Relevance Theory Through Pragmatic Theories of Meaning

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Relevance Theory Through Pragmatic Theories of Meaning Relevance Theory through Pragmatic Theories of Meaning Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen (ahti-veikko.pietarinen@helsinki.fi) Department of Philosophy; P. O. Box 9 FIN-00014 University of Helsinki, Finland Abstract is the sum total of its implications for possible observa- tions and actions. I argue that we may classify the Rele- A century ago, Peirce developed a pragmatic theory of vance Theory (RT) of (Sperber & Wilson, 1995) within meaning. The theory appeals to the Pragmatic Maxim. the framework of such pragmatic theory of meaning. It says that the meaning of a concept is the sum total The RT claims to provide a logical and cognitive ac- of its implications for possible observations and actions. The Relevance Theory of Sperber & Wilson is classified count of relevance. It attempts to capture the notion of according to that criteria to the category of pragmatic relevance in communicative situations through contex- theories of meaning. It is argued that relevance is an tual effects. Since it is impossible to know in advance instance of the application of the Pragmatic Maxim. which descriptions of circumstances or parts of the com- Keywords: Relevance theory, pragmatic theory of mon ground will actually be relevant to the dynamic, meaning, Peirce, pragmatic maxim, pragmatics, com- on-going processes of linguistic communication, Sperber positionality. & Wilson define the notion in terms of a context-change potential. In other words, relevant factors or properties of an Introduction expression are those which intrude into the context of discourse. This is an argument from cognitive economy: Peirce's Pragmatic Theory of Meaning the goal of communication is to maximise the relevance Charles Sanders Peirce (1839{1914), the noted American of the phenomena available to language users while min- philosopher and scientist, took pragmatic meaning as a imising the amount of mental or cognitive processing ef- rule of logic embodied in the Pragmatic Maxim (PM): fort. The grounds for believing in cognitive economy are, Consider what effects, that might conceivably have prac- in turn, evolutionary. tical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then our conception of these effects is the whole of Relevance Theory and the Pragmatic our conception of the object (5.402, 1878, How to Make Maxim our Ideas Clear).1 When considering whether a thought is logical, one has to take the practical consequences of Preamble that thought into account. These consequences do not The Inferential Model of Communication Ac- have to be actually acted out, but one has to consider cording to RT, the inferential model of communication them and take them to be conceivable if any thought was involves attempts to share, distribute and recognise acts to be complete at all. of intention, emotion and other modalities delivered in Such pragmatic forms of meaning are of utmost im- communication. These attempts are what contribute portance not only in linguistic pragmatics and commu- to the relevance of utterances intended to communicate nication, but also in current theories of knowledge repre- particular pieces of information. What agents recognise sentation, conceptual graphs in computer and cognitive as relevant is largely related to common traces in their sciences, as well as in the upcoming vision of a `semantic experience. web' (Pietarinen, 2003a). All of the applications have enormous potential for the future societies and methods Context The notion of context is therefore central to of communication. Among others, the prominent role of this theory, since what is relevant is that which produces such thinking is recognised in recent logical and topolog- a tangible contextual effect, or which penetrates the con- ical approaches to space and time (Pietarinen, 2005a). text of discourse.2 The goal of RT is to provide a theory of communication that would function as a reference for Sperber & Wilson's Relevance Theory a host of pragmatic phenomena running wild in linguistic populations. Peirce developed a pragmatic theory of meaning, which appeals to the PM. It says that the meaning of a concept 2Apart from cognitive economy, the idea hints at an el- ement of utilitarianism in the definition of communicative 1The reference is to Peirce (1931{1958) by volume and goals in terms of the maximisation of something (in this con- paragraph number. text, relevance). 