Political Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir: from Dominant Party to Multi-Party System

Political Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir: From Dominant Party to Multi-Party System

THESIS

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science

By JAVID AHMAD AHANGER

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF Dr Irfan-Ul-Haq Assistant Professor

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA)

2019

Certificate

This is to certify that Javid Ahmad Ahanger, Research Scholar of the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh (UP) has completed his thesis titled Political Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir: From Dominant Party to Multi- Party System under my supervision. This thesis has been submitted to the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh, in the fulfillment of requirements for the award of the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. To the best of my knowledge, it is his original work and the matter presented in the thesis has not been submitted in part or full for any degree of this or any other university.

(Dr. Irfan-ul-Haq) Supervisor

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA)

Ref No………………. Dated……………………

CANDIDATE’S DECLARATION

I, Javid Ahmad Ahanger, Department of Political Science certify that the work embodied in this Ph.D. thesis is my own bonafide work carried out by me under the supervision of Dr. Irfan-ul-Haq at Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh. The matter embodied in this Ph.D. thesis has not been submitted for the award of any other degree.

I declare that I have faithfully acknowledged, given credit to and referred to the research workers wherever their works have been cited in the text and the body of the thesis. I further certify that I have not willfully lifted up some other's work, para, text, data, result, etc. reported in the journals, books, magazines, reports, dissertations, theses, etc., or available at web-sites and included them in this Ph.D. thesis and cited as my own work.

Dated ...... Javid Ahmad Ahanger Enrolment no: GJ-0886

…………………………………………………………………………………….

Certificate from the Supervisor

This is to certify that the above statement made by the candidate is correct to the best of my knowledge.

Dr. Irfan-ul-Haq Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh

(Signature of the Chairman of the Department with seal)

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA)

Ref No………………. Dated ……………………

COURSE/COMPREHENSIVE EXAMINATION/PRE-SUBMISSION SEMINAR COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Javid Ahmad Ahanger, Department of Political Science has satisfactorily completed the course work/comprehensive examination and pre- submission seminar requirement, which are part of his Ph.D. programme.

Prof. Nigar Zuberi (Chairperson) Department of Political Science Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH-202002 (INDIA)

Title of the Thesis Political Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir: From Dominant Party to Multi-Party System

Candidate’s Name : Javid Ahmad Ahanger

The undersigned hereby assigns to the Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh copyright that may exist in and for the above thesis submitted for the award of the

Ph.D. degree.

JAVID AHMAD AHANGER Acknowledgments

As I finally succeeded in achieving this milestone of my career, I would like to take the opportunity to thank one and all who guided and encouraged me through this whole process. My foremost gratitude is to Almighty Allah, the most gracious, merciful, and benevolent, who bestowed upon me the requisite time, intellect, and commitment quintessential to achieve this milestone.

My supervisor, Dr. Irfan Ul Haq, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science (AMU), undoubtedly deserves to be treasured for all the good that I could avail of him. Apart from acting as my academic guide, he constantly lent me motivational and emotional support which encouraged me to go for the best in my life. His advices on my research as well as career have been priceless. This feat was not possible without the unconditional support provided by him from the day I joined the Department for research. For me, it was a great opportunity to work under his guidance and to learn from his research expertise. I thank Allah for blessing me with his supervision.

I express my sincere thanks to Professor Nigar Zuberi, Chairperson, Department of Political Science, AMU, for her timely assistance throughout the course of my study.

I also express my deep gratitude to Dr. Aijaz Ashraf Wani (Assistant Professor, Political Science, University of Kashmir), Dr. Mohammad Ibrahim Khwaja and Dr. Altaf Hussain Para (Assistant Professors, Political Science and History, respectively, Higher Education Department, J&K) who always supported me through thick and thin. It is your unwavering, selfless guidance and care which instilled confidence in me and made me strive for what you could foresee in me. I am grateful to Suhail-ul- Rehman Lone (Ph.D. research scholar, Department of History, AMU) who stuck with me all these years as a sincere friend and brother. Merely thanking you all wouldn’t suffice as it may undermine the love that I hold for you. Live long and stay blessed!

The scope of this text doesn’t permit me to jot down the contributions of all my friends and colleagues individually. Yet, to mention their names here is to tell them that I am obliged to them all for their moral and academic support in the absence of which it would have been too difficult a journey to walk. My heartfelt thanks to Musavir, Mohammad Lateef Mir, Bilal Shergojri, Amir Sultan, Sajad Ahmad Dar, Muzaffar bin Aziz, Waseem Yousuf Makai, Iqbal Ahmad Baba, Shabeer Ahmad Parrey, Showkat Mandloo, Mohd. Ashraf Khaja, Rafaqat Dev, Nasir Shah, Nasir Nabi, Farooq Ahmad Waza, Anayat Ullah Mugloo, Ishfaq Yatoo, Muzamil Yaqoob, Arshid Iqbal, Peer Muzamil, Gowher Qadir Wani, Haseeb Abdullah, Rameez Bhat, Suhail Mir, Naiyar Iqbal, Waseem Sofi, Tabassum Rasool, Mudasir Qazi, Mudasir Ramzan, Ahrar Lone, Mubashir Gull, Peerzada Mahboob Ul Haq, Rahil Arshid, Yasir Bashir, Faizan Bhat, Mohiuddin Abdul Quadir, Shafiq Ahmad Ahanger, Mudasir Ahmad Sheikh, Mukhtar Ahmad, Ajaz Para, Tanveer Khan, Shahnawaz, Nuzhat Gul, Ishrat Wani, Mehvish Shah, Uzma Bashir, and Mir Safoora for your unconditional support, morale-boosting, and love.

I would also like to thank the University Grants Commission for providing me the fellowship during my research work. It was not possible for a student like me to complete my research without any financial support.

I acknowledge the assistance and guidance provided to me by the faculty members of the Department of Political Science (AMU) whenever I needed their help. I am also highly thankful to the staff at the Maulana Azad Library who have created a conducive and peaceful environment in the library indispensable for a researcher.

Although I may have missed some names in this page on acknowledgements, yet I sincerely thank all of them who helped me directly or indirectly in the successful completion of this study.

Last, but certainly not the least, whatever endeavors I have put in to achieve this goal would not have been possible without the persistent support from my family. My siblings have for so long waited for me to finish this project. My beloved brother Firdous Ahmad Ahanger, and sisters Khalida Akther and Heema Ahad, I do remember you and everything you have done for me. For that I am grateful to you. My father Abdul Ahad Ahanger and mother Rafeeqa Bano have burnt in the flame of hopes and expectations, the light of which has illuminated my life. Abba and Mummy, I hope your tulip blossoms one day. Your resolute attitude in the face of so many challenges is what has inspired me to stand tall. I am indebted to you in this world and the word hereafter. May Almighty Allah shower his blessings upon all of you!

