The Napoleon Series The Campaign of 1814: Chapter 16, Part I By: Maurice Weil Translated by: Greg Gorsuch THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 (after the documents of the imperial and royal archives of Vienna) _____________________ THE ALLIED CAVALRY DURING THE CAMPAIGN OF 1814 ________________________ CHAPTER XVI. OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF SILESIA UNTIL THE MARCH OF THE EMPEROR ON ARCIS-SUR-AUBE (from 5 to 17 March). CRAONNE. - LAON. - REIMS. 5 March 1814. --Surprise of Reims by the French. --Fortune had been unable to decide to stay long faithful to Napoleon. After having smiled for a few days, it already had to make him pay dearly for his momentary good graces. The surrender of Soissons was to be the starting point of a new series of misfortunes and disappointments, failures and disasters under the weight of which the Emperor's genius was to eventually succumb. One day, one fact had been enough to bring a serious and unexpected change in the situation of the two armies. Misfortune caused by the criminal failure of Moreau had destroyed the legitimate expectations of the Emperor without lessening his indomitable energy, to veil and obscure his wonderful lucidity. Appalled at first by the sudden collapse of his strategy, he had already resumed his composure, regained his usual presence of mind and held that if the damage was great, it was not yet irreparable. Unable as he had hoped, in cornering Blücher at the Aisne, to make him fight at a disadvantage with a river behind him and prevent his junction with Bülow, he recognized the impossibility of abandoning the offensive operations that perhaps now he regretted having begun, but that he could not give up. Also, immediately taking a strong resolution, he decided to reach beyond the Aisne the opponent who had to escape, to turn its left wing and cut its communications with Belgium. For ease of movement and to ensure some favorable opportunities, to achieve a safe operation, almost under the eyes of the Army of Silesia, of his flank march on Laon and his passage in Berry-au-Bac, the Emperor gave orders to undertake a series of transactions designed to both menace his adversary and divert its attention from the point through which he was expected and prevent the turn. Acting primarily to protect his right against the enterprises of Saint-Priest that he knew was in march from Châlons towards Reims, cut communications of Blücher with this general and with the Allied Great Army,1 to get in touch with cities of the Ardennes, from which he wanted to recall the garrisons, meeting in Mézières, getting General Janssens, join him in Laon, then departing for Reims, with orders to take this city from the Russians, General Corbineau with the cavalry of General La Ferrières-Lévesque. Marching through short cuts in order to be more certain to conceal his march, supported by the people alerted to his enterprise and whose support could be counted on, Corbineau, arrived around 4 o'clock in the morning at Saint-Brice, went around Reims by the road from Laon and entered the city whose inhabitants, after running to arms, managed to occupy the gates. He managed in this way to envelope, surprise and make prisoners, almost without firing a shot, the four small squadrons and Cossacks that Prince Gagarin posted, some on the plateau of the left bank of the Vesle to the west of the suburb Épernay, the other in the same city. Surprise of Cossacks at Braisne. --In the center, Roussel had taken advantage of the darkness of the night to make amends from the day before and leaving from Paars and from Bazoches, he fell at Braisne at 2 o'clock in the morning, on a thousand Cossacks, taking a hundred, releasing the prisoners made the night before and established himself in this small town.2 Movement orders of the Emperor. --As the French cavalry succeeded in these night operations, the news of the surrender of Soissons reached the Emperor at Fismes, a few moments before the taking of Reims. "It certainly was," as he wrote the same night from Berry-au-Bac to the Duke of Feltre,3 "a small compensation for the great harm done by the treachery of the commander of Soissons." Relieved at least momentarily of potential concerns caused by the approaching Saint-Priest. Napoleon took 1Blücher to Schwarzenberg, Laon, 10 March, Report on the Events of 3 to 10 March, received by Schwarzenberg 14 March. (K. K. Kriegs Archiv., III. 182.) 