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Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: from Distraction to Dissidence

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Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: from Distraction to Dissidence Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: From Distraction to Dissidence © 2020 IAI by Anas El Gomati COVID-19 has changed the world It first served to distract international and the way we live it, establishing powers from their diplomatic ISSN 2532-6570 something of a “new normal” as states obligations and peace building in and societies battle the pandemic Libya, acting as a cover for local and learn to accommodate its factions and their foreign sponsors to multidimensional effects. For Libyans’ intensify the conflict during the initial living in the midst of conflict, normality global shockwave of the pandemic at and a new normal are difficult to the beginning of 2020. Towards the determine. end of 2020, however, the pandemic compounded socio-economic and The economy, healthcare system and political pressures in Libya, sparking everyday lives of Libyans’ have been far national demonstrations and from normal as a result of the 18-month dissidence towards the rival factions, conflict sparked by General Khalifa leading to political resignations and Haftar’s attempt to overthrow the UN- renewed diplomatic negotiations in the recognised Government of National process. Accord (GNA) in Tripoli. When world leaders met in Berlin on However, the pandemic and its 20 January 2020 to enforce an arms dynamism has had an impact far embargo and ceasefire to end the war beyond the everyday lives of citizens. in Libya, none of them realised they The lifecycle of the pandemic has had would be returning home to prepare a major impact on the conflict itself. for their own war against COVID-19. Anas El Gomati is the founder and current Director General of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, the first public policy think tank in Libya, established in August 2011. This paper is published in the framework of an ongoing project run by IAI’s Middle East and Mediterranean Programme in cooperation with the Department of Historical Studies and the Department of Cultures, Politics and Society of the University of Turin with the support of the Compagnia di San Paolo Foundation, which includes a series of six commentaries exploring the impact of COVID-19 on conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa. Views contained in the article are IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER 2020 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES of the author only and do not necessarily reflect those of other project partners and sponsors. 1 Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: From Distraction to Dissidence The German government had Tripoli residents described the LAAF’s successfully brokered a fragile ceasefire resumption of the conflict as the worst to be followed by further UN-mediated they had witnessed in the past three political talks aimed a unifying the civil wars.2 Civilian neighbourhoods rival parties in Geneva in March. The were shelled, killing and injuring ceasefire collapsed and the diplomatic civilians and displacing nearly 25,000 talks not only broke down, but led civilians in less than a month of to the resignation of the UN Special renewed conflict.3 © 2020 IAI Representative for Libya, Ghassan Salamé. In response, Turkey sent further Syrian mercenaries and military None of the governments who met technicians of its own, and used its in Geneva were there to pick up the highly sophisticated drone technology pieces; world powers previously to destroy nine sophisticated air focused on peacebuilding efforts were defence systems supplied to the LAAF now closely monitoring the pandemic’s by its foreign sponsors.4 Foreign grip on Italy, Spain and South Korea. powers took discrete control of the ISSN 2532-6570 Consumed by the ensuing panic, global levers of the conflict. Turkey signed a attention shifted away from the Geneva maritime and military memorandum dialogue. Libya’s fragile ceasefire began of understanding with the GNA in to unravel and the conflict intensified as November 2019, which was able to rival parties sought to exploit a window assist the GNA in forcing an end to of opportunity to make military gains Haftar’s assault on Tripoli in May 2020 instead of political concessions. and push the UAE and Russia back to the central city of Sirte, dividing west Haftar’s self-styled Libyan Arab Armed from east Libya. An uneasy military Forces (LAAF) advance and siege of stalemate between the rival factions Tripoli entered a new brutal phase has ensued since June 2020. under cover of the pandemic. This period saw a surge in foreign military 2 Hala Bugaighis, “I’ve witnessed the war…”, support and direct intervention from Twitter post, 24 March 2020, https://twitter.com/ both the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and halabugaighis/status/1242684298320326656. 