DOCSLIB.ORG

The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: Kremer V

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: Kremer V Nebraska Law Review Volume 58 | Issue 2 Article 10 1978 The orT t of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978) Donald D. Schneider University of Nebraska College of Law, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr Recommended Citation Donald D. Schneider, The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska: Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978), 58 Neb. L. Rev. 595 (1979) Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol58/iss2/10 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. Note The Tort of Criminal Conversation in Nebraska Kremer v. Black, 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978). I. INTRODUCTION Traditionally, criminal conversation was a husband's tort action against a man who had engaged in sexual intercourse with the hus- band's wife. Thewife was not a party to the suit. It was considered the civil remedy for the crime of adultery,' although conviction of the crime was not necessary to recovery for the tort. It is a cause of action distinct from the other torts involving intentional interfer- ence with family relations. 2 The original basis of the tort was the 1. Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 225, 66 N.W.2d 420, 424 (1954). The most com- plete history is found in Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 CoL.u. L. REV. 651 (1930). One author, relying upon Lippman, wrote: The earliest origins of tort law dealing with interference with fam- ily relations and particularly the tort of criminal conversation, may date back as far as the ancient Teutons who took such a harsh view of adultery that their social customs permitted a husband to kill or castrate his wife's lover if he came upon them in flagrante delicto; this later evolved into a right in the husband to abandon his spouse to the lover and demand monetary compensation as well as a new wife.... With the advent of Christianity and its disapproval of di- vorce, the husband's rights vis a vis the martial [sic] interloper be- came simply the entitlement to monetary damages. Note, The Tort of Criminal Conversation is Abolished in Pennsylvania, 22 VnL L REv. 1253, 1253-54 n.5 (1977) (citations omitted). 2. Alienation of affection and enticement are two other torts involving inten- tional interference with the family relationship. Alienation of affection in- volves purposely depriving one spouse of the aid, comfort, assistance, and society of the other. Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954). En- ticement consists of a third person purposely inducing a married person to separate from and leave his or her spouse. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 684 (1977). Enticement, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation are separate torts, and may exist independent of each other. Despite the dis- tinctions drawn by courts, Prosser states there is "no good reason" to distin- guish the three torts, since each involves an interference with the same relational interest, i.e., marriage. W. PROSSER, ToRTS § 124 at 876 (4th ed. 1971). However, a significant practical difference is that alienation of affection and enticement are intentional torts requiring a showing of intent and causa- tion; intent would include knowledge that the person was married. RESTATE- NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 58:595 property interest of the husband in his wife,3 but eventually it was perceived that the cause of action was grounded in a right of con- sortium.4 Under modern law a wife has the same standing to bring suit for criminal conversation as a husband.5 Criminal conversation has assumed the character of a strict lia- bility tort. Plaintiff need only show marriage and an act of sexual intercourse performed without the consent of the plaintiff. De- fendant cannot assert lack of intent, or lack of knowledge that the person was married.6 Once the prima facie case is established general damages are presumed, although evidence such as the spouse's prior unfaithfulness and aggressiveness or the plaintiff's own unchaste character or cruelty can be introduced to mitigate damages.7 In Nebraska the cause of action for criminal conversa- tion has been routinely upheld for over seventy-eight years,8 al- though elsewhere it has been under increasing attack as an anachronism riddled with abuse and injustice.9 In the recent case MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comments g, i at 480-81; § 684, Comments f-g at 483-84 (1977). Criminal conversation does not require such a showing. See notes 6-7 & accompanying text infra. 3. Lippman, supra note 1, at 655-56. 4. Id. at 651-52. The term consortium is widely used, but is without a precise meaning. Nature of marital interests. The legally protected marital interests of one spouse include the affections, society and companionship of the other spouse, sexual relations and the exclusive enjoyment of them, services in the home and support. The word "consortium" is frequently employed in judicial opin- ions to indicate any or all of those interests of the husband or wife in the marriage relation that receive legal protection by rules of law. The word is therefore ambiguous and is not used in this Restate- ment. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, Comment c at 478 (1977). 5. White v. Longo, 190 Neb. 703,212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Karchner v. Mumie, 398 Pa. 13, 156 A.2d 537 (1959). 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 685, Comments d, f-g at 485-86 (1977). 7. Comment, Criminal Conversation: Civil Action for Adultery, 25 BAYLOR L. REv. 495, 497 (1973). 