" Iii'Sf >,."t···C··' "ZT""1IiIiIIII >-~ .. ill1fT :rt:-M M'ttW"... prejudice of lies not in the fact that treatment of marginal humans, I agree with marginal humans are treated better than Evelyn that speciesism is a prejudice. animals but in valuing typically superior human intelligence so highly that the interests and Notes suffering of animals are considered morally insignificant in comparison to those of humans, 1. See "Moral Community and Animal which is to say normal humans. He thus Rights," American Philosophical Quarterly 17 focuses on the issue of animal suffering, which (1980), pp. 45-52, or Morals Reson and is the motivating concern of animal advocates, Animals (Philadelphia: Temple University and the moral insignificance of animals' Press, 1987), Chapter 8. supposedly inferior intelligence as an excuse for not taking their SUfferingsuffering seriously. This 2. (New York: Avon Books, 1975), pp. 6-6­ analysis suggests characterizing speciesism in 9. a rather different way than either of the two definitions Evelyn has given us. Such a characterization might run as follows:

a speciesist doctrine is one which gives ONTHE such great moral importance to what typically distinguishes one species from others that it RELEVANCE leads to disregarding the interests of those others in favor of satisfying the interests of OF MARGINAL members of the favored species. HUMANS: If we start by presuming that the interests of others should not (prima facie) be A Repry To disregarded, then the burden of proof is clearly on those who maintain a speciesist Sapontzis doctrine to demonstrate why it is not a prejudice. And I think that in contemporary, Western society we do start with that Evelyn Pluhar presumption, since the idea that animals should not be treated cruelly is a commonplace today, I couldn't agree more with Professor Sapontzis' contention that the root of human the controversy thus being not over whether willingness to sacrifice nonhuman animals is animals are morally considerable at ail but the assumption that our "superior" mental more specifically over what sorts or degrees abilities license the exploitation of so-called of moral status they have and what sorts or "lesser" beings. The>The - "untutored" view is degrees of moral responsibility or obligation shared by mainstream ethical theorists, who we have to them. It follows that the question hold that autonomous moral agents ('persons' of whether speciesism is a prejudice covers a in the strictest sense of that term) are the whole range of questions: does our primary possessors of basic moral rights. I

characteristically superior intelligence justify pointed this out ~t the beginning of this paper, our routinely killing animals for entertainment or meat, justify our routinely imprisoning them for amusement or profit, justify our routinely making them sick to cure our ills, and so forth. I think that the answer to those DISCUSSION questions is "No," which is why, no matter what one concludes about our preferential 99 8E'IWEt:N WE spECIES and I have argued about this assumption at treatment of marginal humans is relevant to length elsewhere. 1 Steve's commentary this issue have strayed from the original further underlines this very important point. concept of speciesism. , in the However, I disagree with his claim that our very. chapter of to which treatment of human nonpersons ("marginal" Steve refers us, describes as "irredeemably humans) is irrelevant to the issue of whether speciesist" those who "while distinguishing speciesism is a bigoted or a justified view. sharply between humans and other animals ..... allow no distinctions to be made within our own Steve offers several reasons to justify his species, objecting to the killing of the severely claim that marginal human are not "where the retarded and the hopelessly senile as strongly action is." The most important is his charge as they object to the killing of normal adults."2 that I locate " the fault" or "the prejudice" in He goes on to present a version of what we speciesism as the inconsistent treatment of have come to call the argument from marginal human and nonhuman nonpersons instead of in cases, the very argument to which speciesists the assumption that the personhood which know they must respond. characterizes our species is of paramount moral importance. I have a two-part reply The argument from marginal cases is often here. First, this is a false dilemma. I do combined with the charge that speciesism is analogous to racism and sexism. In this happen to believe that the personhood context, the analogy must not be and never has assumption or criterion is mistaken. But been presented as thoroughgoing. No surely it is also mistaken to treat beings who, nonspeciesist would ever compare blacks or on one's own view, have the same moral women to mentally deficient white men. The status, in morally dissimilar ways. The recent point of the analogy is that it is wrong to treat defenders of speciesism certainly take the ~~ charge of inconsistency extremely seriously, ~~ as well they should; they devote all their beings whom one regards as morally similar, energies to defeating it (unsuccessfully, as I be they human or nonhuman nonpersons, or women and men, or blacks and whites, in argue). Second, the focus of this paper is morally dissimilar ways. The burden is on speciesism. Speciesism as such is the view speciecists to show that their view does not that a right to life or preferential treatment belong in this group. However,.af1.e.r. one has may be accorded on grounds of species, i. e., argued that the right to life is not restricted to that otherwise morally similar beings may be persons or to members of personhood­ treated differentially for that reason. characterized species, it becomes appropriate Although it may at bottom be a prejudiced to raise the analogy between speciesism and view, the assumption that persons are the racism/sexism in a much more general way, primary possessors of basic moral rights is for one would then be entitled to say that not in itself speciesist. Hence, my concern in normal humans and many other beings are 1bl§. paper is to show that recent defenders of morally similar. In the face of this, continued speciesism, who try to forge links between the preference for humans at the expense of personhood assumption and nonpersons others would be just as bigoted, in all belonging to personhood-characterized species, respects, as racism or sexism. Current fail to justify our radically different treatment defenders of speciesism can hardly be of human and nonhuman persons. How could impressed by this moral general analogy, of this be irrelevant to the question of whether course, since it merely begs the question speciesism can be justified? against them. The more restricted analogy which can be drawn in conjuction with the Contrary to what Steve suggests, I do not argument from marginal cases has much more believe that those of us who think the sting.