JAVID AHMAD AHANGER

Political Opposition in Jammu and Kashmir: From Dominant Party to Multi-Party System

ABSTRACT

SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT FOR THE AWARD OF DEGREE OF

Doctor of Philosophy In Political Science

By JAVID AHMAD AHANGER

UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF Dr. Irfan-Ul-Haq Assistant Professor

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY ALIGARH (INDIA) 2019

Abstract

Parliamentary Democracy entails a ‘Party System’ wherein two or more political parties vie for political power within an established Constitutional framework. Different political parties give representation to the plural and sometimes even conflicting ideas, interests and opinions which are unavoidable in human societies. However, for any ‘Democratic Political System’ to function and sustain its durability, political opposition in the form of ‘organized political groups’ is crucial on a ‘regular and sustained basis’. The organized and viable political opposition is expected to provide an alternative to the government, whenever necessary through democratic methods. It practically provides an option to the electorate to change a defunct government. Thus, avoids the misuse of the political power. The ‘institutionalized and well organized political opposition’ is thus a sheet anchor of ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ and plays a crucial role in the working of ‘Modern Democratic Governments’. Parliamentary Democracy with well-organized party system assumes more importance in ‘plural societies having multiple cultural and ethnic identities’ which need a due representation in the political institutions. Political parties as such come handy in representing these identities through democratic means. The opposition politics in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is divided into two phases: political opposition in ‘Dominant Party System’ which characterized the State polity from 1947-2002 and political opposition in ‘Multi-Party System’ which characterizes the State polity from 2002-2014.

Political Opposition in Dominant Party System

This state polity of J&K since 1947-2002, a fairly large period of 55 years, was characterized by ‘Dominant Party System’ first under National Conference (NC) (1947-65), then under Congress (1965-77) and lastly again under NC (1977-2002). Opposition parties, in this phase, were not able to pose any serious challenge to the ruling party either due to their stunted growth or overwhelming nature of the party in power. There was not a solid opposition within or the outside of the State legislature. The NC from 1947-65 remained in power with 9/10 seat majority in the Assembly. The main semblance of opposition of any consequences to the party was provided by Praja Parishad, a Jammu based political party, both outside and within Assembly. Though two factions emerged within NC in the form of ‘Social Democratic Front’ 2 and ‘Democratic National Conference’, which provided opposition to some extent, yet both factions could not provide any ideological alternative or pose serious electoral challenge to the ruling party as they quickly vanished from the political scene. Similarly, the Congress Party remained dominant from 1965-77 with more than 3/4 majority in the Assembly. The role of opposition was taken by ‘faction’ of NC led by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad and Jan Sangh. This phase in the State politics (1947-77) witnessed almost the absence of any credible opposition to the ruling party which could pose serious challenge to its continuance in power. The ruling party also used election manipulations to cut the size of any serious opposition to its power. Outside Assembly, however, Plebiscite Front, Political Conference and Awami Action Committee (AAC) stood for ‘right to self-determination’ to the people of State and boycotted poll process.

The return of Sheikh Abdullah in 1975, and the revival of NC again brought back ‘Single Party Dominance’ which lasted till 2002 elections. NC remained in power with ‘absolute majority’ in Assembly though with a comparatively strong opposition. Other political parties were better organized and provided more strong opposition to the ruling party. The electoral alliance between NC and Congress in 1987 Assembly elections again consolidated State politics at the cost of opposition while NC retained absolute majority in 1987 Assembly elections as well. The opposition of Muslim United Front was cut to see through election rigging which won only four seats in Assembly. In 1996 assembly elections which took place after six years of ‘President Rule’ in the State and amidst continuing ‘armed militancy’; NC again emerged with absolute majority. Nevertheless, the opposition from outside assembly was taken by People’s League by Shabir Shah, found in 1975 ‘to keep quests for self-determination alive, after Sheikh Abdullah shunned ‘right to self- determination politics’. ‘All Party Hurriyat Conference’ (APHC), a conglomerate of some 27 parties formed in September 1993 for a peaceful struggle to achieve the basic ‘right of self-determination’ for the people of J&K, also launched a door to door campaign for boycott of elections in 1996.

Political Opposition in Multi-Party System

The state polity entered a ‘new phase’ of opposition politics after 2002 Assembly elections, which is conceptualized as political opposition in ‘Multi-Party System’. 3

This is exactly the phase J&K state entered into with the emergence of ‘People’s Democratic Party’ (PDP). The party (PDP) eroded the support base of NC among Muslim majority in the state and gained its chances of securing ‘absolute majority’ which made it the single largest party in the earlier phase. PDP, a regional party proved to be an effective challenge to NC than national parties like Congress or Janata Party in late 1970’s and 1980’s. This resulted in the division of Muslim votes in the State which helped ‘Multi-Party System’ to emerge. The three Assembly elections of 2002, 2008 and 2014 have witnessed similar election results in which no party could form government on its own. More importantly for ‘Multi-Party System’, the mandate, despite very turbulent political conditions due to the mass uprisings of 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2013 which sharpened the regional identity in the State. It gave rebirth to the ‘politics of protests’ or ‘separatism’ and produced sharp regional cleavages. The opposition politics in this phase has gained in strength and become more effective because ‘criticism and protests of opposition parties’ cannot be so easily neglected in ‘Multi-Party’ politics which is prevalent in J&K, where coalition governments remain in power by marginal support and at the brink of losing power in absence of ‘absolute majority’. Nevertheless, Opposition ‘inside’ the Assembly has continued amidst political opposition from ‘outside’ the Assembly. The political opposition by separatist groups (like APHC, JKLF, AAC and many others) outside the Assembly has many issues which remain part of formal opposition groups of the State, which has remained a ‘permanent’ feature of the state since 1948. Meanwhile, post-2008 public protests have once again increased the separatist tendency and its scope in the State politics. The ‘politics of protests’ continued in 2009, 2010, 2013 and later in 2016 (still continues) that engulfed the State in violent public demonstrations. Yet, there is no doubt that the political opposition in the state is gaining vigor and playing important role in democratizing the State polity. That has particularly suffered under burden of conflict and created propensity to treat ‘national interest’ and ‘security of state’ as more important than the democratic values. The opposition parties showed stunted growth and elementary civil liberties and human rights remain prone to get sacrificed on the pretext of ‘national interest’. The opposition as such has a significant role to play in J&K to strengthen ‘Democracy’ and State institutions.

Significance of the Present Study

The political opposition in the State of J&K has entered a new phase with the emergence of ‘Multi-Party System’. It has acquired new strength and shunned its timidity to take a more positive role in ensuring optimum use of political power for political, social, and economic development in the State. The political opposition has strived for democratic rights like right to vote, civil liberties, good governance, accountability, transparency, responsive and corruption free administration. The prospect of opposition politics in the State is particularly significant in view of its remaining a ‘conflict area’ under the shadow of which democracy takes less priority than security. Since opposition politics in the state of J&K has not received proper scholarly attention, partly due to absence of any commendable opposition in the state. The picture stands changed over the last decade or so; it is high time to objectively understand its pros and cons and set the trend for future study as well.

Objectives of the Study

The study aims at attainment of following objectives and purposes.

