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The Napoleon Series

The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 16, Part I

By: Maurice Weil

Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

(after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna)

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THE ALLIED CAVALRY

DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814

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CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA UNTIL THE MARCH OF THE EMPEROR ON ARCIS-SUR-AUBE (from 5 to 17 March). . - . - .

5 March 1814. --Surprise of Reims by the French. --Fortune had been unable to decide to stay long faithful to Napoleon. After having smiled for a few days, it already had to make him pay dearly for his momentary good graces. The surrender of was to be the starting point of a new series of misfortunes and disappointments, failures and disasters under the weight of which the Emperor's genius was to eventually succumb. One day, one fact had been enough to bring a serious and unexpected change in the situation of the two armies. Misfortune caused by the criminal failure of Moreau had destroyed the legitimate expectations of the Emperor without lessening his indomitable energy, to veil and obscure his wonderful lucidity. Appalled at first by the sudden collapse of his strategy, he had already resumed his composure, regained his usual presence of mind and held that if the damage was great, it was not yet irreparable.

Unable as he had hoped, in cornering Blücher at the , to make him fight at a disadvantage with a river behind him and prevent his junction with Bülow, he recognized the impossibility of abandoning the offensive operations that perhaps now he regretted having begun, but that he could not give up. Also, immediately taking a strong resolution, he decided to reach beyond the Aisne the opponent who had to escape, to turn its left wing and cut its communications with Belgium.

For ease of movement and to ensure some favorable opportunities, to achieve a safe operation, almost under the eyes of the Army of Silesia, of his flank march on Laon and his passage in Berry-au-Bac, the Emperor gave orders to undertake a series of transactions designed to both menace his adversary and divert its attention from the point through which he was expected and prevent the turn.

Acting primarily to protect his right against the enterprises of Saint-Priest that he knew was in march from Châlons towards Reims, cut communications of Blücher with this general and with the Allied Great Army,1 to get in touch with cities of the Ardennes, from which he wanted to recall the garrisons, meeting in Mézières, getting General Janssens, join him in Laon, then departing for Reims, with orders to take this city from the Russians, General Corbineau with the cavalry of General La Ferrières-Lévesque. Marching through short cuts in order to be more certain to conceal his march, supported by the people alerted to his enterprise and whose support could be counted on, Corbineau, arrived around 4 o'clock in the morning at Saint-Brice, went around Reims by the road from Laon and entered the city whose inhabitants, after running to arms, managed to occupy the gates. He managed in this way to envelope, surprise and make prisoners, almost without firing a shot, the four small squadrons and Cossacks that Prince Gagarin posted, some on the plateau of the left bank of the Vesle to the west of the suburb Épernay, the other in the same city.

Surprise of Cossacks at Braisne. --In the center, Roussel had taken advantage of the darkness of the night to make amends from the day before and leaving from and from Bazoches, he fell at Braisne at 2 o'clock in the morning, on a thousand Cossacks, taking a hundred, releasing the prisoners made the night before and established himself in this small town.2 Movement orders of the Emperor. --As the French cavalry succeeded in these night operations, the news of the surrender of Soissons reached the Emperor at , a few moments before the taking of Reims. "It certainly was," as he wrote the same night from Berry-au-Bac to the Duke of Feltre,3 "a small compensation for the great harm done by the treachery of the commander of Soissons."

Relieved at least momentarily of potential concerns caused by the approaching Saint-Priest. Napoleon took

1Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March, Report on the Events of 3 to 10 March, received by Schwarzenberg 14 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III. 182.)

2They found a curious proclamation at Braisne of Bernadotte. displayed by order of the Allies.

"The Crown Prince of Sweden to the French,"

"French! I have taken up arms by order of my king, to defend the rights of the Swedish people. Having avenged the insults he had received and contributed to the deliverance of Germany, I crossed the Rhine. Seeing again the banks of the river where I so often and so successfully fought for you, I feel the need to let you know my thoughts."

"Your government has continually tried to debase everything, felt entitled to despise everything; it is time that this system changes!"

"All enlightened men call for the conservation of old ; they wish only that it is no longer is the scourge of the earth."

"The sovereigns have not come together to make war with nations, but to force your Government to recognize the independence of States. Such are their intentions, and I am with you as guarantor of their sincerity."

"Adopted son of Charles XIII, placed by the election of a free people on the steps of the throne of the Great Gustavs, I can now have no other ambition than to work for the prosperity of the Scandinavian peninsula. May I, fulfilling this sacred duty towards my new country, contribute at the same time happiness to my former compatriots."

"Given at my headquarters of Avesnes, 23 February 1814."

"CHARLES-JEAN."

This proclamation was accompanied by a letter from the Russian commander of Fismes, Barnecky, to the mayor of Braisne, urging him to warn farmers menacing armed patrols, to cease hostilities and threatening retaliation. These two pieces were displayed at Braisne on 27 February. (Archives of the War.)