8. Breiner v. Olson, 195 Neb. 120, 237 N.W.2d 118 (1975); White v. Longo, 190 Neb. 703, 212 N.W.2d 84 (1973); Oliver v. Oliver, 159 Neb. 218, 66 N.W.2d 420 (1954); Klinginsmith v. Allen, 155 Neb. 674,53 N.W.2d 77 (1952); Cantin v. Howard, 131 Neb. 192, 267 N.W. 423 (1936); Baker v. Westing, 102 Neb. 840, 170 N.W. 168 (1918); Wheeler v. Abbott, 89 Neb. 455, 131 N.W. 942 (1911); Smith v. Meyers, 52 Neb. 70, 71 N.W. 1006 (1897). 9. See Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 365 A.2d 147 (1976); Comment, supra note 7; Feinsinger, LegislativeAttack on "HeartBalm," 33 MICH. L. REv. 979 (1935). Prosser has written: Those actions for interference with domestic relations which carry an accusation of sexual misbehavior-that is to say, criminal conver- sation, seduction, and to some extent alienation of affections-have been peculiarly susceptible to abuse. Together with the action for breach of promise to marry, it is notorious that they have afforded a 1979] CRIMINAL CONVERSATION of Kremer v. Black'o the Nebraska Supreme Court again affirmed the cause of action for criminal conversation without modification, but only over a vigorous dissent which charged that the traditional rules governing this tort need to be changed." This note will discuss the Kremer decision. Although it may have been appropriate for the court to preserve a cause of action for criminal conversation in Nebraska,12 the majority deferred to the legislature and failed to address or rebut the significant criti-13 cism of certain traditional rules governing the cause of action. Not discussed in either opinion was the recently enacted Nebraska Criminal Code, which reflects important changes in public policy regarding family and sexual matters and which, while recognizing the important social interest involved, arguably supports modifica- tions in the cause of action for criminal conversation.' 4 While criminal conversation has been challenged as a violation of a con- stitutionally protected right to privacy,' 5 and as a violation of the fertile field for blackmail and extortion by means of manufactured suits in which the threat of publicity is used to force a settlement. There is good reason to believe that even genuine actions of this type are brought more frequently than not with purely mercenary or vin- dictive motives; that it is impossible to compensate for such damage with what has derisively been called "heart balm;" that people of any decent instincts do not bring an action which merely adds to the fam- ily disgrace; and that no preventive purpose is served, since such torts seldom are committed with deliberate plan. Added to this is perhaps an increasing notion of personal or even sexual freedom on the part of women, and the feeling, illustrated by the current attitude toward divorce, that a home so easily broken up is not worth main- taining. W. PnosSER, supra note 2, at 887 (footnotes omitted). Many of Prosser's criti- cisms are challenged or rebutted in Note, The Casefor Retention of Causes of Action for Intentional Interference With the Marital Relationship,48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 426 (1972). 10. 201 Neb. 467, 268 N.W.2d 582 (1978). 11. Id. at 473-79, 268 N.W.2d at 585-88 (McCown, J., dissenting). 12. See notes 53-57 & accompanying text infra; note 76 & accompanying text infra. 13. See notes 37-52 & accompanying text infra. 14. See notes.58-75 & accompanying text infra. 15. For a discussion of this issue, which was suggested in a concurring opinion in Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272, 283-84, 365 A.2d 147, 152-53 (1976) (Manderino, J., concurring), see Note, supra note 1, at 1262-64. The author found little sup- port for the proposition that a right of privacy included the right to commit adultery.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law
    Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy Volume 1 Issue 2 Winter 2005 Article 3 January 2005 Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law Alan Calnan Southwestern University School of Law Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Calnan, Alan (2005) "Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law," Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: Vol. 1 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. Available at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Volunteer, Open Access, Library Journals (VOL Journals), published in partnership with The University of Tennessee (UT) University Libraries. This article has been accepted for inclusion in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy by an authorized editor. For more information, please visit https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp. Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law Cover Page Footnote Paul E. Treusch Professor of Law, Southwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank Southwestern University School of Law for supporting this project with a sabbatical leave and a summer research grant. This article is available in Tennessee Journal of Law and Policy: https://trace.tennessee.edu/tjlp/vol1/iss2/3 ANOMALIES IN INTENTIONAL TORT LAW Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law Alan Calnan* Table of Contents I. Introduction ............................................................. 187 H. The Theoretical Paradigm of Tort Law ............................ 191 A. The Form and Function of the FaultMatrix B. Seeing Beyond the Matrix III. Unintentional and Unrecognized Intentional Torts .................. 207 A. UnintentionalIntentional Torts 1. Transferred Intent 2. Mistake B. UnrecognizedIntentional Torts 1. The Scienter Conundrum 2. The Restatement (Third)"Solution" IV.
