Integration of the Captive Portal Paradigm with the 802.1X Architecture
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Configuring SSL for Services and Servers
Barracuda Web Application Firewall Configuring SSL for Services and Servers https://campus.barracuda.com/doc/4259877/ Configuring SSL for SSL Enabled Services You can configure SSL encryption for data transmitted between the client and the service. In the BASIC > Services page, click Edit next to a listed service and configure the following fields: Status – Set to On to enable SSL on your service. Status defaults to On for a newly created SSL enabled service. Certificate – Select a certificate presented to the browser when accessing the service. Note that only RSA certificates are listed here. If you have not created the certificate, select Generate Certificate from the drop-down list to generate a self-signed certificate. For more information on how to create self- signed certificates, see Creating a Client Certificate. If you want to upload a self-signed certificate, select Upload Certificate from the drop- down list. Provide the details about the certificate in the Upload Certificate dialog box. For information on how to upload a certificate, see Adding an SSL Certificate. Select ECDSA Certificate – Select an ECDSA certificate presented to the browser when accessing the service. SSL/TLS Quick Settings - Select an option to automatically configure the SSL/TLS protocols and ciphers. Use Configured Values - This option allows you to use the previously saved values. If the values are not saved, the Factory Preset option can be used. Factory Preset - This option allows you to enable TLS 1.1, TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 protocols without configuring override ciphers. Mozilla Intermediate Compatibility (Default, Recommended) - This configuration is a recommended configuration when you want to enable TLS 1.2 and TLS 1.3 and configure override ciphers for the same. -
26. Java 8 and 8 Security Controls 2-28-2017
New Security Control Enhancements Java 8 and 9 JIM MANICO Secure Coding Instructor www.manicode.com A little background dirt… [email protected] @manicode § Author of "Iron-Clad Java, Building Secure Web APPlications” from McGraw-Hill/Oracle-Press § 20+ years of software develoPment experience § OWASP Volunteer and Former OWASP Global Board Member § Kauai, Hawaii Resident Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY 2 Java Enhancement ProPosals Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY 3 'ohana (oh-ha-na) MEANING: Family. MOST COMMON USE: In referring to the WHOLE family. Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY JEP IT UP § JEP stands for a JDK Enhancement Proposal § JEP's are how you drive change in the Java ecosystem. § Involvement is actually a lot of work. § Attention is given to PeoPle that put in the work. § The way to make imProvements or get ideas seriously considered is to do them via the JEP ProPosal Process. § Mike Ernst and Werner Dietl are good examPles. They are the duo that built type annotations which we we will talk about soon. Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY 5 Java 9 Security JEP's Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY 6 Java 9 Security Enhancements § There are 8 main security related JEPs for JDK 9: 219: Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) 229: Create PKCS12 Keystores by Default 232: ImProve Secure APPlication Performance 244: TLS Application-Layer Protocol Negotiation Extension 246: Leverage CPU Instructions for GHASH and RSA 249: OCSP Stapling for TLS 287: Support SHA-3 Hash Algorithms 288: DisaBle SHA-1 Certificates Creative Commons MANICODE SECURITY 7 akamai (ah-ka-my) MEANING: Smart or Clever. MOST COMMON USE: Smart. -
X.509V3 Certificates for SSH Authentication
X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication The X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication feature uses public key algorithm (PKI) for server and user authentication, and allows the Secure Shell (SSH) protocol to verify the identity of the owner of a key pair via digital certificates, signed and issued by a Certificate Authority (CA). This module describes how to configure server and user certificate profiles for a digital certificate. • Prerequisites for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 1 • Restrictions for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 1 • Information About X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 2 • How to Configure X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 3 • Verifying the Server and User Authentication Using Digital Certificates , on page 6 • Configuration Examples for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 6 • Additional References for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 7 • Feature Information for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication, on page 8 Prerequisites for X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication The X.509v3 Certificates for SSH Authentication feature replaces the ip ssh server authenticate user command with the ip ssh server algorithm authentication command. Configure the default ip ssh server authenticate user command to remove the ip ssh server authenticate user command from the configuration. The IOS secure shell (SSH) server will start using the ip ssh server algorithm authentication command. When you configure the ip ssh server authenticate user command, the following message is displayed: Warning SSH command accepted; but this CLI will be deprecated soon. Please move to new CLI ip ssh server algorithm authentication. -