3 Correspondence, no 21444. advantage of restoring communications with towns of the Ardennes, returning to the plan he had previously formed and pressed the execution of movement by which he wanted to outflank the left of Blücher. From the early hours of the morning, all the orders of the Emperor were already prepared and sent.

With only the one stone bridge of Berry-au-Bac, he resolved to establish two trestle bridges at and Pont-Arcy. The Dragoon Guards, who were from the day before in , sent, would be immediately supported by Nansouty, who with the Poles of Pac and the cavalry of Exelmans, to seize the Berry-au-Bac bridge. The Poles, however, were only directed on Berry-au-Bac after the completion and recovery of the Maizy bridge. Ney marched following them on Maizy, while Victor went from Fère-en-Tardenois to Fismes. Finally, to divert even more fully Blücher's attention from the movements that the right of the Imperial Army would execute by the bad roads that led to Berry- au-Bac, Mortier and Marmont were ordered to probe Soissons, to see if the enemy evacuated the place and, if not, to move on Braisne, as soon as the Pont-Arcy bridge was completed.

A few hours later, between 9 and 11 o'clock in the morning, the movement on Berry-au-Bac was accentuated again. In the idea of the Emperor, Mortier would come from around Soissons to Braisne and Pont-Arcy: the Old Guard, Ney, Victor and the Duke of Padoue would march on Berry-au-Bac. The Poles of Pac were ordered to cross on the right bank of the Aisne to cut the road from Laon and take an artillery convoy leaving that city. The rest of the cavalry was to follow them closely and become, the 5th, the advanced guard at Laon.

Orders of Blücher. --Meanwhile, Blücher worried by the demonstrations made on Braisne in the afternoon of the 4th but not yet considering the possibility of a movement by the Emperor on Berry-au-Bac, was only concerned with a frontal attack against the plateau that extends between the Aisne and the (Lette). The day of the 5th should have served him to complete the training and deployment of his army in two lines facing the Aisne. He, however, at for the moment, intended to compete with the Emperor and accept the battle, and the orders that on the night of the 4th to 5th, was addressed to his corps commanders, began with these words: "The enemy pretends to want to flank my left and tries to cross the Aisne from Vailly at Berry-au-Bac. If Napoleon follows up on this project, I will attack between the Aisne and the Ailette."

If it was too late to guard the Berry-au-Bac bridge, it was still easy to occupy Craonne and ; however, in his order, Blücher had confined himself to prescribe to Winzingerode, whose corps, placed at the extreme left and with fresh troops, seemed appointed to run the movement towards Corbeny, to remain in his positions at Braye and Cerny-en-Laonnois, and watch the terrain in front of him to the Aisne. Sacken would be post to his right and leaving some troops in Vailly, would be formed with his main body from to Braye-en-Laonnois. The third Russian corps, that of Langeron, with the exception of the troops of General Rudzevich, which constituted the garrison of Soissons, would come from to Aizy and monitor the course of the Aisne, from Celles up to Soissons. The Prussian corps would form the second line and was ordered to post: the IInd Corps (Kleist) between La Royère and Filain; the Ist Corps (Yorck), between Jouy and Pargny: the IIIrd (Bülow) at the cross roads near .

The troops of the Army of Silesia were to begin their movements at 7 o'clock in the morning; the pontoons had orders to await further orders at the farm of the Ange-Gardien. The baggage continued to file on Laon and was to be imparked until further notice on the road of Crépy. As for Blücher, he remained in person at .

Marmont tries unsuccessfully to retake Soissons. --The different corps of the Army of Silesia had barely started their movement when the marshals Marmont and Mortier, hoping the Army of Silesia, retiring on the Craonne plateau, had renounced seriously defending Soissons, headed at 6 o'clock in the morning from Noyant by and on this city. At 8 o'clock in the morning, when the heads of the French columns debouched at the suburbs, they had to march under fire from the batteries of a Russian detachment that had crossed the river to Missy. It took them several hours to get to deploy in the plain, and it was in vain that they attacked, under the protection of their artillery, the suburb of Paris defended by four regiments of Russian eiger and a battalion of the Starooskolsky Regiment. The twenty-eight guns placed in battery by General Rudzevich vigorously answered the thirty pieces of the marshals. Sadly, despite all the efforts of the French, the tirailleurs of the Christiani Division hardly managed to snatch some of the Faubourg Saint-Christophe from the Russians of Colonel Dournow. The marshal then attempted at 3 o'clock, with the Ricard Division, an attack against the right-most suburb of Reims, defended by the Belozersk Regiment and the 48th Eiger. The French, who were reinforced, succeeded for a few hours to occupy the suburbs, but not to enter the city, though their shells had started more fires, their bullets would have expanded the breaches in the walls and that one of their batteries, firing from the ancient Celestine monastery, had enfiladed the Laon road. At 6 o'clock in the evening, the fire completely ceased. This attack, that Marmont in his Memoirs calls "a slight attempt and was to be unsuccessful," had to cost him a lot of people, since the losses of the Russians, who fought under cover, rose to 1,056 men.4 It had disastrous consequences for Soissons; busy coping with marshals, the Russian officers could not maintain order in the city and prevent irregulars and marauders taking advantage of the fight to pillage with impunity. Finally, the Marshal having persisting without reason to seriously tackle a place he believed retaken without effort, had lost sight of the formal orders of the Emperor and was still at 6 in the morning, in Villeneuve-Saint-Germain, when it was thought, and that indeed he should have made it to Braisne with his whole corps.

