The Vietnam Dilemma

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Case 552, Instructor Copy

THE VIETNAM DILEMMA

Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love The Catholic University of America Crapa Fellow, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

ISBN 1-56927-552-1

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THE VIETNAM DILEMMA

Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love The Catholic University of America Crapa Fellow, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

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AMBASSADOR HANFORD’S DILEMMA International Religious Freedom, was a captain in the Marine Corps who flew 300 combat missions in When John Hanford was sworn into office May 2, Vietnam, earning five Battle Stars. Both were bridge 2002, as the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for Interna- builders, intent on using quiet diplomacy to build tional Religious Freedom, it was the culmination of trust and new relationships with the Vietnamese to a career of advocacy on behalf of religious freedom. overcome the wounds of the Vietnam war and cre- Ironically, he helped write the law that created his ate new opportunities for growth in U.S.-Vietnamese Ambassador-at-Large position, the International relations. As Ambassador Seiple put it, “there is a Religious Freedom (IRF) Office in the Department of role for tough talk sometimes, but if you look at State (DoS), and the independent U.S. Commission where we have achieved success, in Laos and Viet- on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). As a nam we took deliberate steps to build relations of staffer for Senator Richard Lugar, he served as a trust, and to demonstrate why it was in their naked chief architect of the International Religious Free- self-interest to embrace the concept of religious freedom Act (IRFA) of 1998. The law mandated that the dom.”1 U.S. government monitor, report, and advocate on Bilateral ties improved, particularly in econom- religious freedom in every country. Ambassador ics, trade, investment and education. Trade grew Hanford was well-versed on all the worst violators of rapidly, especially after the Bilateral Trade Agree- religious freedom around the world. Which country ment was signed in 2001. The Vietnamese govern- merited the first high-level visit by the newly ment (VG) was eagerly seeking Permanent Normal appointed Ambassador-at-Large for International Trade Relations with the U.S. and membership in Religious Freedom? In August 2002, Ambassador the World Trade Organization, and hoped these Hanford went to Vietnam. might be achieved before Vietnam hosted the Asia The U.S. normalized relations with Vietnam in Pacific Economic Community (APEC) Summit in late 1995, twenty years after the U.S. war in Vietnam 2006. But while U.S. trade relations with Vietnam and the fall of Saigon. The first officials to represent were booming, Vietnam had a poor record on reli- the U.S. government in Vietnam were Vietnam war gious freedom and human rights. Members of Con- veterans. Ambassador Pete Peterson was an Air gress, USCIRF, and NGOs wanted Vietnam to be Force Captain who spent six and a half years as a named as a “Country of Particular Concern,” (CPC) prisoner of war in the infamous “Hanoi Hilton” as designated by the IRFA law. But DoS was divided prison after his plane was shot down. Ambassador on the question, with the IRF office split and the Robert Seiple, the first Ambassador-at-Large for U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam opposed. What should 1 2 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy

the newly appointed Ambassador-at-Large for Inter- sects of Cao Daism, an indigenous religion that is national Religious Freedom do? influenced by Mahayana Buddhism but also inte- grates aspects of many other religions, were offi- RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN VIETNAM cially recognized, but there are between 1.1–3 million Cao Dai. One Muslim organization was offi- Both the State Department and the U.S. Commis- cially recognized; Muslims comprise only 0.1 per- sion on International Religious Freedom reports cent of the population. Neither the small Hindu documented serious abuses of religious freedom community of approximately 50,000 ethnic Cham and human rights, including: imprisonment of reli- in the south-central coastal area, or the estimated gious leaders; physical beatings of believers, some- 2,000 members of the Baha’i faith, were recognized times to death; forced renunciations of faith; by the government.2 seizures and failures to return church properties; Officially, the Vietnamese Constitution guaran- state control of all aspects of religious life, such as tees freedom of religion, freedom of belief and non- restricting and blocking which churches were belief for its citizens, and people are allowed to par- allowed to register and operate, and state control ticipate in the approved activities of officially recog- over the naming and training of religious leaders, nized religions. In practice, the government restricts the publication and distribution of religious texts, the ability of religious communities to register, and the conduct of religious services and activities. maintains tight control even over officially recog- Vietnam is a majority Buddhist but religiously nized religious communities, and can break up or pluralistic country of 80 million people. Many Viet- imprison members of unrecognized religious groups namese Buddhists practice “the triple religion,” a at any time. Vietnam is an authoritarian country combination of Mahayana Buddhism, Taoism, and controlled by the Communist Party of Vietnam. Reli- Confucian traditions. But in 2002, only one Buddhist gious freedom and participation has improved since sect was recognized by the government. The United the communist takeover of Vietnam in1975, particu- Buddhist Church of Vietnam (UBCV) is not officially larly for recognized religious groups in urban areas. recognized, and its leaders are harassed, impris- But religious freedom remains restricted, particu- oned, or placed under house arrest. Many older larly for unrecognized religious communities in the UBCV members opposed the Communist rise to rural provinces, for groups that are also ethnic power; many younger members feel the state-sanc- minorities and/or whom the government suspects of tioned Buddhist sect distorts their religious beliefs anti-communist or separatist sentiments. The VG and practices. Only one Hoa Hao Buddhist group and Provincial officials used supplemental decrees was officially recognized, even though Hoa Hao to nullify or neuter the religious freedom clause of comprise 1.5 to 4 percent of the population. The the Constitution. One stated that “All activities ethnic minority Khmer Buddhists are also not recog- which threaten freedom of religious belief, all activi- nized. There are sizeable communities of Roman ties using religious belief in order to oppose the Catholics throughout the country (about 7 million). State of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, to prevent While Roman Catholicism is officially recognized by the believers from carrying out their civic responsi- the VG, the government restricts the number of bilities, to sabotage the union of all the people, to go applicants to become priests in the seminaries, con- against the healthy culture of our nation, as well as trols the ordination and assignment of priests and superstitious activities, will be punished in confor- selection of bishops, restricts religious education, mity with the law.” The UN Human Rights Commit- has confiscated and not returned many church tee and the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of properties and restricts the expansion or some- Religion or Belief expressed concern about VG times even repair of church facilities, does not rec- decrees which allow detention without trial for two ognize Catholic nuns, and has imprisoned some years for anyone held on an alleged national secu- Catholic leaders. While there are over 1 million Prot- rity offense, including “attempts to undermine estants (1.2 percent of the population), the govern- national unity.” Officially, the Office on Religious ment officially recognized only two Protestant Affairs oversees recognized religious bodies. In prac- organizations in 2002. The majority of Protestants tice, protection of religious freedom is uneven (par- belonged either to banned or unrecognized groups, ticularly in the north and Central Highlands), and such as the house churches whose members are there are not effective means of repeal or redress for often ethnic minorities in the Central Highlands and violations of religious freedom committed by gov- the northwestern provinces, such as the Hmong, ernment officials. These mechanisms afford the VG Hre, Steing, and Montagnard Protestants. Two small plenty of latitude to restrict religion.3 Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 3