Crosslink TG Software and Programming Manual
Product revision: 1.4 2021-03-12 CrossLink TG Software and Programming Manual www.crosscontrol.com CrossLink TG Product revision: 1.4 Software and Programming Manual 2021-03-12 Contents Revision history ......................................................................................................................... 4 1. Introduction .......................................................................................................................... 5 1.1. How to access functionality .......................................................................................... 5 2. RTUControl API ..................................................................................................................... 7 2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 7 2.2. Starting and finalizing RTUControl module .................................................................. 7 2.3. RTC time ........................................................................................................................... 8 2.4. Sleep and usecsleep ...................................................................................................... 9 2.5. Power Management ...................................................................................................... 9 2.6. Hardware RTC ............................................................................................................... 12 2.7. Default Movement Sensor .......................................................................................... -
12 Certificates-In-The-Wild Slides
Certificates in the wild Slides from • Dave Levin 414-spring2016 • Michelle Mazurek 414-fall2016 Certificates in the wild The lock icon indicates that the browser was able to authenticate the other end, i.e., validate its certificate Certificate chain Subject (who owns the public key) Common name: the URL of the subject Issuer (who verified the identity and signed this certificate) Serial number: Uniquely identifies this cert with respect to the issuer (look for this in CRLs) Signature algorithm: How the issuer will sign parts of the cert Not valid before/after: When to start and stop believing this cert (start & expiration dates) The public key: And the issuer’s signature of the public key Subject Alternate Names: Other URLs for which this cert should be considered valid. (wellsfargo.com is not the same as www.wellsfargo.com) Can include wildcards, e.g., *.google.com CRL & OCSP: Where to go to check if this certificate has been revoked Non-cryptographic checksums Certificate types Why are these different? This is an EV (extended validation) certificate; browsers show the full name for these kinds of certs Root CAs Root CAs in iOS9 • iOS9 ships with >50 that start with A-C • Full list at: https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT205205 Verifying certificates Browser Certificate “I’m because I say so!” Certificate “I’m because says so” Certificate “I’m because says so” Verifying certificates Browser Certificate “I’m because I say so!” Root key store Every device has one Certificate “I’m because says so” Must not contain malicious certificates Certificate -
U-Connectxpress, Open Source Software Licenses, Application Note
u-connectXpress Open source software licenses Application note Abstract This document contains the licensing terms for third party open source software included in u-blox short range modules. UBX-15022695 - R21 C1 - Public www.u-blox.com u-connectXpress Open source software licenses - Application note Document information Title u-connectXpress Subtitle Open source software licenses Document type Application note Document number UBX-15022695 Revision and date R21 4-Feb-2021 Disclosure Restriction C1 - Public This document applies to the following products: Product name Software version ANNA-B112 All NINA-B111 All NINA-B112 All NINA-B221 All NINA-B222 All NINA-B311 All NINA-B312 All NINA-B316 All NINA-B410 All NINA-B411 All NINA-B416 All NINA-W131 All NINA-W132 All NINA-W151 All NINA-W152 All NINA-W156 3.1.0 onwards ODIN-W260 All ODIN-W262 All ODIN-W263 All u-blox or third parties may hold intellectual property rights in the products, names, logos and designs included in this document. Copying, reproduction, modification or disclosure to third parties of this document or any part thereof is only permitted with the express written permission of u-blox. The information contained herein is provided “as is” and u-blox assumes no liability for its use. No warranty, either express or implied, is given, including but not limited to, with respect to the accuracy, correctness, reliability and fitness for a particular purpose of the information. This document may be revised by u-blox at any time without notice. For the most recent documents, visit www.u-blox.com. -