Cavalry Action of Berry-au-Bac. --Thanks to the speed of his movement, to the special character of vigor and decisiveness that his presence never failed to give his operations, thanks to the negligence of Blücher having considered it unnecessary to guard the bridge of Berry-au-Bac except by some Cossacks supported by a small detachment of infantry and two cannons, thanks to the number and accuracy of the information that his cavalry and the locals had provided to him in the course of the morning, Napoleon, knowing positively that Blücher was waiting on the plateau between the Aisne and the Ailette, could, at 11 o'clock, countermand the construction of bridges at Maizy and , to lead the whole army immediately on Berry-au Bac and launch without delay on this point Nansouty with the Poles of Pac and the cavalry division of Exelmans.

Driving before him the Cossacks sent to reconnoiter towards Roucy, Nansouty pushed them back so strongly on the farm of Moscou, he passed through the bridge pell-mell with them, crushing the Russian light infantry and the cavalry of Chernishev posted in the village, taking Prince Gagarin who had just joined with debris of his detachment surprised in the morning at Reims, captured in a blink of the eye from Berry-au-Bac and pursued to beyond La Ville-aux-Bois the Russians from whom he took two cannons and 300 men.

The infantry immediately took advantage of his success: the Meunier and Boyer divisions followed crossing the bridge and came to settle on the right bank of the Aisne in front of Berry-au-Bac, where the Emperor would spend the night of the 5th to 6th, while Nansouty continued on Corbeny and his scouts appeared around Laon.5

At 6 o'clock at night, the Emperor sent the order: to Victor and to the Duke of Padoue, the first arriving at Fismes, the second in Fère-en-Tardenois, to join him at once; to Corbineau, to send back the division of La Ferrières; to Grouchy, to rally the 6th at the latest, with the cavalry of Roussel, on the road to Laon; Mortier and Marmont were, he believed already in Braisne, to start up the 6th in the morning for Berry-au-Bac; finally, Marmont, to arrive on the 7th in Berry, so as to take part in the battle he expected to engage in Laon.

The possession of the Berry-au-Bac bridge was all the more important to the Emperor as the Cossacks who guarded the Aisne, from Soissons to Berry, had seriously thwarted attempts to establish bridge making at Vailly, at Maizy and Pontavert and that the pontoon equipment of General Léry, leaving in the morning from Château-Thierry and waiting in the night at Fismes, could not have been made it to Berry-au-Bac before 6 in the morning.

Skirmishes of the cavalry of Tettenborn before Reims. --Movement of the partisans. --Meanwhile, Tettenborn, heading for Reims and leaving Ville-en-Tardenois at 5 in the morning with his Cossacks, received almost simultaneously the news of the capture of the city by Corbineau and the warning of the approach a dragoon regiment marching on Reims by the road of Fismes, in the most open fashion and without any precautions. Tettenborn pounced on these dragoons with two of his Cossack regiments, surprised them, taking some fifty men and pursued them to the gates of Reims. Greeted with fusil fire and not being strong enough to try to retake the city, completely cut off from the corps of Winzingerode, there remained no other course to take than for them to withdraw to Épernay, where it was joined by a Cossack regiment of General Naryshkin and where it immediately communicated

4 Major Mareschal to Schwarzenberg, Troyes, 12 March (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 228.); Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Report, from Laon, 10 March (Ibid., III, 189), and Journal of Operations Count Langeron (Topographical Archives, no 29103). 5 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189), Major Mareschal to Schwarzenberg (Ibid., III, 228), and General Renni to Prince Volkonsky, from camp near Laon, 8 March (Ibid., III, 157).

with General Count de Saint-Priest, who had just arrived in Châlons.6

The partisans of Lützow and Falkenhausen had left since the day before Berry-au-Bac and taken by La Selve and Dizy-le-Gros, the path of Montcornet, finally to monitor what was happening on the side of Ardennes and menace the communications of the Emperor with Sedan and Mézières.

Despite the failure of the attack against Soissons of Marmont, Napoleon had nevertheless reason to be satisfied with his day. His movement had succeeded: he was master of the Berry-au-Bac bridge; he had made a strong foothold on the right bank of the Aisne, without engaging in a serious fight, and while Blücher had said a few days later, in his report to Schwarzenberg that "his army was posted in such a way that it could, either oppose the enemy on the heights between the Ange-Gardien and Craonne, or take the offensive by debouching by Craonne",7 it was nevertheless clear that the demonstrations on Soissons and on Braisne, had made a change in the Field Marshal, in diverting his attention to his left wing, the point both most vulnerable and most essential of his position, he had unmasked the flanking movement of Napoleon and prevented, ultimately, debouching by Craonne on Corbeny and regaining at this point the great road from Reims to Laon. The Emperor had thus foiled the first plans of Blücher, that for which the Prussian general had made his army to take position on the plateau from Cerny up to Laffaux, so as to dispute the passage of the Aisne.