 To analyze the issue of political opposition from two conceptual categories representing two distinctive phases of the state polity: political opposition in ‘Dominant Party System’ and political opposition in ‘Multi-Party System’.  To bring out the trends of opposition politics in the state in ‘Dominant- Party’ phase from 1947 to 2002 and its role, if any, in the rise of militancy and consequent armed opposition.  To study the nature of electoral politics in J&K and its impact on the state polity.  To study the emergence, role, and decline of NC as a hegemonic character in the state polity.  To examine the emergence and role of the Indian National Congress, People’s Democratic Party, and Bartiya Janta Party as significant political parties in the state in the backdrop of the failures of NC. 5

 To analyse the factors and political circumstances in the state in which coalition politics has become a norm from the last one decade or so, and its subsequent impact on ‘Democratic Development’ of the State.

Research Questions

 How did the political movement in J&K that was ruled by the Dogras in pre-1947 period give birth to political mobilization and political parties in the state?  How did the post-1947 politics in the state create a feasible political atmosphere that led to the ‘One-Party Dominance’ in J&K?  Why is it that a seasoned opposition politics couldn’t develop till 2002 in the state?  How did the state politics, earlier dominated by NC, change into the politics of competitiveness since 2002?  What were the reasons that led to the emergence of new political actors in the mainstream politics and how far did they expand the scope and space of mainstream politics in the state?  How far has PDP redefined the politics of the state in the last one and a half decade?  Why and how have the Coalition governments become a political norm since the rise of the ‘Multi-Party System’?

Data Analysis Techniques and Methodology

The study is carried by historical, analytical, empirical, and quantitative methods. Moreover, the content analysis method has been applied frequently throughout the study to evaluate the critical political developments in J&K. The analysis in the study has followed the chronological political developments that occurred in J&K and through this method a fair picture of the political phenomena is critically interpreted and documented in the proper context.

To address the objectives of the study and answer the research questions, both primary and secondary data is utilized to reach out to the conclusion. Primary data mostly consists of government reports, legislative debates, speeches, interviews, party 6 statements, historical documents, agreements, and accords. Apart from these sources; biographies and autobiographies of some of the important political leaders of J&K have also been used. This research work, has largely dealt with secondary sources that are used for the completion of the present study. The secondary sources mostly include books, magazines, journals, periodicals and newspapers (both local, national and international). The other relevant information from inside and outside the state is used relevantly. The hypotheses are tested against empirical data and conclusion is drawn accordingly.

Chapter Outline

The present study has been divided into Five Chapters. Besides these Chapters, the thesis begins with introduction that gives outline of the study. The thesis ends up with conclusion and some important recommendations.

The First Chapter of the study entitled Evolution of Party System in Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective traces out the origin and development of Party System in J&K in pre 1947 era. The Chapter examines the political developments that took place in princely state of J&K from 1931, that gave birth to political awakening as well as Political Party like Muslim Conference. The Chapter debates the issue of conversion of Muslim Conference (MC) into National Conference (NC) in 1939 in historical perspective. Besides, it studies the revival of MC and its role in the state. Moreover, the Chapter deliberates some other significant opposition forces such as, the Students’ Federation, Kisan Sabha, Kashmir Youth League, and Mazdoor Sabha and their role in J&K. After debating the emergence and role of political parties, the Chapter set the trend to study the State politics in post 1948 era, when the J&K entered into Constitutional relation with India.

The Second Chapter of the thesis entitled Jammu and Kashmir: One-Party Dominance, Concept and Context defines the concept of ‘One Party Dominance’. After defining the idea, the Chapter analyzes the role of NC during the days of partition and aftermath, especially the role of Sheikh Abdullah’s interim government and political revenge in the state. It further studies the role of Political Parties (especially NC and Congress) in post-dismissal era of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 and subsequently the gradual process of erosion of the State Autonomy. The Chapter 7 explores the reasons and factors that led to the ‘One Party Dominance’ of National Conference from 1948-1964 and later INC (as outsider political entity) from 1965- 1975 by studying the State Assembly and Parliamentary elections from 1952 to 1975 in the State.

The Third Chapter entitled Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pre-Accord Phase (1947-1975) analyzes the major political changes that took place in J&K since states conditional accession with India in 1948 till 1975. After explaining the meaning and definition of opposition, the Chapter studies the emergence, role and issues of various political parties such as: Praja Parishad, Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front, Jamaat-e-Islami, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, and Democratic National Conference in the state politics. The Chapter also studies the role of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad in reviving the NC after Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq merged National Conference with Indian National Conference in 1964. Besides this, the Chapter studies the emergence and role of opposition outside the Assembly (such as: Political Conference, Plebiscite Front, and Awami Action Committee) that has remained one of the essential future of state polity since the state acceded with India. It further attempts to study the State Assembly and Parliamentary elections from 1951 till 1975 and explore the reasons behind the ‘Single Party Dominance’ of National Conference and Congress but weak, fragile, unorganized and non-existent political opposition in the State.

The Fourth Chapter entitled Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Post-Accord Phase (1975-2002) analyzes the political developments that took place in J&K after ‘Indra-Sheikh Accord or Kashmir Accord’ in 1975. The Chapter studies the role of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in revival of NC after he shunned down the ‘Politics of Plebiscite’. It further attempts to study the State Assembly and a Parliamentary election from 1975 till 1999 and explores the reasons behind the ‘Single Party Dominance’ of National Conference, fall of ‘Democratic Institutions’, and collapse of ‘Indian Democracy’ from 1987 to 2002 in the state. The Chapter also studies the role of Opposition Parties such as Indian National Congress and Janta Party in the politics of the J&K. Furthermore, the Chapter explains the reasons behind the downfall of NC after the death of Sheikh Abdullah. Subsequently, it explores the rise and role of Secessionist Parties from mid 1970s such as J&K People’s League, 8

J&K People’s Conference, J&K Political Front, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, and most importantly the birth of All Parties Hurriyat Conference in the State. Besides this, it documents the emergence and role of armed struggle as a counter narrative to mainstream politics in J&K.

The Fifth Chapter of the thesis entitled Multi-Party System and Coalition Governments Since 2002 explores the meaning and definitions of ‘Multi-Party System’ and ‘Coalition Politics’. The Chapter broadly explains the factors and reasons behind the rise of People’s Democratic Party (PDP). Subsequently, it studies the nature of electoral process since 2002-2014 in the State Legislative Assembly and Parliamentary elections. However, emphasis has been laid on State Assembly elections of 2002, 2008 and 2014 to explore the role of PDP, Congress, NC, BJP and other small players’ vis-à-vis opposition and in Coalition governments in J&K. The Chapter further studies the voyage of National Conference and Congress since 2002. An attempt has been made to understand the rapid rise and role of Bartiya Janta Party in J&K. Lastly, the Chapter studies the emergence and role of small parties like J&K National Panthers Party, J&K Awami Ittehad party, Communist Party of India, and most important political development like the reemergence of J&K People’s Conference as a mainstream Party led by Sajad Gani Lone in the politics of J&K.

Limitations of the Study and Future Prospect

It is acknowledged fact that no research is final and complete in nature and scope; same is true of the topic under investigation. Since it is not possible and in fact much difficult to cover all the aspects of the State Polity. Likewise, this study within the contours of the research topic has some limitations. Therefore, while studying the theme in the light of objectives and research questions it become obvious that the research has certain limitations also. They can be summed up as under.

