Good is the supreme Idea. These eternal ideas are not perceived by our sense organs but by our rational self. Thus Plato believes the existence of two worlds – material world and the world of Ideas. In this article I shall try to explore Plato’s idealism, its origin, locus etc. -
Lotze and the Early Cambridge Analytic Philosophy
LOTZE AND THE EARLY CAMBRIDGE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY ―This summer I‘ve read about a half of Lotze‘s Metaphysik. He is the most delectable, certainly, of all German writers—a pure genius.‖ William James, September 8, 1879.1 Summary Many historians of analytic philosophy consider the early philosophy of Moore, Russell and Wittgenstein as much more neo-Hegelian as once believed. At the same time, the authors who closely investigate Green, Bradley and Bosanquet find out that these have little in common with Hegel. The thesis advanced in this chapter is that what the British (ill-named) neo-Hegelians brought to the early analytic philosophers were, above all, some ideas of Lotze, not of Hegel. This is true regarding: (i) Lotze’s logical approach to practically all philosoph- ical problems; (ii) his treating of the concepts relation, structure (constructions) and order; (iii) the discussion of the concepts of states of affairs, multiple theory of judgment, general logical form; (iv) some common themes like panpsychism and contemplating the world sub specie aeternitatis. 1. LOTZE, NOT HEGEL, LIES AT THE BOTTOM OF CAMBRIDGE ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY Conventional wisdom has it that the early philosophy of Moore and Russell was under the strong sway of the British ―neo-Hegelians‖. In the same time, however, those historians who investigate the British ―neo-Hegelians‖ of 1880–1920 in detail, turn attention to the fact that the latter are not necessarily connected with Hegel: William Sweet made this point in regard to 1 Perry (1935), ii, p. 16. Bosanquet,2 Geoffrey Thomas in regard to Green,3 and Peter Nicholson in regard to Bradley.4 Finally, Nicholas Griffin has shown that Russell from 1895–8, then an alleged neo-Hegelian, ―was very strongly influenced by Kant and hardly at all by Hegel‖.5 These facts are hardly surprising, if we keep in mind that the representatives of the school of T. -
Materialism and Metaphysics Mcluhan Between Innis and Teilhard De Chardin
Conference: Re-reading McLuhan Bayreuth, Feb. 2007 Hartmut Winkler Materialism and Metaphysics McLuhan between Innis and Teilhard de Chardin. translated by Michael Barchet 1 McLuhan Strictly speaking, my paper shall neither attempt a re-reading nor a novel interpretation of McLuhan. What I am rather interested in, however, is the specific direction media discourse took with McLuhan – especially since this direction is still vivid in our days. Although my paper starts with McLuhan, it actually takes the opposite way from the present back to McLuhan. Let me begin with an irritation. It has caught the attention of many, who have read McLuhan more carefully, and there are countless rather astonished comments: While Understanding Media in 1964 presents a point of view that is relaxed, easy going, ironic and utterly sympathetic with the media in a manner very much of this world, and also refuses for the most part to apply moral considerations, McLuhan’s first book about media, The Mechanical Bride made its points in 1951 by an explicitly judgemental, moral critique of the media.1 His second book made McLuhan more famous than The Mechanical Bride could have ever done, and this was certainly well deserved. Undoubtedly, the new media-friendly attitude must be seen as an achievement and the renunciation of moral considerations may well have made possible a new kind of neutral description. Yet what happened between the two books? How did this switch of positions come to pass, this drastic change of attitude? In his biography2, Marchand notes a turning point in 1953 – years before the National Association of Educational Broadcasters (NAEB) commissioned McLuhan to conduct the research that would be the basis of Understanding Media.3 Marchand offers a biographical explanation: McLuhan encountered the books by Harold Innis, who had approached the subject of media from the very worldly aspect of economics. -
Priestley and Kant on Materialism
Intellectual History Review ISSN: 1749-6977 (Print) 1749-6985 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rihr20 Priestley and Kant on materialism Udo Thiel To cite this article: Udo Thiel (2020) Priestley and Kant on materialism, Intellectual History Review, 30:1, 129-143 To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2020.1688481 © 2019 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group Published online: 19 Dec 2019. Submit your article to this journal View related articles View Crossmark data Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rihr20 INTELLECTUAL HISTORY REVIEW 2020, VOL. 30, NO. 1, 129–143 https://doi.org/10.1080/17496977.2020.1688481 Priestley and Kant on materialism Udo Thiel Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Graz, Austria ABSTRACT KEYWORDS Kant maintains in the Critique of Pure Reason that both materialism materialism; soul; and spiritualism cannot explain our existence. This paper argues that consciousness; unity; Kant’s relation to (psychological) materialism is more complex than simplicity; identity; this rejection suggests and is usually thought, and it evaluates this apperception relation in a new and more positive light. The paper shows that Priestley anticipates some of Kant’s arguments against rationalist psychology, and that Kant’s rejection of materialism does not commit him to an immaterialist metaphysics of the soul. These arguments involve a discussion of the problem of the unity of consciousness and of notions such as simplicity and identity. Kant argues in the Critique of Pure Reason that materialism is “incapable” of “explaining my existence”.1,2 Several commentators, including, notably, Henry Allison, take Kant’s rejection of materialism to be a “refutation”, suggesting that Kant attempts to prove that materialism, as a metaphysical thesis, is false. -
Artificial Intelligence: How Does It Work, Why Does It Matter, and What Can We Do About It?
Artificial intelligence: How does it work, why does it matter, and what can we do about it? STUDY Panel for the Future of Science and Technology EPRS | European Parliamentary Research Service Author: Philip Boucher Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA) PE 641.547 – June 2020 EN Artificial intelligence: How does it work, why does it matter, and what can we do about it? Artificial intelligence (AI) is probably the defining technology of the last decade, and perhaps also the next. The aim of this study is to support meaningful reflection and productive debate about AI by providing accessible information about the full range of current and speculative techniques and their associated impacts, and setting out a wide range of regulatory, technological and societal measures that could be mobilised in response. AUTHOR Philip Boucher, Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), This study has been drawn up by the Scientific Foresight Unit (STOA), within the Directorate-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS) of the Secretariat of the European Parliament. To contact the publisher, please e-mail [email protected] LINGUISTIC VERSION Original: EN Manuscript completed in June 2020. DISCLAIMER AND COPYRIGHT This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament. Reproduction and translation for non-commercial purposes are authorised, provided the source is acknowledged and the European Parliament is given prior notice and sent a copy.