The presence of the Emperor, the decrees he had shot out had given new impetus to the mass uprising and had revived the courage of rural populations. From La Ferté-sous-Jouarre up to Soissons, from Château-Thierry to Ville-en-Tardenois, from Épernay until around Laon, all the farmers from the right bank of the Marne had run to arms, killing the isolated and stragglers, attacking small units and weakly escorted convoys, taking dispatches and orders. One of these bands had a few days earlier, taken at the very gates of Châlons, Colonel de Saint-Priest, brother of the General.8

Despite the ease with which he had performing the first part of his movement and in gaining a foothold on the right bank of the Aisne at the head of its columns, the situation of the Emperor was however still quite precarious. He had only one bridge over the Aisne and had not been able to gain enough ground for fear of fighting with a defile behind him.

The first part of his flank march was executed without an encumbrance; but Marmont and Mortier were still at Soissons, Victor at Fismes and Padoue in Fère-en-Tardenois. Fortunately for him, Blücher, keeping his left between Cerny and Braye, awaiting his attack on the front of his position, neglecting to guard Berry-au-Bac, had of his own free will banned the possibility to engage before he had finished his deployment and recalled the corps that followed on him. In addition, the 5th in the evening, the Field Marshal had only vague and incomplete information on the events of the day and on the movements of the Emperor.

To the news that Allied couriers sent on 4th for the Great Army, had been forced to turn back and had in the afternoon of 5th come against the enemy on the beside Reims, the Field Marshal was content to write in the evening to Winzingerode, telling him to monitor Berry-au-Bac, report to him on the passage of the enemy, to enable him to mass his army on the plateau. He instructed further to hold the position of Craonne. He had, moreover, been informed by Major von Colomb, posted with his partisans between Pont-Arcy and Beaurieux, of attempts to throw a

6Tettenborn to Schwarzenberg, Port-a-Bison, 13 March 1814. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 241.)

7Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Report on Operations from 4 to 10 March, Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.) 8Letter from the Count de Saint-Priest to the Emperor Alexander, dated 28 February/12 March. (Journal of Received Pieces, no 424.)

The Emperor wanted to maintain the intensity of the national movement. Writing the 6th of March to Clarke, from Berry-au-Bac, he said: "You think, you others in Paris, France is lost; but when you see the dispositions of the peasants and the people we are far from sharing this idea. One could not be happier than I am with the farmers demanding only revenge and taking up arms." (Correspondence, no 21450.)

bridge over at Pont-Arcy and had learned by that officer that Benckendorff, thrown back from Braisne to the right bank of the Aisne, reported the progress of large columns moving on Berry-au-Bac.

Despite this information, he nevertheless refused to believe in the likelihood and imminence of the movement that the Emperor had so quickly executed during the day of 5th. So Winzingerode was left at Braye, instead of pushing on up Craonne and to press to the left of the other corps; it was thought useless, even harmful, to send much of the numerous cavalry of the Army of Silesia, which he only knew what to do with on the plateau, to the plain of Corbeny where there were the Cossacks of Ilovaysky and some squadrons of Chernishev.

6 March 1814. --Blücher informed on the night of the 5th to 6th of the crossing of the Emperor at Berry-au- Bac. --It was on the night of the 5th to 6th and only towards morning that the Field Marshal received the first notice of the crossing of the Aisne at Berry-au-Bac. The 6th at midnight Winzingerode had sent him at his headquarters in Braye-en-Laonnois, reports that came sent to him by the generals Vorontsov and Chernishev. "Before my infantry had time to pass Craonne," spoke Vorontsov in his dispatch to Winzingerode,9 dated from the bivouac near Craonne, 21 February (5 March) at 8 o'clock at night, "the enemy pushed General Ilovaysky so strongly that he was driven from Corbeny, and the enemy occupied this place. Ilovaysky withdrew on the road to Laon, with three regiments of Cossacks and four cavalry squadrons. It appears, moreover, that the enemy has pushed from Reims to somewhere about Neufchâtel because there have been some scouts who flanked our baggage in our rear. At present I have put my infantry between Craonne and Hurtebise; there is a road to the right that falls into that of Laon, on which our whole corps could go, if the intention of your Excellency was to cover Laon. I am sending parties, both to put me in communication with Ilovaysky, and to act on the rear of the enemy, between Corbeny and Berry-au-Bac. I find it very unfortunate that we were not able to defend this bridge, your Excellency can see, calculating the time that the thing was impossible, the infantry only leaving Soissons yesterday in the evening to go to their quarters. Your orders are eagerly awaited and I will send you instantly, all the news that I receive. It is also that in a moment like this, I almost had broken a leg last night by a horse, which makes me suffer impossibly." Winzingerode, transmitting the report, which had revealed to him the imminence of an attack, sent word to the Field Marshal that he had at once massed his troops and his cavalry especially, prescribed his vanguard to give to Sacken the defense of the bridge of Vailly, leaving only a string of vedettes on the Aisne, from Vailly to Pontavert and to join him immediately, and he added,10 ''I'll do my best. I will attack the enemy or defend myself against him, according to the events, and if I am forced to fall back before having been strengthened, will execute this movement by the road,11 which comes from Craonne, joining near Ange-Gardien the highway from Soissons to Laon. The night," Winzingerode was still saying, "prevents me from realizing the real forces of the enemy. I am told by certain reports and although I cannot believe it, that the enemy heads from Berry-au-Bac on Laon."

