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The Global Financial Crisis, Future of the Dollar, and the Choice for Asia

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The Global Financial Crisis, Future of the Dollar, and the Choice for Asia The Global Financial Crisis, Future of the Dollar, and the Choice for Asia NEAR-ADBI Published by NEAR Press NO.801, WON-CHANG B/D, 26-3 YEOUIDO-DONG, YEONGDEUNGPO-GU, SEOUL, KOREA (02) 783-7409, [email protected], http://www.nearfnd.com Copyright ⓒ 2011 by NEAR Press All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher. Contents Foreword Duck-Koo Chung Opening Address Masahiro Kawai Section I : The Global Financial Crisis and the Role of the G-20 The Global Financial Crisis and Reform of the International Financial Architecture: The G-20 and the International Monetary Fund Shinji Takagi Reform of the International Financial System — A Korean Perspective Kwanho Shin The Global Financial Crisis and the Role of the G-20 Tae-Joon Kim The Global Financial Crisis and the Strengthening of Financial Regulation Werner Kamppeter Roundtable Discussion Richard N. Cooper Fan He Shinji Takagi Deok-Ryong Yoon Kwanho Shin Tae-Joon Kim Woosik Moon Jung Sik Kim Shin-ichi Fukuda Chalongphob Sussangkarn Eiji Ogawa Werner Kamppeter Section II: The Future of the US Dollar Standard Past, Present, and Future of Vehicle Currency in East Asia: Some Evidence from Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand Shin-ichi Fukuda The Future of the US Dollar as a Vehicle Currency Jung Sik Kim The Future of the US Dollar Richard N. Cooper The Future of the US Dollar Standard Peter J. Morgan Is the Renminbi Ready to be an International Currency? Seung-Gwan Baek The Future of the US Dollar Standard Yeongseop Rhee Roundtable Discussion Chalongphob Sussangkarn 3 Contents Shin-ichi Fukuda Jung Sik Kim Richard N. Cooper Peter J. Morgan Seung-Gwan Baek Yeongseop Rhee Fan He Masahiro Kawai Eiji Ogawa Antoine Chery Section III: Global Imbalances, Asian Capital Markets, and Foreign Reserve Pooling Global Imbalances, Asian Capital Markets, and Foreign Reserve Pooling Doo Yong Yang Global Imbalances, Asian Capital Markets, and Foreign Reserve Pooling Inchul Kim The Subprime Crisis and East Asian Financial Cooperation Chalongphob Sussangkarn Global Imbalances, Asian Capital Markets, and Foreign Reserve Pooling Kyungsoo Kim Why Do East Asian Countries Need Regional Monetary Cooperation? Changkyu Choi Roundtable Discussion Masahiro Kawai Inchul Kim Chalongphob Sussangkarn Doo Yong Yang Kyungsoo Kim Changkyu Choi Richard N. Cooper Kwanho Shin Hee-Yul Chai Jongkyu Park Section IV: One Money in Asia Monetary Cooperation in Asia Hee-Yul Chai Monetary Cooperation in Asia Eiji Ogawa Asia Needs More Cooperation, Not a Single Currency Thomas D. Willett Monetary Cooperation in East Asia Junggun Oh The Global Financial Crisis, Future of the Dollar, and the Choice for Asia Gong-Pil Choi Roundtable Discussion Barry Eichengreen Hee-Yul Chai 4 Contents Eiji Ogawa Thomas D. Willett Taeyoon Sung Gong-Pil Choi Inchul Kim Richard N. Cooper Masahiro Kawai Peter Morgan Duck-Koo Chung Fan He Junggun Oh Summary Discussion Duck-Koo Chung Richard N. Cooper Shinji Takagi Peter J. Morgan Fan He Masahiro Kawai Chalongphob Sussangkarn Sang Ki Min Appendix: World Economic Roundtable The Global Financial Crisis and the Asian Economy Richard N. Cooper Masahiro Kawai Duck-Koo Chung Fan He Peter J. Morgan Kyung-Wook Hur 5 Authors and Conference Participants Authors and Conference Participants Seung-Gwan Baek, Professor, Hongik University, Republic of Korea Hee-Yul Chai, Professor, Kyonggi University, Republic of Korea Antoine Chery, Economic and Commercial Councilor, Embassy of France, Republic of Korea Changkyu Choi, Professor, Myongji University, Republic of Korea Gong-Pil Choi, Senior Adviser, Korea Institute of Finance, Republic of Korea Duck-Koo Chung, Chair, NEAR Foundation, Republic of Korea Richard N.Cooper, Professor, Harvard University, US Barry Eichengreen, Professor, University of California, Berkeley, US Shin-ichi Fukuda, Professor, University of Tokyo, Japan Fan He, Assistant Director, IWEP, Chinese Academy of Social Science, People’s Republic of China Kyung-Wook Hur, Deputy Minister, Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea Werner Kamppeter, Representative in the Republic of Korea, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation Masahiro Kawai, Dean, Asian Development Bank Institute, Japan Inchul Kim, Professor, Sungkyunkwan University, Republic of Korea Jung Sik Kim, Professor, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea Kyungsoo Kim, Director, The Bank of Korea Institute, Republic of Korea Tae-Joon Kim, President, Korea Institute of Finance, Republic of Korea Sang Ki Min, Professor, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea Peter J. Morgan, Senior