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S. Irudaya Rajan Ginu Zacharia Oommen Editors Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries S. Irudaya Rajan • Ginu Zacharia Oommen Editors

Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries Editors S. Irudaya Rajan Ginu Zacharia Oommen Centre for Development Studies Kerala Public Service Commission Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India Trivandrum, Kerala, India

ISBN 978-981-32-9286-4 ISBN 978-981-32-9287-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore Preface and Acknowledgement

The idea to bring out this book was conceived owing to the success of the International Conference on Gulf Migration held at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), Teen Murti Bhavan, New Delhi, in October 2014. Due to the overwhelming response of participants and other scholars from around the world, we decided to bring out this edited book as an essential volume on Gulf migration, with contributions from participant scholars as well as other scholars invited to write for this volume. The conference was organized by the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (NMML), New Delhi, whilst Dr. Oommen was an NMML Fellow at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, where Prof. Rajan is a Professor. Our journey of collaboration on Gulf migration studies started with our introduction which was unbelievably facilitated by the eminent scholar Mr. S. Krishnakumar, Associate Professor, Venkateswara College, New Delhi, and we are highly obliged to him for his sincere efforts. To organize this conference, the wholehearted support we received from the former Director of NMML Dr. Mahesh Rangarajan and staff was invaluable, and we are very grateful. We are also indebted to our mentors Prof. Prakash C. Jain and Dr. K. C. Zachariah for years of guidance in research in the topic of Gulf migration. We would also like to thank our organizations, the Centre for Development Studies and the administrations and our colleagues for their support and encouragement to pursue research on Gulf migration. Dr. Oommen is also highly indebted to his former organization MIGRINTER, University of Poitiers, France. We also express our gratitude to our research team, mainly Nikhil Panicker, Sreeja K. S. and Anu S. Nair, for their sincere efforts in putting this work together.

v vi Preface and Acknowledgement

It would be remiss if we do not acknowledge our families for their love and care throughout the years. Dr. Rajan thanks his wife Hema and his three children Rahul, Rohit and Mary Catherine, and Dr. Oommen thanks his wife Suvarna and his daughter Rebecca. Last but not least, we thank Springer Nature for the timely publication of this book.

Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India S. Irudaya Rajan Ginu Zacharia Oommen Contents

1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook �� 1 S. Irudaya Rajan and Ginu Zacharia Oommen 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future �� 19 George Naufal and Ismail Genc 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries �� 37 Zahra R. Babar 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf �� 55 M. H. Ilias 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries �� 69 M. V. Bijulal 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar �� 83 Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al-Ghanim, Kien Le Trung, and Laura Harkness 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf �� 103 Graeme Hugo 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries �� 127 Neil G. Ruiz

vii viii Contents

9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic Discontent? �� 151 Zakir Hussain 10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble �� 177 Marie Percot 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation of Regional Disparities in Outflows of Workers, Remittances and Poverty �� 189 G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq, and Nasir Iqbal 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook �� 219 Bilesha Weeraratne 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics and Contradictory Policies �� 233 S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity Amongst Syrian Christians in Kerala �� 247 Ginu Zacharia Oommen 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview �� 267 Prakash C. Jain 16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf �� 281 S. Irudaya Rajan and Ginu Zacharia Oommen About the Editors and Contributors

Editors

S. Irudaya Rajan, PhD, is Professor at the Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala (India). He has 35 years of research experience. Professor Rajan has coordinated eight major migration surveys in Kerala since 1998 (with Prof. K. C. Zachariah), Goa Migration Survey 2008, Punjab Migration Survey 2009 and Tamil Nadu Migration Survey 2015. He played an instrumental role in conducting the Gujarat Migration Survey 2011 and in the process of initiating Andhra Pradesh, Telangana and Bihar migration surveys. Professor Rajan has published extensively in national and international journals on social, economic, demographic, psychological and political implications of international migration. He has undertaken projects on international migration with European Union; International Labour Organization; World Bank; International Organization of Migration; South Asia Network of Economic Research Institutes (SANEI); Rockefeller Foundation; United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); Migrant Forum in Asia; Department of Non-Resident Indian Affairs, Government of Goa; Department of Non-Resident Keralite Affairs, Government of Kerala; Commissionerate of Rehabilitation and Welfare of Non- Resident Tamils, Government of Tamil Nadu; Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Government of India; India Centre for Migration of the Ministry of External Affairs; Canadian Institutes of Health Research; and International Development Research Centre. He is the Editor of the annual series India Migration Report since 2010 and also founding Editor-in-Chief of the international journal Migration and Development.

Ginu Zacharia Oommen, PhD, is a member of the Kerala Public Service Commission, Trivandrum. Prior to this, he was a visiting professor at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’homme (FMSH), Paris. Oommen has held numerous fellowships and has been Visiting Faculty at MIGRINTER (the Centre for International Migration), University of Poitiers, France; Nehru Memorial Museum and Library,

ix x About the Editors and Contributors

New Delhi; Zentrum Moderner Orient, Berlin; Gulf Studies Programme, JNU; Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi; Centre for South Asia–West China Cooperation, Sichuan University, China and India Centre for Migration, New Delhi. Oommen was also a Hermes Postdoctoral Fellow at MIGRINTER, University de Poitiers France and Visiting Graduate Fellow at the Rothberg International School, Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Israel. Besides, Oommen was also offered two other prestigious fellowships: the Swedish Institute Guest Postdoctoral Fellowship at Uppsala University, Sweden, and the Visiting Senior Fellowship at MACIMIDE, University of Maastricht University, the Netherlands, both of which he declined since it coincided with other fellowships. His major publications include Ethnicity, Marginality and Identity: The Jews of Cochin in Israel (Manak, 2011), South Asian Migration to Gulf Countries: History, Policies, Development (Routledge, 2015). Oommen has conducted extensive field research in Israel, Palestine, Kuwait, France and Kerala.

Contributors

Kaltham Al-Ghanim is Professor of Sociology, Qatar University.

G. M. Arif is a demographer and currently he is the Joint Director at the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad. He has been member of various government commissions and study groups on poverty reduction and migration.

Zahra R. Babar is Associate Director for Research at the Center for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar.

M. V. Bijulal is Assistant Professor at the School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam.

Abdoulaye Diop is Associate Research Professor and Head of the Research Department at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University (QU).

Shujaat Farooq is working in Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Pakistan, as Director of Monitoring and Evaluation.

Andrew Gardner is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Puget Sound in Tacoma, Washington. He is the author of numerous articles, book chapters, books and essays. About the Editors and Contributors xi

Ismail Genc is Professor of Economics and the Head of the Economics Department at the American University of Sharjah, United Arab Emirates. Prof. Genc received his PhD in Economics from the Texas A&M University.

Laura Harkness is Freelance Researcher and she was a research associate at Carnegie Mellon University in Qatar.

Graeme Hugo was ARC Australian Professorial Fellow and Director of the Australian Population and Migration Research Centre, University of Adelaide.

Zakir Hussain is Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi.

M. H. Ilias is Professor at the India-Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi.

Nasir Iqbal is Director of Research at the Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Pakistan. Previously, Iqbal was Assistant Professor of Economics at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE).

Prakash C. Jain is UGC Emeritus Fellow following his superannuation as Professor of West Asian Studies from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Jolin Joseph is Doctoral Scholar at York University, Canada.

Kien Le Trung is Associate Professor at the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University.

George Naufal is Senior Research Associate at PPRI and a Research Fellow at the Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) at Bonn. He was also an Assistant/Associate Professor of Economics at the American University of Sharjah in the United Arab Emirates.

Marie Percot is an anthropologist and is associated with the Laboratoire d’ Anthropologie Urbaine/Institut Interdisciplinaire d’ Anthropologie du Contemporain (EHESS), Paris, France.

Silvia Pessoa is Associate Teaching Professor of English at Carnegie Mellon University, Qatar. Her areas of expertise are immigration studies and academic writing development. xii About the Editors and Contributors

Neil G. Ruiz is a Senior Policy Analyst and Associate Fellow at the Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program. His research focuses on regional and state economic development, innovation, international migration, high-skilled immigration as well as global economic issues.

Bilesha Weeraratne is currently a Research Fellow, attached to the Labour, Employment and Human Resources Development Unit at the Institute of Policy Studies, Sri Lanka. She is also serving as an International Consultant to the Asian Development Bank, Philippines. List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Immigration number – all females (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100) �� 22 Fig. 2.2 Immigration number – all males (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100) �� 23 Fig. 2.3 Immigration number – all (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100) �� 23 Fig. 2.4 Share of population as foreigners. �� 26 Fig. 2.5 Nationals and non-nationals sex ratio. �� 26 Fig. 2.6 Age distribution by nationality: GCC countries. �� 27 Fig. 2.7 Distribution of employed population by nationality. �� 28 Fig. 2.8 Share out of total foreign population in Kuwait (2012). �� 28 Fig. 2.9 Unemployment rate in Kuwait (2012). �� 29 Fig. 2.10 Labour force participation rate in Kuwait (2012). �� 29 Fig. 6.1 Duration of low-income migrants’ stay in Qatar, 2012 �� 88 Fig. 6.2 Living quarters for low-income labor migrants in qatar �� 94 Fig. 6.3 Monthly basic salary and migration costs, by nationality �� 95 Fig. 7.1 Indonesia: Migrant Stocks by Country of Destination. �� 105 Fig. 7.2 Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979–2013. �� 107 Fig. 7.3 Saudi Arabia: Arrivals and departures of non-Saudis with Indonesian country of citizenship, 2000–2011 �� 108 Fig. 7.4 Indonesia: growth of remittances, 1983–2013. �� 111 Fig. 7.5 Indonesia: age–sex structure of the population, 2010 (shaded) and 2030 �� 117 Fig. 7.6 Example of a brokerage network for official migrants to Saudi Arabia. �� 121 Fig. 8.1 Overseas workers welfare administration within the Philippine government. �� 134

xiii xiv List of Figures

Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006. �� 135 Fig. 8.3 Philippine government emigration institutional organizational chart �� 149 Fig. 9.1 History of Saudization in private sector (in per cent). �� 161 Fig. 9.2 Total and youth unemployment in Saudi Arabia, 2006–2010. �� 162 Fig. 9.3 Work permits issued to foreign workers to different enterprises, 2001. �� 164 Fig. 9.4 Projected national labour force, 2010–2050. �� 166 Fig. 12.1 Skills of migrant workers 1994–2015. �� 221 Fig. 12.2 Gender distribution of migrants. �� 222 Fig. 12.3 Migrant Departure by Age and Gender: 2015. �� 223 List of Tables

Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of various expatriate groups at different time intervals (%) �� 21 Table 2.2 Difference between male and female expatriate populations in the GCC �� 24 Table 2.3 Occupation by nationality and gender – Kuwait 2012 �� 30 Table 6.1 Averages for key variables, by ethnicity �� 97 Table 6.2 Averages for key variables for South Asian migrants, by religion �� 97 Table 7.1 Indonesia: estimated stocks of overseas contract workers around 2013 �� 105 Table 7.2 Estimates of stock of Indonesian female domestic overseas contract workers, 2011–2013 �� 109 Table 7.3 Main Asian labour exporting countries: workers’ remittances relative to exports and imports in US$ million, 1980–2012 �� 112 Table 7.4 Indonesia: Comparison of key economic and demographic indicators, early 1990s and 2010–2013 �� 113 Table 7.5 Indonesia: labour force and unemployment �� 114 Table 7.6 Indonesia: demographic variables, 1970 and 2010 �� 116 Table 7.7 Indonesia: growth and projected growth of population aged 15–34 �� 116 Table 8.1 Number of OWWA welfare cases, January to September 1994 �� 131 Table 8.2 Post-1995 Philippine emigrant institutions �� 140 Table 8.3 Philippine legislation and policies dealing with emigration �� 141 Table 8.4 Recruitment and placement by recruitment intermediary, 1986 �� 143

xv xvi List of Tables

Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987 (in Philippine pesos) �� 144 Table 8.6 Philippine remittance industry revenue estimate, 2004 �� 146 Table 9.1 Share of foreign workers in total Saudi labour force (in thousands) �� 153 Table 9.2 Categories of business units under Nitaqat �� 154 Table 9.3 Nitaqat zones �� 155 Table 9.4 Schematization of the Nitaqat provisions for business units under different categories �� 156 Table 9.5 Percentage of Saudization under different Nitaqat zones �� 158 Table 9.6 Saudization bands across the select business lines (in per cent) �� 159 Table 9.7 Average monthly wage to Saudis and non-Saudis in private sector in Saudi Arabia (in Saudi Riyal) �� 164 Table 9.8 Salary gap between Saudis and non-Saudis in select profession (in per cent) �� 164 Table 9.9 Reasons for Saudi unemployment �� 165 Table 9.10 Share of Saudis in different business units �� 168 Table 9.11 Share of Saudis employed in different industries (July 2011) �� 168 Table 11.1 Migration to the Gulf and domestic labour market �� 192 Table 11.2 Workers’ remittances and GDP growth in Pakistan �� 194 Table 11.3 Comparison of two methods in district classification into very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration categories �� 198 Table 11.4 District classification into low-, medium- and high-migration categories �� 200 Table 11.5 Distribution of inflows of remittances (%) by migration status �� 201 Table 11.6 Share of self-employed (non-agriculture sector) in total employed labour force by migration status �� 202 Table 11.7 Migration, poverty and deprivation �� 203 Table 11.8 Proportion of households (%) deprived in education dimension of multidimensional poverty by migration status �� 205 Table 11.9 Proportion of households (%) deprived in health dimension of multidimensional poverty �� 205 Table 11.10 Proportion of households (%) deprived in standard of living dimension of multidimensional poverty by migration status �� 206 List of Tables xvii

Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators, weight and definitions (dimensions are equally weighted) �� 211 Table 11.12 Classification of districts into high-, medium-, low- and very-low-migration categories-based remittance share and incidence-of-migration methods �� 212 Table 12.1 Departures by skills and gender—2015 �� 222 Table 12.2 Distribution of departures to GCC countries 2011–2015 �� 224 Table 12.3 Skills composition by destination: 2015 �� 225 Table 12.4 Composition of remittances: 2015 �� 226 Table 12.5 Gender distribution of departures and complaints origins—2015 �� 226 Table 15.1 Trading and entrepreneurial ethnic groups among overseas Indian communities �� 268 Chapter 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook

S. Irudaya Rajan and Ginu Zacharia Oommen

Asia’s historical contacts with the Gulf region date back to ancient times. Many historians have documented the existence of Indian settlements and merchant guilds in Aden and other prominent Gulf ports prior to the discovery of oil in the region (Secombe and Lawless 1986). In the beginning of the nineteenth century, the industrialization process, pearl trading, Haj and the requirement of skilled workers in the ports had prompted the flow of Indian migrants to the Persian Gulf region. These included ordinary artisans, masons, technicians, clerks and administrative personnel during the colonial times, largely to support the British colonial apparatus in the region (Kumar 2016). The colonial rulers used ‘Indian subjects’ as treasured resources to sustain and operate critical ventures like communication, education, health, bureaucracy, postal services and so on. Later, in the 1930s major Western oil companies like Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) and Aramco Gulf Operations Company Limited and Petroleum Development Qatar (PDQ) employed a substantial number of labourers from the subcontinent and a recruiting office was established in Surat (Kumar 2016). Thus, by late 1950s, Indian and Pakistani migrant workers constituted the largest workforce in many Gulf countries particularly in Kuwait and Bahrain. The discovery of oil in the 1970s and the economic rise of the Gulf Co-operation Countries (GCC) inspired a huge influx of migrant workers from Asia, in particular South Asia (Abraham and Rajan 2012; Rajan 2017a, b; Chowdhury and Rajan 2018). Therefore, the contemporary large-scale migration to GCC countries from India is not an isolated event connected to oil boom of the 1970s, as it dates back to the colonial policies and historic trade linkages.

S. I. Rajan (*) Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India e-mail: [email protected] G. Z. Oommen Kerala Public Service Commission, Trivandrum, Kerala, India e-mail: [email protected]

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 1 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_1 2 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen

At present, out of roughly 15 million expatriates in the Gulf region, Asians constitute around 12 million (Rajan 2018, 2019; Jain and Oommen 2016). The historical linkages, religious and cultural proximity, poverty, unemployment, political instability and insurgency in the Asian countries are some of the factors that have led to this large influx. The majority of expatriate workers in GCC countries are largely from South Asian and Southeast Asian countries. In GCC countries, massive developmental activities had forced the oil-rich monarchies to instate an ‘open door’ demographic policy encouraging large-scale migration from outside the region (Hussain 2011, 2014, 2016). The neighbouring Arab countries had failed to provide skilled workforce to the region to sustain this process of development. Although, in the beginning, the workforce came largely from neighbouring Arab countries like Egypt, Yemen and Sudan, by 1980s, the GCC countries shifted the preference of workforce towards Asian countries, particularly from the South Asian region, mainly to avoid the spread of radical and socialistic political ideologies in the Gulf region. Though, the composition of migrant workers has been changing in GCC, a consistent and a significant shift from Arab to Asian workers had started since late 1970s, mainly to safeguard the political interests of the oil rich monarchies. The Asian workforce became a preferred choice due to certain characteristics, specifically docility, political neutrality, flexibility, willingness to work at manage- able wages and readiness to work hard (Kapiszewski 2006). In addition, Asians have not been looked upon as a threat to the political establishment of the GCC countries and the involvement of Asian governments in the recruiting process helps in attracting a monitored and filtered workforce. Thus, by the mid-1980s, Asian workforce in GCC had further expanded, beyond India and Pakistan, and countries like Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka also joined in the labour market (Rajan 2016). The flow of migrant workers from Asia, particularly South Asia, had given a stiff competition to the workers from West Asia (Kapiszewski 2006). Hence, ‘Asianization’ of migrant labour in the Gulf is the outcome of the ‘preference and choice’ of the receiving governments due to various economic–political considerations and these dynamics paved the way for the emergence of an Asia–Gulf Migratory Corridor in region. In an earlier work, Naufal and Genc (2014) observed that there is a structural break in remittances around the 1990s, where the largest portion of remittances there leaves the region, presumably heading to Asia. Asian female labour migrant population growth rate surpasses that of Arabs earlier than the 1990s. The extraordinary and unmatched movement of the people, remittances flow, developmental initiatives, voluminous trade, energy security, diplomatic and strategic overtures are the overt and outstanding results of the embryonic ‘Asia– Gulf Migratory Corridor’ in the region (Naufal et al. 2016). The Asian region, especially India, receives the largest amount of remittances and those from the GCC constitute the major external financial flow for these developing nations. The Asian migrant communities have made a remarkable contribution to the socio-economic and the cultural development of GCC countries and have become the dominant workforce in economy of the region. The strategic and 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 3

economic implications of Asianization on migration and remittance flows are quite important for both sending and receiving countries. Remittances from GCC countries play a significant role in the foreign exchange reserves of the host country, alleviation of poverty and socio-economic development of recipient countries. Remittances from GCC countries have been a major source of influence on the annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of the Asian countries, as is evident from the fact that it constituted one-fifth of the total flow to the region in 2008 (Oommen 2016). However, due to the economic crisis there was a slowdown of remittance flow to the Asian region in 2009, but it resumed to normal by 2011 (Rajan 2012). On the impact of migration in Pakistan, Arif (2009) noted that, ‘The social contribution of migration is even more encouraging in terms of improving children’s education, enhancing housing condition, eliminating child labour, empowering women of the migrant household’. The path-breaking prosperity of the ‘Gulf Pockets’ in the Asian countries can be highly contributed to the strength and dynamisms of the emergent ‘Asia–Gulf Migratory Corridor’. The flow of remittances to developing countries reduced in 2008 because of economic crisis, and it affected recipient countries adversely. By 2010, GCC countries had regained some of the economic growth, which had a direct impact on the remittance flow. The economic fluctuation did not affect the flow of migrants, but a shift in domestic economic policies of the Gulf countries are expected to affect the quantum and nature of migration patterns. The recent nationalization policies and the exodus of large number of migrant workers from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait did not make any impact on the flow of remittances (Rajan 2016). The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs (2012) data gives a clear picture of the enormous amount of remittances flown to India during the last decade, with a quantum jump from $14.8 billion in 2002–03 to $53.9 billion in 2009–10. India continues to be the top recipient of remittances with $80 billion in 2018 (Ratha et al. 2018). In 2008, India, China, Bangladesh and the Philippines were among the top 10 remittance recipient countries (Kelegama et al. 2011). Migration and remittances, particularly from the Gulf region contribute significantly in the overall developmental process of South Asia and Southeast Asian countries. The large flow of remittances has prompted the South and Southeast Asian countries (Arasaratnam 1970) to formulate policies to attract migrant workers and chan- nelize maximum amount of remittances through the formal channels, mainly through banks, cheques and telegraph and post office transfers rather than informal channels. The informal flow of remittances through hawala/hundi is a major concern for the recipient countries. To block the inroads of informal remittance links, Asian countries have opened branches of major banks in GCC region, and also provide various schemes to deposit money in these branches of native banks. The Asian countries have formulated many financial schemes to attract the remittances such as Non-Resident Indian Account (NRI Account) in India, Non-Resident Foreign Currency in Bangladesh, Foreign Employment Bond in Nepal and Share Investment External Rupee Account in Sri Lanka (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012). The job market in Gulf countries is not egalitarian in nature, and the wage differential is quite high between expatriates and the natives. However, the migration 4 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen policies of all Asian countries, except India, promote migration. Interestingly, the global economic crisis, job cuts, anti-immigrant efforts of the GCC governments and socio-spatial isolation of the expatriates have neither reduced the steady flow of migrants from the Asian region nor has it created a ‘reverse migration’ back to the sending countries (Rajan 2012). However, the decision of the Saudi Arabian government in late 2014 to strictly implement nationalization of workforce was an unexpected setback in the free flow of migration to the Gulf region (Zachariah et al. 2014). Various domestic factors like high unemployment among natives, economic burdens due to the Gulf Wars, increase of the female participation in the labour market and Arab Spring have forced many of the GCC countries to introduce restrictive policies towards migration, implementation of ‘Nitaqat Law’ and active enrolment of natives in the private sector. Education, health, construction, manufacturing and care industry are highly dependent on the Asian workers, thus, the recent attempts made by GCC countries to implement the Nitaqat Law may not be successful due to the reluctance of the nationals to participate in blue collar and private sector jobs. Presently, a substantial number of migrant workers from Asia in GCC countries are in the construction sector (Rajan and Narayana 2012). Majority of the Asian migrants in GCC countries are semi-skilled or unskilled workers, mostly illiterate, single and male (Ozaki 2012). Since 1990s, the IT boom and the technological advancement have altered the skill composition of the migrants as well as the demand of the host countries particularly in the case of Indian expatriates (Srivastava and Sasikumar 2003). The majority of the Pakistani workers in GCC region are unskilled, followed by semi-skilled, skilled and highly qualified professionals (Arif2009 ). The statistics on Bangladeshi immigrants show that majority of the migrants are from poor and downtrodden sections. Rita Afsar (2009) study on Bangladeshi migrants pointed that hunger and desperation, unemployment and debt traps are the main factors prompting them to migrate to oil-rich monarchies. According to job classifications, skilled categories include nurses, teachers and technicians; semi-skilled categories include masons, drivers, carpenters and welders; and unskilled categories include construction labourers, cleaners and domestic workers. The average age of migrant workers is nearly 32 years, and vast majority of the migrants are male (Bohra and Massey 2009). A study conducted by Williams et al. (2010) shows that the vast majority of the Nepali migrants (90%) are working as labourers in GCC region and only 2% are engaged in professional jobs. The Asian migration to GCC countries is predominantly a male phenomenon. The relatively limited participation of women as a migrating workforce is attributed largely to the prevalence of patriarchy in the sending countries. According to the Asian Development Bank report, women migrants constitute nearly 15% of the total migrant workers from South Asia (Ozaki 2012, Tinker 1974; Winckler 2010; Sohan 2011). Not surprisingly, study on the Asian women migrant workers has received less attention both in the academic world and at the policy level. Migration of Women from South Asia to the Gulf (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012), Indian Nurses in Persian Gulf (Percot 2006; Percot and Rajan 2007) and Sri Lankan Migration to 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 5 the Gulf: Female Bread Winners (Gamburd 2010) are some of the notable academic works in this regard. In the context of international labour migration, majority of the women workers are from South Asia–Southeast Asia, and the majority are engaged in low skilled and semi-skilled jobs (Baldwin-Edwards 2011). The oil boom of the 1960s in the Gulf countries lowered the participation of the nationals in the workforce and brought a new form of ‘royal sheikh culture’ which heightened the demand for maids and domestic workers. Asian women are mostly employed as teachers, paramedics, nurses, assistants, in manufacturing, entertain- ment and care industry as maids and domestic workers (Ozaki 2012; see also Varghese and Rajan 2011; Kodoth 2015). Gamburd (2010) noted that the ‘army of housemaids’ represents the feminization of migration in South Asia. Initially, women workers migrated from India, Pakistan, Philippines and Bangladesh, but by the year 2000, Sri Lankan women migrants had emerged as the largest group in the GCC region. Factors that prompted Asian women to migrate were mainly poverty, hunger, debt traps, oppressive social system, marital discords, alcoholism of the spouse, aspiration for the betterment of life and so on (Gamburd 2010). Women migrant workers are often victims of patriarchy in both sending and receiving countries (Kabeer 2007). Sexual abuse, harassment at workplace and long working hours without proper payment are quite rampant in GCC countries (Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2015, 2016, 2017). However, the precarious issues related to women migrants have received less attention and more women-friendly policies need to be formulated by both sending and receiving countries in the future to safeguard the unprecedented movement of the migrant workers in the ‘Asia-Gulf Migratory Corridor’. It is interesting to note that policymaking centres in Asia have been focusing more on maximizing benefits out of this trend of international migration through the process of remittances than treading any confrontationist path with the generally repressive Gulf regimes (Panicker 2013). But this preoccupation has sometimes come at the cost of ignoring the pitiable conditions under which the labourers work in alien territories, bearing the wrath of a whole host of prejudice and discrimination meted out against them. However, the working conditions and protection of labour rights are relatively low in GCC countries. Irregular payment, withholding of wages, inconsistency between the promised and real wages, deduction of salary, non- payment of salary for long duration, denial of medical insurance and long working hours in hostile climatic conditions are quite rampant in the region. The spurious recruitment process, visa trading, harsh working conditions, autocratic nature of Kafala system and the high visa cost undermine the stability and economic structures of the migrant sending families. ‘The vast pool of cheap labour from India, Pakistan and other parts of Asia has been pivotal to the Gulf’s economic boom in recent years. But labour abuse is frequent. Recruiters often require workers to sign one contract in their home country, then instruct them to sign a new one at a far lower wage once they arrive in the Gulf’ (Surk and Abbotarch 2009). Therefore, both sending and receiving countries have to deliberate upon the plight of migrants more seriously and formulate policies which would safeguard rights of migrant workers. 6 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen

The exploitation of the recruiting agencies and the helplessness of sending governments to curtail the powerful recruitment private lobby are being raised on various high-level meetings on migrant workers (Rajan et al. 2011). At the same time, there are numerous instances of harassment committed by the employers on hapless migrant workers, like confiscating the passport, physical abuse, non-payment of wages and medical insurance and so on. Hundreds of migrant workers are living in pitiable conditions in labour camps without basic amenities, civic rights, insurance, proper working conditions, decent living conditions and sexual exploitation (Wickramasekara 2011; Zachariah et al. 2004). The circular migration to the Gulf, which has crossed over more than three decades, continues to be characterized by a serious deficit in migrant rights. The large commercialization of the recruitment industry has made migration in the region not only too costly, but also quite risky. The 2008 ILO Regional Symposium at Dhaka has highlighted the problem experienced by women migrant workers in general, and argued for a gender sensitive management policy. The initiatives with respect to the ASEAN Declaration on the promotion and protection of the rights of migrant workers are presented as an instance. Ironically, none of the Asian countries has so far signed the ILO conventions on migrant workers and only Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have signed the UN Convention on Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), 1990 (Wickramasekara 2011). Though there is a worldwide demand for labour force from the Asian countries, the risks involved in the process are very high and alarming. The major challenges before the migrant community are debt, racism and xenophobia, high migration costs, corruption, deceit, fraudulent recruiting agencies, sexual and physical harassment, hazardous working conditions and non-payment of wages, poor medical facilities, absence of grievance redressal mechanism and basic labour rights. In this context it is highly imperative that both sending and receiving countries have to formulate policies and legislations to ensure equitable and vigorous working atmosphere. Due to the heavy outflow migration, few Asian countries like India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Philippines have formed separate ministries/departments to administer the overseas labour migration and diaspora. However, loopholes in the governance of migratory process have been publicly acknowledged by the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, as it noted that ‘the system that government had put in place to regulate and streamline the emigration process itself has resulted in corruption and in the formation of a nexus between government and officials and recruiting agencies leading to increasing exploitation of poor’ (Rajan et al. 2011). Except India and Nepal, all the other major migrant sending Asian countries have vibrant and comprehensive policy to deal with emigration and migrant workers (Datta 2005). Interestingly, Sri Lanka and Philippines have the most outstanding policies to monitor and safeguard the right of overseas migrant workers (Wickramasekara 2011). The legislations such as ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,’ Sri Lanka’s ‘National Labour Migration Policy,’ Pakistan’s ‘National Emigration Policy: Promoting Regular Emigration and Protecting Emigrants’ and the ‘Overseas Employment Policy’ of Bangladesh are some of the outstanding 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 7 migration policies enacted by the Asian countries to safeguard the overseas migrant workers. Ironically, India with a substantial overseas migrant population is yet to formulate a transparent and coherent migrant policy till date. Wickramasekara (2011) noted that ‘therefore origin countries in Asia are generally confronted with the dilemma between “promotion” and “protection”. Thus, the delicate balance between the promotion of foreign employment and the protection of national workers abroad is a continuous challenge.’ Though many origin countries have supported out-migration through institutional mechanisms, it did not result in protecting the rights and dignity of migrant workers. The strategic and economic implications of Asianization of migrant workers in GCC countries, particularly its impact in terms of migration and remittances are undoubtedly an important aspect in the context of the emerging Gulf–Asia strategic relations. The unprecedented and massive exodus of migrant workers to the oil-rich monarchies is surely a blessing in disguise for many of the Asian countries as remittances constitute the largest external financial flow. The Asia–Gulf migration corridor will emerge in the foreseeable future as a vital component in the Asia–Gulf strategic relations. For the past two decades, Asia has emerged as the largest trading partner of GCC countries accounting for more than 57% of its total trade (Tamimi 2013). GCC countries are the key global suppliers of hydrocarbons and they contribute around 42% and 24% of the world total oil and gas reserves respectively. The GCC countries, as part of their ‘Look East’ policy, are looking for non- western economies to invest their surplus funds and they are also keen on diversifying their petroleum-based economies. GCC exports more oil products to Asia than to Europe and both India and China are the largest buyers of GCC’s oil products. Gulf–Asia relations are multifaceted and multidimensional with strong emphasis on trade, human resources, agribusiness, economy, education and defence. Trade in crude oil forms the backbone of Gulf–Asia relations which is bound to continue in the future too. The cross-regional investments and engagements between both the regions particularly in the field of maritime security are yielding great results. The construction sector is one of the crucial areas in which both India and China’s private players have been engaged successfully (Calabrese 2009). The Gulf–Asian economic relations are multilayered, inclusive and diverse and have immense potential to expand (Calabrese 2009). The ruling establishment in GCC countries is very keen to diversify and invest their sovereign funds in both India and China, the emerging economies of Asia. The liberalization and uncomplicated investment policies have been formulated by both India and China in past two decades to tap the Foreign Direct Investment from GCC countries. The Gulf is an inseparable part of Asia’s foreign policy that serves mutual interests, confronts terrorism and extremism, as well as taps the investment potential. GCC–Asia relations have come a long way and diversified to accommodate new areas. The apolitical and passive approach of the Asian workers in the political sphere of the Gulf society and their hard-working attitude are highly attributed to the uninterrupted flow of migrant workers to GCC states. The social networking and the 8 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen informal links have added additional impetus to the Asia-Gulf migratory process, and flow of workers to the Gulf would continue to flourish in future. Though Gulf migration is both transitory and circulatory in nature the ongoing demand for expatriate workers from the GCC states has contributed to the existence of both second- and third-generation migrants in the region. However, the flow of migration from Asia still revolves around certain geographical locations, communities, families and it is yet to permeate horizontally in the sending societies. However, the lack of a unified voice and the non-sensitive attitudes of sending countries have intensified the socio-economic uncertainties of migrant workers. Though remittances from GCC countries constitute the major portion of the external financial flows for recipient countries, the migrant workers have not been developed as core component in the strategic discerning of sending governments. The bilateral agreements of labour rights and minimum wages are quite inadequate to safeguard the social insecurity and gross human rights violations in the host setting. Therefore, both sending and receiving countries should approach the multifaceted concerns of Asian migrants more holistically and sensitively. In addition, issues concerning women workers should be dealt with utmost care and policies should be formulated without curtailing the basic rights and mobility of migrant workers, particularly women migrant workers. This book intends to explore the multifaceted nuances of the ‘Asia-Gulf migratory corridor’ and also would try to unearth the future prospects and strategic implications. The book examines remittance behaviour, changing gender roles of immigrants, the social-spatial mobility, migrant policies, human rights, sense of belonging and the identity, perception and the interaction between nationals and non-nationals and so on. George Naufal and Ismail Genc explore three periods of Gulf migration and the reasons for the emergence of Gulf countries as a lucrative destination for labour migration. The authors also focus on the contemporary labour market in Gulf region and highlight the opportunities and challenges for the future. Naufal and Genc argue that the large oil wealth, unavailability of labour in the local population, high labour compensation and the political stability are some of the major reasons for the large inflow of migrants to the GCC countries. The authors observe shifting of the labour market in favour of Asian countries by the 1990s and also the large flow of remittances towards South Asia and Southeast Asia. The large influx of expatriates has highly altered the demographic composition of Gulf region and the ruling establishment is quite concerned about this alteration. The initiatives by the local governments in Gulf region to create local human capital or the local workforce have not produced substantial results. Hence the authors predict that the uninterrupted flow of foreign migrant workers is likely to continue regardless of the anti-immigrant measures in the Gulf region. The uncontrolled and voluminous influx of migrant workers has created continuous formulation of labour migrant policies in the Gulf countries. Zahra Babar provides a detailed sketch of the migrant policies and legislations devised by the oil monarchies and its implications. She argues that migration policies of the host countries have invariably deprived the basic human rights of migrant workers. In the 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 9

GCC, the policymaking and management of migration has evolved within each state’s national context, based on their national interests and needs. The Kafala and labour contracts have always been biased against the migrant’s rights and places the employer in an advantageous position. In spite of various migrant policies, she observes that the recruiting agencies have a key role in managing the lives of hapless migrant working class in the Gulf region. The author pointed that the ruling establishments are aware of the shortfalls of the Kafala system and have been systematically trying to devise mechanisms to rectify the loopholes, but it has not yielded anticipated results. Though the host countries have failed to formulate any equitable or reasonable policies, the participation of Gulf countries in Abu Dhabi dialogue and Colombo process underlines the acknowledgment of the migrant phenomenon by the ruling establishments. Finally, Zahra also highlights the valuable interventions of ILO and UN and other international agencies in recognizing and protecting the rights of migrant workers. Ilias Hussein’s article provides non-citizenry aspects of popular politics which was reflected in the general strikes among the South Asian migrant workers in Dubai in 2006. Hussein argues that the popular politics of migrant workers move around the notion of rights rather than around political power. This paper highlights the idea of popular politics among the migrant workers in the Gulf countries through a set of informal expressions. Popular politics among the expatriate workers is an outcome of a particular political context, which is informal in nature and does not take an institutional form. Hussein noted that these informal actions are within the context of ‘imagined politics’ that offers an escape from the political realities in the host country. Moreover, Hussein strongly asserts that the local population in the GCC countries perceives the existence of South Asians as a threat to their cultural heritage and identity. The socio-political dynamics of Kerala is directly transmitted among the expatriate workers in the Gulf as well and the popularity of new social movements among the migrant workers show the intrinsic connection between the developments in home and host societies. Hussein concludes that the development of popular politics in the Gulf revolves mainly around this sense of alienation. Bijulal’s article reflects on the implication of non-hegemonic form of human rights interventions to address human rights violations faced by low-skilled, underpaid expatriate Indian workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Bijulal argues that a rights-denying, growth-seeking development approach has emerged in governing the world of work. While authentic informal documentation of migrant workers elsewhere have led to changes in the policy framework, in the GCC countries, where the human rights violations have not been considered actively under the legal and political system, the conditions are extreme. Bijulal asserts that the expatriate/guest worker classification attached to the migrant workforce leads to a discriminatory legal status in terms of access and the right to judicial redressal. Theoretically, the requirement is to evolve a transnational rights approach in understanding and to resolve the problems and violations involved. Bijulal points that the migrant workers in the Gulf converses a condition of statelessness, similar to bondage and distressed labour. The migrant sending countries should evolve an intergov- 10 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen ernmental mechanism to manage the large flow and life of migrant workers and also to protect the dignity and rights of migrant workers. Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al Ghanim, Kiene le Trung and Laura Harkness attempt to explore the multifaceted migratory experiences of low-income workers in Qatar based on an extensive and in-depth survey. The authors argue that the low-income labour force in Qatar remains a temporary and transnationally cyclical labour force. The data revealed that the low-income migrants in Qatar had little or no previous work experience outside their home country and wished to return to their home countries after the completion of the contract. Contradictory to the established notions, none of the migrant workers is keen to settle for a long duration of time in the Gulf region (see also Bedi et al. 2016). The recruiting process has become highly commoditized, which makes the migration process quite costly, debt-trapped and complicated. The survey shows that vast majority of the workers failed to sign an authentic work contract prior to departure and relies on verbal assurances. The authors finally reiterate that the misinformation, deception and unrealistic expectations continue to play an unfathom- able role in the migratory process. The data reveal that the rough nature of the Kafala system and incessant passport confiscation continue to be a dreadful phenomenon amongst the lowest economic segment of the foreign workforce. Indonesia’s tie with the Gulf countries dates back to centuries, and Graeme Hugo vividly narrates the pattern, impact and future determinants of Indonesian migration to Gulf region. Hugo examines the contemporary socio-economic and demographic trends of Indonesia and argues that the slowdown in migration is due to the range of alternative opportunities. The informal migratory channels like social networks play significant role in the uninterrupted flow of migrants to the Gulf countries. Unlike other Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia was never involved directly in the recruiting process of Gulf migrants until the early 1980s. The startling Asian crisis in the late 1990s and lack of opportunities have steadfastly accelerated the flow of migrants to the Gulf region in an unprecedented manner. Hugo pointed that the dominance of women migrant workers was one of the notable characteristics of Indonesian–Gulf migration until the ban of female domestic workers going to Saudi Arabia by the Indonesian government. He argues that the remittances from the Gulf occupy a vital role in the development of remote rural areas and in the future, government is seeking strong policies to provide more protection to the migrant workers to the Gulf. Neil Ruiz, who was with the Brookings Institution at the time of conducting this research, examines how labour export became a well-established occurrence in the political and economic structure of Philippines’ polity. Philippine economy has increasingly depended on overseas migration with nearly 10% of the population working abroad, which has substantially reduced the unemployment among the educated youth. The unprecedented growth of labour migration and dependency on remittances has prompted the creation of vibrant emigrant institutions like Philippines Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to safeguard the migration industry. Neil argues that over a period of time Philippines government has evolved many policies that extended beyond the ambit of nation-state to safeguard 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 11 and manage the large-scale emigrants. The ‘Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995’ is considered to be a paradigm shift in the realm of international migrant policies particularly in protecting the rights of hapless migrant workers. He highlights that prior to the departure all the Filipino workers must undertake mandatory deployment process mainly the pre-departure orientation seminar (PDOS) and subscribe the Overseas Filipino Workers (OFW) identification cards. Moreover, the Dual Citizenship Act, 2002, allows natural-born Filipinos who have become foreign citizens to retain their Philippine citizenship and also encourages overseas Filipino population to participate in the Philippines’ political system. The Philippine case provided a picture of how emigrant institutions can give the state powers in areas that are normally considered a loss. The recent decision of the Government of Saudi Arabia to implement the Nitaqat Labour Law is a matter of great concern for the migrant-sending countries. The decision of Saudi Arabia that one out of every employee in business establishment will have to be a Saudi national, is leading to displacement and deportation of thousands of Asian migrant workers from the country. Zakir Hussein discusses the implications of Nitaqat on the South Asian countries and also the sustainability of Saudi Arabia’s present nationalization process. Hussein argues that the broad aim of Nitaqat was to showcase the government’s determination to reduce the existing and growing unemployment among the Saudi national labour force, and to force private sector to strictly adhere to the norms of Nitaqat. The statistics reveal that the private sector employs more than 90% of the total nine million expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Hussein observes that the failure of the past efforts of Saudization has been another important reason for implementing Nitaqat policy. Moreover, Nitaqat could be seen as a political strategy of the Saudi government to insulate itself from the severe impact of the Arab Spring and also to mitigate the socio-economic and political discontent. Hussein further argues that the triggering of nationalization policy will neutralize regional turbulence by reducing unemployment among the citizens. Moreover, it also aims at reducing dependence on expatriate workers and to ensure the precipitous participation of native workforce in the economy. Hussein opines that in the future higher wages in private sector will attract Saudis to seek employment in private enterprises. Bangladesh is one of the top 10 remittance recipient countries in the world. Interestingly, the country which started with modest migration of 6087 in 1976 has reached an astonishing figure of nearly four million at present. Marie Percot discusses precarious condition of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman based on an extensive field research in both Oman and Bangladesh (see also Kanchana and Rajan 2014). She discusses the complex reasons and context of the Bangladeshi local fishermen for opting hazardous and risky profession in Oman. Marie reiterates that majority of the fishermen migrants in Oman have failed miserably to succeed economically in spite of their long duration of stay in Oman and ironically most of them have ended up in jail or debt-trapped. The field survey explores the absence of authentic and appropriate work contract prior to the departure and the majority has opted to migrate on the basis of verbal assurances. Marie discusses the exploitative nature of the Kafala system and narrates the methodical trails of illegality in the visa 12 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen system which invariably traps the migrants in the unending web of miseries. Marie argues that the price of illegality is the constant fear of being caught by the police or landing in jail. The debt-ridden migrants are further ambushed in the interminable snares of debts and liabilities, and futilely stay back in Oman in the hope of repay- ing loans. Marie concludes that debt-ridden migrants and their families not only do not benefit from the efforts made to go abroad, but most often end up in enhancing poverty than reducing. The economic turmoil followed by partition, poverty, religious affiliation, geographical proximity and volatile political situation led to a large outflow of migrants from Pakistan to GCC countries. G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq and Nasir Iqbal focus on the uneven geographical pattern of migration to the Gulf from Pakistan and highlight the regional disparities in the utilization of remittance and also narrate its impact. Migration from Pakistan to GCC countries is not properly represented across the country as majority of the migrants to the Gulf are from central and north Punjab province followed by Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, North-West Frontier Province and to a lesser extent from South Punjab. The authors argue that the migration from poorer regions of country, notably, Sindh, Balochistan and South Punjab is very low, which invariably affects the development of these regions. The uninterrupted flow of the young generation to the Gulf has substantially reduced the unemployment and level of poverty in higher migration regions of Pakistan. However, the authors opine that the higher level of poverty and underdevelopment in the poorer districts consistently coincides with the low level of overseas migration. The article pointed the preference of return migrants to shift from wage employment to self-employment which invariably helps to create jobs for non-migrants as well in the higher migration districts. In addition, the article highlights the exemplary impact of migration in education and health sector largely in the migrant-dominated districts and alerts the lack of migration-promoting institutions in the poorer regions of the country. Finally, the article makes few policy recommendations to improve the skill-oriented overseas migration from the poorer regions and also for the stronger dissemination of information and opportunities. Bilesha Weeraratne examines the recent trends, current situation and future outlook of labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf countries. Sri Lanka, the island country of South Asia, was a victim of ethnic conflicts and violent bloodshed for nearly three decades. The recent acceleration of migration to the Gulf is attributed to the political turmoil in Sri Lanka. She pointed that remittance is the single largest foreign exchange-earning component in Sri Lanka and 55% of the remittances have been received from the Gulf countries. While Sri Lanka is the main source for women domestic workers, the recent trend shows an overall decline in the flow of women migrant workers to the Gulf region from the country. Moreover, the mandatory requirement of Family Background Report since 2013 has also reduced the flow of female migrant workers from Sri Lanka. Bilesha highlights harsh working conditions in the Gulf region and pointed the frequent complaints of abuse against women workers mainly in Saudi Arabia. The author is quite cautioned about the volatile situation in the West Asian region and urges the government to formulate contingency plan to meet the unexpected repercussions in the future. 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 13

Factors that prompted the Asian women to migrate to the Gulf region were mainly poverty, hunger, debt traps, oppressive social system, marital discords, alcoholism of the spouse and aspiration for the betterment of life. The women domestic workers are more likely to engage in precarious and perilous work while in the Gulf region (see also Kodoth 2015). Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph explore the hapless and uncertain lives of the Indian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia, based on a broader study of low- and semi-skilled Indian migrants in Saudi Arabia carried out by the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala. Rajan and Jolin argue that despite the ongoing interventions at the origin and receiving states, domestic services within private households of Saudi Arabia remain among the world’s most undocumented, unregulated and invisible forms of employment. At the same time, these flows represent an important livelihood option for South Asian women. The authors systematically examine the migrant women’s structural and systemic frameworks that restrict their lives. Rajan and Jolin highlight that the accessible complaint mechanisms, enforcement of standards, recruiting agencies and sustained international cooperation with sending countries could greatly enhance the safety and security of the of the overseas domestic workers in the Gulf region. Finally, the authors appeal for a gender-inclusive migration policy to solve the vulnerabilities of migrant women in the Gulf region. The discovery of oil in the Gulf countries and the subsequent oil boom in 1970s initiated a huge wave of immigration from Kerala. The transnational nature of the Gulf migrants has also significantly influenced the class structure, social hierarchy, worship patterns, family structure and above all, religion and religiosity in Kerala. Ginu Zacharia Oommen attempts to explore how migratory movements and remittances affected the religion and religious practices in Kerala, thus, leading to a transformation of the society by examining the trajectories of Christians of Kerala. Oommen argues that the flow of remittances on the one hand, contributed to larger investments in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across Kerala, largely funded by migrants and Gulf-based associations; and on the other, to the prevalence of new and ostentatious religious practices, doctrines and rituals. Oommen pointed that reorientation of the lives of Christian immigrants living in the host country (Gulf countries) and the newly created wealth brings dramatic change in the lives and practices of Christians back home (in Kerala). The article focuses on the ‘remittances inspired’ social transformation of Kerala Christians and argues that the changes in religiosity and religious practices were in turn influenced by migrant experiences based on their religious beliefs in their host countries. The study asserts that migration-centred religious reorientation of Kerala Christians is abetting commodification of religion, assertion of communal identity, proliferation of radical religious groups and the emergence of new forms of worship in the Kerala society. The Indo-West Asian relations date back to antiquity and there had been close political, economic and cultural ties between the two regions throughout history. There was a significant presence of Indian trading communities across the Persian Gulf and there are evidences of regular visits of Indian scholars in the courts of Fathmids (Egypt) and Abbasids of Baghdad (Jain 1990, 1991, 2003). Prakash C. Jain presents a historical and sociological profile of Indian trade diaspora in the 14 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen

West Asian region. Jain pointed that Indo–Gulf ties had flourished in the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century and during this period that a number of Indian merchant communities were firmly established throughout the Gulf/ Red Sea region. In the nineteenth century, Muscat hosted three distinct Indian business communities and Indian merchant communities also existed in Iran, Aden and the Trucial States. Jain noted that the Indians’ close proximity with the British had at times created problems and Indian merchants were viewed with suspicion and ‘as agents of British designs for Oman.’ Jain pointed that the age-old Hindu temples in Muscat reveal the historical and deep-rooted continuation of Indian merchant communities in the Gulf region (Allen 1981; Lorimer 1970; Mahajani 1960; Mangat 1969; Markovits 2000). What will happen to Asia–Gulf migration corridor in the future? During the global crisis, both migration and remittances were resilient in South Asia (Rajan 2012). The editors examine the future of Asian migration in the Gulf. At the time of writing this, the oil crisis has already set the minds of policy makers both in Asia and the Gulf. Will the same experience be repeated at least in the short run? We have to wait for the answer but the debate is on.

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Percot, M. (2006). Indian nurses in the Gulf: Two generations of female migration. South Asia Research, 26(1), 41–62. Percot, M., & Rajan, S. I. (2007). Female emigration from India: Case study of nurses. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(4), 318–325. Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2012). India migration report 2012: Global crisis, migration and remittances. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2016). India migration report 2016: Gulf migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I. (Ed.). (2017a). South Asian migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegration. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I. (2017b). South Asia-Gulf migration corridor: An introduction. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), South Asia migration report: Recruitment, remittances and reintegration (pp. 1–19). New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. 1. (2018). Demography of Gulf region (Chapter 3). In M. Chowdhury & S. I. Rajan (Eds), South Asian migration in the Gulf (pp. 35–59). Palgrave Macmillan. Rajan, S. I. (2019). The crisis of gulf migration. Chapter 48, pp.849-68 in Cecilia Menjivar. In M. Ruiz & I. Ness (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of migration crises. New York: Oxford University Press. Rajan, S. I, & Joseph, J. (2013). Adapting, adjusting and accommodating: Social costs of migration to Saudi Arabia (Chapter 9). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), Global financial crisis, migration and remittances: India Migration Report 2013 (pp. 139–53). New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2015). Migrant women at the discourse–policy nexus: Indian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia (Chapter 2). In S. I. Rajan (Ed), India migration report 2015: Gender and migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I, & Joseph, J. (2016). Gulf migration in times of regulation: Do migration controls and labour market restrictions in Saudi Arabia produces irregularity? (Chapter 12). In S I. Rajan (Ed.), India Migration report 2016: Gulf migration. New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2017). Migration (in) flux: Impact of legislation on patterns and quantum of irregular mobility between India and Saudi Arabia (Chapter 14). In P. Fargues & N. M. Shah (Eds.), Skilful survivals: Irregular migration to the Gulf (pp. 269–292). Cambridge: Gulf Research Centre. Rajan, S. I., & Narayana, D. (2012). The financial crisis in the Gulf and its impact on south Asian migration and remittances (Chapter 5). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2012: Global financial crisis, migration and remittances (p. 74). New Delhi: Routledge. Rajan, S. I., Varghese, V. J., & Jayakumar, M. S. (2011). Dreaming mobility and buying vulnerability: Overseas recruitment practices and its discontents in India. New Delhi: Routledge. Ratha, D., De, S., Plaza, S., Seshan, G., Yameogo, N. D., & Kim, E. J. (2018). Migration and remittances: Recent development and outlook (Migration and development brief 30). World Bank: Washington, DC. Secombe, I. J., & Lawless, R. I. (1986). Foreign workers dependence in the Gulf and the international oil companies 1910-50. International Migration Review, 20(3), 548–574. Sohan, F. (2011). South Asia migrant commission. In S. Kelegama et al. (Eds.), Migration, remittances and development in South Asia (pp. 3–10). New Delhi: Sage Publications. Srivastava, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2003). An overview of migration in India: Its impact and key issues. Paper presented at the regional conference on migration, development and pro-poor policy choices in Asia, jointly organised by DFID, UK and RMMRU, 22–24 June, Dhaka. Surk, B., & Abbotarch, S. (2009). India steps up pressure for minimum wages for its Workers in the Gulf, International Herald Tribune, Dubai, 27 March. Tamimi al Nasser. (2013, June). Asia- GCC relations: Growing interdependence. ISPI, No. 179. Thimothy, R., & Sasikumar, S. K. (2012). Migration of women workers from South Asia to the Gulf. Research Project, NOIDA, V V Giri National Labour Institute, pp. 84–88. Tinker, H. (1974). A new system of slavery: The export of Indian labour overseas, 1830–1920. London: Oxford University Press. 1 Asianization in the Gulf: A Fresh Outlook 17

Varghese, V. J., & Rajan, S. I. (2011). Governmentality, social stigma and quasi-citizenship: Gender negotiations of migrant women domestic workers from Kerala. Chapter 7. In S. I. Rajan & M. Percot (Eds.), Dynamics of Indian migration: Historical and current perspectives (pp. 224–250). New Delhi: Routledge. Wickramasekara, P. (2011). Labour migration in South Asia: A review of issues, policies and practices, international migration paper-no.108. Geneva: ILO. Williams, N., et al. (2010). Nepali migrants to the Gulf cooperation countries: Values, behaviors and plans. In M. Kamrava & Z. Babar (Eds.), Migrant labour in the Persian Gulf. New York: Colombia University Press. Winckler, O. (2010). Labour migration to the GCC states: Patterns, scale and policies. Washington, DC: Migration and the Gulf, The Middle East Institute. Zachariah, K. C., Prakash, B. A., & Rajan, S. I. (2004). Indian workers in UAE: Employment, Wages and Working Conditions. Economic and Political Weekly, XXXIX(22, May 29), 2227–2234. Zachariah, K. C., Rajan, S. I., & Joseph, J. (2014). Kerala emigration to Saudi Arabia: Prospects under the Nitaqat law (Chapter 16). In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), India migration report 2014: Diaspora and development (pp. 229–248). Routledge. Chapter 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future

George Naufal and Ismail Genc

Abstract In a relatively short period of time, the Gulf region has positioned itself as the third most important labour-importing region in the world. Embarking on ambitious development projects and taking advantage of regional factors, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries were able to provide a safe haven for millions of workers over the last four decades. The movement of workers to the region was so large that it altered the demographic structure of the GCC countries. Foreigners constitute on average more than half of the population in the region and in some countries, they are more than 80%. This chapter examines three periods of this migration phenomenon. First, we briefly summarize the history of labour migration to the region focusing on what made the Gulf a lucrative destination for many. Second, we provide an update on the current situation of the labour force in the region. Finally, in the third part, special attention is given to future opportunities and challenges that labour markets in the Gulf region are most likely to face.

Introduction

The Gulf region consists of six countries which make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the State of Kuwait, the Sultanate of Oman, the State of Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the State of the United Arab Emirates (UAE).1 The Council intends to unify the member coun-

1 For a macroeconomic analysis of the GDP of the GCC countries altogether, see Genc and Termos (2011).

G. Naufal (*) Public Policy Research Institute (PPRI), Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, USA IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, Germany I. Genc The American University of Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 19 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_2 20 G. Naufal and I. Genc tries on a range of political and economic issues of which labour, especially foreign labour forms the most prominent concern.2 This is because all of these countries rely on the foreign labour force to man their tremendously large economies compared to indigenous populations. Not only are the countries relatively new in the international political landscape, but they lack educated and competent talent to handle the challenges and opportunities that a natural resource economy presents.3 For example, other than Saudi Arabia, the remaining countries gained their independence in 1971 (Oman in 1964). The large oil wealth, the insufficient local population, relatively high labour compensation, and stable political environment in the GCC have come together to open the door to one of the largest movement of people in recent history. These are some of the most frequently cited reasons for migration in the literature.4 Although the reliance on the expatriates is less severe in Saudi Arabia and Oman with under 30% of the foreign labour force, the percentage of expatriates hovers around 90% in Qatar and 70% in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait. These figures have built up over time thanks to the conditions mentioned above. However, the stock of the expatriate labour force evolved over the course of history with the addition of people from different national backgrounds. The researchers have identified two main waves/strands of migration to the Gulf region, which can be stated in the form of the following hypotheses5: H1. Before 1990s, there were large numbers of Arabs in GCC. H2. Arabs used to come as families. The next section discusses migration trends to the GCC countries in more detail and specifically explores the two hypotheses listed above.

Trends in the Migration History of the GCC

We collect data on migration to the GCC from the World Bank’s World Databank covering Global Bilateral Migration for the period of 1960–2000 decade by decade. We concentrate our attention to two different regions of the world which send

2 For legal reasons, foreign labourers are called expatriates in the GCC as they are not allowed to immigrate to the countries they work. They are there at the status of ‘guest workers’ for which reasons a better term is ‘expatriates’ to convey the transitory nature of the work environment. Nevertheless, we will use all these concepts for academic purposes only as they are understood in the literature. 3 The GCC crude oil production as a share of the world’s production in 2010 is 21% (Naufal and Genc, 2012). 4 For a review of the literature on migration, including to the Gulf, over several decades refer to Todaro (1969), Harris and Todaro (1970), Bartel (1979), Stark (1984), Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair (1988), Russell (1989), Khalaf and AlKobaisi (1999), Posel (2002), Fargues (2004), de Haas (2007), Richards and Waterbury (2008), Adams (2009), Naufal and Termos (2009) and Naufal and Vargas-Silva (2010). 5 See Naufal and Genc (2012) and references therein for a detailed discussion on the issue. 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 21

Table 2.1 Annual growth rates of various expatriate groups at different time intervals (%) Female Male All Period Arabs Asians EB Arabs Asians EB Arabs Asians EB 60–90 13.68 14.18 9.90 14.21 13.53 8.60 14.06 13.73 9.01 90–2 K 1.05 2.23 1.28 1.23 2.32 2.52 1.18 2.29 2.09 Notes: Period refers to the beginning and the end of the years for which the growth rate is com- puted. The 60–90 is the 1960–1990 period while 90-2 K refers to the 1990–2000 period. EB stands for Eastern Bloc. Source: World Bank labourers to the GCC countries, that is, the Asian countries (Group 1), Arab countries (Group 2), and Eastern Bloc countries (Group 3). These are the most frequently cited labour-sending regions of the world to the Gulf.6 The first group (Group 1) includes Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The second group (Group 2) has Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Sudan, Yemen, Morocco, and West Bank and Gaza (as Palestine). And the third group (Group 3) includes Bulgaria, Kazakhstan, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. It goes without saying that this is not an exhaustive list of the countries which send labour to the region. For example, there are guest workers at many levels of business and academia from the Western countries, as well. Nevertheless, the list for which we gather data is pretty comprehensive.7 Immigrant population is firstly divided into groups of males and females, and secondly totalled by the country groupings indicated above. As we lack a frequently observed dataset, we resort to the growth rate, gX, formula for a variable of interest, say X, which allows non-consecutive observations yielding annual growth rates:

1 ts- æ Xt ö gX = ç ÷ -1, X è s ø where t and s are two dates (years), which are not necessarily consecutive but where t > s. The next subsections examine the empirical validity of the two hypotheses listed above as they are portrayed by literature on migration. H1. Before the 1990s, there were large numbers of Arabs in the GCC To test our first hypothesis, we compute the annual growth rate of various expatriate groups who were in the GCC at different time intervals based on the afore- mentioned formula. The results are in Table 2.1. Arabs and Asians were the major immigrants in the region due to historical, geographical, and cultural reasons. This trend continued well into 1990s supported by the economic windfall of the region

6 Genc and Naufal (2013). 7 Further, these countries are at the heart of the migration and development research agenda that Clemens (2013) passionately called the GCC countries to consider. 22 G. Naufal and I. Genc thanks to its natural resources, in particular, the oil and natural gas. This phenomenon is clearly observed in Table 2.1 as the growth of Asians and Arabs are almost identical prior to the 1990s. Eastern Bloc countries are latecomers to the labour markets in the Gulf as the table attests. Nevertheless, there is a dramatic shift in the source of labour in the GCC in the 1990–2000 period. Although all immigrant categories suffered heavy losses in the latter period, the decline in the Arab group is much more pronounced than in other groups. Naufal (2011) and Naufal and Genc (2013) also arrive at the same conclusion by studying the change of direction in the remittances in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Given that the GCC constitutes a significant portion of the remittance-sending countries in the MENA, the non-GCC countries are the major beneficiaries of the operation. The authors observe that there is a structural break in remittances around the 1990s, where the largest portion of remittances thereof leaves the region, presumably heading to Asia. This finding is anything but the anomaly as shown in the existing literature. For example, Choucri (1986), Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair (1988), and Kapiszewski (2004) have all made similar observations around this time frame. To reiterate our point, we display the immigration data in Figs. 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. We equate the initial observation in 1960 to 100 to discern the pattern of growth over time. In the female category of workers, Arabs make up the majority until the 1990s after which Asians take over. Asian female labour migrant population growth rate surpasses that of Arabs earlier than the 1990s. We conjecture that the earlier shift in the labour policy of the Gulf as stated in Choucri (1986) must be due to the impact of the change in the female population. Those who find the shift in later

7000

6000

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Asia EB Arab

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

Fig. 2.1 Immigration number – all females (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100) 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 23

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Asia EB Arab

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

Fig. 2.2 Immigration number – all males (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100)

7000 6000 5000 4000 3000 2000 1000 0 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Asia EB Arab

NB: 1960 value is equated to 100.

Fig. 2.3 Immigration number – all (NB: 1960 value is equated to 100) times are probably observing the behaviour of the male migrant population whose growth rate among Arabs decline after the 1990s as compared to Asians. This claim is further supported by the same behaviour discerned for the All migrant graph. The migration literature lists political and economic causes behind the shift in the employment policies of the GCC countries (Russell 1989, 1992). Those who prefer the political explanation cite the First Gulf War which divided GCC and non- GCC MENA countries in, broadly defined, opposite camps. After the war, GCC 24 G. Naufal and I. Genc countries retaliated with deporting citizens from countries which did not align with the position of the GCC. Those who advance economic explanations for the change in the labour policies cite the well-known financial portfolio theory which advocates the diversification of financial investment for the purposes of risk aversion (or at least risk minimization). By that logic, it is not wise to rely on a small number of countries to meet the labour needs of the region, which would mitigate the bargaining power of the Gulf in labour negotiations with labour-sending countries.8 On a side note, we would like to address a likely observation of readers regarding the tremendous decline in the growth rate of immigrants in the 1990–2000 period compared to before. There could be several explanations. One of them is that perhaps it took a long time for foreigners to come back to the GCC in the aftermath of the war in the Gulf in 1991. Or alternatively, we can say that the labour market in the region has attained a somewhat steady state given the more mature economic structure in the post-1990s period versus the earlier times. Therefore, the region now needs less growth in the labour force, especially foreign labour to satisfy the demand. All in all, one finds that the population growth rate of the region in the 1960–1990 period is 5.1%, whereas it is more than halved in the 1990–2000 period with 2.2%. Additional support for this observation comes from the UN migration data which find even negative net migration stock for the 1990–1995 and 1995–2000 periods. H2. Arabs used to come as families Our second hypothesis points to a typical family structure in the Middle East. Arab men do not travel abroad without the family, especially if the workplace is in the Middle East. Unfortunately, we do not have historical data on the family composition of the expatriates in the region. We proxy the family structure by comput- ing the differences between the number of male and female migrants in the GCC region for the two largest groups – Arabs and Asians. No one would deny the fact that males and females do not necessarily represent families, but given Arab culture, chances are the foreign Arab women in the region are with their families. Hence, as shown in Table 2.2, the male–female difference among the two largest expatriate groups in the Gulf seems to be always greater/larger on the Asian side. We can guardedly say that there is at least some evidence that Arabs came to the Gulf with their families.

Table 2.2 Difference between male and female expatriate populations in the GCC Year M–F Asia M–F Arab 1960 35,157 22,075 1970 110,761 109,966 1980 583,272 541,133 1990 1,360,446 1,289,434 2000 1,726,037 1,470,383 Source: World Bank

8 This could be thought as the typical case of a monopoly. 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 25

Incidentally, some researchers emphasize a particular characteristic of the Arab labour force, which is their tendency to stay on in the region rather than leave. This, then, counters the notion of the ‘guest worker’ idea that the policymakers in the region have in mind when importing foreign labour. Therefore, Asian workers are more readily willing to come to the Gulf for a transitory period and return home after their visa expires.9 While the previous analysis has provided new data evidence on migration trends in the GCC countries, the next section provides a brief summary of current demographics of foreign workers in the Gulf region.

Current Labour Force Profile

Since we discussed the migration trends in previous sections, we now would like to turn to the current picture in the region. Obviously, we need data on current statistics to conduct this analysis. However, one of the main difficulties in studying migration and labour markets in the Gulf region is the lack of data available. The GCC countries have not systematically collected and disseminated data on foreign workers residing in the region. With the advancement in the World Wide Web, several of the GCC countries have slowly started to share some information using their government institutions’ webpages.10 Although the data shared does not provide enough in-depth coverage of the foreign and local labour force and is difficult to match across the GCC countries, it is still considered a step in the right direction. Having said that, that step is still far from doing justice to the importance of the region in current international migration flows. To complement official efforts to disseminate existing migrant data, the Gulf Research Center (GRC) and the Migration Policy Centre (MPC) at the European University Institute (EUI) have just launched the Gulf Labour Markets and Migration (GLMM) initiative to collect, organize, clean and disseminate data on Gulf labour markets.11 The following section uses data from both official and GLMM sources in order to shed light on the demographics of the foreign population in the Gulf. Figure 2.4 shows the latest estimates of the share of foreigners from the total population in each GCC country in 2013 for Oman, Kuwait and KSA. In the case of Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, the number reflects 2010 values. Foreigners constitute on average, 62% of the population in the Gulf region with the highest numbers

9 This should not, however, give the wrong impression that everybody duly obeys the law. See, inter alia, Kapiszewski (2001), Shah (2008) and Shaham (2008). 10 Some of these initiatives include Open Data Platform in Bahrain, government online in Kuwait, Omanuna initiative in Oman, Qatar census in Qatar, Saudi in KSA, and the National Bureau of Statistics in the UAE. 11 The Gulf Labour Markets, Migration, and Population (GLMM) website can be seen at www. gulfmigration.edu, at this moment it only includes data on Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and some aggregate statistics on the region. 26 G. Naufal and I. Genc

100 85.7 88.5 80 68.5

60 54 43.7 40 32.4 Percentage 20

0 BahrainKuwait Oman QatarKSA UAE

Fig. 2.4 Share of population as foreigners. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014)

600 569

466

n 500 420 400 293 287 300 209 200 101 93 102 99 102 100

Men per 100 Wome 100

0 BahrainKuwait Oman QatarKSA UAE

Men per 100 Women Non-Nationals Men per 100 Women Nationals

Fig. 2.5 Nationals and non-nationals sex ratio. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014) found in the UAE, Qatar and Kuwait. If one puts these figures in terms of absolute numbers, then the Gulf region is home to more than 30 million migrants. An interesting aspect of migration to the Gulf region is its distinct gender bias towards males. Most of the low-skilled jobs are manned by South Asian men while female migration from neighbouring Arab countries is more difficult due to traditional and cultural reasons. Fig. 2.5 highlights this gender imbalance by showing a ratio of more than four foreign men to one foreign woman in half of the GCC countries (Oman, Qatar, and the UAE).12 The smallest migrant gender disproportion is found in Kuwait but the number of men is still twice that of women. The gender

12 The data for Bahrain and the UAE reflect 2010 statistics, Kuwait and Qatar reflect 2012 and Oman and Saudi Arabia’s numbers are for 2013. 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 27 distribution of migrant workers is consistent with the shift in the source of labour from Arab towards South Asian workers. The skewed distribution of migrant population by gender is also mirrored in the age distribution with more than 80% of foreigners being of working age (between 15 and 64) (Fig. 2.6). Interestingly, the share of the population above 65 is very similar across nationality, reflecting a very young local population. While Figs. 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 have focused on the demographic side of the total population in the GCC countries, Fig. 2.7 presents the distribution of the employed population. In all GCC countries, working foreigners outweigh the number of working locals, with large differences in all of them (foreigners constitute at least 70% of the working population) except in Saudi Arabia. Out of the employed population in Qatar and the UAE, more than 90% are foreigners. All the previous statistics and figures divide the population into nationals versus non-nationals. Historically, most GCC countries did not publicly provide in-depth breakdowns between nationals, using instead a more generic distribution for national security concerns. We use Kuwait as a case study due to the availability of data that include the distribution of foreigners by ethnicity. Figure 2.8 presents the share of Arabs, Asians, Westerners and Africans out of the total foreign population. This means that 55% of the foreign population comes from Asian countries (mainly South Asian countries) while 41% comes from neighbouring Arab countries. In terms of gender, Asian females constitute 17% of the foreign population while Arab females make up 14%. Males constitute 66% of the foreign population. Finally, out of the total foreign population, 48% is the share of employed Asians while the figure is 20% for Arab workers. This suggests that 29% of foreigners in

90 84 80

70 60 60

40 37 Percentage 30

20 15

10 4 1 0 0-14 15-64 65+ Age Nationals Non-Nationals

Fig. 2.6 Age distribution by nationality: GCC countries. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014) 28 G. Naufal and I. Genc

100 93.8 92.9 90 82.8 77.4 80 74.8 70 60 56.5 50 43.5 40 Percentage 30 25.2 22.6 17.2 20 7.1 10 6.2 0 BahrainKuwait Oman QatarKSA UAE

Employed Non-Nationals Employed Nationals

Fig. 2.7 Distribution of employed population by nationality. (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014)

60% 55%

50% 48% 41% 40% Arabs 30% Asians 20% Westerners 20% 17% 14% Africans

10% 3% 1% 1% 2% 1% 2% 0% PopulationFemale Employed

Fig. 2.8 Share out of total foreign population in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014)

2012 were not employed. Although not reported in Fig. 2.9, out of the foreign Arab population, 49.7% were employed in 2012, while for Asians workers, this number was 86.8%. The large discrepancy between the percentages of Arabs versus Asians working is due to fundamental differences in migration patterns, skill levels and cultural distinctions; all documented in the Gulf migration literature. We next look at the unemployment and labour force participation rates in Kuwait for 2012. Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show that unemployment rates for both Kuwaitis and foreigners are very similar and vary between 1.2% and 3.6%. Female unemploy- 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 29

3.6% 3.4%

2.6%

1.2%

Unemployment Rate for 2012

Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female

Fig. 2.9 Unemployment rate in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014)

84%

52%

36% 30%

Labor Force Participation Rate for 2012

Kuwaiti Male Kuwait Female Foreigner Male Foreigner Female

Fig. 2.10 Labour force participation rate in Kuwait (2012). (Source: GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014) ment rates are higher. The picture is very different when one considers the labour force participation rates. Male foreigners have the highest participation rates (84%) while both male and female Kuwaitis have 36 and 30% rates of participation. Even foreign female participation rate is higher than 50%. It would be interesting to further examine the foreign female participation rate by Arab and Asian ethnicity, but unfortunately, the data are not available. 30 G. Naufal and I. Genc

Table 2.3 Occupation by nationality and gender – Kuwait 2012 Kuwaitis Arabs Asians Male Female Male Female Male Female Senior officials and managers Professionals 12% 26% 12% 29% Technicians 15% 15% Clerks 32% 52% 11% 22% Service/sale workers 31% 19% 14% 24% 82% Agriculture workers Craft workers 10% Production supervisors 12% 27% Regular work professionals 20% 22% Not stated 21% Notes: Authors’ calculations using data from the GLMM database – demographic and economic database 2014

We then focus on the occupation of the main three components of the population: Kuwaitis, Arabs and Asians. The last two constitute more than 95% of the foreign population living in Kuwait in 2012. Table 2.3 highlights the distribution of workers by occupation. We only show the percentage if it is at least 10% to avoid cluttering the table and to allow the reader to clearly distinguish the difference in occupations by nationality and gender. For instance, 32% of Kuwaiti males work as clerks. What is clear from Table 2.3 is the concentration of Kuwaitis in the upper-level occupations such as professionals, technicians and clerks while Arab and Asian males are found in the production sectors. Arab females work as professionals, service work or are not stated while Asian females are mainly found in service and sales work. While the above brief analysis has presented some data on the current population in the GCC and labour in Kuwait, one has to acknowledge the limitations of the data and therefore analysis.13 What is available on the foreign (and local) labour force in the Gulf region is scarce at best and mainly descriptive. The data cannot be used to draw comparisons across different GCC countries since they either differ by definition, collection, year or availability (Naufal, 2014). Further, the data are not good enough to examine correlations and causal effects to draw policy implications. Despite the growing efforts in creating, organizing and disseminating data on migration in the Gulf, we are only at the beginning and there is still a lot left to do in order to be able to study the determinants and effects of migration and remittances in the GCC countries. Ultimately, these studies would bring policy recommendations to better deal with the challenges and opportunities that the region is facing. This is the main topic of the next section.