 The research is limited to the growth of ‘Party System’ and role of ‘Political Opposition’ in J&K. However, it does not study the organizational structure of the parties like National Conference, People’s Democratic Party, Bartiya Janta Party, Congress, Panthers Party, Communist Party of India (M) and many other small parties in the State. 9

 It also doesn’t study the origin of Kashmir conflict separately and it’s various political dimensions, causes and possible solutions.  Similarly, it doesn’t study each Coalition government since 2002 in the state in a detailed manner and their performance, achievements, and failures separately.  Furthermore, it doesn’t make any comparative study of the previous three Coalition’s governments since 2002.  Last but not least, the study of ‘Politics of Separatism’ as a distinctive political discourse falls beyond the scope of this study.

Thus, keeping the above limitations into consideration, there is further scope of research on the topic to understand the nature and scope of state polity (Parliamentary Democracy) since the rise of ‘Multi-Party System’ in J&K. I hope the present study would make a significant and substantial contribution to the relevant arena and become the foundation for the future research.

Conclusion

With regard to the emergence of Party System one can safely divide public opinion in J&K in the three categories: first, there were those who supported the Hindu Dogra rule of Maharaja Hari Singh; second, the Muslim Conference which claimed to represent the Muslims in Jammu region and the Kashmir valley and third was National Conference, the creation of Sheikh Abdullah, which originally until 1939 had been called Muslim Conference, and in opposition to which the Muslim Conference eventually revived itself and opposed Abdullah’s secularization project (though contested by Muslim Conference leadership). These oppositional factions in J&K played a key role in shaping the politics from 1930 to 1950 when the British left Indian Sub-Continent after dividing it into two countries—India and Pakistan. Nevertheless, the post-1947 saw ‘Single Party System’ and no dissent was allowed to flourish. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, however, displayed autocracy and highhandedness. As a result of which the ‘Democratic Institutions’ became the first casualty in J&K. The eras of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Shamsuddin and later Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Mir Qasim were phases of exceptional politics in the post-1948 political history of the state. The period from 1948 to 1975 was by no means normal, but it had its effect on the working of the 10

Party System in J&K. While Pradesh Congress gained its strength from 1964, the NC was not in a position to consolidate itself due to many political reasons, chief among which were Sheikh’s prolonged incarceration and lack of patronage in New Delhi. This obviously had resulted in fragile opposition which in the long run caused democratic deficit – because there was hardly any ‘democratic institutionalization’ in the post-accession period. Few important political forces which emerged both within the State Assembly and outside were: Praja Parishad (Jammu based party), Plebiscite Front (Separatist political entity), Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front, Democratic National Conference (led by G.M. Sadiq), Bakshi’s National Conference (A group of 20 members around him), Awami Action Committee (religious com political force emerged after holy relic theft), Kashmir Political Conference (small pro-Pakistan group under Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra) and Jamaat-I-Islami (socio- religious political organization). Though, less in scope, these political opposition groups played a significant role in the political atmosphere of J&K from 1947-1975.