2They found a curious proclamation at Braisne of Bernadotte. displayed by order of the Allies. "The Crown Prince of Sweden to the French," "French! I have taken up arms by order of my king, to defend the rights of the Swedish people. Having avenged the insults he had received and contributed to the deliverance of Germany, I crossed the Rhine. Seeing again the banks of the river where I so often and so successfully fought for you, I feel the need to let you know my thoughts." "Your government has continually tried to debase everything, felt entitled to despise everything; it is time that this system changes!" "All enlightened men call for the conservation of old France; they wish only that it is no longer is the scourge of the earth." "The sovereigns have not come together to make war with nations, but to force your Government to recognize the independence of States. Such are their intentions, and I am with you as guarantor of their sincerity." "Adopted son of Charles XIII, placed by the election of a free people on the steps of the throne of the Great Gustavs, I can now have no other ambition than to work for the prosperity of the Scandinavian peninsula. May I, fulfilling this sacred duty towards my new country, contribute at the same time happiness to my former compatriots." "Given at my headquarters of Avesnes, 23 February 1814." "CHARLES-JEAN." This proclamation was accompanied by a letter from the Russian commander of Fismes, Barnecky, to the mayor of Braisne, urging him to warn farmers menacing armed patrols, to cease hostilities and threatening retaliation. These two pieces were displayed at Braisne on 27 February. (Archives of the War.) 3 Correspondence, no 21444. advantage of restoring communications with towns of the Ardennes, returning to the plan he had previously formed and pressed the execution of movement by which he wanted to outflank the left of Blücher. From the early hours of the morning, all the orders of the Emperor were already prepared and sent. With only the one stone bridge of Berry-au-Bac, he resolved to establish two trestle bridges at Maizy and Pont-Arcy. The Dragoon Guards, who were from the day before in Roucy, sent, would be immediately supported by Nansouty, who with the Poles of Pac and the cavalry of Exelmans, to seize the Berry-au-Bac bridge. The Poles, however, were only directed on Berry-au-Bac after the completion and recovery of the Maizy bridge. Ney marched following them on Maizy, while Victor went from Fère-en-Tardenois to Fismes. Finally, to divert even more fully Blücher's attention from the movements that the right of the Imperial Army would execute by the bad roads that led to Berry- au-Bac, Mortier and Marmont were ordered to probe Soissons, to see if the enemy evacuated the place and, if not, to move on Braisne, as soon as the Pont-Arcy bridge was completed. A few hours later, between 9 and 11 o'clock in the morning, the movement on Berry-au-Bac was accentuated again. In the idea of the Emperor, Mortier would come from around Soissons to Braisne and Pont-Arcy: the Old Guard, Ney, Victor and the Duke of Padoue would march on Berry-au-Bac. The Poles of Pac were ordered to cross on the right bank of the Aisne to cut the road from Laon and take an artillery convoy leaving that city. The rest of the cavalry was to follow them closely and become, the 5th, the advanced guard at Laon. Orders of Blücher. --Meanwhile, Blücher worried by the demonstrations made on Braisne in the afternoon of the 4th but not yet considering the possibility of a movement by the Emperor on Berry-au-Bac, was only concerned with a frontal attack against the plateau that extends between the Aisne and the Ailette (Lette). The day of the 5th should have served him to complete the training and deployment of his army in two lines facing the Aisne. He, however, at for the moment, intended to compete with the Emperor and accept the battle, and the orders that on the night of the 4th to 5th, was addressed to his corps commanders, began with these words: "The enemy pretends to want to flank my left and tries to cross the Aisne from Vailly at Berry-au-Bac. If Napoleon follows up on this project, I will attack between the Aisne and the Ailette." If it was too late to guard the Berry-au-Bac bridge, it was still easy to occupy Craonne and Corbeny; however, in his order, Blücher had confined himself to prescribe to Winzingerode, whose corps, placed at the extreme left and with fresh troops, seemed appointed to run the movement towards Corbeny, to remain in his positions at Braye and Cerny-en-Laonnois, and watch the terrain in front of him to the Aisne. Sacken would be post to his right and leaving some troops in Vailly, would be formed with his main body from Ostel to Braye-en-Laonnois.