Consultant, Asian Development Bank Institute, Japan Woosik Moon, Professor, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea Eiji Ogawa, Professor, Hitotsubashi University, Japan Junggun Oh, Professor, Korea University, Republic of Korea Jongkyu Park, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute of Finance, Republic of Korea Yeongseop Rhee, Professor, Seoul National University, Republic of Korea Kwanho Shin, Professor, Korea University, Republic of Korea Taeyoon Sung, Professor, Yonsei University, Republic of Korea Chalongphob Sussangkarn, Distinguished Fellow, Thailand Development Research Institute, Thailand Shinji Takagi, Professor of Economics, Osaka University, Japan Thomas D. Willett, Professor, Claremont McKenna College, Claremont Graduate University, US Doo Yong Yang, Professor, Kyung Hee University, Republic of Korea Deok-Ryong Yoon, Senior Research Fellow, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, Republic of Korea Note In this publication, the term East Asia is used to refer collectively to the countries of East and Southeast Asia. 6 Foreword Forward Duck-koo Chung Chairman The NEAR Foundation In 2007, the U.S. sub-prime mortgage crisis drove investment banks and commercial banks into insolvency and ultimately sparked the biggest global financial crisis since the Great Depression. One of the biggest lessons from the crisis is that the market can be both an angel and a demon, and that government may be both a savior and a tyrant. We also learned that the U.S. or the E.U., which now make up less than 30% of the world economy, do not command the global economy on their own. Most of all, the diminishing faith in the financial industry has led to the failure of the internal balancing mechanisms of the world’s economies, which in turn has triggered the fall of financial capitalism. Meanwhile, the countries such as Great Britain, Japan and others that are closely attached to U.S.-led financial capitalism faced most damage whereas countries such as China that are not closely attached to U.S.-led financial capitalism mitigated the financial crisis relatively well during the crisis. Also, the countries with largely depending on imports and exports or foreign capital, the countries with low birth rates and aging populations and the countries with excessive debt have also been among the hardest hit during the crisis. In addition, the financial crisis has also shaken up the nature of international economic competition, providing an opportunity for a radical shift in the dynamics between the traditional growth engines such as the U.S., the E.U., China, and Japan, and other newly developing countries. With a tremendous effort and collaboration, the world economy could extricate itself from the steeper fall and get back on the track. However, the uncertainties surrounding the world economy still looms because we all failed to precisely predict the course and magnitude of potential risk, and the international financial organizations, on the bottom, no longer have sufficient capacity to address tough issues such as global imbalances, excessive financial capitalism, or even moral hazard. These uncertainties are followed by structured and extensive problems, and these problems range from the financial and monitoring system issues to the moral hazard issues in the market economy. However, we believe that we can provide fundamental solutions to these problems when the recession and financial distress mostly become alleviated in few years. Many of these problems are associated with the key currency system (U.S 7 Foreword Dollar), and there are a number of disputes whether a new international financial system should be in place. At the center of these problems, there are many lingering questions for diminishing U.S Dollar standard; Will the dollar continue to play the dominant role in the future? SDR as a reserve currency, IMF bonds in Chinese FX reserves? Will the dollar remain strong in the future? and the future of the Euro? Is there a chance for Chinese yuan or Japanese yen to be a key currency? The countries with a large amount of the U.S Dollar-based assets are anxious because the United States monetary authorities have yet to assure them with clear answers. Since most East Asian countries use currencies that are not freely convertible, their currencies are closely linked to the U.S Dollar. China, for example, is a country which is largely sensitive to the changes in the value of U.S Dollar because of its massive investment in US dollar denominated assets. Therefore, Chinese government is trying to avoid potential risk, and, as a way of avoiding potential risk, the RMB internationalization is considered as an alternative measure. However, the real barrier is the fragile financial system, and this barrier should be removed most urgently.
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