13 For a more thorough analysis of the latest available data on the Gulf region, refer to Naufal (2014). 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 31

Challenges and Opportunities of the GCC Countries

The GCC countries embarked on ambitious development plans two decades ago, updating their infrastructure and building financial and tourist sectors. These projects have made the region one of the top labour-receiving regions in the world, second only to traditional and historical destinations (North America and Europe). These development projects, while significant and very ambitious, do not even come close to the ones the region is about to embark on in order to host the Dubai Expo 2020 and the World Cup 2022 in Qatar. With such tremendous expected growth, one has to wonder about future challenges and opportunities in its labour markets that the region might be facing. We first identify the current and future concerns for local governments, that is, the development of the local human capital. With cheap and abundant foreign workers available, the incentives for local labour to invest in its own human capital are weak. In fact, the GCC countries at this point can afford to be very meticulous and choosy in terms of whom to bring into the region, because they face an almost hori- zontal supply of labour. The Gulf region can import labour from all non-GCC Arab neighbouring countries that are suffering from political instabilities (Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria and Lebanon). In addition, other countries that are not struggling with instability are facing dire economic conditions. Difficult economic situations are being faced not only by neighbouring Arab countries but also by South and East Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, the Philippines and Nepal) and African countries. Even Western countries have struggled with the latest economic and financial crisis (Spain, Greece, Portugal among others) giving the GCC countries a huge potential pool of skilled western workers, not just unskilled workers. In fact, one can estimate the size of the potential pool of foreign workers to exceed two billion people. Even though the GCC countries have an unlimited supply of labour at their disposal, local governments have invested heavily in human capital development through education, training and initiatives to employ local labour in the private sector. So far, these initiatives have not brought the needed results (Naufal, 2014). In certain sectors such as health, the need for increased participation from the local labour market is very high. Due to the nature of migration to the region, most foreigners are temporary workers and therefore turnover is high. This brings additional costs and has long-term consequences on areas like business reputation and quality of service, to name a few. Another concern comes in the form of demographic changes in the local community. The GCC countries are experiencing declining levels of fertility in two decades that Western countries achieved over centuries. Late marriages and increasing levels of female education have contributed to this drop in fertility (Al Awad and Chartouni, 2010). With the exception of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, the GCC countries have a total population of fewer than four million. The local population is actually less than one million for each of the UAE, Qatar and Bahrain and is less than 32 G. Naufal and I. Genc two million for each Oman and Kuwait.14 Facing a growing economy with declining fertility levels and an already small local population means that the Gulf region will always be depending on a large population of foreign workers. Given that expectation, better data on migration are crucial to not only study the effects of mobility and remittances on local Gulf economies, but also to contribute to the international debate on the relationship between migration and development. A recent study by Seshan and Yang (2014) is a fine example of desperately needed empirical evidence from the region. Another consequence of demographic trends in the GCC countries is the changing role of women in the labour market. More local females are entering labour markets in the region. The increasing labour force participation rate of females in the Gulf does not only have implications on the fertility rate, but also on other social aspects such as the marriage market. More local females are not only marrying at a later age, but are also are marrying foreigners. This is contributing to a growing trend of local men choosing foreign women as wives. The GCC countries in the near future will face a growing generation of mixed locals, triggering a re-examination of national identity and belonging in the context of a population that is no longer as ethnically and culturally monolithic. In fact, the UAE government has not shied away from discouraging locals from marrying foreigners.15 While demographic concerns will bring serious challenges to the local populations in the region, other economic worries are also looming on the horizon. Most of the economic growth and improved standards of living are reflections of the large supply of natural resources that the Gulf region enjoys, specifically hydrocarbon resources. Gulf countries have always relied heavily on the oil sector and while they have spent significant efforts to diversify the local economy, the region is still far from oil independence. What could potentially bring more competition to the GCC countries is the emergence of shale oil in several countries, specifically large economies such as the US (Sultan, 2013). The implications of shale oil and shale gas extractions on the Gulf region are still not clear and may remain that way in the near future. However, the GCC countries have to take into consideration possible long- term repercussions on their budgets and the ability to maintain support for the local population.

Conclusions

In a relatively short period of time, the Gulf region has positioned itself as the third most important labour importing region in the world. By embarking on ambitious development projects and taking advantage of regional factors, the GCC countries were able to provide a safe haven for millions of workers over the last four decades.

14 Authors’ calculations using GLMM database. 15 See Al Sadafy (2012) and Sherif (2012). 2 Labour Migration in the Gulf Cooperation Council: Past, Present and Future 33

Large natural reserves endowment, significant and continuous political instability in the region, and weak economic performance of neighbouring economies all contributed to the status of the Gulf region as a labour destination hub. The movement of workers to the region was so large that it altered the demographic structure of the GCC countries. Foreigners constitute on average more than half of the population in the region and in some countries, they are more than 80%. The average male-to- female ratio is 3.7 across the Gulf and in some instances reaches as high as 5.6 (Oman). This article examines three periods of this migration phenomenon. Firstly, we briefly summarize the history of labour migration to the region focusing on what made the Gulf a desirable destination for many. Secondly, we provide an update on the current situation of the labour force in the region focusing on Kuwait due to data availability. Finally, in the third part, special attention is given to future opportunities and challenges that labour markets in the Gulf region are most likely to face. What we find is that the region was an attractive migration destination for non-GCC Arabs for historical and cultural reasons until the early 1990s and they used to come with their families. However, the trend has changed thereafter. South Asians have become the most preferred source of foreign labour in the region, especially in the low-skilled labour market. While the source countries of labour differ over time, the reason for moving and the type of the move to the Gulf has not. People move to the region because of job opportunities and wage differential. The move is almost always temporary. The GCC countries do not offer an opportunity to permanently settle (citizenship). This historical trend seems to have taken root in the region in terms of changing dynamics of the population and more importantly, in the labour force. Not only is the concentration of non-locals increasing in the region, but it is also changing demographic and lifestyle tastes among the locals. Governments’ efforts to induce local labour force growth and participation have not yielded the desired outcome so far and face tremendous challenges in the future. On the one hand, foreign workers are simply cheaper to hire. They are more readily available, more flexible (in terms of geographical location), and are more experienced than their local counterparts. That said, every private business owner would have clear preference towards foreign workers versus local labour. On the other hand, working in the private sector is not appealing to the local labour force. The intensive job requirements (working hours and often work-related stress), and lack of job security relative to the public sector, coupled with generous welfare system have directed the interest of the local workforce towards the public sector. The key struggle of the GCC governments is to alter the incentives of both, that is, private business owners and the local labour force. The Gulf region offers a fantastic opportunity to study migration. On one hand, it hosts large numbers of foreign workers and is growing economically, but on the other hand, it is constrained by a small local population. These three factors lead to a potentially increasing demand for workers. In other terms, the opportunity is here to stay. Unfortunately, most of the current research is descriptive and therefore highly speculative and the need for policy-oriented academic studies should remain a priority not only for local governments but also for international organizations as well. 34 G. Naufal and I. Genc

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Zahra R. Babar

Abstract In light of mounting international criticism over the living and working conditions for many migrant workers in the region, over the past few years, many of the Gulf Cooperation Council governments have initiated reforms in relation to their mechanisms for governing regional migration. Critical interventions have been initiated to address problems that have arisen as a result of the kafala or worker sponsorship system, as well as to mitigate shortfalls within regional labour law. This chapter will examine the evolution of Gulf labour migration policies, contentious areas which have come under criticism by proponents of migrant workers’ rights, and current reforms that are underway.

Introduction

With the discovery of oil in the middle of the last century, the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates began a process of development which changed these countries at multiple levels. In addition to the transformation of the region’s physical landscape, manifesting in the mushrooming of sky-high cities of steel and glass, the other emphatic reminder of what petrodollars have brought to the Persian Gulf is glimpsed in the region’s distinctive demography. From about the 1960s onwards, the arrival of immense hydrocarbon wealth rapidly fuelled expansive development projects across the region, resulting in a demand for manpower that far outstripped what was indig- enously available. With their small populations and low levels of citizen participation in the workforce, the GCC states began to import large numbers of foreign workers to meet their domestic labour needs (Kamrawa and Babar 2012). Over the course of the past five decades, there has been little indication that this reliance on an externally sourced labour supply is diminishing, and currently about 43% of the

Z. R. Babar (*) Centre for International and Regional Studies (CIRS), Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 37 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_3 38 Z. R. Babar population across the Gulf is made up of foreign workers (Fargues 2011; Edwards 2011). While determining the exact number of migrants at any given time is not simple, given both fluctuations in the number of arrivals and departures and the lack of easily accessible and transparent data, recent estimates indicate that there are about 20 million migrants present in the region (Lori 2012). According to the United Nations, all six of the GCC countries are listed amongst the top 20 nations in the world boasting on the highest proportion of migrants to nationals (Razgallah 2008). Foreign labour comprises a majority of five out of six of the GCC countries national workforces, and only in Saudi Arabia very recently have nationals begun to outnumber foreigners in the labour market (Lori 2012). Foreigners dominate the labour force, as well as constitute an absolute majority of the populations of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) (Lori 2012). The demographic breakdown in some of these countries is quite unique – in Qatar and the UAE, for example, over 90% of the total population and over 95% of the workforce is foreign – a condition which is not replicated anywhere else in the world. Foreign workers in the Gulf come from a variety of countries, but in recent times the largest cohorts originate from the African and Asian continents (Kapiszewski 2006). While the majority of this foreign labour force consists of ‘unskilled’ or ‘low skilled’ workers, typically engaged in low-paying positions in sectors such as construction, skilled migrants also populate a host of professional positions, particularly in the private sector.1 Thus, oil wealth has turned this small, historically sparsely populated, arid corner of the world into the third largest hub of global migration. This region has also increasingly become a site of contestation for what are in fact globalized debates over migration. Much of the international discussion on Gulf migration fixates on regional specificities, and highlights the particularly egre- gious nature of local practices of migration management. Yet, these debates that draw attention to the lack of basic rights’ protections given to Gulf migrants, ignore the fact that migration policy and practice in the region is certainly informed by global migration policymaking and practices. Criticism of the Gulf migration system is equally relevant if applied in many other countries of destination. At the most fundamental level, the implementation of national immigration policies by all states often inherently clashes with the basic human rights of migrants. In recent years, of the multiple sites of contestation on issues of migration – for example, in the southwest of the United States, in Europe or in Australia’s territorial waters – the Persian Gulf region has emerged as an area of intense study and scrutiny by scholars and human rights’ advocates. The Gulf region, in fact, is receiving an inordinate deal of scrutiny insofar as the rights of migrants are concerned, and much of this scathing attention appears to be divorced from global migration policies and practices.

1 In Qatar, for example, where foreigners far outnumber locals in the labour market, non-nationals account for the bulk of jobs across most sectors. But in spite of this, 72% of the foreign population is engaged in lower-income categories or ‘elementary occupations’. The average ‘foreign worker’ in Qatar is male and works in the construction sector. For more on this please see: Fancoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar”, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Research Note, No. 8, 2014. 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 39

Gulf Migration Policy and Practice

In the GCC, the policymaking and management of migration has evolved within each state’s national context, based on their national interests and needs. As is the case in most other nation-states, each Gulf country maintains strict control over who has entry rights to its sovereign territory, and who can reside and participate in the domestic labour market. While migration policies have developed as per national requirements, the GCC policies reflect a degree of similarity due to comparable labour market conditions. Internal discussions of labour migration amongst GCC nationals and policymakers also reflect similar concerns. It needs to be stated that GCC policymakers have repeatedly asserted that viewing foreign workers based in the region as ‘migrants’ is in fact incorrect (Lori 2012). The GCC is not a destination for traditional migration leading to settlement, and region-wide, the system is structured to only grant foreign workers opportunities for temporary cycles of employment (Kamrava and Babar 2012). A common concern that frames much of the national debates on migration centres on the demographic ‘imbalance’ in the Gulf, with foreigners outnumbering locals in several of GCC states. Another common feature to GCC states’ migration deliberations is that this reliance on a foreign workforce is framed as a temporary condition, despite the fact that in reality the phenomenon has persisted for decades now and shows no indication of disappear- ing. Additionally, all six GCC countries stress their commitment to establishing a citizen workforce, and suggest that once they are successful in this goal they will no longer have an unhealthy dependency on foreign workers. It is within the context of these common themes or anxieties that Gulf migration policies have developed. For several decades, in all six GCC states the migrant labour population has been governed through the kafala, or worker-sponsorship system. This system was historically rooted in traditional Bedouin practices of tribe members standing as personal guarantors for visitors, and evolved out of local Gulf customs of hospitality and protection offered to strangers (Longva 1997). In its present-day rendition, the kafala creates a direct relationship between each labour migrant and his citizen- sponsor or kafeel, and binds each migrant worker to a particular job for a specified period of time. The kafeel maintains control over a worker’s mobility for the duration of his or her stay in the Gulf, and a migrant’s visa status is thus tied to his continued employment with his sponsor. Workers cannot change their place of employment nor exit the country without obtaining prior approval from their sponsor. In addition, the kafala is grounded by the contractual agreements which are signed between foreign workers and their sponsors. These contracts, particularly for the lower skill categories of migrants, are usually drawn up for a 2-year period of employment and residency, but may be renewed or extended. Upon the completion of the contracted period of employment, sponsors are responsible for ensuring that workers are immediately repatriated to their country of origin. Both the kafala and the labour contracts are structured so as to ensure that migrants’ stay in the Gulf States is of a temporary nature, and tied to their employment statues. There are 40 Z. R. Babar almost no pathways to obtaining permanent settlement or citizenship. Migrants may choose to engage in repeated cycles of employment within one or more of the GCC states, interspersed with periods of repatriation home. Several of the Gulf States have instituted reforms to their citizenship laws to allow for processes of naturalization. However, the multiple and onerous conditions which must be met by appli- cants means that hardly any migrants qualify for naturalization (Babar 2014). The kafala and the labour contracts they are girded in have placed employers in an advantageous position vis-à-vis their sponsored employees at multiple levels. This system that privileges the needs and interests of citizen-employers in essence also provides them with a central role in managing regional migration (Gardner 2010). While the states and their apparatus of course administer much of this migration system, citizen-employers and private sector actors such as labour recruiters and manpower agencies have increasingly assumed a central role in governing the lives of migrants to the Gulf. Gulf States have often asserted that national labour laws provide the necessary corrective and are there to check bad practices. Employers are bound to comply with the labour laws that have been crafted to ensure that workers’ basic rights are protected. In each of the GCC states, labour law provides for a host of specific protections for foreign migrants and curtails the potential workers’ exploitation. Laws established include: stipulations that licenced recruiters are not allowed to receive any recruitment fees or costs from the migrant workers; that contracts should include details of the work that is to be undertaken and need to be signed in advance of the worker’s departure from his home state; that the wages that are to be paid for the same work are agreed to in the contract, and are to be paid in a timely manner. Regional labour laws also provide elaborate regulations on maximum working hours, paid leave, annual leave, sick leave, health and safety rights, and compensation for injuries sustained in the work place. The highly unequal power dynamics between worker and citizen-employer through the kafala arrangements, and the inability for labour laws to adequately protect migrants’ rights have been raised by international organizations. There have been frequent calls for Gulf States to dismantle the kafala, and for regional government to accept a greater degree of responsibility in ensuring that their labour law is complied with.

Reforming the Gulf Migration System

Increasingly, GCC governments have acknowledged the limitations of the kafala, and over the past few years are showing a more vigorous engagement with addressing shortfalls in migration governance. Several of the GCC states have initiated reforms to tackle the most problematic elements of the kafala, but at this stage we have not seen a complete dismantling of the sponsorship system. In 2009, the government of Bahrain omitted one of the more restrictive practices of the sponsorship system, by enacting a ‘mobility law’ allowing migrants to change employers 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 41 without requiring the approval or consent of their sponsors. In 2011, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates followed suit, and also allowed foreign workers to change places of employment without needing their sponsor’s permission or losing their visa status. In 2010, Kuwait also changed its labour law to establish minimum wages for foreign workers and domestic workers. In May 2014 Qatar announced a series of labour law reforms, which include a renaming of the kafala, the removal of restrictions on changing places of employment (in certain cases) and the establishment of a ‘Grievances Council’ as a space of mediation for foreign workers who are facing challenges from employers wishing to deny them the exit permits necessary to leave the country. Further to these, broader reforms to regional labour law and new programmes targeting some of the most frequently occurring infringements of workers’ rights have either been implemented or are in the process of being executed in several of the GCC states. The UAE pioneered a system for electronic validation and registration of workers contracts (Al-Ramahi 2014; Barakat 2014). The purpose of this is to bypass deceitful recruiters and Gulf employers who often misinform potential migrants in the sending countries about their job conditions. The electronic registration of workers contracts necessitates that UAE employers provide information of a worker’s contract through an online application which is vetted by the Ministry of Labour. This application process ensures a full disclosure of all the details of the work contract, including, information on wages, the sort of work that is to be undertaken, working hours and benefits. The Ministry of Labour in the UAE processes the application, and then passes the contract on directly to the responsible recruitment agency in the sending country. The agency in the sending country is required to obtain the worker’s attested consent, and a duly designated government agency also accesses the record for the purpose of reviewing the terms of employment prior to granting emigration clearance. Once these steps have been followed, the Ministry of Labour will register the legally binding work contract and issue a work permit. While the UAE was the first GCC to develop system, other GCC countries have committed to adopt similar electronic mechanisms for ensuring that contracts are transparent and open. The Wage Protection System (WPS) is another recent programme adopted by several of the GCC states, that is meant to ensure that workers are receiving their full wages and in a timely manner.2 Initially launched in 2009 by the Ministry of Labour in the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have also adopted the system. Starting in December 2016, Qatar has also introduced a WPS, requiring employers to transfer salaries directly to employee bank accounts within 7 days of their due date to avoid fines; the requirement of online bank transfers is to ensure employer accountability as well as simplify both monitoring and employee complaints (Zahra 2016). The WPS creates a link between the citizen-employer, the country’s central bank

2 For more on this, please see the United Arab Emirates Ministry Of Labor website: UAE, Ministry of Labor, Wage Protection System Guideline, 2009. http://www.mol.gov.ae/newMolGateway/english/wpsGuidelineEng.aspx#3 42 Z. R. Babar and the Ministry of Labour to ensure timely and accurate payment of workers. Additional areas of reform under discussion by the GCC are as follows: • Adopting of a unified draft contract for domestic workers. • Establishing processes for direct recruitment and bypassing recruiting agencies. • Creating stronger mechanisms for dispute settlement between workers and employers. • Enhancing the capacity of the Ministries of Labour by increasing the number of labour inspectors; • Banning mid-day outdoor work during the summer months. • Increasing the financial penalties for the illegal confiscation of workers’ passports (Financial Times 2014; Al Jazeera 2014; Ministry of Interior 2015).3 Given that contract-related and salary issues are consistently the areas where migrant workers most frequently express dissatisfaction, such measures to address specific shortfalls are indeed positive. Developing standards and policies which serve to improve workers’ rights and also strengthen the role of the state in enforc- ing labour law are good steps forward. However, none of these reform processes are willing to actually consider a systematic reconfiguration of the status of migrant workers within the host state. Past experience with reform in the GCC has largely occurred as a result of domestic pressures and rather than external ones (Ehteshami and Wright 2007; Rathmell and Schulze 2000). While over the past 5 years, almost all the GCC states have taken measures to reform and realign the kafala, there continues to be strong domestic incentives to maintain some sort of system which care- fully controls migrants’ entry into and participation in the local labour markets. For example, despite severe international criticism and pressure to address shortfalls in the labour migration system, the pace of change in Qatar has remained very slow. While there seems to be acceptance that reform is inevitable, the state is grappling with how to implement labour reforms without creating instability in the domestic political milieu. Beginning in early 2014, key Qatari government figures made public comments on proposed reforms to the kafala system, but these statements were made cautiously and indicated that the state was reluctant to challenge the status quo head-on (Booth et al. 2014; Bollinger 2014; Qatar Today 2014). Most recently, Qatar provided revisions to its labour law in December 2015 which were fully implanted by December 2016. Amongst other reforms, Law No. 21 of 2015, the ‘Law on the Regulation of Expatriates’ Right to Entry, Exit and Residence’ has withdrawn (the somewhat politicized) the use of the word kafala from labour law when identifying the designated employer/sponsor of a foreign worker (Zahra 2016). Instead being identified as a ‘sponsor’, the employer is now to be referred to

3 “Gulf States to reform contracts of domestic workers,” Financial Times, November 2014, http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82c820aa-756b-11e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3POyJ3hyL; “Qatar promises to reform ‘kafala’ labour law,” November 16, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/qatar-promises-reform-kafala-labour-law-2014111661154969555.html; “Qatar Announces Wide-Ranging Labour Market Reforms,” May 14, 2015, http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/ english/news/2014/05/14/32204.html 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 43 as the ‘recruiter’ of a foreign worker. This change in official terminology demonstrates the Qatari government’s keen sensitivity to the fact that the kafala system as whole has gained global notoriety. Law No. 21 modifies the previously existing full control that employer-sponsors maintained over the mobility of their employees. While previously foreign workers were unable to exit Qatar without the explicit permission of their employers, under the new reforms foreigners may now contest their employers’ denial of an exit permit at the newly established Committee on Expatriates’ Exit Grievances if they feel that the denial is unfairly grounded.4 Additionally, the law against employers’ rights to hold their employee passports (a common complaint made by many foreign workers) has been strengthened, with greater penalties and higher fines now established. These tighter laws also apply to cases where employers have provided written evidence to suggest that they have been holding passports because they are requested to do so by their workers (De Bel-Air 2015a). With respect to the transfer of sponsorship, the new law provides some amendments to previous legislation, primarily granting the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Interior with a greater role in the process. While previously foreign workers could not change their place of employment without the explicit permission of their employer-sponsor (in the form of a No Objection Certificate), Law 21 allows foreign workers to change their jobs via directly submitting a request to do so to the Ministry of Labour, either after completing their fully contracted period of employment (if employed on a limited duration contract), or else after completing 5 years of employment (on an open-ended contract). The reforms also allows for the Ministry to intervene and allow a foreign worker to change his or her job in cases where they have faced abuse and exploitation or if the transfer is ‘deemed to be in the public interest’ (Al Jazeera 2016). In addition to Law No. 21, the Qatari government has over the past several years adopted new measures to address some of the concerns around the treatment and care of foreign workers which have received international attention. In 2014 the Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Decision No. (18) for the year 2014 was adopted specifically to address issues relating to the substandard living conditions of lower-income foreign workers. This decree has mandated that employers are bound to provide housing to their workers that is set to certain national standards. Decision No. 18 of 2014 provides detailed stipulations regarding what is considered adequate in terms of workers’ housing. Employers must provide basic furnishings such as a bed, mattress, air-conditioner, refrigerator, gas oven and a full water closet with a water heater for their workers. The decree also sets minimum standards for cleanliness and sanitation as well as safety and health standards for all workers’ accommodations. In addition, it is mandated that there must be an adequate number qualified resident nurses or doctors on site, if the number of workers in the accommodations exceeds 100. The decree does not allow employers to deduct any money from workers’ wages for housing equipment and maintenance. Another common feature of recent GCC labour reforms is the effort to increase the number of Gulf nationals in the labour force, with particular focus on expanding

4 Article 7, Qatari Law No. 21 of 2015. 44 Z. R. Babar the hiring of citizen workers in the private sector. There is a variance amongst different GCC states in terms of how vigorously they are pursuing their plans to ‘nationalize’ their labour forces, based on internal pressures and the differing domestic contexts of the six states. The Saudi Arabian government, which faces a legitimate and grave challenge in providing public employment to its burgeoning youth population, has shown the greatest commitment amongst the GCC states in terms of prioritizing the expansion of citizens’ employment. This is clearly demonstrated through the 2011 ‘Nitaqat’ reforms adopted in Saudi Arabia, with the specific aim of expanding ‘Saudization’ of the labour force and gradually replacing foreign workers in the Saudi private sector (De Bel-Air 2015a). The programme is largely driven by concerns about Saudi dependency on foreign labour combined with increasing demographical pressures as a result of high Saudi population growth rates and anticipated increases in the coming years as a result of women’s growing participation in the work force (De Bel-Air 2015a). The underlying concern of the regime is that unless employment and economic concerns of the citizen population are met, social and political stability could be eroded through a growth in public anti-government sentiments (De Bel-Air 2015a). The Nitaqat both incentivizes and rewards Saudi employers who are able to increase their number of Saudi employees through a system of financial subsidies and tax cuts (De Bel-Air 2015a). Companies in Saudi Arabia are measured and scored based on the percentage of their employees who are Saudi citizens, and tiered along categories that are colour-coded from red to platinum, with red desig- nating a company’s poor performance in terms of attracting/hiring/retaining citizen- employees and platinum companies demonstrating that they are top performers who are successfully hiring locals. The Nitaqat provides additional rewards to companies successfully applying affirmative action programmes that succeed in employing women, nationals with disabilities and other designated groups of citizens (De Bel-Air 2015b). Any company failing to meet the green status faces punitive measures, including fines for foreign workers deemed to be ‘redundant’ and limited ability to issue work visas for new foreign hires (De Bel-Air 2015b). From the perspective of the Saudi government, the initial results of the Nitaqat programme seemed promising, as between September 2011 and the end of 2013, the number of Saudi workers had increased by 1,063,669, about 430,000 (40% of which were women (De Bel-Air 2015b). Of this employment increase, however, around 40% of new job creations were in the public sector and while the rest were in private sector positions, during the same time frame, 67% of private sector jobs still went to non-nationals (De Bel-Air 2015b). The programme therefore largely failed to deliver the increase in Saudi-held private sector jobs. In response to these shortcomings, the Saudi government launched the ‘balanced Nitaqat’ in 2016 to address the failures of the original programme to deliver the desired reductions in unemployment among Saudi citizens, especially women. The new, revised programme hopes to increase Saudi women’s labour market participation from 22% to 30% as part of the Saudi Vision 2030 (Halligan 2016). The Nitaqat measures have, however, been met with apprehension from Saudi Arabia’s foreign workforce, especially those who are already working in the coun- 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 45 try and whose career prospects are at risk under Nitaqat efforts to increase Saudi citizens’ employment figures. Exacerbated by the economic downturn brought on by low oil prices, 2016 saw reports of thousands of Indian workers left without a job, sufficient funds to buy food and the necessary exit permits to leave Saudi Arabia (Venkataramakrishnan 2017). The situation worsened to the point that the Indian External Affairs Minister got involved and vowed to help the unemployed Indian citizens unable to leave Saudi Arabia (Balachandran 2017). These issues have been partially attributed to the government’s Nitaqat reforms, which have encouraged employers to replace foreign labourer with Saudi nationals, leading to layoffs of foreign workers. There are concerns that the situation of the Indian diaspora in Saudi Arabia may become increasingly precarious now that the ‘balanced Nitaqat’ programme is set to expand the number of sectors included in the Saudization project (Kasim 2016). There is clearly a gender imbalance when it comes to Gulf migrants, and existing data clearly indicate that the vast majority of migrants present in the region are male.5 However, there is a discernible pattern that shows that female migration has also increased over the past few years (Manseau 2017). Migrating to the GCC is appealing to women as much as it is to men, as it offers them the opportunity to increase income generation to support their families and their communities, to potentially expand their skill-sets and broaden their horizons. While women migrate to the Gulf for a variety of employment opportunities, and increasingly we see that skilled and highly skilled foreign women are entering the labour markets, most of the existing research on female migrants to the region looks at female domestic workers. It is extremely difficult to assess the total number of female domestic workers in the GCC, and there are wide variations between official data released by the states estimates and put forward by international organizations. The estimates vary from suggesting that there are about one million to upwards of three million domestic workers currently working in the GCC (Fernandez 2014). Previous research demonstrates that female migrants to the GCC are even more vulnerable to violation of their rights, particularly if they are engaged in the domestic work sector (Fernandez 2014). Women are more likely to be exploited at pre- departure points in their states of origin, by recruiters who actively misinform them about wages and job conditions awaiting them in the Gulf (Philipose 2012; Nicola Piper 2003). Women tend to also not have the same economic resources as men do to cover the costs of formal migration, so may be more likely to migrate through irregular and thus unsafe channels. Upon arrival in the Gulf to take up occupation, women will find that as domestic workers they are excluded from protections afforded through national labour law. In essence what this means is that domestic workers are left completely to the mercy of their employer-sponsors and have little legal recourse should they face situations of exploitation and abuse. The only binding document that these women have in hand are the work contracts signed between

5 For example, the Qatar Statistics Authority released date in 2014 which indicated that only 17.6% of the foreign population in Qatar is female. Women migrants also make up only 11.4% of the foreign labour force. 46 Z. R. Babar themselves and their employers. These contracts which are meant to specify responsibilities, duties and obligations of both parties are frequently problematic. Contracts often do not contain correct information on wages, maximum work hours, weekly days off, paid annual leave and other benefits. The GCC states have come under increasing pressure to address the outstanding problems relating to protection for domestic workers, and over the course of the past 2 years there have been region- wide discussions on reforming the regulation of the domestic work sector. There is little indication that the reform process will extend national labour law to cover the domestic work sector, rather efforts have been focused on strengthening workers’ contracts and enacting piecemeal legislation to address some of the areas of contention. For example, in 2013 Saudi Arabia introduced new regulations which stipulate mandatory daily rest hours for domestic workers, weekly holidays and paid leave on a bi-annual basis (Fernandez 2014).

GCC Regional Migration Platforms

Regional and international frameworks for managing migration are becoming a preferential route for states that wish to engage on the issue of migration and migrants’ rights, but are not willing to consider accession to the Migrant Workers Convention. While the GCC states have not to date formally harmonized policies for managing migration, they have begun to take a more proactive role in addressing the issue as a bloc. In 2005, GCC countries, as observers, attended the annual meeting held under the Colombo Process. The Colombo Process brings together a number of migrant-sending countries of Asia, and is primarily concerned with the protection of overseas workers. Building on this involvement, and spearheaded by the United Arab Emirates, all six of the GCC states in 2008 launched the Abu Dhabi Dialogue. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue is a regional consultative process on labour migration to the Gulf. It serves to bring labour sending countries from South and Southeast Asia together with labour receiving countries of the Gulf, with the aim of addressing the concerns of both. The Abu Dhabi Dialogue, however, evolved primarily as a response to increasing international sounds of alarm around migration management in the Gulf, as opposed to out of strictly GCC-based concerns. Efforts such as the Abu Dhabi Dialogue underlie the fact that in the GCC there is recognition that improvements in migration governance are necessary. The region continues to bring in scores of migrant workers on an annual basis, and these flows do not appear to be diminishing any time soon. Given the increasing scrutiny being given to the issue of migrants’ rights at the international level, maintaining their domestic requirements without drawing censure requires the regional leadership to show dexterity and skill. Importing non-national workers to meet domestic labour needs brings with it benefits as well as costs. Non-nationals can be brought in quickly – and in most cases cheaply – to meet labour needs as and when required on a project-by-project basis. They can also be easily released and sent back to their countries of origin when no longer needed. There is, however, considerable discus- 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 47 sion amongst both state actors and local citizens about the potential costs of hosting such large numbers of non-nationals for long periods of time. These costs are not merely economic in nature, but are also potentially social and cultural as well. The massive influx of foreigners from all over the world is often seen as a threat to national heritage and cultural values, and even a latent threat to political stability.

International Migrants’ Protections

From about the middle of the last century, international workers’ rights organizations began to acknowledge that unless migrant workers were included under national labour law, the climate for promoting the rights of workers in societies in general would be eroded. The International Labour Organization (ILO) pioneered the initial efforts towards including migrants’ rights within global discussions on workers’ rights. The preamble to the ILO’s 1919 constitution highlights this commitment by explicitly mentioning the organization’s interest in serving workers who are ‘employed in countries other than their own’ (ILO 1919). Over the decades, several international labour standards and migrants’ rights conventions have been put forward by the ILO, and adopted by a host of countries. In addition to the eight fundamental rights provided in the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundament Principles and Rights at Work, specific instruments such as those which provide for wage protections, occupational health and safety, employment policies, labour inspections, social security provisions and domestic workers’ rights comprise the host of ILO conventions which address the needs of labour migrants. There are four migrant-specific instruments that have developed under the ILO’s aegis: (1) the 1949 Migration for Employment Convention, (2) the 1949 Migration for Employment Recommendation, (3) the 1975 Migrant Workers Convention and (4) the 1975 Migrant Workers Recommendation. These ILO migrant-specific instruments are complemented by a host of United Nations’ international human rights mechanisms, which are applicable to all people regardless of their nationality. Of the United Nations’ core human rights protocols, the one most relevant to migrant workers is the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1990 and entered into force in 2003. The United Nations convention broadens the discussion of migrants’ protections beyond the realm of securing their labour rights, already established through the ILO instruments, and strives to establish more holistic set of norms regarding migrants’ inclusion in national human rights agendas. While the ILO conventions focus primarily on securing migrants’ economic rights and protections within their working environments, the UN convention stipulates the more general needs of securing adequate social and cultural rights for migrants, and promotes the expansion of earlier views which conceived of labour migrants as purely economic agents. Increasingly, migrants’ rights agendas have built on this recognition and seek to address their social and cultural exclusion within host states. Within these global debates the remaining area 48 Z. R. Babar of rights that migrants continue to still be excluded from are political rights; political rights are normatively accepted as been reserved for citizens alone. The evolution of special protections for migrants within the domain of international human rights discussions has not been a seamless one. There continues to be a persistent ambiguity within international norm-setting in terms of determining how and exactly to what extent the needs and interests of non-citizen populations are to be accommodated by sovereign states. In an environment of increasing sur- veillance and hyper scrutiny of interstate travel, and where a latent threat to states’ interests comes head-to-head with the cross-border mobility rights of individuals – state sovereignty seems to be trumping over multiple areas of migration governance. The ILO instruments, the UN convention and subsequent multilateral frameworks for migration all recognize that migration is a transnational phenomenon, impacting millions of individual migrants, countries of origin, countries of transit and countries of residence and seek to establish and harmonize basic principles around the treatment of migrant workers that take into account the needs and interests of different stakeholders. The UN convention highlights the particular situation of vulnerability to which migrant workers and their family members are exposed.6 Migrants’ designation as a category of persons of vulnerability arises in the first place from the fact that they are not in their country of citizenship, and thus do not enjoy the usual rights and protections that citizens are accorded. The convention is embedded in the understanding that the rights of migrants have been insufficiently addressed by states, and thus there is a need for supranational agreement to establish protections that are specific to migrants’ particular conditions. In themselves, conventions are to a degree structurally deficient, as they do not come with enforcement mechanisms, and it is largely left up to the signatory states to ensure their compliance. In terms of drafting national laws, states are left to their own devices, but with the expectation that having signed on to a specific convention, they will attempt to not undermine the spirit of the convention through the ways in which they implement it domestically. Parties to a United Nations convention are also provided with a loophole, in that they can become signatories to a convention while also inserting a ‘reservation’ or caveat which exempts them from certain commitments upheld in the agreement. A number of Arab states have on occasions inserted reservations upon becoming signatory to various human rights conventions, reserving their rights to not abide by the clauses or articles which are at variance with Islamic law or practice. Regardless of the limited enforcement capacity of international conventions within sovereign states’ domestic domain, becoming a signatory to universally recognized agreements such as UN conventions is a significant step forward in declar- ing a state’s intentions and obligations. Becoming party to such conventions does

6 For further elaboration of this point, please see: “The International Convention on Migrant Workers and its Committee”, Fact Sheet No. 24 (Rev.1), Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, (New York and Geneva: 2005), http://www.ohchr.org/ Documents/Publications/FactSheet24rev.1en.pdf 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 49 impose upon the signatory state the commitment to recognize certain inalienable human rights. Several of the GCC states have taken active steps to become signatory to a host of UN agreements, including amongst them: the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination; the Convention on Ending Discrimination Against Women; the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, none of the GCC states are signatories to any of the specific migrant conventions. Becoming party to international agreements on human rights may be problematic for many countries. These conventions propose a principle of universality, where it is accepted by all signatories that certain rights or protections are granted on a basis which supersedes the state’s sovereignty or authority. Many states dispute the principle of universality, and argue that this principle does not allow for the exceptional circumstances that some states may face, nor does it allow for differences in religious, social and cultural practices. The GCC states have grap- pled with how to appropriately incorporate or adopt many universal principles on human rights, and how to negotiate accession to the various United Nations conventions on rights and protections. It needs to be stated, however, that the Gulf region is not exceptional in its reluctance to adopt the Convention on Migrant Workers. Of the 47 countries that are party to the convention, almost all are labour-sending nations rather than host states. None of the Western migrant-receiving states, including the traditional immigration hubs of North America, Australia and most of Europe have signed on to the Convention, and as such, the treaty is not in effect in those parts of the world most heavily populated by labour migrants (The International Convention on Migrant Workers and its Committee 2005). The primary challenge to its ratification lies in the perception by most states that the Convention would encroach too deeply on their sovereign rights. It is an interesting fact that out of the eight core international human rights conventions, the Convention on Migrants Workers is the one that has been so strongly resisted in the West, and is often referred to as the ‘orphaned’ Convention. It is clearly the lack of political will in the domestic milieu of labour- receiving states that remains the primary obstacle towards the treaty’s ratification. This reluctance demonstrates that expanding the rights of migrants is universally a politicized issue. The contradiction seems to lie in how different stakeholders con- ceive of migrant workers’ rights in the first place. For the United Nations and assorted human rights organizations, migrants’ rights are largely conceived of as being essentially in the same basket as internationally recognized and accepted human rights. These rights arise from our common understanding that all human beings have a basic dignity which is to be protected above other considerations and regardless of their country of citizenship. However, from the perspective of labour- receiving states, migrants’ rights are considered to be directly linked to national immigration policy rather than to human rights platforms. As such, creating or broadening commitment to migrants’ rights impinges on the state’s ability to imple- 50 Z. R. Babar ment policy decisions that best serve their national interest in terms of effectively managing migration.7 Growing levels of globalization coupled with increasing labour shortages in certain segments of the labour market in the developed world have led to a situation where many temporary jobs are being filled by labour migrants. As a result, for labour-receiving states throughout the world there is increasingly an interest in limiting the rights of temporary migrants to those rights that are most closely associated with their economic and employment status. There is a convergence in the development of immigration policies adapted to suit contemporary circumstances, with a growing set of restrictions being imposed on migrant workers’ access to important social and cultural rights, such as the access to education and skill training, health services, family reunification and social security. These restrictions are largely justi- fied on the basis of the temporary nature of these workers’ residence in the host country. Governments have been searching for migration policies that suit their national interests, and significant attention has been directed at those programmes and policy frameworks that support the flow of temporary labour migrants rather than permanent ones. These policies address national labour shortages by importing workers for short periods of time, but remove the need for integration, marginalize pathways to citizenship and reinforce the concept of migrants existing in a host state solely as economic agents. Global ways in which labour migration are currently been discussed and thought of, such as the migration and development discourse promoted heavily by many international bodies, or the circular migration framework, continue to demonstrate that there is an evident disconnection between the promotion of universal human rights and the management of migrants’ rights. When viewed through the migration and development lens, migrants are conceived of largely as autonomous economic agents who, through the experience of entering foreign labour markets, are able to generate incomes for themselves, contribute to the development of their host country and through financial and social remittances also contribute to the development of their home states. Labour migration is thus conceived of as a structural necessity of the world we live in, and the role of states is to effectively and seamlessly manage migration flows to ensure that there are ‘win–win–win’ developmental outcomes for individual migrants, host states and countries of origin. Circular migration, which is currently being heavily promoted in Europe and whose language we are seeing used more frequently by GCC governments, also adopts a similar positivist posture of linking migration with successful economic outcomes for states and migrants alike. Positing labour migrants as independent economic actors who choose to take up temporary periods of employment overseas in order to meet certain economic goals before a return home, endows them with far greater agency and choice than they in reality have. Framing current patterns of temporary migration within the circular migration framework alleviate the anxieties of labour-sending states that have not managed to establish healthy economic opportunities to keep their citizens at home,

7 For elaboration on this argument please see Martin Ruhs, The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration, (Princeton University Press: 2014). 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 51 while it also assuages the disquiet of host countries who wish to fill their labour market shortages through inexpensive pools of foreign labour, but without necessarily accommodating the needs or interests of these foreign workers beyond those linked with their employment conditions. Both the migration and development and circular migration frameworks conceptually reinforce the notion that according migrants limited rights which are associated with their ‘temporary-ness’ and linkage to their labour status is normatively acceptable.

Conclusion

Almost all the labour reforms already established, underway, or under discussion in the GCC are largely tied to a common perception that it is migrants’ working conditions, relationships with their employers and structural status as ‘workers’ that is impinged upon through a lack of adequate state protections. This replicates the prevailing global discourse on migrant workers, which tend to view migrants’ vulnerabilities as located principally in their status as purely economic agents, and who are in need of economic protections and deserving of a protection of their associated economic rights. The broader human rights doctrine which conceives of migrants as human beings with agency, in need of broader social and cultural fulfilment, deserving of personal respect and human dignity, appears to lack salience not only at the regional level of the Gulf, but also at the international level. Labour migration is thus accepted as a practical necessity of the development demands of the region’s political economies, a positive contributor to the development needs of the labour sending states as well as a natural element of the global economic structure. While migration policy in the Gulf has developed in response to specific national and region-wide challenges, it is also informed by broader, global shifts in the discourse on migration. Throughout the world, peoples’ mobility across borders is more and more scrutinized and embedded in issues of state sovereignty and governance. Borders are being made less permeable, channels for permanent settlement for new migrants are being narrowed, pathways to inclusion and participation pared down and criterion for citizenship made more stringent. Beyond the impersonal machinery of the state clamping down on potential migrants, it is also the politiciza- tion of immigration debates and public sentiment in the developed world that indirectly supports these policies. Indeed, throughout the developed world, recent trends indicate public opinion moving sharply against migration. Much of this hinges on anxieties of governments and citizenry around the presence of new streams of migrants who could become eligible for rights of full citizenship and place added pressures on the socio-economic and political capacity of the state. Framing migration as a threat to the development of politically and economically viable societies is a global phenomenon that is leading to a global climate of migration fear. Invariably, regardless of a particular national context, enforcement of immigration laws encroaches on the human rights of migrants. There are multiple sites of contestation around the world, where states’ upholding of their immigration laws and the 52 Z. R. Babar human rights of migrants are coming head to head. Be it in North America, Europe, Australia or in the Persian Gulf the overarching sources of tension remain largely the same. What is increasingly apparent to researchers studying the patterns of Gulf migration, is that the foreign labour force and its experience is more varied than suggested.8 Despite the rigid mechanisms and policies in place which are meant to ensure that the pool of foreign workers is constantly rotating, over time, in many parts of the Gulf, migrants are staying for longer and longer periods. Recent research has suggested that in addition to the longer duration of stay for Gulf migrants, family uni- fication is also on the rise, as is the phenomena of mixed marriages between Gulf citizens and foreigners (De Bel-Air 2014). While these trends may cause palpita- tions in the breast of many a Gulf national, what they also demonstrate is that in this age of global migration, despite the intentions of states, controlling peoples’ mobility, their length of stay and the ways in which they impact a host nation is not so easily possible.

References

Al Jazeera. (2014, November 16). Qatar promises to reform ‘kafala’ labour law. http:// www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/11/qatar-promises-reform-kafala-labour- law-2014111661154969555.html Al Jazeera News Team. (2016, December 14). Qatar introduces changes to labour law. Al Jazeera English. Al-Ramahi, N. J. (2014, July 12). UAE Ministry of Labour: e-contracts will be issued within 48 hours. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/employment/ uae-ministry-of-labour-e-contracts-will-be-issued-within-48-hours-1.1358714 Babar, Z. (2014). The cost of belonging: Citizenship construction in the State of Qatar. The Middle East Journal, 68(3), 2014. Balachandran, M. (2017). Narendra Modi government scrambles to help 10,000 stranded and hun- gry Indians in Saudi Arabia. Quartz India, August 1, 2016. Accessed 2 Feb 2017. Barakat, N. (2014, July 5). UAE labour cards and contracts go electronic. Gulf News. http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/general/uae-labour-cards-and-contracts-go-electronic-1.1356047 Bollinger, S. (2014, May 15). Qatar announces changes to labor law. Al Jazeera Online. http://www.aljazeera.com/humanrights/2014/05/qatar-announces-changes-labour-system-2014513115014474205.html Booth, R., Black, I., & Gibson, O. (2014, Wednesday May 14). Qatar promises to reform labour laws after outcry over world cup slaves. The Guardian. De Bel-Air, F. (2014). Demography, migration, and labour market in Qatar (Gulf labour markets and migration research note, No. 8). De Bel-Air, F. (2015a). The legal framework of the sponsorship system in the Gulf cooperation council countries: A comparative examination. (Gulf labour markets and migration explanatory note, no. 10). De Bel-Air, F. (2015b). The socio-economic background and stakes of ‘Saudizing’ the workforce in Saudi Arabia: The Nitaqat policy. (Gulf labour market and migration explanatory note, no. 3).

8 For example, please see: Fancoise De Bel-Air, “Demography, Migration, and Labour Market in Qatar”, Gulf Labour Markets and Migration Research Note, No. 8, 2014. 3 Understanding Labour Migration Policies in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries 53

Edwards, M-B. (2011). Labour immigration and labour patterns in the GCC countries: National Patterns and trends (Research Paper No.15, Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalisation in the Gulf States). London: London School of Economics. Ehteshami, A., & Wright, S. (2007). Political change in Arab oil monarchies: From liberalization to enfranchisement. International Affairs, 83, 913. Fargues, P. (2011). Immigration without inclusion: Non-nationals in nation-building in the Gulf states. Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, 20(3–4), 273–292. Fernandez, B. (2014). Essential yet invisible: Migrant domestic workers in the GCC (Gulf labor markets and migration research note no. 4/2–14). Financial Times. (2014, November). Gulf States to reform contracts of domestic workers. http:// www.ft.com/cms/s/0/82c820aa-756b-11e4-a1a9-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3POyJ3hyL Gardner, A. (2010). City of strangers: Gulf migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain. New York: Cornell University Press. Halligan, N. (2016, June 12). Saudi Arabia plans new ‘Balanced’ Saudisation scheme. Arabian Business. Accessed 2 Feb 2017. International Labor Organisation Constitution. (1919). Preamble. Kamrava, M., & Babar, Z. (Eds.). (2012). Migrant Labor in the Persian Gulf. New York: Columbia University Press. Kapiszewski, A. (2006). Arab versus Asian migrant workers in the GCC countries. United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration and Development in the Arab Region. Beirut: United Nations, Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Kasim, S. (2016, April 26). Indians expected to be hit as Nitaqat expanding to more sectors. Mathrubhumi English. Accessed 2 Feb 2017. Longva, A. N. (1997). Walls built on sand: Migration, exclusion, and Society in Kuwait. Boulder: Westview. Lori, N. (2012). Temporary workers or permanent migrants? The Kafala system and contestations over residency in the Arab Gulf States. Note d’Ifri. Paris: Center for Migrations and Citizenship. Manseau, G. S. (2017). Contractual solutions for migrant Labourers: The case of domestic Workers in the Middle East. Human Rights Law Commentary, 3, 25–47. Ministry of Interior. (2015, May 14). Qatar announces wide-ranging labour market reforms. http://www.moi.gov.qa/site/english/news/2014/05/14/32204.html Philipose, P. (2012, June 11). Global: Gulf journeys: Securing the lives of South Asia’s women migrants. Women’s Feature Service. Piper, N. (2003). Feminization of labor migration as violence against women international, regional, and local nongovernmental organization responses in Asia. Violence Against Women, 9(6), 723–745. Qatar Today. (2015). An announcement of labor reforms that are still to come. June 6, 2014. http:// www.qatartodayonline.com/an-announcement-of-an-announcement-of-labour-reforms-that- are-still-to-come/ Qatari Law No. 21. (2015). Rathmell, A., & Schulze, K. (2000). Political reform in the Gulf: The case of Qatar. Middle East Studies, 36(4), 47. Razgallah, B. (2008, June). The macroeconomics of workers’ remittances in GCC countries. (Economic Research Forum Working Paper No. 410). The International Convention on Migrant Workers and its Committee. (2005). Fact sheet no. 24 (rev.1). New York/Geneva: Office of The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Venkataramakrishnan, R. (2017, January 3). The 10,000 starving Workers in Saudi will not be the last shocking story from the Gulf. Scroll.in. Accessed 2 Feb 2017. Zahra, M. (2016). Qatar’s legal framework of migration (Gulf labour market and migration explanatory note, no. 2). Chapter 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non- Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf

M. H. Ilias

Abstract This chapter examines how the idea of popular politics has flourished among a marginalized section of expatriate labourers in the Gulf society through a set of subtle informal expressions. Taking cues from the experience of Indian labourers in the Gulf, this chapter seeks to provide accounts of non-citizenry aspects of popular politics apparently manifested in the recent labour strikes. As it happens all over the region, popular politics of expatriate labourers revolves around the ideas and practices of rights rather than around ideas of political power which in the case of Gulf States is inaccessible for immigrant population. The ways in which values and practices of dissent and democracy become entrenched in popular politics and thereby in the political imagination of non-citizen labourers in a subtle manner are examined by analysing the experience of protest movements of South Asian labourers.

Introduction

One way or another, politics of non-citizen labourers has become the subject of intense debate in the Gulf today. The recent South Asian labour unrest in the UAE and Bahrain appears to be an indicator of politics of that sort gaining momentum in the region. What is more significant is the way in which these protests were

Some parts of this work have already been published in two earlier works of the author. See M. H. Ilias, Malayalee Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Re-conceptualizing ‘Political’, Contextualizing the Modern Middle Eastern Diaspora, Anthony Gorman & Sossie Kasbarian (ed.), Edinburgh University Press, 2015, pp. 303–337 & M.H. Ilias, South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the Arab Gulf Region, Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.4, No. 1& 2, 2011, 74–102

M. H. Ilias (*) India Arab Cultural Centre, Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 55 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_4 56 M. H. Ilias organized; it was previously unimaginable in a place where labour unions remain illegal and protests of any sort can end in termination and immediate deportation.1 However, unlike the region-wide Arab Spring-induced popular protests, in the specific contexts of Arab Gulf, the politics of immigrant labourers has been not necessarily about equal political rights as the aim of protestors not in any way is the recognition as full citizens by the state. Fully aware of peculiar social and political status, the migrant workers seek no citizenship rights and what figures in their demands are economic rights and a dignified life in the hosting countries. The political imagination in such cases is limited by the matters of legality and legal protection of labour.2 The protests demonstrations staged by them were not necessarily against the rulers or the system of ruling, but in most cases point to the inherent anomalies in the system which cannot be solved through the means of political reforms. These uprisings, therefore, did not make much of political resonance in the host society’s politics nor did gain any recognition by the other groups engaged in popular politics of various sorts. Often pitched against the employment providers, the state cannot fully comprehend the political content of such demonstrations. The limited recognition of the rights of foreign labourers and the narrowly defined non-citizen rights often become more profound with the government effort to institutionalize it with complex sponsorship legislation, unequal compensation structure, selective nationalization of workforce and controlled access to opportunity for non-nationals. The recent cases of labour unrest have brought into focus the inherent but not-so- open hostile relationships between the state institutions and non-citizen workers. The popular politics among Indian migrants based mainly on the discriminatory practices takes various forms: informal gathering with political undertones on specific occasions and not-so-open demonstrations and campaigns operating clandestinely. Strangely enough, most of these political expressions are not formal or apparent and, therefore, do not invite unfriendly and intolerant reactions from host states. The labour unrest of 2006 in Dubai in which Indian migrants had a greater role to play was the only exception, wherein the authorities noticed the content and assertiveness of expatriate politics. Massive open demonstrations raised many eyebrows and the UAE government became concerned by the demonstrations’ popularity. This was particularly significant when it happened in a country where all sorts of political organizations remain illegal and evidence of political associations of any sort can end up in imprisonment or immediate deportation for activists. This work examines how the idea of popular politics is flourished among a marginalized section of expatriate labourers in the Gulf society through a set of subtle informal expressions. Taking cues from the experience of Indian labourers in the Gulf, this chapter seeks to provide accounts of non-citizenry aspects of popular

1 M. H. Ilias, South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the Arab Gulf Region, Indian Journal of Politics and International Relations, Vol.4, No. 1& 2, 2011, 74–102. 2 Ahamed Kanna, ‘A Politics of Non-recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in the Year of Uprising’, Interface: A Journal for and About Social Movements, vol. 4(1), 146–164, May 2012. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 57 politics apparently manifested in the recent labour strikes. As it happens all over the region, popular politics of expatriate labourers revolves around the ideas and practices of rights rather than around political power which in the case of Gulf States is inaccessible for immigrant population. The ways in which values and practices of dissent and democracy become entrenched in popular politics and thereby in the political imagination of non-citizen labourers in a subtle manner are to be examined by analysing the experience of protest movements of South Asian labourers.

Politics of Translocality

There are many ways to understand the specific political context in which the popular politics of non-citizen workers of South Asia in the Gulf emerged. The nature of immigration, living conditions, work cultures and the relationship between the labourers and employers and discriminatory practices of the state institutions – all have contributed to the making of this. Without exception, foreign labourers in the Gulf are sojourners whose stay in the host countries lasts normally for a period specified in the labour contract. This sojourning nature of labour emigration along with at least once a year or once in 2 years trips to the ‘homeland’ makes expatriate labourers maintain links with their places of origin. Maintaining constant relationship with the ‘homeland’, especially in the case of ordinary labourers, offers an escape from the harsh economic ambiguities and uncertainties with regard to changing labour rules in the Gulf. As outsiders, migrant labourers in the Gulf live in a state of legal and political ambiguity, and the lack of involvement in the host country’s political and social processes drives them to seek shelter within the politics of their homeland. This lack of political involvement also contributes to the process of producing translocal political consciousness and affinities among the expatriate population in the GCC States. What seems to be happening is not simply the extension of political discourse beyond the boundaries, but this extension offers an avenue of subtle expression for the otherwise politically ‘silenced’ South Asian expatriates in the Gulf. Although it is placed mostly within an imaginative setting, translocal South Asian politics significantly touches upon the issue of identity. The expatriate labourers from the region look to this refashioned politics to give themselves a coherent identity and a ‘national’ narrative in order to compensate for the lack of political space in the receiving countries’ politics. The increasingly observable collective identity formation and diasporic political consciousness primarily reflect a response to the inhospitable climate and the social discrimination being faced by the South Asian labourers in the Gulf States. Several studies on the evolution of translocal political structures among Malayalee migrants argue that their form generally takes root in the struggles for civil rights in the host land.3 The new media that allow dias-

3 Nisha Mathew, ‘Between Malabar and the Gulf: History, Culture and Identity in the Making of the Transnational Malayalee Public Sphere’, Unpublished Paper, 2011., M.H. Ilias, Malayalee 58 M. H. Ilias pora communities to be involved in and influence the day-to-day political developments in their homeland play a significant role in order to maintain this identity. Furthermore, the translocal politics helps individuals and communities find positive and revitalizing sides to the experience of migration and gradually adjusts to new conditions and circumstances. In most of the cases, this refashioned identity may not directly address alienation from the host states’ political process, but it creates new forms of politics whose dynamics have, under translocality, brought forth a diverse set of popular political practices in the Gulf. As has been discussed earlier, the expatriate workers in the GCC Countries are the flashpoint of a series of uncertainties that mediate between everyday life and its fast shifting socio-political backdrop. They are represented by multiple criss- crossing divides and boundaries that give separate ethnicities their own national identification in the region.4 The harsh experience of migration and relocation always shapes a new national awareness of self and this awareness, under favourable conditions, can be riveting and transformative. This national awareness along with linkages with home country’s politics eventually metamorphoses into specialized polities within the host countries with the capability to create new forms of political space.5 With concern over the issues happening in both the host countries and homeland, this kind of informal politics is deemed to be private, existing outside the formal institutions, thus allowing one to create important forms of popular politics. They take many different forms and states in the Arab Gulf never fully containing the everyday experience of such spaces. Understanding various forms of informal associations and networks existing with minimum encounters with the political and social institutions of the host countries also constitutes a major means to study the nature and evolution of popular politics flourished among the South Asian immigrant labourers. As discussed earlier, this popular politics is, actually, a product of a particular political situation and the informal nature does not permit it to gather tangible institutional form. With complete departure from clear institutionally protected relations, this popular politics often tends to remain either as covertly operated political associations or as formal social, cultural or community organizations with unrevealed and subtle political agendas. While some of the community organizations are politically neutral, some enjoy the backing of major political parties in India like the Indian National Congress (INC), Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPIM) and the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML).

Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Malayalee Migrants and Translocal Kerala Politics in the Gulf: Re-conceptualizing ‘Political’, Contextualizing the Modern Middle Eastern Diaspora, Anthony Gorman & Sossie Kasbarian (ed.), Edinburgh University Press, 2015 & Jose Itzigson, ‘Immigration and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants’ Political Transnationalism’, pp. 1126–54. 4 Sulayman Khalaf, ‘The Evolution of City Type, Oil and Globalization’, in J. Fox, et al. (eds.), Globalization and the Gulf, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 244–266. 5 The distinction between citizen and immigrant is integral to these specialized polities. See Paul Dresch, ‘Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society’, in J. Fox, et al. (eds.), Globalization and the Gulf, London: Routledge, 2006, pp. 200–223. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 59

The perceptions of South Asian expatriates in the Gulf States are generally influenced by a sense of alienation, which is deeply rooted in their relationships with the nationals. The informal associations stress on this alienation which results ultimately in a form of ‘imagined politics’ that offers an escape from the political realities in the host country and drifts away from the political constraints of the state. The feeling of cultural suspicion is another issue being faced by the South Asian expatriates.6 Nationals in many of the Gulf States clearly began to see the large South Asian workforce as a threat to the cultural identity of their nation.7 South Asian community’s pattern of earnings and relatively low spending has become a major cause of displeasure for the GCC States.8 Although the cultural national identity debates in the GCC Countries have generally been revolved around prominent ‘others’ (mainly ethnic and religious minorities like Iranians and Shias9), the increasing cultural influence of South Asian expatriates becomes a source of acute socio-economic concerns.10 The new demographic composition, which previously was neither so menacing, has generated a great deal of debate over the huge presence of South Asian workers, whose population outnumbers locals in some of the Gulf States. Making up 90% of the total work force,11 they constitute nearly four to one in every Gulf society. A large part of the worry is about the Indians who outnumber locals in places like Qatar, and the GCC authorities have changed the way they look at the overwhelming presence of the Indian expatriates.12 There is the issue – perhaps must be the most significant of all – seeing the foreign presence as a threat to national culture and identity. In a ministerial meeting of

6 Due to the particular nature of their job (domestic workers, house drivers, caregivers, school- teachers and babysitters) and greater access to women and children in the Gulf societies, nationals in most of the Gulf countries see South Asians as a group with a potential to alter the local culture. This has been shared by many nationals during my field visits held between 2008 and 2010. 7 This worry was echoed in the GCC’s meeting held in Doha in 2008 in which participants openly shared their uneasiness and warned about the possible repercussions. See Gulf News, 29 November 2008. 8 Most of the GCC States are now more concerned about the large amount of money being sent out by the Indians. A substantial amount of hard currency earnings is flowing to the home country as direct remittances. 9 The religious and political dimensions of Iran–GCC conflicts often leave a mark on the treatment of Shias in the GCC states barring UAE, where Shias are an affluent group. The ill-treatment of Shias has resulted in Shia uprisings in Bahrain and Saudi. 10 Niel Patrick, ‘Nationalism in the Gulf States’, Kuwait Programme on Development and Globalization in the Gulf States, 2009, no. 3. 11 www.news.bbc.uk/2/hi/middle-east/7266610.stm. Accessed on 24 September 2013. 12 As per the recent statistics published by the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, New Delhi (www.moia.gov.in), nearly 5.5 million Indians work in the Gulf. The new demographic composition has become a matter of serious concern for some of the Gulf States. In order to deal with this issue of growing Indian presence, the governments in the GCC countries have taken some controlling measures and administrative regularizations. The UAE, for instance, fixed matriculation as the minimum requirement for Indian labourers, while Bahrain put in practice a quota system for Indians. 60 M. H. Ilias

GCC members held in 2005, Abdul Rahman Al-Attiya, General Secretary of the Organization, had openly shared his uneasiness and warned about the possible repercussions of the situation. He stressed on ‘the need to look at the massive presence of expatriate workers basically as national security issue and not merely as an economic matter…’13 This worry was also echoed in the Gulf Cooperation Council’s meeting held in Doha in 2008. Along with serious regional issues of security, common energy policies, joint nuclear energy plant and currency union, this issue topped the agenda of talks.14 The formation of a collective political identity and solidarity can also be seen as a response to this cultural suspicion. The popular politics among the South Asian migrants, perhaps, may also be seen as an expression of political nostalgia that motivates ordinary workers to maintain their political affiliations left behind in the homeland. Sometimes, this nostalgia becomes a norm which is required to be reproductive for a group in order to survive in a political atmosphere of complete alienation.15 This is very evident in the case of labourers from Kerala. While the politics in the Gulf, by and large, remains alien to them, Malayalee expatriates find refuge in some nostalgic events of the past in Kerala politics. With certain elements of emotional identification, this nostalgia is being used strategically by the Malayalee organizations for mobilizing expatriates. The reinvention of the past in the form of nostalgia, however, becomes a tactic for using collective memory to selectively manipulate certain aspects of Kerala’s past. While organizations maintaining links with the communist movement in Kerala often take advantage of memories of a series of agitations launched by the movement against the landlords, Muslim organizations use the tradition of resistance raised by the community against the European colonialism in the state.16 A close look at the composition of Malayalee migrants in the Gulf reveals that the majority of the workers are overwhelmingly young males in their twenties or thirties coming from a backward but politically vibrant area, Malabar. This area comprising six districts of north Kerala has traditionally been a strong bastion of leftist movements and Muslim organizations both of which offered a tradition of challenge against the European colonial powers and their cronies, the local rulers who enjoyed relentless support of the former. Having come from poor but politically active backgrounds, expatriates from Malabar generally carry forward the anti-imperialist political legacies of the region with them and try to create a subtle replica of their political positions in a diasporic setting. The anti-imperialist positions of these organizations are manifested mainly through their consistent but covert criticism over American policies in the Gulf and support for the boycott called against American and Israeli products against the backdrop of events like the

13 Gulf News, 24 November 2005. 14 Gulf News, 29 November 2008. 15 Politics in the homeland continues to be a primary generator of memory for the diasporic communities. See Baba, Nation and Narration for the details of this debate. 16 During a field visit in Oman, the author personally witnessed to a function commemorating Sayyid Fadl, a champion of anti-colonial (anti-British) struggle in Malabar in nineteenth century by an organization of Malayalees in Muscat dominated by Muslim migrants from North Kerala. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 61

US invasion of Iraq.17 However, with a secret mode of operation alien to the host countries and limited reach outside Malayalee community, the extension of Kerala politics finds no substantial resonance among the nationals. Almost all political developments in Kerala make a ripple in the Gulf. This is evident from the popularity of new social movements among Malayalee expatriates. Single issue-oriented movements revolving around particular social and political issues in Kerala have caught the popular imagination over the last decade. Kerala- centric environmental and human rights groups are active in creating new forms of politics that hinge on signature campaigns, protest meetings and street plays in response to the sensitive issues taking place in Kerala, though the scope of such debates and campaigns may always be limited to the four walls of residential areas where the Malayalee migrants stay collectively or labour camps. Except on certain occasions, governments in the GCC Countries are unaware of the serious political content of these activities.18 The issues related to the Malayalee workers in the Gulf have also found a place in the agenda of Malayalee organizations recently. New informal social movements and networks have sprung up, dedicated to the issue of exploitation of Indian workers in the Gulf which the old movements are not able to take up. While the old movements provide an important venue for sharing information and participating in the diasporic culture without being a direct or indirect threat to the state, the new movements tend to clandestinely deal with highly sensitive issues like violation of human rights in labour camps.

Signs of Political Assertion

The recent South Asian labour unrest19 in which Indian labourers took a lead role is actually a pointer to a larger political assertion. Although India-centric clandestine networks played no direct role in the labour strikes, the political consciousness they created has been instrumental in instilling confidence among the labourers from the country to go against their employers by demanding salary hikes and improvement in living conditions. There is an opinion which has been echoed in Indian dailies

17 As a means of protest to the US aggression in Iraq in 2003, Left organizations in Kerala (mainly CPI (M)) led a ‘boycott American goods’ campaign. This call for boycott received responses from the organizations in the Gulf attached to CPI (M). Soft drinks like Coca-Cola and Pepsi and the soaps made by Hindustan Lever were the major targets of this boycott. The Hindu, 12 April 2003. 18 In 1992, the play the Ants Feast on Corpses had invited the wrath of administration for its alleg- edly blasphemous content in Sharjah. The court sentenced 6-year jail term to a Malayalee theatre group for staging this play. India Today, 15 November 1992. 19 The strike of South Asian expatriate labourers that began in Dubai in 2007 had a lively spread all over the region. Though, the main reason at the initial stage was low wage in the context of inflation and the lowering exchange of the currencies of the Gulf countries, the focus of strikers later on turned to the issues of poor living conditions, unequal compensation structure and lack of proper health care. The Hindu, 22 November 2007. 62 M. H. Ilias discussing South Asian labour unrest as an indicator of the increased bargaining power that Indian labourers gained.20 Much of the migration from India to the Middle East has now been stimulated mainly by market considerations. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s when the majority of Indian labourers had little bargaining power, the present Indian migration of skilled and semi-skilled labourers in the Gulf contributes significantly to the development of the receiving countries, simultaneously impacting the sending country. The criticality of Indian labourers is the major factor as there is a huge demand for them and tremendous pressure from employers in the UAE and Qatar to employ more Indian labourers despite area-wide extensive nationalization drive. Media reports state that major contracting companies in the UAE and Qatar are frantically trying to hire labourers from India.21 India is still the number one supplier of labour and about 80% of new workers are from India. In Dubai and Doha, many mega projects face long delays to finish off due to shortage of skilled Indian manpower. A booming economy in India also means that many there no longer see the need to travel to the Gulf. Risks to their living in the Gulf are inflation and currency instability due to the (fixed) dollar peg system. The labourers complain bitterly that the money they earn in the Gulf stretches less far when sending to their families in India due to the increasing rate of inflation and consequent price hike in the region.22 With tremendous pressure from employers, the governments in the Gulf had taken a soft stand regarding the labour strike, which could otherwise end in severe punishment of people who were involved. Companies did not want the government deporting any more workers as they were having trouble finding enough to complete the works. The newfound assertiveness was only a tip of the iceberg and the circumstance provided a clue to Indian labourers’ calculations in striking, even if they were aware of the dire consequences of termination and deportation. The movement of Indian labour in the Gulf, therefore has, to a large extent, been influenced by the force of the global free market. When the business firms are searching for an economic and competent workforce, which is relatively inexpensive and efficient, Indian skilled workers have advantage of the situation. That is the reason why Indians are being given priority in recruitment even when the Gulf States like the UAE are cutting down on expatriates in order to overcome the pinch of recession and to bring down the unemployment rate among their citizens.23 India is still the major supplier of labour and the Indians constitute a large proportion of the skilled workforce, although there is a selective use of Indians labourers in certain categories. While unskilled labourers are replaced by inexpensive ones from other South Asian states like Nepal and Sri Lanka and are forced to return to

20 Atul Aneja, ‘Growing Assertions of Asian Workers in the Gulf’, The Hindu, 22 November 2007. 21 Ibid. 22 An average Indian worker in the UAE construction industry makes about AED 1000–1500 per month. In the present economic regime, this is not enough to meet their own expenses in the Gulf and support a family in India. From the conversation with the Indian labourers during a field trip in the UAE in May 2015. 23 Ibid. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 63

India, employers insist on the continued employment of semi-skilled or skilled Indian labourers beyond their contract period despite massive nationalization programmes.24 With the pressure from employers, the UAE government has taken a soft stand regarding strikes, which could otherwise end in severe punishment of people who are involved. Moreover, the boom in the economy and the consequent infrastructural development spree have created an enormous amount of job opportunities for semi-skilled and skilled labourers especially in states like Kerala, where the labourers are less enthusiastic to migrate.25 So, a flourishing economy in India means that many there no longer see the need to travel to the Gulf. Failure of targeted nationalization of the labour also forms to be a major reason for the growing assertion of Indian labourers. Nationalization remains a distant dream, and the process has met several obstacles. Only in certain fields like banking and the hydrocarbon sector the governments in the Gulf could achieve a position close to the target. Most of the job opportunities coming in current phase of Gulf countries’ development are in manufacturing, construction and other allied services, which require skills that have traditionally not appealed to nationals. The private sector jobs are, generally, designed for expatriates, with long and strict working hours and salaries that do not meet local standards. Work in the private sector is sometimes perceived as debasing the nationals’ social status.26 Because of their ‘superior position’, locals are averse to accepting the low-skilled, low-salaried posts and they are inclined to work mostly in the government sector. The majority are employed in simple jobs like administrative support, clerical and security services. But the case is not so in the states with low-growth rate, like Oman, where all sorts of jobs are attractive for relatively poor locals. Nationalization measures meet the same problems in highly skilled job fields also. Mismatching profiles of nationals have hindered the removal of other nationals in highly skilled positions. In the UAE, for example, there are abundant job opportunities in information technology, but the education and training systems are unprepared for the boom in this field. Economic diversification efforts have, thus, expatriate participation more inevitable. The other reason is the alleged non- flexibility of nationals, especially in terms of salary and work culture. Despite emerging strains of unemployment and competition in the labour market, the wage structure of nationals throughout the region remains high and uncompromising. Furthermore, the mandatory nationalization and the quota system have attracted the wrath of entrepreneurs across state lines. They genuinely fear that such moves will finally lower productivity and erode profit. Nationalization in the UAE (encap- sulated by the term Emiratization), for instance, was grudgingly accepted by private sector companies, though they were asked by the government to employ more locals to curtail the rate of unemployment. Ironically enough, the drive in many Gulf States has met fierce opposition from the nationals themselves. The sponsorship

24 M.H. Ilias, ‘South Asian Labour Crisis in Dubai and the Scanty Prospects of Indian Policy in the Arab Gulf Region’. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid. 64 M. H. Ilias regime, kufala,27 makes the citizens privileged employers and business owners, drawing surplus from the foreign presence. It also allows nationals to make money out of selling visa documents and to extract rents through discriminatory pricing.28 Nationals, fearing a considerable drop in their sponsorship money, have come vehe- mently against the nationalization agenda. So, nationalization, contrary to the highly placed wish, cannot contain unemployment pressures, though it may lead to increased employment of nationals in government sectors regardless of their com- petencies and skills.29 The measures for the replacement of relatively expensive Indian workers are generally insufficient even in the time of deepening economic crisis. The governments brought many controlling measures and administrative regularizations to halt the movement of Indian labourers in excess. The UAE, for instance, fixed matriculation as the minimum requirement for labours. But the unavailability of skilled and competent labourers in bulk number torpedoed their plan. The latest example is of the State of Qatar, which took a complete U-turn to the earlier decision to limit the number of Indians despite the constant pressure due to increasing unemployment and economic crisis.30 The Labour Ministry in Qatar is now in a massive hunt for skilled workers for its booming gas and construction industry and bringing tens of thousands of new workers from India.