Orders and movements of the Emperor. --As Blücher received this news, the Emperor, despite the doubts expressed on this subject by Winzingerode had really intended to push straight on Laon. Marmont, after trying one last time, on the 6th, at 6 in the morning to take Soissons unsuccessfully, had left before the place a cavalry screen and had started his movement on Braisne, where his troops halted in the afternoon. The cavalry and infantry of Mortier, which had preceded, had, on the night of the 5th and 6th, relieved the cavalry of Roussel. These, filing from the morning on Berry-au-Bac, joined the Emperor before his departure for Corbeny. The infantry of Mortier and that of Victor were marching from Braisne and from Fismes on Berry-au-Bac.

The Emperor was, however, determined to make himself the head of the movement on Laon. Before leaving Berry- au-Bac to get to Corbeny he had taken care to conceal from King Joseph and the Duke of Feltre, the plan he intended to continue the implementation of and the Chief of Staff summed up in these terms in his dispatch to Macdonald:

Berry-au-Bac, 6 March at noon. --"His Majesty will go today on Laon and ordered to leave from the towns of Ardennes and Moselle, two strong divisions. His Majesty intends to fall on the right flank of the enemy Great

9Vorontsov to Winzingerode. (Original in French.) 10Winzingerode to Blücher, Braye, 6 March, midnight.

11He speaks here of the .

Army, by Saint-Dizier and Joinville, at the time Augereau will fall on his left flank by Bourg, Lons-le-Saunier that he already occupies and Besançon where he will lift the siege.”12 Throughout the morning, French troops would continue to move to Berry-au-Bac and a little before noon, the Emperor himself would go on with the cavalry of Grouchy, the division of La Ferrières-Lévesque called back from Reims, a brigade of General Pierre Boyer, and head on Corbeny, having prescribed the rest of the infantry to follow his movement. It is evident that at the same time, the Emperor hoped to find the road from Reims free and did not expect to meet between Corbeny and Laon, any cavalry positions supported by inferior numbers to those who followed them and he thought would easily be ended. Driving before him the Russian light cavalry of Chernishev that Winzingerode sent down into the plain and fell back skirmishing and in good order, he easily occupied Corbeny. He stopped there awaiting his infantry, while his cavalry chased from the Cossacks of Ilovaysky who settled there after their check of the day before, and from Sainte-Croix, the flying corps of Colomb that retired at the approach of the French horsemen onto the plateau of the Maison-Rouge south of .13

First order of Blücher. --While the French troops were headed, one on Corbeny, others on Berry-au-Bac, Blücher had already been informed of the crossing of the Aisne for a few hours, the concentration of the French between Berry-au-Bac and Corbeny and their clear intention to continue on Laon. When the day was gone, he took himself in person to the farm of Froidmont and ordered General von Müffling; to reconnoiter the terrain and the positions of the French. But the departure of the marshals who left from the area near Soissons to head to his left, completed the proof that the Emperor, far from thinking of the attack as was intended, instead, headed on Laon. Renouncing his first plans, Blücher, without waiting for the return of Müffling decided therefore to debouch from Craonne on to the plain of Corbeny in the hope of hitting the Imperial army as it performed its flank march on Laon.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon, from Froidmont, he sent his corps commanders, the orders to immediately move on Craonne, the infantry marching in mass in the center of the road, flanked to the right and on the left by the cavalry. "If there is battle," added the Field Marshal, "the cavalry will remain massed."

The idea of Blücher was certainly logical. The departure that he had just taken, seemed to promise him a success even easier and more certain as, Marmont and Mortier unable to arrive between Corbeny and Berry-au-Bac before the 7th in the evening, the Field Marshal had all the time necessary to crush, before their arrival, the Emperor that he had in his grasp in his flanking march from the Aisne to the Ailette. The execution of this plan was, however, subject to two essential conditions that the Field Marshal had made the mistake of losing sight up to then: the occupation of Craonne, the possession of which was vital for him to debouch on the flank of the French columns and the ability to bring, in the time necessary, his different corps to the new position that he thought to take, his right towards the Aisne from Cerny and to Craonne, his left from Bruyères to Festieux, his center at La Bôve and in the valley of the Ailette.

But Blücher had so belatedly admitted the possibility of an attack against his extreme left, he had given so little thought to the difficulties of marching and nature of the terrain, he had so firmly believed in a frontal attack on the side of Vailly, that he carried out the reconnaissance of Craonne plateau only at the time when the Emperor, warned of the presence of Russian troops on the heights of Craonne, attacked and took this position.