THE POLICY DEBATE assembling for peaceful religious activities such as worship, preaching, and prayer, including arbitrary U.S. government officials, USCIRF, NGOs, and mem- registration requirements; (ii) speaking freely about bers of Congress agreed about these basic fact pat- one’s religious beliefs; (iii) changing one’s religious terns. They disagreed over what U.S. policy should beliefs and affiliation; (iv) possession and distribu- be in response, particularly concerning whether tion of religious literature, including Bibles; or (v) Vietnam should be named as a CPC as designated raising one’s children in the religious teachings and by the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) of practices of one’s choice; or (B) any of the following 1998. Were the religious freedom violations in Viet- acts if committed on account of an individual’s reli- nam “particularly severe,” defined as “systematic, gious belief or practice: detention, interrogation, ongoing, egregious,” which would require CPC des- imposition of an onerous financial penalty, forced ignation and could trigger diplomatic sanctions? labor, forced mass resettlement, imprisonment, IRFA (Public Law 105-292) works to promote reli- forced religious conversion, beating, torture, mutila- gious freedom as a U.S. foreign policy goal and to tion, rape, enslavement, murder, and execution.” combat religious persecution in other countries. Violations of religious freedom include “persecution IRFA created both USCIRF and the State Department of one religious group by another religious group, IRF Office to monitor the status of freedom of religious persecution by governmental and nongov- thought, conscience, and religion or belief abroad, ernmental entities, persecution targeted at individu- as defined in the Universal Declaration of Human als or particular denominations or entire religions, Rights and related international instruments, and to the existence of government policies violating reli- issue annual reports. The State Department IRF gious freedom, including policies that discriminate Office, headed by an Ambassador-at-Large for IRF, is against particular religious groups or members of responsible for issuing a complete state-by-state such groups, and the existence of government poli- report on religious freedom and persecution in all cies concerning limitations or prohibitions on, or foreign countries by September 1 of each year. lack of availability of, openly conducted, organized USCIRF, a non-partisan government commission religious services.” CPC countries are those which with members appointed by the President and Con- engage in or tolerate “systematic, ongoing, egre- gressional leadership, is charged with issuing a gious violations of religious freedom, including viola- yearly report each May 1 on the countries with seri- tions such as—(A) torture or cruel, inhuman, or ous religious liberty deficiencies, and with giving degrading treatment or punishment; (B) prolonged independent policy recommendations to the Presi- detention without charges; (C) causing the disap- dent, the Secretary of State, Executive branch, and pearance of persons by the abduction or clandestine the Congress. USCIRF also serves as a watchdog, detention of those persons; or (D) other flagrant offering assessments and critiques of the State denial of the right to life, liberty, or the security of Department and USG’s efforts to promote interna- persons.” The CPC designation then triggers Presi- tional religious freedom. As Tom Farr, retired FSO dential action, from a private demarche to a range and former Director of the IRF Office notes, a of U.S. diplomatic actions and/or specific, targeted healthy tension between IRF and USCIRF can economic sanctions toward CPC countries. advance U.S. foreign policy. “It’s good when it’s a Everyone agreed there were violations of religious good cop/bad cop thing. When the Commission is freedom in Vietnam. But were they severe, system- harshly criticizing the State Department about its atic, ongoing, egregious violations? Did they meet failure to take to task one country or another, the the standard set by the IRFA law to warrant desig- State Department, if it is wise, can use that to its nating Vietnam as a CPC? And if so, what were the advantage with country X,” leveraging that pressure policy implications of such a designation? The IRFA for change. law outlines a variety of policy paths to take with On the basis of both the internal and external CPC countries. Which policy path would be most recommendations, the Secretary of State recom- likely to advance religious freedom and other U.S. mends and the President decides which countries to foreign policy objectives in Vietnam? designate as “countries of particular concern,” countries where governments “engage in or tolerate” “particularly severe violations of religious freedom.” THE SKEPTICAL POSITION The Law defines “violations of religious freedom” as “including violations such as—(A) arbitrary prohibi- U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam Raymond Burghardt tions on, restrictions of, or punishment for (i) put Vietnam’s religious freedom record in a longer 4 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy context. He first served in Vietnam as a young For- mine what was happening to those who repatriated eign Service Officer in the U.S. Embassy from as well as those who hadn’t left. There was political 1970–1973. Returning as Ambassador in Decem- historical baggage here as well as religious issues. ber 2001 was an experience of the past constantly The Montagnards cooperated with U.S. forces during permeating the present. The structure of the streets the Vietnamese War, and continue to be deeply dis- of Saigon was the same, and some of the religious trusted by the Vietnamese today. Only some who dissidents who were part of his “beat” as a junior converted to Protestantism were in the government officer at the Embassy were still battling the VG. recognized churches. Most were in the repressed Upon his return he was quite moved when he met House Churches. It was difficult to get permission to with Catholic Cardinal Minh in the Cardinal’s office visit these areas, and the VG tried to control our fact in a splendid old French-era villa. Ambassador finding visits by assigning us “minders.” But we Burghardt spent many hours with Cardinal Minh in used tactics of losing our minders. We visited house 1973, sitting in that same seat in that same office, churches. In trips to the Highlands we met with trying to persuade the Catholic Church (and various Protestant leaders of both the official and unregis- other players) in Vietnam that the Paris Peace tered churches. We had pretty frank meetings by Accords were a good agreement. Considering how it keeping the “minders” out of the room, sometimes all turned out for the Catholic Church and for the literally barring the door by force. We kept the pres- country (the South Vietnamese government fell, the sure on the VG over ways to have longer term solu- Communist Party took over the country and many tions of religious freedom issues, which would Church properties, and severely repressed people of include bringing house churches into official recog- faith), Ambassador Burghardt had some strong emo- nition. The percentage of officially registered tions returning to meet in that same place. “I com- churches was ridiculously low.”5 pletely understand,” Cardinal Minh responded. “You In Ambassador Burghardt’s view, Vietnam did not don’t have to say anymore.”4 warrant CPC designation because compared to Ambassador Burghardt had no illusions about the 1975, moderate to significant progress had been repressive nature of the Vietnamese communist made in Vietnam. Also, the issue was less specifi- regime. The Bilateral Trade Agreement was signed cally about religion, and had more to do with poli- five days before he took office, and “economic rela- tics, and Vietnam’s distrust of all civil society. “I tions dramatically improved. Trade barriers on Viet- could see that we might be able to make some prog- namese goods entering the U.S. market fell from 40 ress on the issues of the Montagnards, but there percent average tariffs to 3 percent, thus the rate of were some issues we are not going to make much trade exploded. But