Secure Content Delivery with Amazon Cloudfront Improve the Security and Performance of Your Applications, While Lowering Your Content Delivery Costs
Secure Content Delivery with Amazon CloudFront Improve the Security and Performance of Your Applications, While Lowering Your Content Delivery Costs November 2016 This paper has been archived. For the latest technical content about secure content delivery with Amazon CloudFront, see https://docs-aws.amazon.com/whitepapers/latest/secure- content-delivery-amazon-cloudfront/secure-content-delivery- Archivedwith-amazon-cloudfront.html © 2016, Amazon Web Services, Inc. or its affiliates. All rights reserved. Notices This document is provided for informational purposes only. It represents AWS’s current product offerings and practices as of the date of issue of this document, which are subject to change without notice. Customers are responsible for making their own independent assessment of the information in this document and any use of AWS’s products or services, each of which is provided “as is” without warranty of any kind, whether express or implied. This document does not create any warranties, representations, contractual commitments, conditions or assurances from AWS, its affiliates, suppliers or licensors. The responsibilities and liabilities of AWS to its customers are controlled by AWS agreements, and this document is not part of, nor does it modify, any agreement between AWS and its customers. Archived Contents Introduction 1 Enabling Easy SSL/TLS Adoption 2 Using Custom SSL Certificates with SNI Custom SSL 3 Meeting Requirements for PCI Compliance and Industry Standard Apple iOS ATS 4 Improving Performance of SSL/TLS Connections 5 Terminating SSL Connections at the Edge 6 Supporting Session Tickets and OCSP Stapling 6 Balancing Security and Performance with Half Bridge and Full Bridge TLS Termination 7 Ensuring Asset Availability 8 Making SSL/TLS Adoption Economical 8 Conclusion 9 Further Reading 9 Notes 11 Archived Abstract As companies respond to cybercrime, compliance requirements, and a commitment to securing customer data, their adoption of Secure Sockets Layer/Transport Layer Security (SSL/TLS) protocols increases. -
Leveraging the Kerberos Credential Caching Mechanism for Faster Re-Authentications in Wireless Access Networks
UBICOMM 2010 : The Fourth International Conference on Mobile Ubiquitous Computing, Systems, Services and Technologies EAP-Kerberos: Leveraging the Kerberos Credential Caching Mechanism for Faster Re-authentications in Wireless Access Networks Saber Zrelli Yoichi Shinoda Nobuo Okabe Center for Information Science Corporate R&D Headquarters Japan Advanced Institute of Science and Technology Yokogawa Electric Corporation Ishikawa, Japan Tokyo, Japan [email protected] saber.zrelli,[email protected] Abstract—Although the wireless technology nowadays provides support cross-domain authentication that enables an access satisfying bandwidth and higher speeds, it still lacks improve- network to authenticate a roaming client that belongs to a ments with regard to handoff performance. Existing solutions remote domain. The cross-domain authentication requires for reducing handoff delays are specific to a particular network technology or require expensive upgrades of the whole infras- message exchange between the AAA server of the visited tructure. In this paper, we investigate performance benefits of network and the AAA server of the roaming station’s home leveraging the Kerberos ticket cashing mechanism for achieving network. Because these inter-domain exchanges occur over the faster re-authentications in IEEE 802.11 wireless access networks. Internet, they are subject to degradations such as packet loss For this purpose, we designed a new EAP authentication method, and network delays which increases the overall authentication EAP-Kerberos, and evaluated re-authentication performance in different scenarios. time. When a roaming station changes of access point, the same authentication procedure takes place again, disrupting Keywords-Wireless; Authentication; Handoff; Performance the user traffic at each handoff. I. -
Legacy of Heartbleed: MITM and Revoked Certificates
Legacy of Heartbleed: MITM and Revoked Certificates Alexey Busygin [email protected] NeoBIT Notable Private Key Leaks • 2010 – DigiCert Sdn Bhd. issued certificates with 512-bit keys • 2012 – Trustwave issued CA certificate for one of its customers DLP system • 2013 – DigiNotar CA was totally compromised • 2014 – Heartbleed bug caused certificate revocation storm. 500000+ certs to be revoked • 2015 – RSA-CRT private key leaks • 2017 – Cloudbleed bug in Cloudflare reverse proxies 2 Checking Certificate Revocation Status: Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL) • CAs publish CRLs – lists of revoked certificate serial numbers • Normally certificate contains URL of the corresponding CRL Why it’s not OK? CRLs are not appropriate for online checks: • Excess size (up to 1 MB) • Vulnerable to replay attacks 3 Checking Certificate Revocation Status: Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) • CAs maintain OCSP responders answering with certificate revocation status • Normally certificate contains URL of the OCSP responder • OCSP provides optional replay attack protection Why it’s not OK? • Slows down connection establishment • Browsing history leaks to CA • OCSP responder is DDoS target 4 Checking Certificate Revocation Status: OCSP Stapling • No browsing history leaks • Choose one: o Replay attack protection o TLS server side OCSP response caching: Minimal impact on connection establishment time Reduced load on OCSP responder Why it’s not OK? • Stapled OCSP responses are optional and may be stripped by MITM • OCSP responder is DDoS target (if replay -