The long plateau that extends parallel to the Aisne and the Ailette, originates northwest of Soissons and comes to an end near the Aisne at the level of Corbeny. From the Ange-Gardien and Laffaux where, on the 6th in the morning, one finds the right of Blücher, this plateau finds at its fullest extent a total length of almost 25 kilometers. Bounded on the north by the narrow and marshy valley at the bottom of which flows the Ailette, limited to the south by the Aisne, which is characterized on this side by many folds, the plateau actually consists of two unequal sized plateaus, mainly variable in width, interconnected by a constriction whose width at Hurtebise is less than 150 meters. It is from this constriction slightly dominated by the two plateau, which stands on the south side of the mountain, a narrow ravine with steep slopes and a perpendicular, leading to the Foulon valley and known as the Trou d'Enfer (Hell Hole), given access only on this side by the neck of Hurtebise. Another ravine, the Trou de la Demoiselle, almost as difficult as the Trou d'Enfer, but dividing into several branches, gave passage by a bad path, starting from

12In the same dispatch, Berthier prescribed to Macdonald to hold at Troyes, "which is a good position" and recommended him in any case to stay on the until 12 March at least. (Archives of the War.)

13Aus dem Tagebuche des Rittmeisters von Colomb, 1813-1814. the Ailette valley and the village of Ailles, climbing the plateau and joining at Hurtebise the path of Dames. In this same place, the latter path, after following along the extent of the plateau from the route from Paris to Laon by Soissons, heads from Hurtebise even on the château of La Bôve, after having joined with the road coming from the highway from Reims by Corbeny and Craonne, traversed its whole length the steep promontory formed by the small plateau. The existence of this defile by which any passing company sought whether to debouch between the Aisne and the Ailette towards Corbeny, or to settle in the western part of the plateau, seems to have escaped the attention of the staff the Army of Silesia. Set in motion after two o'clock, and even admitting that only three of the six corps had followed the road from Dames, the Russian and Prussian troops would infallibly have lost even more time by debouching in front of Craonne that the frost which occurred during night, increasing the natural difficulties and dangers of the passage, would have made an impossible night march, at least for the artillery.

First action of Craonne. --While his army was committed on the long and narrow course, flanked north and south by the ravines that tilt towards the Ailette and towards the Aisne, the Field Marshal, having dispatched his orders for marching, was headed to Craonne, eager to join Müffling, combined with his subsequent operations, and desiring further to go by himself for a more accurate account of the terrain.

Covered in front by the 13th and 14th Regiments of eiger who, under the command of General Krasovsky, covered the eastern end of the plateau, Vorontsov took a position with the bulk of his infantry up to the mill of Craonne. General Poncet with the regiments of Tula and Navaguinsk, was in reserve Hurtebise.

The appearance of the Russians at Craonne and at Chevreux was enough to reveal the danger to the Emperor. Confiding to his aide, Captain de Caraman, two battalions of the Guard, he charged the Russian eiger skirmisher of Chevreux of at Craonne, pushing a reconnaissance on the plateau and to settle there.

Caraman, after taking Chevreux and firmly standing in Craonne, debouched by the ravine of the Pontoy mill onto the plateau; but repelled by the two regiments of Russian foot eiger, he was forced back on Craonne that he retained despite all the efforts of the Russians.14

At the same time, an order from the Emperor brought by General Dejean, Ney, to facilitate and support the reconnaissance of Caraman, was directed by the wood of Corbeny and the right bank of the Ailette, on La Bôve where he had pushed the Meunier Division forward on Hurtebise. Taken and retaken several times, the farm of Hurtebise ultimately remained with the Russians, when at 7 o'clock at night, the Emperor gave the order to break off the fight. The Meunier Division encamped on the slopes of the plateau between the farm of Hurtebise and the abbey of Vauclerc, connecting with its right to the brigade of General Pierre Boyer, who occupied the right of the road from La Bôve and the mill of Bouconville. The cavalry of the Guard (two divisions), the Old Guard of the Friant Division, divisions of generals Boyer de Rébeval and Curial bivouacked between Corbeny and Berry-au-Bac; the dragoons of Roussel settled in Berry-au-Bac with a part of the corps of Victor. Padoue stood around Roucy, Mortier at Cormicy and Marmont at Braisne.

Although this affair had not had any result hoped for and only the taking of Hurtebise could have provided, making the bloody battle the next day unnecessary, or at least completely changing its character, it never the less ended in

14The Count Nostitz, an eyewitness to the action, said the following in his Tagebuch: "the 6th, we were to take position on the plateau of Craonne. I found, at the mill located at the end of the plateau, General Chernishev with a few battalions and some cavalry. He watched from there the road from Reims to Laon, determined to prevent the enemy's arrival on this side on the plateau. The steep slopes of the hills at the foot of which there is a wood that we had not thought it necessary to occupy, seemed likely to make a fairly easy task. We suddenly noticed French skirmishers creeping into the wood. It narrowly escaped our attention. Soon after bullets arrived on plateau. We then tried unsuccessfully to flush out the skirmishers: the battalion sent against them was repulsed, and we were forced to leave the mill."