BErrWEEN THE SPECIES 100

Q.t Ii ---~------_.._--_._._-

IIiiII III' ."'",1 7- IT we WI ill!@e\lf@'1i"iMie t l' tMr &li?n.'·i'n'M'.....,.., Would we be more successful in making a nonhumans. The other side of this cOincoin is that case for nonhuman rights if we redefined failure to answer their arguments contributes 'speciesism' along the lines Steve proposes and to that exploitation. then attacked it? I do not think so. Steve's version of speciesism, which entails that the We are all opposed to unjustified suffering interests of those who don't belong to the and death. That is why it is imperative to "right" species may simply be disregarded to determine whether speciesism is justified. satisfy members of the favored species, is Showing that it isn't is deadly serious much easier to counter than the view which I business, not "an abstract intellectual game." have been attacking. The limitations of this If we are ever to get anywhere inin securing "straw speciesism" are well-illustrated in nonhuman animals their due, itit can only be by Thomas Young's article on the killing of having justification on our side. animals. He too defines speciesism inin terms of

disregarding interests merely on species grounds. That is why he refuses to call ~ himself a speciesist, holding as he does that it See my "Moral Agents and Moral would be wrong to inflict gratuitous pain on Patients," 4(1), 1988, 3 nonhumans. Yet, as I discussed, he proceeds pp.32-45. to defend a view, clearly speciesist iiiin my (and Singer's) sense, which "justifies" the routine 2 Peter Singer, Animal Liberation (New painless killing of healthy nonhumans (but not York: Avon Books, 1975), Chapter 1, p. 20. human nonpersons). I have a difficult time thinking of such a view as a triumph for 3 Thomas Young, "The Morality of Killing "nonspeciesist thinking!" No, we should Animals: Four Arguments," AND continue to battle the strongest position our ANIMALS V (4), 1984, pp. 88-101. Se my opponents have to offer us. footnote 33 in "Speciesism: A Form of Bigotry or a Justified View?" I agree with Steve that it would be ghastly if the goal of refuting speciesist arguments 4 "The Personhood View and the Argument were to induce moral consistency merely for from Marginal Cases," PHILOSOHPICA 39, its own sake. Those of us who reject the 1987 (1), pp. 23-28. exploitation of nonhumans have no wish to see 1987 (1), pp. 23-28. sentient marginal humans in laboratory cages or feedlots. The goal is to make speciesists or feedlots. The goal is to make speciesists LABORATORY RABBIT realize that something is dreadfully wrong

with their initial assumptions about the IIII. 5SaD00I.roJ1f/.[fJQJl!l ~ treatment of nonhumans, and in my experience Oh /lL0lU/l taJ

that is the usual result. The few who, like When.IJheA hou.uu;hou-iJu; he.aJUihe.evr.d .tlu!..t1l£ ....&X&cu.t-Loneof-'..:..cu..U.oneJt'.. be.LLb&LL

~v..~v& .toc:..o.iAc:....u. ~o .tlu!..t1l£ -l.a1J..lab. .t.h.tU.t.itJU :J am. tudtud

Frey, conclude instead that vivisection of

t Milt /f0lLll."OWl. vu...vUL C<1lJ-'1-.C4l1", ..u.Jt..uJt vu.e...~ woltlltodwo.f-lltod ~o~O dl4e.LL.dI4&LL. sentient marginal humans must be permissable, nCJJf ./JUn./:..th..iJL1:. u.ponu.pon. /f0lLll."OWl. touA.tau./.. an.do.rui &v.u..vu. b.l.o""b.l.o""

must be confronted in additional ways. The //0'" ..oon0 on. IItIf 1JA-tlG~&.. an.do.rui ..~..

S.taJJbe.d once ",Uh ~ an.d b~b~.l.o'" argument from marginal cases is insufficient S.taiJbe.d once. ",Uh.

:J -t.

to carrry the whole burden of the case for bJlLoA.IJIuLt. ~1tIj~"'" MMe.d "'"IU otat IItIf ~ pJ..a.c.e?pJ..ac...? 4 bJlLoA.IJIuLt. paJtaJ:f.i.q.m.~ ..u.ppLi.e.du.ppLi.ed "au./f0u. ",Uh.",Uh ..&JCC.IJ.4e?xe.tL4..

nonhuman rights, as I have argued elsewhere.4 ? //0'" can. /f0lLll."OWl. ..cA.en..UA~-hen.cJun.en.cA.en..UA~-heAcJuu.n...0 cU.

However, this does not alter the fact that

However, this does not alter the fact that

Th..he bbe..~....~ Jte.actoJ<.u.acto"- .to ~~&.. pItO.uAn....pM.te-i.n.... 1ItIJ.od1ItIJ.od&?..? dismantling the speciesists' case for continuing no o~O~ !

to treat nonhuman and human nonpersons in To trta.tdL .tA..~e peM..apep.Ud..peJLt.apep.Ud& o.t. .u.. q.aJIlL/q.aJIIJZ-l radically different ways removes a m....e.jQ.rm....s.jQr Leo Kortman excuse for continued exploitation of

101 BEIWEENBE'IWEEN THE SPEX::IES