Non-citizenry Aspects

Incapable of exercising political rights in a state of expatriation, all non-citizens in the Gulf are socially vulnerable. All expatriates are lawfully denied political rights and the asymmetry in the structural and human relations between the two populations – citizens and non-citizens – leaving its imprint on the Gulf countries’ political regimes. Relations among nationals and expatriates are affected by specific laws and conditions that relegate most migrant groups to subordination. In an ‘ethnocratic’31

27 The sponsorship system means that expatriate workers can enter, work and leave the host country only with the assistance of their local sponsor. 28 Paul Dresch, ‘Foreign Matter: The Place of Strangers in Gulf Society’, 2006, p. 203. 29 Nevertheless, progress has been made to nationalize certain areas of employment, such as gold and vegetable markets in Saudi Arabia, though large-scale nationalization remains next to impossible. Oman is the only state which continues to go ahead with nationalization though other States have taken serious measures, especially in the wake of financial crunch. 30 Based on discussion with the recruiting agents during author’s field research in 2010. 31 The privileged status of ‘national’ or muwatan is sharper and conceived sometimes in tribal or genealogical terms. Natives’ work is rewarded with disproportionately high compensation. The presence of non-GCC workers and their inferior legal, social and political subjection to the GCC citizens lead to a sort of ‘ethnocracy’. See Ang N. Longva, ‘Neither Autocracy or Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and the Socio-Political Systems in Kuwait’, in P. Dresch and J. Piscatori (eds.), Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, London: IB Tauris, 2005, pp. 114–36. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 65 set up, citizens enjoy a certain amount of privilege, and the distinctive identity of citizens is protected in sometimes unusual ways. ‘The exclusion of foreign workers’ according to Longva ‘may entirely be in line with the widely accepted principle that political rights are a function of national citizenship’.32 Non-citizens, especially the South Asian expatriates, despite their wealth and economic influence, find themselves at the bottom of the socio-political structure.33 No expatriate community in this sense is a part of the political community in the Gulf. Not only their low social rank but also their visible alienation from the political process deprives foreigners of a voice in Gulf society. The development of popular politics in the Gulf revolves mainly around this sense of alienation. The ideas and practices associated with it, therefore, pay little attention to the formal politics in the region and does not enter into direct interactions with the formal politics dominated by the state and its institutions. The informal nature of it also does not permit to gather tangible institutional form. Majority of their actions do not remain strictly inside the state and their ‘legally ambiguous’ position does not put pressure on the state to act against them. Operating from within the permissible legal boundaries, their activities also never pose any real threat to the state or exacerbate worries about national political coherence. Their operative styles also are not ways that would attract widespread tensions in the host society. A closer look at the context of origin of the popular politics reveals that it is the marginal status (economically disadvantaged and right-less) of a section of expatriate population that makes them politically alert and active. But the content of such a politics remains limited to seeking minor changes in the polity. Serious reforms within the existing system or an immediate end to the regime through revolution are nowhere in the agenda of this politics. The political imagination is often limited by the matters of legality and economic rights. Anyway, the experience associated with the popular politics among the South Asian labourers goes beyond the procedural or institutional political development which often seeks formal structures, procedures and contracts to flourish. Recently, there has been a dramatic rise in support for such popular politics and movements (not much organized) which present themselves as the promoters of the rights of underprivileged in the Arab Gulf region. This development is very significant in the absence of organized political forces to aspire the demands of such sections. Recent uprisings of Kuwaiti Bedoon – stateless people – whose mixed status create uncertainties about the national self and citizenship is illustrative of the right- based popular politics gathering momentum all over the region. Their legally ambiguous national status, of course, puts pressure on the government to take coer- cive measures and their movements threaten the policing of borders. Their cultural orientation and specific dialect in most cases exacerbate worries about modern

32 Ang N. Longva, Wells Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait, Boulder: West View Press, 1997, p. 118. 33 Situation may be slightly different in the UAE and Dubai in particular, where the elites among the immigrant population, to some extent, are considered alternate or unofficial citizens. 66 M. H. Ilias national cultural coherence. However, the Kuwaiti administration does not see any serious political threat in their uprising as it does not pose any direct challenge to the state sovereignty. As discussed in the introductory part, political assertions of the marginalized sections in the Gulf barring the case of Bedoons in Kuwait34 are not necessarily about equal political rights. It could also be often not about to secure equal citizenship rights or recognition as full citizens by the state.35 Connecting them to the experience of Arab Spring-induced political development in the region becomes a futile exercise. The Arab Spring-induced political uprisings of citizens are more political oriented while those of non-citizen workers appear to be more oriented towards rights. Keeping awareness about the peculiar social and political status, the migrant workers seek no citizenship rights or equal access to the resources of the state. In place of that what figures in their demands are recognition of their legal rights as non- citizen workers and dignified life in the hosting countries.36 These uprisings, according to Kanna, ‘seem to want, at most, a limited recognition by the state, the recognition that they are not citizens’.37 However, this non-citizenry aspect has deep political implications as the demand moves beyond the regular discussions of participation by opening up the polity for outsiders. Political practices associated with this popular politics often base their strength and legitimacy on the principle of popular sovereignty which stands in conflict with the notions of procedural and institutional politics. Taking the scope of politics further, these uprisings expose the issues involved in the neo-liberal economic reconfiguration of the states in the region. Over the last two decades, the Gulf States have endured an advanced experience of economic liberalization and these experiences have deeply accentuated the unevenness of capitalist development-widening gaps between labourers (mainly non-citizen) and the private sector and state employers.38 The recent cases of labour unrest have brought into focus not just the inherent hostile relationships between the non-citizen workers and the employment providers but the limitations of legal system to protect the rights of non-citizen workers fully in the context of burgeoning exploitation. This is very significant in the context that the civil society movements in the Gulf, which are mostly patronized by the government39 and with its elite social

34 The stateless Bedoon’s uprising in Kuwait advocates for constitutional reforms which have wider political implications than others. 35 Ahmed Kanna, ‘A Politics of Non-recognition? Biopolitics of Arab Gulf Worker Protests in the Year of Uprising’, p. 147. 36 Ibid., 148. 37 Ibid. 38 Adam Hanieh, Class Capitalism in the Gulf: The Political Economy of the Gulf Cooperation Council, interview with Adam Hanieh by Ed. Lewis, Global Research 15 December 2011. 39 Jill Crystal, ‘Public order and Authority: Policing Kuwait’, in James Piscatori and Paul Dresch, Monarchies and Nations: Globalization and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. 4 South Asian Labour Unrests and Non-Citizenry Aspects of Popular Politics in the Gulf 67 content are restricted to a small section of politically equipped citizens, never represent a site of negotiation for the non-citizen labourers or a possibility opened by the activities of them.

Conclusion

With novel political explorations, informal networks and particular community practices, Indian migrant workers in the Gulf, to a certain extent, are able to adjust to the not-so-open political system of the Arab Gulf monarchies that do not entertain political participation of any sort by the expatriate communities. Politics in the host communities being hostile to foreigner participation and determined merely by citizenship rights, the extension of a sort of popular politics becomes a gravitational force connecting up with and pinning down a large immigrant population the Gulf over. This popular politics also becomes a practice very much resorted to, when the formal politics in the host community is determined only in terms of citizenship and foreigners need to find other ways of connecting a large number of people to each other. Being connected politically to the issues of the homeland, a new political space is construed into which they clandestinely bring ideologies and political doctrines which are otherwise sensitive to the local dynasties. The role of popular politics in the political process of the Gulf societies is often left unexplored or underexplored by the more formal and macro approaches of understanding the political development. As discussed earlier, the popular politics in the context of Indian migrants does not enter into direct interactions with the politics dominated by the state and its institutions. So its failure to catch the attention of others is obvious. Its efforts are not fully rooted in the popular quest for the democratization of the state and society, but to retain the rights of a politically and socially excluded section as non-citizens. Similarly, unlike the experiences happening elsewhere in the Arab World, these issue-oriented mobilizations do not have the baggage of coherent political ideology or strategies to pursue with and the protest movements popular among the Indian migrants in the region are largely subtle in its methods of raising demands. Still they are significant as their intervention even in its subtlety set in motion a new sort of politics being emerged and provide accounts of the ways in which a non-citizenry, non-institutional politics acquiring social roots in the region. Chapter 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

M. V. Bijulal

Abstract Independent investigations by human rights organizations and public interest reports through investigative journalism have exposed many areas of urgent human rights concerns for the workers. Governments across South and South East Asia have responded to such precarious situations in varying degrees. Some interventions have resulted in immediate strategies for reinstating confidence and guarantee of rights and dignity to the workforce. In some Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, official sources have acknowledged the highly deplorable state of life of the workers and have even opined that the unrest among workers is an expression of their angst. Governmental response to crises has varied across the GCC; from minimal regulation measures, to radical intervention for protection of rights of the workers. However, in the last decade, there are indications of a common GCC policy on migrant labour. Recent press reports also indicated fresh diplomatic moves in this direction.

Unskilled labour from India in the GCC countries – Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Oman and Bahrain – number nearly 1.2 million (Kapiszewski 2006). However, contemporary field data and assessments from experienced community workers in the Gulf tend to place the figures higher to account for undocumented workers. Since 2004, labourers of South Asia including Indian workers have been part of massive labour strikes in the GCC countries. Such massive non-Arab-speaking migrant labour strikes were unheard of in the GCC countries.1 Independent investigations by human rights organizations and public interest reports through investigative journalism have exposed many areas of urgent human

1 There were large-scale strikes and protests by Arab-speaking workers (mainly Egyptians and Palestinians) in the 1970s and 1980s. The Gulf countries responded to these struggles with a long- term strategy of higher intake of more non-Arab Asian labour.

M. V. Bijulal (*) School of International Relations and Politics, Mahatma Gandhi University, Kottayam, Kerala, India

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 69 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_5 70 M. V. Bijulal rights concerns for the workers. Governments across South and South East Asia have responded to such precarious situations in varying degrees. Some interventions have resulted in immediate strategies for reinstating confidence and guarantee of rights and dignity to the workforce. However, since last decade there are indications of a common GCC policy on migrant labour (Ditto 2008). Recent press reports also indicated fresh diplomatic moves in this direction.2 While authentic informal documentation3 of migrant workers elsewhere has led to changes in the policy framework, in the GCC countries, where the human rights violations have not have been considered actively under the legal and political system, the conditions are extreme. Here, the expatriate/guest worker classification attached to the migrant workforce leads to a discriminatory legal status in terms of access and the right to judicial redressal. Arguments for integrating legal and human rights principles into the policies governing migrant work are considered in this paper. In the light of studies and selected life writings (Ayesha 2008) in contemporary slavery, modern slavery and the development of human rights instruments on human trafficking, this study advocates a transnational approach, ensuring the legal and human rights obligations of the states involved. Also, it refers to the importance of civil, informal mechanisms to constantly monitor the working conditions. From a workers’ rights perspective (Bijulal 2012), this study argues that a rights denying, growth-seeking development approach has emerged in governing the world of work. It seeks to revisit the significance of the statistical narratives that usually opt for a ‘neutral’ numerical existence for the migrant person. Economistic and one- dimensional construction of the migrant identity is questioned here using the standpoint of studies in citizenship.4 While the universality of legal standards and ethical concern on the rights protection of the workers inform the academic/and systemic initiatives, it is argued here that non-hegemonic means of human rights protection are highly warranted in such situations, along with strong legal actions that protect rights and the dignity of workers. This study is an effort to understand the reasons for the deterioration of labour rights in the GCC countries and to suggest legal and civil means for the protection and promotion of the human rights of workers. In this context, the evolution of the rights discourse in identifying rights at work, as developed with the International Labour Organization (ILO) since 1937, discussions on social, legal and political rights at the international scenario, integration of rights of the families as inherent to labourers’ rights, new research on contemporary slavery (Bales 2005), international agreements on the forms of trafficking in persons (UNCJIN2000 ) and regional policy developments in the sphere of human rights law are discussed here. The concept of ‘lifeworlds’ is drawn on to explain the transnational contexts – political, social and economic – that constitute the violations of rights of migrant workers.

2 http://www.muscatdaily.com/Archive/Oman/GCC-to-discuss-standardised-contract-for-migrant- domestic-workers-2656 (Downloaded on 20 May, 2013). 3 Belgian government’s responses to investigations conducted by De Stoop. 4 Observations of Partha Chatterjee (2004) on formal and real types of citizenship are important an mentioned here. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 71

Background

The lifeworlds of workers, in this context, are placed in an amorphous spatio-legal condition that places them in a peculiar state of being divided between two different political systems with different cultural and social specificities, and without being effectively considered under any universally justiciable labour rights and/or human rights regime. The urgent need, therefore, is to evolve a transnational rights approach in understanding and to resolving the problems and violations involved. This study based on the data on direct interactions with workers considers various acts of direct, indirect and contributory forms of violence, violations of laws, denials of freedoms, exploitation, etc., from the standpoint of a transnational rights perspective. This situation of ‘pawning of life’5 for livelihoods needs serious rethinking based on emerging definitions6 of human trafficking as informed by the Palermo Protocol on forced work and trafficking in persons.7 A special case is to be made in the case of construction workers of the semi- skilled and non-skilled orders. In the last two decades, large-scale expansion of urban infrastructure intended to host international commercial/business hubs has attracted worldwide attention to the GCC countries. The completion of monumental infrastructural projects like the Burj Khalifa as well as setting up of landmarks of national pride as in the case of the FIFA World Cup stadiums required massive organization of less paid, irregular workforce, ‘on war footing’. The immediate result of such high-paced growth of economic and infrastructure was a regime of lawless- ness. From the year 2004 onwards, many of the GCC countries witnessed violent

5 Jeevan panayappeduthuka, an expression in Malayalam, meaning ‘pawning life’ dominated the workers’ registry of narrating experiences of forced labour. This expression was found inalienable to most of the reminiscences on life at work, from a workers’ standpoint. Another expression of similar order was adimappani/ adimavela which means ‘slave labour’. Majority of the respondents testified that they found their expectations on security of the place of work, workload, freedom and leisure were quite misplaced once they entered their jobs. The expression, ‘slave-like’ was given by majority of workers. 6 Studies in modern slavery (see Bales 1999) as a disciplinary approach have captured the situation in the language of rights and dignity. According to Professor Gary Craig, Professor in Community Development and Social Justice, School of Applied Social Sciences, Durham University, UK. The practice of trafficking workers from Asia through extremely hazardous means (stocking-up workers in refrigerated trucks, etc.) has led to deaths of many Asian workers in France, Italy and other places. Modern slavery is an extension of Kevin Bales’ study (1999) on ‘disposability’ of people in the context of his studies in slavery. (Interview with Professor Craig, November 2008, Delhi.) 7 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/protocoltraffic.htm (referred on 30 October, 2012). 72 M. V. Bijulal demonstrations by Asian workers demanding better working conditions and wages. The labour strikes in 2008 and 20118 almost repeated the same demands.9 According to 2010 estimates10, GCC countries account for the first three positions on a global level in terms of percentage of migrant population in the total population.11The critical importance of remittances from the GCC countries to South and South East Asian economies has been a major topic of research in the last decades (Rashid Amjad 1989, Prakash 1998). A majority of academic sources that deal with migrant work have paid little attention to the conditions of life and workplace experiences of labour within the economy in the Gulf countries. This academic invisibility on the life and work of labourers was quite prominent in public sphere as well.12 At the same time, reports on gross violations of security norms in hazardous occupations became a matter of concern. There was under-reporting of fatalities at work, as Sönmez et al. (2011) says: There are conflicting reports on numbers of injuries and deaths; for example, two construction workers are reportedly killed each week (104 per year) in Abu Dhabi, while the Municipality of Dubai recorded only 34 construction worker deaths in all of 2004 and 39 in 2005, despite the significantly greater construction activity there. Independent research reported 880 deaths in the UAE among migrant construction workers in 2004 (483 Indians, 397 Pakistanis). Although the causes of death were not disclosed, a representative of the Indian Community Welfare Committee noted that 30 percent of deaths among Indians in Dubai were related to accidents on construction sites. An official at Dubai’s Indian Consulate reported to HRW (Human Rights Watch) that 971 deaths were registered in 2005, from which 61 were attributed to site accidents. The Bangladesh Embassy in Abu Dhabi estimates repatriating about eight to 10 bodies of construction workers each month, of which three are work-related deaths.13

8 The immediate response to the 2004 strikes was the restrictive practices in recruitment by introducing quota systems in different Arabian Gulf countries. The South Asian unskilled workers’ influx, especially after the 1991 Gulf War, was looked upon as a strategy to displace politically oriented Arab workers from non-monarchic Arab countries to avoid political threats to the Arabian Gulf monarchies. New efforts of control and putting a cap on Indian labour may promote labour influx from countries like Nepal and Sri Lanka where cheap labour is in abundance. 9 As per a report in The Sydney Herald (2011), nearly 2000 labourers of Jams HR Solutions went on a violent struggle in 2011, causing widespread losses. They were protesting against the mistreatment by security personnel of the company. 10 http://esa.un.org/migration/p2k0data.asp 11 Israel is another country of the West Asian region which ranks among first 10 countries with large numbers of migrants as a percentage of population. 12 Charles Tilly (2007) deliberates on this situation and even suggests that we use the migrant experience narrations as primary materials for concept building on transnational migrant workforce. 13 The authors speculate that discrepancies in reporting site accidents are due to the UAE’s efforts to downplay risks associated with construction work. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 73

Review of Instruments for Migrant Human Rights

This section undertakes an analysis, structured on the conceptualization of migrant workers’ rights as codified in the international instruments, namely, the Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families 1990; the UN General Assembly Palermo Protocols Regarding Forced Work; Human Rights of Migrants 2004; the ILO Convention No. 97 on Migration for Employment, 1949; and the ILO Convention No. 143 on Migrant Workers (Supplementary Provisions), 1975. The ILO Convention of 1949 advocated unrestricted exchange of migration- related state data, as well as policies (free service to assist migrants, mechanisms for employment-related travel, appropriate health care, hygienic conditions of living, equal rights, etc.) among parties of the Convention (Art.1). It also called for ‘an adequate and free service to assist migrants for employment, and in particular to provide them with accurate information’ (Art. 2). Article 4 of the Convention talks about appropriate mechanisms for employment-related travel, stay and departure of migrants to be dealt with by appropriate state interventions. Article 5 emphasizes the responsibility of the receiving state to provide appropriate health care and to ensure hygienic conditions of living to the migrants. Conceptualization of the right to equality as per Article 6 of the Convention would be one of the earliest concerns of the international order on the right to equality of migrant workers.14 The ILO Convention on Rights of All Migrants and Families 1990 identifies the need ‘to make further efforts to improve the situation and ensure the human rights and dignity of all migrants in addition to the existence of an already established body of principles and standards’. The Convention on Rights of All Migrants and Families 1990 indicates to a journey from the rights to survival – freedom of movement, protection from torture, degrading and inhuman treatment, protection from slavery or servitude, protection from performing forced or compulsory labour to social and cultural rights, to freedom to practise one’s religion and freedom to seek, receive and impart information. The coordinated effort to formulate an international Convention on Rights of All Migrant Workers 1990 was an extended process starting from 1979 to 1989. The Convention was made with specific reference to ‘instruments within the framework of the International Labour Organization’ like the Convention concerning Migration for Employment (No. 97), the Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143), the Recommendation

14 Article 6 talks about ‘non-discrimination based on nationality, race, religion, or sex, to immigrants lawfully within its territory, treatment no less favourable than that which it applies to its own nationals in respect of the matters: relating to remuneration, including family allowances where these form part of remuneration, hours of work, overtime arrangements, holidays with pay, restrictions on home work, minimum age for employment, apprenticeship and training, women’s work and the work of young persons’. Article 6 also refers to freedom of organization though membership of trade unions and enjoyment of the benefits of collective bargaining. It refers to provisions for accommodation; social security according to national laws or regulations is covered by a social security scheme to a great extent. 74 M. V. Bijulal concerning Migration for Employment (No. 86), the Recommendation concerning Migrant Workers (No. 151), the Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour (No. 29) and the Convention on Abolition of Forced Labour (No. 105). Article 7 of the 1990 convention refers to cross-cutting themes in human rights as per the international human rights instruments followed by Part II, which deals with the human rights of all migrant workers and their families. These include the right to freedom of movement ‘at any time to enter and remain in their State of origin’ (Art. 8); legal protection to the right to life of migrant workers and members of their families (Art. 9); protection from torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 10); protection from slavery or servitude, protection from performing forced or compulsory labour (Art. 10 and 11); and social and cultural rights (Art. 12). The ILO Convention on Domestic Work is another important instrument that comes as rights defining apparatuses for marginal, footloose labourers, mainly invisible women. Other important provisions of the convention are the right to access to legal proceedings in matters of verification by law enforcement officials of the identity of migrant workers (Art. 16); immediate communication to consular or diplomatic authorities of the migrant concerned in the event of arrest or detention, and to avail legal protection while in custody to prevent abuse, etc. (Art. 17); the right to equality with nationals before law at the host country, and right to protection from collective expulsion (Art. 18); equal status in remuneration and other work-related conditions and benefits with nationals (Art. 25); right to form unions (Art. 26); right to medical care (Art. 28); right to personal liberty and right to education of children and to transfer earnings and savings, personal effects and belongings (Art. 32).15 The United Nations Convention on Transnational Organized Crime 2003 was the most recent international human rights instrument that extended the debate on human rights of migrant workers. The definition of trafficking in persons is given as in the following extract (Art. 3): For the purposes of this Protocol: (a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs. The protocol was a reiteration of the right to protection of human rights as listed in the conventions. The prominent contribution to the discourse regarding forced work in the protocol is the most mentionable aspect, which has immediate applications to all situations where question of forced work as well as denial of dignified work is concerned. In the context of universal human rights documents, the rights experience in GCC countries could be looked at, considering that the legal rights regime for migrant workers may not encode the rights as prescribed by the ILO conventions

15 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cmw/cmw.htm. Downloaded on 17 May, 2013. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 75 or other relevant international bodies. As we see from the ILO data on ratifications16 of important labour rights, the conventions had a relatively low rate of participation by the GCC countries or those countries from which manual and unskilled labour force come. Among the migrant source countries, Sri Lanka was the only South Asian state to ratify the ILO Convention of 1990. Bangladesh was another country that had signed any other significant human rights instrument. However, in the case of GCC countries, country reports in select cases, as the response to the Committee on International Convention on Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations (ICERD), indicate commitments to the United Nations Human Rights Mechanism.17

Remittances, Citizenship and Development

Studies on migrants’ remittances and their implications for host economies, as well as relations between migration and trade (Sajitha Beevi Karayil 2007), continue to be a major area of interest in academic research. Some studies (Singh 2009; Ratha and Xu 2008; Panda 2009) have cited the importance of migrant remittances18 in a way indicating national interest in these transactions.19

16 According to estimates, among the GCC Countries, ratification of labour rights, instruments were highest among Kuwait and Bahrain. Oman, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have ratified four to eight instruments, while it was 74 and 21 in the case of Kuwait and Bahrain respectively. Source (http:// www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.subject?p_ lang=en&p_classification=17: Downloaded on 17 May, 2012) 17 Compatibility of national regimes with standard international norms, however, is not a foolproof yardstick to assess human rights situations. For example, in India, despite the strong domestic regime starting from 1948, labourers’ working and living conditions continue to be dirty, demean- ing and dangerous. 18 According to a study (Ratra and Xu 2008), worldwide flows of remittances were around $320 billion in 2007, with remittances sent home by migrants from developing countries accounting for $240 billion. Remittances were twice as large as foreign aid and nearly two-thirds of foreign direct investment flows were to developing countries. India is considered to be the biggest beneficiary of remittance flows. With more than ten million workers worldwide, many of them highly skilled workers in the West, India’s annual remittances are said to have crossed $27 billion in 2007, followed by China ($25.7 billion), Mexico ($25 billion), the Philippines ($17 billion), France ($12.5 billion), Spain ($8.9 billion), Belgium ($7.2 billion), Germany ($7 billion), UK ($7 billion) and Romania ($6.8 billion). According to the World Bank, figures for the year 2012, India ($ 69 billion) and China ($ 60 billion) still stay on the top. Philippines ($24 billion) and Mexico ($23 billion) are the other large recipients. (Source: http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,co ntentMDK:20648762~pagePK:64257043~piPK:437376~theSitePK:4607,00.html) Downloaded on 17 May 2013. 19 Panda (2009: 177) points to migrant workers’ contribution to Kerala’s economy as a backdrop for advocating a more serious view of the issue of migrant workers hailing from India. He cites the potential of migrant workers as powerful economic backup for the state at the time of any economic crisis, the impact of their remittances on not just India’s economy, but also the morale of the country. Panda writes ‘For the longest time, the government took no note of the inflow, notwithstanding occasional stories about how the Gulf workers fuelled the boom in Kerala. It was the nuclear tests in May 1998, when New Delhi floated the Resurgent India bonds to cushion the possible impact of sanctions, which first tested the depth of the NRI commitment. 76 M. V. Bijulal

Detailed interactions with workers whom the author met personally, mostly during the migrant labourers’ rights advocacy campaigns have strongly testified on such trade-offs in the life in Arab countries. Some respondents strongly observed the conflict between the moral principles of Islam – the state religion in Arab countries influencing all ethical, social, political and economic matters – and the system of exploitation in the labour sector. To many workers, such conflict explains the strengthening of new exploitative arrangements in work and the lack of formal legal/governmental systems in addressing this ethical and moral crisis in the Arab societies and cultures. The workers feel that as long as workers’ rights realization is kept in a grey area of inaction, shared by the country of origin and destination, as well as unattended by law or human rights principles, the crisis is set to remain. Since this is related to workers’ individual status as migrants, at some point they conflict with rights connected to institutional citizenship. Here, the post-national citizenship advocates’ arguments need to be considered for uniform acceptance of respect to rights when rights are restricted for a person as a citizen of a country. Benhabib (2007) recog- nizes that changes in patterns of political belonging have been accompanied by forms of exclusion, and some groups (e.g. asylum seekers and refugees) have not benefited from the spread of cosmopolitan norms. Ong 2006( , 23) similarly acknowledges that citizenship rights have been extended only to some migrants, ‘instead of all citizens enjoying a unified bundle of citizenship rights’. These read- ings constitute counter-hegemonic discourses because they question particular elements of state sovereignty and would, if accepted, undermine those facets of the global political economy that require the labour of underpaid and insecure migrants. Many circumstances connecting to lives of the expatriate lower skilled workers across the world have exposed the limitation to the term ‘global governance’ (Betts 2011: 5–8). Managed migration and its application through local and wider scales are often seen as a law-oriented initiative, with a clear role for interest groups (Mentz 2009: 5–8). Another important aspect is the increasing role of the non-state agencies in the formulation of principles as well as the prominence of humanitarian and human rights organizations in matters related to managing migrations (ibid.). The involvement of many such organizations, like Amnesty International, needs to be seen in this context: their argument is for ensuring basic human rights to all migrants, irrespective of the legal sanctity of their stay in a host country. An important, universal issue regarding the status of workers in host countries is the legally sanctioned discrimination against workers as non-citizens on various concerns connected to their social, economic, political and cultural rights. This also involves a human rights reading on contemporary practices of organizing and employing migrant workers in different parts of the world. It seeks to employ a transnational framework to restore the rights and dignity of labour, which has emerged as a major concern of academic works in legal aspects of modern slavery/ contemporary slavery (Bales 2005:41–44) and new scholarship20 in citizenship

20 New scholarship could be characterized as enquiries on the lack of human rights culture in shaping state policies as well as the role of non-state locations to advocate means to avoid a ‘legitima- tion crisis’ for states parties, in the case of ensuring rights and dignity of migrant workers. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 77

(Benhabib 2007; Basok 2009). As Aihwa Ong (2006: 15) states that migrant rights are better protected by disengaging citizenship into bundles of rights, as in the case of European countries. Ong raises this in continuation with the discussion on how it becomes important to disengage the concept of citizenship in the context of violations against migrant workers, especially in the globalized sites of hyper growth (ibid p. 23). The rights deficit for the migrant workers is quite relevant to be read along with Article 1 of the United Nations International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Considering labour as an integral part of development, this institutional model becomes more applicable with nuanced adaptations in various countries. Another important model in civil engagement is the effort to revise rights situations with the application of non-codified human rights principles. According to Basok (2009), while exploring the contributions of civil initiatives on advocating for non- hegemonic rights in the case of migrants in the USA and Canada ‘hegemonic human rights norms are congruent with liberal notions of formal equality between individuals and individual freedom from coercion, as well as principles of national sovereignty while counter-hegemonic human rights values are the ones that in one way or another challenge the status quo, either by undermining the political economic foundations of liberal democracies and/or the principles of national sovereignty. The need for open non-state perceptions on rights is furthered by Benhabib (2007) through an argument for “delinking citizenship rights, from mandatory membership in a nation-state, a core to the new human rights debate on migrants, opting for a the conceptualization of citizenship membership and more towards citizenship of residency with civil and social rights, and, in some cases, political participation rights, extended to non-citizens”.

Response from GCC Countries

Interviews with workers show that GCC countries generally avoid concerns related to poor wage structure, non-payment of salaries, lack of medical care and substandard housing. It is also to be noted that the states promulgated legislations that offered restricted participation of workers. In many cases, practices of control and exclusion clearly point to violation of universal human rights principles, inalienable and non-negotiable for the dignified and safe human existence in any situation.21 Initiatives in providing elementary forms of participation were accompanied by stringent measures against organizing or participating in strikes. To explain this

21 In 2002, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs promulgated new regulations that authorized the establishment of ‘workers’ committees’ in private businesses with 100 or more employees. The ILO Director-General Juan Somavia called this development ‘a milestone in the labor history of Saudi Arabia’, and said it was ‘gratifying for the ILO to be cooperating with a country which is making real efforts to promote social and labor rights’ (ILO 2002). 78 M. V. Bijulal situation, Human Rights Watch (2004) refers to Article 191 of the Saudi Labour Law which states: ‘Where an employee, head of an enterprise, employee or work- man stops work with the object of exerting pressure on public authorities or of protesting against a decision or measure adopted by such authorities instead of having recourse to legitimate means, each such offender shall be punished with imprisonment for a terms of 2–6 years or a fine of 4000 riyals to 10,000 riyals, or both.’ In the meantime, the Government of Saudi Arabia decided to initiate a representative system of workers in those units where 100 or more workers were enrolled. Though this development in 2002 was hailed as an important step in the history of social and labour rights by the ILO in 2009, critics mark this development as symbolic and nominal, with no real power vested in the Committee of Workers. The ILO did not publicize the fact that the committees would lack real independence. Employees in each company could form only one committee, with three to nine members. The Minister of Labour and Social Affairs must approve the committee members; the Minister and companies’ management have the right to send representatives to committee meetings; and the minutes of all meetings are required to be provided to management. There are interesting examples indicating the seamless powers of international capital in nullifying efforts to protect labour rights. In 2006 and 2007, the UAE Labour Minister Ali al-Kaabi implemented some basic life protection of measures for the workers. Mid-day work breaks during the hot, summer months was notable in this regard. In another instance, the minister ordered a well-known company to pay about $2 m as fines for failing to pay its workers. However, these labour-friendly measures ended when Mr. Kaabi was replaced in 2008, invoking doubts about the extent of acceptability of his measures. On the other hand, Bahrain is reported to have taken a consultative course to deal with situations arising from the labour unrest. One of such measures following the 2008 unrest is the setting up a commission to arbitrate in the dispute. Another important step initiated in the GCC countries is the effort to change the ethnic composition of the workforce by opening up more areas of work for nationals.22

Conclusions

The lifeworlds of labourers in the Gulf communicate a condition of statelessness, peculiar to migrant work in situations similar to bondage and distressed labour. Connecting the labour rights movements with the ongoing global process of urban development has become more relevant in this contest. There are direct linkages to the excessive pace of development (infrastructure projects in the main) and the increasing depth and spread of denials and violations of rights. In GCC countries, it

22 ‘Unified Gulf plan needed to tackle labour issues’, IANS, Wednesday, 10 September 2008, 12:30 hrs. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 79 is also important to see how Islamic principles for decent work as given in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR) are been followed.23 The unquantifiable pain of loss involved in the terms of engagement (i.e. forgoing better emotional and physical security as well as civil and cultural rights at home for more income) never becomes a valid point for academic as well as official enquiries into worker rights issues. Rather, the classic condition of alienation of less privileged migrants is seen from the logic of instrumental rationality by official and popular sources. There are two usual ways of understanding migrant rights experience which may be broadly termed as ‘methodological nationalisms’. The interpretation of rightless- ness of workers from a ‘progressive citizen’ (Varghese 2011) point of view uses a ‘nationalist diction’ which focuses on their ‘inescapable’ drudgery. Similarly, there is an academic endorsement of indispensability of progressive realization through hegemonic human rights mechanisms. Various academic outlooks are also affected, which I would refer as a ‘State plus’ category, endorsing official state positions in a conscious and unconscious manner. In this context, lies the importance of the civil society as agency to accelerate those forms of non-hegemonic spaces for the protection of workers’ rights. Worker accounts from many South Asian countries suggest an urgent need for joint diplomatic missions to take up violations with the host country in times of emergency. In the context where the importance of rights protection for migrant workers is emerging stronger in South and South East Asian countries,24 India needs to consider the safety and dignity of its citizens working in dangerous and difficult situations as a major component of its bilateral policy agenda with the GCC countries. There is a soft-pedalling in Indian policy on human rights and dignity at work to informal workers, who are in millions. Initiating academic efforts to identify common threads for an inclusive policy, focusing on rights deficits of the informal, semi-skilled and unskilled workers is pertinent in this context. Human rights approaches on the study of conditions of migrant workers (ex. Human Rights Watch (2004)) has brought in an academic turn, giving prominence to organic narratives and human rights activist reportage which attained several forms of recognition and influence in social and public policy. The migrant person having separated from assuring situations of humane and legal care at home is often forced to live in a sense of anonymity, political and social invisibility and amidst

23 Regarding the status of workers and their dignity, the preamble part G (3) is unambiguous on the stance against forced labour. Article XVII reads that ‘Islam honours work and the worker and enjoins Muslims not only to treat the worker justly but also generously. He is not only to be paid his earned wages promptly, but is also entitled to adequate rest and leisure’. Source: http://www. alhewar.com/ISLAMDECL.html. (Downloaded on 23 May 2013). 24 The proactive stance for rights of workers by some Indian officials in GCC countries has, however, led to diplomatic chaos. While this made the issue more visible, countries like Thailand and Indonesia have demanded fair wages and other facilities as minimum conditions for their citizens to work as housemaids in Gulf countries. However, this position has angered governments like Saudi Arabia, leading to a temporary ban on workers from these countries. The ban was lifted in late 2012. 80 M. V. Bijulal many forms of vulnerabilities. Body of the workers as captive site for profit has been used in such situations, resembling indentured or forced labour references of which needs to be in place while we engage with aspects of rights in transnational migration. The States and their parties must undertake a comprehensive mapping of the migration processes with emphasis on isolating factors that promoted humane and safe means. The host countries (GCC) can see how the expatriate labour force can lead a peaceful and meaningful life with more opportunities for social life for the workers. This has two dimensions: one, on the possibilities for larger interaction among various migrant communities. And, an effort to explore more areas of communication between the local population and the migrant population can be made as a second action. Both actions can be done by introducing the idea at the civil–social milieu with active roles assigned to the local citizens and the representatives of expatriates. Such efforts at enhancing communications through efforts to mutually inform the lifeworlds can bring about solutions to the present crisis of foul play, denials of rights, xenophobic tendencies, etc. Such efforts may inform a transnational action to protect and promote human rights, with the play of active, direct human persons entering the conventional areas of state-oriented management of migrant work scenario. Labour-sending countries in South and South East Asia can form an intergovernmental body to help the functioning of a people-oriented management of migration. This is especially relevant since sharing of the data (on migrant life experiences, needs, aspirations and challenges of women and men who migrate from similar economic and social situations) is essential. It is also relevant to individual countries so that they may formulate their own policies on labour, considering the changes in the factors that influence migration from a particular country to another. States need to develop immediate systems for the protection of rights to life and dignity of legal as well as undocumented migrant persons in difficult conditions. People languishing in jails, people fearing state action for non- possession of essential documents, people suffering from cruelties from employers, etc., need to be restored to their families through transparent arrangements between the governments. With the introduction of direct state-mediated recruitment channels in different GCC countries, there are chances for reducing the abuse of migrants in these countries. However, there are chances for corrupt practices by the citizens of the host country who act as recruiting agents. It is also argued that transparent traditional linkages that have maintained migration for a long time should remain. Promoting and ensuring workers’ rights to life, livelihood and dignity has to emerge as a prominent aspect of managing migration through meaningful transnational policy initiatives. Promoting the emerging concerns in defence of broader citizenship rights, both in academic writings as well as human rights defence initiatives, is the key to a meaningful transnational approach for the protection of the rights of migrant workers. 5 Contemporary Forms of Slavery, Citizenship and Human Rights of Migrant Workers… 81

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Andrew Gardner, Silvia Pessoa, Abdoulaye Diop, Kaltham Al-Ghanim, Kien Le Trung, and Laura Harkness

Abstract Though transnational labour migration in the Gulf States has increasingly been of scholarly interest, that scholarship has to date relied largely on qualitative ethnographic methodologies or small non-representative sampling strategies. This chapter presents the findings of a large representative sample of low-income migrant labourers in Qatar. The data describe the basic characteristics of the low- income migrant population in Qatar, the process by which migrants obtain employment, the frequency with which this population of migrants encounters the problems and challenges described by previous ethnographic work, and the role played by nationality, ethnicity and religion in patterning that experience. While the findings generally affirm many of the claims made in earlier ethnographic studies, they provide a means by which the extent of these problems and challenges can be ascertained more directly.

Introduction

By some estimates, labour migration to the petroleum-rich states of the Arabian Peninsula comprises the third-largest transnational migration flow in the contemporary world (ESCWA 2007; Gardner 2011). Current estimates suggest that more than 11 million foreign workers are currently employed in the region.1 Given that many

1 See Martin Baldwin-Edwards for a recent estimate [Baldwin-Edwards, ‘Labour Immigration and Labour Markets in the GCC Countries: National Patterns and Trends’ (2011)]. Andrzej Kapiszewski estimated the 2004 total to be over 12.5 million [Kapiszewski, ‘Arab Versus Asian Migrant Workers in the GCC Countries’, United Nations Secretariat (2006), p. 3].

A. Gardner (*) University of Puget Sound, Tacoma, WA, USA S. Pessoa · L. Harkness Carnegie Mellon University, Ar-Rayyan, Qatar A. Diop · K. Al-Ghanim · K. Le Trung Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI), Qatar University (QU), Doha, Qatar

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 83 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_6 84 A. Gardner et al. migrants remain in the GCC states for only one or two contract periods, and considering that many of them are best conceptualized as emissaries of large Asian and African households that are deeply dependent on Gulf-sourced remittances, it seems obvious that the millions of foreign workers currently employed in the region are only the visible component of the total social field encompassed by Gulf migration. However, the scale of labour migration to the Arabian Peninsula stands in stark contrast, to the lack of data concerning labour migration in the region. In part, this lack can be attributed to the traditional peripheralization of the GCC states in the larger field of Middle Eastern studies. But, it is also due to the long-standing anxieties of the authoritarian regimes typical of the Peninsula, since research and scholarly inquiry focused on the transnational migrant populations has often been made difficult, if not impossible, by the results of such anxieties. Yet even in Qatar – where for the last 5 years the state has, ostensibly, been interested in learning more about the living and working conditions faced by the migrants in the region – relevant publications and accessible data concerning migrant populations remain few and far between. This chapter seeks to address this dearth of material by describing a subset of the findings produced by a large, 2-year project funded by the Qatar National Research Fund.2 Recognizing that much of the qualitative and ethnographic work concerned with labour migration in the Gulf States has been focused on the challenges, problems and rights-based issues facing migrants in the region, this project sought specifically to develop a quantitative portrait of issues previously identified through qualitative and ethnographic analysis.3 We also sought to verify, and potentially improve upon, the findings of the occasional small-scale survey projects that under- pin substantial portions of contemporary analysis of migration in the Gulf.4 Building

2 This publication was made possible by a grant from the Qatar National Research Fund under its National Priorities Research Program (award #09–857–5-123). Its contents are solely the responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official views of the Qatar National Research Fund. 3 Longva, Walls Built on Sand: Migration, Exclusion and Society in Kuwait (1997); Longva, ‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check: The Kafala System in the Gulf’, Middle East Report 211 (1999); Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle: Transnationalism and Sri Lanka’s Migrant Housemaids (2000); Kapiszewski, Nationals and Expatriates: Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Cooperation Council States (2001); Jureidini, ‘Migrant Workers and Xenophobia in the Middle East’ (2003); Gardner, City of Strangers: Gulf Migration and the Indian Community in Bahrain (2010); Gardner, ‘Engulfed: Indian Guest Workers, Bahraini Citizens and the Structural Violence of the Kafala System’, in The Deportation Regime: Sovereignty, Space, and Freedom of Movement, eds De Genova and Peutz (2010); Gardner, ‘Gulf Migration and the Family’; Strobl, ‘Policing Housemaids: The Criminalization of Domestic Workers in Bahrain’, British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009); Kanna, Dubai: The City as Corporation (2011). 4 For example, see: Human Rights Watch, ‘Dubai: Migrant Workers at Risk’ (2003); Human Rights Watch, ‘Building Towers, Cheating Workers: Exploitation of Migrant Construction Workers in the United Arab Emirates’ (2006); Human Right Watch, The Island of Happiness: Exploitation of Migrant Workers on Saadiyat Island, Abu Dhabi (2009); Human Rights Watch, ‘Building a Better World Cup: Protecting Migrant Workers in Qatar Ahead of FIFA 2022’ (2012); Human Rights Watch, ‘For a Better Life: Migrant Worker Abuse in Bahrain and the Government Reform Agenda’ 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 85 on the sampling framework developed by the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI) at Qatar University for its 2010 Omnibus Survey, our research team devised a comprehensive structure through which a representative sample of 1189 low-income migrants in Qatar was surveyed during February and March 2012.5 In addition, the team conducted a series of follow-up interviews with a subset of the survey participants throughout 2012, to help clarify the particularly puzzling and complex issues revealed through our analysis of the survey data. Overall, the survey administered to a random sample of these low-income migrants in Qatar was attentive to 95 distinct variables. This is obviously too large a number to be dealt with in any comprehensive fashion here. Instead, the analysis concentrates on the sets of variables pertaining to three distinct questions: First, what do these data reveal about the basic characteristics of the low-income population of labourers in Qatar? Second, what do these data reveal about the variations in the ways migrants obtain work in Qatar? Third, what perceptible roles do nationality, ethnicity and religion play in determining migrants’ various experiences while abroad in Qatar? Finally, the discussion and conclusion of this chapter provides an opportunity to explore further what these data reveal about the labour problems typically portrayed by ethnographic and qualitative research conducted among this migrant population. Following a brief discussion of the methodology used, these questions and issues provide a roadmap to the remainder of the chapter.

Survey Data and Methodology

The key to our contribution to the existing literature is the representative sample underlying these findings. Our goal was to explore the experiences of low-income workers in Qatar. Therefore, our sample was limited to foreign workers with an income of less than QR2,000 (US$549) per month. This arbitrary delineation, based on ethnographic work conducted in Qatar and elsewhere in the GCC region, seemed to represent a viable threshold between the ‘unskilled’ and ‘low-skill’ underclass of

(2012); Endo and Afram, ‘The Qatar-Nepal Remittance Corridor’, World Bank Study (2011); ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’, Union View 21 (2011). 5 The first Omnibus Survey was conducted by SESRI in Qatar in 2010, and looked at ‘Qatari citizens, resident expatriates, and migrant laborers’ [SESRI, ‘First Annual Omnibus Survey: A Survey of Life in Qatar’ (2010), p. i]. Our project utilized portions of the SESRI team’s sampling frame, particularly that for labour camps, and significantly expanded the scope of questions included in the survey, so as to reflect the substantial ethnographic findings that had explored the experiences of transnational migrants over the past decade. The list of labour camps comprising this sampling frame was assembled by SESRI, in cooperation with the government ministries that administer utilities to these camps. As discussed in the conclusion of this chapter, while this sampling frame allowed us to derive a representative sample of low-income migrants in Qatar, it does not include the smaller portion of migrants who live and work in the domestic sector, nor the small but substantial portion of migrants who do not dwell in ‘labour camps’. 86 A. Gardner et al. foreign workers and the ‘semi-skilled’ lower middle class.6 Our respondents, framed as ‘low-income’ migrants or labourers in the remainder of this chapter, comprise the largest segment of the foreign workforce in Qatar and, indeed, in all the GCC states. However, beyond this purposeful limitation, our sampling strategy did not allow us any access to workers in the domestic sector – the drivers, nannies, maids, gar- deners, servants and other domestic workers typically employed by Qatari and elite expatriate households. Although the domestic sector of the foreign workforce in the region has been the subject of intensive scrutiny and international rights-based criticism, social norms in Qatar make it extremely difficult for survey enumerators (and, for that matter, any outsiders) to have access to these men and women. This is a noteworthy caveat to the findings presented here and will be further discussed in the chapter’s conclusion. As noted, the sampling frame was based on a comprehensive list of migrant labour dwellings in Qatar assembled by SESRI at Qatar University for Qatar’s first omnibus survey. These labour camps were divided into five strata, ranging from very small (those with less than seven inhabitants) to very large (those with 200 or more inhabitants). Based on these five categories, we employed proportionate stratified sampling to randomly select larger numbers of subjects from larger camps and smaller numbers of subjects from smaller camps. Supervisors initially visited each camp to deploy this sampling procedure and identify the languages spoken by randomly selected subjects.7 These subjects were then visited by a linguistically appropriate survey enumerator. In addition to the pre-test of the survey instrument and debriefing meetings with interviewers and supervisors, all the interviewers were trained for a period of 3 days before the survey began. With this training, the research team was able to ensure that all the interviewing staff members had a clear understanding of the objectives of the study and a detailed understanding of the survey instrument. Overall, 1189 interviews were completed using this procedure, yielding a maximum margin of error of ±4.4%. This overall sampling strategy was to ensure the representativeness of the sample and to increase the accuracy of the estimates derived from the data set. The term ‘low-income migrant’, perhaps, requires a brief explanation, particularly as we envision this as an unfamiliar and, perhaps, unwelcome addition to the lexicon of terms used to describe the foreign workers on the Arabian Peninsula. In the authors’ long experience with the population of foreign workers in the region,

6 For example, see the ethnographic project A Longitudinal Analysis of Low-Income Laborers in Contemporary Qatar, funded by the Center for International and Regional Studies at the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, and resulting in: Gardner, ‘Why Do They Keep Coming? Labor Migrants in the Gulf States’, in Migrant Labour in the Persian Gulf, eds Kamrava and Babar (2012). 7 Initial visits by survey supervisors provided an opportunity to update information about the labour camp (or collective household) and to inform camp managers about the research project’s official relationship and its sponsorship by the Qatar government. In the context of the GCC, such visits improve cooperation and facilitate access to the camps. In the survey, 3.76% of the labour camps (19 of 504) denied our team access. Two of those 19 camps or collective households were for female labour. 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 87 we developed a deep skepticism about any strong correlation between skill levels and income levels in the Gulf. The term ‘low-income migrant’ reflects this convic- tion and the nature of our sample. Our concern was only with the migrants’ economic class in the Gulf and was consciously blind to the fact that many of these migrant men and women earning QR2,000 or less have extraordinary training, skills and previous work experiences that go unremunerated in the Gulf labour force.

Basic Characteristics of Low-Income Migrants in Qatar

The low-income migrants in our sample came from more than 25 different countries. The largest contingent of low-income labourers in Qatar, comprising 39% of the total sample, came from Nepal. India (29%), Sri Lanka (9%) and Bangladesh (9%) were next, followed by the Philippines (5%), Pakistan (3%) and Egypt (3%).8 The remaining nationalities made up about 2% of the total sample. Almost all the migrants surveyed were male, which is explained partly by the preponderance of male labourers in this transnational circuit, and partly also by our sampling frame’s omission of the domestic sector in which many low-income female migrants are employed. In addition, the low-income labour migrant population in Qatar is relatively young, with an average and median age of 32 and 30 years respectively. Overall, 72% of low-income migrants in Qatar were married at the time of the survey, and on average, low-income migrants supported an average of 2.4 children. Considering the states that send the most low-income labourers to Qatar, the religious constitution of the low-income workforce was unsurprising. Nearly half of the respondents (49%) were Hindu, and a substantial number were Muslim (37%). Smaller proportions of the workers identified themselves as Christians (9%), Buddhists (5%), or adherents to other religions (less than 1%). Education levels of low-income migrants in Qatar vary, with low-income migrants having on average completed 8.7 years of education. Almost all migrants in Qatar report themselves as being literate in their native language (93%). However, regarding the languages that they used in Qatar’s public sphere, only 18% of low-income migrants reported being able to speak at least some Arabic, while approximately a third (32%) could speak at least some English. One open question in the existing literature ponders the duration of stay for transnational migrants in the GCC. While there is no question that the presence of a foreign underclass has become a perennial demographic characteristic of all the GCC States, some have suggested that individual transnational migrants are

8 These percentages differ slightly from those previously reported in Qatar. For example, the 2010 SESRI Omnibus survey found that the Filipino migrant population made up 10% of the total migrant population. These differences are partly explained by the continually shifting sources of foreign labour throughout the GCC, but more directly by the QR2,000 screening for monthly income deployed in this survey. 88 A. Gardner et al.

increasingly extending their stay in the region.9 Our data are more indicative of the opposite – that the low-income labour force in Qatar remains a temporary and transnationally cyclical labour force. The duration of stay of low-income migrants in Qatar varied, from less than 1 year to 45 years, with a mean of 5.5 years and a median of 4 years. Over half of the migrants we sampled (58%) had been present in Qatar 4 years or less. The graph in Fig. 6.1 presents the overall distribution of the migrants’ length of stay in Qatar in early 2012, the time of the survey (Fig. 6.1). Our survey also asked subjects to estimate how long they intended to remain in Qatar. While their long-range plans and aspirations are frequently scuttled by the challenging realities of life as a labour migrant in Qatar, on average the migrants in our survey intended to remain in Qatar for an average of 3.6 years beyond the date they were surveyed (after excluding 17% of respondents who said they did not know). However, a bit more inspection of the data revealed interesting and noteworthy patterns. First, of the 1189 migrants surveyed, over one-fifth intended to return home after the conclusion of their current contract. Moreover, the average intended stay was much higher for migrants from some sending states such as Pakistan (6.8 years) and Egypt (6 years) than for those from Bangladesh (4.9), India (3.7), the Philippines (3.2) and Nepal (2.6 years). Overall, we believe that this quantitative portrait of low-income migrants in Qatar indicates that substantial numbers of migrants – and particularly South Asian migrants – clearly conceptualize their stay as a temporary one. This portrait of low-income migrants in Qatar generally fits descriptions of the migrant population as a temporary and transnationally cyclical population rather than a growing and imminent population of semi-permanent diasporic residents.

30 25 20 t 15 Percen 10 5 0 less than 22 to 34 to 56 to 78 to 910 or more Years since beginning work in Qatar

Fig. 6.1 Duration of low-income migrants’ stay in Qatar, 2012

9 For example, this was a central premise in recent workshop convened at Oxford University, entitled Migrations to the Gulf Countries: From Exception to Normality, held on 18 June 2010. 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 89

Further extending this hypothesis, our survey found that low-income migrants in Qatar typically had little or no previous work experience outside their home country. The great majority of low-income foreign workers in Qatar (68%) were first- time migrants. Conversely, about one-third (32%) of the low-income migrants in Qatar had previous experience working outside their country of origin. Nearly two- thirds of those previous migrants (64%, or 21% of the total sample) had previous work experience specifically in one of the GCC states. Although previous labour migration experience was varied, low-income migrants in Qatar were employed in a constellation of different vocations. Altogether, survey participants listed more than 80 different job titles. A quarter (25%) of the participants described their job title as ‘labourer’ or ‘helper’, job titles that are often (but not always) analogous to the Euro-American idea of a ‘construction worker’. Other common responses included driver (10%), cleaner (6%), mason (5%), carpenter (6%), electrician (4%), painter (3%), salesman (3%) and security guard (3%). The average and median monthly salaries reported by the foreign workers in our sample were respectively QR1,061 (US$291) and QR1,000 (US$274). On average, the workers in our sample sent home an average of QR764 (US$209) every month, with an average monthly living expense in Qatar of QR418 (US$114). In addition to the migrant’s reported basic salary, low-income migrants reported various other sources of remuneration while in Qatar: Over half (56%) worked overtime and received overtime pay, with a monthly average amount of QR327 (US$90); a third (33%) received a food allowance, with a monthly average amount of QR228 (US$63); only 2% of the migrants surveyed had additional remunerated part time work, with an average monthly supplemental income of QR399 (US$110). As many researchers have noted, much of the money remitted from Qatar and the other Gulf States is typically used, first and foremost, to service debts incurred to send migrants to the Gulf States in the first place. As discussed in Sect. 4 of this chapter, low- income labourers in Qatar report a mean total migration cost of US$1031. While nearly 3 of 10 (29%) of our respondents reported paying nothing for migration, the amount of the average migration cost for low-income migrants is considerable, given the average of the salaries reported by respondents in our sample.10 Overall, the findings presented in this section generally align with the qualitative estimations described previously by researchers and scholars working in the GCC. Through the processes of chain migration, the composition of the low-income labour forces in other GCC states often differs significantly. Although the national proportions in these low-income migrant populations may vary between GCC countries, in the GCC states, all the various migrant populations are nationally diverse.

10 In our data set, we utilized a ‘total cost of migration’ estimate because we felt that the migrants themselves could provide us with a better and more reliable estimate than we could generate using any method that attempted to grapple with the diversity of costs they often face. For reliability, these costs were reported to us in the home (sending country) currency. Considering the fact that the migrants in our sample had arrived in Qatar in several different decades, we adjusted and con- verted these amounts to US dollars based on the appropriate exchange rates at the time the amount was paid. 90 A. Gardner et al.

In Qatar, this low-income migrant labour force is also religiously diverse and consists mostly of first-time migrants. Even though our sample was specifically tailored to locate and survey workers who make under QR2,000 a month, we were nonetheless surprised by the variable levels of income within those parameters. In all these reported data, we saw ample evidence of a migration system that results in a transitory and temporary workforce. As reported, the vast majority of low-income migrants were relatively new arrivals in Qatar, and large numbers of our respondents wished to return home permanently at the conclusion of their current contract or after the contract following the current one. Although it is clear that foreign workers have become a perennial feature of GCC demography, we see little support for contentions that the majority of migrants in Qatar have established a more permanent life abroad or intend to do so.

Arranging for Work in Qatar

In the existing literature concerning labour migration in the Gulf States, there is little clarity about the processes and procedures by which potential migrants secure employment in Qatar or the other GCC states. With some notable exceptions, detailed qualitative portraits of the transnational labour brokerage system are not available.11 In part, this is because more pressing issues (migrants’ experiences while abroad, remittance flows to sending countries) have eclipsed concern for this particular and complicated juncture of the migration experience. Perhaps more importantly, the labour brokerage system in the sending states is difficult to study: labour brokers are reluctant to speak about their methods and profits, and the system itself is geographically diffuse. While it does not provide a comprehensive portrait of the mechanics of the labour brokerage system, this section of the chapter does explore those parts of our data set that relate directly to the process by which employment is obtained in Qatar. For readers unfamiliar with labour migration in Qatar and the Arab Gulf States, all migrants to the GCC submit to the sponsorship system (in Arabic, the kafala). This system locks the foreign worker to a particular job, and that worker’s sponsor is his or her primary representative in the institutions and ministries that regulate the migrant population. He or she cannot legally obtain other employment in Qatar without that sponsor’s permission. As a system, the kafala exists at the junction between law and custom,12 reinforced by legal contracts, typically 2 years in length,

11 Notable exceptions include Gamburd, The Kitchen Spoon’s Handle (2000); Breeding, ‘India- Persian Gulf Migration: Corruption and Capacity in Regulating Recruitment Agencies’, in Migrant Labour in the Persian Gulf, eds Kamrava and Babar (2012). 12 The historical emergence of the kafala is perhaps best described by Elizabeth Frantz in ‘Exporting Subservience: Sri Lanka Women’s Migration for Domestic Work in Jordan’ (2011). For an explanation of the connections between culture and the kafala as law, see Gardner, ‘Engulfed’, (2010), pp. 212–13. 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 91 signed by most migrants. Over the past decades, the work visas that permit men and women to enter this employment system have been commodified. Prospective migrants often pay hundreds or even thousands of dollars for the right to work in Qatar or one of the other Gulf States for 2 years (Human Rights Watch 2009; Gardner 2010a, b); in doing so, they typically risk significant familial and household resources. The debts incurred to meet these migration costs remain in the sending country; migrants in Qatar often spend their first year or more attempting to pay back the debts incurred for the visa costs associated with their transnational migration (Gardner 2011, 2012). Over the past decade, the kafala (sponsorship system) and the labour brokerage system have been the focal point of a global human-rights- based critique.13 Qatar and many of the other GCC states have long been exploring the possibility of altering aspects of this system in response to these assessments (Anon 2012; Toumi 2012). In our sample, over half of the migrants (56%) reportedly obtained their position in Qatar through a labour broker in their home country. Most of the remainder secured their position through family connections (21%) or friends (22%) already working in Qatar. This clearly suggests that the formal labour migration system (labour brokerages in sending countries, mostly connected to manpower agencies or other employers in the receiving countries) continues to coexist with the informal, network-based system that historically characterized labour migration to the region. In addition to these variable pathways to employment in Qatar and the GCC, we found that over half (60%) of the migrants in our survey had friends or family who had previously migrated to the Gulf States. We interpret this number as notably low: Despite decades of migration between the common sending states and the GCC, a vast reservoir of human capital with little or no experience with, and understanding of, the Gulf migration system continues to flow to Qatar and the other GCC states. While there is often consternation in Qatar and the other GCC states about undocumented migrants, almost all (96%) of the low-income workers in our survey arrived under a formal work visa. Although previous qualitative analysis often portrays the associated work visa fees as a ubiquitous aspect of Gulf migration, we were surprised to find that only 71% of the migrants in our sample paid for their visa. Low-income migrants in Qatar paid an average of US$1031 for the right to work in Qatar for 2 years (with a median amount of US$933). Since this is a substantial sum for most potential migrants and their respective households, and since a large majority of low-income migrants pay these work visa fees, our survey also explored how migrants assembled the necessary funds. The three most significant sources of funding for these trips were loans (reported by 45% of migrants surveyed), household/family savings (30%) and personal savings (26%). Ideally, this transnational labour brokerage system provides potential migrants with an opportunity to inspect and sign a labour contract in the sending country prior to any agreement and prior to departure. However, in our survey, less than half

13 For example, ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Building a Better World Cup’. 92 A. Gardner et al.

(44%) of low-income migrants signed a contract before departing for work in Qatar, and most (78%) of those who did sign a contract before departing for Qatar were required to sign another contract when they arrived in Qatar. Conversely, of the 56% of low-income migrants who did not sign a contract before departing, slightly more than two-thirds (67%) were required to sign one upon arrival. Overall, these findings point to a diversity of processes and arrangements that continues to coexist in Qatar: Some migrants never sign a contract, some migrants sign one contract before departure, some migrants sign a contract only after arrival in Qatar, and some migrants sign contracts before departure and after arrival. The large number of low- income migrants who do not sign a contract before leaving for Qatar is surprising: without a signed contract prior to departure, new migrants have to rely on the verbal assurances of labour brokers, acquaintances and friends working in Qatar. Overall, the transnational labour brokerage system and the labour contracts in that system are portrayed as a key junction in the ongoing generation of labour problems, exploitation and human trafficking in Qatar and the GCC (Human Rights Watch 2012a, b; Gardner 2011, 2012; Breeding 2012). The data presented here reinforce that analysis and, more generally, reinforce the role that misinformation, deception and unrealistic expectations continue to play in the migration conduit which shuttles migrants to Qatar and the other GCC countries (Gardner 2012).

Labour Problems

Qatar and all the GCC states perennially occupy the lower rungs of the US Department of State’s Human Trafficking Report and have, in the past decade, been subjected to scathing criticism for the various human rights violations systematically endured by migrants throughout the region (US Department of State 2007; Human Rights Watch 2006, 2009, 2012a, b). These reports and evaluations were preceded by a decade of ethnographic work that discerned many of the same problems and conditions among the population of foreign workers in the GCC states. Much of the existing work, while qualitative in nature, paints a fairly dire portrait of the living conditions and labour relations faced by migrants in the region. This section reviews our findings in relation to several of the most commonly discussed problems reported in the existing literature: passport confiscation, lack of documentation, job switching, salary withholding and problems related to labour camps and living conditions common to low-income foreign workers in Qatar and the neighbouring states. One of the most commonly reported problems in current research among migrants in the Gulf States focuses on the control and possession of the migrant’s passport. By law, Qatari sponsors or their delegates are allowed to possess the passports of the workers they sponsor only for the period of time required to complete residency or renewal processes (Jaffir2009 ). However, as researchers and human rights activists have long noted, it is common practice for employers to maintain 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 93 possession of worker passports for the entire duration of their stay abroad.14 This practice is often framed by employers as means of ensuring workers do not flee the country or otherwise abscond from their contractual obligations. Our findings confirmed the widespread nature of passport confiscation among the lowest economic segment of the foreign workforce: 90% of the respondents in our survey reported that their employer possessed their passport.15 It is worth noting that our qualitative interviews also revealed that some migrants were content with the status quo, particularly since they felt they had no secure location at their labour camps in which to store important documents like the passport. Regardless of the migrant perspective on this issue, the high proportion of migrants who lack possession of their passport is a testament to the poor enforcement of this law. Although possession of the passport remains a predominant issue for migrants, sponsors and their proxies also fail frequently to document, properly and legally, the workers they bring to Qatar under the sponsorship system. Small sections of the foreign workforce are partly undocumented, in the sense that they have never received a residence permit, or that a previously valid residence permit was never renewed. In our survey, 7% of the foreign workers reported that they did not have a QID (residence permit). Similarly, a much larger percentage (56%) of the workers lacked a government-mandated ‘health card’, which is needed for accessing health care in the state’s expansive public health system. Failing to provide low-income migrants with a residence permit and/or a health card is generally assumed to result from employers seeking to avoid the fees and surcharges levied by the government for each of these types of official documentation. Salary withholding is also commonly identified as a widespread problem among this segment of the foreign workforce in Qatar and the other GCC states. Through the imbalances of power resulting from the sponsorship arrangement, through the lack of enforcement or regulation of employer practices and through the inexperi- ence of many first-time migrants to the region, unscrupulous sponsors can readily withhold months of salary from employees. In our findings, 21% of low-income workers in Qatar reported that they received their salary on time only sometimes, rarely or never. This should be compared with the 79% who reported that they ‘usually’ or ‘always’ received their salary on time. The average amount owed to these workers was QR 1750 (US$481) with a median amount of QR 1400 (US$385). Our survey also asked respondents to identify the employers’ justifications for withholding their salaries. Those justifications included deductions related to ‘visa

14 For example, Longva, Walls Built on Sand; Longva, ‘Keeping Migrant Workers in Check’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Dubai: Migrant Workers at Risk’; McGeehan, ‘Trafficking in Persons or State Sanctioned Exploitation? The False Narrative of Migrant Workers in the United Arab Emirates’, Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Law, 26 (2012). 15 Although previous surveys in Qatar have, at times, utilized different methodologies and designs, earlier reports concerning the frequency of passport confiscation in Qatar have been strikingly similar: 91% [SESRI, ‘First Annual Omnibus Survey’, p. 17] and 88% [Pessoa et al., ‘The State of Migrant Workers in Qatar’, p. 11]. 94 A. Gardner et al. fees’, absence from the workplace, perceived poor job performance, ‘agent fees’, insurance and ‘security deposit’. Survey respondents, quite commonly, also reported that no reason was given at all. While most low-income workers in Qatar always or usually receive their salary on time, the experience of this 21% of the low-income workforce suggests that employers and their proxies, empowered by the sponsorship relationship and the lack of oversight, can and sometimes do act with impunity with regard to their employees’ salary. Our findings related to ‘job switching’ – the reportedly common scenario in which migrants are promised one job in their home country, but find themselves on arrival directed to work in an entirely different job – were somewhat ambivalent. In Qatar, 15% of low-income migrants found themselves put to work a different position when they arrived. Similarly, 20% arrived in Qatar to a salary different from the one promised to them in the sending country. However, when we correlated these two sets of workers with answers to a second survey question concerning overall job satisfaction in Qatar, in both cases the number of migrants who self-reported as being ‘satisfied’ or ‘somewhat satisfied’ with their job was significantly higher than those who were ‘somewhat unsatisfied’ or ‘not satisfied at all’ (78% versus 47% in the case of having the same job, and 78% versus 56% in the case of receiving the promised salary). These findings suggest that while ‘job switching’ (and alterations to the promised salary) are relatively common, those changes are not always perceived by migrants as detrimental to their overall interests. Finally, our research team asked low-income migrants a series of questions related to the labour camps in which most of them live. A great majority of the low- income migrants in Qatar (88%) reported that their accommodation in Qatar was provided by their employer, while the rest arranged for their own accommodation. Regarding the labour camps themselves, survey enumerators recorded the type of camp for all participants in the survey. Dormitory-style camps were the most common (40%), followed by ‘villa camps’ (single Qatari family homes now occupied by contingents of workers) (25%), apartment flats (16%), portacabins (7%), private homes (5%) and other types of accommodations (7%) (Fig. 6.2).16 As noted earlier in this chapter, migrants in Qatar reported an average of just over six people per room. The survey also inquired about the supplies of electricity, water and the provision of air conditioning. Overall, small proportions of low-income migrants faced challenges in this area: 5% reported that they sometimes or never had sufficient water at their camp, 2% reported that they sometimes or never had a sufficient supply of electricity at their camp and 2% reported that they sometimes or never had ample air conditioning in their rooms.

16 For more information and detail concerning labour camps in Qatar and the GCC, see Bruslé, ‘Who’s in a Labour Camp? A Socio-Economic Analysis of Nepalese Migrants in Qatar’, European Bulletin of Himalayan Research 35–6 (2009–10); Gardner, ‘Labor Camps in the Gulf States’, Viewpoints: Migration and the Gulf (2010); Marsden, ‘Lords of a Dubai Labour Camp: Pakistani Migrants in the Gulf’, ILAS Newsletter 49 (2008). 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 95

Fig. 6.2 Living quarters for low-income labor migrants in qatar

Nationality, Ethnicity, Religion and Migrant Success

One of the open questions amenable to quantitative analysis in labour migration studies in the Arabian Gulf concerns the variability of migration experiences among the low-income population. So far, this chapter has considered the surveyed population as a homogeneous group. In this section, however, we examine and explore patterns and variations in the circumstances and experiences of low-income migrants, with particular attention to variations by nationality, ethnicity and religion. Although the sample sizes for some of these migrant subpopulations were small, we nonetheless discerned the significant role played by some of these variables in determining low-income labourers’ circumstances and experiences in Qatar. Because of the limitations of our sample, these findings should be understood as suggestive rather than representative. With the limitations of the sample in mind, the data allowed us to explore the impact of nationality on migrant experiences and outcomes. Significant differences are readily apparent in the basic salary levels received by low-income migrant labourers from different sending countries when obtaining work in Qatar. Basic monthly salaries for low-income workers from the Philippines (mean = QR1,443) and Egypt (mean = QR1,454) were, for example, substantially higher than those obtained by workers from Nepal (mean = QR853), the lowest-earning nationality in Qatar’s population of low-income migrants. Moreover, obvious correlations between average monthly salaries and the value of the commodified Qatari work visa were not apparent (Fig. 6.3): for instance, low-income Bangladeshi migrants paid much more for the right to work in Qatar than other nationalities, but arrived to earn some of the lowest wages (mean = QR1,050/month) among all low-income migrants. Conversely, Filipino workers were among the highest earners from our sample of low-income workers (mean = QR1,443/month), but paid the least in total migration costs to come to Qatar. 96 A. Gardner et al.