simultaneously the U.S. was progress on, such as the freedom to organize, the engaged in one of the worst human rights disputes need to register with the state to begin with. We that we’d had in our relations with the Vietnamese, were never going to change that. That’s basic Lenin- an acute dispute over the Montegnards in the Cen- ism 101. They do not believe in civil society. They tral Highlands who had demonstrated during Easter may compromise on the role of it, but they are 2001. They were repressed and dealt with violently never going to truly accept it. They saw what hap- by the VG, and upwards of one thousand fled over pened in Poland, first the Churches advocated for the border into Cambodia. With some great diffi- change, then the unions, and they felt they were not culty a program was set up for those who wished to going to allow that to happen in Vietnam. It’s delu- return to be able to, and UNHCR was to help repatri- sional to believe that the fundamental situation is ate them to Vietnam. But the VG didn’t like UNHCR going to change as long as the overall communist monitoring, and kicked them out. This triggered a structure is in place. As a political scientist, I expect serious dispute between the US, Canada, the EU, the Leninists to behave like Leninists.” Thus Ambassa- UN, etc. and Vietnam, which cast a serious black dor Burghardt was skeptical about the utility of des- cloud over U.S.-Vietnamese relations when I entered ignating Vietnam as a CPC. Because of Vietnam’s office. My view was that human rights concerns regime, “you don’t get any leverage; all you do is posed a serious problem. But religious freedom and piss them off.”6 CPC designation was also not clear cut and dry. We Other groups were also against CPC designation. needed to be able to do two things at once, pursue The business community represented by the U.S. the human rights as well as the economic agenda. Chamber of Commerce argued that CPC designation We had to aggressively pursue the issue and get the would be disastrous for trade. VG to allow the UNHCR back in. We had to have The Institute for Global Engagement, an NGO aggressive fact finding visits to the area to deter- established by retired Ambassador-at-Large for Inter- Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 5 national Religious Freedom Robert Seiple and Some at the Embassy and DoS also questioned headed by his son, Chris Seiple, were against CPC why Ambassador Hanford and the IRF Office were designation, arguing an emphasis on punitive spending most of their time on Protestant issues in actions would be counter-productive. They believed a majority Buddhist country where Catholics and that given Asian cultural traditions of “saving face,” other groups well-outnumbered Protestants. Ambas- public shaming was offensive, would play into the sador Hanford replied that the Protestant issues hands of hardliners, and was less effective than were more acute. But some argued that “for credibil- quiet, behind the scenes engagement.7 ity and integrity it is important to focus more on the concerns of all religious groups.”10 The U.S. Congress, particularly the Congressional THE AFFIRMATIVE POSITION Human Rights Caucus, the Taskforce on Interna- tional Religious Freedom, and the Congressional USCIRF directly opposed the Ambassador’s view, Caucus on Vietnam, were active on the issue, and and recommended that Vietnam be designated a adamant that Vietnam be designated as a CPC. CPC immediately. USCIRF commissioners and staff Hearing from USCIRF, human rights and religious members made several trips to Vietnam in which NGOs and Vietnamese Americans in their districts, they met with jailed religious leaders and religious Congress kept the pressure on.11 Throughout 2003 leaders from both registered and unregistered and 2004 they held briefings and Congressional groups. They also reported clumsy attempts by the hearings, and passed legislation on the issue. In VG to prevent them from meeting with religious November 2003 the bipartisan Congressional Cau- leaders, such as abruptly closing roads to literally cus on Vietnam12 introduced House Resolution 427, block USCIRF commissioners from meeting reli- which called on the State Department to designate gious communities. USCIRF acknowledged that Vietnam a CPC for “egregious, systematic and ongo- some Vietnamese citizens assembled to worship ing abuses of religious freedom.” In July 2004 Con- and conduct charitable projects within government- gress passed the Vietnam Human Rights Act (H.R. approved parameters. But others faced severe viola- 1950), which prohibited non-humanitarian aid to tions, particularly those in unrecognized religious Vietnam until the government made substantial groups which have either chosen not to register or improvements in religious freedom and human been denied registered status (and most religious rights. groups were not officially recognized) or those deemed by the government to threaten national security or social harmony. The violations included THE “GO SLOW” POSITION fines, confiscation of property, imprisonment, physical violence, and the destruction of religious sites. Ambassador John Hanford wanted to take some “Because of these systematic, ongoing, and egre- time to gather and verify the facts on the ground, gious violations of religious freedom, USCIRF recom- and for diplomacy to play out. He traveled to Viet- mends that Vietnam be designated as a “country of nam repeatedly, meeting particularly with members particular concern.”8 of persecuted Protestant religious groups in the Cen- There was a fierce internal debate in the DoS IRF tral Highlands and Northwest Provinces, as well as office. Staff member Will Imboden and Office Direc- with VG officials. As Ambassador Hanford described tor Tom Farr argued that the IRF office should be rec- it, “We spent an enormous amount of time forming ommending CPC status for Vietnam. Will Inboden trusting relationships, so Vietnamese officials would argued that “1) diplomacy can continue to play out believe we were dealing in good faith, that we were even after the IRF office recommends CPC status. not discussing religious freedom issues to rub their CPC designation does not stop diplomacy. 2) We nose in it, but that we were pursuing the interests of need to uphold the IRFA law. 3) Designating Vietnam the United States. Because no other government as a CPC will make things better. It will focus the VG’s raises the religious freedom issue as we do, we had attention on religious freedom issues at a time when to explain our position, as well as the threat of CPC the USG has leverage with Vietnam. The threat of designation. My approach was to be respectful and CPC designation, the VG’s desire for better U.S. rela- gentle, but substantive and detailed. I had very long tions and improved trade status, and their concerns meetings, boring down into the specific evidence about a rising China all provided leverage with Viet- regarding key arrests for religious practices, and nam. John Hanford overruled us, because the Em- forced renunciations of the Christian faith. I spent bassy and others in DoS were not on board yet.”9 time explaining why the U.S. cares about religious 6 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy freedom, how it goes back to our heritage, how we respected that they were not blindsided. When we were founded by people fleeing religious persecu- all work together it bears greater fruit.”15 tion. Also we had this International Religious Free- Good human rights and religious freedom report- dom Act which places particular requirements upon ing from the Embassy and Consulate in Vietnam every Administration, whether they like it or not.”13 were critical, identifying and building trust and rela- Because of his background as a religious free- tionships with religious groups in Vietnam, investi- dom advocate, Ambassador Hanford was particu- gating specific claims of abuses and gathering larly interested in compiling the evidence of evidence. The cables with strong reporting were key, religious freedom violations, and laying out specifi- as was the legwork human rights officers had to do cally what the VG would need to do to avoid CPC to reach contested groups and areas. Officials designation. “I had to provide so much specific evi- describe