However, after the Indra-Sheikh Accord of 1975, NC returned to power and the Party once again remained ‘the preponderant political force in the state’ till the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982. The death of Sheikh Abdullah ended up ‘personality cult’ in Kashmir politics, on the one hand, and created instable and feeble political formations, on the other. However, due to the inadequacies of NC at political and ideological front, the Party lost its dominant character of regional party. During Farooq Abdullah’s tenure the Party considerably lost much of its political constituency due to poor decisions and by toeing the line of New Delhi in Kashmir. The birth of PDP was seen as an important political development vis-i-vis electoral politics of J&K. The new Party (PDP) filled the space of the separatists as it envisioned alternative to both NC and APHC. Similarly, the Panthers Party, Communist Party of India (M), many other small parties did not succeed in becoming anything other than a loosely opposition knit of ambitions of leaders and political parties in J&K. These all parties retain meager social and electoral acceptance and didn’t flourish as a vibrant opposition till 2002. Since the rise of secessionists the politics in J&K have been predominately dominated by two main narratives. One is the separatist political discourse endorsed by APHC and other similar ideological groups. They don’t believe in state’s final accession and for them people of Kashmir has yet to decide their future. They 11 recognize India as colonial power that had occupied Kashmir against the will of people. The contrast to this narrative is the mainstream politics—mainly believers of state’s final accession with India. However, most of the mainstream regional parties also recognize Kashmir as a political problem that needs a solution within the ambit of Indian Constitution or talks with Pakistan. During the first 55 years from 1948 to 2002, due to the ‘Single Party Dominance’ the state polity couldn’t draw a line between the ‘agenda of governance’ and ‘electoral discourse’, as both were in consonance with each other. The trend has been recently changed in the state, when PDP emerged an alternative to NC. The mainstream constituency in the Kashmir has reached a stage where no ‘Single Political Party’ would emerge to form the government on its own. After 2002 Assembly elections, state witnessed fractured mandate and have witnessed three Coalition governments till 2014. The ‘politics of absence of mainstream’ changed into ‘politics of presence’. At the same time the politics of ‘Single-Party System’ changed into ‘Politics of Multi-Party System’. In such political environment the fractured mandate will remain permanent feature in Kashmir politics. However, what was notable thing along with ‘competitive politics’ was the rebirth of ‘protest movement’ or ‘politics of separatism’ that unfolded in the state in post 2008 Amarnath crisis. In this way, political instability continued in the form of public uprisings and protest movements and revival of militancy. As far as Coalition governments are concerned in J&K, they have proved unstable and short living so far. Be the Coalition of Ghulam Mohammad Shah (Awami National Conference with Congress in 1984) or (Congress-NC alliance in 1987) both proved short-living and disastrous for the J&K. The later Coalition of 2002 between (PDP-Congress) could not complete its term of six years; due to the rift over 2008 agitation. However, Congress-NC Coalition (2008-2014) was the first kind of Coalition that not only completed its term of six years, but it gave hope that two different ideological parties can ensure somehow a least suitable government in the state. all the Coalitions and electoral alliances from 1980s to 2014 were weak, fragile, and unsuitable that could not have accomplished their respective terms in office except the Congress-NC Coalition of 2008-2014. Nevertheless, the regional parties in J&K realized the political realism that no Coalition is possible without the national parties due to the emergence of ‘Competitive Politics’ since 2002. While regional parties become dependent on national parties like Congress or BJP to attain or retain power and likewise national parties are dependent on regional parties. It led to the 12 four visible trends in state politics, viz, the decline of dominance of NC, rise of PDP as an alternative to NC, growing number of small individual parties and most important the growing influence of national parties in power sharing in the state. There is no denial to this fact that mainstream political actors since 2002 have played significant role in democratizing the state institutions by representing the diverse political opinions both within and outside the State Assembly. But at the same time the emergence of multiple actors have reduced the power of regional actors (parties) to bargain from the Delhi over the most crucial issue of ‘Autonomy’ and ‘Self-Rule’. The representative character claim of political parties for the state didn’t authorize them to speak up for the larger dispute, though they won the elections and form the governments. But, when mainstream parties are less secure about their mass support and political constituency, they balance it either by turning ‘separatists’ in the valley or some turn ‘Hindutva’ politics in Jammu. The coincidences between different ideological groups and dichotomous relationship between mainstream and separatist politics have continued its impact on state politics. The diverse needs of J&K and their solution are obviously strategic, situational and most important historical- specific. How far the ‘Multi-Party System’ and ‘Coalition Politics’ will be able to balance the needs is a debatable question! CONTENTS Acknowledgements List of Tables Abbreviations Introduction 1-13 0.1 Political Opposition in Dominant Party System 1-4 0.2 Political Opposition in Multi-Party System 4-6 0.3 Significance of the Present Study 6 0.4 Relevance of the Study 6-7 0.5 Objectives of the Study 7-8 0.6 Research Questions 8 0.7 Hypotheses of the Research Work 8-9 0.8 Data Analysis Technique and Methodology 9 0.9 Chapter Outline 10-12 0.10 Limitations of the Study and Future Prospect 12-13 Chapter One: Evolution of Party System in Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective 14-32 1.1 Dogra Rule and Party System 14-19 1.2 Emergence of Muslim Conference and External Factionalism 19-23 1.3 Conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference: A Debate 23-26 1.4 Revival of Muslim Conference: Debate with National Conference 26-28 1.5 Other Oppositional factions in Dogra Rule 28-31 1.5.1 The Students Federation 29 1.5.2 Kisan Sabha in J&K 29-30 1.5.3 Kashmir Youth League 30 1.5.4 Mazdoor Sabha 30-31 Chapter Two: Jammu and Kashmir: One-Party Dominance, Concept and Context 33-83 2.1 One-Party Dominance: Definition and Meaning 33-37 2.2 Prelude to Accession: National Conference and State Politics 37-39 2.3 Accession with India: Role of National Conference 39-42 2.4 Interim Government 1948: Politics of Vengeance 42-46 2.5 Post-Abdullah Dismissal: The Politics of Integration (1953-1963) 46-50 2.6 Elections of 1957: One-Party Dominance of National Conference 50-52 2.7 Abdullah’s Release in 1958: Role of National Conference 52-53 2.8 Elections of 1962: Dominance of National Conference 53-57 2.9 Holy-Relic Agitation: Advent of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq 57-61 2.10 Indian National Congress in J&K: (1965-75) 61-80 2.10.1 Nehru’s visit to Kashmir 63-66 2.10.2 Merger of National Conference into Pradesh Congress: Erosion of Autonomy 66-70 2.10.3 Elections of 1967: Dominance of Congress 70-80 Chapter Three: Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pre-Accord Phase (1947-1975) 84-138 3.1 Meaning and Definition of Opposition 84-87 3.2 Praja Parishad: Emergence and Role as Opposition 87-98 3.3 Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front: Emergence and Role 99-101 3.4 Democratic National Conference: Formation, Role and Disappearance 101-08 3.5 Revival of National Conference: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Politics of the State 108-10 3.6 Opposition Outside the Assembly 111-13 3.7 Plebiscite Front: Emergence, Role and Disappearance 113-22 3.8 The Advent of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq: Role of AAC as an Opposition 122-25 3.9 Jamaat-e-Islami in J&K: Emergence 125-27 3.10 Jamaat-I-Islami: Role as an Opposition 127-36 Chapter Four: Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Post-Accord Phase (1975-2002) 139-200 4.1 The Merger Proposal: Sheikh Abdullah and Indra Gandhi 141-42 4.2 The Revival of National Conference: Role of Abdullah 142-46 4.3 Elections of 1977: Dominance of National Conference 146-51 4.4 Pradesh Congress: Role as an Opposition 151-55 4.5 Janta Party: Emergence and Role as an Opposition 155-58 4.6 Death of Abdullah: Weakening of National Conference 158-60 4.7 Elections of 1983: Dismissal of Farooq Abdullah 160-70 4.8 Dismissal of G.M. Shah: NC-Congress Electoral Cooperation 170-74 4.9 The Rise of Secessionist Parties: The Politics of J&K in Post-1975 Era 174-79 4.9.1 Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League 176 4.9.2 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference 177-78 4.9.3 Jammu and Kashmir Political Front 178-79 4.10 Elections of 1987: National Conference and Collapse of Indian Democracy 179-84 4.11 The Upsurge of Armed Resistance: Role of JKLF 184-88 4.12 The Advent of APHC: Role in State Politics 188-90 4.13 The Resurgence of Mainstream: Diminishing Dominance of NC (1996) 190-95 Chapter Five: Multi-Party System and Coalition Governments Since 2002 201-258 5.1 Meaning and Definition 201-05 5.2 Elections of 2002: The Advent of PDP and Competitive Politics 205-18 5.3 National Conference: A Voyage from Opposition to Realization of Power (2002-2014) 218-25 5.4 Congress in J&K: The Politics of Coalition and Electoral Competitiveness 226-30 5.5 The Rise of BJP in J&K: Role and Realization of Power 230-39 5.6 Other Players 239-49 5.6.1 Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party 240-43 5.6.2 Jammu and Kashmir Awami Ittehad Party 243-45 5.6.3 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference 245-46 5.6.4 Communist Party of India: Role in State Politics 246-49 Conclusion 259-270 Appendices 271-278 Bibliography 279-294

LIST OF TABLES

Table Title of the Table Page No. No.

1.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to Praja Sabha (J&K People’s Assembly) in pre-1947 phase 32 2.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951-1962 81 2.2 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967-1972 81 2.3 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 4th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1967 in J&K 82 2.4 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 5th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1971 in J&K 83 2.5 Region-wise polling percentage in Parliamentary Elections of 1967-1971 in J&K 83 3.1 Electoral Performance of Praja Parishad to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951, 1957 and 1962 136 3.2 Electoral Performance of Bharatiya Jana Sangh to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967, 1972 and 1977 136 3.3 Electoral Performance of Bharatiya Jana Sangh to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1972, 1977 and 1983 136 3.4 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951, 1957, and 1962 137 3.5 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967-1972 137 3.6 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 5th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1971 in J&K 138 4.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1977 196 4.2 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 6th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1977 in J&K 196 4.3 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 7th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1980 in J&K 196 4.4 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1983 197 4.5 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 8th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1984 in J&K 197 4.6 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1987 198 4.7 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 9th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1989 in J&K 198 4.8 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 11th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1996 in J&K 199 4.9 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1996 199 4.10 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 12th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1998 in J&K 200 4.11 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 13th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1999 in J&K 200 5.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2002 250 5.2 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2008 251 5.3 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2014 252 5.4 Region wise share of seats of Political Parties to State Assembly Elections of J&K from 2002 to 2014 253 5.5 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 14th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2004 in J&K 254 5.6 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 15th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2009 in J&K 255 5.7 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 16th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2014 in J&K 256

5.8 Content Analysis of Election Manifestos of National Conference and People’s Democratic Party from 2002 to 2014 257-58