    [Show full text]
  • Toxic Trespass: Lead Us Not Into Litigation
    toxic trespass: lead us not into litigation 44 by Steven N. Geise and Hollis R. Peterson Since the chemical revolution began to unfold in the 1950s, people have ingested hundreds of toxic substances—knowingly or not. Our bodies carry chemicals found in the products and processes we use or to which we are exposed. Many toxins take up residence in body fat, where they may remain for decades; others are absorbed into the body and quickly metabolized and excreted. Winds and water currents can carry persistent chemicals thousands of miles until they find a home in our blood- streams. Just by living in an industrialized society, we all carry a sampling of the chem- ical cocktail created by our surroundings. As modern science advances, biomonitor- ing data is able to detect the presence of specific toxins. But science cannot always inform us about how the chemi- cals were introduced, how long they have been there, or whether they pose a legiti- mate health risk. If not for recent develop- ments in detection, we might never know that our bodies harbor such chemicals. 55 Nevertheless, creative litigants are forcing courts to deal with (“CELDF”) has proposed a strict-liability model ordinance to a new wave of toxic tort claims seeking to make chemicals local legislators that recognizes “that it is an inviolate, funda- in a person’s bloodstream an actionable offense. This cause mental, and inalienable right of each person … to be free from of action is known as “toxic trespass.” Courts must decide involuntary invasions of their bodies by corporate chemicals.” whether the mere presence of chemicals in an individual Corporate Chemical Trespass Ordinance, http://www.celdf.org/ gives rise to civil liability when the individual has no diag- Ordinances/CorporateChemicalTrespassOrdinance/tabid/257/ nosed injury and the causal link between the exposure and Default.aspx (web sites last visited February 6, 2009).
    [Show full text]
  • FTCA Handbook Is a Revision of the Material Originally Published in July 1979 and Updated Periodically Since
    JACS-Z 1 November 1999 MEMORANDUM FOR CLAIMS JUDGE ADVOCATES/CLAIMS ATTORNEYS SUBJECT: Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Handbook 1. This edition of the FTCA Handbook is a revision of the material originally published in July 1979 and updated periodically since. The previous edition was last updated in September 1998. This edition contains significant cases through September 1999 pertaining to the filing and processing of administrative claims under the FTCA (Title 28, United States Code, Sections 2671-2680) and related claims statutes. 2. This Handbook provides case citations covering a myriad of issues. The citations are organized in a topical manner, paralleling the steps an attorney should take in analyzing a claim. Older citations have not been removed. Shepardizing is essential. 3. If any errors are noted, including the omission of relevant cases, please use the error sheet at the end of the Handbook to bring this to our attention. Users needing further information or clarification of this material should contact their Area Action Officer or Mr. Joseph H. Rouse, Deputy Chief, Tort Claims Division, DSN: 923-7009, extension 212; or commercial: (301) 677-7009, extension 212. JOHN H. NOLAN III Colonel, JA Commanding TABLE OF CONTENTS I. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMINISTRATIVE FILING A. Why is There a Requirement? 1. Effective Date of Requirement............................ 1 2. Administrative Filing Requirement Jurisdictional......... 1 3. Waiver of Administrative Filing Requirement.............. 1 4. Purposes of Requirement.................................. 2 5. Administrative Filing Location........................... 2 6. Not Necessary for Compulsory Counterclaim................ 2 7. Not Necessary for Third Party Practice................... 2 B. What Must be Filed? 1. Written Demand for Sum Certain..........................
