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Committee: Arab League Issue: Establishing measures to resolve the conflict of the Qatar diplomatic crisis Student Officer: Hesham El Alamy (President of Arab League) I. Introduction June 2017 was marked as month that witnessed the ignition of the severe diplomatic crisis between Qatar and numerous Arab countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, UAE, and Jordan. The air, sea, and land blockade on Qatar was initiated by Saudi Arabia on June 5, and all the blockade members took different approaches and methods of cutting diplomatic ties with Qatar . The blockading countries stated that Qatar’s assistance to terrorist groups and aiding in destabilizing the region is the main reason behind the blockade. 1 However, Qatar strongly denied these accusations. A list including 13 demands was sent by the blockading countries to Qatar, the ​ ​ demands in this list had to be executed and agreed on by Qatar in order to terminate the blockade. Qatar refused to execute any of the 13 demands2. From that point, the blockade started escalating and numerous conflicts started emerging in the following years. Until 2019, tension is still present in the Arab world despite numerous efforts put by the USA, other gulf nations, and non-Arab countries to find common grounds and resolve the issue between Qatar and the blockade members. The issue is of great importance since it is massively affecting all of the Middle East and not only the involved countries. As the Arab League, it is our goal to find solutions to any barriers that stand in front of the unity of this council, and this conflict is the main barrier that should be pushed aside in order to complete walking in the path of unity and peace. 1 “Qatar Hosts a U.S. Military Base. Saudi Arabia Says It Backs Terrorism.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News ​ ​ Group, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypt-saudi-arabia-among-gulf-states-cutting-ties-qatar-n768161. ​ ​ 2 “Qatar Crisis: What You Need to Know.” BBC News, BBC, 19 July 2017, ​ ​ www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757. ​ 1 II. Key Vocabulary 1) Blockade: an act or means of terminating relations with a place/country to prevent goods ​ or people from entering or leaving. It is very important to understand the correct definition of ​ the word Blockade while debating this topic since the resolution would have to tackle all the aspects of a blockade. 2) Extremist groups: terrorists groups who use unlawful violence especially against ​ civilians in a specific region in the pursuit of political aims. 3The cause of this blockade was the accusation of the blockading countries to Qatar that they aid extremist groups. 3) Inflation rate: a measure for the rate of increase in the price of goods and services in a ​ certain country over a specific period of time4. It is crucial to understand the definition of this ​ word while researching the economic effects of the blockade on all the involved countries. III. Focused Overview of the Issue Causes of the Crisis There are several factors that led to Saudi Arabia and its allies to execute the blockade on ​ Qatar.The main reason behind cutting diplomatic ties was “Qatar's embrace of various terrorist and sectarian groups aimed at destabilizing the region" including the Muslim Brotherhood, 1 al-Qaida, and ISIS”. Qatar’s​ response to this accusation was that they acknowledged the fact that ​ they had given Islamist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood various assistances such as giving them money, goods, and weapons. However, The Qatari government strongly denied any 5 accusation that is related to Qatar funding extremist groups in the region at all. However, Qatar supporting the Muslim Brotherhood was enough for some countries to join the blockade since the Muslim Brotherhood is classified as a terrorist group in their nations. Qatar’s strong diplomatic ties with Iran- Saudi Arabia’s main rival- played a huge role in escalating tensions 3 “Extremist: Definition of Extremist in English by Lexico Dictionaries.” Lexico Dictionaries | English, Lexico ​ ​ Dictionaries, www.lexico.com/en/definition/extremist. 4 Chen, James. “Inflation Definition.” Investopedia, Investopedia, 27 June 2019, ​ ​ www.investopedia.com/terms/i/inflation.asp. 5 “Qatar Crisis: What You Need to Know.” BBC News, BBC, 19 July 2017, ​ ​ www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757. ​ 2 7 between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, and eventually led to the blockade6. The 13 demands list sent ​ ​ by the blockading countries to Qatar is extremely helpful when it comes to understanding the reasons behind this blockade. In the next section Qatar’s response to these demands are discussed. The Crisis Escalating The start of the crisis took place after the Qatar News Agency website was hacked and a fake statement attributed to Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Bin rd Hamad was published on May 23 .