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Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber-Vulnerabilities of UAS: Components, Autonomy V Automation, Sensors, SAA, SCADA and Cyber Attack Taxonomy

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Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber-Vulnerabilities of UAS: Components, Autonomy V Automation, Sensors, SAA, SCADA and Cyber Attack Taxonomy Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain Chapter 3: Understanding Hostile Use and Cyber-Vulnerabilities of UAS: Components, Autonomy v Automation, Sensors, SAA, SCADA and Cyber Attack Taxonomy Student Learning Objectives An introduction to the Problem of countering hostile use of UAS against U.S. national defense interests will be introduced. The student will be able to identify critical components of an Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS), identify potential cyber vulnerabilities and understand the taxonomy of UAS operations that may be compromised against USA interests. FAA rules and US laws lag the UAS technology growth. In this chapter, UAS critical components, sensors, and levels of self-reliance are identified. These components are viewed in terms of Sense and Avoid (SAA) and SCADA environments. These components are then incorporated -into the Cyber – Attack Taxonomy. (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) What Is The Counter -UAS Problem? The risk of successful terrorist attacks on USA Air Defense Systems (ADS) via UASs is greater because of improving commercial capabilities and accessibility. Advanced small drones, capable of carrying sophisticated imaging equipment and significant payloads, are readily available to the public. A range of terrorist, insurgent, criminal, corporate, and activist threat groups have demonstrated their ability to use civilian drones and gather intelligence. How does the country defend against a growing UAS threat? This is also known as the counter – UAS Problem. General James D Mattis, SECDEF summed up the Problem succinctly: “Unmanned Aircraft are being developed with more technologically systems and capabilities. They can duplicate some of the capabilities of manned aircraft for both surveillance/ reconnaissance and attack missions. They can be small enough and / or slow enough to elude detection by standard early warning sensor systems and could pose a formidable threat to friendly forces.” (Chairman, 2012) Operational Protection from Hostile UAS Attacks – A Helicopter View “According to LCDR Boutros of the Navy War College, developing technologies do not paint a pleasant picture of counter – UAS problem (Boutros, Operational Protection 2015). UAS has seen a widespread proliferation among both state and non-state actors. This is a cause for concern to US Operational Commanders.” (Boutros, 2015) General James D Mattis, SECDEF concluded: “The proliferation of low cost, tactical unmanned aerial systems demand we think about this potential threat now… we must understand the threat these systems present to our joint force and develop the tactics, techniques and procedures to counter the problem.” (Chairman, 2012) (Myer, 2013) It can be argued from the quantity and diversity of production that China is the current leader in this technology. China is thoroughly exercising its UAS muscles in the Spratly Islands. 48 Nichols, Ryan, Mumm, Lonstein, & Carter Over 90 countries and non-state actors have UAS technology. Many of these actors foster terrorism. “Most of the UAS systems, except for China, Russia, USA, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran inventories are low- technology, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) platforms.” (Boutros, 2015) Experts believe that by 2025 China will produce over 50% of UAS systems. (Yan, 2017) China's commercial drone market to top 9B USD by 2020. The market value would be tripled to 180 billion yuan by 2025, according to the guidelines made by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. The estimate was much higher than a forecast by an iResearch report last year, which said the overall market of UAVs, commonly known as drones, could reach 75 billion yuan by 2025 in China. (Yan, 2017) Iran has supplied long range, low technology Ababil UAS weapons systems to Syria and Sudan, and to extremist groups like Hezbollah, Hamas, and ISIS. Hezbollah’s inventory is estimated at over 200 UAS, which concerns the Israeli military commanders. (Zwijnwenburg, 2014) Joint Publication (JP) 3-01 identifies friendly assets that an adversary may attack during a campaign using UAS. A Theater Commander must plan for counter – UAS actions against air defense sites, logistics centers, and national critical infrastructure. (Boutros, 2015) “Due to their small size and unique flying signatures, many UAS are difficult to detect, identify, track, and engage with current joint air defense systems. The increasing proliferation of global UAS has exposed a critical vulnerability in the protection function of operational commanders, requiring joint efforts to include intelligence, Electronic