Abbreviations

AAC: Awami Action Committee AFSPA: Armed Forces Special Powers Act APHC: All Parties Hurriyat Conference BJP: Bhartiya Janta Party BJS: Bharatiya Jana Sangh CBI: Crime Branch of India CM: Chief Minister CPI: Communist Party of India DNC: Democratic National Conference ECI: Election Commission of India EPW: Economic and Political Weekly FIR: First Information Report HM: Hizbul Mujahedeen IAK: Indian Administered Kashmir IB: Intelligence Bureau INC: Indian National Congress J&K: Jammu and Kashmir J&KNPP: Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party JeI: Jamat-e-Islamia JKCCS: Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society JKDAA: Jammu & Kashmir Disturbed Areas Act JKLF: Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front JKPC: Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference JKPF: Jammu and Kashmir Political Front JNP: Janta Party JS: Jana Sangh KMC: Kisan Mazdoor Conference LeT: Lashkar-e-Tubia MC: Muslim Conference ML: Muslim League MLA: Member of Legislative Assembly MLC: Member of Legislative Council MUF: Muslim United Front NC: National Conference NDA: National Democratic Alliance PAK: Pakistan Administered Kashmir PCC: Pradesh Congress Committee PDF: People’s Democratic Front PDP: People’s Democratic Party PL: People’s League PM: Prime Minister PSA: Public Safety Act PSP: Praja Socialist Party RRP: Reading Room Party RSS: Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh SDF: Socialist Democratic Front SOG: Special Operation Group SRO: Sadri-Riyasat Order STF: Special Task Forces TADA: Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act UNO: United National Organisation UNSC: United Nation Security Council UPA: United Progressive Alliance

Introduction

Chapter One: Evolution of Party System in Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective

Political parties are an indispensable part of any modem ‘Democratic State’. They play a fundamental role in the political processes that govern the operational character of the system. In fact, the working of formal organizations in a ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ becomes clearly comprehensible only through the dynamics of party system. Like other states of India, Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) too has its own regional party system. To understand the nuances of politics in the state, it is important to attempt a brief historical survey of the origin and development of its party system which has its roots in the pre-1947 period.

The Dogra dynasty ruled the state of J&K from 1846 to 1947. The political structure of the state under the Dogra regime was established on the subjective rule of the prince who theoretically used to enjoy complete sovereignty over the internal governing institutions with the British Government as the Paramount Power. The political system of Dogra regime has often been described as harsh and cruel: people were denied civil liberties, democratic rights, and freedom to express their angst towards the government. Yet, the emergence of political awakening among the people and its placement on a strong footing during the 1930s could not be controlled by the state. As the political upheaval turned widespread and the demand for a responsible government gained momentum, the ruling class was forced to concede at least some rights to the people: in 1932, the permission to form political associations was granted to the people. Thus, the emergence of political parties turned into a reality. The politics in the state has been extensively influenced by the deep-seated political, social, historical, economic and psychological features. The focus of this chapter lies on the development of party system in J&K.

1.1 Dogra Rule and Party System

Although the emergence of political awakening in the princely state of J&K is generally traced to early 1930s. Until 1920s, the Muslims of Kashmir remained in political backwaters as compared with their co-religionists in the rest of British India. This political inertia may also be attributed to the ban on the formation of political 15 associations or even the publication of newspapers in the valley. As late as 1921, the Dogra government hesitantly gave permission to the formation of an association whose objective was the teaching of the Quran and ordered the police “to watch that the Anjuman does not take part in political matters.”1 In the Jammu province, some Muslim youth in Jammu founded the organization called Young Men’s Muslim Association.2 The association convened many meetings, where the grievances of the Muslims were voiced and the demands for their removal made. While the Valley did not yet possess such a platform, a group of Kashmiri migrants in Punjab had established an association in Lahore called the Kashmiri Muslim Conference during the late 19th century. Sir Mohammad Iqbal was among its founding fathers. The basic objective of the Kashmiri Conference was to highlight the deprivation suffered by the Kashmiris who had migrated to Punjab. And, it was due to the efforts of the Conference that Punjabi Kashmiris were enlisted in the defense services, claim Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.3 However, it also helped destitute and poor Kashmiri Muslim students with scholarships and to get them trained in various educational institutions outside the state. In 1926, the Conference approached Maharaja Hari Singh for his permission to submit a memorial, but this request was rejected on the grounds that “it was made by outsider Mohammedans regarding the grievances of His Highness’ own subjects.”4

In 1925, Sanatan Dharma Young Men’s Association, a representative organization of Pandits, was founded and functioned for socio-religious purposes before it became actively engaged in state politics during 1930s.5 The people of Jammu province were allowed to have a political organization in the form of the Dogra Sabha. The Sabha, however, protected the interests and safeguarded the rights of the upper class Dogras. It is believed that the ruler allowed the existence of this organization only to act as a safety value to evaporate and discharge any dangerous

1 The government also accorded permission to Sanatan Sabha to open its branch in Srinagar in 1923 on the distinct understanding that the Sabha will take no part in politics. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “The Social Background of Peoples Movement in the Jammu and Kashmir State 1846-1931,” in Y. Vaikuntham (ed), Peoples Movements in the Princely States, (Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2004), 181. 2 Its prominent members included Chaudari Ghulam Abbas, Mistri Yaqoob Ali, Sardar Gowher Rahman, Allah Rakha Saghar, Ghulam Haider Ghaury, Abdul Majeed Qarshi, and Molvi Mohammad Hussain and many others. For detailed analysis see, Aijaz Ashraf Wani, “The Popular Voice: Secular- Progressive Discourse in Kashmir (1932–47),” Indian Historical Review 34, no. 1 (2007), 244-269. 3 S. M. Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar, Eng. Trans. by Mohammad Amin as The Blazing Chinar: An Autobiography (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2013), 56-57. 4 P. N. Bazaz, Inside Kashmir (Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, first edition 2002), 108-109. 5 Ibid., 289. 16 agitation that might otherwise go underground. The organization was subsequently extended to the Kashmir valley and a session was held in Srinagar in 1926. The Dogra Sabha, however, failed to capture the imagination of the people of Kashmir.6 In 1931, Maharaja Hari Singh gave his permission for the foundation of three political parties in the state: they were the Kashmiri Pandit Conference, the Hindu Sabha in Jammu, and Sikhs Shiromani Darbar.7 However, politically-speaking, the majority community, that is the Muslims, were yet to have their own body of representatives.