3 Russia to assist the LAAF in breaking “6 Killed by Indiscriminate Shelling in Libya’s Tripoli”, in CGTN Africa, 24 March 2020, https:// the GNA’s resolve. The UAE deployed africa.cgtn.com/?p=168104; International drones and air defence systems, and Organization for Migration (IOM), Tripoli hired Sudanese mercenaries, alongside Displacement Map, 16 April 2019, https:// displacement.iom.int/node/5525. Russia’s Syrian mercenaries and private 4 Selcan Hacaoglu, “Mapping the Turkish military contractors from the infamous Military’s Expanding Footprint”, in Bloomberg, Wagner group.1 7 March 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2019-03-07/mapping-the- turkish-military-s-expanding-footprint- quicktake; Altan A. Ozler, “Libya: A Catastrophe for Russia’s Pantsir S1 Air Defense System”, in 1 Anas L. Gomati, “Russia’s Role in the Libyan Real Clear Defense, 19 June 2020, https://www. Civil War Gives It Leverage over Europe”, in realcleardefense.com/articles/2020/06/19/ Foreign Policy, 18 January 2020, http://bit. libya_a_catastrophe_for_russias_pantsir_s1_ ly/2G3HTEU. air_defense_system_115394.html. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER 2020 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES 2 Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: From Distraction to Dissidence Libya’s (and importantly, Libyans’) number of reported infections per day experience of the pandemic is perhaps began doubling around June 2020. the most unusual in the region. The country’s capacity to respond has According to the Libyan National Centre been weakened by years of conflict Disease Control (NCDC), as of October and destruction, but also as a result of 2020 Libya has a reported total of over Libya’s institutional divisions. 50,000 cases, with almost a thousand cases per day.7 It is likely that these © 2020 IAI There is no single unified authority numbers are significantly understated, accounting for COVID-19 contagion not least because of the difficulty for the numbers in Libya, with two rival NCDC to co-ordinate and collect data governments reporting on these across a divided country with restricted figures: the UN-recognised GNA access to testing. in Tripoli established in December 2015 and its rival, the rump interim An independent in-depth survey of government in Bayda, eastern Libya, Libya’s healthcare system in March 2020 which is supported by the LAAF. had shown Libya’s lack of preparation ISSN 2532-6570 These institutional divisions, across for a pandemic. The average hospital a vast territory, and the inability to had 200 beds, but only nine lifesaving resume regular intergovernmental intensive care unit facilities and communication have hindered a truly mechanical ventilators needed for coherent national response. severe cases of infection. Some facilities had no nurses whatsoever, and 70 per Nevertheless, in April, the GNA cent of doctors surveyed claimed they announced a 500 million Libyan had to purchase their own personal dinar (310 million euro) package to protective equipment.8 combat the spread of the disease across the country, including territory Inadequate resources and preparation controlled by the LAAF. This package for infectious diseases can be traced has been supplemented by a further to decades of administrative neglect 20 million euro provided by the EU of Libya’s public health system under to improve detection and contact the former Ghaddafi regime. However, tracing measures.5 Meanwhile, Libya’s current public health crisis is the International Organization for exacerbated by the damage caused Migration has ramped up its efforts to respond to the needs of displaced people COVID-19%20PREPAREDNESS%20AND%20 and refugees considered to be the most RESPONSE%20PLAN%20APPEAL_10042020. vulnerable.6 Despite this package, the pdf. 7 Sami Zaptia, “Libya’s Coronavirus Cases Pass 50,000 Mark”, in Libya Herald, 20 October 2020, 5 EU Delegation to Libya, European Union https://www.libyaherald.com/?p=126267. Mobilizes €20 Million for COVID-19 Response 8 Muhammed Elhadi et al., “Concerns for in Libya, 4 August 2020, https://europa. Low-Resource Countries, with Underprepared eu/!Gw77Wr. Intensive Care Units, Facing the COVID-19 6 IOM Libya, COVID-19 Appeal, April– Pandemic”, in Infection, Disease & Health, Vol. December 2020, 10 April 2020, https://libya.iom. 25, No 4 (November 2020), p. 227-232, https:// int/sites/default/files/news/IOM%20LIBYA_ doi.org/10.1016/j.idh.2020.05.008. IAI COMMENTARIES 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER 2020 20 | 79 - NOVEMBER IAI COMMENTARIES 3 Libya and the COVID-19 Lifecycle: From Distraction to Dissidence through civil war, that the GNA’s or recent COVID lockdowns, hurting COVID-19 recovery package does not local economic activity and limiting address and cannot hope to resolve. the circulation of financial liquidity to a private sector starved of cash from Libya’s two urban-centred civil wars years of banking crisis. fought in Benghazi between 2014 and 2017 and the LAAF’s military campaign This has limited the purchasing power on Tripoli since 2019 deliberately needed to prepare supplies for the © 2020 IAI targeted and destroyed much of pandemic. Acute water shortages as Libya’s public health infrastructure and a result of conflict, corruption and overwhelmed its personnel. sabotage have reduced Libya’s supply of water by 30 per cent during the Since the beginning of the Tripoli pandemic when it is most needed,11 campaign, the LAAF has launched and there is a nation-wide shortage of airstrikes on the capital’s hospitals, cooking gas.
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