a “cat and mouse” game, where the Viet- dence of violations of religious freedom that they namese minders attempted to limit the U.S. ability couldn’t deny it. For example, you had a hideous to meet with religious groups and leaders, while the practice of forced renunciations of faith, where offi- delegations sought to break away from their motor- cials were rounding up Christians by the tens of cades and minders, and to meet with people in the thousands over time, seeking to force them, under villages where the persecution was worst. Ambassa- great duress, to renounce their faith. You had physi- dor Hanford echoed the views of many when he cal harassment of believers where people were noted, “We were fortunate to have some very good being beaten, in one or two cases to death. In our human rights officers in Vietnam. We worked well meetings the Vietnamese were denying forced with them, and they were a real tribute to DoS.”16 renunciations. But I had and presented the docu- As Judd Birdsall from the IRF office noted, “the ments in Vietnamese that they were using, and challenge is to figure out what the religious piece is pointed out that the form was identical to the form in abuses. Human rights groups may try to “religion- Laos was using, and noted this was an interesting ize” issues in order to use the CPC designation for form of cross-border cooperation they had going leverage. Governments may try to “dereligionize” there. I spent the time allowing them to get to know issues because they want to avoid CPC designation. us, explaining our concerns, and going into a lot of We have to do our homework, talk to as many differ- detail regarding cases. I told them they were on the ent groups as possible, really do the research to verge of being designated a CPC. Countries are less determine who is reliable, who is exaggerating, to insulted if you tell them, give them notice, and cre- know the actors on the ground and their inter- ate opportunities for them to avoid this, and plot a ests.”17 specific roadmap for improvements.”14 Even with good human rights reporting, how- Ambassador Hanford needed time not only to ever, there were still disputes over how to interpret negotiate with the Vietnamese, but he also needed the facts. Ambassador Hanford was of the view that time to build consensus within the State Depart- not all religious persons are imprisoned for religious ment. Initially the U.S. Ambassador to Vietnam and reasons. For example, VG authorities imprisoned the East Asia Pacific bureau were opposed to CPC Father Thaddeus Nguyen Van Ly, a Roman Catholic designation believing it would be a negative in over- priest, in May 2001 for “undermining state unity” by all relations. According to Ambassador Hanford, “we writing a letter to the U.S. Commission on Interna- had to make our case over a significant period of tional Religious Freedom condemning Vietnam’s time, and had tough negotiations within DoS. When religious persecution. Fr. Ly was sentenced to 15 we can come to agreement within it makes a stron- years in prison, and the priest’s niece and nephews ger case. But DoS personnel differ from person to also received 3–5 year prison sentences for bringing person in their passion for these issues and under- the matter to international attention. Were Fr. Ly standing the importance of religious freedom to U.S. and his relatives imprisoned for religious or political foreign policy. Sometimes people develop a clien- beliefs? According to Ambassador Hanford, some- telist perspective. Other issues coming from the times religious people “use religious venues to regional bureaus are usually more front and center attack the government. For example, Fr. Ly is a of the priority list, while issues from the functional famous Catholic activist. His cause meant a lot to bureaus like DRL and IRF don’t get priority. As evi- many on Capitol Hill. But he was not arrested for dence built over time, as you work with human religious activities. A Communist government is not rights officers to substantiate allegations, meet with willing to tolerate calls for it to be brought down. people in country, the evidence became harder to The detention of these people is unjust, and a viola- deny, and we built agreement. Within DoS people tion of human rights that we protest at the highest Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 7 levels. But they are most accurately viewed as politi- Covenant on Civil and Political Rights . . . the right to cal prisoners, rather than religious prisoners.”18 freedom of thought, conscience, and religion or Ironically, this is also the view of the VG when it belief is “far-reaching and profound” and “encom- imprisons people for “using religious belief in order passes freedom of thought on all matters [and] per- to oppose the State.” sonal conviction,” as well as “the commitment to Others in the IRF Office, such as Tom Farr and religion or belief.”19 Will Imboden, had a broader definition of religious freedom, prisoners and structures. Religious expres- sion is not a private matter, to be cloistered within WHEN IS ENOUGH ENOUGH? mosque, temple, or church walls, but freedom of religion means freedom to express religious views in Secretary of State Colin Powell raised religious free- the public square, even if those religiously motivated dom in his meetings with Vietnamese officials in views critique the government. Beyond freedom of 2004, but instead of seeing improvements on reli- worship, religiously motivated people have rights to gious freedom, the VG proceeded with further participate in the public square. restrictions. The evidence coming from Vietnam As USCIRF notes, the right to freedom of religion persuaded Michael Green, Director of Asian Affairs is more expansive than freedom to worship. “The at the National Security Council, that Vietnam State Department’s narrow definition excludes from should be designated a CPC. consideration anyone arrested or detained for In an election year, politics also played a role. peaceful public advocacy to protect religious free- Vietnam was in the news given questions about dom, including expressing support for the legal or President Bush and Senator Kerry’s service during political reforms needed to fully ensure it . . . those the Vietnam war. White House political advisor Karl who monitor the freedom of religion and are Rove wondered why a group of Vietnamese Ameri- arrested or otherwise punished for the publication cans had been big financial supporters (known as of their findings . . . those who, motivated by ongo- “Eagles”) of President George H. Bush but had not ing restrictions on religious practice or the arrests of supported the Presidency of his son George W. fellow-believers, peacefully organize or protest to Bush. A delegation from this Vietnamese-American draw attention to government repression. The State group visited the White House during the summer Department’s standard for determining who is a religious “prisoner of concern” draws an arbitrary of 2004 and said that religious freedom and CPC line between “political” and “religious” activity not status for Vietnam was their number one priority. found in international human rights law. USCIRF As Congressman Chris Smith put it in July 2004, contends that in all the most recent cases of arrest, “When is enough, enough? Vietnam needs to come detention, and imprisonment, religious leaders or out of the dark ages of repression, brutality and religious-freedom advocates engaged in legitimate abuse and embrace freedom, the rule of law, and 20 actions that are protected by international treaties respect for fundamental human rights.” and covenants to which both the United States and Ambassador Hanford and the IRF Office were Vietnam are signatories. In addition to the free- putting together the 2004 IRF report. Should they doms to believe and to worship, the freedom to recommend that Vietnam be named a CPC, and if peacefully advocate for religious freedom and so, which policy tools (public condemnation, eco- express views critical of government policy are legit- nomic sanctions, etc.) would be most likely to imate activities guaranteed by the Universal Declara- advance religious freedom and other U.S. foreign tion of Human Rights and the International policy objectives in Vietnam?