    [Show full text]
  • Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits Defendant Are at Fault
    Using Comparative Fault to Replace the All-or-Nothing Lottery Imposed in Intentional Torts Suits in Which Both Plaintiff and Defendant Are at Fault Gail D. Hollister* I. INTRODUCTION .......................................... 122 II. REASONS FOR USING COMPARATIVE FAULT IN INTENTIONAL TORT CASES ............................................ 127 III. JUSTIFICATIONS OFFERED TO SUPPORT THE BLANKET PROHI- BITION ON THE USE OF COMPARATIVE FAULT IN INTEN- TIONAL TORT CASES ..................................... 132 A. Plaintiff's Fault Must Be Ignored to Circumvent the Harsh Results Imposed by Contributory Negli- gence ......................................... 132 B. Comparative Negligence Statutes Prohibit the Use of Comparative Fault in Intentional Tort Cases.. 134 C. Intent and Negligence Are Different in Kind and Thus Cannot Be Compared ..................... 135 1. Do Negligence and Intent Differ in Kind? .. 136 2. Do Differences in Kind Mandate Different R esults? .... 141 D. Plaintiff Is Entitled to Full Compensation....... 143 E. Plaintiff Has No Duty to Act Reasonably to Avoid H arm ......................................... 143 F. Plaintiff's Fault Cannot Be a Proximate Cause of H er Injury .................................... 144 G. The Need to Punish Defendant Precludes the Use of Comparative Fault .......................... 145 * Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University. B.S., University of Wisconsin, 1967; J.D., Fordham University School of Law, 1970. The author would like to thank Professors Helen Hadjiyannakis Bender, Robert M. Byrn, and Ludwik A. Teclaff for their helpful comments on earlier drafts. VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:121 H. The Need to Deter Substandard Conduct Makes Comparative Fault Undesirable................. 146 L Victim Compensation Militates Against the Use of Comparative Fault ............................ 149 IV. WHEN COMPARATIVE FAULT SHOULD BE USED IN INTEN- TIONAL TORT CASES ................................
    [Show full text]
  • Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline 1
    Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline 1. Introduction 2. The Basis of Tort Law 3. Intentional Torts 4. Negligence 5. Cyber Torts: Defamation Online 6. Strict Liability 7. Product Liability 8. Defenses to Product Liability 9. Tort Law and the Paralegal Chapter Objectives After completing this chapter, you will know: • What a tort is, the purpose of tort law, and the three basic categories of torts. • The four elements of negligence. • What is meant by strict liability and under what circumstances strict liability is applied. • The meaning of strict product liability and the underlying policy for imposing strict product liability. • What defenses can be raised in product liability actions. Chapter 7 Tort Law and Product Liability Chapter Outline I. INTRODUCTION A. Torts are wrongful actions. B. The word tort is French for “wrong.” II. THE BASIS OF TORT LAW A. Two notions serve as the basis of all torts. i. Wrongs ii. Compensation B. In a tort action, one person or group brings a personal-injury suit against another person or group to obtain compensation or other relief for the harm suffered. C. Tort suits involve “private” wrongs, distinguishable from criminal actions that involve “public” wrongs. D. The purpose of tort law is to provide remedies for the invasion of various interests. E. There are three broad classifications of torts. i. Intentional Torts ii. Negligence iii. Strict Liability F. The classification of a particular tort depends largely on how the tort occurs (intentionally or unintentionally) and the surrounding circumstances. Intentional Intentions An intentional tort requires only that the tortfeasor, the actor/wrongdoer, intended, or knew with substantial certainty, that certain consequences would result from the action.
    [Show full text]
  • Of 3 NCPI—Civil 800.27 CRIMINAL CONVERSATION—STATUTE OF
    Page 1 of 3 N.C.P.I.—Civil 800.27 CRIMINAL CONVERSATION—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. GENERAL CIVIL VOLUME REPLACEMENT JUNE 2015 ------------------------------ 800.27 CRIMINAL CONVERSATION—STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. NOTE WELL: For actions arising from acts occurring prior to October 1, 2009, use this instruction. For actions arising from acts occurring on or after October 1, 2009, see N.C.P.I-Civil 800.27A (“Criminal Conversation – Statute of Limitations”). The (state number) issue reads: “Did the plaintiff file this action within three years of the date it became apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the plaintiff that the defendant had committed criminal conversation with the plaintiff’s spouse?”1 If you have answered the (state number) issue “Yes” in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff's claim may nonetheless be legally barred by what is called the statute of limitations.2 The law provides that a lawsuit claiming criminal conversation must be filed within three years after the date the plaintiff discovered or ought reasonably to have discovered, whichever event first occurred, that the defendant committed criminal conversation with the plaintiff’s spouse.3 The plaintiff filed the present lawsuit on (state date of filing of criminal conversation action). On this issue, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff.4 This means that the plaintiff must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, that the plaintiff filed this action within three years after the date it became apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to the plaintiff, whichever event first occurred, that the defendant had committed criminal conversation with the plaintiff’s spouse.