Fig. 6.3 Monthly basic salary and migration costs, by nationality

Overall, these data and variations by nationality can be partly explained by a confluence of forces and processes in the transnational migration industry that shuttles workers from sending states to Qatar and the other states of the GCC. Some sending states have established bilateral agreements or unilateral policies that insulate migrants from exploitative labour relations, that instigate minimum wages for their transnational migrants, or that help potential migrants navigate the complexities of a transnational work arrangement before they travel abroad. In the Philippines, for example, the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 established a certification process for host countries, increased oversight of recruitment agencies, levied penalties for common offenses (including illegal recruitment) and much more (Agunias et al., 2012). Variations induced by these policies and agreements often coalesce with the organic patterning of labour migration to the region, a process through which men and women from particular sending states are perceived by GCC-based sponsors, manpower agencies and employers as ‘appropriate’ for particular types of work (Indonesian women as domestic servants, West African migrants as security guards and so forth). Combined with the process of chain migration (where migrants already in Qatar arrange for friends or acquaintances to follow their migratory path) and price-based competition in the globalized labour market, numerous forces and processes collude in patterning this transnational migration flow over time. We were also interested in the impact of ethnicity and cultural affiliation on migration experiences. To gauge the differences in the migration experiences by ethnicity, we classified all of our respondents into one of three categories: South Asian, Arab or Other. ‘South Asian’ included low-income migrant workers from Nepal, India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Bangladesh. In our sample, ‘Arab’ included migrant workers primarily from Egypt, along with a few migrant workers from Syria. The classification of ‘Other’, omitted from Tables6.1 and 6.2, included migrants from Southeast Asia, Africa and elsewhere. While many of the variables established in our survey yielded no discernible differences when examined through the lens of ethnicity, we noted significant differences in several key areas when comparing the experiences of these two ethnic groups (Table 6.1). For example, although our sample included only small numbers of Arab migrants, those migrants’ 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 97

Table 6.1 Averages for key variables, by ethnicity Basic salary Total migration Workdays/ Owed money by (QAR) cost (USD) week Roommates employer? Arab 1446 1604 5.87 4.93 0.0% South 1028 1052 6.18 6.17 11.0% Asian

Table 6.2 Averages for key variables for South Asian migrants, by religion Basic salary Total migration Workdays/ Owed money by (QAR) cost (USD) week Roommates employer? Muslim 1169 1190 6.10 5.60 13.16% Hindu 916 984 6.22 6.63 9.46% salaries were, on average, QR418 (US$114) higher than their South Asian counterparts. Those higher salaries, however, corresponded with higher up-front costs for migration to Qatar. On average, low-income migrants from Egypt and Syria paid almost QR552 (US$151) more for the right to work in Qatar than those from the South Asia. Once in Qatar, Arab low-income migrants in our sample reported working fewer days per week and living in slightly less crowded conditions; unlike their South Asian counterparts, they reported no problems with salary withholding (Table 6.1).17 The data do not allow us to ascertain some of the causal forces determining these differences, but we can at least speculate on the basis of our own observations, qualitative follow-up interviews and other previous ethnographic work. However, from those sources, we speculate that even low-income Arab migrants, with a cultural and linguistic facility in Qatari society, are better able to assert their basic rights, build and call upon social capital while abroad, navigate the bureaucratic complexities of work in Qatar and respond appropriately to alterations in their living and working situation while abroad. While the total cost of migration to Qatar is higher for this Arab sub-population of the low-income workforce, our data reveal that their living and working conditions are substantially better than those of their South Asian counterparts. With those findings concerning ethnicity and migration in hand, we approached the same issues again through the lens of religion. By distilling only those cases where our respondents were South Asian, we were able to examine the impact of religious affiliation on the migration experience and circumstances, while controlling for ethnicity (Table 6.2). Our findings were much less conclusive than when driven by ethnicity alone: While low-income Muslim migrants from South Asia earn an average of QR248 more than their Hindu counterparts and live in less crowded conditions, their workdays per week are almost equal, and Muslim low- income foreign workers from South Asia actually report a higher frequency of

17 Note that the small numbers of Arab migrants in our sample make these data speculative at best. 98 A. Gardner et al. employers withholding their salary than their Hindu counterparts (Table 6.2). In our interpretation, these data suggest that unlike ethnicity, cultural affiliation and fluency in Arabic, religious affiliation alone does not play a discernibly significant role in the migrant’s experience in the foreign low-income workforce in Qatar. Overall, while our general findings suggest that low-income migrant labourers in Qatar face a similar regime of strictures, practices and challenges, there is significant variation within the total population of low-income migrants. Of the three variables explored in this section, nationality and ethnicity seem to play the most significant role in shaping migrant experiences. In part, these differences can be explained by the historical development and subsequent differentiation of the migration apparatus in each sending state. Over time, we hypothesize that migration experiences and migration costs become established and normalized in a variety of different cultural and ethnic contexts. The large and substantial fees paid to labour brokers in Bangladesh, for example, become normalized over time in Bangladesh, while the smaller fees paid by Filipino migrants are, over time, normalized in the Philippines as the typical and appropriate costs of Gulf employment. At the same time, however, there is the striking coincidence that the Philippines, with one of the most active states in terms of its regulation and management of this transnational migration flow, is also the nation with the lowest migration costs in the constellation of countries sending low-income migrants to Qatar. We also recognize that market forces most certainly play a role in this calculus. The fact that the lowest-paid national contingent (the Nepali contingent) is also the largest component of Qatar’s low-income labour force is what one would expect in an international market in which labour is the commodity. Our interpretation of these data is influenced by the numerous stories we heard in qualitative interviews concerning entire national contingents of low-income labourers being replaced by less expensive migrants from Nepal or elsewhere. While we recognize the important role played by the forces implicit in this international market for labour in determining the constitution of the low-income labour force in Qatar and the other GCC states, the data presented in this section also point to the role of nationality, ethnicity and cultural affiliation in shaping the experiences of the men and women in the low- income foreign labour force.

Discussion and Conclusion

The burgeoning quantity of research, studies and reports concerned with Qatar and its neighbours have spotlighted the junction between labour migration and human rights in the GCC. Our growing understanding of this migratory conduit has long relied on a qualitative, ethnographic foundation. That ethnographic work has explored and unpacked the complex arrangements and junctures that typify this migrant flow and has more recently been joined by a florescence of publications from non-governmental organizations and other state-based actors and institutions. While all of this collective work has been instrumental in shifting concern with 6 A Portrait of Low-Income Migrants in Contemporary Qatar 99 labour migration in the GCC away from the periphery of scholarly and public attention, our collective understanding remains largely limited to ethnographically produced insights and their corroboration in small-scale studies and rapid appraisals.18 The data set and analysis presented in this chapter are intended to address this issue and to add a statistical foundation to our current understanding of labour migration in Qatar and the GCC as a whole. While we see no points of major disagreement with the existing canon of research concerning migrants in the Gulf States, the findings presented here help by adding to the expanding and nuanced portrait of the labour migrant in Arabia. These findings also indicate a host of more specific issues that merit further research and analysis. From our vantage point, some of those specific issues would include the fact that low-income migrants pay extraordinarily different amounts for the right to work in Qatar for 2 years. These amounts certainly vary by sending nation, but they also coexist with the fact that some low-income migrants pay nothing at all. A better understanding of the brokerage system, the commodification of the work visa and the circumstances that produce exceptions to the norm is needed. A significant percentage of low-income migrants also encounter a constellation of labour problems in Qatar, from the almost ubiquitous relinquishing of their passports to sponsors or sponsors’ proxies, to the non-payment of promised wages and various fees and deductions appropriated from their promised salaries. While the analysis presented here has been attentive to some of the ethnic, national and religious patterns that may bring about these experiences, a better understanding of the legal and ministerial context that permits, condones and/or overlooks these experiences is also needed. Regarding the interpretation and findings presented in this chapter, several important caveats are worth mentioning. First, because our sample of low-income migrants excluded all workers in the domestic sector, these findings do not incorporate the problems and challenges that ethnographic work portrays as commonplace (and perhaps even endemic) to that sector (Nagy 1998; Gamburd 2000). Considering the observations and findings found in previous work focused on the domestic sector, we suspect that many of the frequencies ascertained here – and particularly those concerned with labour problems – would rise if our sample had incorporated migrant workers in the domestic sector. Furthermore, while we hope that these findings can eventually be correlated and compared with similar quantitative data describing the low-income labour migrant population in other GCC states, we recognize that a confluence of forces has, historically, patterned different demographic constitutions in those receiving states, as well as different experiences for low-income migrants. We expect that such a comparison would largely support the contention that the GCC states generally comprise a singular and fairly homogeneous experience for low-income migrants, but also that noteworthy and possibly substantial differences would be observed as a

18 For example, ITUC, ‘Hidden Faces of the Gulf Miracle’; Human Rights Watch, ‘Building Towers, Cheating Workers’; Human Rights Watch, The Island of Happiness; Human Rights Watch, ‘Building a Better World Cup’; Human Rights Watch, ‘For a Better Life’; Gardner, City of Strangers. 100 A. Gardner et al. result of different policies, laws, bilateral agreements, enforcement and labour culture, specific to each GCC state. With regard to what these findings contribute conceptually to our understanding of labour migration in Arabia, we suggest that first and foremost the data described here point to the variability of the migration experience in Qatar. As previous work has argued, by distributing the responsibility of regulating and governing foreign workers to sponsors and their proxies, the kafala produces highly variable experiences among migrants in the region (Longva 1997). This also seems to be the portrait resulting from our review of the data sketched in this chapter. Without a proactive and established legal and regulatory system in place and in operation, the fate of a low-income migrant worker depends heavily on his or her sponsor and that sponsor’s proxies. Low-income migrants in Qatar encounter all sorts of different challenges and difficulties, although in many realms of the migration experience, there is extraordinary variation in the frequency and impact of these issues. We interpret this variation as the direct result of the kafala arrangement and the variability it structures. Finally, although the kafala is paramount in framing the findings presented here, it is also important to note that few Qataris are employed in positions that directly supervise and manage low-income migrants in Qatar. Unlike Bahrain, Oman and some other GCC states, Qatar’s extraordinary per capita wealth allows most citizens to secure public sector employment. While citizens may be partners, silent partners, owners or hold other positions in the business concerns that employ these low- income migrants, it is typical of Qatar that the individuals directly involved in the governance of contingents of foreign labourers are themselves migrants. As this suggests, the data presented here should not be framed as evidence of how transnational migrants are simply exploited by Qataris in Qatar. Rather, with both debt and money circulating transnationally through that migration system, with migrants themselves coming from a variety of different sending states, and with other migrants often directly responsible for some or most of the challenges and exploitation they face while abroad in Qatar, it is difficult to construe this migration system and the problems that it currently produces as a purely Qatari – or even Arab – problem. Instead, the data presented here further confirm an understanding of labour migration in the GCC states as the manifestation of a truly transnational migration industry.

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Graeme Hugo

Abstract Indonesia has a long history of labour migration to Gulf countries. This chapter examines the evolution of this movement and its determinants with a view to identifying likely future flows and their determinants. Indonesia has been a quintessential migration source nation, but recent demographic, social and economic developments are producing some significant changes, which will influence the scale and composition of future emigration.

Introduction

Indonesia has been one of the world’s most important emigration nations over recent decades, and Gulf countries have been a major destination. Indeed, Indonesia has been a quintessential emigration nation with high rates of growth of its workforce, high underemployment and increasing levels of unemployment, especially among the educated and the young. However, Indonesia is undergoing rapid economic, social and demographic change, which is predicted to see it moves from currently being the sixteenth-largest economy in the world to the seventh largest by 2030 (Oberman et al. 2012, 2). To what extent will the changes currently sweeping Indonesia impinge on its role as a pre-eminent source of labour migrants? The chapter begins with an analysis of recent labour flows from Indonesia to the Gulf countries and summarizes what is known of the drivers and impacts of those movements. It identifies the areas and groups which have been the main sources from which these migrant workers have been drawn. It then examines recent demographic, social and economic trends in those areas and argues that there has been a reduction in the push pressures in those areas not only due, partly, to reduced population growth but also due to the development of a range of alternative economic opportunities. One of the major factors in bringing about these changes has been the prolonged

G. Hugo (*) Australian Population and Migration Research Centre, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 103 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_7 104 G. Hugo inflow of remittances into these areas as a result of the long history of migration to the Gulf. On the other hand, the development, maintenance and strengthening of social networks between these areas and the Middle East are a strong element in maintaining the flow. Indeed, many of these linkages are direct to families in Middle Eastern countries and will result in continuity in the migration pattern. Another element that will be examined is the policy content in Indonesia. Indonesian governments are taking an increasing interest in labour migration and increasingly building it into development strategies. However, there also have been concerns about the rights of migrant workers, and bans have been imposed on particular countries and particular types of workers. Government policy and engagement will be of additional importance in the future. Another element relates to the increasing attraction of Asian destinations for Indonesian labour migrants. These flows may well be enhanced after 2015 with the introduction of the ASEAN Economic Community. This will be an important determinant of future patterns of labour migration. The chapter concludes with a discussion of likely future scenarios of labour migration between Indonesia and the Middle East. It is argued that the migration corridor which has been a development between Indonesia and particular Middle Eastern countries has developed to such an extent that labour migration will be only one element in a more varied pattern of movement. However, there will continue to be significant demand for Indonesians to work in the Gulf for the foreseeable future.

A Quintessential Emigration Nation

The United Nations (2013a) identified some 2.99 million Indonesia-born persons living in foreign countries and their distribution is shown in Fig. 7.1. The equivalent figures in 1990 were 1.34 million which increased to 2.01 million in 2000 and 2.83 million in 2010. It is apparent from Fig. 7.1 that the Gulf countries of the Middle East are an important destination for Indonesian emigrants. However, the United Nations’ data probably miss significant numbers of contract labour migrant workers since they are based mainly on censuses. Table 7.1, for example, shows a range of estimates of the stocks of overseas migrant workers and indicates significantly higher levels than the United Nations’ data. However, even these figures underesti- mate the scale of labour migration. The Indonesian National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers Abroad (BNP2KI), the Indonesian government agency involved in managing labour migration authoritatively, estimates that there are 6.5 million Indonesians working abroad who remitted $7.4 billion in 2013 (Migration News, 21, 2 April 2014). The reasons for the underestimation are the significance of undocumented migration and the fact that much of the movement is on temporary visas and not detected in population censuses. There can be no doubt, however, that Indonesia globally is a major emigration nation. It is the fourth-largest nation in the world, and despite rapid economic, social and demographic change, it remains a ‘labour surplus’ nation. Although rates of pop- 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 105

Fig. 7.1 Indonesia: Migrant Stocks by Country of Destination. (Source: United Nations 2013a)

Table 7.1 Indonesia: estimated stocks of overseas contract workers around 2013 Destination Estimated stocks Sources Saudi Arabia 1,000,000 to 2,000,000 DeBel-Air (2014, p. 7) Kuwait 64,780 IOM (2010a, p. 63) United Arab Emirates 100,000 Ruiz (2012) Malaysia 2,000,000 Migration News, April 2013, Vol. 20, No. 2 Hong Kong 150,600 Migration News, April 2012, Vol. 19, No. 2 Singapore 54,400 Yeoh and Lin 2012 Taiwan 100,000 Jakarta Post, 6 October 2006 South Korea 31,000 Statistics Korea (2012) Japan 22,862 Okushima (2005, p. 14) Philippines 26,000 SCMP, 10 December 1998 Brunei 40,000 Hassan (2010) Total 4,589,642 ulation growth have declined due to a reduction in fertility, it continues to grow and the workforce is still growing. Moreover, although there have been major structural changes in the economy and significant advances in education, there are still large numbers of workers in low productivity jobs and high levels of underemployment. The levels of unemployment are low by OECD standards; however, unemployment in the Indonesian context is not comparable because there are no government unem- 106 G. Hugo ployment provisions which means that the poor are forced to undertake some form of employment regardless of its remuneration, danger, time demands, etc., because they have to survive. Accordingly, whereas the unemployed in OECD nations tend to be drawn predominantly from the poor in Indonesia, they are generally from the better- off whose family can afford to support them until they can get the job they want. Underemployment is a far more meaningful indication of a labour surplus

Evolution of Migration from Indonesia to the Gulf

Linkages between Indonesia and the Middle East go back many centuries when Islam first came to the archipelago. For centuries, there have been Arab communities in Indonesia. Indonesains have been in working in Mecca for centuries (Vredenbregt 1962). Associated with the hajj, communities of Indonesians developed in Mecca (Vredenbregt 1962, 109) during the colonial era, and they have been maintained. Indonesians often worked in Saudi Arabia to fund their hajj. The deployment of overseas contract workers (OCWs) to the Middle East, however, is relatively recent. Although there were contract workers sent to Malaysia, Surinam, Fiji and elsewhere during the colonial period, there were none sent to the Middle East at this time (Hugo 1980). Figure 7.2 presents the official statistics relating to the deployment of Indonesian labour overseas, and the increasing tempo of movement is apparent as is the dominance of the Middle East as the major destination. Since most workers are on 2 years or longer contracts, the actual number of workers officially overseas in any 1 year is greater than the numbers deployed in an individual year. Indonesia was slow to develop its international contract worker industry in the 1970s following the 1973 oil shock when its ASEAN neighbours, the Philippines and Thailand were sending large numbers of workers overseas, especially to the Middle East. Whereas in other countries, the government became involved in sending workers to the Middle East, but this did not happen in Indonesia until the early 1980s, although private agents in Indonesia were sending small numbers of workers to the Middle East (Anon 1984). Figure 7.2 shows clearly an increasing tempo of movement. The number of ‘official’ international labour migrants was very small in the First Five-Year Plan (1969–1974) but more than trebled to be nearly 20,000 in the Second Plan. During the Third Five-Year Plan, it quadrupled to almost attain the target of 100,000. In the following 2 years, the number moving was almost as great as the total over the entire first three Five-Year Plans. This reflects both the government’s growing interest in promoting this movement and also, perhaps, the ‘capturing’ of a greater proportion of movement in official statistics than was previously the case. The increasing government involvement saw targets for deploying OCWs overseas built into the Five- Year Plan from the Third Five-Year Plan onwards. The programme reached a new level in the 1990s when the government became more active. The target of the Department of Labour in sending labour migrants overseas in the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1984–1989) was 225,000, which was exceeded. This encouraged the government to increase the 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 107

Manpower, 1979-2013

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Fig. 7.2 Number of Indonesian overseas workers processed by the Ministry of Manpower, 1979– 2013. (Source: Suyono 1981; Singhanetra-Renard 1986, 52; Pusat Penelitian Kependudukan, Universitas Gadjah Mada, 1986, 2; Antar Kerja Antar Negara; Soeprobo 2004; Ananta and Arifin 2008; BNP2KI (National Agency for Placement and Protection of Indonesian Workers), unpublished data) target for Repelita V (1989–1994) to 500,000 (Tempo, 45, XIX, 6 January 1990, p. 15), and it was exceeded. Similarly, with Repelita VI (1994–1999), the unusual increase in 1996–1997 was a function of more than 300,000 irregular labour migrants in Malaysia being regularized. The onset of the Asian crisis in 1998 coincided with a parametric increase in the outflow. Work overseas became a more attractive proposition because of the reduction in opportunities within Indonesia, a decrease in the value of the rupiah and increased purchasing power of foreign earnings in Indonesia. Thereafter, Figure 7.3 which uses the Migration Policy Database on flows of Indonesian citizens into the Gulf indicates the upwards trend has continued. Several important features of the official overseas worker scheme in Indonesia need to be stressed. One is the dominance of women, most of whom are to be employed as domestic workers at the destination. In 1997–1998, the sex ratio of the outflow was one of the lowest on record being 20. The dominance of women seems to have been reduced in recent years. This may be, at least in part, a function of bans 108 G. Hugo

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Fig. 7.3 Saudi Arabia: Arrivals and departures of non-Saudis with Indonesian country of citizenship, 2000–2011 on the deployment of female domestic servants in Saudi Arabia and, for a period, in Malaysia. Nevertheless, the dominance of women among official migrant workers is one of the most consistent features of Indonesian international migration. Saudi Arabia has remained the dominant destination of Indonesians working in the Middle East, in part, reflecting the long association based on hajj migration. The flows to the Middle East continued at high levels and reached a new high in 2009. However, subsequently, there has been a significant fall, which is associated with a prolonged ban on the deployment of Indonesian women to be employed as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. The data in Fig. 7.2 relate to international labour migration which goes through official channels, but there has been, and continues to be, significant irregular migration to both of the main areas of destination – Malaysia and the Middle East. In relation to the Middle East, the following types of irregular migration can be identified: • OCWs recruited within Indonesia and sent overseas on tourist visa without going through the official labour migration system. • OCWs who travel to Saudi Arabia on a hajj or umrah visa and remain in the region to work. • OCWs who move through the official system but ‘run away’ from their employers because of abuse, exploitation, lack of payment or underpayment. 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 109

Their numbers vary from time to time, and irregular channels of migration become most significant when there are some kinds of official bans as has recently been the case with the ban on deployment of female domestic workers. Nevertheless, the official OCW migration from Indonesia to Gulf Countries understates the full scale of mobility. It is, of course, difficult to estimate the scale of undocumented migration, but Andrevski and Lyneham (2014, 3) argue: ‘While official data indicates that approximately 400,000 Indonesians migrate for work annually, (evidence) ... suggests one million may be a more accurate estimate when taking into account documented and undocumented migration.’ Indonesian migration to the Gulf is overwhelmingly to Saudi Arabia, which in most years is the largest single destination country. The UAR and Qatar are also in the top 10 destinations, but the strongest linkages are with Saudi Arabia.

Feminization of Migration to the Gulf

Women have outnumbered men among official OCWs leaving Indonesia every year since 1984–1985. Indeed, Indonesia is one of the largest countries of origin of female migrant workers who are employed in domestic situations as household help and carers. It is estimated that there are around a million Indonesian women in such work at any one time. Table 7.2 presents an estimate of the numbers in individual nations with the largest groups in Saudi Arabia and Malaysia although Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are increasingly significant. These women can be vulnerable to exploitation not only by virtue of being a migrant (often undocumented) and a woman but also because of the asymmetrical power relations of their work context and the lack of protection because of households not being seen as workplaces by protection agencies. Reports of abuse of Indonesian female migrant domestic workers are many (e.g. Asian Migration News, 1–15 November 2006), but there are also contexts where

Table 7.2 Estimates of stock of Indonesian female domestic overseas contract workers, 2011–2013 Country Number Sources Saudi Arabia 1,000,000 Santolan (2011) Malaysia 300,000 Jakarta Globe, 5 January 2012 Hong Kong 150,000 Amnesty International News, 21 November 2013 Singapore 90,000 Jakarta Globe, 5 January 2012 United Arab Emirates 65,000 Ruiz 2012 Taiwan 150,000 Kennedy 2012 Oman 29,000 Jakarta Globe, 3 July 2012 Bahrain 12,395 Jakarta Globe, 3 July 2012 Total 1,796,395 110 G. Hugo women are empowered, and gain from this experience. In Qatar alone, 553 Indonesian domestic workers ‘ran away’ from their sponsors in 2005 because of maltreatment, physical and sexual harassment, disputes over contracts and non- payment of salary (Asian Migration News, 15–31 January 2006). In Saudi Arabia, between 19 September and 24 October 2011, 4,550 workers had run away from their employers after being unpaid or suffering abuse (Jakarta Globe, 7 November 2011). There are a number of indicators of the problematic situation with Indonesian female domestic workers in Saudi Arabia: • A high rate of non-completion of work contracts and early return to Indonesia among female domestic workers. • High rates of ‘running away’ from individual employers. • Significant numbers of female domestic workers who die in Saudi Arabia. • High-profile cases where maids have been tried and executed for killing an employer. The problems of Indonesian female domestic workers in Saudi Arabia are of long standing. A study more than two decades ago (Hugo 1992, 182–184) documented cases of mistreatment and exploitation and concerted efforts by Muslim organizations, NGOs and human rights groups to ban the movement. In 2011, Indonesia stopped sending domestic workers to Saudi Arabia after the Saudi government, without informing the Indonesian government, beheaded a domestic worker who confessed to killing her employer (Migrant News, October 2013). This ban is partly responsible for the overall downturn in the number of OCWs deployed evident in Fig. 7.2. However, it is evident that many workers bound for Saudi Arabia are, in fact, now travelling via other Gulf countries, especially the UAE. In addition, there has been an increase in the numbers moving irregularly. The Indonesian government has also occasionally placed bans on deployment of workers to other Gulf countries. For example, it briefly banned sending domestic workers to Bahrain because manpower agencies refused to accept new regulations regarding a minimum salary (BP60 per month) and sick and annual leave entitlements (Asian Migration News, 16–30 April 2005). There was a similar ban imposed on the United Arab Emirates in response to human rights violations (Asian Migration News, 1–15 February 2005), but as with other such bans, it had little impact on the outflow of Indonesian migrant workers.

Labour Migration and Development in Indonesia

There is very limited empirical evidence to assess the impact of migration on economic and social development in Indonesia. The main element which has been at the centre of the new focus on the beneficial impact of migration upon development in origin countries and communities has been remittances (IOM 2010b). Indonesia’s large size means that the relative impact of remittances on the overall economy has been less than in smaller nations, but several points need to be made in this context. 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 111

• Migrant workers tend to be drawn from specific areas so that remittance impact is much greater on regional and local economies than at the national scale. • The areas which migrant workers are drawn from include some of Indonesia’s poorest and most isolated areas so that remittances are a crucial element of capital inflow. • There has been rapid growth of remittance flows in recent years. Official Bank of Indonesia estimates of remittances received in Indonesia are presented in Fig. 7.4. The pattern is dominated by a sudden upturn in 2005. Manning and Cronin (2008, 19) point out that this dramatic increase was due to the inception of a revised methodology for calculation of remittances by the Bank of Indonesia. Manning and Cronin (2008) consider that the new methodology is more robust and that past methods have severely underestimated remittance levels. Hence, the estimate is that the present annual level of remittances to Indonesia is around US$7 billion. Table 7.3 indicates that this represents almost 4% the size of exports and of import levels. It is also apparent from the table that remittances have been increasing both their relative share of the economy and absolute size. It is shown elsewhere (Hugo 2005) that international labour migration has considerable potential to deliver significant development dividends to Indonesia through

8,000

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Fig. 7.4 Indonesia: growth of remittances, 1983–2013. (Source: World Bank, Annual Remittances Data, April 2014, http://econ.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDECPROSPE CTS/0,,contentMDK:22759429~pagePK:64165401~piPK:64165026~theSitePK:476883,00. html) 112 G. Hugo

Table 7.3 Main Asian labour exporting countries: workers’ remittances relative to exports and imports in US$ million, 1980–2012 Total merchandise R R Country Year Workers remittances Exports (X) Imports (M) X M Indonesia 1980 33 21,908 10,834 0.2 0.3 1992 264 33,815 27,280 0.8 1.0 2012 7212 186,146 190,225 3.9 3.8 Philippines 1980 421 5744 8295 7.3 5.1 1992 2538 9790 15,465 25.9 16.4 2012 24,641 51,995 65,360 47.4 37.7 Thailand 1979 189 5240 7158 3.6 2.6 1992 1500 32,473 40,466 4.6 3.7 2012 4713 229,519 247,590 2.1 1.9 Vietnam 2000 1340 14,483 15,638 9.3 8.6 2006 3800 39,826 45,014 9.5 8.4 2012 10,000 114,573 113,793 8.7 8.8 Source: Hugo 1995; World Bank World Development Report, various issues; World Bank Remittances dataset remittances and other economic and social effects. However, there are a number of barriers which are diluting those impacts (Hugo 2005): • The high transaction costs of migration • A lack of articulation of national, regional and local development policy and programmes • High costs of transferring remittances • Poor governance of migration, high levels of corruption

Determinants of Future Migration to the Gulf

Global international migration is in a rapid state of change. The most recent United Nations (2013b) Report on International Migration indicated that the number of people living outside their country of birth in 2013 was 232 million, increasing from 175 million in 2000 and 154 million in 1990 (United Nations 2013b, 1). One of the major trends evident in 2013 is that south–south migrations are now almost as large as north–south migration. Asia is assuming increasing significance in the global migration system. The speed of change in global economies and demographics has been such that individual countries have undergone rapid transitions from being predominantly emigration nations to net immigration nations. In Asia, this has been the case in South Korea and Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s, and Malaysia and Thailand in the 1990s and 2000s. Hence, it is important to assess trends in the drivers of Indonesian labour migration to Gulf countries and assess the potential of changes to them.The Global Commission on International Migration (2005, 12) argued: 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 113

In the contemporary world, the principal forces that are driving international migration are due to ‘3Ds’: differences in development, demography and democracy. Accordingly, we will examine recent and impending change in Indonesian economic, demographic and political situations and draw out the implications for future labour migration to the Middle East. However, there are a number of other elements which will impinge on future labour migration.

Indonesia’s Rapidly Changing Economy

As was indicated earlier, Indonesia has long been a quintessential emigration nation, but Table 7.4 indicates that the economic and demographic elements which have driven high emigration levels have undergone significant change. In the early 1990s, Indonesia was squarely within the ranks of the countries classified as low income. However, in 2013, Indonesia’s per capita annual income was 36.5 million rupiah, more than three times that in 2004 (Bank Indonesia 2013, 43). Indonesia is on the verge of entering the middle-income category of nations.1 Indonesia is now recognized as one of resurgent Asia’s strongest growing economies. A recent analysis (Oberman et al. 2012, 2) found that the Indonesian economy: … has performed strongly over the last decade or more and is more stable and diverse than many observers from beyond its shores realise.

Table 7.4 Indonesia: Comparison of key economic and demographic indicators, early 1990s and 2010–2013 Early 1990s (Source: 2010–2013 (Source: Bank Indicator Hugo 1995) Indonesia 2013) Population growth rate (% pa) 1.6 1.1 Total fertility rate 2.9 2.2 Annual growth of workforce 3.1 1.4 GNP per capita US$ 670 3592 Annual growth rate of GDP 5.7 6.2 Annual increment of workforce 2.54 m 500,000 Percent employed in agriculture 48.2 38.3 Percent unemployed 2.8 9 Percent working less than 44.6 69.6 35 hours per week Male labour force participation 70.6 84 Female labour force participation 43.1 51.4

1 According to the World Bank, low-income nations have annual per capita monies of less than US$1005 and lower middle-income nations between US$1006 and 3975. Indonesia’s 2013 annual per capita income was US$3499.90 (Bank Indonesia, 2013, 43). 114 G. Hugo

The report identifies that Indonesia had the lowest level of volatility in economic growth of any OECD nation. Moreover, it anticipates that Indonesia’s economic growth should benefit from a number of powerful positive trends. Moreover, improved productivity has been more important than a higher number of workers in driving Indonesia’s recent economic growth. Labour productivity has grown at around 3% per annum which is among the highest rates in the region. Nevertheless, overall productivity in Indonesia remains low. Despite strong recent economic performance and a most promising future outlook, Indonesia remains a labour surplus nation. Table 7.5 presents recent employment data. Open unemployment has increased, and the informal sector still accounts for 60% of workers. Although fertility has fallen by almost two-thirds over the last four decades, the population is still growing at 1.1% per annum. Moreover, its labour force is increasing at 1.4% per annum – a net increment of around 1.6 million workers are added annually to the almost 111 million currently in the labour force. Indonesia remains a low-income nation. While there is considerable debate about the definition of poverty in Indonesia, the Indonesian Central Statistical Agency reported that 19.6% of the population lived in poverty in 2004 compared with 11.3% in pre-crisis 1996. Bank Indonesia (2013, 49) estimates that in 2013, 11.5% of the population lived in poverty (28.6 million). For a long period, Indonesia has had relatively low unemployment rates because the poor in Indonesia simply could not afford to be unemployed and must take on whatever work they can get regardless of the low income, low status and long hours associated with it. Despite rapid structural change, more than a third of Indonesian workers remain in agriculture. Hence, experiencing rapid and far-reaching change, it remains emphatically a labour surplus nation and one which in a globalizing world has become an important origin country of international migrants. In discussing Indonesia’s comparative advantage in the international labour services trade, Manning and Cronin (2008, 20) point to the abundance of low-skilled labour. The share of the labour force with primary level or no education continues to decline – a long-term trend. However, more than half of the work force still are in the lowest education category and only 5% of the workforce has tertiary-level training. It is also relevant as Manning and Cronin (2008, 21) point out that despite the declining share of the workforce in the lowest education categories, there are

Table 7.5 Indonesia: labour force and unemployment Main activities February August February August February August Productive age (≥15 years) 170.7 171.7 172.9 173.9 175.1 176.7 Labour force participation (%) 70.0 68.3 69.7 67.9 69.2 66.9 Labour force 119.4 117.4 120.4 118 121.2 118.2 Full-time worker (%) 64.6 64 64.2 64.8 64.6 62.6 Part-time worker (%) 15.5 17.9 17.2 18.2 18.3 21.9 Partial unemployment (%) 13.2 11.5 12.3 10.8 11.2 9.2 Open unemployment (%) 6.8 6.6 6.3 6.1 5.9 6.3 Source: Bank Indonesia (2013, 49) 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 115 increasing levels of unemployment in this group. In the past, unemployment has been strongly concentrated in the more highly educated groups. As Manning and Cronin (2008, 21) point out, jobs are becoming harder to get among the less educated as the economy modernizes. This is clearly of significance when we consider the demand for low-skilled workers in domestic services, agriculture and construction in the Middle East and in higher-income Asian countries. In Indonesia, while agriculture still accounts for over a third of the workforce, it is growing at an extremely slow rate and it is the higher skill occupations which are growing most rapidly. Although the fact that the educated, skilled workforce has grown faster than the low-skill group in recent years, Manning and Cronin (2008, 21) point out that the number of secondary and tertiary graduates in the workforce grew at 4.4% and 7%, respectively, over the 2001–2006 period, while the total growth of the labour force was only 1.5%. Nevertheless, unemployment rates increased for the secondary educated and declined only marginally for the tertiary educated, but 10.8% of the latter and 15% of the former remained unemployed. This may provide potential for some more skilled workers to be involved in international migration. Manning and Cronin (2008, 22) also point out that labour market pressures have been experienced more by females than males. Unemployment rates are higher for females than for males for all levels of education. As they point out ‘Indonesia’s comparative advantage for export of labour lies particularly in an abundance of secondary educated females who are searching for better paying jobs’. They argue that while Indonesia does not have a relatively comparative advantage among professional workers in the international arena, the high levels of unemployment among professionals, especially females, suggest that Indonesia could fill many niche areas in international labour markets such as aged care and nursing, where tertiary training is increasingly required. They sum up the situation as follows (Manning and Cronin 2008, 22): To sum up, from trends in labour supply and demand, the excess supply of semi-skilled labour remains a key characteristic of the Indonesian labour market, although this situation is changing slowly as education standards rise. Secondly, there is clearly an excess supply of secondary educated people, especially females, who might be able to take lower-middle skill jobs, or upgrade their skills and education for jobs in specific niche markets abroad. Finally, although job opportunities have grown fastest for tertiary educated people, professionals and managers in particular, unemployment among this group is also high and hence specialist areas such as IT, design and work in other service industries, could be an important area in which Indonesia could penetrate labour markets abroad.

Indonesia’s Changing Demography

Like most Asian nations, Indonesia has undergone a demographic transformation over the last four decades as is evident in Table 7.6 (McDonald 2014). Most significantly, Indonesia has experienced a massive decline in fertility as both a consequence and cause of the economic and social transformation it has undergone. The population doubled over this period, but fertility was more than halved from 5.3 to 116 G. Hugo

Table 7.6 Indonesia: demographic variables, 1970 and 2010 1970 2010 Population (‘000) 114,067 240,676 Annual growth rate 2.49a 1.39b TFR 5.3 2.5 Life expectancy at birth 54.1a 69.6b % Urban 17.1 49.9 % Aged less than 15 43.2 29.8 % Aged 65+ 3.3 5.0 Source: (United Nations 2012, 2013a, b, c) a1970–1975, b2005–2010

Table 7.7 Indonesia: growth and projected growth of population aged 15–34 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030 15–24 19,437 29,349 37,383 42,684 40,530 46,119 47,023 25–34 19,437 29,349 28,407 36,326 40,987 39,587 45,226 Total 38,875 58,698 65,790 79,010 81,517 85,706 92,249 Total population 114,067 145,494 178,633 208,939 240,676 269,413 293,482 15–34 as % of total 34.08 40.34 36.83 37.81 33.87 31.81 31.43 population Average annual percentage growth rate 1970– 1980– 1990– 2000– 2010–2020 2020– 1980 1990 2000 2010 2030 15–24 4.21 2.45 1.33 −0.52 1.30 0.19 25–34 4.21 −0.33 2.49 1.21 −0.35 1.34 Total 4.21 1.15 1.85 0.31 0.50 0.74 Total population 2.46 2.07 1.58 1.42 1.13 0.86 Source: United Nations (2013c)

2.5 children per woman, and more than 15 years of life were added to the average Indonesian with the reduction in mortality. In 2010, the population growth rate was only a little more than half that in 1970. From the perspective of international labour migration, the impacts of demographic change on age structure are important. Labour migration is highly selective of young adults in the prime working ages. Rapid fertility decline in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s has meant that there has been a significant reduction in the rate of growth of the dependent child age groups. However, the cohorts born in the years of higher fertility, when they move into the young working years, provide Indonesians with a potential demographic dividend because they constitute a comparatively large proportion of the total population. This is usually interpreted as being due to their engagement with the labour market within their country, but in emigration contexts, it increases the potential numbers of migrant workers. Table 7.7 shows that the numbers of Indonesians in the peak mobility age groups (15–34) increased rapidly in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. However, the impact of reduced fertility is increasingly being felt with small declines in the numbers 15–24 in 2000–2010 and 25–34 in the current decade. 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 117

The important point from the perspective of the future of labour migration out of Indonesia, however, is that the numbers in this age group are continuing to grow, albeit at a significantly lower rate than was the case in the last three decades of the 1990s. This is in contrast to several other countries in the Asian region, where overall declines in the young working ages have commenced. This means that there will continue to be a substantial increase in young adults entering the Indonesian labour market and, hence, put pressure on underemployment and unemployment levels. Figure 7.5 overlays the contemporary Indonesian age structure with that of the projected 2030 population, and it is strikingly apparent that the prime migration age groups of 15–34 will continue to grow over this period, while there will be actual declines in the young dependent age groups. Hence, while there have been substantial and promising shifts in Indonesia’s economy and demography, there is every indication that there will continue to be significant emigration pressures within Indonesia, which will be associated with significant labour surpluses, especially of the low skill, low levels of education group. Hence, the Gulf region will continue to be an attractive opportunity for young Indonesians weighing up their life options.

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Fig. 7.5 Indonesia: age–sex structure of the population, 2010 (shaded) and 2030 118 G. Hugo

The Role of Political Factors

The GCIM (2005) formulation of the three ‘Ds’ intercountry differentials driving increased levels of international migration identifies ‘democracy’ or variations between countries. In Indonesia, this factor has been a driver of some migration, such as the outflow of ethnic Chinese in the late 1990s following anti-Chinese riots (Hugo 2000). While there is little evidence of forced labour migration to the Middle East of Indonesians seeking greater freedom, political factors have become an increasingly important influence on labour migration, as governments recognize the contribution that remittances and other effects can contribute to development. Indonesia’s future policy on labour migration to the Gulf will be a major factor influencing future flows. Concerns about the poor governance, exploitation and corruption in the Indonesian labour migration system are of longstanding (Hugo 1995), but it has been in the post-Suharto era that most concerted efforts to improve governance of labour migration in Indonesia have occurred. In 2005, the government issued a law (No. 39/2004) on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Overseas Workers. Ananta and Arifin (2008, 28) summarize some of the elements in the new law as follows: • The objectives of the law were to bring about. 1. Better management of migration flows. 2. Establishment of institutional mechanisms for placement and protection of OCWS. 3. Advocacy • Inclusion of administration and penal sanctions for breach of provisions of act aimed especially at agents and others exploiting migrant workers in Indonesia. • The rights of workers are specified – equal rights, opportunities and treatment, rights to correct and timely information regarding overseas placement, freedom to practise religions, receive standard destination salary, access to legal protection and retain an original of the contract. • The obligations of workers are also specified – follow laws in origin and destination, perform job specified in contract, report on arrival and departure to Indonesian embassies. • The law was also the constitutional basis for setting up BNP2 TKI. The issuing of the law was followed by a Presidential Instruction (INPRES No. 6/2006) to reform the placement and protection, brokers/sponsors, placement institutions and support from banking institutions and included the following (Ananta and Arifin2007 , 28–29): 1. The necessity of simplifying and decentralizing the placement of workers. 2. Having ‘one-stop shop’ systems in embarkation and disembarkation areas. 3. Improving the quality and quantity of workers sent overseas. 4. To improve intelligence and understanding of the global market for Indonesian workers. 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 119

• It specified the administrative structure of BNP2 TKI with a Head, General Secretariat and three Deputies (Foreign Collaboration and Promotion, Placement, Protection). Service Centres of Placement and Protection were to be set up in the capital only of each province and designated cities of embarkation. Service posts were to be established in each part of embarkation. • A strong relationship was to be maintained with the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration which remains the main policymaker and regulator, while BNP2 TKI is the operator which coordinates the activities of several ministries – manpower and transmigration, immigration, foreign affairs, population administration, health and police. There is evidence of the Indonesian parliament and government seeking to provide more protection for OCWs to the Gulf and elsewhere. In addition, civil society, which was for so long hampered in its activities with OCWs in Indonesia, has become much more active. Hence, while there are significant issues of corruption and poor governance, it is likely that steps like the current ban on deployment of Indonesian women as domestic workers in Saudi Arabia will continue unless there is a bilateral agreement on migrant worker issues.

The Immigration Industry

In examining both undocumented and documented labour migration from Indonesia to Gulf countries, it is important to recognize that there is an element of ‘self- perpetuating momentum’ which has developed so that while movement is influenced by economic trends and policy, it is, to some degree, independent of them. In particular, two elements are important in this momentum. One relates to the involvement of the complex varied group of recruiters, travel agents, lawyers, agents of various kinds, travel providers, immigration officials and an array of gatekeepers of various kinds. There can be no doubt that much Indonesian migration is at least facilitated, and often initiated, by these crucial intermediaries, and this is especially the case for international labour migration and especially for the segment of that movement which is clandestine. The high levels of profitability associated with people smuggling and the ‘new slave trade’ involving workers who are effectively indentured to their owners have led a diverse range of players at local, regional, national and international levels to move into this arena. The role of such groups goes back to the ‘contract coolie’ trade in the latter part of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when most countries in the region were under colonial rule. In examining the role of the migration industry, it is crucial to recognize a number of its characteristics: (a) That it is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia. It has a history extending over centuries. (b) The migration industry with Indonesia is very large and multilayered with the involvement of international criminal organizations down to large cities with agents and local communities with subagents and sub-subagents. 120 G. Hugo

(c) There is a high level of complicity of government and government workers at all levels. (d) Many agents are involved in both legal and illegal movements. (e) It is interlinked with family and regional networks. (f) It operates for both internal migration with Indonesia and international movement. (g) It is extremely flexible with workers in the industry able to diversify in other activity if demand for their services in one area of migration should dry up. Accordingly, the industry can be very quick to respond to new opportunities, and it cannot be killed off by destroying one avenue for undocumented migration (Munro 2011). (h) The industry is embedded in local communities. (i) The industry has strong linkages with the fishing industry. (j) The migration industry has very strong, long historical connections with the Middle East, which have been utilized in facilitating the flow of intending IMAs. (k) In most cases, there is not a single agent, but migrants and intending migrants are passed through networks of agents at different points and often with new payments at each point. (l) It is becoming an increasingly professionalized. The strong importance of the industry in Indonesia is seen in the fact that there are four Indonesian words for migration industry agents – tauke, mandor, calo and taikong. During the Dutch colonial period, mandors were used extensively, not only for recruiting overseas labour migrants but also for recruiting workers in densely settled areas to work on mines, plantations and forests in less densely settled areas. These roles have continued and proliferated, especially since the 1970s when labour migration to the Middle East and other parts of Asia (especially Malaysia) has grown massively. The government has been involved in attempting to regularize the industry in various ways over the last three decades, but most of the industries are not in the formal migrant agents’ associations or registered with authorities. The highly convoluted nature of the migration industry in Indonesia is reflected in Figure 7.6, which provides examples of the number of intermediaries that intending contract migrant workers need to go through in seeking to work in Saudi Arabia.

Social Networks

It is not sufficiently acknowledged that the majority of international movers from Asia move along well-trodden paths or corridors, which, if they have not travelled along them before themselves, have been traversed by family members and friends. Migrants tend to travel with friends or family and have a range of contacts at the destination. The networks that are established linking origin and destination become key elements in sustaining and enhancing population flows between them. These 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 121 Info AKAN Centre Agency Jakarta , 297) Info Fee Info Fee Demand 1999 Associate of local broker Agency Saudi Arabia Fee Demand Fee Info Info Employer Info Local broker Information Loan Friends/ relative Debts and Interest Info Wage/ accommodation Prospective migrant Example of a brokerage network for official migrants to Saudi Arabia. (Source: Spaan for official migrants to Saudi network Example of a brokerage

Fig. 7.6 Fig. 122 G. Hugo networks inject a self-perpetuating dynamism into flows of population, which allows movement to continue long after the original economic reasons for the flow have been superseded or rendered redundant. Whenever a person immigrates, every individual that he or she knows acquires social capital in the form of a contact at the mover’s destination, which can be ‘cashed in’ at any time to obtain help in getting a job or accommodation and social support while adjusting to the destination. The networks established by earlier generations of movers from families and localities act as conduits to channel later generations of movers to those destinations in an atmosphere of certainty. Previous generations of movers have not only supplied valuable information and encouragement but often paid for, or arranged and eased, the passage. Moreover, when the immigrant arrives at the destination, the destination end of the network lends valuable assistance in the adjustment process, especially through assisting in gaining access to housing and employment. The fundamental role of networks is to greatly reduce the risks associated with migration, and many movers from Asian origins, thus, operate in an environment of total certainty. This risk minimization factor is important. While other factors are necessary to initiate the beginning of a new limb of the network once the pioneer(s) is established at the destination, the increase in the subsequent flow can be rapid. The pioneer immigrants constitute anchors to which much larger numbers of subsequent immigrants are drawn. The pioneers can be people who gain access through some form of recruitment or refugee migration but then can facilitate substantial movement through legal family reunification movement. On the other hand, illegal migration is virtually impossible unless there is an informal network linking origin and destination to facilitate the clandestine movement. The pioneer migrants to the Middle East may have been people undertaking the hajj. The networks may link employers with agents, former migrants or communities in Indonesia. The increase in international migration from Indonesia to the Gulf resulted in a lateral extension and increasing density of social networks linking Indonesia with the region. There has been a massive increase in the channels along which both documented and undocumented migrations can occur. These will ensure that Indonesia will remain an important origin of labour migrants, even in the face of bans like that currently in place on domestic workers.

Conclusion

While the Indonesian government in recent years has recognized the role that international labour migration can play in reducing unemployment and underemployment, in earning foreign exchange and in training its workforce, there is little integration of labour migration and development policy within Indonesia. As is the case elsewhere, there is little of linkage and coherence between labour migration and development policy. Martin (2008, 17) has argued that there are three challenges facing countries like Indonesia in this respect: 7 Determinants of Future Indonesian Labour Migration to the Gulf 123

• Further incorporation of the range of issues captured by the migration development nexus into policy formulation • Implementation and evaluation of the strategies to capitalize on the benefits that migration may bring for development • Institution of more effective international collaborations The real challenge is clearly moving towards strategies which take into account and use the positive interconnections between migration and development and seek to minimize negative impacts. In the Indonesian case, however, it is apparent that there is an initial, necessary step that needs to be taken. This involves the removal of the impediments and barriers which currently intervene to prevent the benefits generated by labour migration to fully flow back to origin families and communities. The poor governance of the Indonesian labour migration system results in a significant part of the earnings of migrant workers not being available to impact on development because it is siphoned off by excessive transaction costs, corruption and exploitation of migrant workers. Only if there is a sound system of governance, will the earnings of workers be fully available to be channelled into development activity. Indonesia has undergone massive economic, social and demographic change in recent decades, which have impinged on the determinants of its long-held status as labour surplus and labour sending country. However, the fundamental demographic and economic drivers remain. Moreover, long-established corridors of mobility linking it with the Gulf, the burgeoning activity of the migration industry in both countries and the cumulative experience of millions of Indonesians who have lived and worked in the Middle East would suggest that labour migration will continue over the foreseeable future.

References

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United Nations. (2013a). Trends in international migrant stock: Migrants by destination and origin, United Nations database, POP/DB/MIG/Stock/Rev.2013. United Nations. (2013b). International migration report 2013. New York: United Nations. United Nations. (2013c). World population prospects: The 2012 revision. New York: United Nations. Vredenbregt, J. (1962). The Haddj: Some of its features and functions in Indonesia. Bijdragen, 118, 91–154. Yeoh, B., & Lin, W. (2012, April 3). Rapid growth in Singapore’s immigrant population brings policy challenges, Migration Information Source. Chapter 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers in the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries

Neil G. Ruiz

…for a long time to come, the Philippines will continue to offer a major highly competitive source of trained labor for the needs of countries abroad. We look forward to the day when, having attained some of our major objectives in the industrialization of the economy, there will be enough resilience and flexibility for us to absorb our own labor surpluses.1 –Blas F. Ople, Minister of Labor and Architect of the Philippine Labor Export Policy.

Introduction

This chapter focuses on how labour export became entrenched in political, economic and social institutions of the Philippines. This period of labour export entrenchment began with the fall of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and continued through 2006 with the building of more state institutions for facilitating the export of Filipino labour. During the Marcos era, overseas employment became one of the major solutions to alleviate the problems from an oversupply of educated degrees coming from a highly unregulated and autonomous private higher educational system. Furthermore, the Marcos regime made efforts to control the educational system and align it with the Philippine national economy. But over the years, the Philippine economy increasingly depended on overseas labour markets not only to relieve the educated unemployment problem but also to create a massive new domestic economy geared towards jobs abroad. With about 10% of the Filipino population working abroad and financial rewards from foreign earnings returning to the Philippines, the labour export industry became a flourishing business for the private sector, the state and the Filipino people. This growth and dependency

1 Philippine Development Magazine, vol. 6, no. 12 (November 15, 1978: 21–29), 29.

N. G. Ruiz (*) The Brookings Institution Metropolitan Policy Program, Washington, DC, USA

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 127 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_8 128 N. G. Ruiz increased the role of the Philippine state in this industry through the creation of emigrant institutions to regulate and protect the overseas labour industry; it also created a cycle of dependency on emigration – from the Filipino population, government and private businesses.

The Expanding Role of the State in the Labour Export Industry

The ability of the state to expand the Philippine labour export industry and to reap the benefits of emigration depends on its ability to provide for its migrants abroad. The Philippine state evolved several times since 1974 to expand its role in managing migration. As overseas employment continued to grow, the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB) evolved to become two agencies within the Labor Ministry on May 1, 1982: the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and the Welfare Fund Administration (WFA).2 The POEA was tasked to: • Establish and maintain a registration and licensing system to regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and overseas placement of workers. • Maintain a registry of skills for overseas placements. • Recruit and place trained and competent Filipino workers. • Promote the development of skills and careful selection of Filipino workers for overseas employment. • Undertake overseas market development activities for placement of Filipino workers. • Secure the best possible terms and conditions of employment of Filipino contract workers and ensure compliance. • Generate foreign exchange from the earnings of Filipinos employed under its programmes. • Promote and protect the well-being of Filipino workers overseas.3 This move to change the OEDB into the POEA was to encourage the participation of the private sector in the labour export industry, especially recruitment agencies and construction contractors.4 Within the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), the POEA licenses private recruitment agencies. It informs potential overseas workers of agencies that have issued false contracts or have not complied with rules during the deployment process. The POEA publishes an updated list of overseas job openings, recruitment agencies’ contact information and the number of

2 Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, Working Abroad: The Socio-Economic Consequences of Contract Labor Migration in the Philippines (Manila: Ministry of Labor and Employment, 1984), 13–16. 3 Ibid., 14–15. 4 Ibid., 15. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 129 vacancies available through their website. The POEA also provides a quality control service by rating the status of the private recruitment agencies.5 Through Philippine Overseas Labor Offices and a dedicated labour attaché in embassies and consulates, the POEA monitors the treatment of Overseas Filipino Workers (OFWs),6 verifies labour documents and assists OFWs in employment- and labour-related disputes. A 1977 Philippine Department of Labor and Employment White Paper proposed that the government should not focus solely on recruitment and placement of Filipinos into overseas employment, but should also create an agency for protecting and promoting the rights and welfare of OFWs.7 This white paper argued that private recruitment agencies were not in a position to protect overseas Filipinos and that there was a role for the Philippine government on welfare issues. This new reorganization of the overseas employment programme in 1982 created a framework for the WFA, which required recruitment companies and workers to contribute to a welfare fund that would provide services and assistance.8 This evolution set the stage for the politics that would arise around protecting overseas Filipinos in the 1980s and 1990s. As labour export became larger, the Philippine state developed policies that extended beyond the boundaries of the nation-state and into other countries. The politics surrounding overseas labour further developed state emigrant institutions.

The State and Protecting the Welfare of Overseas Filipinos

As a result of state involvement and an increase in Filipino emigration, major political issues arose around reports of the maltreatment, illegal recruitment and even deaths of OFWs. Between 1987 and 1991, a total of 23 Senate bills and 32 House bills were filed in the Philippine Congress in an attempt to investigate several mysterious OFW deaths and issues related to overseas work.9 According to the Philippine Department of Labor and Employment, about 1224 overseas Filipino workers were sent back home dead during this period.10 All of them are said to have died of

5 The POEA rates recruitment agencies in the following categories: good standing, delisted, cancelled, forever banned, inactive, revoked, suspended and denied renewal. For a list of the current recruitment agency ratings, see: http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all 6 This refers to Filipinos who are temporary workers on overseas employment contracts for 2 years or more years. 7 Department of Labor and Employment, ‘White Paper on the Phase-Out Policy’, Unpublished (Manila: Department of Labor and Employment, 1977). 8 Institute of Labor and Manpower Studies, Working Abroad, 16. 9 Maruja M.B. Asis, ‘The Overseas Employment Program Policy’, in Graziano Battisetlla and Anthony Paganoni (editors), Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992: 68–112). 10 Michael A. Bengwayan, ‘When Filipino maids return home in coffins’,New Straits Times, Opinion Section, March 7, 2001, 10. 130 N. G. Ruiz

‘unknown or mysterious circumstances’. Reports from the hearings revealed that many of the dead bodies, particularly from domestic workers working in Taiwan and Hong Kong, ‘bore bruises and deep cuts’. In some cases, autopsy examinations discovered that internal organs were missing and were possibly sold for transplants to unknown beneficiaries.11 During the 1990s, the Philippine government had to deal with several major overseas Filipino cases that sparked major changes in how the government now handles overseas employment. During the 1991 Gulf War, the government brought home about 30,000 Filipinos from Iraq and Kuwait. The repatriation highlighted problems in coordination, lack of reliable data on the Filipinos in the region and the inadequate number of government personnel abroad. The repatriation also strained relations between government officials and the workers they were trying to repatriate.12 In 1991, Flora Contemplación, a Filipina domestic worker in Singapore, was charged for a double murder of another domestic worker, Delia Maga, and the child of Maga’s employer. Having minimal knowledge of English and after being drugged and administered electric shocks, she was reportedly coerced into a confession without a lawyer present.13 She was later put to death despite the Philippine president’s direct appeal to the government of Singapore.14 This incident sparked an upheaval of protests in the Philippines challenging the state’s labour export policy. A grenade exploded at the Singapore Airlines office in Metro Manila following the news of Contemplación’s death,15 and mass demonstrations also took place at the Embassy of Singapore in Manila and at the departments of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and Labor and Employment (DOLE). The Philippines downgraded its diplomatic relations with Singapore, the secretaries of DFA and DOLE resigned, and the deployment of domestic helpers to Singapore was temporarily halted.16 The perceived injustice surrounding Contemplación’s death captured the sentiments of an increasingly uneasy society after more than two decades of large-scale temporary emigration. A 42-year-old mother of four children and sole provider to her family, Contemplación came to symbolize the sacrifices of Filipino migrants – the ‘modern-day heroes’ who are willing to risk even death to provide for their families back home. As Joaquin Gonzales, an expert on Philippine studies, noted,

11 Ibid. 12 Graziano Battistella, ‘Return Migration in the Philippines: Issues and Policies’, in International Migration: Prospects and Policies in a Global Market, ed, Douglas Massey and Edward Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 232. 13 Anne-Marie Hilsdon, ‘The Contemplacion fiasco: The hanging of a Filipino domestic worker in Singapore’, in Anne-Marie Hilsdon, Martha Macintyre, Vera Mackie and Maila Stivens (eds.), Human Rights and Gender Politics (New York: Routledge, 2000), 172–173. 14 Ibid. 15 US Department of State, ‘1995 Patterns of Global Terrorism’, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_95/terasi.htm. 16 Joaquin Gonzales, Philippine Labour Migration: Critical Dimensions of Public Policy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1998), 6–7. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 131

Contemplación’s death ‘heightened long-standing debates in the Philippines and exposed the lack of adequate government attention to the plight of Filipino overseas contract workers (OCWs), not just in Singapore but in all the labor-receiving countries’.17 Other negative reports about OFWs spread throughout the Philippine media. Illegal recruitment for positions as prostitutes or ‘comfort women’ became another politicized issue. In Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan and Singapore, many Filipina women are brought to work as hostesses at bars. Reports illustrate how many of them were being imprisoned and under guard during the daytime and released at night to work as prostitutes.18 They had been recruited from the Philippines to work as entertainers under contracts that did not inform them of having to provide sex in the job description. For example, Rosa, who was fresh out of high school, was lured to Japan from Manila in 1988 with promises of a trip to Tokyo Disneyland and opportunities to make good money. When she arrived in Japan, her employer turned out to be a gangster who ordered her to sit with the customers, pour their drinks and make dates. When she refused to make dates, her employer beat her and kept a close watch on her by prohibiting her from straying outside of the neighbourhood.19 As a Filipino migrant, she was forced into modern-day slavery. Government statistics showed that women are more likely to be victims due to the nature of their work (Table 8.1). These events in the early 1990s resulted in the most significant reorganization to date of the Philippines’ labour-export policy, namely the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act of 1995. The so-called Magna Carta responded directly to the

Table 8.1 Number of OWWA welfare cases, January to September 1994 Nature Total Male Female Female/male ratio Overall (number) 9368 3021 6347 2.1 Overall (percent) 100 32 68 Maltreatment 1419 546 873 1.6 Delayed or non-payment of salaries 1272 565 707 1.2 Contract violations 1373 691 682 0.9 Physical abuse 187 6 181 30.0 Rape and sexual abuse 15 0 15 N/A Sexual harassment 330 0 330 N/A Health problems 42 13 29 2.2 Mental illness 6 0 6 N/A Other 3769 694 3075 4.4 Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, as cited in ‘Filipino Women Migrants: A Statistical Factbook’, National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women and the Asian Development Bank

17 Ibid. 18 Glenn Schloss, ‘Sex-trade women kept like slaves’, South China Morning Post, News section, January 21, 2001, 3. 19 Teresa Watanabe, ‘Without a Country’, Los Angeles Times, View Section, March 31, 1992, E1. 132 N. G. Ruiz

Contemplación case. The law called for the government to promote the welfare of migrant workers and place their protection above all else. It states: While recognizing the significant contribution of Filipino migrant workers to the national economy through their foreign exchange remittances, the State does not promote overseas employment as a means to sustain economic growth and achieve national development. The existence of the overseas employment program rests solely on the assurance that the dignity and fundamental human rights and freedoms of the Filipino citizen shall not, at any time, be compromised or violated.20 The Philippine government put in place many programmes to protect and represent Filipino migrants. The Magna Carta created an Office of the Legal Assistant for Migrant Workers Affairs (OLAMWA) within the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) to take responsibility ‘for the provision and coordination of all legal assistance services to be provided to Filipino migrant workers as well as overseas Filipinos in distress’.21

The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)

Republic Act 8042 was an attempt to create a more centralized overseas migration system to control the recruitment, representation and return of Filipinos living abroad. It was created ‘to institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in Distress’.22 Republic Act 8042 institutionalized labour recruitment by creating the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) for licensing and supervising recruitment agencies. In order to be licensed, an agency had to ‘fulfill minimum capital requirements, pay annual licensing fees, and follow a complex set of regulations’.23 As of April 2004, there were about 2884 recruitment agencies licensed by the POEA.24 The POEA publishes an updated list of overseas job openings, recruitment agencies’ contact information and the number of vacancies available through their website.25 They also rate the status of the agency (good standing, delisted, cancelled, forever banned,

20 Senate Bill No. 2077, ‘To Institute the Policies of the Overseas Employment Program and Establish a Higher Standard of Protection and Promotion of the Welfare of Migrant Workers and for Other Purposes’, Ninth Congress of the Republic of the Philippines, Third Special Session, May 24, 1995. 21 Philippine House of Representative, ‘Republic Act 8042, Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995’. Available at http://pinoymigrant.dole.gov.ph/ra%208042.htm 22 Ibid. 23 Peter Stalker, Workers Without Frontiers: The Impact of Globalization on International Migration (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2000), 123. 24 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Status of Recruitment Agencies as of April 4, 2004’, http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all 25 See http://www.poea.gov.ph 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 133 inactive, revoked, suspended and denied renewal) based on assessments made by the POEA. This provides information about available jobs while also serving as a quality control of the private recruitment agencies. The Workers Welfare Administration evolved to becoming the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) as the main agency for protecting Filipinos while abroad due to its much larger scope of responsibilities, which extend beyond the provision of legal assistance.26 OWWA was reorganized to become the most extensive operation organized by a migrant-sending government for protecting its citizens abroad. It featured a complex organizational structure that now includes a board of trustees, a secretariat, and regional and international offices. Today, OWWA’s board of trustees is a tripartite body with the DOLE secretary as chair and 12 members representing government, management and OFWs. The president of the Philippines appoints all board members. The board is broadly representative of a cross-section of government agencies, including the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Budget. OFWs are allotted sea-based, land-based and women’s sector representatives. An overwhelming majority of board members are not OWWA members, a major source of criticism from civil society and OFWs. The board plans and implements policies and programmes, crafts rules and regulations, oversees fund sources and creates yearly appropriations for the Secretariat, OWWA’s administrative arm.27 Unlike other Philippine government agencies that administer trust funds, OWWA has no charter. This setup allows for more flexibility but may also allow the board to exercise blanket and unregulated authority. As a permanent government agency, changes to OWWA’s operations can only be made through legislation. The Secretariat, headed by an administrator, manages day-to-day operations in the Philippines and abroad. Of its staff of 580, only about 100 employees are stationed at its main office in Manila. The rest are stationed at regional offices within the Philippines (about 300 employees) or based in countries with particularly large numbers of temporary workers (about 180 employees).28 In 2006, 28 welfare officers were assigned to 16 countries, with more than half of them placed in the Middle East, including nine in Saudi Arabia alone. The OWWA administrator recommends welfare officers, whom the DOLE secretary nominates and whom the president of the Philippines appoints. The welfare officers abroad work together with the labour attachés and the ambassadors or consuls-general to assist Filipino migrant workers (Fig. 8.1). They are usually attached to Philippine embassies and consulates. Indeed, the government considers

26 Edgar Rodriguez and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the Philippines’, In University of Toronto Department of Economics Working Paper Series (Toronto: University of Toronto Department of Economics, 1995), 18. 27 Overseas Worker’s Welfare Administration, Board of Trustees, http://www.owwa.gov.ph/page/ board_of_trustees/. 28 The staff numbers are estimates; actual numbers are unknown according to OWWA. 134 N. G. Ruiz

Department Department of Foreign Department of Labour and Employment Department of of Finance Affairs (DFA) (DOLE) Budget and (DOF) Management (DBM)

Overseas Philippine Workers Overseas Welfare Employment Administration Agency (OWWA) (POEA)

Embassies OWWA and/or Board consulates Secretariat

Philippine International Head - Regional Overseas Labor Offices quarters offices Offices (POLOs)

Migrant workers and other overseas Filipinos resource centers

Foreign service Labor attaches Welfare personnel officers

Fig. 8.1 Overseas workers welfare administration within the Philippine government. (Source: Author interview of stakeholders and government documents)

OWWA staff abroad to be part of its unified team in that country, with the ambas- sador as the leader.29 Membership in OWWA, which is mandatory for migrants going abroad through official channels, may be obtained in two ways: By enrolment upon processing of a contract at POEA or by voluntary registration of a would-be member at a job site overseas. Membership is valid until the OFW’s employment contract expires. For voluntary members who register at a job site, membership does not exceed 2 years.30 Ideally, the employer and/or agency pays the membership fee, a practice that some

29 Section 23 of the Rights and Enforcement Mechanism Under International and Regional Human Right System of the Philippine Department of Foreign Affairs, as cited by Arnel F. de Guzman, ‘A Critical Assessment of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (RA 8042)’, unpublished paper, September 2010. 30 Overseas Worker’s Welfare Administration, ‘Omnibus Policies, Board Resolution No. 138’ (Manila: OWWA, 2003). Available at http://www.owwa.gov.ph/filemanager/download/. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 135

$45,000,000 $40,000,000 $35,000,000 $30,000,000 $25,000,000 $20,000,000 $15,000,000 $10,000,000 $5,000,000 $0 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Year

Membership fees Interest income Other income

Fig. 8.2 OWWA’s income in US dollars, 2002–2006. (Source: Overseas Workers Welfare Administration Financial Management System, 2001–2006) critics say rarely happens. A 2004 independent field study by the Scalabrini Migration Center, a Manila-based research institute, confirmed that the membership fee is ‘routinely passed onto migrant workers’.31 Although the mandatory nature of membership has been instrumental in shoring up the fund’s assets, some migrant organizations are questioning the authority of OWWA to require such payment. The number of OWWA members has increased through the years, reflecting the general upward trend in OFW emigration. It is important to note that, despite the mandatory membership requirements, a large proportion of temporary workers are not OWWA members. As of May 2007, OWWA had over one million members, which represents just 28% of the 3.8 million legal temporary workers abroad in 2006, as estimated by the Commission on Overseas Filipinos, another government body. Through these membership fees, OWWA managed to raise about $40 million dollars per year between 2002 and 2006 (Fig. 8.2). The OWWA created a number of programmes that fall under four major categories targeting contract workers. It offers integrated support services for: participation in pre-departure orientation seminars, public assistance programmes, on-site services abroad and an OWWA identification system.32 Prior to departure, all overseas contract workers must undergo the Philippine government’s mandatory deployment process, two key components of which are pre-departure orientation seminars (PDOSs) and the issuance of OFW identification cards. PDOSs are largely organized by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that work in partnership with the Philippine government’s Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) for OFWs and the Commission on Overseas Filipinos for permanent emigrants. Every departing OFW and Filipino emigrant must attend a one-day seminar and provide the government with a certificate of

31 Maruja Asis, Preparing to Work Abroad: Filipino Migrants’ Experience Prior to Deployment (Manila: Philippine Migrants Rights Watch and Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2005), 52. 32 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, ‘Programs and Benefits’,http://www.mydestiny. net/~owwa/integrated.html 136 N. G. Ruiz completion to receive permission to emigrate. Attendees learn about destination country customs and laws, resources available to them at the embassy or consulates, important contacts for any problems that might arise and financial management seminars. The goal of this programme is to give emigrating Filipinos as much knowledge as possible about their country of destination and the resources available to them abroad. Through financial management seminars, banks and other money transfer operators educate emigrating workers about methods of sending their money home, and in some cases, they open bank accounts for emigrating workers. The POEA also processes overseas contracts and provides every OFW a government- issued identification card, which can also be used as an ATM card with one of the major Philippine banks. The OWWA created Filipino Resource Centers throughout the world in order to provide further assistance abroad. These centres operate six programmes: community reach-out, on-site repatriation, welfare assistance, reintegration preparedness, sociocultural and sports development and country-specific pilot programmes.33 The community reach-out includes projects that enhance awareness, unity, cooperation and self-reliance among Filipino communities at the destination country. Through on-site repatriation, the OWWA can negotiate with employers/brokers and receiving country authorities, facilitate the documentary requirements such as exit visas, clearances, medical and police reports, and provide airport assistance. The welfare assistance programme offers counselling for distressed workers, paralegal services and some diplomatic services. Reintegration preparedness helps OFWs who are returning to the Philippines by providing business development information, training schemes and psychosocial counselling services. The sociocultural and sports development programme organizes cultural activities and celebrations around Philippine national events and sports activities to build the OFW community in the destination country. The pilot programmes are aimed at specific issues, such as gender-related and country-specific projects.34 Lastly, the identification system is used for easy processing of OFWs and to keep records of them and their dependents living in the Philippines. The OWWA repatriation programme facilitates the immediate repatriation of distressed and physically ill contracts workers, as well as the remains of those who die while working abroad. In both planned and forced return, OWWA negotiates with employers/brokers and other host-country authorities; facilitates documentary requirements for issuance of exit visas, clearances, monetary claims and medical or police reports; and coordinates with Philippine embassies and DFA for other necessary administrative actions and airport assistance. Recently, for instance, the government negotiated the release of 700 OFWs jailed in Saudi Arabia, mostly for cultural offenses like carrying a Bible or drinking alcohol. OWWA is instructed by law to maintain, among others, an Emergency Repatriation Fund to evacuate OFWs

33 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, ‘Programs and Benefits’,http://www.mydestiny. net/~owwa/integrated.html 34 Ibid. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 137 in case of wars, disasters or epidemics. The 1995 act allotted a seed amount of 100 million pesos (US$2.2 million) to comply with this law.35 During the war in Lebanon in July 2006, for example, OWWA reserved US$ten million for the evacuation of Filipino workers.36 About 6300 workers were repatriated between July and October 2006, with OWWA eventually spending $1200 per returnee.37 It is not clear how many of the repatriated were OWWA members. In 2006, OWWA assisted in the repatriation of 10,834 workers from Lebanon and other countries, spending almost 170 million pesos (US$3.7 million) in airfares. This represented about 13% of revenue in 2006. Apart from repatriation, OWWA offers other forms of assistance, services and programmes in its offices abroad, including counselling for distressed workers, paralegal services and low-key diplomatic initiatives (e.g. negotiations for imprisoned OFWs, mobile welfare services, hospital and prison visits, sports development projects like sport leagues, cultural and recreational activities, and contingency operations during crisis situations.) About 600,000 members, or 62% of total membership in 2006 (both within the Philippines and overseas), received various kinds of assistance or services.38 Embassies and consulates abroad provide legal assistance for overseas Filipinos in distress. OLAMWA coordinates all legal assistance services for Filipino migrant workers. The Philippine Congress created a legal assistance fund of 100 million pesos, partly sourced from OWWA, to pay for foreign lawyers, bail bonds, court fees and other litigation expenses.39 Another item provided by OWWA is insurance claims. OWWA provides members with life and personal accident insurance while abroad. The coverage includes 100,000 pesos (US$2173) for natural death and 200,000 pesos (US$4347) for acci- dental death; a burial benefit of 20,000 pesos (US$434) is also provided. OWWA charges an additional 900 pesos (US$19.50) per year for health insurance. As a rider to the life insurance, OWWA also offers monetary assistance to workers who suffer work-related injuries, illness and disabilities during employment abroad. The benefit ranges from 2000 pesos (US$43) to 50,000 pesos (US$1086) and up to 100,000 pesos (US$2173) in case of permanent disability. Between 2001 and 2006, a growing number of OFWs have used the death and disability benefits, from fewer than 600 in 2002 to more than 1500 in 2006.40 This

35 Philippine House of Representatives, ‘Republic Act No. 8042 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995’. 36 Manila Standard, ‘Few Pinoys in Lebanon Want to Go’, Manila Standard, August 24, 2006. 37 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Annual Report 2006, 27. 38 Note that members who used the workers assistance program might also be accounted for in other services, such as repatriation. Given the limitations of OWWA data, it is difficult to verify this assumption. 39 Renee E. Ofreneo and Isabelo A. Samonte, ‘Empowering Filipino Migrant Workers: Policy Issues and Challenges’, In International Migration Papers (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 2005), 8–12. 40 Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Insurance and HealthCare Availment Report, 2002–2006. 138 N. G. Ruiz has been an effective tool used to protect overseas Filipinos while they are working abroad to ensure that their families are covered from the risks of overseas employment. But critics, especially among migrants, note that the OWWA needs to be more accountable to migrants to ensure the funds are properly used. These criticisms stem from government scandals involving misuse of the OWWA funds for other purposes.41

Expansion of Emigrant Institutions

In addition to regulation and protection of overseas Filipinos, the Philippine government also sponsors many programmes to represent Filipino migrants. These include the Commission for Filipinos Overseas (CFO).42 The CFO is a group of government officials who advise the President with specific concerns from Filipinos abroad. This body formulates policies and provides representation in the executive branch for the millions of Filipinos living outside of the country. On January 20, 2000, President Estrada issued Executive Order No. 203 to create the Interagency Committee on Shared Government Information System for Migration (SGISM). This committee included leaders from the following government agencies: Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Justice, Department of Tourism, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Bureau of Immigration, National Bureau of Investigation, National Statistics Office and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas.43 Through the SGISM, the Philippine government can facilitate a more efficient and speedy response to the needs of OFWs. Furthermore, the Philippine government has attempted to gather accurate demographic information about their overseas contract workers and permanent emigrants so that the private sector and NGOs can provide migrant services. The POEA and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas keep a record of Filipinos who are departing the country on overseas contracts or for permanent emigration. Since 1993, the National Statistics Office has conducted an annual Survey of Overseas Filipinos, which provides socioeconomic characteristics of migrants and statistics on cash and in-kind transfers sent by migrants to their families. The Philippine government also developed an interagency committee to facilitate a more efficient response to the needs of OFWs.44 However, due to a lack of funds, this group has not been able to

41 Angie M. Rosales, ‘OWWA faces Senate inquiry over OFW fund disbursement’, Tribune, July 13, 2013. 42 Edgar Rodriguez and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the Philippines’, 18. 43 Department of Labor and Employment Administration, ‘SGISM Shared Government Information System for Migration’, http://pinoymigrant.dole.gov.ph/about.htm 44 These include the Department of Foreign Affairs, Department of Labor and Employment, Department of Justice, Department of Tourism, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 139 fully integrate information sharing between its various components. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)45 works closely with the Association of Bank Remittance Officers Incorporated46 to ensure that regulations are favourable for a competitive remittance industry. Since 2006, the BSP has required banks and other financial institutions to clearly state remittance charges, available options for sending money and other information posted on BSP’s website for the benefit of both remitters and their recipients.47 Table 8.2 provides an overview of the Philippine emigrant institutions involved in recruitment, representation and returns since the passage of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 (Republic Act No. 8042).