At a visible level, it was in 1930s that the people initiated a generally non- violent movement across the state. The precursor to the movement was the ‘Reading Room Party’ (RRP). Composed of middle class, western-educated people, it aimed at discussing the economic situation, job opportunities, and familiarizing its members with the political happenings in and outside the state. It was this group of Kashmiris which gradually assumed the political leadership, using mosques for conducting political meetings. The members were considerably affected by the anti-colonial movement launched by the Indian people.8 As many young men from the state attended the conventions of both Indian National Congress and Muslim League, they were imbued with fresh ideas and new spirit.9 The situation of economic deprivation and political alienation back home was to affect their psyche substantially. For instance, in 1930 when Maharaja Hari Singh visited England to attend the First Round Table Conference, he established a cabinet of four members which could carry on the administration in his absence. Ironically, the cabinet comprised of neither a Muslim nor a Kashmiri member.10 This exposed his policy regarding Kashmiris. However, what precipitated the matters was the bloodbath which Kashmir witnessed in 1931 in the face of the challenge to the Dogra hegemony. The result was a serious anti- Maharaja uprising. Historically and politically, the 13th of July 1931 is the most

6 Ibid., 92-93; See also N. N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Maneuvers, 1846-1980 (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, January 1988), 85-86. 7 Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 15; See also, S.P. Vaid, Socio-economic roots of unrest in Jammu and Kashmir (1931-47) (Jammu: Shyama Publication, n.a), 66. 8 The Reading Room Party, as it was called, enjoyed the moral and financial backing of the Kashmiri Muslim elite and its supporters include Khwaja Said-ud-Din Shawl, Molvi Abdullah Vakil, Aga Sayyid Hussain Jalali, Hafiz Mohammed Ismail, Molvi Zia-ud-Din, Khwaja Assadullah Vakil to mention only a few. Abdul Rashid Tasir, Tarikh-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir, (Srinagar: Muhafiz Publishers, n.a), Vol. I, 77. Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 52. 9 Khan, “Social Background of Peoples Movement,” 103-104. 10 The cabinet had as its members G.E.C. Wakefield (a European), P.K. Wattel (a non-state subject Hindu), General Janak Singh (a Dogra Rajput) and Thakur Kartar Singh (a Dogra Rajput). For further details, see Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 99-100. 17 important day in the annals of Kashmir history, and a lot of literature has been written on its significance. Sheikh Abdullah equated the importance of the 13th July 1931 event with the significance of the Jallianwala Bagh event (1919) in Punjab.11 On 12 November 1931, Maharaja appointed commission, under the chairmanship of Mr. B.J. Glancy to register the demands of Muslims and other sections of people so as to recommend their redress.12

It is also important to note that, by and large, the Muslim politics in the state during the early 1930s remained under the virtual control of a section of Punjabi Muslim leadership. Among these, the Majlis-i-Ahrar and Ahmadiyyas were the most prominent, the latter working through. The latter took up the case of Kashmir through the All India Kashmir Committee formed in 1931.13 The appointment of Glancy Commission in late 1931, as a measure to look into the grievances of Kashmiris after an unprecedented political upheaval in the state, changed the situation.14 Based on its recommendations, in 1932 Maharaja Hari Singh allowed the establishment of the first political party in the state, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (hereafter AJ&KMC or simply MC).15 Later, he reluctantly introduced ‘Constitutional Democracy’ in J&K. It was limited in nature and scope as it did not allow for a universal adult suffrage. With only about 5 per cent of whole population entitled to vote, it still allowed a restricted freedom of speech, freedom to protest, or freedom to oppose politically. The right to association was accepted by the Maharaja and the Praja Sabha or People’s House (Legislative Assembly) was established on October

11 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 77. Every year, 13 July is still observed as the ‘Martyr’s Day’ across the State. 12 To look for a commission, Muslims nominated Ashai from Kashmir and Chaudari Ghulam Abbas Khan from Jammu, while pandits nominated Prem Nath Bazaz and Jammuties Hindus chose Pandit Lok Nath Sharma. Ibid., 102-103. 13 The All India Majlis-i-Ahrar, with its roots in Punjab, was a radical section of Muslim democrats and nationalists. The Ahmadis (also known as Mirzais and Qadianis) were a well-knit, compact and highly organized section among Muslims. They were pro-British and like other outside Muslims, they too had eyes on Kashmir but were additionally accused of winning over Kashmiris to their side and faith. Both Ahrars and Ahmadis worked independently of, and often in antagonism to, each other to achieve their respective goals. For Ahrars’ role in Kashmir, see Muhammad Iqbal Chawla, “Role of the Majlis-i- Ahrar Islam in the Kashmir Movement of 1931,” Pakistaniaat, A Journal of Pakistan Studies 3, no. 2 (2011), 82-102; see also Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 109-113. For Ahmadiyyas, see Adil Hussain Khan, “The Kashmir Crisis as a Political Platform for Jama’at-i Ahmadiyya’s Entrance into South Asian Politics,” Modern Asian Studies 46, 05 (Sep. 2012), 1398-1428. Also, see Khan, “The Social Background of Peoples Movement,” 183. 14 Set up on 20 October l931, the Commission was headed by Bertrand J. Glancy, a senior member of the Indian Political Service. For details see Ian Copland, “Islam and political mobilization in Kashmir, 1931-34,” Pacific Affairs (1981), 228-259. 15 Ghulam Hassan Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940 (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers 1980), 167. 18

17, 1934.16 The Maharaja tightly controlled the essentially powerless 75 seats of the assembly out of which he appointed 35 members. Suitably qualified subjects owning land, having status or practicing a profession elected the other 45 members, who comprised 21 Muslims (in a 77 per cent Muslim majority state), 10 Hindus, 2 Sikhs, 6 special constituencies for landed interests (who invariably supported the Maharaja’s position), and 1 constituency for pensioners.17 In 1934, Sheikh Abdullah and Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas organized a civil disobedience campaign which compelled the Maharaja to liberalize his policy towards the Muslims. On April 22, 1934, he enacted the Constitutional Act, Regulation Number 1 of Samvat 1991 (1934 A.D.). The first election ever held in Kashmir was in 1934, in which Muslim Conference captured 14 out of 21 seats allotted to the Muslim voters in the state assembly.18 In the same year, J&K government announced the Constitution of Legislative Assembly which was granted to the people of the State. The first Assembly was held in the autumn of 1934 at Srinagar. The Royal Proclamation of the Maharaja which was delivered while inaugurating the first historic assembly, raised high hopes among the people; but, it soon became evident that the assembly was powerless. Bazaz claims that the government played one party against the other, Hindus against the Muslims, nominated against the elected members.19 Commenting on the nature of legislature Assembly the Tribune of Lahore wrote:

From the events that have happened in the assembly during the last few days it is evident that there is a general awakening in the state and that the people can no longer be satisfied with the toy legislature, though it may be given the grand eloquent name of Praja Sabha.20

The parties that contested the elections in 1934 were All J&KMC, the Azad Muslim Conference (under the patronage of Mirwaiz Mohammad Yusuf Shah) and Sanatan Dharam Yuvak Sabha (a party of Kashmiri Pandits).21 Again, in 1939, the Maharaja

16 N. N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeurs.1846-1980 (Delhi: Patriot Publishers, January 1988), 103; See also, Aijaz Ashraf Wani, “Ethnic identities and the dynamics of regional and sub-regional assertions in Jammu and Kashmir,” Asian Ethnicity 14, no. 3 (2013), 309-341. 17 Christopher Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (United Kingdom: C-Hurst & Co Publishers, 2015), 131. 18 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 17; see also Vaid, Socio-economic roots of unrest in Jammu and Kashmir (1931-47), 131. 19 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 188-189. 20 Ibid., 191. 21 Shailendera Singh Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, (Jammu: Saksham Books International, 2011), 104. 19 proclaimed the J&K Constitution Act Number 14 of Samvat 1996 (1939 A.D.) which established an executive office, council of ministers, judiciary, and legislative branch. But, as usual, most of the important powers remained in his own hands.22

The formation of Praja Sabha had had its effects on the political developments of the state. The Sabha not only provided the forum where different political entities expressed their viewpoints, but at the same time it led to a ‘Democratic Consolidation’. The people who were protesting inside the mosques and streets found an alternative platform where they compelled the Maharaja for many reforms in the later era. In the context of the emergence of party system in J&K, one could divide the forms of public opinion in four broad categories. First, there were those who supported the Dogra dynasty; second, the MC which represented the Muslims in Jammu & Kashmir; third, the National Conference, converted from MC in 1939; and, fourth, the revived MC (in 1941) as an alternative to the NC.

