IV. THE DEEPENING CRISIS, JUNE 17-AUGUST 20: REPUDIATION OF THE JUNE 16 AGREEMENT, U.S. EFFORTS TO PROMOTE CONCILP;TION, PRESS COVERAGE AND INTERNATIONAL OPINION, JULY 18 ADDRESS BY DIEM, RENEWED DENUNCIATION OF THE BUDDHISTS BY THE NHUS 180. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State’ Saigon, June 19,1963-noon. 1209. CINCPAC for POLAD. I called on Vice President Tho June 18 to congratulate him on success his mission in reaching agreement with Buddhists. He seemed genuinely to appreciate the gesture. In course of conversation, Tho acknowledged that negotiations had been quite difficult. He denied, however, that Buddhist demands had gone so far as in effect to amount to demand that Buddhism become “established” church Vietnam. (British Ambassador had got- ten this impression from his separate talk with Tho.) Vice President said that he thought Buddhists were satisfied with results and that if there were no misunderstandings (malentendus) in implementing agreement, there should be no further trouble. However, he made it clear that he thought there was considerable possibility of misunder- standings. For example, when I said I had been pleased to see that the communique’ provided for continuation of his commission to super- vise implementation and asked how this would be accomplished, he said that complaints would be referred to commission and that Minis- ter of Interior (member of commission) had all the means necessary to deal with them, provided he had the necessary support from above. Tho was obviously not sure that he would. Vice President asked me whether I thought agreements were fair, and I said I thought they were. However, it seemed to me that they should be regarded by government as point of departure, rather than conclusion of a difficult episode. I thought that events since May 8 had left deep and widespread scars and that government had suffered severe loss of support in all important segments of population. Ques- tion now was whether government would conclude danger had passed and draw back and tighten up or whether it would move forward with actions to restore lost confidence. This I thought would require not I Source: Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-l S VIET. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to CINCPAC. ’ See Document 178. 400 The Deepening Buddhist Crisis 401 only faithful carrying out of agreement but concessions to other griev- ances. Unfortunately, I said, such indications as had yet appeared suggested tightening up. Vice President nodded throughout this but limited himself to saying that I “understood the problem well”. Earlier in the day, I talked to Thuan along much the same lines, only more bluntly. I told him that, in my opinion, President had not only suffered severe loss confidence in Vietnam but also in Washing- ton. I also spelled out for him, as I had not done for Vice President, indications which led me to believe that there was at least strong pressure on the President to tighten up. I mentioned the anomalous meeting at headquarters of Women’s Solidarity Movement on the morning of announcement of agreement at which tape recordings of June 7 resolution3 had been read. I cited news reports in Times of Vietnam June 17 which sought to place “responsibility for hysteria which has been created in past week squarely on shoulders of those who for undisclosed reasons delayed final signing,” and another state- ment that, although communique states that those supporting Bud- dhists’ 5 demands will benefit from Presidential clemency, “there is no clear agreement to absolve completely those who provoked the affairs of the last two weeks.” I pointed out also that we had solid evidence that certain elements of security forces were devoting their major attention to activities and movements of Americans rather than VC or Buddhists. Finally I cited specific incident of apparent harassment of American (see separate CAS telegram). 4 Thuan asked me what sort of further GVN concessions I had in mind. I replied that it would not be difficult to produce specific suggestions but I thought it would be better if GVN came up with ideas of its own. Specific suggestions from US would, I feared, be tainted in GVN mind. One area which immedi- ately suggested itself, however, was that of justice, viz., bringing long- detained prisoners to trial, etc. Thuan indicated agreement with my analysis of problem but did not otherwise react. Unless Department has objection, I shall push along on these lines as I am able to find opportunities to do so. Trueheart ‘See footnote 2, Document 157. ’ Not found. 402 Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, Volume III 181. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam’ Washington, June 19, 1963-8:28 p.m. 1247. For Trueheart from Hilsman. Embtels 1209,’ 1211.3 En- tirely concur with line you have been taking as reported reftels. Be- lieve this line must now be followed by very hard-hitting approach to Diem which you may put on paper as gist of an instruction from Department. Unless you have most serious reservations you are instructed convey to Diem following as coming from Washington. Until May 8 incident U.S. public and official opinion increasingly impressed by GVN success against Viet Cong. This favorable trend has now been dangerously reversed. Hilsman and other U.S. officials who must defend in current Congressional hearings U.S. aid and assistance programs for Viet-Nam are finding their position increasingly difficult in the face of grave political pressures and serious questions about the Buddhist problem. There is room to be generous in dealing with the Buddhists and such dealing is necessary to rebuild the prestige of the Vietnamese Government in America. While agreement on five points has been reached, suspicions and tensions are still most serious and a reasonable and friendly attitude is absolutely necessary if the GVN is to regain its prestige in Viet-Nam and its reputation in Washington. Also the GVN should not be equated with one individual. For example statement (Embtel 1156)4 “Buddhism can count on the Constitution, in other words, on me” made bad impression here. (FYI Preceding two sentences may be used at your discretion. End FYI) There should be no separation between the Government and people of Viet-Nam the great majority of whom consider themselves to be Buddhists. The barricades in Saigon emphasize this serious sepa- I Source: Department of State, Central Files, AID (US) S VIET. Secret; Limit Distri- bution. Drafted by Wood and cleared by Rice and, in draft, by H&man. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. ’ Supra. ’ In telegram 1211 from Saigon, June 19, 5 p.m., Trueheart reported that Thuan had assured him that no additional bonzes had been jailed beyond those already known to the Embassy. Trueheart noted that he reiterated to Thuan the advice outlined in tele- gram 1209 from Saigon, and expressed his concern over the possibility of a further damaging statement from Madame Nhu. (Department of State, Central Files, SOC 14-1 S VIET) ‘See footnote 3, Document 165. The Deepening Buddhist Crisis 403 ration and should be taken down. The highest leaders of the Govern- ment should meet Buddhist leaders regularly and treat them as respected equals. The Government should consider other gestures of good faith which recognize that the Buddhists are sincere and that they are enti- tled to an honored place in the Vietnamese nation. The joint communique of June 16 in which agreement was reached on the five demands should be scrupulously respected and promptly carried out so as to reduce the suspicions of the Buddhists who are watching the Government’s actions closely. The Buddhist leaders are well organized and have not permitted the Communists or political opposition elements to take control. They are a disciplined and peaceful people who must be treated without suspicion. News of these events reaches Washington promptly and any evi- dence that elements within the GVN were seeking to hold back on the agreements or to criticize the Buddhists publicly or privately would have grave effects. Madame Nhu’s statements have caused such seri- ous questions in Washington (and evidently in Saigon) as to the sincerity of the GVN’s intentions that a profound sense of irritation is already damaging the close U.S.-GVN sense of cooperation which must endure for a long time if Viet-Nam is to succeed against the Communists. (FYI Dept has just received [document number not declas- sified]. End FYI. Other steps to win back the Buddhists should be considered and preparations should be started now to carry out free parliamentary elections in August. The GVN must seriously consider such steps as permitting opposition candidates to run without harassment, at least some trials of prisoners, and broadening the Cabinet. In general the GVN should seek to convince its citizens that it is a reasonable Government dedicated to assisting, not harassing them and to preserving law and order without employing means so strong or so irritating as to cause divisions and dissensions. Well realize difficulty of conveying these thoughts, but unless they are clearly understood the entire U.S. effort of supplying neces- sary support to Viet-Nam is in jeopardy. Enemies of foreign aid are making maximum use of all derogatory news from Viet-Nam. As a specific example it will now be more difficult to approve recently requested crop destruction program (Deptel 1208) 5 since any ’ The reference should be to telegram 1208 from Saigon, June 19, 11 a.m., in which the Embassy reported on a South Vietnamese military operation and noted that the Diem government had made an urgent request to the Embassy for supporting crop destruction with herbicides in the area of the military operation.