Extending Democratic Institutions Abroad

New policies have been developed to further institutionalize the representation of overseas Filipinos. Two significant pieces of legislation were passed in the Philippine Congress in November 2002 extending full citizenship rights beyond the Philippines’ national borders. The Dual Citizenship Act allows natural-born Filipinos who have become foreign citizens to retain their Philippine citizenship.48 Additionally, the Absentee Voting Act permits qualified overseas Filipinos to register and vote for the positions of president, vice-president, senator and party-list representatives from abroad.49 These legislative pieces would finally implement the 1987 Philippine Constitution proposition of granting OFWs the right to vote. Article V, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution states: ‘The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.’50 Together with the Republic Act No. 8042 and Executive Order No. 203, these two pieces of legislation create a state outside the country’s boundaries. Not only is the Philippine state responsible for the welfare of overseas Filipinos, the migrants can also make demands on the government – using the same instruments of citizenship rights as those residing in the Philippines. Table 8.3 gives an overview of the major legislation and policies implemented by the Philippine government to deal with emigration.

Overseas Workers Welfare Administration, Bureau of Immigration, National Bureau of Investigation, National Statistics Office and the Commission on Filipinos Overseas. 45 Translated as the Central Bank of the Philippines. 46 A network of bank officials in charge of remittances products and services in the private sector. 47 Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, SP Circular No. 534 dated June 26, 2006. For website of remittances costs by destination country, see: http://www.bsp.gov.ph/about/advocacies_ofw.asp 48 Rocky Nazerno, ‘Senate Passes Dual Citizenship Bill’, Philippine Daily Inquirer, October 24, 2002. 49 Aurea Calica, ‘Brother-Sister act speeds up passage of voting bills’, Philstar.com, http://www. philstar.com/philstar/print.asp?article=58915 50 Republic of the Philippines, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1987. 140 N. G. Ruiz

Table 8.2 Post-1995 Philippine emigrant institutions Emigrant Institutionalized institution Role Responsibilities by Philippine Recruitment Supervision of the deployment of Republic act no. overseas regulation, OFWsb under the best possible 8042 employment protection terms, and the regulation of private administration sector participation in recruitment (within DOLE)a and overseas placement Licenses recruitment agencies Pre-departure orientations Monitor migrants abroad and protect their rights Reintegration programme Overseas workers Welfare and Extension of social, welfare and Republic act no. welfare protection other assistance to OFWs and their 8042 administration dependents (within DOLE) Pre-departure loans and family assistance loan for Filipino migrant workers and their families Funds for emergencies Filipino resource Welfare and Extension of OWWA duties to the Republic act no. centers protection following programmes abroad: 8042 Community reach-out, on-site repatriation, welfare assistance, reintegration preparedness, sociocultural and sports development and country-specific pilot programmes Inter-agency System for To facilitate a more efficient and Executive order committee on information sharing speedy response to the needs of no. 203 shared on migration OFWs by sharing information government between the Department of Foreign information Affairs, Department of Labor and system for Employment, Department of Justice, migration Department of Tourism, Philippine overseas employment administration, overseas workers welfare administration, Bureau of Immigration, National Bureau of investigation, National Statistics Office and the commission on Filipinos overseas (continued) 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 141

Table 8.2 (continued) Emigrant Institutionalized institution Role Responsibilities by Commission on Representation, Provide assistance to the president Executive order Filipinos promote stronger and the congress of the Philippines no. 203 overseas economic and in the formulation of policies and cultural ties measures concerning or affecting between the Filipinos overseas. Philippines and Develop and implement programmes Filipinos overseas to promote the interest and Well-being of Filipinos overseas. Serve as a forum for preserving and enhancing the social, economic and cultural ties of Filipinos overseas with the motherland. Provide liaison services to Filipinos overseas. aDOLE Department of Labor and Employment bOFW Overseas Filipino Workers

Table 8.3 Philippine legislation and policies dealing with emigration Legislation or policy What it does? Source of legitimacy Republic act no. 8042: Creates a comprehensive piece of Passed in house and senate, Migrant workers and legislation that gives the Philippine signed into law by overseas Filipinos act of government responsibility for overseas president Fidel Ramos 1995 Filipinos. Institutionalizes the Philippine overseas employment administration and overseas workers welfare administration within the Department of Labor and Employment. Executive Order No. 203: Creates new institutions to carry out the Ordered by former Shared Government republic act no. 8042: president Joseph Estrada Information System for Establishes the interagency committee Migration, 2000 on shared government information system for migration. Establishes the commission on Filipinos overseas. Republic act no. 9225: Allows former citizens to obtain Passed in house and senate Dual citizenship Philippine citizenship even if gave up and signed into law by retention and citizenship to obtain a new one, allows president Gloria re-acquisition act of 2003 Filipinos to have more than one Macapagal-arroyo citizenship Republic act no. 9189: Allows overseas Filipinos to vote either Passed in house and senate, Overseas absentee voting through embassies and consulates or current negotiations and act of 2003 via mail signed into law by president Gloria Macapagal-arroyo 142 N. G. Ruiz

These polices extend the representative powers of the Philippine nation-state abroad. Through citizenship rights, absentee voting and representation in the executive branch, the state provides an avenue for migrants to participate in the state’s domestic institutions. The sending government’s emigrant institutions also become a legitimate force abroad. Through these policies and emigrant institutions, the Philippine state obtains compliance, participation and legitimacy from its emigrants – fulfilling all of the characteristics of a state functioning abroad.

The Expanding Business of Overseas Labour

The expansion of Filipinos working in the overseas labour market not only benefitted Filipino households and the Philippine government but also the private sector. The business of labour export involves transnational transactions among various actors both at home and abroad with potential and contracted overseas employees. It involves dealing with the various Philippine government agencies that manage the emigration process, making sure the OFW has the necessary contract and travel documents to enter the country of destination. Facilitating the transfer of migrant earnings to migrants’ families has become a lucrative business for private financial institutions and money transfer operators. Education targeting specific overseas positions has also become a large business, especially with the laissez-faire system of tertiary education adopted by the Philippines (as discussed extensively in Chap. 3). Three industries have flourished because of labour export: recruitment, remittances and education. Together with the increasing demand by the Filipino population to work abroad and the government’s need for foreign currency and to reduce the unemployment rate, businesses have managed to supply the market for labour export with services allowing them to make money off the prospect and deployment of overseas employment.

The Recruitment Industry

The recruitment industry focused on deploying overseas workers annually is a multi-billion dollar industry. Recruiters make money on both the prospect and actual deployment of OFWs abroad. The Philippine Overseas Employment Administration’s (POEA) main purpose is to regulate private recruiters to ensure that Filipinos who hope to work abroad are not cheated by the recruitment agencies. There are many opportunities for businesses to take advantage of Filipinos’ aspirations for working abroad; in fact, this prospect led the Philippine government to attempt to take over the entire recruitment industry from 1974 to 1978.51 But because

51 Maruja M.B. Asis, ‘The Overseas Employment Program Policy’, in Graziano Battistella and Anthony Paganoni (editors), Philippine Labor Migration: Impact and Policy (Quezon City: Scalabrini Migration Center, 1992: 68–112), 70–72. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 143

Table 8.4 Recruitment and placement by recruitment intermediary, 1986 Recruitment intermediary Number of workers Total placement (in percentage) Construction/service contractors 53,348 17.0 Private employment agencies 176,741 56.0 Government placement 13,188 4.0 Manning agencies 70,973 23.0 Total 314,250 100.0 Source: Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, Annual Report, 1987

it had difficulties keeping up with the huge demand by employers abroad who were looking for Filipino workers and the high interest by Filipinos to work overseas, this ban on private recruitment agencies was lifted in 1978.52 Since 1978, private recruitment agencies have grown tremendously. According to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, about 56% of all overseas placements were made by private employment agencies – the largest share compared to other intermediaries (Table 8.4). The government has a very small share (4%) of all overseas placements. It focuses primarily on regulating the large private industry that also includes placement agencies (23%) for sea-based workers and contractors (17%) for land-based construction companies. The small percentage where the government is involved in recruitment is focused on bilateral agreements between the Philippine government and the foreign government.53 For private recruitment agencies to participate in the overseas employment programme, they must obtain a license from the POEA by demonstrating that at least 75% of the company controlled by Filipino citizens; paying a 10,000 peso application fee, a 50,000 peso licensing fee, a bond to the government in the amount of one million pesos; and demonstrating a minimum capitalization of two million pesos.54 New licenses are given on a year-by-year conditional basis to ensure that the recruitment agency complies with the regulations. After 3 years, the agency can obtain a full license that lasts for another 3 years. The POEA may also ban travel agencies and members of government agencies dealing with migration from obtaining licenses. As of 2013, there were 3479 private recruitment agencies listed in the POEA directory. Of these, 876 have valid licenses to recruit for land-based overseas jobs and 400 have licenses as manning agencies that recruit for sea-based positions.55 The large majority of this directory consisted of private agencies that at one

52 Ibid. 53 Patricia Santo Tomas, former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Republic of the Philippines, Personal Interview, July 22, 2004. 54 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Participation of the Private Sector in the Overseas Employment Program’, available at http://www.poea.gov.ph/rules/POEA%20Rules.pdf 55 Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Status of Recruitment Agencies’, accessed August 11, 2013. Available at http://www.poea.gov.ph/cgi-bin/agList.asp?mode=all 144 N. G. Ruiz

Table 8.5 Estimates of placement expenses, 1980–1987 (in Philippine pesos) Year Placement fees (average) New hires total Total expenses 1980 2020 214,590 433 million 1981 1821 266,243 485 million 1982 3897 314,284 1.2 billion 1983 5658 291,197 1.6 billion 1984 6421 260,161 1.6 billion 1985 3002 232,391 3.0 billion 1986 11,707 255,341 2.9 billion 1987 9381 314,250 2.9 billion Source: Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas, ‘Response to New Market Opportunities: The Case of the Overseas Employment Sector’, Philippine Institute of Development Studies, Working Paper Series No. 89–11, June 1989 point had licenses but were either ‘delisted’, ‘suspended’ or ‘banned’ from recruiting overseas employees because of rules violations or fraudulent activity. According to the former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Patricia Santo Tomas, the purpose of POEA is to ensure that OFWs are not being taken advantage off. It is a complete public–private partnership, where the government concentrates its efforts on protecting the OFW and the private recruitment agencies concentrate on negotiating the details of the position with the employer abroad and with the employee.56 Private recruitment agencies require fees and payments from the prospective OFW in order to operate. By law, the POEA does not allow recruitment agencies to charge more than the maximum placement fee to the OFW. This maximum placement fee grew from 300 pesos in 1979 to 5000 pesos in 1985, to the equivalent of one month’s salary from 1995 onwards.57 To provide an idea of placement expenses, a 1989 study by Abrera-Mangahas provides recruitment costs for migrating abroad. The paper shows that between 1980 and 1987, placement fees averaged between 2020 pesos and 11,707 pesos (Table 8.5). Examples of specific destinations reveal how it varies by destination country. In 1999, the costs for migrating OFWs going to Hong Kong and Italy are between $784 and $1487 for Hong Kong and between $1556 and $6038 for those bound for Italy. These included the placement fee charged by the recruitment agency, the OWWA contribution, a POEA administrative fee and fees for medical treatment,

56 Patricia Santo Tomas, former Secretary of Labor and Employment, Republic of the Philippines, Personal Interview, July 22, 2004. Patricia Santo Tomas was also the first Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and also worked for Blas Ople, the architect of the Philippine Labor Export Policy. 57 Dean Tiburcio Alegado, ‘The Political Economy of International Labor Migration from the Philippines’, Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Hawaii, 1992; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, ‘Hiring Filipino Workers’, accessed August 11, 2013, available at http://www. poea.gov.ph/about/hiring.htm 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 145 passports, medical clearances, a pre-departure orientation, a POEA certificate of overseas employment and agency registration.58 Where do potential OFWs obtain the capital to pay these fees before working? A 1990 survey was conducted to understand the financing of overseas employment. The large majority of financing came from loans (8 of 10 respondents exclusively relied on loans). Additionally, 10% supplemented these loans by selling property and another 5% supplemented the loans with personal savings.59 The large majority of loans were provided by relatives (50%), money lenders (38.9%) and banks (6.1%); 27.7% of these loans were interest free; 29.5% had preferred rates of 10%; 10.4% carried a yearly interest rate between 11% and 30% a year; and the balance of 32.3% carried rates of 120% a year. The Philippine government does have a lend- ing wing of OWWA to offset the costs of working abroad, but these programmes are a marginal source, accounting for only 1.8% of all funding transactions in overseas employment and used only by 2.6% of all OFWs in 1990.60

The Remittance Industry

The Philippine state has always had an interest in securing the foreign currency that overseas Filipinos send to the Philippines as remittances. Since 1968, mandatory remittances of OFW earnings were a requirement for overseas employment, although this remittance policy proved difficult to enforce. In 1982, an interagency body formed by the Central Bank, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Labor and Employment issued Executive Order (EO) 857, which required migrants to send mandatory remittances of 50%–70% of overseas workers’ salaries.61 Under EO 857, if overseas workers did not show proof of sending remittances back to the country, they would be unable to renew their Philippine passports – making it impossible to continue working abroad.62 Sea-based workers and overseas workers employed by contractor and construction companies and various professional workers were required to send 70% of their salaries as remittances through official banks or intermediaries approved by the Central Bank. Other land-based workers such as domestic and service workers and workers who are not provided free housing during their overseas work had to send 50% of their salaries.63

58 Edita A. Tan, ‘The Wage Structure of Overseas Filipino Workers’, University of the Philippines School of Economics Discussion Paper Series, No. 0503, March 2005, 18. 59 Alcestis Abrera-Mangahas and Luz Aguila-Bautista, Profiling Filipino Worker-Families through a Socio-Economic Survey Module (Geneva: International Labour Organisation, 1990), 36–37. 60 Ibid., 43. 61 Rodriguez, Edgar and Susan Horton, ‘International Return Migration and Remittances in the Philippines’, 19–20. 62 Dean Tiburcio Alegado, ‘The Political Economy of International Labor Migration from the Philippines’, 192–193. 63 Dean Tiburcio Alegado, ‘The Political Economy of International Labor Migration from the Philippines’, 193. 146 N. G. Ruiz

Table 8.6 Philippine Central bank remittance figures $7.6 billion remittance industry revenue Average transaction size $350 estimate, 2004 Transaction volume 21.7 million Average price $8.00 Average foreign exchange spread 1% Transaction revenue $174 million Foreign exchange revenue $76 million Total revenue $250 million Source: Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances (Manila: Asian Development Bank, July 2004)

The Central Bank enforced this policy by requiring all recruitment agencies approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to submit basic information about each OFW that included the names and account numbers of the bank(s) that the worker used to send remittances back to the Philippines. This top-down state policy met protest by OFWs and private recruitment agencies, as well as criticism from the International Labour Organization for violating article 6 saying that employees should have freedom to use their earnings as they wish.64 The policy was ineffective, and the government eventually abandoned it in the mid-1980s. There have been few estimates of the size of the Philippine remittance market. In 2004, the Asian Development Bank estimated that the remittance industry produces about $250 million to $500 million dollars in revenues per year.65 Table 8.6 outlines how this estimate, which is based on official remittances that have flowed through the Philippine Central Bank, the size of remittances and average price for each transaction based on surveys and internal estimates from the Central Bank. In 2004, the formal remittance industry had 17 Philippine-headquartered financial institutions that provided services through their branches or affiliates abroad. About 80%–90% of the formal remittance market is controlled by six major financial institutions: Philippine National Bank (PNB), Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Equitable PCI Bank, MetroBank, Rizal Commercial and Banking Corporation (RCBC) and Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Each of these banks reported handling at least $700 million dollars of remittances annually from overseas Filipinos annually.66 These private financial institutions are part of the Association of Bank Remittances Officers Incorporated (ABROI) that promotes the interests of the private remittance industry. In particular, ABROI has worked with the Central

64 Ibid., 193–194. 65 Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances (Manila: Asian Development Bank, July 2004), 21. 66 Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances, 21–22. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 147

Bank of the Philippines to reduce the price of remittances by agreeing that 11 of the ABROI members would use the Central Bank’s real-time settlement system called PhilPass – that would serve as a local clearing house to credit banks.67 Before PhilPass, banks used different clearing houses for interbank transfers that would pass on another 150-peso charge to the remittance sender.68 The PhilPass payment system infrastructure eliminates settlement risks when money passes through different clearing houses – making it faster, efficient and less risky to transfer money from the origin institution abroad to the Philippine bank account. This also allows ABROI member banks to reduce costs. There are also non-financial institutions such as cargo companies that are in the business of transferring overseas remittances. Companies such as iRemit Incorporated and LBC Express handle about $25–$500 million in remittances volume per year. Other key players in the remittance market are the international money transfer agencies (MTAs), such as Western Union and MoneyGram. Western Union has the largest presence in the Philippines with a large network of 6000 agents, subagents and partnerships with BPI and many pawnshops and rural financial institutions. These international MTAs are able to deliver remittances in the least amount of time, although they are also the most expensive.69 The Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) coordinates with private remittance companies – whether banks or money transfer operators – to educate migrants before they depart the Philippines. Every Overseas Filipino Worker (OFW) is required to attend Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars (PDOS) that ori- ents the departing emigrant with information about their destination country; what to do in case of emergency, labour disputes or maltreatment; and government assistance programmes abroad. Additionally, the PDOS has financial education seminars that a bank or money transfer operator conducts to inform the OFW about financial planning, savings and options for sending remittances to their families back in the Philippines. During this multi-hour session, the OFW has the opportunity to open a bank account with the bank conducting the PDOS seminar that day.70 Although this is a great opportunity for OFWs to open a bank account prior to departing the Philippines, it also prevents OFWs from getting perfect information about competi- tor remittance transfer companies. In order to run the PDOS financial seminar, the individual remittance service provider must submit a bid to OWWA for a multi-year partnership. OWWA has received multimillion dollar bids to conduct these seminars since it is one of the best opportunities to capture the remittance sender before being deployed for overseas work. The PDOS seminars are just one example of the intense competition among migration-centred businesses.

67 Amando M. Tetangco, ‘Supporting Overseas Workers through lower Remittances Fees’, Speech made at PhilPass-ABROI Memorandum of Agreement Signing, Manila, December 2, 2009. 68 Asian Development Bank, Enhancing the Efficiency of Overseas Workers Remittances, 11. 69 Ibid., 21–22. 70 Based on observations during author’s participation in Pre-Departure Orientation Seminars in September 2004. 148 N. G. Ruiz

The Evolution of Labour Export Institutions

This chapter illustrated how labour export extended the economic and political boundaries of the Philippine state abroad. It argued that new political and economic forces arising from overseas employment led to the institutionalization of the overseas labour export programme that made the Philippine state increasingly responsible for not only managing the emigration process but also the protection of Filipinos working abroad. From 1986 to 2006, the labour export industry became entrenched into the economic, political and social institutions of the Philippines. The returns for labour export were high for Filipino households and the Philippine government through the flow of foreign currency into the country as remittances from Filipinos working abroad. The Philippine state expanded its role to protect and manage the labour export programme and developed institutions for extending citizenship rights to overseas Filipinos. Not only did labour export expand employment opportunities beyond the limited domestic labour market overseas, but it also reaped major financial returns for the overseas worker and the migrant household-receiving remittances. For the Philippine state, the labour export programme continues to expand the labour market so that educated Filipinos can obtain a job – whether in their preferred profession or in a different occupation with higher salaries than if they stayed in the Philippines. For private businesses, the overseas employment programme was filled with business opportunities to make a profit. The overseas labour market has penetrated the recruitment, remittances and education industries. Altogether, labour export has penetrated all aspects of Philippine society. As the former Secretary of Labor and Employment Patricia Santo Tomas said, ‘overseas migration is now part of Philippine life’.71 The ability of the Philippine state to control the benefits of migration depends on its ability to provide for its migrants abroad. This chapter showed that a close analysis of the development of policies and emigrant institutions in the Philippines helps us understand how states can gain from migration. The Philippine government relied heavily on foreign borrowing from official and private lenders to finance both agricultural and industrial growth. This reliance led to the rise of external debt from $360 million in 1962 to $28.3 billion by 1986, making the Philippines one of the most heavily indebted countries in the developing world.72 The development of emigrant institutions allowed the state to capture the benefits from migration. The Philippine case provided a picture of how emigrant institutions can give the state powers in areas that are normally considered a loss. As pointed out in this analysis, emigration does not necessarily hurt national economies. Instead, domestic institutions are capable of restructuring to transform the benefits from migration into

71 Patricia Santo Tomas, ‘Filipinos Working Overseas: Opportunity and Challenge’, in World Migration 2005: Costs and Benefits of International Migration. 72 James K. Boyce, The Philippines: The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1993), 10. 8 The Rise of the Philippine Emigration State: Protecting Migrant Workers… 149

Department of Labor and Department of Foreign Employment (DOLE) Affairs (DFA)

Overseas Workers Philippine Overseas Commission on Office of the Undersecretary Welfare Office of the Employment Overseas Filipinos for Migrant Workers Affairs Administration Undersecretary for Administration (POEA) (CFO) (OUMWA) Special and Ocean (OWWA) Concerns

Migrant Workers and Embassies International Philippine Overseas other overseas Filipinos and Overseas Absentee Offices Labor Offices (POLOs) resource centers Consulates Voting Secretariat

(Representation in Welfare Labor Attachés Foreign Service Philippine Elections) Officers Personnel

Fig. 8.3 Philippine government emigration institutional organizational chart sources of state strength for the government and private businesses. The Philippine government continues to be deeply involved in facilitating the labour migration of its citizens throughout the world. The state negotiated, intervened and provided resources in its attempt to increase the flow of remittances back to the domestic economy. In response to problems occurring abroad, the Philippine state developed emigrant institutions to protect and facilitate the employment of its OFWs. Citizenship rights were also given to Filipinos abroad to increase their representation. The Philippine state stood at the centre of all of this with its ability to design policies and emigrant institutions to extend its arms beyond the territory of the state (see Fig. 8.3 for overview of the Philippine government emigrant institutions). Chapter 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic Discontent?

Zakir Hussain

Abstract This chapter attempts to answer two aspects of the Nitaqat programme: (1) How does Nitaqat differ from the earlier versions of Saudization? and (2) What is the contextual reality of Nitaqat? Is it a rentier response to the Arab Uprising? The timing of the renewed emphasis of Saudization under the new name of ‘Nitaqat’ seems essential and opportune for the Kingdom now, both from the political and economic angles. Politically, Saudi Arabia needs to insulate itself from the political ‘tsunami’ of the Arab Uprising, spearheaded by the youth who are mainly discontent with the growing unemployment, social inequality and suspicious role of the regime. The government has vigorously revised, at least in policy prescription, the employment policy of the private sector and attempted to generate employment opportunities. It has mandated the private sector firms to employ a certain percentage of the nationals. Economically, the regime can afford the high cost of addressing emergent problems and create an enabling atmosphere for redressing and mitigating socio-economic and political discontent. The high level of oil prices has given an enormous economic capability to the regime to afford a lavish lifestyle and largely unproductive policies to appease the citizens, particularly the youth who are witnessing relatively a high level of unemployment.

On September 12, 2011, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Labour (MoL) announced Resolution 4040 (Hussain 2014), ‘necessitating some radical rethinking of its current “localisation” policies’ of jobs in the country’ (Ramady 2013). The Resolution termed the new labour law as Nitaqat, which classified local companies broadly in four different colour code zones according to the percentage compliance in terms of Saudi nationals employed, with penalties imposed for non-compliance (ibid.). The broad aim of Nitaqat appeared to be focusing on two major aspects: First, to showcase the government’s determination to reduce and finally weed out the existing and growing unemployment among the Saudi national labour force, and second, to force private sector to strictly adhere to the norms of Nitaqat, which has been a more systematic, comprehensive and time-framed result-oriented plan for achieving

Z. Hussain (*) Indian Council for World Affairs, Sapru House, New Delhi, India

Saudization in the Kingdom. Although since the First Five-Year Plan (1970–1975) the government inclined to increase the share of national labour force in the economy, due to one or other reasons, it could not implement it firmly. Nevertheless, the regime kept passing royal decrees time and again to reserve or fix quotas for the nationals in different business units and professions, but unemployment among them remained one of the chronic issues of the Kingdom’s labour policies. Though the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the country in real terms grew from USD 70 billion to USD 365 billion between 1970 and 2005, it also created thousands of employment opportunities, but the rate of joblessness among the nationals continued to grow. On the other side, the share of foreign workers in the Kingdom steadily grew (Table 9.1).

Today, amid nine million foreign workers employed in gainful professions in the Kingdom; officially, 12–15% Saudi labourers are unemployed; currently, over 6,22,533 Saudis are reported to be the active job seekers in Saudi labour market. Against this backdrop, this chapter attempts to examine the following aspects of the Nitaqat programme: A. How does Nitaqat differ from the earlier versions of Saudization? B. What is the contextual reality of Nitaqat? Is it a rentier response to the Arab Uprising?

Defining Nitaqat

In the present context, Nitaqat (‘scope’ in Arabic) is meant to limit private sector companies’ employment of expatriate workers. According to Al-Alami, a US-educated management consultant, the new Nitaqat programme was part of a 25-year plan drawn up in the mid-2000s to gradually wean the economy off foreign labour dependence by a skilled Saudi workforce to replace it. Official statistics reveal that the private sector employs above 90% of the total nine million expatriates in Saudi Arabia. Nitaqat aims to achieve its objective by applying three distinct policy measures: (1) constricting the ‘scope’ or ‘ability’ of the private-sector enterprises to employ foreign workers, (2) limiting the ‘duration’ of foreigners’ stay in the Kingdom and (3) a ‘stick-and-carrot’ policy approach to penalize and support the abiding and non-abiding private enterprises. Broadly Nitaqat has three distinct features: (1) identification of business/market activities, (2) determination of Nitaqat zones/bands and (3) fixation of quota for Saudization. (i) Identification of Business/Market Activities Nitaqat divides private sector enterprises into four categories: Silver/Excellent, Green, Yellow and Red – depending on the degree of adherence to quotas of 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 153 2012 4397.4 5992.9 10,390.3 57.7 2011 4143 5792.5 9935.5 58.3 2010 3955.2 4879.7 8834.9 55.2 2009 3838 4310 8148 52.9 2008 3681.6 4278.20 7959.80 53.7 2007 3584.8 4181.6 7766.4 53.8 2006 3431.6 4091 7523 54.4 2005 3284.8 3835.7 7120.5 53.9 2000 3172.9 4003.4 7176.3 55.8 1995 2357.10 3628.20 5985.30 60.6 1990 1934 2878 4812 59.8 1985 1440 2662 4102 64.9 ; Data from Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2013, Saudi Arabia ; Data from Ministry of Economy and Planning, 2013, Saudi 1975 1027 773 1800 42.9 2005 ; Ramady 2012 Share of foreign workers in total Saudi labour force (in thousands) Share of foreign workers

Saudi Non-Saudi Total Percentage of non-Saudi in total Table 9.1 Table Source: Hertog 154 Z. Hussain

Table 9.2 Categories of Business unit Labours employed business units under Nitaqat Micro Less than 9 Small 10–49 Medium 50–499 Large 500–2999 Giant 3000 and more Source: Labour Bureau, Saudi Arabia

Saudization. The new programme avoids the earlier blanket imposition of 30% Saudization on all companies; it identifies 41 business/market activities, each con- sisting of five units, namely, giant, large, medium, small and micro, which depends on the number of persons employed in each units, that is, 41 × 5 = 205 (Table 9.2). The business units, which employ less than nine workers, are exempted from the purview of Nitaqat mandates. These units are termed as Micro or White Zones companies. As a result, a total of 164 (41 × 4 = 164) market activities are identified for implementing Nitaqat-determined quota policies by the Ministry of Labour (MoL). The percentage of quota for these market/business categories depends on the number of workers employed as well as nature of work. For instance, in the banking sector, 70% employment will be reserved for Saudis; in the media, 19%; and in the construction sector, 10% as reported in Arab News; ‘[c]ommercial establishments, insurance companies and public schools will have the same-19 per cent quota’, according to Al-Madinah. Some job categories do not have quotas, while others are reserved exclusively for Saudis ... [t]he Riyadh Chamber of Commerce and Industry ordered the immediate Saudization of shops selling women’s attire, including abayas and lingerie (Arab News 2011b). It further stated that ‘all saleswomen should be Saudis’ and that the working time should follow ministry regulations (ibid.). In addition, there are ‘exclusive working zones’ for women (ibid.). A total of 49 economic activities, including four recent ones – petrol stations; works related to stone, granite and tiles; four – transport of goods and passenger outside cities – have been added to the Nitaqat list (Arab News 2012). (ii) Determination of Nitaqat Zone/Bands Nitaqat divides the total 164 market activities into four zones or bands: Silver or Excellent, Green, Yellow and Red. The division of bands or zones is determined by the outcome of their quota adherence. Nitaqat also gives grace period to the companies to improve their records. Companies categorized as ‘Silver/Excellent’ and ‘Green’ need to meet 100% Saudization. ‘Silver’ companies have a grace period of 1 year, ‘Green’ companies have 6 months and ‘Yellow’ companies have 9 months. ‘Red’ enterprises are deprived of all benefits, including issue of visas, renewal of iqama (work permit), transfer of visas, opening new branches or facilities with Labour Offices. If they do not improve their nationalization records within 6 months, they also face closure. According to the Labour Minister, around 30%–40% enterprises fall in this category. 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 155

‘Green’ companies enjoy complete freedom to manage their expatriate workers. They can transfer or change the services or professions of expatriate workers and even transfer them without fulfilling the condition of spending 2 years with their current employers. They can renew the iqama irrespective of their period of stay in the Kingdom. They are also authorized to sign up expatriate workers of the ‘Red’ and ‘Yellow’ categories directly even without taking permission of their current employers (Tables 9.3 and 9.4). According to Haatab Al Anazi, spokesman of the Ministry of Labour, the new system allows renewal of iqama for expatriates working in ‘Green’ and ‘Silver’ companies freely; iqama of the foreign workers in ‘Red’ companies will not be renewed, irrespective of the years they have spent in the Kingdom, ‘Yellow’ companies will need to correct the Saudization conditions to get the iqama of their workers to be renewed. Expatriate workers of ‘Red’ companies would not be allowed residency of above 6 years. The Nitaqat system does not apply to the household sector, which absorbs a sizeable percentage of expatriate workers. Table 9.4 schematizes the provisions of the programme for different categories. (iii) Fixation of Saudization Quota The MoL has fixed quota for every business units falling under different Nitaqat zones. For instance, if a company that wants to be in the Silver zone, it has to reserve 40% of its jobs for Saudis. Likewise, companies falling under Green zone will have

Table 9.3 Nitaqat zones

Source: Compiled from FAQs Document: Nitaqat-Incentive Programme for Entities to Nationalise Jobs, Ministry of Labour, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 156 Z. Hussain

Table 9.4 Schematization of the Nitaqat provisions for business units under different categories Category Provision Features regarding expatriate workers Silver/ Concession Can change their professions, including those restricted to Saudi excellent nationals except for professions exempted (these professions are reserved for Saudis even in the silver/excellent categories like receptionists, expediter, cashier, civil security guard, etc.) Can transfer their services to themselves together with change of profession simultaneously (in silver/excellent category, an enterprise will be allowed to transfer the services of expatriate workers to it together with change of profession simultaneously provided the enterprise does not fall below the excellent category; it does not submit applications for transfer of workers’ services more than once every 2 months). Can transfer their services to themselves even if the worker has not spent 2 years with his current employer (silver/excellent group companies will be allowed to transfer the services to expatriate workers to it without the need to fulfil the condition that the workers should spend 2 years with the current employees). Can renew their work permits irrespective of their period of stay in the kingdom, provided the remaining period before the expiry of the iqama is at least 3 months on the day of renewal of the work permit. Can sign contracts with expatriate workers from companies and establishments falling in the red and yellow categories and transfer their services to themselves without the consent of the employer. Penal action Applications for visas will be received according to the new rules provided the enterprises do not fall to a category lower than green after granting the visas. Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every 2 months. Grace 1 year period Green Concession Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for exit-only visas (i.e. one visa for every two workers departing from the kingdom for good). Can change the profession of their expatriate workers except for professions restricted for Saudi nationals. Can renew work permits irrespective of the workers’ period of stay in the kingdom. Can directly sign contracts with expatriate workers from yellow and red companies (provided it does not drop below the green category). Penal action Can avail the benefits provided they do not fall to a lower category after granting the visas. Also, an enterprise must not apply for visas more than once every 2 months. Grace 6 months period (continued) 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 157

Table 9.4 (continued) Category Provision Features regarding expatriate workers Yellow Concession Can obtain one (replacement) visa for every two transactions for exit-only visas, provided the two workers have actually departed from the kingdom and the application for replacement visa is submitted within 1 year from the date of departure of the first worker. Can renew the work permits of its expatriate workers provided they have not spent a total of more than 6 years in the kingdom, irrespective of the period the worker has spent with the employer. Penal action Applications for new or seasonal visas will not be accepted. Cannot transfer the services of expatriate workers to itself. Cannot change the profession of its workers. Their expatriate workers can freely sign contracts with a new employer. Grace 9 months period Red Concession Can renew the work permits of expatriate workers irrespective of their period of stay on condition that the remaining period in the visa does not exceed 3 months on the date of renewal of work permit. Penal action Cannot change workers’ professions. Cannot transfer expatriate workers’ services to themselves. Cannot get any new, replacement or seasonal visas. Cannot open files for new enterprises (whether they are entities or branches) at the labour offices. Cannot renew work permits. Cannot stop their expatriate workers from signing contracts with a new silver or green company employer. Grace 6 months period White Nitaqat New rules do not apply to household servants. rules do not Renewal of their iqama is not linked to the duration of stay in the apply country. Their visa would be automatically renewed, depending on the sponsors’ will. Source: Compiled by the author from various Gulf-based newspapers and concerned websites to reserve 10%–39% of the jobs for the Saudi nationals. The companies, which fail to meet the quota targets, will be listed under Yellow and Red zones (Table 9.5). Ultimately, a company has to attain Silver status if it wants to continue its business in the country. ‘The quota compliance is monitored through the government integrated social and visa records’ (Peck 2014). Peck (2014) also views Nitaqat as a government instrument to combat the ‘resource curse’ on the labour market and manage common economic problems, including corruption, political instability, high unemployment, problem arising due to weak institutions, etc. By this, government plans to generate approximately or absorb around 50%, including graduates, of the total national labour force. According to David B. Ottawy, the Saudi government has ‘adopted the U.S. Republican political mantra, “jobs, jobs, jobs.” It is pressing the private sector as never before to solve a problem it can- 158 Z. Hussain

Table 9.5 Percentage of Saudization under different Nitaqat zones Business size Silver/excellent Green Yellow Red Small (10–49) 40 10–39 5–9 0–4 Medium (50–499) 40 12–39 6–11 0–5 Large (500–2999) 40 12–39 7–11 0–6 Giant (3000+) 40 12–39 7–11 0–6 Source: Tala Al-Hejaila: ‘Be Aware: Focus on Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’, Be Aware Newsletter, June (2012) not: jobs for 250,000 to 300,000 Saudi university graduates and other youth entering the labour market every year’ (2012: 5). The Labour Minister Adel Fakeih recently announced the launch of a new programme ‘Jahiz’ or ‘ready’ and ‘will create job opportunities for Saudi students who have just finished their scholarship programmes abroad and returned home’ (Zawya 2012). Since King Abdullah ascended the throne in 2005, under international scholarship programme, the Kingdom has sent large number of students, particularly to the USA for higher education. Approximately 130,000 students are abroad and the total cost incurred on their scholarship is estimated approximately of USD 5 billion (Knickmeyer 2012). Prior to 2001, 66,000 Saudi students were present in different universities and colleges of the USA; however, after 9/11, the US authorities almost closed the visa service to Saudi students. As result, by 2004, their number declined to 1000. It was only after the pivotal meeting in 2005 at the president’s ranch in Crawford, Texas, the King was able to convince George W. Bush that ‘the education program between the two countries “was crucial for the two countries” long-term relationship’ (Knickmeyer 2012). ‘The stated goal of the program, which, the Arab News daily in December reported cost more than 20 billion riyals [USD5.3 billion], is to prepare Saudi nationals to replace expatriate workers in better-paid technical jobs in the kingdom, reducing unemployment’ (McDowall 2012). The wave of returnees ... is growing yearly. From just a few hundred graduates from U.S. institutions in 2006, their number reached 6000 in 2012, a 50 per cent increase...[Mody] Alkhalif [Director of Cultural Affairs at the Saudi Embassy in Washington] said, “very few” graduates were electing not to return home. Another embassy official quoted in March by the English-language Arab News said that so far “only 13 students applied for citizenship in the United States” (Ottaway 2012: 4).

How Nitaqat Is Different from Past Efforts

The Nitaqat programme avoids taking direct administrative measures by imposing a blanket quota or restricting inflow of contract workers in the country. But, it has indirectly prepared the ground for it by tightening the private companies’ employability of expatriate workers: ‘the state will impose a six-year cap on residency visas for expatriate workers, if their employers fail to meet quotas’ (Sfakianakis 2011). The new programme ‘is more dynamic and pragmatic’; it is based on ‘applying 205 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 159 categories of quotas that vary on the line of the nature of “work” and “employment size” of the company’ (ibid.). The new labour policy divides all the 205 business activities into four categories termed as Nitaqat zones (Table 9.3). Each zone has to reserve fixed percentage of jobs for Saudis, which depend on the number of workers employed by these business units (Table 9.4). However, a business unit that employs less than nine workers is not subjected to Nitaqat mandates. This is known as White Zone category firms. The criterion of reserving jobs is based on a meticulous approach of striking a balance between creation of employment opportunities for Saudis and economic viability of private enterprises. The programme systematically analyses current and projected demands for jobs and the economic capacity of different enterprises to absorb Saudi employees. Its provisions also seem futuristic, proposing adoption of Saudization in a phased manner. Table 9.6 provides the estimated level of nationalization required for companies employing 3000 and more people in Saudi Arabia. The thriving private sector has

Table 9.6 Saudization bands across the select business lines (in per cent) Category Profession category Red Yellow Green Silver Category I (preferred by Personal services 4% 12% 64% 65% Saudis) Printing, publishing and media 14% 34% 64% 65% Electricity, gas and water 7% 19% 69% 70% Kindergartens, institutes and 14% 34% 69% 70% colleges Maritime transport 9% 29% 74% 75% Communications 9% 29% 74% 75% Community services and social 9% 21% 74% 75% Petrochemical, coal and rubber 19% 44% 74% 75% Private and public schools girls 39% 49% 79% 80% Oil and gas extraction 14% 34% 84% 85% Employment agencies 51% 76% 86% 87% Financial institutions 49% 64% 89% 90% Offices of public services 9% 29% 89% 90% Recruiters eligibility 9% 29% 89% 90% Category II (mixed Nutrition services 4% 15% 30% 31% preferences) Manufacturing 7% 19% 34% 35% Wholesale and retail trade 9% 24% 36% 37% Private and public schools boys 14% 19% 39% 40% Accommodation and tourism 5% 17% 41% 42% Ground transportation to 4% 11% 44% 45% passengers, within cities Insurance and business services 4% 19% 54% 55% Cement industry 7% 29% 59% 60% Trading gold and jewellery 9% 28% 59% 60% Air transport 9% 29% 59% 60% Collection offices and real estate 4% 17% 59% 60% services (continued) 160 Z. Hussain

Table 9.6 (continued) Category Profession category Red Yellow Green Silver Category III (predominantly Transport of goods within cities 7% 11% 21% 22% for expatriates) Farmers, fishermen and 1% 8% 26% 27% herdsmen Agriculture, fishing, grazing and 4% 13% 26% 27% horse raising Agriculture and livestock 5% 9% 26% 27% production Pharmacies and drug stores 9% 14% 29% 30% Foreign schools 6% 14% 29% 30% Building materials and 4% 7% 30% 31% construction Construction maintenance, 3% 6% 30% 31% operation and subsistence Source: Al Masha Capital Limited (2011:33) maintained its growth and competitiveness on account of cheap, efficient contract workers working for long hours; non-Saudis are paid one-fourth the average salary of Saudis. For instance, in 2009, the average monthly private sector wage for nationals was SR3,137 per month, and for expatriates for the same job, it was around SR765. The authorities have also raised minimum wages in the private sector, to encourage Saudi employment. Failure of the past efforts of Saudization has been another important reason for implementing Nitaqat policy. Although, even before the oil-price revolution (1973–1974), the Saudi government realized the need of maintaining a fair percentage of national labour force in overall employment stream, it could not succeed; rather the percentage of foreign workers steadily kept growing, particularly in private sector (Fig. 9.1). As a result, Nitaqat can be seen as a stringent response to non-abidance of private sector enterprises to the nationalization of employment policy of the government (Alhamad 2014; Al Masiah Capital Limited 2011). Figure 9.1 shows the declining share of Saudis in private sector. In 1970, Saudis were holding 84% of the total jobs in private sector, but in 2010, it reduced to 13%, while the share of non-Saudis increased to 78% from 15% during the same period.

Nitaqat and the Arab Uprising – Is it a Rentier Response?

The timing of the renewed emphasis of Saudization under the new name of Nitaqat seems essential and opportune for the Kingdom now, both from the political as well as economic angles. Politically, Saudi Arabia needs to insulate itself from the political ‘tsunami’ of the Arab Uprising, spearheaded by the youth who are mainly discontented with the growing unemployment, social inequality and suspicious role of the regime. The 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 161 t Per cen

1970 1975 198019851990199520002004200520062007200820092010 Saudis 84.1471.7249.3540.1734292510.111.612.813.113.31213 Non-Saudis 15.8628.2850.6559.8366717589.988.487.286.986.78887

Fig. 9.1 History of Saudization in private sector (in per cent). (Source: Central Department of Statistics (CDS), Labour Force Statistics in Saudi Arabia, 1977, 1990, 2001 (Jeddah). Figures for 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008 are taken from Hertog 2012 and 2009 and 2010 are author’s estimates) government has vigorously revised, at least in policy prescription, the employment policy of the private sector and attempted to generate employment opportunities. It has mandated the private sector firms to employ a certain percentage of the nationals. Economically, the regime can afford the high cost of addressing emergent problems and create an enabling atmosphere for redressing and mitigating socio- economic and political discontent. The high level of oil prices has given an enormous economic capability to the regime to afford a lavish lifestyle and largely unproductive policies to appease the citizens, particularly the youth who are witnessing relatively a high level of unemployment. The immediate objectives of Nitaqat are as follows: (a) Neutralizing the spillover effects of ongoing regional turbulence in the country by reducing unemployment among citizens, thus ensuring a medium- to long- term socio-economic and political stability in the country. (b) Stimulating economic growth by plugging the huge remittance outflow. According to Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA), over the last 18 years (1990–2008), expatriate workers remitted approximately SR 524 billion (USD139 billion) (Ramady 2005). (c) Preparing the nationals to take up their labour market responsibilities through better education, training and skill upgradation programmes and weeding out skill mismatch. (d) Reducing dependence upon expatriate workers through effective labour management policy. 162 Z. Hussain

Unemployment

John Sfakianakis, Chief Economist, Banque Saudi Fransi (SFB), views the new programme as ‘desperate measures’ in ‘desperate times’ (Sfakianakis et al. 2011). Another reason that perhaps goaded the Saudi authorities to announce the new policy is the increasing unemployment among nationals, despite the large number of jobs generated in recent years and the robust economic growth. Today, ‘there is a striking paradox in Saudi Arabia’s labour market. Expatriates working in the kingdom send home more remittances than those living in any country in the world apart from the U.S. Yet youth unemployment among Saudi citizens are higher than [in] every country in the Middle East and North Africa, except Iraq’ (cited in Focus Migration 2012). According to official statistics, unemployment is currently running as high as 10.5% (Fig. 9.2). Men in the age group 20–24 experienced 30.3% unemployment, while 12.7% men in the age group 25–29 are without work. According to Al-Dosary et al. (2005), around 20%–30% university graduates are unemployed. Another source estimates that unemployment rose to more than 30% from about 12% between 2000 and 2005. Citing the latest statistics, the Labour Minister, Adel Fakeih, noted that ‘there were about 500,000 unemployed Saudi men and women against the presence of eight

2010, 35.6

2006, 31.8 2009, 30.2 2007, 29 2008, 27.8

2006, 12 2007, 11 2008, 10 2009, 10.5 2010, 10.5

Saudi Youth Unemployment Total Saudi Unemplyment

Fig. 9.2 Total and youth unemployment in Saudi Arabia, 2006–2010. (Source: ILO 2009 (G20 Statistical Report)) 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 163 million foreigners, of whom about six million are employed by the private sector’ (Arab News 2011a). Overall, unemployment in Saudi Arabia ‘is running at 10.5 per cent’ of which ‘28 per cent... were women and 40 per cent were high school graduates’ (ibid.). Citigroups’ Chief Economist for the Middle East Farouk Soussa warned that. serious imbalances have been building in the country over decades and that we believe require urgent attention: only 40% of Saudis of working age are in employment, 43% of 20–24-year-olds are officially unemployed, 51% are below the age of 21, expat workers make up 90% of the private sector work force (quoted in Zawya 2011).

Locating Causes of Unemployment

The foremost reason for high rate of unemployment among nationals lies in resource distribution – the distribution of oil wealth among citizens on the principles of natural justice than on economic rules of efficiency and marginal productivity, which suited the objectives of the political regime to maintain its legitimacy by lavishly purchasing the will and consent of the citizens. Since the first oil bonanza occurred in the region, other productive forces such as agriculture, sea-based economic activities and service sector gradually lost their sheen and the classic ‘Dutch disease’ gripped the economy. Furthermore, private sector jobs came to be regarded as menial and below par socially and culturally, fit only for migrants. The Saudis, consequently, opted to remain unemployed rather than be employed in the private sector. In the Gulf, there is a problem of reluctance by citizens to take up technical and productive jobs and their preference of administrative, office and supervisory jobs... their preference of the public sector is also aggravating the redundancy problem and widening the gap in real production (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, quoted in Kawach 2010). There is an economic angle too, which fuelled unemployment or plateaued the employment opportunities for the Saudi nationals even the policy of Saudization had been put into practice more vigorously since. Saudis were generally paid three times higher wages than the expatriates holding the same position. Since the Arab Uprising started the government has also raised the amount of the minimum wage to SR 3000 per month to the Saudis, but there has been no such upgradation to the expatriates’ wages (Table 9.7). This variation in wage rates is present across the professions. Table 9.8 shows the gap of salaries paid to the Saudis and non-Saudi in select professions. It is noted that the gap is as high as 61% (clerical jobs) between nationals and expatriates. As a result, most of the jobs created in the Kingdom went to the foreign workers. During the 6 years (2005–2011), almost 2.5 million jobs were created in Saudi Arabia, and it went to the benefit of foreign labourers (Bel-Air 2014). This is also evident from the increased number of work permits issued to the foreign workers to different private enterprises in the country (Fig. 9.3). In fact, job creation has not been a problem in the entire GCC bloc, including Saudi Arabia. According to the 164 Z. Hussain

Table 9.7 Average monthly wage to Saudis and non-Saudis in private sector in Saudi Arabia (in Saudi Riyal) Years 2004 2005 2006 2007 Saudis 4367 3878 3596 3624 Non-Saudis 1037 1028 1060 1011 Source: Hertog (2012)

Table 9.8 Salary gap between Saudis and non-Saudis in select profession (in per cent) Saudi Non- Salary gap between Saudis Main occupation nationals Saudis and non-Saudis (%) Building and construction 3320 1029 31.0 Professional, technical and related 9394 4758 50.6 work Administrative 14,858 13,160 88.6 Clerical 6212 3816 61.4 Sales 3676 777 21.1 Electricity, gas and water 8659 4187 48.4 Service 3619 1204 33.3 Agriculture, animal husbandry and 3191 1000 31.3 fishermen Production, transport, equipment 6721 1119 16.6 operator and related work Mining, oil and gas 16,927 4916 29.0 Not reported 3963 2512 63.4 General average 7034 2354 33.5 Source: Alshanbri et al. (2014)

11,41,601

9,70,805

7,16,347 5,97,272 5,31,434 5,16,826 538892 5,65,124 4,20,928 4,15,619 4,23,172 3,52,924

Fig. 9.3 Work permits issued to foreign workers to different enterprises, 2001. (Source: Hertog 2010) 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 165

Table 9.9 Reasons for Saudi unemployment Issue Private sector justifications Labour The relatively high cost of Saudi manpower Social and cultural perceptions Saudis are reluctant to take up and seriously pursue certain types of jobs. Work-related social status affects marriage and other social relations Control over process of Expatriate workers are more disciplined. They are prohibited production from changing jobs without their sponsor’s permission Lack of social integration in a Local populations are reluctant to integrate into multi-cultural multi-cultural environment work environments, fearing that it might diminish their existing status Job tenure Saudi workers cannot be dismissed easily Inadequate qualifications Saudi employees may have inadequate qualifications, lack English fluency, or have a non-technical background Mobility Saudi workers are less mobile than foreign workers Source: Ramady (2005)

Ahmed, ‘Over the past 10 years, the GCC created about seven million new jobs – a significant achievement for a region with a total population of about 40 million.’ But, fewer than two million – less than one-third – went to nationals. The sharp rise in expatriate employment took place mostly in the private sector (Ahmed 2012). According to Torofdar (2011), ‘unemployment among nationals is driven by a number of factors such as lack of skills, low motivation to work, and high salary expectations’. Ramady (2005) cites the reasons for Saudi unemployment as given in Table 9.9. Figure 9.4 shows the projected rate of job requirements over the next five decades. It also characterizes the possibility of two major trends in the Saudi labour markets, including its impact on society in the long term: one, an ever-increasing rate of male–female labour force participation; and second, increasing share of female labour force in the total. The participation of male and female labour force will almost become equal, with economic necessity giving way to gender equality and mitigating gender bias. Willoughby (2004) termed this a silent revolution in the GCC labour market, which would potentially replace the expatriate workers. Politically, the new programme seems a timely motivated intervention in the labour market, which has become a hot playground of restive youth politics. This is most likely due to the demonstration effect (emphasis added) of the Arab Uprising currently underway in the entire Islamic Crescent. Another plausible reason for the Nitaqat policy is the aspect of diverting the hearts and minds of the Sunni-majority population through regional balancing. The Kingdom appears more concerned with maintaining peace and stability in the oil-rich eastern region, which is Shia dominated. Shias account for approximately 10–11% of Saudi Arabia’s population and are more susceptible to the current upheaval. The Sunni Saudi regime is also cautious about the rising Shia crescent in the post-Saddam Gulf era and in the wake of the Arab Uprising, which emphasizes rule by majority. Demographically, the Shia population is larger than the Sunnis in the Gulf region, constituting approximately 166 Z. Hussain

15Million

11 Million

7 Million

3Million

Total, 2020- Total, 2030- Total, 2040- 2024, 0 2034, 0 2044, 0

Women

Fig. 9.4 Projected national labour force, 2010–2050. (Source: http://www.zwaya.com (accessed 11 December 2013))

61% of the total population (Hussain 2011, 2012). Iran is emerging as a natural leader of the Shia sect, leading to a Shia encirclement of Sunni Saudi Arabia (emphasis added). To counter Iran’s growing influence and isolate it in the region, Saudi Arabia invited, in the recent annual GCC meeting, two Sunni-majority countries – Morocco and Jordan – to join the bloc. It has also renewed its interest in Yemen and is promoting a regime change in Syria, a staunch Iranian ally. The Saudi king also proposed to form a Gulf Union by forgoing an alliance with Bahrain. He urged the kings, emirs and sultans gathered at the meeting, ‘you all know that we are targeted in our safety and security’ (Knickmeyer and Delmar-Morgan 2012).

Economic Rationale of the New Labour Programme

Another significant reason for announcing the new labour policy is the financial luxury which allows Saudi Arabia the fiscal profligacy after a long time. It is estimated that due to sustained rise in oil prices, the Kingdom has a surplus of approximately USD 900 billion (The Economist 2014). This luxury of surplus finance has occurred after more than one and half decades; between 1985 and 1998, the Kingdom managed its expenditure through deficit financing and increasing its debt–GDP ratio reached almost 100%, which was reduced to 16.7% in 2010 from 21.6% in 2009. Besides these surpluses, Saudi Arabia has huge cash deposits in Western countries and a huge sovereign wealth fund (see IMF 2011; Hussain 2009). It has more than 1.5 trillion SR wealth for emergencies. 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 167

In addition, growth rate of the non-oil economy is less prone to fluctuation and has maintained a consistent rate of growth than the oil economy. This means that the Saudi economy is heading towards diversification, which will open more avenues for job creation (Looney 2004a, b; Sadi 2013). The economy will expand laterally. Thus, more people will be involved in the economic and political systems, and the country will move towards democratization in the medium to long run.

Feasibility, Expectations and Impact of the New Programme

The Nitaqat programme has evoked a mixed response among different stakeholders.

Officials and Government Employees

According to the Labour Minister, the plan will help reduce joblessness in the country. He also ‘expects to end 99 per cent of black-market visas and with help from the private sector, this market would be totally dissolved’. ‘The program will also end commercial concealment, where foreigners run businesses under Saudi cover’ (Arab News 2011a). According to the ministry, ‘50 per cent transport companies have achieved the required Nitaqat level. “The Saudization levels set by the Nitaqat program in each sector are determined by what can be achieved practically”, it said’ (Arab News 2012). Due to Nitaqat, ‘250,000 Saudis were employed in less than a year. Before introducing the system in Shawwal 1432H, it took five years to create such amount of jobs for Saudis. Nitaqat has also helped 54,000 women get jobs within seven months’ (ibid.). The Labour Minister has great hopes of meeting the challenges of unemployment. He maintains that ‘if the government succeeds in pushing 50 per cent of private Saudi companies into the green zone, “after three to five years, we will run out of real Saudi job seekers” in the kingdom’ (Ottaway 2012:6). Peck (2014) has collected a detailed data of the number of firms of different categories, employing both Saudis and non-Saudis. He reached to the conclusion that between July 2011 and October 2012, Nitaqat succeeded in creating approximately 462,000 jobs for Saudis in private sector as well as ‘improving the colour- band assignments, with most Red and Yellow firms moving into the Green or Platinum bands’. He found that the industries/firms falling under large and medium business groups have absorbed the highest percentage of Saudi workforce, 36.84% and 29.47%, respectively, while Giant Business group employed only 18.83% of the total 645,716 Saudi nationals (Table 9.10). A detailed analysis of the share of Saudis employed in different industries is given in Table 9.11. 168 Z. Hussain

Table 9.10 Share of Saudis in different business units % of Total % of Saudis Business Number of Number of workforce Saudi employed in Share of group firms workers employed workers different groups Saudis Tiny (<10) 1027,017 1,780,937 24.02 21,250 3.29 1.19 Small 102,693 1,823,386 24.60 74,759 11.58 4.10 (10–49) Medium 12,935 1,582,555 21.35 190,263 29.47 12.02 (50–499) Large 1187 1,428,220 19.27 237,851 36.84 16.65 (500– 2999) Giant 58 798,029 10.77 121,593 18.83 15.24 (3000+) Total 1,143,890 7,413,127 100% 645,716 100% 8.71 Source: Pack (2014, table IV, page 46)

Table 9.11 Share of Saudis employed in different industries (July 2011) Share of Number Number of Share of Saudi of firms employees workforce Total Saudi workforce Industry in each in each industrywise workers industrywise share No. Industry category firm (%) industrywise (%) Saudi 1 Building and 40,147 2,627,940 46.66 1,52,046 24.35 5.79 construction 2 Wholesale and 20,597 9,27,861 16.47 1,27,711 20.45 13.76 retail trade 3 Manufacturing 6981 4,18,025 7.42 69,096 11.06 16.53 4 Multiple 16,050 1,99,166 3.54 4795 0.77 2.41 economic activities 5 Maintenance and 1331 1,67,817 2.98 12,791 2.05 7.62 cleaning services 6 Farmers, 6435 1,28,447 2.28 1532 0.25 1.19 fishermen and shepherds 7 Restaurants and 4847 128,118 2.27 7961 1.27 6.21 catering services 8 Health services 1292 1,24,640 2.21 20,358 3.26 16.33 9 Social and 2321 1,32,849 2.20 39,229 6.28 31.67 communal services 10 Workshops and 6679 1,22,235 2.17 3196 0.51 2.61 maintenance services 11 Personal services 2545 82,198 1.46 11,923 1.91 14.51 (continued) 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 169

Table 9.11 (continued) Share of Number Number of Share of Saudi of firms employees workforce Total Saudi workforce Industry in each in each industrywise workers industrywise share No. Industry category firm (%) industrywise (%) Saudi 12 Petroleum and 73 70,720 1.26 53,699 8.60 75.93 gas extraction 13 Passenger 1447 65,567 1.16 4929 0.79 7.52 transportation (intercity) 14 Lodging and 1289 62,190 1.10 8185 1.31 13.16 tourism 15 Agriculture and 418 42,124 0.75 4878 0.78 11.68 livestock 16 Consulting 551 38,015 0.67 5691 0.91 14.97 services 17 Passenger 501 35,215 0.63 3654 0.59 10.38 transportation (intercity) 18 Insurance and 637 33,701 0.60 8251 1.32 24.48 business services 19 Governmental 406 30,045 0.53 11,390 1.82 37.91 and private schools 20 Financial 80 28,777 0.51 23,040 3.69 80.06 institutions 21 Electricity, gas 114 23,330 0.41 8329 1.33 35.70 and water 22 Cement 83 20,292 0.36 4584 0.73 22.59 23 Institutes and 222 20,292 0.36 8607 1.38 42.42 colleges 24 Foreign schools 281 17,794 0.32 6776 1.09 38.08 25 Collection offices 233 14,599 0.26 2172 0.35 14.88 and real estate 26 Mining and 85 12,111 0.22 4808 0.77 39.70 quarrying 27 Petrochemicals, 85 11,735 0.21 5298 0.85 45.15 coal and rubber 28 Pharmacies 268 11,316 0.20 1907 0.31 16.85 29 Printing, 273 10,922 0.19 2127 0.34 19.47 publishing and media 30 Fishing, grazing 217 9731 0.17 835 0.13 8.58 and horses 31 Gold and 92 8847 0.16 2750 0.44 31.08 jewellery trade (continued) 170 Z. Hussain

Table 9.11 (continued) Share of Number Number of Share of Saudi of firms employees workforce Total Saudi workforce Industry in each in each industrywise workers industrywise share No. Industry category firm (%) industrywise (%) Saudi 32 Private labour 77 5391 0.10 234 0.04 4.34 recruitment agencies 33 Air transportation 92 2897 0.05 352 0.06 12.15 34 Shipping 59 2376 0.04 518 0.08 21.80 35 Communications 12 1661 0.03 198 0.03 11.92 36 Storage 22 1602 0.03 428 0.07 26.72 37 General office 31 644 0.01 188 0.03 29.19 service Total 1,16,873 5,632,190 – 6,24,466 – 11.09 Non-Nitaqat 10,27,017 17,80,937 31.62 21.250 3.40 1.19 firms Source: Peck (2014) Note: This table provides sample statistics on the composition of the workforce by industry at baseline (July 9, 2011). Column 1 counts the number of forms in each industry category, and column 2 shows the number of employees at firms in those industries. Column 3 sorts industries by their share in the total private sector workforce. Columns 4 and 5 report the number of Saudi workers in each industry and the share of workers in that industry in total Saudi private sector workforce. Column 6 calculates the share of workers in each industry that are Saudi nationals, that is, the overall industry Saudization rate. The last line reports the same statistics for the firms that were too small to be included in the Nitaqat programme (less than 10 employees)

Reactions of the Business Class and Private Sector

On Nitaqat, a Saudi businessman opined thus: We have had such proposals in the past. I don’t think they are feasible?... [L]et us take the case of accountants. Almost all the accountants working in Saudi Arabia have been here for more than six years. If we send them back home tomorrow, do we have enough accountants to replace them? These questions need to be asked... Another Jeddah-based businessman, Ahmad Al Faroqi, too expressed fears that such a decision would potentially impact negatively on Saudi business sector... ‘Many jobs here require qualified expatriates and there are no Saudis ready to do these jobs’, he said (Arab News 2011a). Increasing the employment share of Saudis in private enterprises through administrative measures instead of following economic rules would bring irrevocable economic losses to the companies and will compel employers to shut down their units in the short to medium run. As noted by the Labour Minister, almost 40% of the enterprises will fail to meet the Saudization targets and, hence, will face the axe. The 6-year departure programme of expatriates may also induce experienced workers to seek employment in other neighbouring countries before their term expires. 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 171

Peck (2014) has also reached to some of the following conclusions of the quota policy that can negatively influence the Saudi Arabia’s economy and labour market: First, it may propel the firms to exit the business; second, it can induce the firms to downsize below the 10-employee cut-off (White category) and avoid to maintain quota adherence; third, it may increase the tendency of temporary hiring of the Saudis, which does not reflect the long-term increase in Saudization. Exit and downsizing of firms may result into the following cascading effects: emergence of big corporate houses and inducement to monopolize the economy, which may leading to the development of inward looking tendencies. Consequently, it may jeopar- dize the spirit of competition and entrepreneurship in the economy and, hence, spoil the objective of making Saudi Arabia a vibrant and globally competitive economy.

An Alternate View of Nitaqat

The provision of 6-year residency applies only to those expatriates whose companies fail to meet their targets of Saudization. The companies would prefer to become capital intensive rather than expanding horizontally. This will reduce the demand for more workers in the long run. Higher wages will be paid to workers, as capital will be cheaply available. Silver/Excellent and Green companies will also earn the opportunity to poach on workers from the Yellow and Red companies. These companies can also recruit or transfer workers, letting the workers complete 2 years under their sponsors. The official government figure of unemployment in the country also requires scrutiny. It is around 10.5% of the population, which was estimated at around 28 million in 2010. Thus, the absolute number of unemployed in the country is around 2.94 million. This is only 32.6% of the total nine million expatriate workers present in the country. The government can easily create space for these unemployed Saudis in the private sector, which can absorb this number comfortably. Two conclusions may, thus, be drawn: Either the government is not furnishing the exact percentage of unemployment in the country or there is much ado about nothing. The government has attracted the attention of the public and given them a sense of care and sympathy, particularly in the current political milieu. In both cases, the expatriates should not worry much about their future in the country. Nonetheless, if Nitaqat remains a sustained policy goal, in medium to long term, it will create some of the following positive spinoffs in the Saudi Arabian economy and labour market. First, trainings and skill acquisition programmes are the mandatory part of the new labour policy. A sustained training and skill acquisition programme will improve the skill profiles of the Saudi labour force; hence, it not only increases the willing of the private firms to employ nationals but also improves the overall productive of the economy, which has significantly gone down in recent decades (Al-Asmari 2008; Aljazira Capital 2013). Second, higher wages in private sector will attract Saudis to seek employment in private enterprises. As a result, it will gradually change the psychology of the Saudis, who treat private sector enter- 172 Z. Hussain prises as migrants’ domain. Better payment and changed psychology will help reduce the segmentation of labour market in the Kingdom. This ‘will also likely affect the human capital investments of Saudi nationals’ (Peck 2014) and align the education system with labour demand of private sector in the long term. Better education and changed attitudes will inculcate better corporate ethics among the Saudi workers, which ultimately fructify the goal of promoting ‘knowledge’ economy, based on innovation and global competitiveness in the Kingdom.

Policy Attention

The new policy should address the private sector’s labour dilemma. The Labour Ministry should strike a balance between Saudization and the economic capacity of the private enterprises to afford Saudi employees. Moreover, the provision of grace period needs attention. The failing companies would simply fill up their quotas with unqualified Arabs and bail out themselves. This will hurt the economy in the long run. For the employed Saudis, these jobs will be sinecures. In the medium to long run, the economy will generate a substandard national labour force and there will be a compromise with low productivity, low competitiveness and the country will have to go again for skilled expatriates. The authorities should also analyse the impact of a 6-year residency cap on expatriate workers. This may promote a flight of experienced and trained guest workers to neighbouring countries, which will mean a net loss to the Saudi economy; the country will incur an undue cost of training new workers every 6 years. A better policy would be to screen out the excess and inefficient labour ab initio. For this, a few actionable steps may be considered: (a) a holistic labour market survey could be undertaken, including gender, skill, age cohort specifics and market requirements. The labour deficit should be managed by the central authorities by fixing a quota for each country and visas issued accordingly; (b) the multiple sponsorship (kafala) system should be managed; otherwise, this would lead to a potential leakage in the new system. The problem of skill mismatch could be removed by policy attention at the following levels: (a) Hardware Reform: Reform in the national education system and expansion of relevant infrastructure facilities. The curriculum at all levels – school, college and university – should be flexible, so changes as per requirements of the labour market can be brought in. (b) Software Reform: Transforming the Saudi minds towards education and employment responsibilities. To achieve this, preference for suitable subjects and the significance of modern education in terms of career, economic contribution and corporate work ethics should be promoted. The intervention of religion in the education system, mode of learning and overemphasis on traditional subjects among students should be changed through persuasion, reservation and by 9 Nitaqat – Saudi Arabia’s New Labour Policy: Is It a Rentier Response to Domestic… 173

implementing strict eligibility criteria for employment, particularly in the public sector. Punctuality, responsibility and accountability should also be brought into the employment criteria. The subcontracting of labour that has mushroomed in the Kingdom in recent years needs serious attention. This has generated a huge opportunity for exploitation of expatriate workers by agents, sponsors and other intermediaries involved in the migration process. It is found that a worker, mostly unskilled, is getting as low as SR250 per month; the rest is appropriated by the intermediaries. The authorities should also pay attention to those sectors which are exempted from the new programme and those enterprises marked as ‘Red’. The problem of illegal or overstaying expatriates will emerge soon. The 6-year residency cap of Red-category enterprises will compel workers to flee. In such a situation, intermediaries will exploit the situation: sponsors will issue excess fake visas in sectors that are exempted from the Nitaqat programme. The Labour Ministry needs to be vigi- lant at two levels, mainly: (a) the number of visas issued in those sectors that do not fall in any of the four categories and (b) maintaining updated records of expatriate workers. At the administrative level, authorities should be prepared to deal with the problem of overstaying migrant workers; locking them up would not be the appropriate solution. Companies which employ them should be made liable if their workers run away. Close cooperation with the labour-sending countries will also help in managing the problem of illegal emigration and other related problems. Since all GCC member countries are facing the dilemma of guest workers, they should formulate a common policy. Any policy pursued in isolation would not lead to optimum benefits.

References

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Marie Percot

Abstract In Oman, Bangladeshis are now the most important community of migrants among South Asians. Among them are fishermen who represent a paradigmatic example of the difficult situation most low skilled workers have to face in the Gulf countries. Based on fieldworks in Hatiya, a small island of the Bay of Bengal from where these fishermen are originating, and in several harbours of Oman, I intend to highlight the different mechanisms which make migration a very risky gamble for these men. From the recruitment process through local networks, the conditions of work and salaries, the unavoidable path to an irregular status and eventually the arrest and deportation of most of these workers, I propose to show how, structurally, their migratory experience almost always leads to failure and increased poverty.

‘They do not pay us our proper share, they cheat us on the price of the fish; But if we try to argue, they beat us with whatever they have at hand: rope, tool, fish, shoe... They insult us and say that we are not even Muslim, just useless people from a des- titute country’. I heard this remark again and again in the harbours I visited in Oman where the vast majority of fishermen come from Bangladesh, all of them eager to speak about the ill-treatment they were enduring from the Omani owners of the

This paper is based on a fieldwork carried out in Oman in November and December 2014 where approximately 100 fishermen were interviewed and on two fieldworks in Hatiya, Bangladesh, in 2014 and 2015 where I met around 50 ex-migrants and many families of the migrants I met in Oman. The interviews were done in Bengali and translated to me in English by Morsedur Sagor Rahman a more than talented interpreter and a very precious collaborator.

M. Percot (*) Laboratoire d’ Anthropologie Urbaine/Institut Interdisciplinaire d’ Anthropologie du Contemporain (EHESS), Paris, France

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 177 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_10 178 M. Percot boats.1 No need to ask any question for that: I was directly presented the migrant whose back was showing the scars of having been beaten by a hammer, another one whose leg was badly infected after a work accident and to whom his boss had denied any treatment, the young one who had been kicked in the stomach for not understanding a few Arabic words when he had been in Oman for less than a month, etc. Beside verbal and physical abuse, all of them were also insisting on how poorly they were earning: theoretically paid by a share on the fishing, all of them were complaining of never getting it properly. Some of them, like in the island of Masira, even claimed that they did not get anything for months: Some crews had abandoned their boat and fled in search of better opportunity; more than 15 empty boats in the harbour were shown to me as evidence. All the Bangladeshi fishermen I met had borrowed a huge amount of money to migrate and all of them had come with great expectations although, as they acknowledged, it is known in their villages that Oman is not a good place.