"This maneuver does the greatest honor to the French light infantry. It had, under our very eyes, managed to first occupy the wood by hiding wonderfully and keep it against our attacks." (Tagebuch of General of Cavalry Grafen von Nostitz: die Feldzuge 1813 und 1814. Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften herausgegeben vom grossen Generalstabe, 1884, V, 119.)

favor of the French. It had earned them the possession of the small plateau of Craonne, that would have been so difficult to snatch the next day from a superior enemy.

It had been useful mainly to show Blücher that it was impossible to debouch on the plateau to fall on the flank of French columns, and there was an emergency to take serious measures adapted to the circumstances to oppose the offensive movement of the Emperor.

Although he found it evident that Napoleon would not decide to defile with the bulk of his forces to Laon while the Army of Silesia occupied such a strong and dangerous a position on the left, Blücher, without waiting for the end of the fight that was delivered before his eyes,15 canceled at 5 o'clock the order he had given four hours earlier and was to bring his army, the right wing to the Aisne, left to the Ailette, halfway to Craonne and Soissons, in an almost impregnable position before which the Emperor, despite his desire and all his hurry to reach Laon, would not have dared defiled and against which the efforts of his little army would inevitably come to break.

In lieu of seeking to provoke this battle that the Emperor was forced to give him, with a defile at his back in weakened conditions such that there could be no doubt on its outcome, Blücher, fearing of being outpaced to Laon by French troops filing by Corbeny and the highway at Reims, gave at 6 o'clock orders that completely altered the dispositions of the afternoon: "The Army of Silesia will march on Laon by effecting a change of front which the infantry of Winzingerode, under the command of Vorontsov, supported by the corps of Sacken, will serve as pivot."

In his report to Prince Schwarzenberg,16 the Field Marshal has, moreover, been careful to explain the causes, decisive in his eyes, that decided this movement in such a hurry that one had not had time to weigh the disadvantages and dangers, with such haste that one could not resolve the details of its execution.

Although it had had to logically cause the Emperor to give up the next day the operations on Laon, this movement of the Army of Silesia was, instead, luckily for Blücher, to exasperate Napoleon and pushed to compromise in an instant the happy results due to his calm and his composure and come wildly crashing against the rock of Laon.

New orders of Blücher for 7 March. --"On 6 March at noon," said the Field Marshal,17 "the enemy columns marched by Berry; I did immediately advanced my army18 to the level of Craonne, for debouching there on to the plain; but Napoleon had, with his Guard, outpaced me to Craonne; he had occupied the woods and all the debouchments in a fashion to render the transit extremely difficult. The plateau of Craonne is too narrow for it to be possible to deploy an army of 80,000 men, and the news of the march of an enemy column by Corbeny on Laon, persuaded me to prescribe the 6 March at seven o'clock in the evening, to the general of cavalry Winzingerode to immediately move further left in passing, with 10,000 horses19 by . I wanted to arrive before the enemy on the road from Laon to take the offensive against him. I sent at the same time General Bülow to occupy the plateau of Laon, to keep my communications with the Netherlands."

Major Mareschal20again provides some observations that complement those just provided to us on the Field

15See NOSTITZ, Tagebuch. (Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften.)

16Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Report on Operations from 4 to 10 March; Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.) 17 Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Report on Operations from 4 to 10 March; Laon, 10 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 189.)

18 This march of an entire army column on only one road was executed, naturally, very slowly: "It was then, a painful movement, especially for the cavalry," wrote Count Henckel. "We were forced to stop at any instant, to make long halts, to then advance a few steps further."

19 The column of Winzingerode consisted, in addition to 10,000 horses, of about 60 pieces of horse artillery.

20 Major Mareschal to Prince Schwarzenberg, Report on the Operations from 2 to 11 March, Troyes, 12 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III, 228.) Marshal. "On the 6th," he said in his report to Schwarzenberg, "Winzingerode (left wing of the Army of Silesia) extended left on Craonne: he was charged with reconnoitering the enemy and throwing them back to the other side of the Aisne. The enemy emerged from Berry-au-Bac, attacked the front of Chernishev, occupied the woods of Corbeny and sent his cavalry on the road to Laon up to Festieux. The army of Blücher crammed onto the plateau, too narrow for it, which extends between the Aisne and the Ailette, and the enemy took the most direct road to Laon, at which point the Field Marshal Blücher directed his retirement. The Field Marshal positioned Vorontsov on the heights between Ailles and . Sacken served as support for Braye. Bülow, in charge of occupying the plateau of Laon, was immediately placed in march and had to cross the Ailette at the bridge of Chavignon (Pont- Oger). Winzingerode with 10,000 horses and 60 pieces of horse artillery that would gather in Filain, must gain the right bank of the Ailette at Chevregny taking it by Presles and Festieux, debouching at daybreak in the plain to the right of Bouconville, to block from the enemy the road from Corbeny to Laon, looking to surprise, threaten its communications, occupy and check, so as to help Bülow get to Laon first. Winzingerode was also, if the Emperor was committed on the Craonne plateau, to fall on his right and on his rear. Kleist and Langeron, crossing the Ailette behind the cavalry and then taking at Festieux the path of Laon, were responsible for eventually supporting Winzingerode. Finally, Yorck remained principally in Froidmont, ready to move at the first warning on the points where his presence would seem necessary."