1767 Moderate Psychologism The basic idea of RT is that the infiltration of such items into that context have thus neither entirely psychological nor epistemic, though may thus be read as Sperber & Wilson's preferred prop- admitting a modicum of both. It aims at providing a the- erties of relevance in linguistic utterances, which balance ory which is psychologically and psycholinguistically re- the inferences made in choosing between possible rival alistic, but not overly so. It is an attempt to make sense interpretations against the notion of the cost of making of linguistic pragmatics at the cognitive level which, ac- such inferences. In the light of PM, and mutatis mutan- cording to (Carston, 1988, p. 713), is \the first account dis, RT turns out to be a markedly pragmatic theory of of pragmatics which is grounded in psychology". pragmatics.5 Note that this may not be a major compliment. Most The Subjunctive Formulation The PM also states have regarded H. Paul Grice's program of analysing lit- that practical consequences need not be actualised, even eral meaning in public language through conversational though they need to be actualisable. They illustrate a maxims as psychological, since it involves speakers' and `would-be', a modality presented to the consciousness hearers' intentions and beliefs (Grice, 1989). I consider of future deliberation. According to Peirce's scholastic this assimilation to be a gross oversimplification even on realism, possibilities are just as real as actual objects and Grice's own account (Pietarinen, 2004b). events. Meaning as a list of practical consequences of a That the aim of relevance would be in psychological concept is characterised in terms of subjunctive rather explanation backfires. Even though announced as one of than indicative conditionals. the main aims of RT, the idea of relevance has not been This subjunctive nature of meaning is central to RT, tame enough to suit the needs of a rigorous logical mod- in which it is exceedingly difficult to say which among elling of discourse, since such an enterprise would hinge the wide variety of relevant semantic attributes would on effective ways of representing contextual information finally materialise. Such hypotheticals manifest them- and its change. selves in the relevance of the proposition \Diamonds are The Pragmatic Maxim hard but not very firm” as expressed by a conditional such as \If diamonds are rubbed then they are unlikely Formulation My key concern, given Peirce's prag- to be scratched" as well as in \If diamonds are struck matic outlook on the meaning of concepts, is the placing against something rock hard they are likely to break into of Sperber & Wilson's proposal in a wider perspective. I pieces". wish to suggest that relevance may be thought of as an instance of Peirce's PM, which says that the meaning of Note that this later subjunctive formulation has a concept is the sum total of its implications for possible caused some to consider the PM to be both too liberal observations and actions. and too broad in its characterisation of concept mean- The formulation of PM first appeared in the January ing in terms of possible, potential or expected practical 1878 issue of Popular Science Monthly. Several versions effects that may never be manifested. of it exist in Peirce's large corpus. A very succinct and Subjunctive Contextual Change This criticism is unambiguous one says that \the maxim of logic [is] that nevertheless not effective in formulations of PM that the meaning of a word lies in the use that is to be made take relevance into account. What is expected to be rel- of it" (CN 2.184, 2 February 1899, Matter, Energy, Force evant is often not only sufficient for a contextual change and Work).3 to happen. A mere potentiality may also intrude into the context and change the constitution in a hypothetical Unfolding the PM For initial purposes, PM may way, as a form of possible or subjunctively accounted con- be read such that, in assessing the scores and the over- textual change, rather than actually realising and bring- all scale according to which items of information are ing any observable effect into existence. weighted depends to a large extent on (i) practical con- sequences of accommodating the chosen piece of infor- One example of a potential effect is the asymmetric mation introduced in communication, and (ii) what will case of the hearer's determination of what would count ensue as a consequence of actually using that piece in as relevant in contradistinction to what the speaker in- further cycles of discourse.4 According to PM, the most tended to be relevant. In other words, relevance to the relevant information is that which provides the best toe- hearer may remain a potential change, given the shared hold for agents to continue the dialogue or action. environment of the utterance. We may thus think of practical bearings as contextual Relevance as a Constraint According to Sperber & bearings which an item of information, or a belief, has on Wilson's original formulation of RT, relevance is some- the context within which it is located. The implications thing that is not determined by context but constrained by context. On the contrary, thus, a particular context 3 The reference is to Peirce (1975{1987) by volume and is determined by the search for relevance, the interpreter paragraph number. The quotation is a striking foreshadow- ing of Wittgenstein's mantra that \the word has meaning by acting according to the version of the Principle of Char- the particular use we make of it" (Wittgenstein, 2000, item ity that concerns relevance maximisation.
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