Introduction

Few researches until now have been done precisely on the Bangladeshi migrants in the Gulf. Their exact number is not even known. Official data from Bangladesh only give a cumulative figure of 7.1 million documented migrants between 1976 and 2015 (BMET 2015). It is estimated that between 4 and 5 millions of Bangladeshis would be living now in the Gulf countries, although these estimates are hazardous considering the high numbers of undocumented workers (Rahman 2011). The first country of destination is Saudi Arabia, followed by the UAE. Oman has become the third destination for Bangladeshis with nearly a million of departure, half of them having taken place these last 4 years. The Omani General Directorate of Civil Status gives a figure of 522,652 Bangladeshi nationals living legally on its territory in 2014, just a little bit less than Indian migrants. International migration is regarded very positively by the Bangladeshi authorities for the remittances it generates (11.2 billion USD in 2014), but also as a means to mitigate the effect of climate change on rural employment (Government of Bangladesh’s BCCAS 2009). Yet, even if the government has initiated negotiations with the GCC countries regarding labour recruitment, it has not been able until now to really negotiate the conditions of employment of its migrant citizens. The latter are, in their vast majority, unskilled migrants whose salaries are among the lowest, compared especially to Indians or Pakistanis (Rahman 2011; Kibria 2011) and who most often find themselves in a very vulnerable situation in the destination country.

1 Although they were very cautious to only speak when there was not boat’s owner around. In a place, Al Khaluf, Bangladeshi fishermen refused to answer any question, specifying that they had been forbidden to speak to any foreigner. (It seems that a foreign TV channel had some years ago filmed on the spot and had pointed out the bad situation of the migrants.) 10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble 179

Bangladeshi migrants moreover have to face a very expensive system of recruitment through ‘travel agencies’ that the State has to date failed to properly regulate. This paper presents the case of Bangladeshis working as fishermen in Oman. By examining the condition of the migrants before and after their departure, I will argue that – for the majority of them – their trajectory can nearly amount to forced migration. In a first part, I explain the local context which leads these men to opt for a move notoriously hazardous and precise the ways of migration. The second part deals with the situation in the destination country and highlights in particular how the migrants are pushed and trapped into illegality. At last, the third part is dedicated to a discussion regarding voluntary/forced migration and the question of migrants’ agency.

Hatiya, an Island Under Pressure

Most fishermen met in Oman where coming from an island in the Bay of Bengal, Hatiya. This island counts 452.463 inhabitants living on 371 km2, that is, a density of 1.219 inhabitants per km2. The first striking view when arriving there is the high number of working children compared to other places in Bangladesh, a clear sign of poverty.2 People in Hatiya make a livelihood out of agriculture and fishing. Few fishermen own their boat and most of them work as day labourer during the 6 months of the fishing season. They then join the already high number of people looking for a daily job in agriculture. Landlessness is moreover a growing phenomenon because, firstly, of the land fragmentation due to division between too many inheritors, but also because of erosion, an endemic problem, which has however increased in the recent years. There is thus a fierce competition on jobs, ending up in a high rate of unemployment. According to the local fishermen, fishing used to be good and to insure relatively decent income, at least for the season, but two facts have compromised the situation: the fish wholesalers to whom money was borrowed to buy the nets have become more greedy, either paying less for the fishing or raising interest rates, thus reducing the share that fishermen can get; then, these last 10 years, dacoits – pirates have started to racket fishermen, regularly capturing men and boats for ransom. Most fishermen in Hatiya have been confronted directly with the problem, some having been badly beaten, some severely injured, all of them only freed after having paid huge amounts of money.3 All of the fishermen now fear to go to sea.

2 Hatiya is indeed ranked among the 10% of « worst » upazilas (districts) according to several factors concerning education of children (number of schools and teachers, school attendance rate…) (BBS, Census 2011). 3 To return a boat, the dacoits may ask around 50.000 takas (approximately 500 USD) and 20.000 to free a man. A fisherman’s salary amounts to 5.000–10.000 takas per month. It seems that the instauration of a rather anonymous system of payment via mobile phone (BKash) has boosted this traffic. Furthermore, the coastguards and local politicians do not appear to be very efficient in struggling against piracy, leading most fishermen to think that they have common interests through corruption. 180 M. Percot

In Hatiya, most landless families have some members working as fishermen whilst the others work in the fields when they are able to get a job. In any case, the incomes are too limited for a decent livelihood. Many of them are illiterate.4 Some do not even own their homestead land and had to build their hut on khas land (governmental land) which means mainly on the digs surrounding the island, a dangerous place in this cyclone and erosion prone area. It is in this class of people that many have opted for a migration to Oman. In Hatiya, the candidates to migration, being particularly poor, a bit isolated on an island and not familiar with travelling to big cities, rely almost exclusively on the local networks to go abroad. The network for Oman has really started 10 years ago. A few islanders had reached this Gulf country earlier, already employed as fishermen. These pioneers had often succeeded in becomingmaji (captain) on the Omani boats; they are at the origin of the flux of migration to the Sultanate.5 As a matter of fact, they soon started to become middlemen between the Omani boat owners and the prospective migrants. If in the previous years it seems that they had done it for free, mostly for some relatives or neighbours, they soon began to negotiate the visas they were able to get for a price which has grown up to 200.000 takas (approximately 2.000 USD).6 This is a huge amount in a place where monthly incomes barely cross 5.000 takas (50 USD). All the migrants I met had borrowed the money to go, gathering the amount from different sources: local usurers, relatives and several micro-credits from different NGOs. To attract candidates to departure is not so difficult because, on the one hand, the maji who sell visas are typical images of migration success (having often been able to build a good house, to buy at least a bit of land, to pay for the education of their children) and because, on the other hand, poor people of the island are left with no real opportunity to earn a decent livelihood. To go as fisherman, a job that most islanders master, is even rather reassuring compared, for instance, to go driving a rickshaw in Dhaka. It is not possible to give a precise figure of the number of people who have left for Oman, but it is in thousands: in some villages of Hatiya, there is no house where there is not at least one migrant there. Yet, the interviews of ex-migrants or of migrant’s relatives show a rather desperate picture: To make it short, except for the few who have been able to become captain I have not found a single example of successful migration. Three types of scenarios were met again and again:

4 Hatiya has a particularly low literacy rate: 34.2% compared to 51.2% for Bangladesh (BBS, 2011 Census). 5 I am still not able to explain how exactly one becomes captain in Oman. Clearly, the fist migrants had better chances, but it has also surely a link with the local hierarchy in Hatiya. Those employed as simple fishermen stated that they had no chance to becomemaji. 6 This price includes the money the maji had to pay himself to the Omani boss (who sells him the visas at first), the fees of the different ‘travel agents’ (a local one and another one in a big city like Dhaka or Chittagong) and the travel fees. From my interviews, I can estimate that the benefit the maji makes on a visa ranges between 400 and 600 USD. 10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble 181

A significant proportion of migrants had been deported, after being sentenced up to 1 year of jail, for working illegally in Oman, be it due to a cheating on their visa or to having fled from their original job. For some of them they had been arrested a few weeks only after their arrival. It is thus felt as a direct and total failure to be back home with the full debt to repay and after having earned nothing for months because of a long incarceration. Another part of the migrants are in a way stuck in Oman, altogether because until now they have not been able to pay back their debt and because they are – for different reasons – in a situation of illegality which does not allow them to leave Oman without being jailed. Yet, they cannot send enough remittances to support the family and to repay the debt. The fathers, mothers or wives of such migrants, pressurized by the lenders, are altogether blaming the migrant for not sending more money and complaining of not having seen him for years. As a father said: ‘My son left nine years ago. His mother passed away six years ago and he did not come for the funeral. He left when my daughter-in-law was expecting her third child, his first son, and he has never seen him. What life is it? If he was doing well, it would be possible to bear, but no, he was only able to send 60.000 takas [600 USD] last year. With the debt we have to pay what can we do?’. In several instances, I met with women who had been sent back to their father’s house because the migrant could not send enough to support his wife and children. In an extended family homestead, the migrant’s wife was living with her children under a sloping roof, hardly protected from rain: The only place left to her by brothers-in-law who were repeatedly telling her that her husband was enjoying life in Oman, playing cards and having mistresses, instead of supporting his family. When I gave her the picture I had taken from her husband in Oman, she hardly looked at it. At last, one finds in Hatiya, the returnees who came back without having been evicted or who had chosen to be evicted in order to come back. They, until now, represent a minority considering the time migration to Oman has started in Hatiya. These are men who have realized that, in no way, they would improve their situation by staying longer or who – having become illegal – were too tired of living with constant fear of police. At best, they have been able to clear the debt contracted for their departure, but I have met no people who have been able to improve their standard of living: they were just back to square one, looking for daily job. Having stayed between 6 and 10 years, most of them still had at least part of the debt to repay. Those who had been evicted as well as those who had voluntary come back however had a rather fatalistic approach of their bad experience in Oman. As several of them put it: ‘I have played and I have lost.’ All of them were presenting the money invested as a bet on a move they knew as risky. For instance, Nazrul, who has spent 7 years in Oman and has failed to pay back his debt, remarked: ‘Yes, it is well known that in Oman the situation is not good, but still there are some people in the island who have done well. I took my chance and I had hopes that I would be among the happy ones. Here, anyway, there is no hope at all, so I had to try my luck.’ When asked to precise who ‘has done well’, the few examples given were without exception of migrants who were captain and selling visas. Regarding the risk taken by the 182 M. Percot migrants and its rationality, one also has to consider that fishermen in Hatiya already live in insecurity, like Mohammad explained: ‘I have been here [in Oman] for six months. To come, I have sold our two cows and borrowed two lakhs. It is surely a hazardous bet […] but at home I was risking my life everyday when I was going to fish. With this problem of dacoits, I feel that I may have saved my life by coming here’. This willingness to go despite the evidence of so many failures can also be traced in the way migrants do not care about the contracts they are presented. Some of them have not even see any papers and have not signed anything; the rest of them have signed contracts written in English and Arabic, languages that they, of course, do not know. To decide to leave for Oman, they thus just rely on the oral promise given by the local visa seller concerning the type of job and the amount of money they would get. None of the people I met had been given a copy of his contract. As I said, the bad situation of migrants in Oman is well known in Hatiya. The migrants do not hesitate to describe the bad treatments they endure and everybody can witness how poorly they have succeeded. It is so true that prices of visas seem to have decreased a bit lately,7 but it has not stopped the flux of candidates to departure. It is clear that migration, in this precise case, is basically a sign of desperation from people ready to anything to escape poverty and having no other perspective at hand. If, of course, they are the ones to decide to go, if they are not ‘passive subjects’ and, in a way, ‘exercise a great deal of agency’ (Khonder and Jahan 2015), it is nevertheless clear that they do not go with an informed consent.

‘Kulu Oman Haram’ (Everything Is Bad in Oman)

In Oman, except for locals fishing on very small boats, all the fishermen are migrants. They mostly work on boats with a crew of 8–10 people, all of them belonging to the same nationality. It seems that, 20 years ago, most of them were Indians – often from Kerala or from Gujarat – but today, the vast majority is from Bangladesh. According to my respondents, Indians have found better opportunities and Omanis would now prefer Bangladeshis because they are cheaper labour.8 The recruitment of foreign fishermen has increased after the Omani government has decided to develop the fishing sector, and to do so, has largely subsidized the purchasing of fishing boats (WTO 2008). If it is legal to hire migrant workers as crew for the big- ger ships, it is illegal for the smaller boats, theoretically reserved for local fishermen.9 A law which is not respected since everywhere Bangladeshis can be seen fishing on these small fibreglass crafts.

7 When I was in Hatiya this year (January–February 2015), visas were sold for 150.000 takas instead of 200.000 the previous year. 8 Several of my interlocutors stated that the situation was so difficult in Bangladesh that people were ready to accept to lower their wages in order to come or to stay. 9 The idea was to turn Bedouins, who were hardly doing anymore a livelihood out of their traditional nomadic occupation, into sedentary villagers. 10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble 183

‘Kulu Oman haram’ (Everything is bad in Oman). This is with this sentence in Arabic that I was welcomed on the first boat with a Bangladeshi crew I visited in Sur, a big fishing harbour in Oman. I was then given a depiction of the physical and verbal abuse the workers were suffering from, a depiction that was renewed in every place I went. They were then complaining about the poor income they were getting. Indeed, fishermen have no fixed salary. They are paid by a share of the fishing: the owner of the boat theoretically takes 50%; on the 50% left, he takes in addition the amount he has spent for the fuel, and most often, for the food of the crew. The rest of the benefits are supposed to be shared between the fishermen including the captain. The captain normally gets in addition a fixed amount of between 1.000 and 2.000 USD a year. But no worker is allowed to go to the market where the fish selling takes place; they thus entirely depend on their boss’s goodwill. In Masira, a small Omani island, most of the crews had not even got any payment for more than 5 months when I visited the place: The Omani owners were just giving them food and sweet water. In such cases, be it a too little pay or no pay at all, many fishermen eventually decide to find another boss who may pay better. To do so they should have the agreement of their first boss, the one who have sponsored them to come in Oman, something which seems to be very difficult to get. Pushed to leave anyway, they thus end up as illegal workers. Many of the migrant fishermen I met were in this situation. Indeed, it is the kafala system, the rule in Oman as in the other Gulf countries, which generates illegal workers, although – as everywhere – it is the migrants who are always blamed and stigmatized. Four circumstances may be observed that lead migrants to illegality. According to this system, the worker is supported by a local ‘sponsor’ (the kafil) who has to be his employer. The system is supposed to give better control over migrants, but it is not oriented towards the protection of the migrants (Gardner 2012). Practically, migrants have few options when confronted to an exploitative kafil, as it is often the case for Bangladeshi fishermen and obviously the easiest, if not the only alternative is to run away: To just go back home is not a really possible choice because of the debt the workers have contracted to come. The second scenario comes from the fact that some Omanis have now made a business of selling visas. They ask to the authorities more visas for workers they actually do not need: Once on the spot, the migrant worker discover that he will have pay to this kafil a monthly amount, but that he will have to manage to find a job by himself. This type of visas is known as ‘free visas’, but it is indeed directly putting the migrant in a situation of illegality (Pessoa et al. 2014). Many fishermen met were in this situation since they were working on boats which were not belonging to their kafil. Another factor pushing to illegality takes place at the time of visa extension. The contracts are generally for 2 years; to renew them, many kafils ask the equivalent of 200 USD to their workers, an amount which can be too high for many. The kafil may even chose not to renew the contract and to instead hire a new migrant since he will make more money by selling this new visa. These three scenarios can be observed everywhere in the Gulf, but the last factor leading to illegal status is more specific to Oman and to fishermen; it is a consequence of the governmental ban on hiring foreign labour for the very artisanal fishing on small boats: 184 M. Percot

Since most nationals prefer to hire migrant workers than going to fish themselves and since they cannot get visas for workers, they directly and very consciously hire illegal workers. As a consequence, if the fishermen left Hatiya with a visa they thought was valid, a large proportion of them find themselves directly or soon in an illegal position. The market for illegal workers seems to be rather open, in a way giving some space to workers whose kafil are too exploitative. But the burden of illegality has a price: The constant fear of being caught by the police, of being jailed and then evicted and the impossibility to get any help from their consulate in such situation.10 Yet, if many evictions are carried out as I could check in Hatiya, a certain tolerance can also be observed which leads to believe that undocumented workers may indeed be useful to the Omani economy: For instance, the Bangladeshi fishermen who illegally work on small boats are housed in sort of slums very visible on some beaches. No other occupation than fishing could justify their living in such places; they are nevertheless not systematically chased and some of them I met have been working illegally there for more 10 years.

A Free Choice?

Many academic studies have described the vulnerability and the exploitation of low skilled or unskilled migrant workers in the Gulf countries and some NGOs continue to denounce the worst cases they observe (Rajan and Sunkendran 2010; Mahdavi 2011; Human Right Watch 2015). Yet, a new trend in the academic field (see, for instance, Khondker and Jahan 2015; Tristan Bruslé 2015) is to reject the picture of migrants as victims to mainly insist on their agency, following the approach developed by J. C. Scott in his book ‘Weapons of the Weak’ (1985). These studies moreover stress out the benefit of migration for the families of the workers as well as for the country they come from.11 The case of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman rather leads to highlight how debt contracted to leave added to the perverse effects of kafala deprive the migrants of rights and freedom. D. Turton (2003) warns against a too simplistic approach in terms of voluntary migration as opposed to forced migration in a binary opposition. He insists on the fact that, even refugees, may have some agency. And certainly, the fishermen from

10 All my interlocutors in Oman insisted on the poor help they anyway get from the Bangladeshi consulate, even when they are staying legally. All of them compared their situation in this regard with their Indian and Pakistani counterparts who would get a lot better support in case of problem with a boss, in case of accident or of imprisonment. Some undocumented fishermen I met tried to get help from the Bangladeshi consulate to go back home, but they were just rejected. 11 Concerning the benefit for the country of poor people’s migration, I will follow J. O’Connell Davidson who writes: “Governments also often have a strong economic interest in emigration, not least because remittances from migrants can substitute for social welfare that they are unable to provide” (O’Connell Davidson, 2013). 10 Bangladeshi Fishermen in Oman: Migration as a Gamble 185

Hatiya decide at a certain point of time to go to Oman, as they often decide, once in Oman, to flee from a bad kafil in search of a better job. They are for sure very active when, as undocumented workers, they have to find a new place to work, and to do so, resort to solidarity networks. In the same way, families at home use their agency when juggling with the lenders who come to get their due each time some remittances come. There is no reason to question the rationality of the migrants and of their families. It is nevertheless possible to discuss their freedom of choice, unless one acknowledges that these men are willingly consenting to their own exploitation or vulnerability abroad. If one considers the situation they are trapped in at home (unemployment, pirates’ attacks, exploitation by wholesaler, landlessness, etc.), migration may indeed be seen at first as the choice of a lesser evil, but once they are trapped in debt and in illegality abroad, the notion of choice become more questionable. As J. O’Connell Davidson writes: ‘The vulnerability of migrant-debtors […] to exploitation and coercion is a political construction’ (2013: 1). To mainly consider the decision of migration as an individual one, without taking into account the local political context (at home and abroad) may lead to understate the responsibility of States in the situation migrants have to face before and after their departure. For instance, in Hatiya, if piracy was stamped out by the coastguards, if landless people were attributed land as they are theoretically entitled to, if wholesale trade of fish was regulated, fewer fishermen would probably be ready to leave, knowing how difficult it will be for them in Oman: It is at least what they say; if there was a control over visa business and travel agencies, prospective migrants would not be trapped in debts for years and thus trapped in the destination country. (To quota again O’Connell Davidson (2013: 5): ‘The right to quit is meaningless for those who have heavily indebted themselves in order to go.’) Similarly, the hardship Bangladeshi fishermen have to bear in Oman is a result of a policy regarding foreign labour, especially through the kafala system, which institutionalize exploitation, or at least, leave workers without protection against it. Migrant fishermen and their family definitely exercise their agency into the limits of survival strategies. Migrant fishermen indeed largely acknowledge their helplessness when they describe themselves as slaves, a word many of them used during the interviews I did in Omani harbours. When people in Hatiya decide as they say ‘to bet’ everything on a possibly ‘better luck’ abroad, they are certainly aware of the risks, and confronted to the sure ‘discomfort of their localized existence’ (Bauman 1998: 2), migration appears at least as a hope. However, the only hope often left after a few years in Oman is to be able to come back home after having cleared part of the debt.

Conclusion

The research I did on migration of Indian nurses to the Gulf countries led me to argue that it was a factor of economic and social empowerment for these qualified women (Percot 2006, 2015). The case of Bangladeshi fishermen in Oman clearly 186 M. Percot shows another picture. It is rather a paradigmatic example of exploitation and discrimination. The potential success of their migration is – right from the outset – jeopardized by the debt they contracted in order to go since, with the poor incomes they get in Oman, they are not able to pay back. As shown in other case studies (Sahoo and Goud 2015; Rahman 2013), the debtor migrants and their family not only do not benefit from the efforts made to go abroad, but most often end up into more poverty. In Oman, these workers are left without any protection against abuse and exploitation. The perverse effects of the kafala system even lead many of them to an illegal status, thus reinforcing their vulnerability. Trapped abroad because of their debt and because of illegality, the migrants manage to survive by fleeing from a boat owner to another, constantly facing the risk of incarceration and deportation. This ‘agency of subalterns’ (Khondker and Jahan 2015) is however exercised through the limits of survival strategies which leave most of them in a distress situation. Fishermen from Hatiya are clearly at the bottom of the migrant hierarchy as economically very poor people, mostly illiterate, low qualified and coming from a country which has failed until now to protect its migrant citizens be it from fraudulent travel agents or fraudulent contractors. The unregulated way this migration takes place – in the home country as well as in the destination country, the lack of protection from their own consulate once abroad, the structural violence they face, indeed leave these men with no real chance to win the gamble they have placed in search of a better future.

References

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O’Connell Davidson, J. (2013). Troubling freedom: Migration, debt and modern slavery. Migration Studies, 1(2), 176–195. Percot, M. (2006). Indian nurses in the Gulf: Two generations of female migration. South Asia Research, 26(1), 41–62. Percot, M. (2015). Malayali nurses in the Gulf: Migration as a factor of women empowerment. In A. K. Sahoo (Ed.), Diaspora, development and distress (pp. 87–98). Jaipur/New Delhi/ Bangalore/Hyderabad/Guwahati/Kolkata: Rawat Publications. Pessoa S., Harkness, L., & Gardner, A. M. (2014). Ethiopian labor migrants and the “free visa” system in Qatar. Human Organization, 73(3). https://www.academia.edu/8115756/Ethiopian_ Labor_Migrants_and_the_Free_Visa_System_in_Qatar. Accessed 15/05/2015. Rahman, M. M. (2011). Bangladeshi workers in the UAE: Gender-differentiated patterns of migration experiences. Middle Eastern Studies, 47(2, March), 395–411. Rahman, M. M. (2013). Migrant Indebtness: Bangladeshis in the GCC countries. International Migration, I.O.M. Rajan, S. I., & Sunkendran, S. (2010). Understanding female migration: Experience of housemaids. In S. I. Rajan (Ed.), Governance and labour migration (India migration report 2010) (pp. 182–195). New Delhi: Routledge. Sahoo, A. K., & Goud, T. C. (2015). Development and distress: A study of gulf returnees in Andhra Pradesh. In A. K. Sahoo (Ed.), Diaspora, development and distress (pp. 201–215). Jaipur/New Delhi/Bangalore/Hyderabad/Guwahati/Kolkata: Rawat Publications. Turton D. (2003). Conceptualizing forced migration. University of Oxford, Refugee Studies Center, Working Paper n° 12, http://www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/files/publications/working-paper-series/ wp12-conceptualising-forced-migration-2003.pdf. Accessed 19/05/2015. WTO. (2008). Examen des politiques commerciales. Rapport du secrétariat: Oman. https://www. wto.org/french/tratop_f/tpr_f/s201-00_f.doc. Accessed 19/05/2015. Chapter 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation of Regional Disparities in Outflows of Workers, Remittances and Poverty

G. M. Arif, Shujaat Farooq, and Nasir Iqbal

Abstract During the last four decades, according to the official statistics, Pakistan has placed abroad approximately eight million workers for employment, mainly in the Middle East labour market. While throughout this period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) remained the main destination countries for Pakistani workers, their placement in other oil-exporting countries of the region, such as Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, has also been a common phenomenon. Migration for employment out of the Middle East region is not very common, suggesting that Pakistan has not been able to find new overseas markets for its workers. The annual placement of Pakistani workers in the Gulf seems to be a major source in easing the demographic pressure on the domestic labour market. This outflow was equal to approximately one-third of the total new entrants in the local labour market, and the annual placement of migrants in the Gulf constitutes more than 10% of the total unemployed labour force of Pakistan. Pakistan is currently passing through a demographic transition which has resulted in a youth bulge and an increase in the working-age population. Migration to the Gulf has probably provided opportunities for productive and remunerative employment for young work force.

G. M. Arif Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan S. Farooq Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Islamabad, Pakistan N. Iqbal (*) Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE), Islamabad, Pakistan Benazir Income Support Programme (BISP), Islamabad, Pakistan

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 189 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_11 190 G. M. Arif et al.

Introduction

International migration of Pakistani workers, along with the inflows of foreign remittances, is considered one of the key factors that have influenced positively the concerned households, communities and nation as a whole. A large Pakistani diaspora exists in three regions of the world: Middle East, Europe and North America. However, the types of migration to these regions are not same; movement to Europe, particularly to United Kingdom (UK) and North America, is permanent in nature for settlement while migration to the Middle East is temporary movement of labour for employment. Under a temporary labour migration system, like the Middle East one, foreign workers are offered jobs on contractual basis for a fixed period of time. At the expiry of a contract, a worker has to return home. Overstay, without an extension in the contract, puts a worker into irregular status, subject to legal action including deportation. Migration of Pakistani workers to the Middle East is managed through a well- established recruitment system, involving private agents and having a mandatory registration of all outgoing workers with the Protectors of Emigrants. During the last four decades, according to the official statistics, Pakistan has placed abroad approximately eight million workers for employment, mainly in the Middle East labour market. While throughout this period, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) remained the main destination countries for Pakistani workers, their placement in other oil-exporting countries of the region, such as Oman, Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar, has also been a common phenomenon. Migration for employment out of the Middle East region is not very common, suggesting that Pakistan has not been able to find new overseas markets for its workers. All (eight million) workers placed in the Middle East since 1970s are not currently in the region. At present, the stock of Pakistani workers in the Middle East is approximately three million; the rest of workers who had a chance to work in the region have returned home. Many of these return migrants are well settled in their communities of origin and have started their businesses by investing the money earned during overseas employment. The contribution of this migration through regular inflows of remittances and entrepreneurship of returning workers in poverty reduction, socio-economic improvements of the concerned households and communities and economic growth is well documented (Iqbal and Sattar 2005; Irfan and Amjad 1984; Oda 2007); although some negative impacts of male emigration on left behind families, particularly women and children, have also been reported in the literature (Nasir et al. 2011). An important, but unanswered question is how widely the benefits of migration to the Gulf are distributed among the population of Pakistan? In other worlds, do workers from all geographical areas of the country have benefitted from job opportunities in the Gulf? Pakistan is administratively divided into more than 100 districts, with a great variation in the total size of their populations. The 40 years of labour migration, as migration to the Gulf countries started in the mid-1970s, indicate a long period sufficient for its widely spread, through social networkers, across 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 191 all regions and districts of the country. But a close look at the annual statistics available from the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment (BEOE) shows an uneven distribution of workers across these districts. There is a heavy concentration of migration to the Gulf from districts located in central and north Punjab, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), and couple of districts from south Punjab. Migration from rest of the country, particularly Sindh, Balochistan and south Punjab, is low or very low; and these are poor regions of the country. Both the inflows of foreign remittances and entrepreneurial activities of returning workers are likely to be concentrated in areas with high migration to the Gulf countries. In view of the multiplier effects of remittances, it is likely that households in high-migration areas are generally better-off than their counterparts in low- migration areas. Overseas migration thus may contribute in widening regional (district-wise) disparities. However, two caveats are noteworthy here. First, there is a possibility that high- migration areas or districts are generally socio-economically better-off than low- migration districts, thus making it difficult to separate out the migration effects from the effects of other development indicators. Second, Gulf is not the only region where Pakistanis have migrated, a large Pakistani diaspora exists in Europe particularly the UK and North America. If the origin (or districts) of these migrants is not different from the origin of Middle East migrants, it would also be difficult to attri- bute all socio-economic effects only to the Middle East migration. In fact, some districts prominent for migration to Europe, such as Rawalpindi, Gujrat and Jhelum, are also among the high-migration districts for the Middle East region. Despite these analytically difficulties, it is worth comparing socio-economic performance of households situated in high-, low- and very-low-migration areas (districts). If the performance across these areas varies considerably, it, at least, makes a case for policy makers to provide overseas migration opportunity to households in low- and very-low-migration areas to improve their socio-economic conditions. It would not only help to reduce poverty in low-migration areas, but it will also improve equalities across the districts and regions. The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Importance of Gulf migration for Pakistan’s economy and society is discussed in the next section, followed by a presentation on theoretical considerations in section “Theoretical Considerations”. Methodology including the data sources used in this study is the subject matter of section “Methodology”. Geographical spread (district-level) of migration to Gulf is analysed in section “Geographical differentiation of Gulf migration” to identify very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration areas. Section “Regional disparities in remittances” presents regional (district-wise) disparities in remittances received. Regional disparities in multidimensional poverty and its three components, education, health and standard of living, are examined in section “Migration, poverty and deprivation”, followed by a brief discussion in the penultimate section on why some regions of the country have not participated in labour migration to Gulf? Conclusions are presented in the final section. 192 G. M. Arif et al.

Importance of Gulf Migration for Pakistan’s Economy and Society

Importance of Gulf migration for the economy of Pakistan and its society has been the subject matter of various studies carried out since the onset of Middle East labour migration system in the 1970s, focusing primarily on the contribution of remittances in balance of payment, GDP growth and poverty reduction. The basic information required for such analysis including the outflows of workers and inflows of remittances through banking channel are regularly reported by the concerned authorities or agencies, for example, State Bank of Pakistan and BEOE through their official documents. However, one issue, which has not been adequately addressed in the literature, is the relevance of workers’ outflows with the growth of domestic labour force and other demographic realities. Table 11.1 sets out data on population, labour force, annual addition in the labour force and migrants to the Gulf as percent of new entrants in the labour markets. Whereas the population of Pakistan increased from 146 million in 2002 to 186 million in 2104, 27% growth in 12 years, the labour force grew during this period by 39%, from 43 million in 2002 to 60 million in 2014 because of both demographic transition (an increase in working age population) and increased participation of female in the labour market. More than a million workers are added annually in the labour force. The stock of unemployed labour force fluctuated between 2.75 and 3.58 million during the last decade, and the unemployment rate first declined from more than 8% in 2002 to 5% in 2007, increasing then to 6% in 2014 (GoP 2015b).

Table 11.1 Migration to the Gulf and domestic labour market No. of Migrants to Labour Unemployed migrants to the Gulf as Migrants as % Population force labour force Gulf % labour of unemployed Year (million) (million) (million) (million) force labour force 2002 145.96 43.21 3.57 – – – 2003 149.03 44.12 3.65 0.21 0.47 5.70 2004 150.47 45.76 3.52 0.17 0.37 4.76 2005 153.96 46.82 3.60 0.13 0.27 3.55 2006 156.77 50.50 3.13 0.17 0.34 5.52 2007 161.98 51.55 2.75 0.28 0.54 10.13 2008 165.45 53.22 2.77 0.42 0.79 15.16 2009 168.99 55.91 3.05 0.40 0.71 13.07 2010 172.57 56.92 3.16 0.35 0.62 11.08 2011 176.20 57.84 3.94 0.45 0.77 11.37 2012 180.71 59.33 5.95 0.63 1.06 10.59 2013 183.57 60.33 3.76 0.61 1.01 16.21 2014 186.19 60.09 3.58 0.72 1.21 20.23 Source: GoP (2015a, b) 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 193

The annual placement of Pakistani workers in the Gulf seems to be a major source in easing the demographic pressure on the domestic labour market, particularly during the last 7 years (2008–2014), when these outflows were equal to approximately one-third of the total new entrants in the local labour market, and the annual placement of migrants in the Gulf constitutes more than 10% of the total unemployed labour force of Pakistan (Table 11.1). Workers who found their placement in the Gulf countries may not be unemployed when they moved out, unemployed labour force is likely to have replaced them. Pakistan is currently passing through a demographic transition (Amjad et al. 2015; Nayab 2008), which has resulted in a youth bulge and an increase in the working age population. Migration to the Gulf has probably provided opportunities for productive and remunerative employment for young workforce. The literature on age-saving profile suggests that these young migrants, living abroad without their families, may save a large part of their earnings to remit home for investment. In this way, migration to the Gulf can be a source to reap the demographic dividend (Amjad et al. 2015). Workers’ remittances from the banking channel have increased from US$2.4 billion in 2001–02 to about US$15.8 billion in 2013–14. The share of Gulf countries as the source for these remittances has gradually increased from 43% in 2001–02 to more than 65% in 2013–14. The inflows of remittances in 2013–14, which are over half the total export value of goods and services (Table 11.2), provide critical support to a precarious current account situation. Remittances as percent of GDP almost doubled from 3.3% in 2001–02 to 6% in 2013–14. Considering the share of Gulf countries in total workers’ remittances as 65% (Table 11.2), remittances from Gulf were approximately 3.6% of the GDP. As noted earlier, the contribution of remittances in GDP growth has been explored rigorously during the last four decades, and in general, it has turned out to be positive and significant. A survey of some studies carried out during the last decade is also found to be on a similar line. For example, Iqbal and Sattar (2005) show that GDP growth is positively related to workers’ remittances during 1972–73 to 2002–03 period. They reported remittances as the third source of capital for economic growth and also argued that in the absence of remittances, it was likely that exchange rate, monetary and fiscal policies could have been come under pressures. A recent study by Javid et al. (2012) found the relationship between remittances and GDP growth positive in the long run, while in the short, this association is found to be negative, though the magnitude is small and negligible. Poverty is generally a part of analyses on the remittances and GDP nexus in Pakistan. The effect of remittances on poverty reduction is not only positive but also more important than other factors that can influence well-being of population (Amjad and Kemal 1997). Poverty in Pakistan, which declined in 1980s, increased in the 1990s, the period when inflows of remittances declined considerably. Siddiqui and Kemal (2006) explored the impact of decline in remittances on welfare and poverty and found that ‘poverty rises due to a decline in remittances during the nineties’. According to their analysis, remittances affect poverty levels both through change in income and consumption level as well as through increase in capital stock. While Irfan (2011) has reached to a similar conclusion that remittances as a 194 G. M. Arif et al.

Table 11.2 Workers’ remittances and GDP growth in Pakistan Remittances Exports GDP Remittances from Gulf as % Remittances Remittances as % of growth Year US$ (million) total remittances as % of GDP as % exports GDP (%) 2001– 2389 43.0 3.3 28.2 12.8 2.0 02 2002– 4237 37.7 5.1 38.0 13.5 4.7 03 2003– 3872 42.2 3.9 31.4 12.5 7.5 04 2004– 4169 44.6 3.7 30.0 13.0 9.0 05 2005– 4600 45.0 3.4 28.0 12.0 5.8 06 2006– 5494 48.2 3.6 32.4 11.1 5.5 07 2007– 6451 51.6 3.8 33.9 11.2 5.0 08 2008– 7810 57.0 4.6 44.2 10.5 0.4 09 2009– 8906 58.3 5.0 46.2 10.9 2.6 10 2010– 11,291 58.7 5.2 45.1 11.6 3.6 11 2011– 13,186 60.9 5.9 55.8 10.5 3.8 12 2012– 13,922 60.8 6.0 56.9 10.6 3.7 13 2013– 15,837 65.0 6.5 63.1 10.3 4.0 14 Source: GoP (2015b) fraction of GDP as well as the total size of the remittances emerged as significant explanatory variable, leading to poverty reduction, he found a negative influence (though insignificant) of recent rise in remittances (since 2002) on poverty. His analysis is probably supported by Javid et al. (2012) who reported that a long run relationship exists between remittances and poverty reduction due to the fact that remittances directly increase the income of poor people, smooth household consumption and ease capital constraint. Return of workers to their countries of origin is an integral part of contemporary contract labour migration systems including the Middle East one. A close look at the data indicates that more workers have returned home permanently than the present stock of Pakistanis in the region. Return migration is also expected to benefit a labour-sending country through more productive individuals returning with physical and human capital earned abroad as well as repatriated savings (Özden and Schiff 2007). The findings of studies on return migration in Pakistan carried out in the 1990s compared pre-and post-migration employment status of workers and revealed 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 195 a high preference for self-employment (Arif and Irfan 1997; Ilahi 1999). Ilahi (1999) considers this behaviour as a rational response to the opportunities and constraints during the migration and upon return. However, Mansuri (2007) argues that return migrants to rural areas of Pakistan are not more likely to become entrepreneurs than other individuals. Their investment preference is towards agriculture land for which the relevance of their skills while abroad is unlikely to be high. Finally, the social contribution of migration is even more encouraging in improving children’s school enrolment, housing conditions, eliminating child labour, empowering women and enhancing the overall social status (Arif 2010). However, the analysis by Nasir et al. (2011) show an adverse effect of foreign remittances on the educational performance of children primarily because of the absence of care- taker in general and parental absence in particular. A joint family system, they argue, may reduce the negative impact of parental absence.

Theoretical Considerations

The movement of Pakistani workers to the Middle East, which started in the 1970s, was initially explained using the structural or dependency perspective.1 The rapid growth of the oil-exporting economies of the Middle East was seen as the emergence of a new oppressive group of core countries (Naseem 1981), and Pakistan was characterized as the supplier of cheap labour, food and services to these countries. Although the Gulf economies to which Pakistanis migrated were certainly capital- rich, they did not share a number of characteristics more usually associated with a capitalist centre. At the same time, Pakistan and other countries contributing to Middle Eastern labour forces did not always reflect all the characteristics of the classical ‘periphery’ state (Addleton 1992). The classical view prevailed in many of the empirical studies conducted in the 1980s, which showed repeatedly that individual migrants went abroad to improve their socio-economic position at home. Migration was considered to benefit, through remittances, the individuals concerned, their families and the country (Arif 2010; Burki 1988; Gilani et al. 1981). Addleton (1992), apolitical scientist, has used both approaches, classical and structural, to understand the causes and consequences of migration from Pakistan to the Middle East. He considered nationalization of banks, life insurance companies, private schools, shipping and some of the heavy industries during the period 1971–77, and an aggressive appeal to Islam rather than socialism during the years 1977–88 to be the centralizing measures of governments which ruled the country between 1971 and 1988. Despite these strong measures, he argues,

1 De Haas (2010) distinguishes four periods in the post World War II thinking on migration and development: the ‘migration optimists’ perspective dominated in the 1950 and 1960s; the large scale pessimism prevailed in the 1970s and 1980s; the emergence of more nuanced nets in the 1990s; and but resurging of optimism on migration and development. The structural and dependency views are labelled as pessimistic by (De Haas, 2010). 196 G. M. Arif et al. appeals based on language, ethnicity and religious–sectarian differences became quite common. In his opinion, the failure of the centralizing efforts was closely associated with the migration of Pakistani workers to the Middle East, which set in motion a process that was characterized by decentralized economic decision-making rather than by enhanced government control (Addleton 1992). However, Arif (1995) in his doctoral work did not agree with Addleton’s consideration and showed labour migration as socio-economically beneficial for the concerned households and society as a whole. He further argued that is difficult to link appeals based on language, ethnicity and sectarian differences to labour migration to the Middle East, which could be rather source for narrowing these differences. More recent studies have used the New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM) perspective to explain labour migration to the Middle East. The NELM approach models migration as the risk-sharing behaviour of households. This approach inte- grates motives other than individual income maximization that play a role in migration decision-making. Oda (2007), for example, has used the NELM framework to identify household characteristics that influence migration decision at the household level in rural barani (rainfed) areas. Due to the weather-dependent agriculture and lack of employment opportunities, migration has been used as one of the important sources of income and has been actively adopted as a household strategy. Similarly, Iqbal (2015) has recently used the NELM framework to examine the role of return migrants in entrepreneurship in Jhelum, a high-migration district in Punjab. This study also follows the NELM approach and considers temporary migration of Pakistani workers to Gulf as a household livelihood strategy to diversify income sources and overcome social, economic and institutional development constraints in places of origin. The study places the behaviour of individual migrants within a wider societal context. Different communities are in the different stages of the migration process. Impacts of migration may vary with these stages. It therefore attempts to understand the geographically differentiated nature of migration and remittance impacts on local communities.

Methodology

Two data sources have been used in this study to understand the geographically differentiated nature of migration to the Gulf countries and inflows of remittances. First, the BEOE registers all workers who go abroad for employment.2 It compiles the registration data by country of employment, occupation of workers and districts of their origin. More than 95% of workers who went abroad for employment and have been registered with the BEOE are destined to the Middle East, primarily Gulf countries. This registration data is a good source of information regarding the origin

2 This registration of outgoing workers with BEOE is mandatory and the data are available since the mid-1970. 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 197

(district) of migrants. Second, the Pakistan Socio-economic Living Measurement Survey (PSLM) 2012–13 is representative at the province as well as district level, having a sample size of more than 75,000 households. In the PSLM, the sampled households were asked to repot ‘remittances received (in cash) from outside of Pakistan (money received which will not be repaid)’. Through this information, it is possible to aggregate the inflows of remittances by district (Amjad et al. 2017; Farooq and Iqbal 2015). Pakistan is administratively divided into more than 100 districts. As discussed earlier, the outflows of workers to the Gulf countries, and inflows of remittances vary greatly across these districts. For this study, the districts of Pakistan are classified into four categories: very-low, low-, moderate- and high-migration districts. Two methods are applied for this classification. First, the incidence-of-migration is estimated by dividing the number of workers went abroad during 1980–2012 period from a district (BEOE registration data) with its population in 2012.3 Districts are then classified as high-migration if the incidence-of-migration is 10% or greater. Medium-migration districts are those where such incidence is in the range of 3–9.99%. If the incidence-of-migration is 1–2.99% districts are classified as low- migration. The last category of very-low migration includes districts with less than 1% of the incidence-of-migration. Second, in the PSLM 2012–13, the sampled households were asked to report ‘remittance received (in cash) from outside Pakistan during the year preceding the survey’. The proportion of households received remittances was calculated at the district level. The districts are then classified into four categories based on the reported remittances data. The districts, where 10% or more households have received remittances from abroad during the year preceding survey are grouped into high-migration categories while the moderate-migration category includes districts where the proportion of households received remittances ranges 3 to less than 10% (9.99%). If the share of remittances receiving households in a district is between 1 and less than 3% (2.99%), they are grouped into low-migration category while the last category of very-low migration includes the districts where the proportion of remittances receiving households is less than 1%. The classification of districts under the incidence-of-migration method shows that out of the total 104 districts, 60 districts are in very-low- or low-migration categories while the number of districts in medium and high categories are 21 and 28 respectively. For the remittance-based method, information is available for all 114 districts, of which, 63 districts are in very-low and low categories, 23 in medium category and 28 districts are grouped into high-migration status. The classification of districts (104) under two methods is compared in Table 11.3, which shows that 60 districts are in a same category. However, 14 districts which are classified as medium-migration under remittance-based method are in low-migration status under the incidence-of-migration method. Similarly, 12 districts which are grouped

3 The district-wise population as shown in the 1998 census is projected for 2012 by population growth rate. 198 G. M. Arif et al.

Table 11.3 Comparison of two methods in district classification into very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration categories Incidence-of-migration method Remittances-based methods Very low Low Medium High Overall Very low 29 9 1 0 39 Low 1 13 2 0 16 Medium 1 14 6 2 23 High 1 2 12 11 26 Total 32 38 21 13 104 Source: (GoP (2014, 2015a) into high-migration status turned into medium-migration status under the incidence- of-migration method. It appears that remittance-based method shows relatively more districts in medium, and high-migration categories. There are several possible reasons for this difference. First, the BEOE data covers a longer period of 30 years while the remittances in the PSLM are reported for the year preceding the survey year of 2012–13. Second, the BEOE data show the number of workers placed primarily in the Middle East while the remittance data include other regions as well (Amjad et al. 2012). Third, occupations of migrants, which directly influence the earnings of workers and their capacity to remit, may very across the districts. This study has used both classifications of districts to better understand the geographically differentiated nature of migration and remittances in Pakistan by comparing socio-economic performance of households situated in high-, moderate-, low-, and very-low-migration areas (districts). Although calorific approach-based poverty estimates have been used to assess households’ performance, the focus of the present investigation is on multidimensionality of poverty (MP), with its three major components, education, health and living standard. Appendix Table 11.11 shows the indicators, their weights and definitions included in each dimension of welfare. The education dimension contains four variables: male education (no male over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above schooling), female education (no female over 11 years age has completed 5 years or above schooling); child school attendance (any school-aged child (6–11) is not attending school) and education quality (not enough teacher, shortage of books, etc.). The health dimension also includes four indicators: access to healthcare, immunization, prenatal care and institutional delivery (Appendix Table 11.11). Factors related to housing (overcrowding, water, sanitation, electricity) and households assets are part of the living standards dimension. Each of the three dimensions (education, health and living standards) has an equal weight of one-third while weights assigned to each indicator varies (Appendix Table 11.11). These weights are used to compute MP, based on a threshold of 33% households which are deprived in 5 (5/15–33%) or more than five indicators. For each indicator, household deprivation is calculated though headcount ratios: raw and censored. The former shows the proportion of households which are poor (deprived) in each category while the latter refers to the proportion of households which are MP poor and are also deprived in the respective indicator. 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 199

Geographical Differentiation of Gulf Migration

In the previous section, more than half of the districts are classified as low- or very- low-migration status while the rest of districts are grouped into high- or medium- migration status. Table 11.4 presents differences in migration status of districts by province. First, all districts of Sindh, according to the incidence-of-migration methods, are either in very-low or low-migration status category. The other method, remittance-based, puts only two districts of this province in the medium-migration status. The situation of Balochistan is not different either; only one district (Zhob) is categorized in high-migration status, according to the incidence-of-migration method. In fact, the first column of Table 11.4 shows that 30 out of 31 very-low- migration districts are either in Sindh or in Balochistan. It appears from this simple analysis that although pockets of high or medium-migration may exist within a districts in Sindh and Balochistan, the population of these two provinces have not in general benefitted from the Gulf migration. The KP presents a situation that is entirely different from Sindh and Balochistan. Not a single district in KP is in ‘very low’ category, while only two districts, according to the incidence-of-migration method, are in the low-migration category. The rest of districts have been classified as high- or as medium-migration districts. In fact, the incidence-of- migration method puts the majority of KP districts, 15 out of 23, in high-migration status. Migration is thus widely spread in KP, except couple of districts in Lakki Marwat–D.I. Khan belt (Appendix Table 11.12). Punjab, the largest province of country, shows a mixed picture. Although only one district, Bhakkar, is in very-low-migration status, according to the incidence-of- migration method, 22 out of total 36 districts of this province are in low- migration category. The other method, remittance-based puts 10 districts in this category. The rest of districts are in the medium- or high-migration status categories. There is heavy concentration of low-migration districts in southern Punjab, while districts classified in high-migration status are situated either in northern Punjab or in central Punjab except D. G. Khan that is a southern Punjab district (Appendix Table 11.12). The spread of districts in medium-migration status is wide across the whole Punjab province. The migration status of Punjab districts suggests that migration to the Gulf which started from northern and central districts four decades ago has gradually spread to southern districts, though still high-migration districts are located in central-north belt of the province (Appendix Table 11.12). This analysis shows that disparities are outflows of workers to the Gulf region in two ways; the first is the inter-province disparity, where both Sindh and Balochistan are lagged behind KP and Punjab. Second, despite a recent spread in migration outflows, the incidence-of-migration remains ‘low’ in southern districts of Punjab. It is important to report here that low- or very-low-migration districts of the country (Sindh, Balochistan and South Punjab) are the poorest districts. Moreover, movement into and out of poverty between 2001 and 2010 period has largely happened in the poor regions where migration is low (Arif et al. 2014). It appears that migration and associated remittances have enhanced the capacity of concerned 200 G. M. Arif et al. 24 23 19 36 102 Remittances- based 24 23 19 36 102 Incidence- of- migration Overall 1 0 26 15 10 Remittances- based 0 8 0 5 13 Incidence- of- migration High 1 6 0 6 13 Remittances- based 0 2 8 21 11 Incidence- of- migration Medium 1 2 4 17 10 Remittances- based 6 4 5 37 22 Incidence- of- migration Low 0 46 21 15 10 Remittances- based ) 2015a , 0 1 31 18 12 Very low Very Incidence- of- migration 2014 District classification into low-, medium- and high-migration categories District classification into low-,

Total Balochistan KP Sindh Punjab Province Source: (GoP ( districts is missing Note: Information on two Table 11.4 Table 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 201 households and communities in high and medium-migration areas to absorb shocks and this cushion is not available to poverty stricken regions of the country.

Regional Disparities in Remittances

Overseas migration contributes in well-being of the concerned households and development of communities or regions through regular inflows of remittances, their uses (savings and investment) and entrepreneurship of migrants when they return home permanently. First, take the case of inflows of remittances. Table 11.5 presents some interesting facts. The population of 70 districts in low- or very-low- migration status is 60% of the total population of Pakistan, but their share in Gulf migration for the 1980–2012 period is only 27%. In total inflows of remittances, as reported in the PSLM 2012–13, the share of these 70 districts is only 21%. In contrast, 11 high-migration districts, where only 12% of the total population live, have more than one-third (35%) share in total outflows of workers and 40% share in total inflows of remittances (Table 11.5). It is noteworthy from Table 11.5 that 30 very-low-migration districts where 16% of the country’s population live have only 2.5% share in total outflow of workers and less than 3% share in total inflows of remittances. All, except one, very-low- migration districts are in Sindh and Balochistan. Irfan (2011) has empirically shown that inflows of remittances are considerably under reported in the HIES type of surveys not only in Pakistan but in other labour-sending countries as well. In 2014, Pakistan received about US$ 15 billion as workers’ remittances through formal banking services, and about half of this inflow is from the Gulf countries. From the data presented in Table 11.5, it is estimated that 80% of these inflows of remittances go to the population of 34 high- and medium-migration districts, constituting only 40% of the country’s population. The remaining 60% of population living in very-low- and low-migration districts get only 21% share in total inflows of workers’ remittances. Almost all high- and medium-migration districts are in KP and Punjab (Table 11.4). Remittances diversify the sources of household income, providing an opportunity not only to combat poverty but also to free some resources for investment. In

Table 11.5 Distribution of inflows of remittances (%) by migration status % Distribution of Migration No. % Share in % Share in migration remittances status districts population (1980–2014) (PSLM-2012–13) Very low 32 16.3 2.4 2.8 Low 38 43.1 24.6 17.7 Medium 21 28.8 37.9 39.1 High 13 11.8 35.1 40.4 All 104 100 100 100 Source: (GoP (2014, 2015a) 202 G. M. Arif et al. this regard, one more dimension that can influence the quality of life in areas or communities where overseas migration is common is the resettlement pattern of return migrants. It is well documented that workers who go abroad for temporary employment generally resettle in their communities of origin, though their migration to other areas particularly cities cannot be ruled out. As reported earlier, during the last four decades Pakistan has placed about eight million workers in the Gulf countries, but the current stock in the region is almost three million, indicating the return of remaining five million workers to their communities in Pakistan after completing overseas job. In general, they return in their prime working age, mid-thirties, having 25–30 more economically active years. The studies carried out in Pakistan and elsewhere have shown a preference of returnees to shift from wage employment to self-employment by starting a new business or investing in the existing family business after return. These returnees are considered in the literature as entrepreneurs, since they not only create job for themselves but also they, some if not all, may generate jobs for others. Iqbal (2015) has recently carried out a survey of return migrants in Jhelum, a high-migration district in Punjab (Appendix Table 11.12), to examine their contribution in entrepreneurial activities. She shows a strong preference of returnees to engage in a business; 56% of migrants returned from Europe were involved in business while the corresponding percentage was 47 for migrants returning from the Middle East. A considerable proportion of returnees have used their overseas experience and savings in entrepreneurial activities. The new business started by return migrants include agriculture, livestock, general store, commercial shops, rent a car, raw material, furniture shops and dairy farms. Both the investment pattern of remittance-receiving households and entrepreneurship of returnees are likely to have promoted self-employment, through business activities, in their communities. Table 11.6 presents data on the share of self-employed in non-agriculture sector in total employed labour force by migration status. In very-low-migration districts, the share of self-employment in non- agriculture sector is 14% of the total employed labour force, while it is 22% in high- migration districts. There is no major difference in results based on two methods, incidence-of-migration and remittances, applied to classify districts into low- or high-migration categories. Migration thus promotes self-employment to ease the demographic pressure. Iqbal (2015) has recently shown that by starting a new business, some entrepreneurs employed up to 5 people after returns. More than half of the returnees from the Middle East and Europe who are engaged in a business after

Table 11.6 Share of Incidence-of- Remittance- self-employed (non- Migration status migration method based method agriculture sector) in total Very low 14.2 13.9 employed labour force by migration status Low 18.2 18.3 Medium 21.5 20.6 High 22.3 21.4 Source: GoP (2014) 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 203 return have given employment to one or more persons. They could be from their families or hired workers outside the family.

Migration, Poverty and Deprivation

It is hypothesized that the population of high-migration (or even medium) areas is socio-economically better-off than very-low- or low-migration areas because of the consumption, and investment behaviour of migrant households and reabsorption patterns of returning workers in the domestic labour market. As argued earlier, both temporary migration of workers and their return promote economic activities in the concerned communities, which are beneficial for non-migrant households as well. So, the quality of life of the population of these communities and areas is in general better than the population of those areas (districts) where the incidence-of-migration and inflows of remittances are low. It is also hypothesized that the persistence of such migration patterns, where the investment in overseas employment is geographically differentiated for a long period of time, could lead to generate regional economic and social disparities or could reinforce the existing disparities.

Poverty and Deprivation

It has been shown earlier that both the incidence-of-migration to the Gulf countries and inflows of remittances are very-low or ‘low’ is Sindh, Balochistan and southern Punjab, where poverty and deprivation has been high for a long period. Table 11.7 shows the statistics on the incidence of both multidimensional poverty (MP) and

Table 11.7 Migration, poverty and deprivation Multidimensional poverty index Income (expenditure)-based poverty (PSLM 2012–13) (HIES2010–11) Per capita monthly Migration Headcount consumption (Rs.) status Method-I Method-II poverty Method-I Method-II Very low 18.7 19.6 14.3 2349 2311 Low 10.8 8.9 13.7 2942 3245 Medium 7.3 7.2 12.0 3194 3612 High 4.1 7.1 10.4 4296 3672 All areas 9.8 9.8 12.4 3029 3029 Source: GoP (2014) for multidimensional poverty and GoP (2011) for income (expenditure) based poverty Note: Method-I and method-II refer to methodology used to group districts into ‘very low’, ‘low’, ‘medium’ and ‘high’ categories. The former is based on the incidence-of-migration data while the latter is based on the inflows-of-remittances 204 G. M. Arif et al. household expenditure (calorific approach)-based poverty. The latter is calculated using the official poverty line methodology with the threshold of 2350 calories per adult per day. The differences in MP between very-low- and high-migration districts are much larger than the difference shown on the income (expenditure)-based poverty. Why is it so? All very-low-migration districts found are Sindh and Balochistan, where social indicators, such as health and education, on which MP is based, are very weak. The case of South Punjab, where the incidence-of-migration is low, is not much different from Sindh and Balochistan. Migration and remittances, which have enhanced the capacity of population living in high or medium-migration areas to invest in health and education, are largely missing in low- and very-low-migration areas. No major improvements in social indicators could be witnessed in these low- migration areas for a long period. Income (expenditure)-based poverty differences by migration status are also substantial (Table 11.7). Poverty in very-low-migration districts is 35% higher than in high-migration districts. It is also supported in Table 11.7 by monthly per capita household expenditure data, which show much higher expenditure in high- and medium-migration districts than in very-low migration districts. Remittances thus help explain short-term regional disparities in household expenditure as well as long-term disparities in social indicators.

Education

The above discussion has set the ground to investigate the disparities in different dimensions of MP. Three dimensions, education, health and standard of living are analysed below. As outlined in Appendix Table 11.11, educational dimension of MP has four indictors: no male over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above schooling; no female over 11 years of age has completed 5 years or above schooling; any school-age child (6–16) in the household is not attending school, and quality of schooling (not enough teacher, etc.). Two headcount ratios are reported in Table 11.8: raw, which indicates the level of deprivation (%) in an indicator, and censored, which shows the proportion of household (%) which are multidimensional deprived as well as deprived in the said indicator. The district classification into very-low-, low-, medium- and high-migration categories, as reported in Table 11.8, is based on both methods, incidence-of-migration and remittances. This scheme of data presentation is also applied to other Tables (11.9 and 11.10) reporting data respectively on health and standard of living dimensions of poverty. As expected, censored headcount ratios for all four educational dimensions are lower than raw headcount ratios irrespective of the migration status. In very-low-migration districts, the headcount ratios for male and female are approximately three times higher than the corresponding ratios for high-migration districts. The difference is even larger for medium-migration areas. In fact, Table 11.8 shows that in very-low-migration areas, 25% and 38 of households had respectively no 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 205

Table 11.8 Proportion of households (%) deprived in education dimension of multidimensional poverty by migration status Any person of age 6–16 year does not attend school because of low quality (not enough No. male over No. female over Any school-aged teacher, distance 11 years of age has 11 years of age has child (6–16) in the high cost) or completed 5 year completed 5 years household is not dissatisfied with or above schooling or above schooling attending school services Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored Censored Migration head head head head head head Raw head head status count count count count count count count count Incidence-of-migration method Very low 32.9 24.9 65.5 38.0 28.5 23.8 21.4 15.2 Low 27.9 16.5 52.0 22.6 16.6 13.1 12.5 7.2 Medium 14.1 5.3 27.7 8.1 7.0 4.4 8.1 3.0 High 19.3 8.8 40.9 14.7 9.9 6.9 8.6 3.7 Remittances-based method Very low 33.5 25.9 68.4 40.2 29.5 24.8 21.8 15.5 Low 24.9 13.4 44.4 18.4 13.9 10.7 11.2 6.0 Medium 23.6 11.2 41.0 15.2 11.9 8.7 10.0 4.8 High 18.4 8.3 37.7 13.8 9.6 7.0 9.2 4.3 Source: Author’s own calculation based on GoP (2014)

Table 11.9 Proportion of households (%) deprived in health dimension of multidimensional poverty Does not use health If women facility because it is 15–49 years old costly, not enough If child 12–- gave a birth in last facilities or uses but 15 months has not 3 year but did not Did not have a not satisfied fully immunized have antenatal care safe delivery Migration Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored status of head head head head head head head head districts count count count count count count count count Incidence-of-migration method Very low 9.9 7.7 29.0 16.0 16.8 12.4 8.3 6.9 Low 9.3 5.9 26.5 10.4 13.6 7.7 4.7 3.0 Medium 8.5 3.3 21.3 4.4 6.8 3.2 3.6 2.1 High 10.7 6.4 26.5 8.3 12.0 6.2 10.1 6.4 Remittances-based method Very low 10.0 8.0 28.8 16.9 17.3 12.7 8.7 7.2 Low 9.9 5.5 23.0 8.5 10.4 6.4 4.1 2.6 Medium 7.5 3.9 24.5 7.1 10.6 5.3 3.4 2.0 High 11.0 6.1 26.9 7.8 11.5 6.0 8.3 5.4 Source: Author’s own calculation based on GoP (2014) Table 11.10 Proportion of households (%) deprived in standard of living dimension of multidimensional poverty by migration status Assets: does not have two small asset (iron, fan, TV) or has no large asset (motorcycle car, Water source does not Toilet facilities does etc.), no land, no If more than 3 persons meet MDG standard not meet MDG Solid fuels are used No access to large animal or < 3 Deprived in wall per room –unsafe standard for cooking electricity goats/sheep Raw Censored Censored Migration head head Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw head Raw Censored Raw Censored Raw Censored status count count headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount count headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount headcount Incidence-of-migration Very low 10.5 6.9 54.0 26.8 16.4 12.3 39.9 25.8 75.6 38.4 13.9 11.6 18.7 14.8 Low 11.5 3.0 43.1 16.6 5.1 1.8 28.5 15.9 74.1 23.4 7.0 5.1 8.6 5.7 Medium 21.9 2.1 28.9 5.6 9.7 3.1 11.0 4.7 33.0 7.6 4.0 2.0 3.4 1.9 High 10.6 6.4 31.2 10.0 10.1 4.4 17.3 8.1 68.2 16.3 3.2 1.7 3.8 2.1 Remittance-based Very low 10.0 5.0 53.3 27.4 17.3 12.7 43.4 28.3 75.4 40.4 16.0 13.2 18.8 14.8 Low 18.0 3.6 38.1 13.9 5.4 1.6 21.6 12.0 56.7 18.4 5.4 3.6 7.2 4.8 Medium 14.4 2.6 37.3 11.0 5.8 1.4 20.5 10.6 56.6 15.3 5.4 3.6 6.0 3.7 High 12.7 2.9 32.5 9.6 11.7 5.3 17.5 7.9 63.8 15.2 3.3 1.7 3.9 2.1 Source: Author’s own calculation based on GoP (2014) 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 207 male and female member who have completed 5 years of schooling. And these areas are primarily in Sindh and Balochistan. Alarmingly, a quarter of households in very-low-migration areas had a school- age child (6–16 years) who is not attending the school while the corresponding ratio for medium- or high-migration areas is only 7–8%. Similarly, the ratio of not- attending school because of the low quality of schooling in terms of teaching staff, distance or dissatisfaction with the provision of other services is three to four times higher in very-low-migration areas than in high- or medium-migration areas. It shows disconnect between the provision of education services and local communities in very-low-migration areas, which are predominantly located in Sindh and Balochistan. Furthermore, during last one decade, enrolment of children in private schools has increased remarkably in both rural and urban areas. The quality of education in private schools in terms of cognitive skills of children is considered better than in public schools. Overseas migration and inflows of remittances have particularly created demand in high-migration areas for better (private) schooling. In some high- migration areas, such as Jhelum and Gujrat in Punjab, return migrants have opened up schools providing good quality education to local communities.

Health

Health dimension of poverty also includes four indicators use of health facilities, immunization, prenatal care and safe birth delivery (Appendix Table 11.11). For the use of health facility, the indicator used is as follows: ‘does not use health facility because it is costly or uses it but not satisfied’. Interestingly, no major difference is found in this indicator among household living in very-low- or high-migration areas (Table 11.9). The likely reason is that migrant families use private health facilities, so in terms of the use of public health services, their experience is not different from the experience of population in low-migration areas. However, the difference exists in child immunization indicator particularly based on the censored method. Compared to 8% in high- migration districts, 17% of households in very-low-migration areas have not fully immunized a child aged 12–15 months. Similarly, the prevalence of not having antenatal care in very-low-migration areas is twice (12.4%) the corresponding prevalence in high- and medium-migration areas. However, no profound difference is found in ‘safe delivery’ indicator between high- and very-low-migration areas (Table 11.9). The health indicators included in the analysis under the MP approach may not truly reflect the impact of migration and remittances and health outcomes. For example, Arif (2004) analysed the impact of migration on mortality for male and female children separately and found the effect more profound for female than for male. 208 G. M. Arif et al.

Standard of Living

Seven indicators are part of the standard of living dimension of poverty: housing (wall material), overcrowding (more than three persons per room), unsafe drinking water, toilet facility, fuel for cooking, access to electricity, and assets (do not have two small assets – iron, fan, etc. – or has no large assets – car, refrigerator, motorcycle, etc. – no land, no large animal or less than three goats/sheep). The first notable difference between households living in very-low-, low- or high-migration areas is in overcrowding or person per room, an important indicator of quality of life (Table 11.10). The censored headcount shows that the incidence of overcrowding in ‘very-low-migration districts is three times (27.4%) of the incidence in high- migration areas. It reflects well the investment preference of migrant households for improving housing quality by building a new house or at least adding some new rooms in the existing dwelling unit. This investment pattern of migrant families may have influenced overall housing quality in high- and medium-migration areas. The same is the case for other indicators of the standard of living dimension of poverty including the use of safe drinking water, having toilet facility that meet MDG standard, use of solid fuel for cooking and access to electricity. Compared to 15% of households in very-low-migration districts, only 2 and 4% of households respectively in high- and medium-migration areas have no assets (Table 11.10). In other words, holding of assets are universal in high-migration areas.

Discussion: Why Participation in Gulf Migration Is Low from some Regions?

The empirical evidence, as presented in last few sections of this study, about the outflows of workers and inflows of remittances indicates high participation of population from some regions of the country, notably KP, central and north Punjab, to the Gulf migration while it is very low or low from Sindh and Balochistan, and to some extent from South Punjab. The analysis reveals both the inter-province and intra-province disparities where both Sindh and Balochistan provinces are lagged behind in benefiting from the Gulf migration. Regional disparities can also be seen in Punjab where high-migration districts are situated either in northern Punjab or in central Punjab while participation from southern Punjab is relatively low. Why some areas have not participated in Gulf migration? The answer probably lies in the socio-economic factors, regional linkages, political structure, migration policies and recruitment system. Low-participation regions are relatively less developed, with low human capital, and high incidence of poverty. Awareness about the job opportunities in the Gulf region could be very weak particularly in rural areas of Sindh and Balochistan. The populations of 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 209 these regions are probably averse to take risk of investing in overseas employment or they do not have capacity for such investment. Political structure also plays a significant role not only in the provision of socio- economic facilities but also keeping them in loop of development. The prevalence of feudal system is relatively high in low-migration regions as compared to other regions like central Punjab. This type of system leads to underdevelopment of the region. Institutional school of thought argues that underdevelopment of the regions (Sindh, Balochistan and south Punjab) is primarily linked with the existence of feudal system and the elite capture of resources keep poor in the state of poverty for a long period. The nature and design of overseas migration policies also contribute in migration disparities or access to overseas employment opportunities. Majority of the migration-promoting institutions are located in well-off regions ignoring the deprived regions. Government has uniform migration policy for all regions instead of adopting area-specific policies that help create awareness among the people from low-migration poor areas. Migration opportunity to the Gulf may be used as a tool for poverty reduction and narrowing the regional disparities in socio-economic indicators. Low-migration regions which are poor in all dimensions deserve to be targeted not only for creating awareness about overseas employment opportunities but also for supporting the poor financially to bear the cost of migration.

Conclusion and Policy Implications

The present study has made a socio-economic comparison of districts by the level of their participation in labour migration to the Gulf region. Incidence-of- migration and remittance-based methods were used to classify more than 100 districts of Pakistan into four categories: very-low-, low-, medium-, and high-migration/remittances-receiving districts. More than half of the districts were found in low- or very-low-migration categories, as identified by these two methods. The analysis reveals both the inter-province and intra-province disparities where both Sindh and Balochistan provinces are lagged behind the KP and Punjab with heavy concentration of low-migration districts in the former two provinces. Regional disparities can also be seen within Punjab where high-migration districts are situated either in northern Punjab or in central Punjab lagging behind the southern Punjab. The low-migration districts have long been considered among the poorest regions of the country. It is beyond the scope of this research to separate out the welfare impact of Gulf migration from the effects of other developments across the districts. Nevertheless, both the incidence-of-migration and remittance-based methods yield similar socio- economic results by expressing that migration appears to be beneficial to districts 210 G. M. Arif et al. having comparatively high migration. Migration has promoted in these areas, self- employment in non-agriculture sector. Both the outflows of workers at a large scale and return migration have also contributed in promoting businesses activities in their communities of origin. Overseas migration and remittances have been influential in improving socio-economic status of populations in these high-migration (or even medium) districts as signified by various indicators including headcount poverty, education, health, asset accumulation and overall multidimensional poverty. It is recommended that to reduce regional disparities in socio-economic indicator, the government needs to take steps to improve the standard of living of populations in poor regions by promoting and supporting overseas migration. First, targeted intervention is required to raise employability and productivity in deprived regions and districts that could be attained though a multisectoral approach aiming to improve human capital and asset creation in these regions. It could be done through provision of better education and health services, improvement in village-level infrastructure, rural–urban linkages and microfinance schemes in these areas. Second, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor project could be another milestone initiative to connect these deprived regions with economically better-off regions and to provide enormous livelihood opportunities for the population of these areas. Third, the poor in low-migration regions are prone to various natural and non- natural shocks since they have been facing the flash floods almost on annual basis. Shock mitigation policies are crucial to minimize these risks including the social safety nets at micro-level and macroeconomic policies to lower down unemployment, inflation and to control floods and other shocks. Finally, the government can improve overseas migration from these low- migration areas by three ways: • Technical training along with dissemination of opportunities for overseas employment in these low- and very-low-migration districts; it would be helpful to raise skill-oriented migration from these areas. • By opening the offices of Protector of Emigrants in these low-migration regions, say interior Sindh, Balochistan and southern Punjab will not only promote overseas migration from these areas but also will help to maintain close links with emigrants to resolve their problems and grievances. It will also create awareness about the overseas employment opportunities in the Gulf region and elsewhere. • Credit facilities may also be provided especially to poor households who cannot finance their overseas migration expenditures. It can be treated as loan to be reimbursed through their overseas earnings. 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 211

Appendix

Table 11.11 Multidimensional poverty: Dimensions, indicators, weight and definitions (dimensions are equally weighted) Dimension Indicator Weight Definition Education Male education 1/12 No male over 11 years of age has completed 5 years and above of schooling Female 1/12 No female over 11 years of age has completed 5 years education and above of schooling Child school 1/8 Any school-aged child (6–11) is not attending school attendance Educational 1/24 If any person of age 6–16 does not attend school quality because of quality (not enough teachers, far away, too costly, no male/female teacher, substandard school), or is attending but dissatisfied with service (shortage of teacher, books, substandard education, far away, education costly, latrine/water not available) Health Access to 1/6 If does not use healthcare facility because is costly does healthcare not suit, lacks tools, not enough facilities, or uses and is facility not satisfied Immunization 1/18 If any child of 12–59 month has not fully been immunized Prenatal care 1/18 If any women 15–49 who gave birth in last 3 years did not have antenatal care Institutional 1/18 If any women 15–49 who gave birth in last 3 years did delivery not have a safe delivery (born at home and is not facilitated by some skilled health person) Living Housing 1/36 Deprived in wall: Mud, uncooked/mud bricks, wood/ standards bamboo, other if in rural area Deprive if in urban area, if household is not owned Overcrowding 1/36 If more than 3 people per room are residing Water 1/18 If water source does not meet MDG standards (unprotected well, surface water, tanker truck, other) Sanitation 1/18 If toilet facility does not meet MDG standards (digged ditch, other, no facility) Clean energy 1/18 If solid fuels are used for cooking (wood, coal/charcoal, agricultural dung, crop residue, other) Electricity 1/18 If there is no access to electricity Assets 1/18 If household does not have two small assets (iron, fan, TV) or has no large asset (motorcycle or refrigerator, car or tractor) or does not own land/commercial property or does not have no large animal or less than 3 goats/sheep. If deprive in all then it is deprived 212 G. M. Arif et al. Very low/ Very migration districts Shangla Kohistan Lakki Marwat Low-migration Low-migration districts migration Chitral Charsada Nowshera Peshawar Bonair Karak Hangu Mansehra Hari pur Batttagram D. I. Khan Medium- districts Swabi Mardan Swat Dir lower Malakand Kohat Attock Bannu Incidence-of-migration-based method High- migration districts migration Very Very low- districts Lakki Marwat D. I. Khan Low-migration Low-migration district Peshawar Chitral Karak Kohistan Abbottabad Tank Medium- migration district Malakand Shangla Swat Mardan Swabi Charsada Nowshera Dir lower Bonair Kohat Hangu Mansehra Haripur Battagram Bannu Remittance share-based method High- migration district Classification of districts into high-, medium-, low- and very-low-migration categories-based remittance share and incidence-of-migration remittance share and categories-based very-low-migration and low- medium-, into high-, districts Classification of

Khyber Khyber Pakhtuankhaw Province Table 11.12 Table methods 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 213 (continued) Bhakkar Very low/ Very migration districts Hafizabad Kasur ……… Sheikhupura Khanawal Lodhran Multan Vehari Okara Pakpattan Sahiwal Khushab Jhang Singh T. T. Muzaffargarh Rajanpur Faisalabad RahimYar Khan RahimYar Layyah Bahawalnagar Bahawalpur Low-migration Low-migration districts migration Mianwali Lahore Attock Rawalpindi Mandibahaudin Narowal:Ayya Islamabad Gujranwala Medium- districts Sialkot Khanawal Jhelum D. G. Khan Gujrat Incidence-of-migration-based method High- migration districts migration Very Very low- districts Khushad Bhakkar Okara Pakpattan Kasur Vehari Rajanpur Bahawalnagar Layyah Muzaffargarh Low-migration Low-migration district Khanawal Lodhran Multan Chakwal Sahiwal Mianwali Sargodha Nankana Sheikhupura Lahore Hafizabad Jhang Rahim Yar Rahim Yar Khan Faisalabad Islamabad Bahawalpur Medium- migration district Rawalpindi Attock Jhelum Sialkot Narwal Mandi Bahauddin Gujranwala Gujrat D. G. Khan Sindh T. T. Remittance share-based method High- migration district Punjab Province 214 G. M. Arif et al. Awaran Lasbela Mastung Kech Jafarabad Tando Tando Muhammad Thatta Shadad Kot Mirpur Khas Sanghar Umer Kot Ghotki Khairpur Feroz Nowshera Very low/ Very migration districts Badin Dadu Hyderabad Kalat Kharan Khuzdar Gawadar Chaghi Nawabshah Sukkur Jacobabad Larkana Low-migration Low-migration districts Sargodha Allah Yar Tando migration Medium- districts Karachi Tharparkar Incidence-of-migration-based method High- migration districts migration Awaran Kalat Kharan Khuzdar Lasbela Tando Tando Muhammad Thatta Jacobabad Mirpur Khas Sanghar Tharparkar Umer Kot Ghotki Khairpur Nowshera Feroz Sukkar Very Very low- districts Badin Hyderabad Allah Tando Yar Gawadar Nawabshah Shahdad pur Larkana Low-migration Low-migration district Karachi Kech Medium- migration district Zhob Remittance share-based method High- migration district (continued)

Balochistan Sindh Province Table 11.12 Table 11 Labour Migration from Pakistan to the Gulf Countries: An Investigation… 215 Very low/ Very migration districts Jhal Magsi Bolan Nasir Abad Qilla Saifullah Pishin Quetta Kohlu Sibbi Ziarat Barkhan Qilla Abdullah Loralai Musa Khel Low-migration Low-migration districts Zhob migration Medium- districts Incidence-of-migration-based method High- migration districts migration Very Very low- districts Mastung Jafarabad Jhal Magsi Bolan Nasirabad Chaghi Qilla Saifullah Pishin Quetta Kohlu Sibbi Ziarat Barkhan Qilla Abdullah Loralai Musa Khel Low-migration Low-migration district Medium- migration district Remittance share-based method High- migration district Province 216 G. M. Arif et al.