SMART Water Heater
SMART Water Heater Mauro Cordoba, EE Bryan Mitchell, EE Vipol Sophonwatthanawichit, CpE Group 36 MOTIVATION “Water heaters account for nearly 17 percent of a home’s energy use, consuming more energy than all other household appliances combined.” • To reduce energy consumption by modernizing a common appliance • To provide more control PROJECT goals • Create an Internet of Things device • Work with embedded linux devices • Try to avoid common platforms such as raspberry pi • Develop Android application • Get experience designing PCB PROJECT requirements • Comparable in size to modern water heater thermostats • Able to control a standard electric water heater element • Able to regulate temperature to +/- 1° C of desired temperature • It will run from 240V mains (120V for demo) • It will be controlled directly though a touchscreen interface or remotely via network PROJECT overview PROJECT overview Water Heater Home automation Controller system Touchscreen Android phone Database HARDWARE design HARDWARE diagram 240V AC • 120 VAC • +5 VDC • Data 240V AC to 5V DC Temperature Relay Heating element 1 Sensors Relay Heating element 2 Flow Sensor PIR sensor WIFI CFA920-TS Adapter MAIN board • 454MHz Freescale i.MX283 processor • 4.3 inch 800*480 TFT touchscreen display • 10/100 Ethernet port • USB port • 128MB DDR2 RAM • μSD reader supports up to 64GB • 24 GPIO pins CFA920-TS EXPANSION board(s) • 240v AC - 5v DC power supply • Interface with CFA920-TS • 97mm x 55mm • Sensor inputs • Relay controlled heating element outputs The first iteration of -
SX-6K3-EVK-SD User Guide
SX-6K3-EVK-SD User Guide Part Number 140-00207-150 Revision A Silex Technology America, Inc. CONFIDENTIAL Copyright & Trademark © 2013 Silex Technology America, Inc. All rights reserved. September, 2013 Silex Technology America SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS OF THIS PRODUCT FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Silex shall not be liable for any errors contained in this manual or for any damages resulting from loss of use, data, profits, or any incidental or consequential damages arising from the use of SILEX products or services. The information contained in this documentation is subject to change without notice. Information and descriptions contained herein are the property of Silex. Such information and descriptions may not be copied, disseminated, or distributed without the express written consent of Silex. This publication is subject to change without notice. The software embedded in this SX-6K3-EVK includes the Linux operating system. Linux and certain other software programs used in the SX-6K3-EVK are licensed under GNU GPL compatible Free Software Licenses. In compliance with these licenses, you can obtain the relevant source code at no charge by contacting Silex at [email protected]. Silex Technology America, Inc. www.silexamerica.com SX-6K3-EVK-SD User Guide 2 Silex Technology America, Inc. CONFIDENTIAL Table of Contents Copyright & Trademark ................................................................................................................................................. -
Vorlage Für Dokumente Bei AI
OSS Disclosure Document Date: 27-Apr-2018 CM-AI/PJ-CC OSS Licenses used in Suzuki Project Page 1 Table of content 1 Overview ..................................................................................................................... 11 2 OSS Licenses used in the project ................................................................................... 11 3 Package details for OSS Licenses usage ........................................................................ 12 3.1 7 Zip - LZMA SDK ............................................................................................................. 12 3.2 ACL 2.2.51 ...................................................................................................................... 12 3.3 Alsa Libraries 1.0.27.2 ................................................................................................... 12 3.4 AES - Advanced Encryption Standard 1.0 ......................................................................... 12 3.5 Alsa Plugins 1.0.26 ........................................................................................................ 13 3.6 Alsa Utils 1.0.27.2 ......................................................................................................... 13 3.7 APMD 3.2.2 ................................................................................................................... 13 3.8 Atomic_ops .................................................................................................................... 13 3.9 Attr 2.4.46 ...................................................................................................................