​ ​ This fake statement quoted the Emir saying that “Iran [is] an "Islamic power" and saying Qatar's relations with Israel were "good" during a 8 military ceremony.” This event raged the blockading countries and is considered as the th spark of the crisis. On the 5 ​ of June, 2017, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain issued ​ official government announcements clearly stating the severing of diplomatic relations with Qatar9. Severing ties with Qatar included Canceling and suspending flights and airlines services to and from Qatar, withdrawal of the ambassadors of the main blockading countries from Qatar, and surely the termination of trading agreements10. 6 “Qatar Hosts a U.S. Military Base. Saudi Arabia Says It Backs Terrorism.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News ​ ​ Group, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypt-saudi-arabia-among-gulf-states-cutting-ties-qatar-n768161. ​ ​ 7 Ap. “What Are the 13 Demands given to Qatar?” Gulf News – No.1 in UAE and Dubai for Breaking News, Opinion ​ and Lifestyle, Gulf News, 31 Oct. 2018, ​ gulfnews.com/world/gulf/qatar/what-are-the-13-demands-given-to-qatar-1.2048118. 8 Associated Press. “What Are the 13 Demands given to Qatar?” Qatar State News Agency 'Hacked with Fake ​ Positive Story about Israel and Iran', 24 May 2017, ​ www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/05/24/qatar-state-news-agency-hacked-fake-positive-story-israel-iran/. 9 Wintour, Patrick. “Qatar given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi Arabia.” The Guardian, Guardian ​ ​ News and Media, 23 June 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-bl ockade. ​ 10 “Qatar Hosts a U.S. Military Base. Saudi Arabia Says It Backs Terrorism.” NBCNews.com, NBCUniversal News ​ ​ Group, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/egypt-saudi-arabia-among-gulf-states-cutting-ties-qatar-n768161. ​ ​ 3 The issue started to escalate on June 22 when the main 4 blockading countries (Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt) sent a list of 13 demands that should be executed and nd 11 accepted by Qatar before the 2 ​ of July which is the expiry date of such demands. As expected, ​ Qatar fully rejected the demands list and called it unreasonable nor actionable, which took the th blockade to a whole new stage. On the 5 ​ of July, Saudi Arabia and multiple allies meet in Cairo ​ to discuss the situation, and a joint statement was released by the Saudi Arabian Embassy. The joint statement showed strong opposition to Qatar’s actions that violate the UN charters and the regulations of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), and that the blockade will continue until the demands are met12. This blockade has caused political instability in the region since Qatar had multiple ties with the blockading countries. For example, “Qatar's stock market lost about 10%, or about $15bn (£12bn), in market value over the first four weeks of the 2 crisis.” ​ Qatar was on the edge of facing a ​ massive economic crisis because of the lack of imports and exports, but it received foreign assistance from USA and Turkey that helped it regain its stability after the blockade nearly damaged its economy. Until 2019, the ambassadors of the main blockading countries are still withdrawn and the political ties between these nations and Qatar are very tense. The conflict still exists till 2019 and no major steps were taken on the road of finding common grounds to end such crisis. IV. Involved Countries and Organizations 1) Saudi Arabia As the initiator of the blockade, Saudi Arabia is one of the countries who have a massive influence on the region because of its oil abundance, economic power and multiple trade agreements. Saudi Arabia condemned Qatar’s relations with Iran because of the tension between 11 Wintour, Patrick. “Qatar given 10 Days to Meet 13 Sweeping Demands by Saudi Arabia.” The Guardian, Guardian ​ ​ News and Media, 23 June 2017, www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/23/close-al-jazeera-saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-bl ockade. 12 “Qatar Crisis: Saudi Arabia and Allies to Meet in Cairo.” BBC News, BBC, 5 July 2017, ​ ​ www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40502556. ​ 4 Saudi Arabia and Iran regarding the petrol and Iran’s nuclear projects13. The Saudi Arabian government also accused Qatar of assisting terrorists groups and causing instability in the Arabian nations, and this was the main reason why several countries agreed to join the blockade. th On the 5 ​ of June, 2017, the Saudi Press Agency ​ released an official statement cutting off diplomatic and consular relations. The statement also prevents Saudi Arabian citizens to travel to Qatar, and prohibits the travel of Qatari citizens 14 to Saudi Arabia. Throughout the years, the conflict is tensioning and despite the numerous efforts of Arabian and European countries to resolve the issue, Saudi Arabia refuses to cut off the blockade until Qatar agrees to Saudi Arabia’s demands.
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