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Bilesha Weeraratne

Introduction

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is an important corridor of labour migration from Sri Lanka. This importance emerged due to the alignment of demand and supply forces in the destination countries and Sri Lanka. On the demand side, after 1970s Gulf countries experienced the two oil booms which were associated with an excess demand for labour (Gunatilleke 1986), and on the supply side, after the late 1970s Sri Lanka underwent policy changes that introduced open market policies such as the relaxation of foreign exchange control and restrictions on labour migration. As a result departures to the Middle East grew to a staggering 27,000 in 1980 from 1500 in 1976 (Gunatilleke 1986). Since then, the importance of the Gulf region as a destination has increased over time. In 2015, departures to the GCC countries were 232,869, while Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE together accounted for over 84% (SLBFE 2016). This chapter examines the recent trends, current situation and future outlook of labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section “Institutional framework” describes the institutional framework in Sri Lanka for labour migration, while section “Recent trends” examines the recent trends in migration in terms of remittances, and composition of migrants’ skills, gender and age. Section “Importance of the Gulf region” discusses the importance of the Gulf as a destination, while section “Recruitment to the Gulf” discusses recruitment of Sri Lankan workers to the gulf. The chapter is concluded in section “Future directions” with a discussion about future directions for labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf.

B. Weeraratne (*) Labour, Employment and Human Resources Development Unit, Institute of Policy Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Institutional Framework

The labour migration industry in Sri Lanka has a few key stakeholders with well- defined roles. One of the main stakeholders in the industry is the Ministry of Foreign Employment (MFE), which is entrusted with the role of governing the industry. Closely linked with the MFE is the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment (SLBFE), which regulates the industry, for instance by handling approvals of foreign job orders, registration of migrants and recruitment agents, and conducting of pre-departure training, to name a few. Another important group of stakeholders in the industry are recruitment agents, who connect the foreign employer with the Sri Lankan worker. The government recruitment agency for foreign employment is the Sri Lanka Foreign Employment Agency (SLFEA), while most licensed private recruitment agents are organized under the Association for Licensed Foreign Employment Agencies (ALFEA), which ensures and enforces the best ethical practices for foreign employment trade in Sri Lanka. Currently there are 1006 licensed agents registered with the SLBFE (SLBFE 2016). Apart from agents, the migration industry in Sri Lanka also includes sub-agents—informal representatives of licensed agents, who are involved at grass root level for scouting of potential migrant workers. Recruitment for foreign employment from Sri Lanka in general is either through licensed recruitment agencies or on own through personal contacts, while the country level arrangement for recruitment is either Government-to-Government, Private- to-Private or an arrangement that lies in between these two extremes. These stakeholders in the migration industry in Sri Lanka are guided by the National Labour Migration Policy of 2008, which focuses on governance; protection and empowerment; and linking migration to development. Together, these components of the institutional framework have developed a coherent system which prepares potential migrants at pre-departure stage, strives for the wellbeing of migrants and their families during the migration stage and reintegrates migrants with family and socio-economy upon return to Sri Lanka. Before migration potential migrants undergo a compulsory pre-departure training. As of April of 2016 there are 25 training SLBFE centres operating in Sri Lanka and the duration and content of the training depends on the destination and the occupation category. In general pre-departure training covers job specific training (such as caring for the elderly and children for caregivers and cooking for housemaids), language skills, financial literacy, laws and customs of the host countries, safe migration, migrant workers’ rights and responsibilities, and arrangements for family left behind (Thimothy et al. 2016). In addition to training at pre-departure, potential migrants are also provided with low interest pre-departure loans. At the migration stage, the state provides many benefits to the families left behind such as awarding scholarships and conducting child protection programmes for the children of migrant workers, and low interest housing loans for migrants themselves. Additionally, the state also pays the insurance premium on behalf of migrant workers, and when in adverse situations migrant workers are repatriated with the mediation of the MFE, SLBFE and the Sri Lankan embassy in the respective destination 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 221 country, while upon return migrants are offered low interests self-employment loans (MFE 2016).

Recent Trends

Along with the well-developed institutional framework labour migration from Sri Lanka has evolved over the years to become an integral component of the economy. In 2015, remittances account for nearly 8.4% of GDP by standing at USD 6.98 billion (CBSL, AR 2016). Currently, remittances is the single largest foreign exchange earning component in Sri Lanka, towering over export earnings from tea, rubber and apparel as well as earnings from tourism. Nonetheless, for the first time in many years in 2015 remittances deviated from its growing trend and recorded a decline of 0.53% compared to the USD 7.01 million received in 2014. As identified by the CBLS 2016( ) one of the main reasons for the decline in remittances in 2015 is the decrease in income of oil exporting countries in the Middle East, which channels majority of remittances to Sri Lanka. Other reasons include the decline in the share of housemaids—whose migration have traditionally been positively associated with growing remittances to Sri Lanka, and the change in the skills and gender composition of recent migrants in favour of more skilled labour migration. Historically, despite its overall downward trend, female domestic workers have been the largest occupational group among migrant workers from Sri Lanka, (see panel 1 of Fig. 12.1). Compared to the share of domestic workers in 1996 (68%), its share has more than halved to 28% in 2015, and the same year marked the first year since 1994, where the share of housemaids dipped below that of skilled workers (31%). Along with the upward trend in skilled and unskilled workers, other skills groups, such as professionals and semi-skilled also experienced growth to reach higher shares of 2.4% and 2% of departures, respectively, in 2015. Despite a noticeable dip, the skills groups of middle-level and clerical & related have also main-

Skilled 70 10 professional Unskilled 60 middle-level Housemaids 8 clarical and related 50 Other Semi-skilled labor 6 40

30 departures 4

20 % of 2 10

0 0

Fig. 12.1 Skills of migrant workers 1994–2015. (Source: CBSL, AR, various years) 222 B. Weeraratne tained overall upward trends in their respective shares among departures (see panel 2 of Fig. 12.1). Amidst the declining share of housemaids among all migrant workers, they still account for a bulk of female departures. In 2015 housemaids accounted for 80% of the 90,677 female departures. Nonetheless, the decline in the share of housemaids among total departures also affects the significance of female migrants, and in 2008 for the first time in 20 years the share of females dipped below the share of male departures. Despite a few fluctuations, by 2010 the share of males have been consistently higher than that of females (see left panel of Fig. 12.2). Before 2013, the lower share of female departures was mainly due to the increase in male departures and not due to a significant decrease in the absolute number of females migrating for foreign employment. However, since 2013 the absolute number of female departures is also declining (see right panel of Fig. 12.2). The overall gender composition of departure for labour migration in 2015 was 66% males to 34% females. Among disaggregated skills groups, the highest share of males was reported among skilled workers (94%) followed by Professionals workers (93%). The highest share of females in 2015 was reported by the group of unskilled workers (13%) (see Table 12.1). As seen in Table 12.1, in none of the

200 80 % females % males Females Males 70 150 60

100 % 50

40 Thousands 50 30

20 0 88 90 92 94 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 96 88 92 94 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 90 96 1986 1986

Fig. 12.2 Gender distribution of migrants. (Source: CBSL, AR, various years)

Table 12.1 Departures by skills and gender—2015 Skills group Male (%) Female (%) Total Professional 93 7 6257 Middle level 90 10 6921 Clerical & related 88 12 12,472 Skilled 94 6 82,098 Semi-skilled 91 9 4837 Unskilled 87 13 77,444 Housemaid – 100 73,278 Total 66 34 263,307 Source: SLBFE (2016) 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 223

Fig. 12.3 Migrant Departure by Age and Gender: 2015. (Source: Author’s illustration based on SLBFE 2016 data) disaggregated skills groups the share of females is close to national average of 33%. This shows that the share of females among departures is heavily bolstered by housemaids and if one was to exclude them and re-calculate the national average, the share of males would increase to 91% males and the share of females would drop to 9%. In terms of the age distribution of migrants workers from Sri Lanka, as seen in Fig. 12.3, in 2015 male migrants were composed of more younger cohorts than female migrants. Specifically, most male migrant workers were concentrated in the five year age groups in 20–34 years, while on the contrary the bulk of female migrants were in the age five year age groups between 35 and 50 years. Among females also the disaggregation of gender and age group of departures by skills level shows that Housemaids and Unskilled departures of females are more mature than females departing for other skilled groups. In addition to these general trends in labour migration from Sri Lanka in terms of remittances, skills, gender and age, another predominant trend is the importance of Gulf as a region of destination, which is discussed next.

Importance of the Gulf Region

Among all alternative destination regions the Gulf has been consistently attracting the largest share of departure of labour migrants from Sri Lanka. As seen in Table 12.2, the GCC has traditionally accounted for 80–90% of total departures, and among GCC countries Saudi Arabia accounted for the highest share of nearly a third of departures to GCC. However, in 2013 Qatar attracted more migrant workers from Sri Lanka to account for an equal share as Saudi Arabia. The rising importance of 224 B. Weeraratne

Table 12.2 Distribution of departures to GCC countries 2011–2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015* Country No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Saudi Arabia 68,552 26 97,964 35 80,887 28 80,480 27 74,910 28 Qatar 52,743 20 57,504 20 80,724 28 84,622 28 65,111 25 U.A.E. 39,320 15 38,297 14 48,502 17 50,347 17 43,601 17 Kuwait 50,635 19 44,244 16 42,740 15 43,552 14 38,451 15 Oman 5379 2 4886 2 5317 2 5759 2 7077 3 Bahrain 5423 2 4536 2 4547 2 3979 1 3719 1 GCC Total 222,052 84 247,431 88 262,717 90 268,739 89 232,869 88 Other 40,909 16 35,016 12 30,501 10 31,964 11 30,438 12 TOTAL 262,961 100 282,447 100 293,218 100 300,703 100 263,307 100 Source: SLBFE (2016)

Qatar was further consolidated in 2014, by surpassing Saudi Arabia and emerging as the single destination country with the highest share of (28%) departures. Nonetheless, in 2015 Saudi Arabia regained its dominance by accounting for a share of 28% of departures while Qatar accounted for 25%. Despite accounting for similar shares among all departures from Sri Lanka, these two leading GCC countries attract different skills sets from Sri Lanka. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the majority of migrant workers in 2015 were housemaids (38%), while to Qatar the majority of Sri Lankan worker departures were for skilled work (46%) (see Table 12.3). Nonetheless, in terms of gender composition both these leading countries attract a majority of males, but the share of Sri Lankan males heading to Qatar is much higher (93%) than the share of Sri Lankan males to Saudi Arabia (59%). Among other GCC countries Kuwait attracts more females, while UAE attracts more males from Sri Lanka, and Oman and Bahrain attract almost equal share from both genders. In addition to departure, the Gulf region is also important in terms of remittances. As seen in Table 12.4, in recent years the Middle Eastern region which includes the Gulf accounts for over half of all remittances received by Sri Lanka. In 2015, Middle East accounted for 54% of remittances, while the European Union and East Asia accounted for 18% and 9%, respectively. However, a noticeable trend in remittances is the slow decline in the importance of the Middle East region as a source of remittances to Sri Lanka. Similar to the importance of the Gulf region for the positive attributes of the labour migration industry in Sri Lanka, this region is also prominent in terms of complaints made by the stock1 of Sri Lankan workers. In 2015, there was a total of 8366 complaints made by the stock of Sri Lankan workers abroad, out of which 92% were reported in the Gulf. Among all Gulf countries Saudi Arabia accounts for the largest share of complaints (55%), followed by Kuwait with 17% and Qatar with

1 It is important to distinguish the stock of migrant workers from the annual flow of migrant departures from Sri Lanka. 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 225 7077 3719 74,910 38,451 43,601 65,111 30,438 Total 233,369 263,307 5 Housemaid (%) 38 59 21 49 31 29 17 28 Unskilled (%) 31 12 29 33 12 17 27 46 29 Semiskilled (%) 1 1 5 2 1 2 2 1 2 Skilled (%) 27 25 25 46 19 37 32 27 31 1 1 8 4 6 5 2 5 Clerical & related (%) 11 Middle (%) 1 <0 4 4 7 3 3 2 3 ) Professional (%) 1 <0 4 3 7 4 2 5 2 2016 Skills composition by destination: 2015

Destination Saudi Arabia Kuwait UAE Qatar Oman Bahrain GCC Other Total Table 12.3 Table Source: SLBFE ( 226 B. Weeraratne

Table 12.4 Composition of remittances: 2015 UDS (million) % Region 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 Middle East 3030 3358 3562 3902 3769 58.9 56.1 55.6 55.6 54 European Union 885 1071 1160 1270 1222 17.2 17.9 18.1 18.1 17.5 Far East Asia 401 509 557 611 698 7.8 8.5 8.7 8.7 10 Europe-Other 232 275 308 337 307 4.5 4.6 4.8 4.8 4.4 North America 154 174 186 204 209 3 2.9 2.9 2.9 3 South East Asia 206 263 288 316 391 4 4.4 4.5 4.5 5 Australia and 103 132 147 161 161 2 2.2 2.3 2.3 2.3 New Zealand South Asia 51 90 83 91 98 1 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.4 South and Central 41 48 58 63 63 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 America Other 41 66 58 63 63 0.8 1.1 0.9 0.9 0.9 TOTAL 5145 5985 6407 7018 6980 100 100 100 100 100 Source: CBSL, AR (2016)

Table 12.5 Gender distribution of departures and complaints origins—2015 Departures Complaints Male Female Total Male Female Total Destination % % No. % % % No. % Saudi Arabia 59 41 74,910 28 19 81 4641 55 Kuwait 37 63 38,451 15 6 94 1425 17 UAE 66 34 43,601 17 21 79 793 9 Qatar 93 7 65,111 25 83 17 607 7 Oman 46 54 7077 3 7 93 188 2 Bahrain 48 52 3719 1 13 88 56 1 GCC total 66 34 232,869 88 22 78 7710 92 Other countries 64 36 30,438 12 42 58 656 8 Total 66 34 263,307 100 23 77 8366 100 SLBFE (2016)

9%. As seen in Table 12.5, in Saudi Arabia 81% of the complaints were made by females, while on the contrary, 87% of complaints in Qatar were made by males. Regardless of region, among all complaints 77% were made by female migrant workers, and 90% of all complaints in 2015 were made by Sri Lankan female domestic worker abroad. The predominant complaint by all migrant workers to all destinations in 2015 were related to breach of employment contract (3055 complaints), sickness at destination (1191 complaints), not being allowed to return to Sri Lanka upon completion of contract (1110 complaints) and non-payment of agreed wages (1017 complaints). Other issues reported by Sri Lankan workers abroad include lack of communication with family in Sri Lanka and physical and sexual harassment 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 227

(SLBFE 2016). Consequences of such difficulties faced by migrant workers include emotional trauma, physical injuries and financial losses or costs (HRW2007 ). To minimize the risk of vulnerability at Gulf countries, Sri Lankan authorities have introduced many Gulf specific measure, such as the minimum age for recruitment of females to the Gulf is higher than that of rest of the world. Specifically, for Saudi Arabia this minimum age of female labour migrants from Sri Lanka is 25 years and 23 years for the rest of the Gulf countries, while for other countries the corresponding minimum age is only 21 years. Such a higher minimum age is imposed with the intention of limiting the departure of very young girls who are more likely to be immature and hence more vulnerable to adverse situations at destination. In addition to higher minimum wages, another such measure is the introduction of mandatory pre-departure training, with specialized training available for the Middle East countries, which includes the Gulf. In the case of first time migrants as housemaids to the Middle East, the SLBFE conducts a 21 day residential pre- departure training programme, while for veteran migrant housemaids a 7 day refresher course is offered. The main difference in this region specific training is the greater emphasis on the culture and rules and regulation in the Gulf, which are aimed at minimizing issues for migrant workers in these Gulf destination. As discussed in the next sections the mechanism for recruitment of Sri Lankan workers to the Gulf has evolved in to a unique one, in part as a response to the issue of high vulnerability of Sri Lankan workers in the region.

Recruitment to the Gulf

Recruitment of migrant workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf are Private-to-Private arrangements between the two countries based on private sponsorship arrangements between the employer and employee often with the assistance of recruitment agencies in destination and Sri Lanka. The recruitment process is initiated in the Gulf by the employer who in most instances approaches a recruitment agency in the destination country to employ a Sri Lankan worker. The recruitment agent in the Gulf submits a job order to the Sri Lankan embassy in the respective destination country. At this point the embassy in the Gulf country checks the credibility of the recruitment agent in the destination country as well as that of the employer with the objective of ensuring the well-being of the Sri Lankan worker at destination. Subsequently, the embassy communicates the certified job order to the SLBFE. The recruitment agent in Sri Lanka who is liaising with the foreign agent obtains a first approval and maximum chargeable recruitment fee for this job order from the SLBFE. As per Amendment No. 56 in 2009 to the initial SLBFE Act of 1985, licensed agents in Sri Lanka are now allowed to charge the actual expenses to be incurred in placement in foreign employment, in the event of not receiving any form of payment from overseas. In such instances, maximum chargeable amount is calculated based on monthly salary, duration of employment contract and exchange rate. For instance, in 2016 the maximum chargeable for a low skilled male worker to the 228 B. Weeraratne

GCC was LKR 125,000, and LKR 35,000 for garment workers (male/female). Recruitment of Female Domestic Workers to the Gulf countries is a unique situation (see next sub section for details), where the maximum chargeable is set to zero given the practice of employer paying all recruitment charges. Subsequent to obtaining the first approval, local agents seek potential migrant workers to fill the vacancy. In the case of recruitment for foreign employment through own-account, the employer in the Gulf would obtain the approval of the embassy and links directly with the potential migrant worker in Sri Lanka (Weeraratne et al. 2016). For such own account recruitment of FDW’s, the employers are required to make a non-refundable deposit worth US $ 400 at the respective embassy (MFE 2016). The purpose of this non-refundable deposit is to cover any unpaid wages or repatriation costs. This non-refundable deposit is only applicable to those recruiting Sri Lankan migrant workers without the involvement of recruitment agents, because the absence of an agent limits the accountability of employer at destination (Weeraratne 2014). Once a potential migrant worker is matched to an employer, the former needs to undergo pre-departure training and fulfil other requirements based on the occupation category. For instance, female domestic workers are required to obtain documents including Family Background Report (FBR), medical report and police report. However, in Sri Lanka, the issuance of medical certificates for employment in the Gulf is restricted to 15 medical clinics. As noted in ILO (2013) this restriction results in inconveniencing prospective migrant workers and the recruitment agency, and affects the speedy procurement process. Subsequent to completion of documentation the potential migrant obtains a visa to the GCC country to depart for foreign employment. Prior to departure the employment contract is signed at the SLBFE, and the migrant worker and the relevant contract is registered with the SLBFE. However, often in GCC countries Sri Lankan migrant workers are compelled to sign a second agreement at destination, which locks the migrant worker to a new set of working terms and conditions different from those agreed before departure. This system of double contracts often leads to confusion and related disagreements among employer and employees (Weeraratne 2014). In addition to double contracting, Block Visas—where approval is granted to a group of migrants, and the Table System—where more than one agency registered under the same name, are other practices in the Gulf that complicates recruitment for foreign employment in Sri Lanka and leads to greater vulnerability of Sri Lankan workers in the Gulf. For instance, under the Table System it is nearly impossible to trace the responsible agent in the event of a complaint by a migrant worker.

Recruitment of Female Domestic Workers

The recruitment of female domestic workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf has evolved into a unique arrangement, where in addition to the payment of recruitment cost, an upfront incentive is also paid to the FDW. Initially upfront incentives were paid only 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 229 to Muslim FDW heading to the Gulf, mainly as a way of attracting them due to their racial and cultural similarity with that of the employers at Gulf. Nevertheless, regardless of race of employees in Sri Lanka, employers in destination have paid the same recruitment fee. Amidst this background, the introduction of mandatory pre- departure training in 1996 leads to greater interaction among potential housemaids and subsequent common awareness about the practice of upfront incentives. This led the demand and eventual payment of upfront incentives to all ethnic groups of female domestic workers from Sri Lanka to Gulf. In 2016 this upfront incentive to FDW and her family was LKR 225,000–250,000 (SAR 5860–6512) (Weeraratne et al. 2016). This payment of upfront incentives in Sri Lanka is unique to female domestic workers destined to the Gulf and the rest of the Middle East countries. FDWs heading outside the Middle East are not paid such an incentive, while other occupation categories from Sri Lanka to the Middle East countries are also not paid such an incentive. Moreover, among all sending countries to the Gulf only Sri Lankan housemaids receive such an incentive. The exact reason why employers in the Gulf are willing to pay an upfront incentive to Sri Lankan housemaids is unclear. Nevertheless, from a financial point of view even with the payment of an incentive, Sri Lankan housemaids still appear cheaper than similar workers from other sending countries. For instance, the monthly salary of Sri Lankan female domestic workers in 2016 was approximately SAR 900, while a similar housemaid from Philippines earned approximately SAR 1500 per month in Saudi Arabia (Weeraratne et al. 2016). When a 2 year contract period is considered the upper limit of the total cost including incentives for a Sri Lankan female domestic workers amounts to SAR 28,112, while the cost of a Philipino female domestic workers—even in the absence of any such incentives, amounts to a much higher SAR 36,000. As analyzed previously female domestic workers are highly vulnerable at Gulf destinations, and their well-being has remained a concern for Sri Lankan authorities. In recent years, authorities in the Gulf also have been under more pressure to improve the working conditions and safety of migrant workers. Due to this growing concern in both Sri Lanka and the receiving countries, with effect from 2017 the recruitment of female domestic workers to Saudi Arabia is carried out under the Musaned system. This new online system of recruitment is aimed at facilitating the procedures for recruitment of female domestic workers for Saudi Arabia and increasing the protection of all parties involved by clarifying their rights and duties. The benefits of the newly introduced system include the ability to apply online for foreign labour visas, provision of an online market place for female domestic workers, where electronic employment contracts can be issued under the close monitoring of both Sri Lankan and Saudi authorities. Additionally, the Musaned system has a facility for workers to lodge complaints related to employment and or employer. As such, it is expected that this new recruitment system would contribute to minimize the vulnerability of Sri Lankan housemaids employed in Saudi Arabia. 230 B. Weeraratne

Future Directions

Based on the foregone analysis a few key trends emerge in terms of labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf. They are (1) increasing dominance of male migrants from Sri Lanka to the Gulf; (2) rising importance of skilled workers migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf; (3) stagnation in the female centric nature of complaints of Sri Lankan migrant workers in the Gulf; (4) the slow decline in the importance of Gulf as a destination region; and (5) the slow decline in the importance of Gulf as a remitting region to Sri Lanka. Among them the combination of the first two trends contributes to the final trend of decline in remittances. Specifically, the increase in skilled migration involves the increase of tied migrants—where spouse as well as children of migrant workers leave Sri Lanka for the Gulf. The absence of a left behind family leads to lower receipt of remittances to Sri Lanka. Similarly, the greater departure of skilled workers alters the temporary/circular nature of labour migration from Sri Lanka and leads to more long-term migration, despite the lack of opportunities to naturalize in the Gulf. This disappearance of temporary migration also contributes to the decline in remittances. Literature notes that compared to males, females have a greater involvement with the operation of the left behind household and thus are more reliable remitters (Le Goff 2016). However, despite being less reliable, when they do remit, males are more likely to remit more because of their higher wages. As such, perhaps the recent years offer an early indication that the higher salaries of male migrant workers from Sri Lanka to the Gulf are not compensating for their irregularity in remitting behaviour, and skilled migrants are in fact remitting less to Sri Lanka. To increase its receipt of remittances in this emerging scenario, Sri Lanka ought to make policy changes to maintain closer links with skilled and male migrant workers in the Gulf. In recent years, Sri Lanka’s labour migration policy has emphasized on destination diversification. As such, this slow decline in the importance of the Gulf may be early evidence of destination diversification of Sri Lanka’s labour migration flows. Nevertheless, no other region outside the Gulf has emerged to increase its dominance as a destination or as a remitting region to Sri Lanka. At the same time this region still accounts for the largest share of issues faced by migrant workers from Sri Lanka, and among them females continue to report most issues. Nevertheless, the increasing dominance of male migrants from Sri Lanka to the Gulf calls for labour migration policies to broadening its scope on addressing vulnerability of Sri Lankan workers in the Gulf. In recent years, most female migrant workers in the Gulf have been working in isolation and within the premises of a household. On the contrary, male migrant workers from Sri Lanka have more opportunities to collec- tivize at destination (i.e. at work, at places of accommodation and at social settings). This necessitates male migrants to be adequately sensitized about the cultural norms, rules, regulations and laws in destination countries. For instance, in many Gulf countries unionization is not allowed for migrant workers and striking is illegal, and punishment for illegal conduct such as brewing of illicit liquor is severe 12 Labour Migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf: Current Status and Future Outlook 231

(Motaparthy 2015). In this context, the pre-departure training provided to male migrants would require a region specific focus in future. For example the pre-departure training for construction workers to Qatar could emulate the existing Middle East bound pre-departure training for Female Domestic Workers. In conclusion, the Gulf region has been and will continue to be a key corridor for labour migration from Sri Lanka. Due acknowledgement to the emerging trends in labour migration from Sri Lanka to the Gulf and appropriate policy changes would allow Sri Lanka to maximize the gains and minimize the losses from this region.

References

CBSL. (2016). Annual report 2015. Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Gunatilleke, G. (1986). Sri Lanka. In G. Gunatilleke (Ed.), Migration of Asian workers to the Arab World (pp. 167–170). Tokyo: United Nations University, Japan. HRW. (2007). Exported and exposed abuses against Sri Lankan Domestic Workers in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon and the United Arab Emirates. New York: Human Rights Watch. ILO. (2013). Recruitment Practices of Employment Agencies Recruiting Migrant Workers: A review aimed at improving recruitment regulations and drafting recruitment guidelines. Geneva: International Labour Office. Le Goff, M. (2016). Feminization of migration and trends in remittances. Bonn: IZA World of Labor, Institute for the Study of Labor. MFE. (2016). Progress report 2015. Ministry of Foreign Employment. Motaparthy, P. (2015, March 11). Understanding Kafala: An Archaic law at cross purposes with modern development. http://www.migrant-rights.org/2015/03/understanding-kafala-an- archaic-law-at-cross-purposes-with-modern-development/. Accessed on June 30 2015. SLBFE. (2016). Annual statistical report of foreign employment 2015.. Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment. Thimothy, R., Sasikumar, S. K., Ratnayake, P., & Alvin, P. A. (2016). Labour migration structures and financing in Asia. Bangkok: International Labour Organization, ILO. Weeraratne, B. (2014). Sri Lankan female domestic workers in the Middle East: Does recruitment through an agent minimize vulnerability? (Labour economic series no. 18). Colombo: Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka. Weeraratne, B., Wijayasiri, J., & Jayaratne, S. (2016). Cost of low-skilled workers: Value chain analysis – Sri Lanka. Unpublished manuscript. Chapter 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics and Contradictory Policies

S. Irudaya Rajan and Jolin Joseph

Sitting with us on the floor of the DammamTarheel (deportation centre) in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia in 2012, Ferzana Begum1spoke, almost inaudibly, about her experiences as a domestic worker in a multi-family household. In her late fifties and older than her peers at the centre, Ferzana had embarked on her first emigration after the passing of her husband a year ago. She had only been working with her employer for 7 months before they unceremoniously dropped her off near the passport office without her documents. Ferzana had been put to work in the kitchen and was also tasked with general housekeeping tasks and hand-washing clothes. The work she described was gruelling and involved going up and down the three-storied house multiple times a day. She began having difficulties keeping up and had to rely on the two other domestic workers also employed in the home. Ferzana had asthma and a medical condition that caused her right leg to swell. What had begun as an arduous yet uneventful employment experience took a turn after her employer’s discovery of her health concerns. With some support, Ferzana stood and slowly pulled back her abaya2 to show us her painfully bloated foot. She had hoped that her condition would go undetected; however, as the work continued to take a toll, she became increasingly mobility-impaired. Her employers reacted with frustration and anger, beating her often and accusing her of cheating them. She was later barred from handling food and personal items and forbidden from interacting with the children. Despite harsh working conditions and being discriminated against for her illness, Ferzana felt unsure about her return to Hyderabad, India, where she had been living

1 Names changed for protection and privacy of respondents. No identifying information included. 2 A long, loose-fitting garment worn over clothing by women.

S. I. Rajan (*) Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India J. Joseph York University, Toronto, Canada

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 233 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_13 234 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph with her older son. She had grown wary of imposing on her son’s family life and finances after being widowed. For a time, she helped out at a provision shop that he ran but was unable to stand for long lengths of time. This made tensions between them worse and stoked her sense of disquiet. She then began looking for employment as a domestic worker. It proved difficult to land local jobs as an older woman without work experience. The only opportunities were low-paying and required travelling long distances daily. For 2 years, the family had been working together to pay off loans incurred for the migration of Ferzana’s youngest son to Kuwait. On his advice, Ferzana contacted a local agent to broker her passage to the Gulf. Her migration had been a strategic choice that would enable her to contribute to paying down the family debt and retain a measure of independence. Now, having lost legal status and faced with her impending repatriation, Ferzana was overcome with a feeling of personal failure, looking past the structures that had systematically failed her. Migrant domestic workers, like Ferzana, have become emblematic figures of migration in the region. Caught at the interstice of restrictive policy regimes and ongoing demand for flexible, feminized care labour, they comprise a highly precarious, largely female global workforce. This chapter presents observations from interviews with 56 Indian domestic workers conducted as part of a broader study of low- and semi-skilled Indian migrants in Saudi Arabia.3 Situated within the broader structures and regimes that govern the labour market and their social lives, the migration experiences of migrant domestic workers are both facilitated and constrained by an assemblage of factors including the kafala sponsorship system, nationalization and regularization efforts, labour laws and migration policies. Through this chapter, we comment on the staying power of migrant domestic work along this regional corridor, owing to the distinct political economy that underpins their mobility and labour and the ongoing structural demand for and dependence on migrant domestic workers. The continued presence of South Asian domestic workers in the Gulf region, despite less-than-favourable political and policy conditions in sending and receiving countries, warrants further consideration. This is particularly timely as many South Asian countries prepare to reckon with the rapid repatriation of migrant workers from the Gulf region owing to stagnation in oil economies, socio-political unrest in an unstable Gulf bloc, and structural reconstruction of Gulf labour markets away from migrant employment. Inconsistent with the tide of returning migrants, streams of migrant domestic workers appear to be steadily resisting this trend – much as witnessed during the global recession a decade ago that saw the retreat of migrant workers across other sectors (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; Rajan and Joseph 2013). The chapter also links and develops two analytical themes that have emerged from the study. The first section attends to the contested politics around gendered-racialized modes of migration and domestic work that have resulted in their systemic devaluation and discrimination. The second section examines the insufficient, and often contradictory, legislative and regulatory frameworks that

3 Study supported by the erstwhile Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs – Research Unit on International Migration at the Centre for Development Studies, Kerala, India. 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 235 shape the migration experiences of South Asian migrant domestics in the Gulf and set the conditions of their precarity. Following some recent shifts in policy development, it reveals gaps and fissures in how their migration and labour are organized, managed and protected by sending and receiving states. While specific national and regional cases are analysed as examples, the authors do not suggest a generalizing or collapsing of contextual dynamics. The chapter concludes by highlighting the importance of responsible, responsive state and supra-state support for migrant domestic workers.

Contested Politics of Gender and Care Work

The Gulf bloc has been recorded as the largest migrant labour-receiving region in the world. The ILO estimates that over 3.16 million migrant domestic workers are employed across Arab States (including 6 Gulf countries) with over 80% of these roles undertaken by women, largely from Asia and Africa (ILO 2015). The gender composition of domestic work in the Gulf region is weighted heavily towards women, with over two-thirds of female migrant workers employed as domestic workers. According to official estimates, Oman had 87,500 registered female migrant workers in 2009, of whom 69,250 were employed in private households (ILO 2011). An estimated two million migrant domestic workers currently live and work in Saudi Arabia alone, accounting for over 47% of total female employment in the Kingdom (ILO 2010). Of this, non-Saudis are estimated at 99.87% of the female domestic workforce (CDSI Manpower Survey 2013). Migration for domestic and household care work follows deeply gendered and racialized transnational patterns of migration that take place under neo-liberal conditions of uneven development, welfare austerity, and flexibilized labour (Kofman and Raghuram 2015). While increasingly apparent on a global scale and a topic of several academic and policy studies (Silvey 2006; Varia 2007; HRW 2008a, b, 2010; Fernandez 2010; Vlieger 2012; Bajracharya and Sijapati 2012; Begum 2014), the increased attention has not parlayed into enhanced policy protections for this critical cadre of workers. This is, in part, due to the diminished value associated with reproductive tasks, particularly those that are increasingly performed by racialized women within private homes. Asian women migrants continue to occupy a narrow range of reproductive labour roles characteristically assigned to female migrants (Piper and Yamanaka 2005). The non-recognition of their crucial socio-economic contributions has much to do with its invisibility within private homes and relega- tion to peripheral, feminized and racialized workers, primarily from the global South. This discursive care/work distinction props up the assumed binary in legislation and further contributes to driving down conditions in this sector. Furthermore, prevailing gender norms across sending and receiving often serve to constrain women’s rights and roles – whether citizens or not. The scale of migrant domestic worker presence and their limited legal coverage accentuates stark power asymme- tries skewed in favour of local employers in the Gulf. This leaves little incentive for 236 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph states and sponsors to adequately value the lives and labour of migrant domestic workers. Asian migrant domestic workers in the Gulf region have been identified among the fastest growing sections of Gulf labour forces (Sabban 2002). Their rising presence has been linked to a number of factors. At the transnational level, these include the feminization of particular migration streams, protracted income inequalities, and the growing privatization and marketization of the care sector amidst declining state social-service delivery (Moors et al. 2009; Malit and Ghafoor 2014; Kofman and Raghuram 2015). The consistent demand for domestic work in the Gulf states can be connected to women’s increasing participation in the labour force, higher living standards, a burgeoning middle and elite class of expatriates who can afford part-time or full-time domestic service, and local workforce non-participation in ‘undesirable’ service sectors. Socio-demographic transitions including (a) shifts in family structures and composition towards nuclear arrangements, (b) decreased birth and fertility rates, and (c) longer life expectancies (Sabban 2002; Begum 2014;Malit and Ghafoor 2014; Tayah and Assaf 2018; Malit et al. 2018) also contribute to these emergent patterns. In her analysis of migrant domestic workers in UAE, Rima Sabban (2002) suggests that the large-scale and longstanding import of migrant domestic workers was strategically implemented by the Gulf States in a bid to secure political legitimacy amongst the local citizenry. Extending this analysis, Malit et al. (2018) note that UAE state supports for their local population have included protectionist labour localization policies as well as education and land subsidies and marriage and child allowances that free up disposable income that may be put towards the hire of domestic workers. Migrant domestic work has therefore been structured into states’ social policy through commodification and contracting-out of care provision (Bergem 2006). In this way, the embedding of migrant domestic workers into Gulf labour markets has served to substitute and supplement government services amidst structural shrinking of formal care provision. On the South Asian sending-side, the significant increase in migrant domestic work has been attributed to a number of interconnected factors (Rajan and Joseph 2015). Women are frequently excluded from the formal sector and statutory coverage, leaving many such as Ferzana Begum in need of alternative opportunities. Structural and social constraints to women’s local employment and skill training, the lack of well-remunerated and decent work opportunities commensurate with economic growth, acute poverty and socio-economic vulnerabilities, and state and societal reliance on remittances, combine to present the Gulf as an important and aspirational avenue for these workers (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; Ghosh 2013). Their migration is actualized through the operation of social networks, formal and informal institutional actors that make migration accessible to even the poorest and remotest sections of society (Rajan et al. 2013). The relative proximity and connectivity to Gulf states and established patterns of migration to these regions further facilitate these flows. For Ferzana Begum and a few other respondents of our study, transnational mobility into domestic work in private Gulf households was a move away from the yoke of cultural and gender mores that cast them as dependents 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 237 and a burden. For some, this represents a move towards empowerment and autonomy (Sijapati 2015). Entrenched social inequalities based on gender norms, caste hierarchies, class relations, and religious differences, and the potential to shift and subvert these through the social mobility that migration accords constitute some key vectors driving South Asian women’s interest in Gulf migration (Gamburd 2000). Alongside sectoral feminization, domestic work in the Gulf displays an ethnic concentration that is notably ‘Asianized’. Intra-regional Arab mobility provided the labour resources for initial oil-led infrastructure development in the region. In the 1980s, Gulf governments gradually turned to Asian migrants who were considered more politically and socially acquiescent and less expensive (Kapiszewski 2017). This Asianization impulse has since expanded and diversified. The economic recession of the late 1980s saw a fall in demand for workers in construction and allied sectors, while the demand for domestic workers continued. This resulted in particular circuits of migration from Asia becoming increasingly feminized (Moors et al. 2009). Domestic service represents the leading occupation of South Asian women in the Gulf (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012). The majority of domestic workers in the region are from South and Southeast Asian countries of the Philippines, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. Both the compensation of domestic workers and associated measures of status for employers are informally stratified in a racialized hierarchy. Bina Fernandez (2010) notes that Filipina women are widely considered to occupy top-tier status, followed by Indonesian and Sri Lankan women, and African women at the bottom of this cascading socio-economic ladder. Studies have highlighted the social standing attached to the employment of domestic workers, signalling a life of luxury and leisure (Sabban 2002; Fernandez 2010; Malit et al. 2018). Specific ethnic groupings of migrant domestic have been seen to embody differential symbolic capital. This has produced and maintained a specific demand for Asian domestic workers. Our 2015 study noted multiple interlocking factors that determine the quality of life, social positioning, and job satisfaction of women domestic workers in Saudi Arabia (Rajan and Joseph 2015). The contours of care work in this context are contingent on prevailing economic inequalities between countries, histories of racial and gender subordination, and labour and (im)migration policies. The informal, underregulated working environment of domestic work lends itself to exploitation, especially where workers are not organized or unionized. The freedom of association and assembly is often denied, and migrant women domestic workers cannot form or join trade unions, collective bargaining efforts, or engage in public social interactions. Many migrant women domestic workers remain sequestered in their employer’s home and cut-off from wider society. Unlike other workers who congre- gate and more freely move through public spaces, domestic workers in Saudi Arabia are often confined behind closed doors with little flexibility and time off. This, in turn, can exacerbate vulnerability as employers wield near-total control over the women they employ as domestic workers. Despite lingering rights deficits, migration for domestic work remains a significant source of employment for South Asian women in the Gulf and an important arena for policy reform. 238 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph

Contradictory State Policies of Labour and Mobility

The precarious status of migrant domestic workers has been maintained and institutionalized by migration and labour policies. Sending and receiving countries are co-implicated in structural processes of racialized–gendered labour exploitation. The bulk of local labour laws and standards in the Gulf explicitly write out migrant domestic workers from their purview and protections. This leaves them with limited legal rights to fair wages, decent and safe working conditions, and with no recourse for exploitation. Most South Asian countries do not incentivize or manage migration, having in fact laid down barriers and bureaucratic controls over the emigration of women, particularly domestic workers (Kodoth and Varghese 2011; Sijapati 2015). These contradictions are not merely incidental, they are characteristic of the low value accorded to women migrants and domestic workers and constitutive of migrant sending and receiving governments’ investment in competitive capital accumulation. For many years, the large-scale labour flows of domestic workers in the region occurred with minimal formal state intervention. More recently, several countries have introduced laws, policies, or schemes to protect domestic workers, regulate the sector, and pre-empt care deficits. This has taken the form of labour law reforms, standard contracts, specific domestic work legislation, (im)migration and recruitment reforms, and bilateral agreements to secure standards and maintain markets for their overseas workers (Ministry of Labour and Employment 2011, Ministry of Labour and Employment 2013, Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment 2016). These efforts remain largely incremental and do not constitute comprehensive reform (Varia 2011). The fundamental institutional architecture governing domestic work migration in the Gulf region is the kafala sponsorship system. Under its aegis, private sponsors assume near-total control over the visa and legal status of migrant workers. Privatization of migration management via local citizen-employers allows states to secure profits while delegating administrative control (Gardner2010 ). Tethering migrant workers to their local employers constrains their agency and heightens the already insecure legal status and diminished citizenship of migrant domestic workers. Migrant domestic workers are explicitly constructed as transient workers. Their residence is linked to temporary, non-transferable work permits that, upon expiry, render them irregular and deportable. The distribution of power vests authority in local employers and fosters rampant criminalization of domestic worker-related labour disputes. Domestic workers in our study often struggled to find adequate legal representation, accepted unfair financial settlements, suffered harsh penalties, and waited for months in overcrowded shelters with little information about the progress of their cases. Among the respondent pool, 29 had left abusive situations, usually their employer’s home, and were seeking refuge or repatriation at shelters. A legal safeguard for Gulf sponsors allows them to report migrant workers that have absconded from work and avail a supplementary permit to bring in another worker in lieu of the ‘runaway’. Fieldwork revealed widespread misuse of this loophole, rendering thousands of workers wrongfully labelled huroob (absconder), and cur- 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 239 rently living in legal limbo – facing detention, expulsion, and flogging. Explicit legal counterbalances are required to ensure security and protection of migrants that come out of and bring complaints about hostile work environments. A number of proposed policy measures and reforms to the kafala system have recently emerged across Gulf countries. Yet as Zahra Babar (2013) notes, ‘conclusive structural change has remained absent region-wide. Reforms have been attempted but none to date have led to a complete dismantling of the sponsorship system’. In a landmark announcement in 2016, Bahrain proposed a ‘flexible work permit’ allowing migrant workers to act as their own sponsors. This proposal followed the 2009 Mobility Law that granted migrants the right to change employment without employer consent. Paradoxically, a follow-up legislation in 2011 required migrants to remain with employers for a minimum of 1 year before switching jobs and reinforced bonded labour aspects of the kafala (ADHRB 2016). While these changes have important implications for labour regimes and conditions in the region, they do not spell the end of the sponsorship system. Both pieces of legislation were only extended to certain groups of workers. This has further amplified class-based differential inclusion, leaving domestic workers and other vulnerable migrant groups outside the ambit of real reform. The content and configuration of local labour laws define the legal, social, economic, and civil liberties of migrant and non-migrant workers. Migrant domestic workers are excluded from virtually all Gulf labour laws and protections. Without legislated standards and protections, particular groups of workers may face perva- sive precariousness. The paucity of representative information on domestic workers has proved a challenge in designing policies, programmes, and monitoring systems to ensure legislative and social entitlements for migrant domestic workers. Insufficient legislative coverage is also tied to the private nature of the household- workplace that does not customarily lend themselves to labour inspections and monitoring. Bahrain currently stands alone in the region for having extended the scope of its labour laws to cover domestic workers in some measure (ITUC 2014). This move has set the agenda for change and has seen gradual reverberation across Gulf policy circles. Qatar has acted on its commitment to revamp domestic labour conditions and replace the sponsorship system. In 2017, the Qatari government entered into a 3-year technical cooperation agreement with the ILO to shepherd these changes and set minimum stipulated entitlements (HRW 2018). In another vein, attempts have been made to enact special legislation to protect migrant domestic workers and incorporate standard contracts. Saudi Arabia passed specific legislation pertaining to domestic workers that guarantee improved work conditions and set basic terms of employment. The regulation warrants monthly payment of wages, paid vacation at the end of 2 years, and 9 hours of rest (Varia 2014). Even so, this does not offer the same protections available to workers in other sectors. Saudi also launched the Musaned e-platform for recruitment of domestic workers as part of a concerted effort to develop and regulate the sector. This may be a step towards restricting the operation of illicit intermediaries. It currently appears to simply facilitate faster processing of e-visas through automated documentation approval, with little mention of improved oversight and rights protections (Hassan 240 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph

2019). Kuwait implemented a compulsory standard contract detailing conditions of work, a day of rest and annual leave and set up a separate nodal department for domestic worker affairs. Since 2014, UAE has also made overtures in these directions and is reviewing a Domestic Worker Law (ITUC 2014; Malit and Ghafoor 2014). Reports on Qatar’s Domestic Workers Law that was ratified in 2017 have called for the implementation of further safeguards and better reference wages/ hours (HRW 2018). These efforts remain difficult to enforce, as evidenced in their limited impacts and lax and uneven implementation. Crucially, specific legislation does little to fundamentally overhaul existing structures that disempower migrants. Rights and issues of migrant domestic workers should be included within broader legislative frameworks. Comprehensive reform in this regard would attend to the weaknesses of the overarching kafala system that shapes and structures migrant- employer relations. The turn to bilateral agreements and regional arrangements endorsing fair and ethical employment and recruitment of domestic workers between Asian and Gulf countries has recently been gaining ground. These negotiated agreements serve to set mutually agreed on intentions and guidelines for the protection and promotion of labour mobility. However, these lack enforcement methods and cannot replace labour law protections or override legally stipulated standards. There is also the inherent danger of prioritizing particular state interests and neoliberal impera- tives of profit maximization over the needs of migrant groups. Memoranda of understanding that facilitate intra-regional mobility often differ in the degrees to which they offer or curtail freedom of movement, settlement, or residence (Kofman and Raghuram 2012). Variability in tone and tenor of agreements may also confer special treatment to certain segments of workers. The Philippines and Indonesia have remained in dialogue with a number of Gulf countries to facilitate the migration of their domestic workers. Saudi Arabia is the only Gulf country to have signed bilateral agreements on migrant domestic worker mobility with countries of South Asia (India and Sri Lanka). They have also indicated that they will enter into agreements with other Asian countries (Malit and Ghafoor 2014). In January 2014, India and Saudi Arabia entered into an agreement on the protection of the rights of domestic Indian workers in the Kingdom (Khan 2014). The new arrangement was set to guarantee that Indian women working in Saudi homes will be able to keep their passports, communicate with their families, get regular monthly pay, and have time off (Varia 2014). This has yet to significantly alter entrenched exploitationary conditions in this context. Evidently, Gulf states have so far developed divergent, and often incoherent, policies concerning domestic workers. This slippage has significant implications for the future of the sector. Apart from individual country plans to mitigate the exploitation of domestic workers, a regional, unified Gulf law on domestic worker conditions is under review (Babar 2013). This has remained in draft stages for a number of years and previous iterations have been critiqued as failing to adequately incorporate the interest of migrant workers (ITUC 2014). Efforts to induct migrant domestic workers into formal labour markets and stimulate growth in this sector are being drafted against a backdrop of heightened regulation and securitization of the broader 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 241 migrant labour populace (Shah 2005). Ongoing policy shifts attempting to improve working and socio-legal conditions of domestic workers have been insufficiently articulated, inconsistently implemented, and largely lack coherent frameworks for enactment, evaluation, and regional coordination (Malit and Ghafoor 2014). Formulation of specific laws and practices around domestic work has rendered these workers exceptional while maintaining the exclusion from existing labour laws. Studies on migrant labour frequently lay the responsibility of protecting migrant domestic workers on host nations of the Gulf. What is relatively less considered is that caustic conditions and insufficient protections in the Gulf, closely mirror informal sector milieu in South Asia. The ILO World Employment Social Outlook 2017 suggests that among the major challenges in South Asia is low female labour force participation. Only 28% of women actively participate in the labour market and over 80% of them are in vulnerable forms of employment (ILO 2018). Triggering media accounts of ‘rescues and repatriations’ from the Gulf do the double-duty of alerting prospective migrants to potential risks, while also glossing over local conditions. This narrative feeds into the rhetoric of the Gulf destinations as particularly inhospitable to migrant workers. Another aspect to consider is how emigration policies from communities of origin inflect the migration experience. A number of Asian sending countries have been imposing and retracting regulatory restraints on the mobility of migrant domestic workers. This has taken the form of intermittent bans, recruitment regulation, mandatory minimum age requirements, and in the case of Sri Lanka ‘The Family Background Report’. Restrictions based on destination, age, gender, skill, or parental status serve to extend the legal basis of gendered discrimination in this regard (Kodoth and Varghese 2012; Sijapati 2015). Women’s rights to freely seek employment, migrate, and remain free from discrimination are enshrined under the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), and the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families. Across the board, Gulf and South Asian countries have withheld ratification of ILO Convention C189 concerning decent pay and working conditions for domestic workers. Existing labour laws and migration protections have been found out-of- step with international human rights standards. Ratifying international instruments is a vital step in ensuring compliance with global norms and standards of worker dignity and safety. This presents an important opportunity for coalitional efforts to engender reform and craft enabling environments for migrant domestic work. Migration of domestic workers has been seen to persist in the face of even the most restrictive regulations. Twenty-two domestic workers in our study were found to have circumvented state controls on entry, exit, and employment at some point in their sojourn. In some cases, this was through procurement and use of falsified documents, others overstayed on visas or were smuggled across borders by illicit agents or employers. This demonstrates the capacity of transnational migrants to challenge indiscriminate migration controls through strategies that transgress borders and bureaucracy. It also underscores the need to see a sustained shift towards transnational governance of migration, and to examine the potential roles of supra-state 242 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph organizations and regional alliances in setting the terms and guidelines around regional mobility.

Engendering Reform and an Enabling Environment

Domestic work is at once the largest sector of employment for Asian migrant women across the Gulf, and the least protected. Demand for migrant domestic workers is likely to endure since their employment is structurally and socially embedded into Gulf care economies. Migration of Asian migrant domestic workers has proven resilient to economic shocks and downturns and regional instability that impacted the residence, employment, and legal standing of migrants in other sectors (Thimothy and Sasikumar 2012; Rajan and Narayana 2010). Over the past decade, Gulf governments doubled down on nationalization policies to temper unemployment rates and stave off domestic dissatisfaction. This renewed labour localization drive has responded to public agitations and high unemployment recorded across the Gulf, especially in Oman and Bahrain. Demographically distinct from the rest of the region, more than half of the Saudi population is under the age of 30 (GLMM 2018). Job creation, education and skill acquisition, and reservations for locals have been identified as critical areas of intervention. Policy push in this direction has had little impact on the quantum and flows of migrant domestic workers. The quota system has not been extended to domestic work and other sectors that were not expected to have domestic demand for participation. The migration of domestic workers was not considered a sensitive issue by most Gulf countries as there is no real competition between locals and migrants. In addition, as local women were able to participate more fully in the labour force, the need to augment the import of migrant care labour became apparent. Despite economic slumps and workforce nationalization policies in the region, the demand for and presence of migrant domestic workers have been resilient (Shah et al 2012; Malit et al. 2018). With labour mobility agreements, ageing populations, lower fertility rates, local workforce non-participation in ‘undesirable’ service sectors, insufficiency of state services for children, elderly and the disabled in the region, and the increasing percentage of local women entering the labour market, migrant domestic work is projected to remain a mainstay of Gulf labour markets. Recent statutory provisions notwithstanding, the need for structural reform in this sector is palpable. Indonesia, Philippines and other Asian sending governments have made attempts to flex diplomatic power and negotiate more favourable conditions for their domestic workers or ban their deployment. However, growing competition among countries of origin has driven down labour standards. In lieu of substantive change, Gulf governments have responded by diversifying their recruitment patterns. This has resulted in retaliationary recruitment bans or shifting demand away from Asian countries towards African source countries such as Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda that demand lower wages for their workers (Fernandez 2010). 13 Migrant Domestic Workers in the GCC: Negotiating Contested Politics… 243

Both Gulf and South Asian states stand to gain from implementing comprehensive reforms. However, the political will remains to be realized. Improving the conditions of migration and care work would certainly drive up wages and associated costs. A critical area of intervention is the need for regulation of employment conditions and circumstances under which informal, home-based work is carried out (Neetha 2009). Regular diplomatic visits, consular checks on employers, and monitoring of contractual agreements are a gateway to ensuring workers’ protection. Reworking emigration protocols of sending states and revoking the sponsorship system of receiving states represents an important arena for change. Accessible and secure complaint mechanisms, monitoring of transnational labour recruitment systems, and sustained international cooperation with sending countries can greatly enhance the migration experience of the migrant domestic workers within the region (Rajan and Joseph 2015). States must find a careful balance between overhauling the migration and recruitment process and preserving the practical elements of the current processes for migration. Enacting more broad-based civil society engagement policies in this context might contribute to a political agenda that addresses the marginalization of domestic work within migration and labour regimes. Striking the right balance between the promotion of socio-economic development interests and protection of rights and requirements of citizens and migrants remains among the most difficult priorities of governments in the region. Institutional capacities need to be strengthened to implement policies enhancing women’s access to employment and decent work. Increasing emphasis on knowledge mobilization and skill development could raise employability and facilitate decent work for migrant domestic workers. A telling observation from our study was that over 30 respondents had no formal skill training, 29 had no previous work experience, only 5 respondents had acquired a working knowledge of Arabic, and just 3 had attended pre-departure sessions. Greater cooperation among sending and receiving governments, and with civil society groups and activists advocating for domestic workers’ rights will allow those closest to the workers to drive policy change. Design and delivery of training material must incorporate local actors and return migrants to reach a broad swath of prospective emigrants. Perhaps most significantly, ‘[f]eminized, and therefore gendered, migration experience calls for gender-specific responses to widespread abusive practices and the largely unprotected status of female migrants’ (Piper and Yamanaka 2005). A closer analysis of prevailing gender norms, migration patterns, and the role of migrant domestic work in propping up capitalist social relations is required to address extant discrimination. Gender-discriminatory approaches to entry, exit and employment accentuate the vulnerabilities of migrant women domestic workers and channel them into irregularity. In considering the political economy of care work migration, it is important to acknowledge the complex entanglements of gender, race, class, and domestic work. Relational and contextual analysis of these gendered–racialized migration processes will allow stakeholders to better represent and respond to the multifaceted needs of migrant domestic workers in these contexts. 244 S. I. Rajan and J. Joseph

Acknowledgements This chapter builds on earlier published work by the authors. See Rajan and Joseph (2015). Migrant women at the discourse–policy nexus: Indian domestic workers in Saudi Arabia. In S. Irudaya Rajan (ed.) India Migration Report 2015. Routledge, India.

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Ginu Zacharia Oommen

Introduction

The religious topography of Kerala, southern state of India, is quite unique. Muslims and Christians together constitute nearly 40% of the total population, which is a rather different demographic pattern from the rest of India. Along with the social changes, by the beginning of twentieth century, the newly introduced colonial economy prompted Keralites to migrate to plantations in Sri Lanka, Singapore, and Malaysia (Malaya) as clerks and coolies. The discovery of oil in Gulf countries and the subsequent oil boom in 1970s generated a huge wave of migration from Kerala. Currently, the state of Kerala sends the largest volume of immigrants to the Gulf countries. The ‘Gulf migration’ provided a new lease of life for the otherwise poor employment situation in the state, and at present, nearly 2.28 million Keralites are working in different Gulf countries (Rajan and Zachariah 2012). As a result of migration, Kerala has witnessed a series of diverse economic and social changes including amongst others, a money order-depended economy. The circular nature of the Gulf migrants has significantly influenced the class structure, social hierarchy, worship patterns, family structure, and, above all, religion and religiosity in Kerala. Though several previous studies have examined the economic consequences of migration and remittances in Kerala, no attempt has been made so far to explore how migratory movements and remittances affected religion and religious practices in Kerala, thus leading to a subsequent social transformation. Consistent with many postcolonial, trans-feudal societies, religion in Kerala provided a clear avenue for the newly rich migrants from Gulf to establish their legitimacy and position in the social order as well as a medium of re-entry for the erstwhile upper classes. This on the one hand, contributed to larger investments

G. Z. Oommen (*) Kerala Public Service Commission, Trivandrum, Kerala, India

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 247 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_14 248 G. Z. Oommen in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across Kerala, largely funded by migrants and Gulf-based associations; and on the other, to the prevalence of new and ostentatious religious practices, doctrines and rituals. The broad question that this study attempts to investigate is as follows: Whether the reorientation of Syrian Christian immigrants’ lives in the host country (Gulf countries) and the newly created wealth there has brought about any major change in the lives and practices of Christians back home (in Kerala)? The broad question that this study investigates is whether migration-centred religious reorientation of Kerala Christians is abetting commodification of religion, assertion of communal identity, proliferation of radical religious groups, rise of ‘Prosperity Gospel’/Tele- Evangelists, and the emergence of new forms of worship in the Christian community. This is an empirical study based on the field research in Kuwait and Kerala. The field research was conducted at Abassiya, the Indian settlement in Kuwait from December 2009 through January 2010 and at the Pathanamthitta district of Kerala during June–August 2013. Pathanamthitta district is one of the prosperous ‘Gulf pockets’ in Kerala with a sizeable Syrian Christian population and also the first wave of migration to Malaya and Singapore was from the outskirts of Pathanamthitta in 1900. The main methods of documentation were through detailed interviews of immigrants and observances at various cultural performances and festivities. During the fieldwork, in-depth interviews of nearly 70 immigrants in Kuwait, along with professionals, Indian journalists, community leaders, priests, and academicians of the Kuwait University, were conducted with help of a detailed interview schedule. Moreover, nearly 100 respondents were interviewed at Pathanamthitta alongside academicians, theologians, bishops, clergies, journalists, local politicians, community leaders, and so on. A convenient sampling was followed in the study whereby the informants were selected through the links established within the community. The key persons of each parish helped to identify the possible respondents. In Kuwait, interviews were conducted in both Malayalam and English. – languages the respondents/subjects and author were comfortable with. It is significant to note that in Kuwait, much of the background information of the workers, professionals, and analysts came mostly from the older generation of immigrants who experienced both the invasion and liberation phase of Kuwait. In Pathanamthitta, the author interviewed nearly 100 people, particularly the return migrants who are very active in Parish affairs and had in-depth discussions with bishops, clergies, theologians, and pastors of the charismatic/new-generation churches. The author’s participation in the services of different parishes, especially the newly build churches helped in understanding the internal intricacies. His association with the vicars of various Christian denominations, Kerala Associations, and clubs further helped in conducting the research more thoroughly. Moreover, the author had the opportunity to attend various social gatherings like marriages, baptism, Christmas carols, feasts, processions, funerals, and other church celebrations, that provided an opportunity to interact and get responses from people outside of the subject list. This undoubtedly helped to understand the internal dynamics of the community. 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 249

This study deals with the three Syrian Christian denominations – Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Marthomite, and Syrian Jacobite as they were the pioneers of migration. Though the Syrian Catholics could be included in this study, but their social and historical formation is quite different from the rest of the non-Catholic Syrian denominations. The Latin Catholics and the Protestants were also largely untouched in the study. In brief, this study focuses mainly on the Eastern Syrian non-Catholic denominations in Kerala. For the purposes of this chapter, the names of the respondents have been changed to hide the real identity.

Migration and Changing Dynamics of Kerala Society

Subsequent to the oil-price boom in the Gulf countries in 1973–1974, the large- scale infrastructural and economic development projects were planned and initiated which included creation of amenities like schools, hospitals, houses, improvement of transport and communication, etc. These programmes created a spurt in demand for not only highly skilled technical experts but also for semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Therefore, the major outflow of Indian migrant workers and other personnel during the past four decades or so to the Gulf countries was about six million (Ramachandran, 2013). The maximum number of Indian workers is in Saudi Arabia. Other major employers of Indian workers are the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. The Gulf migrants are the transitory migrants as stringent residency and citizenship laws as well as the contractual nature of their work forbid them from settling permanently in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries. Due to the large-scale migration and remittances flow, a commoditized economy and conspicuous consumption practices have developed as integral features of Kerala’s society. Remittances are spent on daily household consumption, consumer durables, construction, repair of building, acquisition of lands, education and religious ceremonies (Zachariah and Rajan 2012). Migration and remittances are twin pillars which supported the sustenance of the much acclaimed ‘Kerala Model’. The Centre For Development Studies (CDS) survey shows that out of the total emigrants, in 2007, nearly 89% emigrated to GCC countries and around 5.7% moved to USA and Europe (Zachariah et al. 2006). The CDS survey further explores that around 18% of Kerala households send minimum one emigrant abroad and 26.5% had either an emigrant or return emigrant. In 2008, INR 16,493 crores was received by Hindu households, INR 7800 crores was received by Christian households, and INR 19,000 crores was received by Muslim households (Zachariah 2006). The district-wise data suggests that the Muslim- dominated Malappuram district sends the largest contingent of migrants, particularly to GCC region and also receives the highest amount of remittances. 250 G. Z. Oommen

There is a general argument that Kerala society has shifted its orientation to consumerism as a result of Gulf migration. Importantly, Kerala’s social and cultural landscape is highly influenced by migratory process and remittances. CDS data narrate that a substantial amount of remittances have been channelized by the families of emigrants to buy lands and also to build luxury/dream houses in Kerala. Since the 1980s, the remittances and migration have had a huge influence in the socio-cultural and political dynamics of Kerala. A consumerist culture with different shades of ‘new richness’ has a profound influence in the Kerala society particularly in the Gulf migrant-dominated areas or ‘Gulf pockets’. Since Gulf migration is both transitory and circulatory in nature, its impact is strongly reflected in all spheres of the society including the religious space. The most transparent impact of migration is in the realm of religion and a new religious market is emerging in Kerala through social remittances. Though a large amount of research had been conducted on the economic consequences on Kerala’s society, the socio-cultural changes associated with the migration process, particularly its impact on the religious spaces, has been largely untouched.

Conceptual Framework

Contemporary migration is marked by an acceleration of the pace of interaction between the host and home setting through multiple networks. Margolis argues that ‘immigrants establish and maintain familial, economic, political and cultural ties across international borders, in effect making the home and host society a single arena of social action’ (Ruiz Baia 1999). The current phase of international migration has set in motion a plethora of such transnational movements. They are transnational in the sense that they refer to movements which come into being within the social intricacies and specificities of certain communities, yet, are increasingly identified and appropriated outside (Roger and Fitzgerald 2000). Technological advancements have further strengthened the migrants’ links with the home countries on a day-to-day basis. The migrants make efforts to sustain their relations with the sending country through transnational religious practices as well (Levitt 2004). Religious communities simulate transnational movements which challenge the way in which we imagine religion and politics traditionally. The migrants often retain their religious beliefs and traditions through various kinds of social and economic links with the home country (Levitt 2003). Although social scientists have written extensively on the role of religion in the diaspora, very little research has been done on the impact of transnational religious groups in the sending countries. Transnational Migration and Fading States (1997) by Rudolph and Piscatori concludes that in today’s post-modern age religious communities have become vital agents in the creation of a transnational civil society (Rudolph and Piscatori 1997). Immigrants lean towards religious institutions to escape the hostility and discrimination of their settings and also to achieve social recognition. Hirschman argues that for immigrants who are separated from their homeland and from many relatives, 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 251 religious membership offers a refuge in the sense that it creates a sense of belonging and participation in the face of loss and the strains of adjustment (Hirschman 2004). Ebaugh noted that religious mobilization also helps immigrants to cope with marginalization by providing fellowships, social services, and leadership positions to compensate for the downward mobility many of them experience (Yang and Ebaugh 2002). Vertovec argues that the new rituals and religious practices reinforce the homeland ties of the immigrants (Vertovec 1997). At the same time, newly moneyed migrants rely heavily on the religious trajectory for the strategic conversion of their economic capital into prestige and status (Osella and Osella 2003). In the case of Syrian Christian immigrants, the transnational religious institutions are operating as one of the viable networks connecting sending and receiving countries. Moreover, the socially isolated situation in the GCC region has reshaped their religious and ritual practices and reinvigorated community/denominational centred identity. In the host setting, the transnational religious practices enhance the transformation and reshaping of identity, perception, and ritual practices of immigrants. Non- acceptance and alienation of the immigrants have strengthened their quest for spiritual and religious identity. The immigrants in Gulf region are socially isolated and alienated from the mainstream society. New places of worship have emerged as ‘community centres’ to fulfil the identity vacuum the alienated immigrants experience in these societies. The reorientation of immigrants’ lives in the host setting has a direct impact in the sending society as well. The religious restructuring and the ghettoization of immigrants have inadvertently affected the socio-cultural realm of the sending society (Kerala). The change in religiosity and religious practices were in turn influenced by the migrant experiences based on their religious beliefs in their host countries. These differential experiences made them reinvent their own religions in a transnational environment but exclusivist in spirit, in the home state of Kerala. Katy Gardner (1995) in her research highlights that the Muslim return migrants in Bangladesh engage into more orthodox, dogmatic forms of Islam, which challenges saints and shrines of the old order (Gardner 1995). In Kerala, the Gulf returnee frequently spends substantial amount of money in becoming patrons of religious activities – a culturally approved way of transforming wealth into political power and social status (Osella and Osella 2003). Ebaugh and Yang (2001) identified a number of immigrant congregations that kept in daily contact with their sending country through Internet (Ebaugh and Saltzman Chafetz 2002). Levit argues that the religious institutions such as protestant groups reinforce localized transnational attach- ments and also encourage civic and political engagement based on religious beliefs in the home country (Levitt 2001). The migrants often retain their religious beliefs and traditions through various kinds of social and economic links with the home country. Contemporary studies have mainly examined the economic consequences and impact of remittances in the sending countries, but left unnoticed the deep influence of ‘Social Remittances’. Social Remittances are ideas, practices, identities, and social capital that flow from the host country to the receiving country (Levitt 2004). 252 G. Z. Oommen

The socio-cultural-ideological reorientation in the lives of migrants in the host society is directly transmitted through identifiable pathways and their source and destination are very clear. Interestingly, one of the crucial variables which stimulates the ‘social remittances’ is the transnational religious networks. Hence, this study argues that the socio-cultural influences from host settings would be transmitted directly to the sending society through multifarious transnational networks including religion. The transnational religious networks play a significant role in the reorientation of the societal space in the sending society. The change in immigrants’ lives and the restructuring of their beliefs has a direct impact on the religious realm in the home society as well.

Syrian Christians of Kerala and Migration

The Christians, including the Syrian Christians of Kerala, constitute 18.6% of the population of Kerala accounting for six million people (Zachariah 2006). Of them, the Syrian Christians – one of the oldest Christian sects in the world – comprise nearly three million.1 Syrian Christians of Kerala are defined as persons born to Syrian Christian parents and who follow the ‘Syrian rite’ (Mathew and Thomas 2005). The Syrian Christians comprise different denominations, such as Syro- Malabar, Malankara Catholics, Jacobites, Orthodox Syrian Church, Marthomites, Caldhaites, Caananites, and Protestant Syrians. Earlier, the community was concentrated in and around five or six districts of Kerala. But, with the high rate of education, occupational diversification, few local job opportunities in the community, Syrian Christians have migrated to other states in India and abroad. This study focuses on the three Syrian Christian denominations – Syrian Orthodox, Syrian Jacobites, and Syrian Marthoma. The history of Syrian Christian migration dates back to early twentieth century when there was a massive flow of them to Southeast Asia, mainly to Singapore and Malaysia. In the beginning of twentieth century, the educated and able amongst the Syrian Christian and Ezhava community from Central Travancore migrated to Sri Lanka, Burma, and Southeast Asia as teachers and skilled labours in British-owned plantations.2 The migration to Southeast Asia was always unstable due to the hostile situation in East Asia region, a traditional area of emigration since colonial times. Later, in the 1960s, proximity of Syrian churches in Kerala with Ethiopian Orthodox Church has opened new avenues of migration to Ethiopia and African countries mostly as teachers, paramedics, and skilled labours for Syrian Christians. Subsequently, with the relaxation of immigration laws in the United States of America, paramedics and

1 Ibid. 2 Ezhavas are a prominent Hindu Community with origins in Kerala. Ezhavas make up more than 40% of Kerala Hindus. 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 253 professionals from the Syrian denominations also emigrated to North America and Canada. Finally, with the consolidation of oil in the Persian Gulf in 1970s Syrian Christian also joined the fellow Keralites to explore the new fortunes in West Asia. Kuwait was the first Arab Gulf country that had opened doors to the indigenous Christian community of Kerala. In the late 1940s, a small group of members of the Marthoma Syrian Church was the first to set up worship services in the region. The oil boom of the 1970s has accelerated further the immigration of Syrian Christians to GCC countries, which simultaneously led to the establishment of Syrian churches across the Gulf countries except Saudi Arabia. The migration has unequivocally altered the socio-economic landscape of the Syrian Christian community and in 2003 the non-Catholic Syrians received nearly INR 3000 crores as remittances from abroad (Zachariah 2006). In Kerala, the Christians rank second in the proportion of population that emigrated abroad and the Marthoma Syrian community has the distinction of sending the highest number of international emigrants (Zachariah 2006). In 2003 of the total remittances sent to Kerala, Roman Catholic households received 9.4%, Marthoma Syrians, 5.6%, Orthodox/Jacobite Syrians 7.0%, and Church of South India and Protestants received 2.0%. Interestingly, nearly 31% of the Syrian Marthoma households received the minimum INR 22,000 as remittances in 2004 (Zachariah 2006). Moreover Christians’ share in the migration to the United States is much higher than the other communities. In 2008, Christian households received nearly INR 7800 crores as remittances (Zachariah 2006). Interestingly, maximum remittances have been received from the GCC countries. Since the late 1960s, remittances from the Gulf States have been a major source of income for Syrian churches in Kerala. It is to be noted that all the Syrian churches have separate Gulf Diocese/Diocesan bishops and serving in a Diaspora diocese is considered a very prestigious assignment amongst the clergy. The Marthoma Syrian community ranks high when compared to all other communities in terms of literacy, education, migration rate, expenditure in health, ownership of land and house, remittances and so on. The path-breaking prosperity and socio-economic development of the Syrian Christians is highly attributed to the unprecedented flow of remittances from the international Diaspora particularly from Gulf region.