The two corps of Vorontsov and Sacken seemed, precisely because of the terrain and the limited width of the plateau, sufficient to resist the attacks of the Emperor, until the cavalry Winzingerode and, if necessary, the corps of Kleist and Langeron would debouch on its right.

Blücher settled for the night in Braye; he proposed to personally direct the defense of the plateau and reserved to give the signal to attack as soon as the cavalry would have appeared. Instead of coming to Froidmont, the corps of Yorck in the evening received the order to stop at the level of Jouy and La Royère, where it spent the night. Kleist bivouacked at the same level. The Russians of Sacken encamped south of Froidmont and Langeron had behind the Prussian IInd Corps.

The Emperor confers with Mr. de Bussy. --Orders given by the Emperor. --While Blücher thusly modified his order of battle and prepared to execute his change of front, the Emperor, studying his maps of the theater of operations the next day, sought out people in the countryside who, thanks to their knowledge of localities, their personal situation and their education, could give him the information he needed before making his final dispositions. The Berry-au-Bac postmaster informed him of the Mayor of Beaurieux, a former artillery officer, M. de Bussy, that the Emperor immediately called to Corbeny, where he arrived in the middle of the night. Making in a few words, his former regiment comrade21 aware of the situation, the Emperor explained that he intended to establish his artillery at , opposing the Russian batteries and entertaining on their front, while Ney debouched to the left of the Allies at the point where the road from Dames arrives on plateau, and that threaten their right beside Vassogne. M. de Bussy pointed out to the Emperor that he was not fully informed about the terrain in the vicinity of Hurtebise, that the path he wanted Ney to follow was impassable for artillery and that debouching on the plateau near Hurtebise, the column of Ney would be blasted by both Russian batteries and by the French cannons. He advised, therefore, to abandon the road of Dames, pushing further into the Ailette Valley and skirting the plateau, not at Hurtebise but on the side of Ailles, while the cavalry of Nansouty would gravitate on the Russians on the right slope of the ravine of Oulches and the valley of Foulon. The Emperor agreed to that advice, altered his orders accordingly and kept near him in the capacity of an aide Mr. de Bussy, who he named colonel and who he charged with providing guidance to the columns of attack.22 Marshal Ney, supported on the left by Victor and Grouchy's cavalry, was to perform the movement on Ailles.23

21M. de Bussy had followed the same courses of the Brienne school together with the Emperor and had served in the same regiment as him.

22FAIN, Manuscript of 1814 and FLEURY, The Invasion in Northeast Departments.

23Position of the French during the night of 6 to 7 March. According to the notes by General Belliard, the troops of Ney (a), crossing the night in from of Oulches in the ravine of the Foulon valley; that of Victor on the little plateau of Craonne militarily guarding the wood of Corbeny, the cavalry of the Guard at Craonne and Craonnelle, the 1st Division of Infantry of the Old Guard at Corbeny where the general headquarters were, the 2nd at Cormicy, behind

The night passed without incident: a little snow fell and a frost occurred suddenly that would further increase the difficulties of travel.

After stopping his dispositions following his meeting with Bussy, the Emperor, on the basis of erroneous reports that were received during the night and who represented to him the Army of Silesia as, "discouraged, confused, in full retreat on Ange-Gardien and from there on Laon or Soissons," hoping not to have to deliver a rearguard battle. It hoped to arrive early in Laon with the bulk of its forces who were still between Berry-au-Bac and Corbeny and "begin retirement for all that had not yet crossed."24

From 4 o'clock in the morning, he had prescribed to the Duke of Padoue to halt his movement from Roucy on Berry- au-Bac; Colbert and Roussel to come at the break of day to settle behind Corbeny; Ney was to follow the Russians once knowing "whether from Ange-Gardien they go on Laon or on Soissons"; the cavalry of General Defrance to take position halfway on the road from Berry-au-Bac to Reims; Marmont was to cover Braisne and Fismes and try to throw over a bridge Maizy that would allow him to join two or three hours earlier.

Placed on the Napoleon Series: September 2015

Berry-au-Bac where the Duke of Trévise had his headquarters; the corps of the Duke of Padoue at Fismes, that of Marmont, one division in front of Soissons, the other at Braisne, the Guard of Honor at Châlons-sur-Vesle. (Archives of the War.)

(a) General Belliard it seems evident speaks here of the cavalry of Nansouty.

24 Correspondence, no 21453: Records of Berthier: Orders to Padoue, Colbert et Roussel, to Ney and to Marmont. (Archives of the War.)