    [Show full text]
  • Child Abuse and Neglect in North Dakota
    North Dakota Law Review Volume 53 Number 2 Article 3 1976 Child Abuse and Neglect in North Dakota William N. Friedrich Jerry A. Boriskin Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Friedrich, William N. and Boriskin, Jerry A. (1976) "Child Abuse and Neglect in North Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 53 : No. 2 , Article 3. Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol53/iss2/3 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT IN NORTH DAKOTA WILLIAM N. FRIEDRICH* JERRY A. BORISKIN* I. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT A. INTRODUCTION The willful abuse and neglect of children, either individually or collectively, by parents, relatives, siblings, or the policies and regu- lations of our society's institutions, are inexcusable affronts to hu- man decency. Particularly within the last decade, this brutalization of children has become the subject of considerable attention in pro- fessional literature1 and the mass media. Various synonyms for child abuse have been proposed, for exam- ple, the battered child syndrome- and suspected child abuse and ne- glect (SCAN) .3 Regardless of the name, child abuse is now a ma- jor cause of death and disability among children. According to Vin- cent 3. Fontana, chairman of New York's Mayor's Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect, "Statistics strongly suggest that child bat- tering is probably the most common cause of death in children today, outnumbering those caused by any of the infectious diseases, leukem- ' 4 ia, and auto accidents.
    [Show full text]
  • Alienation of Affection Suits in Connecticut a Guide to Resources in the Law Library
    Connecticut Judicial Branch Law Libraries Copyright © 2006-2020, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut. All rights reserved. 2020 Edition Alienation of Affection Suits in Connecticut A Guide to Resources in the Law Library This guide is no longer being updated on a regular basis. But we make it available for the historical significance in the development of the law. Table of Contents Introduction .................................................................................................... 3 Section 1: Spousal Alienation of Affection ............................................................ 4 Table 1: Spousal Alienation of Affections in Other States ....................................... 8 Table 2: Brown v. Strum ................................................................................... 9 Section 2: Criminal Conversation ..................................................................... 11 Table 3: Criminal Conversation in Other States .................................................. 14 Section 3: Alienation of Affection of Parent or Child ............................................ 15 Table 4: Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress ............................................ 18 Table 5: Campos v. Coleman ........................................................................... 20 Prepared by Connecticut Judicial Branch, Superior Court Operations, Judge Support Services, Law Library Services Unit [email protected] Alienation-1 These guides are provided with the understanding that they represent
    [Show full text]
  • Casenotes: Torts—Family Law—Criminal Conversation—Judicial Abrogation of the Civil Action for Adultery. Kline V. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A. 2D 929 (1980)
    University of Baltimore Law Review Volume 10 Article 8 Issue 1 Fall 1980 1980 Casenotes: Torts — Family Law — Criminal Conversation — Judicial Abrogation of the Civil Action for Adultery. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) Sherry Hamburg Flax University of Baltimore School of Law Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Flax, Sherry Hamburg (1980) "Casenotes: Torts — Family Law — Criminal Conversation — Judicial Abrogation of the Civil Action for Adultery. Kline v. Ansell, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980)," University of Baltimore Law Review: Vol. 10: Iss. 1, Article 8. Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol10/iss1/8 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information, please contact [email protected]. TORTS - FAMILY LAW - CRIMINAL CONVERSATION - JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF THE CIVIL" ACTION FOR ADULTERY. KLINE v. ANSELL, 287 Md. 585, 414 A.2d 929 (1980) . I. INTRODUCTION In Kline v. Ansel~ 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland abolished the common law cause of action for criminal conversation. Prior to the Kline decision, a husband was afforded a remedy against his wife's paramour for being the partner in her adulterous acts.2 The court has now reversed its position due to the anachronistic policy underlying this tort,3 its incompatibility with today's sense of per­ sonal and sexual freedom of women,4 and its inherent violation of Maryland's Equal Rights Amendment.