The Assertion of Religion Amongst Kerala Immigrants in the Host Setting

Currently, there are nearly 60 Malayalam churches in the GCC countries that include both Syrian Christian and Catholic denominations, besides various neo-Pentecostal and Charismatic groups. Until the 1990s, the Church trying to woo immigrants was nothing more than a routine and low key affair. However, in the last one decade or 254 G. Z. Oommen so the role of religion has dramatically increased amongst Indian immigrants, especially within the Syrian Christian community. During the author’s field research amongst the Kerala migrants to the Gulf, it was observed that religion is a salient factor in a migrant’s day-to-day life, as it fills the emotional vacuum created in the context of extreme social isolation that migrants experience in foreign countries. The Christian immigrants of Kerala in Kuwait have noted that in the last one decade or so the spirituality and the role of religion have increased exorbitantly amongst Kerala migrants. Till the 1990s, in Kuwait, religious activities in Kerala and amongst the migrants in the GCC was nothing more than a routine and low key affair. Charismatic religious groups such as the neo-Pentecostal and Evangelical Christian denominations, Muslim groups with strong Wahabi traditions such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, and Hindu groups like the RSS and various cults like Mata Amritanandamayi have made deep inroads in the lives of Kerala immigrants in the GCC states, particularly Kuwait. These religious groups are transnational in nature and they are actively linked to both home and destination countries. Moreover, the lack of social interaction with the local people and social alienation felt by the immigrants in GCC countries has only strengthened their quest for spiritual and religious identity. The major development amongst migrants particularly Christians in the beginning of 1990s was the rise of neo-Pentecostal and new religious groups. Digging deeper, one can see that there is a gamut of issues that led to the assertion of the religious organizations in the life of expatriate workers. Two major Gulf Wars and the subsequent War on Terror contributed to the emergence of a new politico- religious context that aggravated the situation further. The region’s political instability and economic slump, the hostile social environment and the community’s continued social alienation from the host society has invigorated the phenomenon. For instance, in Kuwait, Iraq’s invasion of the country in 1990 and the subsequent expulsion of immigrants from Kuwait inflicted a sense of insecurity and deep-seated fear in the minds of the migrants. The proliferation of prayer groups with charismatic priests, huge donations to missionary activities, popularization of donation to religious activities, increasing dependence on godman/sadhus/pastors/clergy, and emerging trends for pilgrimage to the holy shrines in India and abroad reflects the exuberant presence of religion in an immigrant’s life. The re-assertion of belief amongst the immigrants has some personal reasons also. The stress in the life of a construction worker to earn the requisite money in the limited contract period or the anxiety over the extension of the period of stay deep- ens this assertion. Interestingly, the major activities of the transnational religious groups are mainly in labour camps which were neglected by the mainstream host society for many years thereby garnering a vast majority of discipleship from the working class section. Geo-political churnings, socio-political isolation, and the exclusion of immigrants from the social structure of the host society has further consolidated the religious space. The accumulation of wealth remains another major concern for immigrants and struggle towards this process is met with anxiety, stress, competition and insecurity. Consequently, in Kuwait, ‘popular religion’ like neo-Pentecostals has attained an 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 255 upper hand over the ‘official religion’ since the popular religion emphatically stresses on the prosperity gospel. The volatile situation is being exploited successfully by the former with a large number of immigrants especially the youth moving towards the new religious movements. Diaspora religious practices play a major role in sustaining the transnational links between home and host settings and also it creates an alternative sense of belonging to the sending country. In the contemporary context, religion provides the opportunity for immigrants for community formation and produces intense conflict between the ‘mainstream’ and ‘popular/conservative’ religious groups and also helps to carve a unique ‘denominational/Born Again identity’. Moreover, the host settings have paved the way for the emergence of ‘popular religion’ and it creates unique ‘global identity’ which transcends the national boundaries.

Gulf Migratory Networks and the Upsurge of ‘Prosperity Gospel’ in Kerala

Over the time, lives of migrants and non-migrants have become trans-nationalized, incorporating ideas, practices, beliefs, and traditions from both societies. Religious beliefs and practices could also act as key components of social remittances. The broad question that needs to be addressed here is whether the reorientation of immigrants’ lives in the host country (Gulf countries) and the newly created wealth brings dramatic change in the religious sphere of Kerala. The dynamics in the host setting has a direct bearing on the lifestyle, consumer patterns, spiritual and worship modes, architecture, and the outlook of the Kerala society. The transitory and circulatory nature of the Gulf migration has strengthened the migrants’ connectivity with the home society and thereby made tremendous changes in the practices and nature of the home society as well as the religious institutions. One of the arenas which had a profound impact through migratory process was undoubtedly the religious space of the Syrian Christians. The change in religiosity and religious practices were in turn influenced by the migrant experiences based on their religious beliefs in their host countries. These differential experiences made them reinvent their own religions in a transnational environment but exclusivist in spirit, in the home state of Kerala. The transitional migration has highly altered the socio-cultural and the spiritual landscape of the Syrian Christians. As indicated above, the spiritual reorientation in the lives of Syrian Christian immigrants and the change in religiosity echoed in the home society, which has a direct impact on the traditional nature of the Church. Presently, ‘Popular Religions’ such as neo-Pentecostal churches made deep unprecedented inroads amongst the Syrian Christians. These evangelic groups have well-knitted networks in Kerala with large congregations to cater to the need of returning migrants. Proliferation of Evangelical prayer groups with charismatic pastors, huge donations to missionary activities, popularization of ‘tithe’, proliferation 256 G. Z. Oommen of diocese in both India and abroad, increase of seminaries and Bible colleges, reflects the brazen and lively presence of religion on communal life.3 In this context, traditional churches such as Syrian Christians find it difficult to compete with the charisma of these ‘new’ religious variants and thus they struggle fervently to stop the exodus of its members to the neo-Pentecostal churches. The Syrian denominations in Kerala have been following Orthodox traditions and Eastern Syriac liturgy due to their long-standing communion with the Middle Eastern Patriarchates. Most of the Syrian churches are highly organized, with a muscular hierarchy, ritualistic in nature, and have oriental-ecclesiastical traditions. Even interventions of European missionaries during the colonial period have not changed the oriental eastern traditions and other ritualistic behaviours. But the neo- Pentecostal new-generation churches have been quite successful in creating a dent into the Syrian community through the active support of the migrants. The Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal churches are very popular in the Diaspora setting with large followers from the Syrian denominations. Moreover, there are numerous transnational-Charismatic churches operating in GCC countries with a loosely knitted hierarchy. The neo-Pentecostal is also predominantly an American-based movement and its theology is centred on the ‘Prosperity Gospel’, and the churches are predominantly a Global Religion. It is a unique theology connecting both faith and wealth within the frame work of the Bible and the globalized market. The ‘prosperity gospel’, is a consumerist theology, whose popularity amongst American Christians has boomed in recent years and it teaches ‘God blessing is the material wealth’. The aim of prosperity gospel is to achieve material prosperity, which is seen as evidence of the love of God. Neo-Pentecostalism is in a way a neo-liberal commercial theology which provides a new kind of religious space, a blend of neo-liberal materialistic values and spirituality and promotes accumulation of wealth and material consumption. In other words, it upholds a new version of ‘commercial Christianity’ and sanctifies the ‘material prosperity’. The spiritual reorientation of emigrants in Gulf and their quest for new spirituality makes significant impact amongst the Syrian Christians in sending society as well. During my field research in Kerala, I had visited a popular neo-Pentecostal Church in the Pathanamthitta town on a Sunday morning. The large congregation comprised largely of middle-class and most of the participants belonged to the various Syrian denominations. During my interaction, I had understood that most members of the congregation were either migrant families or return migrants. Currently, the neo-Pentecostal groups are very popular amongst the Syrian Christian community in Kerala. The codified liturgy, colourful sacraments, altar, cassocks, and candles of Syrian churches are replaced with electric organs, theatri- cal prayer sessions, thundering orations, amplified guitar, trumpet, thrashing drums,

3 Tithe is an Old Testament concept. Portion of one’s annual income or one-tenth of the income to be contributed voluntarily to the Church. 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 257 and loud music. Spirited prayers, miracles, speaking in tongues, thundering oratory, and devil-beating preachers have become the order of worship. Looking closer, varied issues have been responsible for the sudden popularity of these Charismatic groups. The cradle of the neo-Pentecostalism is amongst the migrant workers in Gulf region as most of these churches are transnational in nature. For example, the major activities of ‘Heavenly Feast Church’ are in the GCC countries and they have more than 25 congregations in the West Asian region. The Diaspora connections, uninterrupted financial flow and the deep influence of social remittances have significantly reoriented the outlook and functioning of the religious institutions in Kerala. Katy Gardner’s work on the migrant communities in Bangladesh indicates that return migrants engage with the purist and orthodox version of Islam and rejects local practices particularly Sufi worship modes. Similarly, Levitt also explores the spiritual influence of Dominican Diaspora from USA in local Dominican churches and argues that migrants make tremendous changes in the homeland religious setting through ‘social remittances’ (Levitt 2003). Interestingly, Kurien (2014) writes that ‘religious institutions undergo tremendous transformations not merely as a result of remittances but also as a consequence of the very process of developing overseas branches of their diasporas’. The ideas and practices that had been generated through the reorientation of migrants’ lives in the host setting have been transmitted via social remittances, which inadvertently reshaped the traditional structure of the Kerala’s Syrian Christian denominations. One of the respondents pointed that ‘I was a staunch Jacobite before migrating to Sharjah. But the hardships in the alien desert have moved me closer to God. The Grace Fellowship pastors visited me regularly when I was in need and I got baptized in UAE. After returning to Kerala, I have planted the ‘Grace Fellowship Church’ (transnational neo-Pentecostal Church) along with my friends from UAE. For the last 7 years, I regularly organized a 2-day spiritual convention in the local community’. In Pathanamthitta, I have encountered return migrants with similar stories, and they have been the torchbearers of the neo-Pentecostal Churches in Kerala. I have personally observed that church has become the ‘epicenter’ for many respondents and the frequency of their participation in religious activities has increased tremendously. In Kuwait, Pastor Josey Joseph, said. In the beginning we had many challenges and the response in India was very cold. But we got an unexpected response from the Gulf migrants particularly in Kuwait. At present we have nearly 60 parishes across GCC region and the TV channel has been operational at the initiative of Gulf migrants. Now we got strengthened in Kerala with the help of migrants and their relatives. There are numerous neo-Pentecostal churches in the Gulf pockets in Kerala and most of them have been flourishing with the support of remittances. For instance, Bishop Barnabas of Syrian Marthoma Church commented that ‘neo-Pentecostals are a by-product of migration and conspicuous consumerism in Kerala. Neo- Pentecostal churches have been a new phenomenon and is has been flourishing at 258 G. Z. Oommen the cost of the uncertain lives of Gulf migrants’. He further noted that many members of the neo-Pentecostal groups do not severe their ties with the traditional Syrian church. Interestingly, many members keep dual membership in both Syrian as well as neo-Pentecostal Church and would prefer all the sacraments (marriage, baptism, funeral) to be conducted at a traditional church. The vast flow of remittances, modernity and consumerism had also brought immense uncertainties and instability in the lives of the families and the new-generation churches have been using this volatile context. Miracles, financial prosperity, and individual economic growth are some of the core teachings that have been suited well for anxious and uncertain public. Significantly, most of the new churches are quite transnational in nature with deep roots amongst the younger generation. The neo-Pentecostal new-generation churches are quite dogmatic and maintain high rigidity in their teaching. For instance, they explicitly forbid participation in the festivals and ceremonies of other religions including other Christian denominations. These churches never support ecumenism and maintain purist rules for the believers. Most of these churches are quite exclusivist and promote a unique ‘born again transnational identity’. In the mid-1980s, some of the neo-Pentecostal pastors along with American preachers have made some efforts to penetrate into the Syrian Church, but they could not succeed due to the stiff resistance from the traditional Church. The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent uncertainties in GCC had been a turning point in the unprecedented growth of the neo-Pentecostal Churches amongst the Syrian Christian denominations. The ghettoized, hostile environment, and spiritual reorientation of the Syrian Christians in Gulf have a direct impact in Kerala, and it has been responsible for the formation of a dogmatic identity and space in the sending society. The neo-Pentecostals groups separate themselves from the rest of the world and project an ‘exclusive’ spiritual identity from the rest of the denominations.

‘Holy Land’ Pilgrimage and the Assertion of ‘Biblical Israel’

The neo-Pentecostals have brought varying ‘American Evangelical’ theological concepts and traditions to Kerala via GCC region. Tithe, Tele-Evangelists, Gospel Channels, Prayer and Worship, Holy Land (Israel) pilgrimage, notion of ‘Biblical Israel’ are some of the concepts that had origins in American evangelical theology which are very popular in Kerala. Currently, pilgrimage to Israel/Palestine (holy land) is extremely popular and thousands of believers from Kerala are undertaking a pilgrimage to Israel every year to visit holy sites. Though pilgrimage to Holy Land never existed in Kerala due to the costs, the practice is now quite popular amongst the Gulf migrants. The pilgrimage to Israel/Palestine is another significant aspect which is widely prevalent amongst Syrian Christian immigrants. Each year almost all the churches in GCC 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 259 states organize a pilgrimage via Jordan to the Holy Land, especially during the summer vacations. Perhaps, due to the influence of Gulf immigrants, the pilgrimage to Israel/ Palestine has become very popular in Kerala too. The travel stories of Gulf migrants to Israel and Palestine have had a tremendous impact amongst the people in Kerala and at present numerous travel and tour agencies have been facilitating the visits to Israel very frequently. In addition, some of the Malayalam dailies have also taken an initiative for these visits. Fr. K.M. George, noted theologian and the former Principal of Syrian Orthodox Seminary observed that interest for ‘Holy Land trips’ is very high among the Kerala Christians and this indeed a new phenomenon. These trips had initially started among the migrant community in GCC countries in the late 1990s and finally Gulf migrants had introduced this to Kerala. Now the parishes across the denominations are competing each other to visit Israel. Some of the clergies are also running tour agencies to facilitate these visits.

Salvation Through Tithe

Another theological conception which has been popularized through Gulf migration is ‘tithe’. Tithe is an Old Testament conception of contributing one-tenth of one’s income to the poor and needy. This was not widely prevalent among the Syrian Church in Kerala. Tithe had been popularized by the neo-Pentecostals, particularly among the migrants, as a mark of thanksgiving for economic success. Earlier the annual subscriptions and ceremonial/festival contributions were the main income of the Church. However, the ‘Tithe’ became a practice widely among the Gulf migrants in response to the unprecedented fortunes and capital they had received in the host setting. The trustee of a local Syrian Church mentioned that the annual income of the church had increased 300 times in the last three decades. One of the Gulf migrants pointed that ‘regular contribution of “Tithe” would multiply the income and blessings’. Another respondent commented that ‘I went to Gulf from an economically weaker family. At present I am blessed with immense wealth and thus I have decided to give one tenth of my income to “missionary activities” in India’. Through Tithe, the people are expecting both salvation as well as the protection of their unexpected wealth. Eminent theologian Fr. K. M. George said ‘Tithe was never popular among the Syrian Christians. The Gulf migrants have popularized this concept in Kerala. Tithe is the backbone of the neo-Pentecostal Churches as they propa- gate that both salvation and prosperity could be achieved through the enormous contribution of Tithe’. The Pentecostals, along with Tele-evangelists, have reshaped and popularized the concept of religious contributions as an avenue for more richness and material prosperity. Neo-Pentecostals have made ‘Tithe’ to be the compulsory duty of a believer and this has turned out to be the major revenue for the preachers and tele- evangelists. The critics have alleged that the split of neo-Pentecostals into numerous 260 G. Z. Oommen splinter groups is largely centred on the financial disputes that emanate due to the unaccounted flow of ‘Tithe’. Like the American Gospel TV channels, the idea of ‘Tithe’ is being highlighted by the Malayalam tele-evangelists as the main path for material blessings.

Liberation Theology and Commercial Christianity

The socialist-communist legacy of Kerala had a significant impact on the Christian community. Though the church hierarchy, particularly Catholics, were at logger- heads with the Communist parties many Bishops and clergies openly supported the Marxian ideas and the liberation theology had immense influence among the church leadership. Liberation Theology is an attempt to interpret scripture through the plight of the poor. This Christian school of theology was developed in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s and it focuses on the liberation of the oppressed and poor (Lukas 2012). The main emphasis was on the redistribution of wealth, allowing poor peasants to share in the wealth fight for social justice. A section of the youth and student movements of the Syrian denominations embraced the revolutionary theology and this was quite popular in the parishes in 1970s and 1980s, particularly in the Marthoma Church. The decline of the left discourse in the church along with the influence of large-scale migration has severely hampered the prospects of progressive theological moorings and has given rise to the tide of ‘commercial Christianity’ in Kerala. The rise of aspirant-rich migrants coupled with an ambitious and uncertain social situation has further weakened the liberal ethos and have fortified the ‘commercial Christianity’ in Kerala. The large-scale migration to Gulf has jeopardized the prospects of ‘liberal’ ideas and this vacuum have been filled by the radical religious groups. The eminent liberation theologian Fr. Sam Koshy commented that ‘earlier the humane and social action of the Church was quite popular among the younger generation. But with the large flow of remittances, consumerist and careerist thinking gained more momentum, which invariably strengthened the prospects of “commercial Christianity” and “Prosperity Gospel”’.

Remittances, Renovations, and Religious Investments

At present the Syrian Christians have been using religion as a strategic platform to transform the economic capital earned from migration to achieve social prestige, status, and legitimacy in the home society and to maintain links with Kerala and also as an easier entry to the home community. The migration and remittances have made significant changes in the Syrian Christian churches. A vast majority of migrants to the Gulf were mostly middle-class or from the poor strata of society. 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 261

The flow of remittances from abroad has transformed the class structure of the Kerala society by promoting upward mobility for families that have sent migrants to the Gulf. Migrant-sending families have increasingly used income earned in the Gulf to promote religion in the public sphere in Kerala, in the process, enhancing their visibility and power in social hierarchy. This contributed to larger investment in churches/mosques/temples and religious establishments across Kerala. Since the beginning of 1990s, there has been a proliferation of temples, churches, mosques, and other religious institutions, particularly in Gulf pockets. Successful migrants have invested remittances and savings in culturally significant arenas – marriages, education, temples, churches, etc. The absence of migrant in the home society is filled through his spending pattern contributions in religious institutions and charity. Migrants’ contribution to the religious institutions is manifested as his presence even if he/she residing in the Gulf. The Syrian Christians tried to display their social mobility through the renovation or construction of churches, parish halls, parsonages, cars for Vicars, arch gates, flag staffs, and memorial halls. The local Bishops pointed that nearly 90% of all the old churches have been either renovated or reconstructed or new churches have been built by demolishing the old ones. The Vicar General of Syrian Orthodox church highlighted that the uninterrupted flow of contributions has prompted the church towards the mega construction spree. Bishop Mar Barnabas of Syrian Marthoma Church pointed that ‘migrants contribute voluminous amount of money for the construction projects and local vicars now spend more time at construction sites rather than pastoral care’. During the church visits an announcement made by the secretary of a parish was quite amusing, as he said ‘Saturday is the deadline for the installation of “family plaque” at the Parish Hall. Those who are interested to erect the family plaque should kindly pay INR 3 lakhs to the trustee’. On inquiry, it was found that nearly 70 parish members had already paid the required amount and all of them were either migrants or return migrants. On vacation, when migrants visit Kerala it is common practice to donate the cushions, candle stands, pulpit covers, altar candles, carpets, altar curtains to the church. The absence of migrant from the society is filled through these monumental donations. The local religious institutions also play a central role in providing systematic support for the reintegration of emigrants into the community when they return home on vacation or permanently after completing the contracts. In Kerala, the construction extravaganza is responsible for the growth of local ‘parish com- plexes’. The church complex comprises church, flag staff, arch gates, marble lambs, parish hall, parsonage, and sometimes buildings for rentals. The church documents reveal that the entire complex has been sponsored by the migrants’ families to take over the patronage of the church. This process of obtaining social mobility by acquiring religious capital often disrupts the existing power structure within the community. The society witnessed the emergence of a new class, generally known as ‘new rich’. It is noted that significant growth of the ‘new rich’ had upset the rural power structure. The position and status enjoyed traditionally by a few landed and aristocratic families are now challenged. 262 G. Z. Oommen

The demolition of the old churches often creates conflicts and legal disputes in the community, which is often termed as the conflict between the old landed families and the ‘new rich’. The emerging rich class consider the church as the symbol of the feudatory structure and reconstruction and demolition of the old ones is often termed as the attack on the old class structure of the community. Migration has nevertheless allowed families to use capital to invest in status and class enchanting activities, engendering changes in local power structure. For instance, in one of the parishes, the construction of a new church had been stalled for nearly 5 years due to a prolonged legal battle two groups of certainly between old traditionally rich and the ‘new rich’ migrant families. An elderly member of the traditional faction commented sarcastically that the old church was built by our forefathers and only few families had the resources to regulate the affairs of the church. Now most of the parishioners have money due to migration and these ‘new rich’ want to demolish the old edifice and to build a new one. The old church is quite strong and there is no need for a new church, but this is an indirect attempt to grab the patronage of the church and also to be elevated into the hierarchy. The enormous contributions to church and the erection of concrete religious building by newly rich migrants is a covert attempt to capture the hierarchy of church which had been denied to them due to the feudal structure of the community. Hence, the new construction boom in the Christian community could be termed as the demolition of the past class hierarchy and the formation of a new social configuration. Generally, the new rich migrant families receive the support of local Diocesan bishops since the church hierarchy is highly dependent on remittances from Diaspora. In Pathanamthitta, the clergies highlighted fierce conflicts in the church with the entry of new rich migrant families into the system. Bishop Mar Kurilos commented that migrants are not interested to support the activities of education or healthcare, because the construction of schools and hospitals will not help to attain fame and also it doesn’t enable him to enter into the social hierarchy. Thus, most of them would like to invest or contribute in local parish to enhance their social status. In fact, in Kerala, since the beginning of twentieth century, the Syrian denominations were in the forefront to establish schools, colleges, and hospitals, and church played a crucial role in the field of education and health. However, at present, the resources of the church are diverted more towards the construction boom than the other social deeds. Hence, the current trends of the Syrian church indicate that the space of religion/local parish is used by the migrants to attain the social legitimacy and to bounce back to the community. The active involvement and participation in the church is to disseminate ones’ newly attained economic mobility. The worship centres are also places for recognition and the display of individual success. The patronages of church or parish designations like secretary or trustee are seen as symbols of social mobility and recognition. The annual elections for church office bearers have turned to be the spaces of stiff competition to display individual success and socio-economic mobility. One of the vicars pointed that 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 263 competition for leadership in church often ends up in conflicts and personal rival- ries. Elections for the church hierarchy are a month-long affair with house-to-house campaigns by the candidates, which was not a very common practice in Kerala. The migrants also fiercely negotiate with the hierarchy to enhance their role in the affairs of the church. For instance, presently with the influx of surplus money there is greater demand for the elevation of parishes’ to be equivalent to Cathedral. Earlier, the Cathedral title was given to a parish with more members/income and also it could be attached to the Bishop house. The reason behind the new demand is that the Cathedral can send more lay representatives in the church council and also laity could play a crucial role in the election of Bishops. In the Syrian Orthodox denominations, certain newly built parishes have been given special status and more lay representatives in the church councils since the parishes agreed to make a significant increase in the annual subscription to diocese. Thus, the parish committees and councils have thus been seen as social mobility and turned to be the spaces to exhibit individual prosperity.

Commoditization and Revitalization of Rituals and Ceremonies

Religious ritual is another significant area to a migrant’s strategic conversion of economic capital into prestige and status. Migration in particular to the Gulf has accelerated the ongoing process of commoditization of ritual practices. The elaborate revitalisation of local festivals and feasts should be understood within the context of emigration. The sustained interest of the emigrant on local festival is related to the display component of religious rituals. Pastors, astrologers, tantris, godmen, and ritual specialists in general have all been able to exploit this growing religious market. Therefore, the new upsurge in religious activity has inadvertently commer- cialized the rituals and ceremonies. The migration-related wealth has led to an ever- increasing commoditization of ritual practices allowing for new performers and sponsors of local church procession or feast. The high spending of money on religious ceremonies and social occasions like baptism and marriage are increasing amongst the Christian immigrants. Large parts of remittances are used to organize performances of ritual activities, which work towards maintenance and augmenta- tion of migrant households’ honour. Pilgrimages to various religious places in Kerala are increasingly popular amongst immigrants in the GCC countries. These pilgrimages and participation of immigrants at the feast in native churches could be termed as expressing their attachment to the home society. The participation in the local church Perunal (local church feast) or feast shrines reinforces their roots, an opportunity to express their attachment to the sending society and also to create an alternative category of belonging by the immigrant community (Levitt 2003). 264 G. Z. Oommen

Local festival is an important factor in a migrant’s life; it is an announcement of his arrival for vacations. The focal point of Perunal is Rasa or procession. During the feast, a new practice which is widely prevalent is to donate a silver- or gold- plated cross to church and also carry it proudly during the procession. Carrying the silver cross in Rasa becomes a perfect vehicle for return migrants to showcase and project to the community his transformed status and mobility. Caroline Brettell argues that, ‘the catholic church and its various activities provide a context where Portuguese emigrants can convert economic success abroad into social prestige when they return to their native village’ (Brettell 2003). The processions are also arenas for competitive and conspicuous consumption and also provide opportunities for the display of hierarchy (Raj 2008). In Kerala, the church procession provides fewer opportunities to display some of the material pos- sessions of the migrant families. Social prestige cannot be achieved in host environment and it is only in his home village that degree of social mobility is valued and social prestige is accorded. In this context, villagers are the jury that measures the success of the emigrants. Thus, carrying the silver cross provides for the affluent migrants a public space to demonstrate the newly acquired social status and economic prosperity. Through these displays the individual status has been transcended as well as reinforced. Interestingly, one of the ceremonies which has been highly commoditized and turned to be the space of display is the funeral. In the Syrian Christian community the simple, sober, and most painful religious affairs are being made occasions to flaunt wealth and social status. The funeral processions are taken out with pomp and show with expensive and decorative coffins, hiring of choirs to sing the devotional songs and which move along with the procession with a large convoy of cars, and distribution of ‘heavy’ food packets after the ritual. The tradition of serving just black coffee is also giving way and is being replaced with gala lunch. According to the bishops the average Christian spends enormous money on funeral as a result of which a new funeral industry has emerged which is positioned around flower merchants, coffin sellers, caterers, newspapers, and videographers. There is a rush for frontpage obituary space in leading local newspapers. Even the poor and non-migrant have begun to imitate the rich in buying costly coffins popu- larly known as ‘Swarga Petti’ (heavenly coffins), which are fancy expensive coffins imported from China and this has turned to be the marker of prestige and status. Rev. George Tharakan, a local priest, explained that ‘in the past a large number of friends and relatives would gather to sing hymns, read the Bible at a bereaved house, now that being replaced with professional and expensive choirs and singing groups. Moreover, the practice of funeral service being videotaped is another unique feature of the Kerala Christian Community. This practice started in connection with migration. Earlier the ceremony was photographed for the children staying abroad who missed the funeral. However, over the period of time it has become an avenue to publicize the honour and prestige of the family. With the advent of social media within hours after the funeral this is uploaded on the web for the public. Dr. Mohan Varghese, who teaches in a local college, comments that ‘nowadays in the funeral, the participants have to perform, and participation of local MLA, Municipal 14 Gulf Migration, Remittances and Religion: Interplay of Faith and Prosperity… 265

Chairperson, politicians and bishops are considered to be the symbol of status and prestige. Now the funeral became more elaborate to add colour to the video graphing’.

Conclusion

The arrival of new religious practices and remittances from the GCC countries is changing the Syrian Christian landscape in Kerala with a long-history of Christian presence. Religious and spiritual reorientation amongst Syrian Christian communities in the host countries is abetting the assertion of communal identity, proliferation of radical religious groups, rise of godmen and cults, and the emergence of new forms of worship in the Kerala society. The Gulf migrants and their families are invariably using the trajectory of religion to achieve social mobility and prestige in the sending society. The spiritual restructuring in the lives of migrants in the host setting has strengthened the quest for spirituality and thus the doctrine of ‘prosperity gospel’ is making deep inroads in the Syrian Christian community. The traditional, oriental, masculine, and hierarchical nature of the Syrian churches has been replaced with loosely knitted ‘neo-Pentecostalism’ and ‘commercial Christianity’. The transnational nature of neo-Pentecostal churches has a direct impact on the religious space of Kerala society and the diaspora networks are playing a crucial role in restructuring the homeland churches. The impact of social remittances is quite visible in the religious spheres and the Gulf connections are directly responsible for an ‘Americanized’ version of Christianity in Kerala. Gulf migration perhaps has eroded the traditional nature of Syrian Christians, giving rise to a more exclusionary, dogmatic, and a consumerist version of spirituality. Rituals and ceremonies have become the avenue to display the mobility and also to strengthen the honour of the family. In Kerala, religion is being used as a strategic platform to transform the economic capital earned from migration to achieve social prestige, status, and legitimacy in the home society, and to maintain links with Kerala and facilitate easier entry of the migrants to the home community. In other words, the religious spaces are being utilized by the migrants to display the newly acquired socio-economic mobility and also to demolish the feudatory class structure. The large flow of remittances and the urge to display the newly acquired socio- economic mobility could be termed as the reasons for the commoditization of rituals and ceremonies in Kerala. The local religious spaces have turned to be the jury to evaluate the economic mobility of Gulf migrants and this often disrupts the existing class hierarchies. The aspirant ‘new rich’ migrants is inadvertently relying on ‘spirituality’ and ‘religion’ to erase the ‘past’ and to elevate into the status of erstwhile upper classes. 266 G. Z. Oommen

References

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Prakash C. Jain

Abstract This chapter presents a historical and contemporary sociological profile of Indian trade diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula countries, namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Although in modern times, the presence of Indian traders in the Persian Gulf region can be traced back to at least the sixteenth century in Oman, and the early nineteenth century in Bahrain, Yemen and the present-day UAE, it got consolidated during the inter-war period throughout the region. Indian traders’ status as ‘British subjects’ particularly helped them in this regard. Further fillip to Indian commercial and entrepreneurial activities was provided by the emergence of Gulf countries as oil-exporting economies since the mid-1970s. Liberalization of economies and opening of free-trade zones in many countries further helped the Indian entrepreneurs in launching a wide variety of commercial and trading activities in the region.

Conceptual Framework

One important feature of Indian emigration since the late nineteenth century has been the migration of traders and entrepreneurs to various parts of the world. At times, they emigrated on their own as in the case of eastern and southern African countries, but mostly they followed or accompanied the emigrating Indian labourers and others. The Gulf countries were no exception. A schematic presentation given below highlights this phenomenon (Table 15.1). The above table suggests that in the Persian Gulf countries and elsewhere trading and entrepreneurship among the overseas Indians is as much a caste and/or community-bound phenomenon as in India itself. It is likely that the hereditary occupational specialization which is one of the central features of the traditional Indian caste system greatly helps in acquiring and using the entrepreneurial skills.

P. C. Jain (*) Centre for West Asian Studies, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India

Table 15.1 Trading and entrepreneurial ethnic groups among overseas Indian communities Main ‘ethnic’ groups engaged in Emigration type Major host countries entrepreneurial activities 1. Indenture labour (i) Exclusively Mauritius, Guyana, Trinidad, Mixed and locally evolved from indentured labour Surinam within the labouring classes (ii) Indentured labour South Africa, Fiji Gujaratis – both Hindus and plus free emigrants Muslims 2. Kangani/maistry Burma, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Coromandel Coast Muslims, labour plus free Lanka Chettiars, Sikhs emigrants 3. ‘Passage’/free Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, South Ismailis, Bohras, Gujarati emigration Africa Hindus, Sikhs, Sindhis and Jains 4. Brain drain type U.K., U.S.A., Canada, Australia, Gujaratis, Panjabis/Sikhs, emigration New Zealand Keralites 5.Persian Gulf Iran, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Sindhis, Bohras, Khojas, emigration Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, Gujarati Hindus, Malabaris Qatar and UAE Source: Adapted from Jain (2010: xi)

As such, the community and family must be playing important roles in these matters. Modern diasporas constitute trans-state triadic networks involving diasporas, their host countries and homelands, and as such they have significant ramifications for international relations as well as their community affairs. Most diasporas play their role in international relations through various forms of networking which facilitate and promote international trade and commerce, economic investment and remittances, transfer of skills and technology, homeland visits and pilgrimage and political lobbying. Within a diaspora, traders, entrepreneurs and other middle-class segments often emerge as the epicentre of numerous kinds of activities. They turn out to be the instigators of various socio-cultural, economic and political associations and organizations, so that their community could move towards institutional completeness. It is also these groups that take lead in establishing multiple linkages between diaspora and homeland which in turn continue to provide them with their ethnic/national identity, and a sense of belonging. At the same time, the need to enhance their self- image as diasporic entities also continually motivate them to engage themselves in various activities for the socio-economic betterment of their homeland. Seen in this perspective, the situation and role of Gulf-based Indians is illuminating and instructive. 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 269

Historical Background

Archaeological and literary evidence suggest that India and West Asia had trade relations since the Indus Valley Civilization days. A considerable number of Indians appear to have migrated to the Persian Gulf region in the pre-Islamic era ‘either to establish businesses, seek employment with Arab traders, or just to escape instability at home. Thus at the time of the advent of Islam, there were many Indian settlers in Arabia who were involved in various activities’ (Ahmad 1971). Apparently, all these groups completely assimilated into the respective societies of their migration. Medieval Arab sources provide the earliest evidence of the presence of colonies of Indian merchants in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas. ‘They reveal that Hindu merchants were present in the port of Shiraj on the Persian shore of the Gulf at least in the ninth century and that they also frequented the coasts of Oman, Socotra and Aden’ (Gopal 1998; Markovits 2000: 10). Sindhi and Gujarati merchants, both Hindu and Muslim, played dominant role in maritime trade and finance across the Indian Ocean (Marcovits 2000). During the later medieval period, there was a considerable amount of exchange of Arab and Indian scholars and religious leaders (Ahmad 1971: 38). Vasco da Gama found the presence of Indians on the shores of East Africa in 1498 and subsequently in the ports of the Red Sea and in the interior of the Arabian Peninsula (Gopal 1992). During this time, a Hindu temple existed in Iran. Port towns of Mocha and Aden and inland cities of Taif and Sanna were also inhabited by the Indians (Gopal 1998). The ruins of a Hindu temple were found at Kalhat, the principal Omani port of the fifteenth century which further suggests a settlement of Indians in Oman (Miles 1966: 526). In Iran besides Omuz, Indians in small numbers had settled down in Yezd, Shiraj, Isfahan, Tehran, Resht, Gilan, Khorasan and Mashad. Following the establishment of a new port of Gombroon or Bandar Abbas in the late seventeenth century, Ormuz declined to insignificance and Indians shifted to the new city. In 1760 when Bandar Abbas was abandoned by the Persians, the Indians shifted to Abu Shehr, Bushahr, and to the Iraqi port of Basra. Towards the end of the eighteenth century, Gujarati Baniyas were replaced by a new group of emigrants known as Shikarpuris who hailed from Sindh (Gopal 1997). In contrast to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which India’s impact on the Persian Gulf region was sporadic confined mostly to trade, it was quite comprehensive in the later nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century. Indo- Gulf relations during this period were ‘varied and multi-faceted’. For about a century or so, India was not only a major partner in the Indo-Gulf trade and commerce, its impact on the Gulf countries in terms of initial modernization and cultural renaissance, reform movement and many other aspects of socio-cultural life such as cuisines, musical instruments, interior designing and architecture was also 270 P. C. Jain

substantial (Elmadani 2003). It was also during this period that a number of Indian merchant communities were more firmly established throughout the Gulf/Red Sea region. It hardly needs to be emphasized here that the Gulf region was virtually an extension of British India and that the Indians in the Gulf enjoyed privileges as British subject. The British administration in the Gulf helped settle a number of Indian communities across the region. Among these the nineteenth-century Muscat hosted three distinct Indian communities: Thattai Sindhi Bhatias, Kuttchi Bhatias and Khojahs or Luwatiya. Some of the prominent entrepreneurs from these communities still continue to flourish even today (Allen1981 , pp. 39–51). Besides Oman, Indian merchant communities also existed in Iran, Aden and the Trucial States (United Arab Emirates) (Al-Sayegh 1998). Besides trading a wide variety of goods, Indians were also involved in pearl- fishing industry in some of the Gulf countries, namely Bahrain, Oman and United Arab Emirates. Pearl fishing was the mainstay of the Gulf economies in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the decline of pearling industry in the 1920s and 1930s, Indian merchants began to concentrate their attention on general trade, importing goods not only from India but also from Europe, America and Japan. These trends were further to strengthen after the Second World War and beyond.

Oman

By the late eighteenth century, Muscat had emerged as a major port with lucrative trade and commerce. Omanis had also secured the East African trade from the Portuguese. Muscat was regarded a secure port. It offered very competitive infrastructural facilities and tax and customs rates. In Muscat, the Indian merchants, mainly Hindus who lived there part of each year, were ‘well represented and influential’. ‘The Hindus were allowed their own religious practices. There were already in existence four Hindu temples in Muscat by the mid-1760s’ (Kechichian 1995: 215). Apparently, the Hindu merchants in Oman had security to life and property. The tolerant and cosmopolitan outlook of the Omani rulers who followed the Ibadi sect of Islam provides one probable explanation for this. In the late eighteenth century, one of the prominent Indian traders operating at Muscat was Tipu Sultan of Mysore. He conducted his trade activities through a permanent representative stationed at Muscat. About this time, the customs farmer at Muscat was a wealthy Indian from Kutch named Mowjee Seth whom British Resident Seton described as ‘the richest subject in the place’ (Gopal 2001: 395). A prominent broker Vishnu Das not only served for the Sultan but also for Hajji Khalil, a wealthy merchant and broker of Bandar Abbas. Sultan’s first wakil at Bombay was Ibrahim b. Ali (Ibrahim Mulla Ali), who purchased commercial goods, marine stores and ammunition from the company. Besides these, there were a number of other influential Indian merchants at Muscat. 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 271

In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, there were three distinct Indian merchant communities in Muscat. The first were the Thatta Bhatias – so-called after the city of Thatta located on the Indus River in Sind – who had been living in Muscat under Portuguese dominance since at least the sixteenth century and continued to prosper through most of the eighteenth century (Allen 1981). But strong competition both in India and in Muscat and the decline of Thatta as a commercial centre drove the Sindi Bhatias from Muscat to Bahrain and other Gulf ports. The Sindi Bhatias were replaced by Kutchi Bhatias since the early nineteenth century. The community grew in size and influence, and continued to thrive until the brief establishment of the conservative Ibadi regime during 1868–71. Meanwhile in the post- Ibadi period a new group of Kutchi Bhatias with international business connections and dealing in a wide variety of merchandise had emerged on the scene. These included such illustrious business families as Virji Pursottam Toprani, Prem ji Jamnadas Bhimani, Ratansi Pursottam, Dowlatgirji, Marupgirji, Virji Ratansi and Damodar Dharamsi. The last four families were considered the ‘four pillars’ of the Hindu society in the nineteenth-century Muscat. ‘Upon this base a number of other Banians established prosperous businesses that have continued to flourish in Muscat.' These include Khimji Ramdas, Dayal Purshottam, Danji Murarji, Vallabdas Umarsi and Gopalji Walj (Allen 1981: 48). A third group of Indians during the period under review were the Khojas (Khwajars) – also called Luwatiyas – originating in Hyderabad, Sind (Allen 1981: 50). They were settled in Matrah (Sur Luwatiya) living in segregation from the Arabs as well as the Hindus. Luwatiyas had monopolized the trade of dried fish, besides trading other usual items. Mohammand Fadl born in Bombay in 1858 was one of the well-known Luwatiya merchant in the late nineteenth-century Muscat. In recent times, Ali Sultan’s name figure as a prominent member of the Luwatiya community. The community was more or less permanently settled in Oman. Since 1970, the Luwatiyas have made active efforts to become assimilated into Omani Society. Since 1875, the Indians enjoyed British protection in Oman. This protection however was like a ‘double-edged sword’. The Indian community’s association with the British ‘insulated the Indians from Omani interference, but it also increased guilt-by-association sentiments that developed among Omanis’ (Kechichian 1995: 218). Many Indian merchants were viewed with suspicion and ‘as agents of British designs for Oman’ (Allen 1987). Notwithstanding these misgivings, however, the number of Indian merchants continued to increase and by the turn of the twentieth century, there were over 2050 of them. Beside trade, Banyans were also involved in customs farming and pearl-fishing. The first half of the twentieth century is characterized by minimal contacts between India and Oman and a self-imposed isolation on the part of Oman amid mega events of two World Wars, the economic depression of 1930s and the abdica- tion of throne by Sultan Taymur bin Faysal in 1932. In spite of all these, the predominant role the Indian merchants in Omani economy was recognized by all concerned. The relations were further strengthened between India and Oman following the signing of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation in March 1953. 272 P. C. Jain

Since the early 1970s, old-timer Indian merchants were joined by new breed of Indian entrepreneurs who cannot own independent business but are allowed to enter into partnership with the Omanis. Thus, presently two kinds of Indian merchants are there in Oman: (1) those who belong to the Peoples of Indian Origin (PIOs) category, and (2) those who are Non-Resident Indians (NRIs). The prominent business houses which are owned by Omanis of Indian Origin (PIOs) are as follows: (1) Khimji Ramdas, (2) Dharamsey Nency, (3) Ajay Group of companies, (4) Ajit Khimji Group of companies, (5) Shah Nagardas Manji & Co., (6) Purshottam Kanji Trading Co. LLC and (7) Laxmidas Tharia Ved & Co. Large-scale Indian immigration into Oman, as in other Gulf countries, is relatively a recent phenomenon. The oil price boom in 1973 and subsequently the infrastructural development activities in the region created a high demand for a variety of manpower. There has been a steady and phenomenal increase in the Indian population in Oman from 1145 in 1948–4500 in 1970, 66,000 in 1981 and 150,000 in 1992 and about 700,000 in 2014. Majority of Indians live in Muscat and other major towns like Salalah, Sohar and Nizwa although they are found in relatively small numbers in the interiors of the country also. In terms of skill composition, Indian work force comprises 25% unskilled workers; 30% semi-skilled workers; 35% skilled workers and 10% professionals such as doctors, engineers, bankers, finance experts, managers, etc. The Indian community is currently represented by the Indian Social Club (ISC) in Muscat, with a branch in Salalah. The Social Club has nine regional language wings representing different communities, viz., Hindi, Marathi, Bengali, Tamil, Malayalam, Gujarati, Punjabi, Kannada and Telugu. The Kerala Association and Indian Ladies Group also function under ISC. Omanis of Indian origin who hail from Kutch (Gujarat) have a separate outfit called Hindu Mahajan Association which was founded in 1941. The Association also manages the one of the two Hindu temples in Muscat, and oversees the socio-religious matters of the Omani Hindu fraternity. There are 25 Indian schools in Oman. Muscat has two Hindu temples where congregations are regularly held with daily Puja being performed. One of the two temples a Shiva Temple is estimated to be over 100 years old, and is located in the old quarters of Muscat. The other one devoted to Lord Krishna is in Ruwi. Two temporary gurudwaras have also been set up in labour camps. There are also seven churches to meet the need of various Christian Sects. The Basic Law of the State promulgated in December 1996 guaran- tees freedom of worship. Indians have lived in Oman for three centuries. Indians’ contributions to the development of the country as a whole and particularly in developing its commerce, healthcare network, housing and communications, are huge and widely acknowledged. 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 273

Yemen

When the Portuguese entered the Indian Ocean trade in the sixteenth century, the Indian merchants, particularly the Gujaratis were found in all the major ports between Aden and Malacca (Marcovits 2000: 11). In the seventeenth century, Indo- Yemen trade involved locally produced Yemeni coffee and Gujarati textiles, spices and other necessities (Gavin 1975: 17). Surat was the main trading partner of Yemen during this period. In the eighteenth century, Gujarati merchants were settled in all the Yemeni towns. These merchants were both sojourning as well as the settled ones. Aden was occupied in 1839 by a combined forces of European and Indian troops. Aden and its Eastern and Western protectorates in the Yemeni hinterland were tied to the British Administration in Bombay until 1937 when Aden became a Crown colony. Aden was of great strategic importance to the British interests in the Gulf region. The major components of the Indian population around this time were ‘the old Indian trading community engaged in commerce of the Red Sea, the garrison and the new Indian community which served it’. (Gavin 1975: 61). The new Indian community comprised the merchants especially the Bombay Parsis and the subordi- nate administrative staff of the settlement and the police force (Gavin 1975: 60–61). According to Gavin, the Parsi community at Aden was from the outset closely connected with the garrison. Some of these Parsi merchants who supplied livestock, fowls, eggs, vegetables, milk, beer, liquor, firewood and other provisions to the steamers and other vessels and the garrison had become quite prosperous and influential in due course of time. The major items of trade around this time were coffee, raw cotton, piece goods, grain and ivory. In the early 1870s, Indians formed the majority of blacksmiths, carpenters, mechanics and sweepers. They were also shopkeepers, bricklayers, bumboat men and merchants. Some were jewellers. ‘The Banyans, who were the wealthiest among the Hindus, had in their hands the wholesale trade of Aden as well as the banking and exchange business. At the other end of the scale, most of the menial servants were Hindus. In contrast with the Banyans, the Parsis were mainly retail merchants’. (Kour 1981: 52). In 1947, Aden’s formal link with India ended, but rupee continued to be the currency until 1951 (Bidwell 1983: 76). In the mid-1960s, the Indian population rose to about 20,000. In 1955, a wealthy Indian V.K. Joshi was elected to the Legislative Council. He was re-elected in 1959, and was a Minister in the Adeni Government in the early 1960s (Sheth 1998: 109). The rise of Arab nationalism in the late 1940s and 1950s, problems of political succession, widening schism between the traditionalists and modernists in the Yemeni society, the unsuccessful coups d’état of 1948 and 1955, dismemberment of the short-lived confederation with the UAR (1958–61) and the 1962 Yemeni 274 P. C. Jain

revolution and the British withdrawal from Aden in 1967 – all these events had their unsettling impact on the Indian immigrant and other population groups in both the Yemens which forced them to go elsewhere. The independence of Aden from the British on 30 November 1967 and subsequently a Marxist revolution led to the establishment of Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). The socialist policies of the PDRY Government led to the takeover of Indian businesses and properties. These developments ‘resulted in the hasty departure from Aden of many PIOs, either for India or some other country. But a large number belonging to Bohra, Khoja and Kachchi communities decided to remain behind and gradually became Yemeni citizens’ (High Level Committee 2001: 43). In 2001, about 109,000 Indians (100,000 PIOs and 9000 NRIs) were reported to be present in the united Yemen by the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora of the Government of India (2001). The NRIs consisted of professionals, skilled workers, nurses and paramedical staff, semi-skilled workers and housemaids. Thus, besides mentioning the presence of an Indian school in Sana’a and the installation of Mahatma Gandhi’s statue in its hall, in a significant passage it does lament the on-going demise of the Indian heritage in Aden including ten Hindu and Parsi temples, and a church. Recently developed civil-war like situation, however, must have forced many Indian origin traders to leave the country. The Government of India itself evacuated about 5000 Indians from Yemen through the operation ‘Rahat’ in March/April 2015.

United Arab Emirates

The Indian traders in the nineteenth century ‘Trucial Coast’ emirates were involved in diverse economic activities of which pearl trading, until its demise in the 1930s, was the most important one. Except India or Indians, no other subject or country was allowed to do pearl fishing (Zahlan 1979: 22). In the late nineteenth century, according to S.B. Miles, in Debaye (Dubai) with a population of 12,000–14,000, the trade was ‘practically in the hands of the Banians whose strong business capacity gives them a leading position’ (Miles 1966: 441). Pearl was mainly bought by Indian merchants who exported them to India. According to Lorimer (1971), there were about 400 Indian pearl merchants stationed in various Trucial States Sheikhdoms in 1901. Of the 408 Indian merchants, 173 were resident traders. The number of Indian traders further increased when some of them who previously lived in Lingah began to settle in Dubai following the decline of Lingah in 1902. Dubai was a free port in 1904 (Al-Sayegh 1998: 89). Since the late nineteenth century, the Indians comprised the second biggest merchant group after the native tribal Arabs who dominated the pearl fishing and trading – two honourable occupations. The Indian merchants called Banians financed the pearling expeditions, besides taking the banking. They monopolized shopkeeping and retail trade. A number of them ‘represented British Indian firms in Bombay’ 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 275

(Al-Sayegh 1998: 88). The Indian merchants were rich and enjoyed commensurate political privileges and influence along with the other merchant groups. The merchant oligarchy continued until the collapse of the pearl industry and the advent of the oil revenues in the early 1930s when rulers began to have direct income and political independence. Early in the twentieth century, the Indian rupee began to replace the Turkish currency in region. Soon the Indian paper rupee, with British consent acquired the status of sole legal tender in the Gulf countries (Tharyam 1987: 57). In the post-depression period and particularly after the Dubai reform movement of 1938, the Indian merchants continued to enjoy relative prosperity, but less of the political influence. Thus, in theMajlis al Tujfair in the early 1950s and in the Dubai Municipal council elections of 1957 the Indian as well as Persian merchants were excluded. In fact, in 1953 the National Front, a loose organization of Dubai Arab merchants, ‘opposed the growing influence of Persian and Indian merchants’ (Al-Sayegh 1998: 98). These developments, however, did not preclude them from participating in Dubai’s evolution as a centre of international trade and exchange, and a cosmopolitan city with excellent educational community and social services. Merchants were and are still dominant figures in Dubai, playing a vital role in its continued growth and development. Dubai’s ancient calling as a ‘city of merchants’ is still as strong today as it was 200 years ago. In the early 1980s, in Dubai alone about 3000 Indian merchant families were living. The textiles trade was dominated by the Sindhis and the gold market by the Hindu Gujaratis (Weiner 1982: 13). These were joined by the ‘new’ immigrants who came to Duabi with the oil and construction boom and who were employed as doctors, nurses, supervisors, clerks, salesmen, technicians, masons, cooks, domestic servants, construction workers, etc. These new immigrants also included the following three categories of Indian entrepreneurs: (1) independent entrepreneurs who operate mostly in free trade zones, (2) partner entrepreneurs (with local traders) who cannot be harassed or removed from the company and (3) sponsored entrepreneurs. There are a number of well-established Indian business houses in the country (see Jain 2010).

Bahrain

In modern times, Bahrain has been home to an important Indian merchant colony since the beginning of the eighteenth century. British Indian merchants included Sindhi and Gujarati. Apparently, the Sindhi merchants were the Bhatias of Thatta. There were also other Sindhi merchants. Like other Gulf countries, its traditional economy was mainly based on pearl fishing and trade which continued to thrive until its decline in the 1930s in the face of the great economic depression as well as the manufacturing of artificial Japanese pearl. In the beginning of the twentieth century, there were 69 Hindu traders in Manama, according to the Lorimer’s Gazetteers (1971: 2383). This number could go up to 175 in the pearling season. A small number of Muslim traders were also there. 276 P. C. Jain

Besides pearl financing, Indian merchants were also involved in trading of a wide variety of other items. Thus, in the late nineteenth century, ‘Indian merchants established import businesses in rice, tea, sugar and shoes, subsidized Arab smugglers in gold and in hashish and opium, trans-shipping from Kabul to Bombay, then from Bombay to the Gulf and elsewhere. In the wake of the modernization process after the First World War when administrative reforms in various government departments were carried out in Bahrain, further immigration of Indians took place in the country. For example, the very first directors or organizers of customs, post and passport departments in Bahrain were Indians. So were the heads of the first medical clinic in 1925, and the very first doctors, nurses, midwives, banks and “customs” senior clerks and agricultural advisers (Elmadani 2003:118). Some Indian traders in Bahrain were quite wealthy. ‘In a confidential report, on the richest among Bahrain’s merchants in the 1930s, six out of thirteen names were Indian’ (Elmadani 2003: 118). Bahrain gained independence in 1971. The oil boom period that followed since 1973 onwards brought an ever-increasing number of expatriate labour force, including professionals. The largest expatriate community. Indians originate mostly from Kerala (70%) and other south Indian states. The Indian workers constitute about 30% of the total workforce of Bahrain. Among the professionals, most NRIs are engineers, doctors, teachers, managers, accountants, architects and executives in various establishments. A very small segment of non-resident Indians is that of traders and entrepreneurs. Among the most successful Indian entrepreneurs in Bahrain one name figures prominently: a ‘toy seller turned hotel baron’ Mohammed Dadabhai. Mohammed Dadabhai and his group of companies epitomizes the Indian success story. Mohammed Dadabhai who migrated to Bahrain at the age of 4 and whose father Ahmedali Dadabhai migrated to Bahrain in 1925 from the princely State of Dungarpur in Rajasthan. Senior Dadabhai initially hawked samosas and later owned a small toy shop in Manama. As a young man, Mohammed sold toys after school on the pavement outside his father’s shop. Subsequently, he got into construction and tourism business. By 1998, the Dadabhai Group owned six blocks of service apart- ments with 275 luxury flats and two 4-star hotels, with a third under construction. ‘Apart from these, Dadabhai Group also ran the Hawar Island retreat of the Amir’ (Kent 1998). With an initial investment of over two million dollars, the group has set up an institute for training Bahrainis in hotel management and catering. Dadabhais hold Bahraini passport. Unlike some other Gulf countries, Bahraini government’s attitude towards non- Muslims has been liberal since the very beginning of the Indian immigration into Bahrain. This has enabled the Indians to build and maintain five churches, a Hindu temple and three Sikh Gurudwaras in the country. 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 277

Kuwait

By the second half of the eighteenth century, Kuwait had come to occupy an important posit as a maritime city. Its geographical location on the desert trade route between the Gulf and Syria, covered by camel caravan in 25–30 days, made it an important city for merchants. Kuwait’s position as a mercantile port around 1792 was further strengthened following the decline of Basra. Traditionally, the Kuwait economy was based on pearl fishing, ship-building and modest sea trade with the Indian subcontinent and East Africa. Apparently, unlike elsewhere in the Gulf, very few Indian merchants were involved in pearl financing in Kuwait. In spite of the British protection extended to Indians during the British era which began in 1896 and ended in 1961, the situation did not change apprecia- bly. The Indian business community continued to remain relatively very small in number. An important reason for this was the fact that the Kuwaiti rulers themselves were merchants and therefore resisted to any significant growth of Indian-owned businesses. So much so that ‘the ruler of Kuwait attempted in the 1930s to exclude all Indians from his state and, as a result, he entered into a dispute with the British Political Agent’ (Elmadani 2003: 121). Besides merchants, other components of the Indian ‘community’ in Kuwait included employees working for education, post and communication and other government departments. In Kuwait, the discovery of oil led to the formation of Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) which has been importing a large number of Indian labourers since the mid- 1940s. Indians were employed as clerical staff, skilled artisans, and semi-skilled and unskilled workers. In spite of better wages, living and working conditions of Indian workers in Kuwait were bad and deplorable. Indian labour continued to flock to Gulf countries including Kuwait even after India’s independence. Oil price hike in 1973 and subsequent period served an impetus to the migration process which has been continuing in ever-increasing numbers. This migration dynamics is further reflected in the progressive strength of the Indian expatriate community in Kuwait – from about 32,000 in 1975 to 100,000 in 1987 and 170,000 in 1990. The 1990–91 Kuwait crisis due to the Iraqi invasion led to the evacuation of about 150,000 Indians. Since then the number of Indians in Kuwait has gone up to 750,000 in 2014. Apparently, these Indians have been operating their business in partnership with local persons or entities as foreign nationals are not allowed to own a business or purchase immovable property in their own name. According to the High Level Committee Report on the Indian Diaspora (2001: 36), these businessmen are ‘mostly engaged in food stuffs, jewelry, garments and motor parts trading’ and ‘they are very well off’. Indian expatriates employed in public as well as private sectors in Kuwait include a large number of unskilled, semi-skilled workers and skilled workers like technicians and nurses. There are about 200,000 domestic workers, 278 P. C. Jain both males and females, which includes housemaids and governesses. A sizeable number of professionals working in Kuwait include engineers, doctors, architects, chartered accountants, management consultants, scientists, information technology professionals, etc. As in the case of other Gulf countries, in Kuwait too, the Keralites constitute the largest segment of the Indian community. Yet, the Indian community is sufficiently diverse to have an all-India character. This diversity is fully reflected in more than 100 cultural and professional associations. Rao Sahib Jashanmal was one of the early Indian entrepreneurs who in 1934 had opened a general store in Safaat Square, Kuwait. A second Jashanmal store selling most prestigious lines of products was opened in 1963 on the fashionable Fahad Al Salem Street. In 1964, a wholesale division was created by the then General Manager of Jashanmal in Kuwait, Gangu Batra. By then the Jashanmal was a very well- known name in the other Gulf countries too. Among other prominent Indian entrepreneurs mention must be made of the Malhotras. A.K. Malhotra, began his career in Kuwait in 1946 with a popular res- taurant. Subsequently, in collaboration with Al-Zahem Co., he diversified into wholesale and distribution of consumer products. Incorporated in its present form in 1980, today Al-Zahem and Malhotra is a leading conglomerate of Kuwait which is involved in a vast array of sectors ranging from manufacturing to hospitality industry. Outside Kuwait, their business is also spread in the UAE, the UK and India.

Qatar

The pearling and fishing was the mainstay of the Qatari economy, which continued to remain so until the establishment of oil industry in the mid-twentieth century. It was in connection with the pearl trade that a small number of Indians had settled in Qatar in the nineteenth century. In 1883, the local ruler Qasim had expelled the Indians from Qatar as unlike Bahrain and Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms, any formal treaty to Britain did not bind Qatar and therefore the Indians were not entitled to special privileges as British subjects. Moreover, Qasim himself was a pearl trader of major importance and regarded the Indians as business competitors. Although Qasim was compelled by the British Political Resident to apologize and pay compensation on two occasions, the net result was that Qatar ‘became the only Gulf Sheikhdom until the recent past without an Indian community’ (Zahlan 1979: 56). Even after a treaty with the British in 1916, ‘with the exception of one Baluchi bar- ber, there were no Indians living in Qatar’ in the 1920s (Zahlan 1979: 99). By 1939, the total population of Qatar was estimated at 28,000. The state of Qatar became an independent country on 3 September 1971 and has been a Gulf Cooperation Council member since 1981. 15 Indian Trade Diaspora in the Arabian Peninsula: An Overview 279

In Qatar, as in other Gulf countries, the immigration of a large number of Indians is limited to the oil industry. ‘Oil was first discovered in 1937, but it was not until 1949 that it was actually exported from Qatar’ (Birks and Sinclair 1980:57). The British-owned Iraq Petroleum Company (IPQ) obtained oil concessions in Qatar in 1935 and in 1936 Petroleum Development Qatar (PDQ) was setup to operate Qatar concessions. However, preferential treatment in recruitment was given to local labour, and therefore very few Indians were employed by PDQ until 1947. In spite of this, a small number of Indians continued to migrate to Qatar during the 1950s and 1960s. And the Indian immigrant community in Qatar remained very small. Thus, in 1975, the total number of Indian immigrants was estimated at 27,000. Since the mid-1970s, the migration of contract Indian workers to the Gulf countries began to take place, which is still continuing along with the migration of entrepreneurs and professionals. The strength of the Indian immigrant community in Qatar kept progressively increasing from 30,000 in 1979 to 50,000 in 1987, 75,000 in 1991, 150,000 in 2005 and about 500,000 in 2014. The Indian community has set up a number of institutions and organizations which are rendering valuable social, cultural and charitable support and assistance for the community.

Concluding Remarks

Indian traders have been trading with West Asian countries since ancient times, but permanently settled Indian diasporic communities in the region did not emerge until the fifteenth century. The Portuguese colonizers had taken note of the presence of Gujarati banians in the Perian Gulf region and the East African countries. Substantial increase in the size and geographical spread of the Indian traders and entrepreneurs however occurred during British colonialism in India and the Gulf region. Among the successful Indian trading communities, mention must be made of Gujarati banians, Kutchi and Thattai Bhatias, Parsis, Muslim Bohras, Khojas and Ismailis and more recently of Keralite entrepreneurs (often called Malabaris). It would appear that the Indian entrepreneurship in the Arabian Peninsula is largely a caste/ community-bound phenomenon. Social capital in the form of ethnic resources has been an important factor in their entrepreneurial success in the region. From petty merchants to wholesale dealers and multinational franchisee from pearl financiers to bankers and business tycoons, Indian traders and entrepreneurs in the Persian Gulf region have traversed a long way. The Indian traders and entrepreneurs and other middle class professionals constitute the core of Indian diaspora in the Gulf countries. They have been deeply entrenched into the Gulf economies for the last four decades. Their sudden departure from the Gulf would be disastrous to the Gulf economies, especially to their trade and service sectors. 280 P. C. Jain

References

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S. Irudaya Rajan and Ginu Zacharia Oommen

Introduction

International migration is one of the most ubiquitous realities in the Gulf states. In many ways, the inexhaustible availability of a foreign labour force has allowed the Gulf nations to become what they are today. Migration has been instrumental in nation-building processes in the Gulf (Chowdhury and Rajan 2018; Rajan 2017a, b). At the same time, the sheer scale of the phenomenon – with foreign majorities in the workforce as well as in total population of several states – is regarded as a challenge to nationhood. At the other end of the migratory routes, for many countries of origin in South Asia, the Arab world and East Africa, migration to the Gulf is an integral part of the lives of tens of millions and a constitutive element of economies and societies. The Gulf countries receive a majority of migrants from two broad regions: Asia (including South and Southeast Asia) and several Arab countries, with a clear and persistent predominance of the former (Rajan 2018, 2019; Jain and Oommen 2016). Most of their emigrants are relatively low-skilled workers, and males constitute the bulk in all cases, except for Indonesia and the Philippines where more than half of all emigrants are female. They all perceive Gulf migration as an important solution to the problems of poverty, unemployment and overpopulation in the home country, some defining it as ‘survival migration’ for the families (Ratha et al.2018 ; Rajan 2012, 2016a, b). As in the case of Asian countries, the five leading Arab sending countries also seek to facilitate emigration to the Gulf through an ‘open door’ policy without

S. I. Rajan (*) Centre for Development Studies, Thiruvananthapuram, Kerala, India G. Z. Oommen Kerala Public Service Commission, Trivandrum, Kerala, India

© Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 281 S. I. Rajan, G. Z. Oommen (eds.), Asianization of Migrant Workers in the Gulf Countries, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-32-9287-1_16 282 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen restrictions of age and skills. One of the fundamental reasons for such policies is the high levels of unemployment in these Arab countries, especially among the highly educated nationals. Arabs have, however, lost ground to Asians because they are perceived by the host countries as exerting potentially disruptive influences on the Gulf political systems, being more difficult to control, and demanding higher wages than Asians. There has been a consistent and significant shift from Arab workers to Asians since the late 1970s, mainly to safeguard the political interests of oil rich monarchies. Arab countries have also sought to harness the potential of emigrants through diaspora policies that could attract investments in home countries. Two major events that particularly enabled this process of ‘Asianization’ were the intensification of globalization since the 1990s which accelerated developmental activities and the demand for immigrant manpower in the Gulf states, and the withdrawal of Yemeni and Palestinian labour from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries on account of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in the wake of their support to Iraq. Both these factors were instrumental in rendering numeric primacy to South Asians in the Gulf countries. Thus, the proportion of the Arab expatriate population which was 72% in the 1970s was reduced to 31% in the late 1990s. Certainly, this preference was also enhanced and encouraged by the characteristic features of South Asian migrant labour – namely docility, political neutrality, flexibility and willingness. The willingness to work for lower wages, and capacity to work hard, helped in the process. Among all the countries with migrants in the Gulf, India has the largest number. Expatriate Indians in the Gulf numbered about seven million in 2013, accounting for about 40% of the region’s labour force (Vinod and Rajan 2012; Rajan and Narayana 2012; Rajan and Saxena 2019). Despite this visible presence in the Gulf, India does not have any exclusive policy for migrants going there, unlike some of the other Asian countries. The Philippines is another country with large numbers of workers in the Gulf, about 55% being females in domestic service. The Philippines presents a contrast to other Asian countries in terms of having exceptionally vocal policies to protect their workers, especially the ones in domestic work. The impact of migration is multilayered. For the sending country or region, the impact of migration is often quantified in terms of economic remittances on one hand and on the other, socio-cultural remittances, such as the ‘changed world views and way of life’ of the migrants that they import back to their home countries. In the context of South Asia, this has meant higher living standards, and escape from unemployment and poverty, as true in the case of India as that of Sri Lankans seeking livelihood and respite from the civil war that tore apart their tiny country, or Bangladeshis seeking a way out of the grinding poverty in their villages and towns. Not only has migration to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) become a major contributor to their home countries’ foreign exchange income, but they have also helped transform the economy of their respective hometowns, villages, cities and states, leading to higher indices of social welfare. Migration has had other major by-products, not always qualified – it has led to greater autonomy for women migrants from India, Nepal and Sri Lanka, who travelled there to work as domestic 16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf 283 helpers and later – as the healthcare industry expanded – as health caregivers and nurses (Percot and Rajan 2007; Rajan and Joseph 2015; Varghese and Rajan 2011).

The Present

Since 1990, annual outflows to the GCC countries from most Asian senders have seen a remarkable increase. In the case of Pakistan, the annual outflows increased by almost 20 times from 41,611 persons in 1990 to 822,032 in 2016. The outflows from Bangladesh and India increased by about six times and from the Philippines by four times. Thus, the general policies to increase or maintain the level of outflows have been highly successful and offer scope for optimism. Indonesia seems to be an exception with a decline in the annual outflow of migrants from 2007 to 2014. There are substantial differences in terms of the specific destination country in the GCC to which migrants from Asia go. Looking at the most recent outflows, the majority of migrants from Bangladesh went to Oman or Saudi Arabia. A majority of Indians and Pakistanis as well as Filipinos went to either Saudi Arabia or UAE. Destinations of Sri Lankans were more varied and most went to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE. In the case of Nepal, Qatar was the most prominent destination country followed by Saudi Arabia. Being the most populous GCC country, Saudi Arabia has attracted the largest number of migrants within the region (Hussain 2011, 2014, 2016; Rajan and Joseph 2013, 2016, 2017; Zachariah et al. 2014). GCC destinations accounted for more than 95% of all migrants in the case of India and Pakistan and about 88.4% in the case of Sri Lanka (Kelegama 2011). Nepalese, Bangladeshi and Filipino workers have explored markets beyond the Gulf countries. About 58% of Nepalese workers headed to the GCC and a very substantial proportion went to Malaysia in 2014–15. About one-fourth (24.5%) of Bangladeshis went to destinations other than the Gulf in 2016. Also, about 60% of all Filipino workers and 66% of new hires went to the GCC while the rest headed to a number of other countries in 2014. Asian countries vary in terms of the gender composition of migrants they send to the Gulf. Migration from Nepal is primarily that of males, constituting about 96%. In the case of Indonesia and the Philippines, more than half the migrants in recent years were female, and about one-third of those from Sri Lanka were female. The sex ratio of outflows from Sri Lanka has changed markedly over the years. Almost three-fourths of all Sri Lankan migrants were female in 1997; since then, the trend has reversed and women constituted less than half of all migrants in 2008. Moreover, only a small percentage of migrants from Asia to the Gulf are highly skilled professional workers. A vast majority are semi-skilled or low-skilled. Among women, a majority are domestic workers. About 57.3% of migrant workers from Bangladesh were semi-skilled or unskilled in 2016, while the figure was 57% for Pakistan. From the Philippines, almost half were service workers while 32% were production workers in 2013. From Sri Lanka, 41.7% of the males were semi-skilled or unskilled while 81% of the females were domestic workers in 2015. 284 S. I. Rajan and G. Z. Oommen

The Future

Migration to the Gulf being temporary and circulatory in nature, return migration and rehabilitation of returnees have also emerged as important issues in most South Asian countries. Nevertheless, it is fascinating when we consider that many of the expatriates from South Asia, especially India, which constitutes the largest group, are today second- or third-generation migrants. For instance, about 2.6 million Indians live in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) alone, constituting the largest expatriate community there. While they send back home about $13.2 billion annually, they are also the largest investors in the UAE’s real estate market. So, though temporary in nature, the symbiosis has engendered a kind of continuous temporariness, even an emotional dividend. Changing geopolitical dynamics has injected another element – that of strategic. This was most starkly demonstrated when the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and the deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan became the Chief Guest at the Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi in January 2017. A slew of accords were signed between India and the UAE, elevating bilateral relations from transactional to strategic. Similarly, India has defence agreements with other GCC countries like the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Oman and these ties are set to only expand and deepen. However, it has not all been rosy and smooth sailing. There have been enough reports and cases of the abuse, oppression of migrant labour in the GCC country, especially of women with few, if any, laws existing for safeguarding their rights and for their protection. In many cases, unscrupulous middle-men from the home countries are also culpable (Rajan et al. 2011). The job market is not egalitarian in the GCC states and that the wage differential is quite high between the expatriates and the natives, with the former employed mostly in the private sector which offers lower wages and fewer facilities. In addition, a variety of factors – high unemployment among the GCC natives, economic burdens due to the various Gulf Wars, the increase in the female participation in the labour market have all determined a more restrictive policy for migration, like the Saudi Nitaqat law, which aims at the ‘Saudization’ of the workforce in private sector in the country by easing out expatriate workers. Nevertheless, there has been no decrease in the flow of migrant workers to the GCC region in the last one decade inspite of political upheavals in the Middle East, low oil prices, or even the global economic slump. This may, of course, change in the future. Globalization, liberalization of the societies of the GCC countries, widening of human rights regime in South Asia has led to greater dialogue among these countries and their respective governments and a number of checks have been put in place to pre-empt and prevent the abuse and torture of the migrants and misuse of labour laws. The fact that through the changing economic–political dynamics, the South Asian, especially the Indian migrant community in the GCC, has endured, is a 16 The Future of Asian Migration to the Gulf 285 pointer to the contribution that migrants make to their host countries (Zachariah et al. 2004; Naufal, Malit and Genc 2016; Kanchana and Rajan 2014; Bedi et al. 2016). Moreover, when migrants make no political claims, and their contribution is acknowledged and appreciated, the relationship between the host and the migrant becomes symbiotic, beneficial to both. The narrative of migration from South Asia to the GCC serves as a beacon in these times of migrant scepticism.

References

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