NOTES

1. Ambassador Robert Seiple, interview with author, 6. Ibid. February 22, 2010. 7. Ambassador Robert Seiple, testimony before the 2. IRF Report and USCIRF Report, 2003. Senate Foreign Relations Committee on “Religious Free- 3. Ibid. dom in Vietnam” February 12, 2004. 4. Ambassador Raymond Burghardt, interview with 8. 2003 USCIRF report. author, May 5, 2010. 9. Will Imboden, interview with author, May 25, 5. Ibid. 2010. 8 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Part A, Instructor Copy

10. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 11. Scott Flipse, USCIRF, interview with author, May 17. IRF staff, interview with author, January 22, 2010. 26, 2010. 18. Ambassador John Hanford, interview with author, 12. Including Representatives Tom Davis (R-Va.), March 10, 2010. Loretta Sanchez (D-Calif.), Chris Smith (R-N.J.), Zoe Lof- 19. 2010 USCIRF report. gren (D-Calif.), and Ed Royce (R-Calif.). 20. Representative Chris Smith, press release July 19, 13. Ambassador John Hanford, interview with author, 2004, “House Passes Smith Vietnam Human Rights Act,” March 10, 2010. http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/nj04_smith/Viet- 14. Ibid. nam.html. 15. Ibid. Case 552, Part B, Instructor Copy

TAK ING ACT IO N a sort of satellite state of theirs, and we would prefer to have better relations with the U.S. as a counter- On September 15, 2004, President Bush added balance. And so we have decided we are going to three countries to the list of CPCs: Vietnam, Saudi improve religious freedom conditions. We are going Arabia, and politically isolated Eritrea. This created a to take steps the U.S. recommends to get off the new pressure for action. CPC designation required CPC list.”23 the USG to take action within 180 days, by March The threat of CPC sanctions gave U.S. negotia- 15, 2005. In all prior CPC cases, the USG invoked tors leverage. As Ambassador Hanford explained, “I already existing sanctions against CPCs Burma, went back to Vietnam, sat down with officials and China, Iran, North Korea, and Sudan, satisfying the said, ‘I would prefer rather than imposing sanctions, letter if not the spirit of IRFA without undertaking I would really prefer if we can talk this out over time additional measures. That option was not available and come to an agreement on what areas you’d be now since Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, and Eritrea were willing to address. We succeeded in coming up with not subject to pre-existing sanctions. USCIRF noted, a document that identified the basic areas that we this gave the USG “an opportunity decisively to were primarily concerned about, and these were respond to severe religious freedom violators. prisoners, physical mistreatment of believers, forced According to the statutory requirements of IRFA, for renunciations of faith, the closing of places of wor- these three countries the U.S. government must: (1) ship, the need for a legal structure to grant greater request consultations with the government on the religious freedom.”24 violations that gave rise to the designation, and con- sult with humanitarian and other U.S. organizations on the potential impact of actions that could be NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT taken; (2) either (a) conclude a binding agreement to cease the particularly severe violations, or (b) take Matthew Schmolesky of the IRF office described the an action from one of several options specified in negotiations. “In our meetings in Vietnam in Febru- the statute (or a “commensurate” action); and (3) ary 2005, a 4–5 day trip was extended to a 9–10 report to Congress on the action taken.”21 IRFA day trip. The first few days we were laying out the specifies several policy options.22 issues, reviewing why the VG was put on the CPC. At this time no country designated a CPC had Ambassador Hanford wanted to show he was an ever been removed from the CPC list except after honest broker, and there was no effort to embarrass U.S. invasion (Iraq, Afghanistan). There was no the VG. The meeting extended because we had a appetite for pursuing tough economic sanctions sense that we might get a bilateral agreement with within DoS, so Ambassador Hanford and the IRF them. Ambassador Michael Marine came to some of staff pursued negotiation of a binding agreement. our sessions, as well as a human rights officer from Rather than CPC designation being an end state, the Embassy. We just lengthened our stay day by they wanted it to serve as a step in a strategic pro- day. By day 8 or 9, the VG was interested in signing cess for change. They continued meetings with the a letter. But it wasn’t there yet. We were drafting let- Vietnamese, to work out a plan for improving reli- ters and handing them copies in the last few days— gious freedom that would lead to removal of Viet- noting these are the benchmarks you need to deal nam’s CPC status, including benchmarks and with, such as restrictive laws for practice and assem- metrics for progress. According to Will Imboden of bling; how religious groups could register, form the IRF office, “When we put Vietnam on the CPC assemblies, buildings religious groups would put up; list, that really got their attention. Shortly after they accountability, how those laws would be put in prac- were made a CPC I flew over to Vietnam for follow tice, holding officials accountable; house arrests, up meetings and happened to have a very revealing beatings, forcing people to renounce their faith. We meeting. I met with a very senior member of their had a good sense of what we wanted before we foreign policy ministry who told me ‘We are chang- went. In coming up with benchmarks there are ing. Look, you Americans have been badgering us problems of being too specific or too general. If you on these religious freedom issues for a while and are too specific, you might get the specific things we’re tired of it. We still don’t quite get why you you asked for but miss out on some larger opportu- care about it a lot, but we sit in a difficult neighbor- nities because they weren’t specifically asked for. If hood. We are concerned about the rise of Chinese you go too general, there may be latitude for the power and growing pressure from China for us to be other party to live up to the letter but not the spirit 9 10 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Part B, Instructor Copy of what you are trying to achieve. We ended up with was going to take, and we needed to work that something in between—here are the main CPC through within State.”25 issues, and if you can deal with these, there is the Ambassador Hanford agreed. “We had to create a possibility of removal from the CPC list. There was mold internally within DoS for what constituted a some shift during negotiations. By day 6 or 7 the VG binding agreement. We worked with the Legal took our letter and rewrote it and said here are Department at DoS on this. When we wrote the some of the issues we’d be interested in signing. IRFA legislation we had looked at other binding Their language started off very flowery—something agreement precedents. We came up with an to the gist of “the Vietnamese government in all its exchange of letters, as long as they were signed by wisdom deems that,” and we were wondering, is the appropriate senior officials and contained clear there any meat in here? Are the language changes language, that the exchange of letters constituted a just a cultural issue in how things should be legal agreement.”26 The letters went back and forth expressed? Or did they just want to weigh in, to be and were agreed upon weeks ahead of time, but the part of drafting? There was some language going final signed versions were announced on May 5, back to the Vietnam war that we would not agree to. 2005. But now we needed to be politick—they are working The VG made improvements in religious freedom with us to put together a document. We needed to in 2005 and 2006. They agreed to implement new work with that and include their inputs, because legislative reforms on religious belief and called on that shifted the dynamic. Now we were working local officials and trained local officials to adhere to together on something, not pressing something by them; they officially banned forced renunciations of ourselves. Then we were contacting the DoS Legal belief; they released 45 religious prisoners; they reg- Office. We needed to have them on board, there istered more religious groups and allowed the were questions they had to answer before we could reopening of some churches that had been shut get to a binding agreement. We realized we weren’t down. going to have all the answers from the Legal Office in time to conclude an agreement on that trip. There was some debate over the distinctions Would it be a binding bilateral agreement? A letter? between the national and local VG. The Vietnamese Private, not a public humiliation? The sense that Embassy presented the view “that their national Ambassador Hanford got was if we decided not to government didn’t have as much control over make this a full press release, with photos and shak- regional local officials, who were not acting at the ing of hands, but instead just tried to get human direction of the national VG. There were two differ- rights issues resolved, we would get more accom- ent views on that. Either they were getting the plished. It didn’t matter if we did it quietly, and results they wanted without the blame, or this was allowed them to save face. By not making the letter in fact what was happening and presented an public, this also left it open for Ambassador Hanford opportunity to get the VG to clamp down and hold 27 to negotiate with other governments in the future local governments accountable.” because they were not privy to all the details of the After the agreement was reached, questions agreement with the VG. If we made it public, some remained about implementation, continued areas of other CPC countries could say, this is the ceiling for religious freedom not addressed by the agreement what we have to do, the limit because this is the (such as the fate of Buddhists not recognized by the deal you gave the Vietnamese government. But we VG such as the UBCV), and whether or not to con- still needed to establish what form this agreement tinue CPC designation.