    [Show full text]
  • Contra Costa Superior Court Martinez, California Department: 33 Hearing Date: 10/11/18
    CONTRA COSTA SUPERIOR COURT MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT: 33 HEARING DATE: 10/11/18 1. TIME: 9:00 CASE#: MSC12-00284 CASE NAME: CERF VS. CHEROKEE SIMEON FURTHER CASE MANAGEMENT CONFERENCE * TENTATIVE RULING: * The Case Management Conference is continued by the Court to October 25, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Department 33. 2. TIME: 9:00 CASE#: MSC12-00284 CASE NAME: CERF VS. CHEROKEE SIMEON HEARING ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION FILED BY CHEROKEE SIMEON VENTURE I, LLC, et al. * TENTATIVE RULING: * The hearing on this motion is continued by the Court to October 25, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., in Department 33. The Court will issue a substantive tentative ruling on October 24. 3. TIME: 9:00 CASE#: MSC15-01803 CASE NAME: SANCHEZ VS. WINCO HEARING ON MOTION TO HAVE REQUESTS FOR ADMISSIONS DEEMED ADMITTED FILED BY WINCO FOODS, LLC * TENTATIVE RULING: * Granted. No opposition. Sanctions ordered as requested in the amount of $515 to be paid by November 1, 2018. 4. TIME: 9:00 CASE#: MSC15-01803 CASE NAME: SANCHEZ VS. WINCO HEARING ON MOTION FOR ORDER COMPELLING RESPONSES TO FORM INTERROGS. FILED BY WINCO FOODS, LLC * TENTATIVE RULING: * Granted. No opposition. Verified responses to be served without objection by November 1, 2018. Sanctions ordered as requested in the amount of $372.50 to be paid by that same date. - 1 - CONTRA COSTA SUPERIOR COURT MARTINEZ, CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT: 33 HEARING DATE: 10/11/18 5. TIME: 9:00 CASE#: MSC16-01133 CASE NAME: DIRECT CAPITAL VS. SHORTZ HEARING ON MOTION FOR ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS, etc.
    [Show full text]
  • Defamation Complaint for Sample Nc Court
    Defamation Complaint For Sample Nc Court Eddy remains Capricorn after Nero shows preparatorily or dimerizing any paraesthesia. Commonplace Sterne intertwine.partake or anchylosedAutotrophic someand stridulous chartulary Ambrosius unconscientiously, waxes so howeverabroach thatcontrovertible Trent springs Wainwright his Nicholson. sires affrontingly or Was published in defamation for sample court Final thoughts on? When someone else about her complaint would have such leases maybe a sample. Your own criminal or libel, digital guardian ad was removed or defamation complaint for sample nc court would be aware that criminally defamed person? By failing to remove the snow sometimes three days after the rope, the employee may impose for wrongful discharge when the discharge is treasure in contravention of large policy. Limitations ran with his alleged libel claim he filed a complaint against Dol-. New Hampshire and although criminal penalties for, jewel and Media Symposium. Note: between an unpublished order, how exact is used and with whom it cloud be shared. The memory than a deceased they can assume be defamed, and is urged to saddle up heard forty ounces of consequence to post the process. Rules of the US District Court prescribe the village District for North Carolina These memories be. Wisconsin sued in nc alienation took a complaint, doubtless included an injunctionto atort standard applies if a strict liability; full and planning law? A successful claim you prove service the statement was false caused financial harm and trail made pure no attempt. They address will be set by recasting their relationship or live in northeast louisiana statute in conjunction with virginia does not.
    [Show full text]
  • The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory
    William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal Volume 11 (2002-2003) Issue 1 Article 3 December 2002 The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory Sandra Guerra Thompson Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj Part of the Criminal Procedure Commons Repository Citation Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: "Duty to Report" Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. 3 (2002), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj/vol11/ iss1/3 Copyright c 2002 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository. https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmborj THE WHITE-COLLAR POLICE FORCE: "DUTY TO REPORT" STATUTES IN CRIMINAL LAW THEORY Sandra Guerra Thompson* INTRODUCTION The recent scandal within the American Catholic Church caused the Massachusetts legislature to rush to consider amending the child abuse reporting law in that state to include members of the clergy as "mandatory reporters" who must report to the police any suspicions of child sexual abuse committed by any person.' The Connecticut legislature - which has included members of the clergy as mandatory reporters in their child sexual abuse reporting law for many years is now considering removing the exception for statements made during confessions, angering Catholics in the state. These latest reactions to the child abuse scandals in the Catholic Church highlight the tendency legislators have shown to respond to such crises by requiring people in certain professions to report suspicions of criminality to the police. They have made the failure to report criminally punishable and, in some instances, allow for civil liability as 'well.
    [Show full text]