Warfare (EW), cyber warfare, (CW) and FIRES.” (Boutros, 2015) But UAS are not invincible. Neutralizing threats or mitigating risk includes active and passive defense methods with kinetic and non-kinetic FIRES.37 (US DoD – JP 3-0, 2012) Countering UAS Air Threats Advanced UAS can carry large payloads great distances. US Predator and Global Hawk UAS, “Chinese Pterodactyl and Soring Dragon counterparts, and Iranian Ababil can carry at least 500 Kg payloads greater than 300 km.” (Boutros, 2015) “They can be armed or unarmed, with ISR payloads, communications relays, Over-The-Horizon (OTH) target acquisition, and precision strike capabilities.” (Boutros, 2015) “Shorter range, tactical, small/micro UAS may not have the distance or payload capacity of more advanced systems, but they can impact a campaign (or US Homeland Defense) in equally serious ways. Because of their size, their heat signatures are almost nonexistent. They easily evade detection. They offer more freedom of action. They can be launched from within US air defense zones and fly to their targets in less time than it takes for a coordinated response.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert: Imagine a swarm of UAS carrying small potent binary bomb payloads attacking a US Carrier at port less than one mile away from the UAS launch point.] The enemy can effectively balance space, time, and force (arguably frequency too). (Beaudoin, 2011) “Small UAS (sUAS) can perform short-range ISR, be outfitted with explosive charges or chemical and biological agents for aerial dispersion, or simply fly over troops or civilians to demoralize.” (Boutros, 2015) [Nightmare alert: Given the effectiveness of enemy use of 37FIRES definition (US DoD – JP 3-0) the use of weapon systems to create a specific lethal or nonlethal effect on a target. 49 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) in the Cyber Domain IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan, a mobile, airborne version would take the Problem to an entirely new level!] (Nichols R.-0. , 2016) Vulnerabilities Perspective “sUAS are vulnerable to kinetic and non-kinetic outside influence in four different areas; their link to a ground station, the ground station itself, the aircrafts various sensors, and cyber weapons.” The military recognizes the first three factors, the authors will concentrate on the fourth. “In 2009 Iraqi insurgents successfully hacked into US Reaper drones, crashing them.” (Boutros, 2015) (Horowitz, 2014). “In September of 2011, ground control stations at Creech AFB were infected by a virus, temporarily grounding the entire UAS fleet.” (Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013) UAS onboard sensors can be manipulated in many ways. “High intensity light directed at an optical sensor can blind it. GPS receivers can be cyber-spoofed, which consists of transmitting a stronger, but false, GPS signal to a receiver, resulting in inaccurate navigation. Influencing the local magnetic field can have adverse effects on both onboard hard drives and sensors that require magnetic orientation to operate correctly.” (Boutros, 2015) (Hartman, 2013) The object is to better understand UAS subsystems, to facilitate exploiting their weaknesses. The author’s contention is that: The hostile technology of remote-controlled warfare is difficult to control or abort; the best defense (counter – UAS) is to address the root drivers of these threats. The threat- roots are SAA and SCADA. Chapter 3 UAS landscape includes automation, collaboration, conventional vulnerabilities and countermeasures, commercial UAS primer, SAA Attack / Defense (A/D) A/D Issues and SCADA vulnerabilities. Conventional Vulnerabilities of Air Defense Systems (ADS), Attacks By sUAS and Countermeasures A simplified, non-classified view of the US Air Defense System (ADS) against a hostile UAS attack occurs in two stages: 1. Early Detection and Identification of “Danger Close” (Myer, 2013) 38 2. Applied appropriate countermeasures with secondary goal of restricted collateral damage. The traditional ADS family of tools for Detection include: 1. Active Radar Surveillance – generate waves, use rebound echoes on UAS to locate, estimate distance, approach speed, size, penetration vector and short-term trajectory, and 2. Passive Monitoring – covers electromagnetic spectrum via visible, thermal infrared, radio waves on common communications channels. 38 Danger Close Definition www.benning.army.mil/infantry/magazine/issues/2013/May-June/Myer.html Nov 14, 2013 - 1) Danger Close is included in the “method-of-engagement” line of a call-for-fire request to indicate that friendly forces are close to the target. ... Danger close is a term that is exclusive from risk estimate distance (RED) although the RED for 0.1 percent PI is used to define danger close for aircraft delivery. Pi = Probability of incapacitation. 2) Definition of "danger close” (US DoD) In close air support, artillery, mortar, and naval gunfire support fires, it is the term included in the method of engagement segment of a call for
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