NOTES

21. USCIRF letter to Secretary of State Condoleeza 6) The delay or cancellation of one or more cultural Rice, February 7, 2005. http://www.uscirf.gov/ exchanges; 7) The denial of one or more working, offi- index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1051& cial, or state visits; 8) The delay or cancellation of one or Itemid=1&date=2010-05-01 more working, official, or state visits; 9) The withdrawal, 22. 1) A private demarche; 2) An official public limitation, or suspension of United States development demarche; 3) A public condemnation; 4) A public con- assistance; 10) Cancellation of Export-Import Bank, OPIC, demnation within one or more multilateral fora; 5) The or Trade and Development Agency guarantees and credit; delay or cancellation of one or more scientific exchanges; 11) The withdrawal, limitation, or suspension of United Case 552, Part B, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 11

States security assistance; 12) Directing US to vote against 23. Will Imboden, interview with author, May 25, World Bank and IMF loans; 13) Limitations on export 2010. licenses for arms, atomic energy, and any other good or 24. Ambassador John Hanford, interview with author, technology that requires prior approval; 14) Prohibiting March 10, 2010. any United States financial institution from making loans 25. Matthew Schmolesky, interview with author, April or providing credits totaling more than $10,000,000 in 28, 2010. any 12-month period; 15) Prohibiting the United States 26. Ambassador John Hanford, interview with author, Government from procuring, or entering into any con- March 10, 2010. tract for the procurement of, any goods or services from 27. Matthew Schmolesky, interview with author, April the foreign government. 28, 2010. Case 552, Part C, Instructor Copy

THE CPC DEBATE REVISITED States should continue to encourage Vietnam to uphold its international commitments on human After the accords were reached, Ambassador Han- rights and religious freedom. This includes full ford noted “Then it was a question of implementa- implementation of the May 5, 2005 agreement. tion. I’ll be quite frank here. I was surprised that two And until significant and tangible progress is made years later this agreement had been substantially on the ground, Vietnam’s CPC designation should implemented by the Government of Vietnam.”28 be maintained.”30 All agreed there had been some progress, but that Scott Flipse of USCIRF questioned “Whether the it was uneven and violations of religious freedom U.S got all it could have gotten from the strategic and human rights remained in Vietnam. The CPC benefit of CPC status, at the time when we had the debate then returned. Some argued to remove Viet- most leverage over Vietnam, when they wanted nam from the CPC list as violations were not severe, PNTR and WTO accession, or did we settle for con- while others argued to retain CPC designation and cessions we likely would have gotten anyway? Did push for more reforms. we ask them to do anything difficult? What did we Ambassador Hanford, many in DoS, and those ask them for? We didn’t ask them to recognize the who had initially been against CPC designation independent religious activities of Buddhist groups, favored removing it. According to Ambassador Han- although Vietnam is a predominantly Buddhist ford, “We have to give credit where credit is due. country. They released some prisoners early from We’re not experienced in crediting improvement, their sentences, in many cases such as Fr. Ly, just to positive change, and success. Many of the issues re-arrest them later. They agreed to implement a law that remained, such as land issues, were not issues they had already passed. While the VG said they of physical brutality. I was thrilled and frankly sur- would halt forced renunciations, they retained lan- prised they made so much progress in two years guage saying that religion undermined the state and since CPC designation, and were sticking to it. You directives counseling officials to get new converts to had to have a sense of diminishing returns, a feel for revert. There is no evidence that CPC status derailed when we could lose all the progress we had made if relations with Vietnam overall. Trade grew and prog- we didn’t move forward. We had all the religious ress toward PNTR and WTO continued while Viet- prisoners released and had change in the legal struc- nam was designated as a CPC.” Flipse and USCIRF ture. We could really undo this progress if we held argued violations in Vietnam still met CPC stan- out for diminishing returns, so we had to do a cost/ benefit analysis here, or we could lose it all if we dards. didn’t at some reasonable point say to the Vietnam- There was pressure from the White House, the ese ‘you have met your promised actions.’”29 trade community, and some in DoS and Congress to Others in Congress, USCIRF, and religious and remove any obstacles to PNTR and WTO accession human rights groups disagreed that the VG had met for Vietnam, in readiness for President Bush’s trip to its promised actions. Only those who held the nar- Vietnam for the APEC meeting in November 2009. row view of religious prisoners concluded that “all” The United States and Vietnam signed the bilateral prisoners were released. USCIRF chair Michel agreement on Vietnam’s accession to the WTO in Cromartie noted in testimony before Congress that May 2006. Bills granting Vietnam PNTR status were “Religious prisoners remain behind bars and new working their way through both houses of Congress arrests have been made, hundreds of churches in 2006. Senior officials such as Secretary of remain closed, forced renunciations of faith con- Defense Rumsfeld and Treasury Secretary Paulson tinue, and restrictions on and harassment of all of visited Vietnam in 2006, prior to President Bush’s Vietnam’s diverse religious communities remain . . . November 17–20, 2006 APEC meeting. Vietnam continues to restrict freedoms of speech, Should the USG remove or continue CPC status to assembly, association and religion and arrests and achieve greater progress on religious freedom in abuses in these areas still occur . . . the United Vietnam?

12 Case 552, Part C, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 13

NOTES

28. Ambassador John Hanford, Interview with Author, the House International Relations Subcommittee on March 10, 2010. Africa, Human Rights, and International Organizations, 29. Ibid. “The Human Rights Dialogue with Vietnam: Is Vietnam 30. USCIRF Chair Michael Cromartie, Testimony before Making Significant Progress?” March 29, 2006. Case 552, Part D, Instructor Copy

CPC ASSESSED: LESSONS LEARNED? Vietnam wants stronger relations with the U.S. as a balance in the region, along with the foreign direct On November 13, 2006, Ambassador-at-Large for investments and remittances from Vietnamese International Religious Freedom John V. Hanford III Americans. All this adds to the USG’s leverage with announced the lifting of CPC designation for Viet- regard to CPC, and is why the USG should have nam. “Vietnam has made significant improvements asked for more. Many on the U.S. Embassy staff toward advancing religious freedom. Though impor- often come to Vietnam after serving in Beijing, and tant work remains to be done, Vietnam can no lon- wrongly see the VG through a Chinese lens, but the ger be defined as a severe violator of religious Vietnamese Communist Party’s position is much freedom. . . . This marks the first time that a coun- weaker than the Chinese Communist Party’s ability try has made sufficient progress as a result of diplo- to coopt the middle class, offer opportunity and matic engagement to be removed from the CPC list, prosperity which can attract party loyalty. The VG and we view this as a very important milestone.” He does not have the same ability to entice future gen- said enactment of new laws had helped VG “revise erations as China does. We should have used CPC and clarify official policy on religion.”31 status better and more strategically. Vietnam made Many regarded this case as a success, a construc- some improvements in religious freedom in order to tive model to be emulated, where CPC designation get PNTR and WTO membership. After the ‘Hanoi was helpful, a useful tool to the Embassy as leverage Spring’ came a crackdown after CPC status was in winning concessions with recalcitrant govern- removed. Prisoners who had been released were re- ments, rather than merely a punishment. And arrested, and beatings and brutality continued, par- Ambassadors Seiple and Hanford argued that if ticularly toward Buddhists under ‘pagoda arrest.’ The backsliding occurred in Vietnam after lifting the CPC argument that CPC status could always be reinstated designation, the USG could always re-designate Viet- was unrealistic given how difficult it was to get Viet- nam as a CPC. nam designated as a CPC to begin with.” USCIRF According to Ambassador Hanford, “We turned a argues that “due to ongoing, serious violations” Viet- negative, CPC designation, into a positive way to nam should again be designated as a CPC. work together, come to a positive resolution, and Ambassadors Seiple and Burghardt argued prag- achieve forward motion on human rights. There are matically that the VG came to realize the positive so many steps in advancing religious freedom. 1) value religion could play in society, providing ser- Beleaguered believers in a country ask for help. 2) vices such as orphanages, hospitals, education, min- You research it and write up a press release. 3) You istries to HIV/AIDS patients and the poor, and jump up and down and draw attention to the issue relieving the burden on the government. Amb. and say we should do something. 4) You engage the Burghardt said, “We should play to that.” He also government leaders, legal structures, the leverages noted the importance of aggressively gathering we have, meet and persuade and document and information. “Don’t mind your minders.”33 work to change government behavior. Most groups Tom Farr believed that a focus on religious pris- do the first end of the spectrum, and don’t necessar- oners was the wrong approach. “The function of ily appreciate or give credit to the great work of the advancing religious freedom has never been inte- IRF Office and DoS in doing the other end of the grated into the broader foreign policy of the United spectrum.”32 States . . . it was compartmentalized. Both ambassa- USCIRF and many human rights organizations dors, [Robert] Seiple and [John] Hanford, did some disagree, seeing the removal of CPC designation as a very good things. Because of their personal persis- lost opportunity that did more harm than good. As tence, they both got people out of jail. . . . But the USCIRF’s Scott Flipse argued, “We asked for too lit- rule is that we’re not actually advancing religious tle. We had more leverage than we thought we did. freedom. We’re cursing the darkness of persecu- Our real leverage is with those who want Western tion. . . . The annual CPC announcement is the only contact through trade, and at this time the VG really attention this policy gets. The content of our policy wanted PNTR and WTO membership. Vietnam has needs to have far more depth than this annual list a love/hate relationship with China, and therefore and the discussion of what that means.”34

14 Case 552, Part D, Instructor Copy The Vietnam Dilemma 15

NOTES

31. Ambassador John Hanford, State Department Press author, May 5, 2010. Conference, November 13, 2006. 34. Tom Farr, “We’re Not Actually Advancing Religious 32. Ibid. Freedom,” interview in Christianity Today, April 2009. 33. Ambassador Raymond Burghardt, interview with Case 552, Teaching Notes

The Vietnam Dilemma

Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love The Catholic University of America Crapa Fellow, U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom

COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL Do Not Duplicate — This is Copyrighted Material for Classroom Use. It is available only through the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy. 202-965-5735 (tel) 202-965-5811 (fax)

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR PART A ignation for Vietnam?

Descriptive Questions DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR PART B Describe the violations of religious freedom in Vietnam in 2003. Descriptive Questions How does the IRF law define “violations of religious freedom” and “countries of particular con- How did CPC designation for Vietnam differ from cern?” other countries designated as CPCs? What leverage did the U.S. have with Vietnam? What policy option was chosen for Vietnam and What were the obstacles to human rights and reli- why? gious freedom reporting in Vietnam? Why were the Vietnamese motivated to be Describe the differences within the State Depart- removed from the CPC list? ment on religious freedom issues. What issues and challenges emerged in negotiating an agreement with the Vietnamese? Analytic Questions What religious freedom improvements did the VG make in 2005 and 2006? What were the various positions regarding CPC designation for Vietnam? Who were the proponents Analytic Questions of each position? What were the pros and cons of these options? What were the pros and cons of pursuing a nego- What is the difference between freedom of reli- tiated binding agreement? gion and freedom to worship? How effective was this approach? Was Fr. Ly a religious prisoner? What other options could have been pursued? What policy options does the IRF law enumerate for Prescriptive Questions CPC countries?

Did Vietnam meet the CPC criteria of the IRF Prescriptive Question law? Should Ambassador Hanford have urged CPC des- What would you have done?

16 Case 552, Teaching Notes The Vietnam Dilemma 17

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR PART C INSTRUCTOR’S NOTE1

Descriptive Question The enclosed questions are a menu of various discussion options, not a recipe. Pick and choose What were the pressures to remove Vietnam among them, and deviate to fit your own course from the CPC list? objectives. To use case and participatory teaching techniques Analytic Questions successfully, attend to classroom culture and dynamics. Establish an environment where partici- What were the various positions regarding CPC pation is the norm, and where students feel com- designation for Vietnam? Who were the proponents fortable participating. This means changing the of each position? existing expectations that the professor will be cen- What were the pros and cons of these options? ter stage, doing most of the talking and analysis. Did Vietnam meet the CPC criteria of the IRF Instead, bluntly, professors must learn to “shut up,” law? and students must learn to “put up.” To facilitate student participation, consider the physical layout of Prescriptive Questions the classroom. If possible, arrange seating into a semicircle or U, or some layout (preferably allowing Should the USG continue CPC status to achieve the students to face each other) that will facilitate greater progress on religious freedom in Vietnam, or students’ direct exchange with each other. If the stu- remove Vietnam from the CPC list? dents can see only you and are directed only to the What would you have done? front, chances are they will listen and direct their comments to you and not to each other. Student name plates on his or her desk, as used at profes- DISCUSSION QUESTIONS FOR PART D sional conferences, allow participants to learn each other’s names, and encourage students to take Descriptive Question responsibility for their own contributions to the class (since they cannot remain anonymous). What are the steps toward advancing religious You can “warm up” the class by beginning the freedom? discussion with softball, easier, descriptive, scene setting questions, and when they are more at ease Analytic Questions and more folks are participating, move to the more high voltage or more difficult questions. “Softball In what ways was the Vietnam case a successful questions” engage students in the material at a low model to be followed elsewhere? stress level, and can be moved through rather What are the limitations of this Vietnamese quickly to get a number of people participating and model? get the facts of the case out on the table. You might How can aggressive human rights reporting help ask basic factual questions here, a battery of short, advance religious freedom? closed, descriptive questions easily drawn from the case (for example, “Who were the actors? What Prescriptive Questions were their interests? What were their options?”). Later in the class, you can push them to evaluate Should religious freedom be better integrated into these early answers or offer their own solutions the broader foreign policy of the United States, and (What were the pros and cons of these options? if so, how? Which actors and interests mattered most? What How can repressive regimes be pragmatically would you have done?) persuaded of the value of religious groups and reli- Or if you are short on time and want to immedi- gious freedom? ately peak their interest in cases, or if the class is a How can you work to better advance religious participatory group and doesn't need much “warm freedom as part of U.S. foreign policy? 1. Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love, “Strategies of Engage- ment,” in The ABCs of Case Teaching, Ed. Vicki Golich, Georgetown University, Institute for the Study of Diplo- macy, 2000, ecase.georgetown.edu/abcs.pdf. 18 Dr. Maryann Cusimano Love Case 552, Teaching Notes up,” you might dive right to the most controversial more comfortable with each other, the method, and points of the case, by asking “What is the Ambassa- the material, you can push them farther into the for- dor’s problem?” or “What should the U.S. govern- est. As the session and the course wear on, “raise ment do?” Emphasize that they don’t need to be an the bar” for participation. You must increase the expert to answer the question. All they need to par- level of difficulty of the questions somewhat quickly, ticipate in the discussion is the information which or students will get bored (and perhaps lazy in their was contained in the case. If the group is more preparation and participation), and class discussion reluctant, save high threshold questions (which may settle in a rut. As the session and course move require students to go out on a limb more, offering on, ask fewer softball, descriptive, open-the-box more personal judgments or prescriptions for questions, and instead ask harder questions (more action), for later in the discussion, after you have evaluative, prescriptive, analytic, judgmental and people participating. interpretive questions), and pose more challenging One means to “prime the pump” and direct stu- followup questions (“can you explain that?,” “do the dent attention to particular points is to distribute 4– rest of you agree?,” “how does that square with...?”), 5 questions prior to the students doing a particular spending less time and emphasis repeating or vali- case. These questions help the students prepare for dating students’ points. As the students get more class discussion, focus attention on key points, and proficient in participation, get to the “red meat” of can give shy students a written “prompt” to have in the case more quickly, allow the students to chew on front of them to break down their discomfort in it with less direction from you, and get out of the speaking. way. Early in the course or in the session you might Besides the “actors–interests–options” question- pair students up or use more group exercises, in ing technique, you might use “the puzzler” question- which students discuss a particular topic among ing technique. Have the students generate the themselves before reporting back to the class as a reasons against something occurring (why Vietnam whole. This can encourage participation (since there was not designated a CPC in 2003), and subse- is safety in numbers), engage students first at a quently ask them why this eventually occurred. The lower threshold (it can be easier to talk to two stu- class creates a puzzle or paradox, then solves it. dents rather than the whole class), vet poor Another technique is the “big bang” method of answers, and boost confidence. Splitting the class questioning, where you begin the case discussion into two sides for a debate can serve the same pur- (with little or no set up questions) by directly posing pose, although since there are more opportunities a big, controversial, high voltage question (“Is U.S. for a student to hide in a larger group, the professor human rights policy effective?”), allowing the stu- must take care in a debate format to ensure that dent discussion to get more heated and directed to voices besides the most gregarious are heard. In two each other, with the professor stepping to the side- party debates, especially on negotiations or bargain- lines. For the big-bang method to be effective, stu- ing cases, “the switch” can be a useful technique to dents have to be “primed” enough to take over the really get students to look at all sides of an issue. discussion, and the question has to be controversial After asking students to argue one point of view, at enough to get them to bite and to generate some some point midway through the debate, unexpect- real heat (and light). Also important is using ques- edly ask the students to switch sides and argue the tions which touch on emotional issues, both early in other position. Role playing can also be useful ear- the course (as a hook and as a signal of things to lier in the semester or class, since a student is not come), and later when they may be more ready to being asked to expose his or her own views, but to take the heat. represent the views of a participant in the case. Role Classes and students are always different, so playing can also be a good device to draw out more there is no magic method or strict timeline for quiet students, or to acquaint more opinionated stu- advancing through the learning curve. Listen to your dents with an opposite viewpoint. students, pay attention to how well they seem to be This is the bread crumb method. Get students to meeting content and participation goals, and adjust bite on the first few questions and in the first few your lesson plans accordingly. sessions with a positive result, and as they become