1.2 Emergence of Muslim Conference and External Factionalism

As already noted, the incidents which transpired in 1931 gave birth to an overt political mobilization that later helped in the emergence of MC. Prior to its foundation, the Reading Room Party of Srinagar and Youngmen’s Muslim Association of Jammu joined hands to launch a common struggle against the Dogra regime.23 A young Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, came to prominence during the 1931 uprising. It was Mirwaiz Mohammad Yousuf Shah who introduced Abdullah, and people accepted him mentally as well as emotionally. He earned the title of Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir).24 To lead the movement, and to achieve its goals, Sheikh Abdullah started an interaction with leaders and comrades and visited Jammu. There he met with Chaudari Ghulam Abbas, Yaqub Ali and others to establish a new organization. Also, adhoc committees of Muslims representatives were appointed; they were assigned the work of formulating the basic principles of

22 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 19. 23 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 104-105. 24 It appears that people accepted him as a leader because Mirwaiz-i-Kashmir Yusuf Shah was very popular, enjoyed high reputation among the Muslims, and was an influential figure in politics. Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 131; See also Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 67. The origin of the title Sher-i-Kashmir is shrouded in mystery. No extant official source proves it except for Sheikh Abdullah’s own autobiography, Aatish-e-Chinar. The resignation from his job and his full-time participation in the political movement made him very popular. The daily Inquilab published from Lahore prefixed the name of Abdullah with Sher-e-Kashmir (Lion of Kashmir). For details see Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 67-71. 20 the proposed organization. The committee prepared a constitutional document which was ratified by in the first session of Muslim Conference held on 14-16 October 1932 at Pathar Masjid. The party elected Sheikh Abdullah as the president, advocate Sheikh Abdul Hamid as the vice-president, while as Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas and Maulavi Abdul Rahim Vakil were chosen as general secretary and secretary respectively of the party.25 Outwardly, the organization would act as the representative body of Muslims as the state was a Muslim-majority region. It would work for their unity and upliftment. However, in its very first session, Abdullah insisted that the Muslim Conference was not a communal organization and the political movement of Muslims was in no way a communal movement. According to him, it was ‘aimed at redressing the grievances of all communities.’26 As its major objectives, the organization fought for a proportional recruitment of different communities to administrative posts on the basis of their proportion in population, recruitment of Kashmiri Muslims in the state army, reduction in taxes, freedom of expression, civil liberties, release of political prisoners, and finally the establishment of a responsible government under the aegis of the Maharaja.27

Muslim Conference remained in existence till June 1938. It held six annual sessions in all. Right from its inception, the organization faced contestation from a section of Kashmiri Pandits. In collusion with the Dogra ruling class, they not only started criticizing the movement led by MC but also fortified communal pandering of the Hindus. As a result, communal politics governed supreme among both the communities – non-Muslims and Muslims.28 The Pandit community felt that the recommendations of the Glancy Commission were not promising; they ousted Bazaz from the Presidentship of the Sanatan Dharam Yuvak Sabha.29 They felt that the Commission had deprived the Hindus of their resources of livelihood, thus raising the slogan ‘our bread is being snatched’. The Muslim demand for the responsible

25 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 121-124; Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 122. 26 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 123. 27 Resolutions of the Muslim Conference, dated 17 Oct., 1932, published by the secretary All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, Dated 17 October, 1932; See also, Mohan Krishen Teng, Ram Krishen Kaul Bhatt, and Santosh Kaul, Constitutional History and Documents (New Delhi: Life and Lime Publishers, 1977), 187. 28 P.S. Verma Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1994), 17; See also, Khan, Freedom Movement, 256; Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 131. 29 Jialal Kilam was new president of Kashmiri Pandits Yuvak Sabha, along with Kashyap Bandhu and others guided and supervised the Bread Agitation (Roti Agitation). Satish Ganjoo, Kashmir Politics (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1990), 21; See also Bazaz Inside Kashmir, 213. 21 government and the recommendations of Glancy Commission were perceived as a ploy to replace “Hindu rule” by “Muslim Rule”. Some went so far as to give a call to the Hindus of the state to unite and organize under one banner and party – that is ‘All Jammu and Kashmir Hindu Conference’ so as to fight for their demands independently.30

Another form of contestation came from Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah. On the basis of an ideological conflict, but also on to assert their respective positions in the newly- established power structure, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah dissociated himself from the MC. He set up a separate political party under the name of Azad Muslim Conference (AMC). His party was to function as a rival to Abdullah’s Conference although it never acquired such significance as the latter did. The party continued to exist in the political landscape as the name of Mirwaiz was respected because of he being the top religious leader of the Valley.31

On the other hand, MC sought to transform itself into an umbrella party that dominated the political discourse for next two decades. In the second annual session of MC, which was held at Mirpur on 15 December 1933, Sheikh Abdullah asked all the people, irrespective of caste, creed, color and religion, to follow one motto: unity is life, disunity is death. MC leaders and Abdullah also invited non-Muslims to join the hands. To quote Sheikh Abdullah:

Demands submitted by the Muslim Conference do not pertain only to the Muslims. In fact, every section of the people in the state will be benefited once they are fulfilled. There is no reason why you should not come forward to throw in your cause with your Muslim brethren and thus strengthen the national cause.32

That the MC had emerged as the chief political organization was apparent during the elections of 1924. Although Abdullah and other leaders were skeptical about the powers of the Assembly, it was thought the best opportunity to ‘make it

30 Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, 256; see also Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 260. 31 Khawaja Abdur Rahim Banday. Khizr Mohammad Zaru, Munshi Asadullah of Sokalipur and Ghulam Mohammad Malik of Kani Kadal played an important role in establishment of Azad Muslim Conference and Khawaja Abdus Salam Dallal became the special advisor to the Mirwaiz. The first session of Azad Muslim Conference was held in Jamia Masjid Srinagar. For further details, see Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 258. 32 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 141-142. 22 clear to the government how mighty the Muslim Conference was.’33 Expectedly, when Maharaja announced elections for the State Assembly in 1934, the AMC of Mirwaiz pitted its candidates against the MC. The parties that contested the elections in the Valley of Kashmir were MC, AMC, and Sanatan Dharam Yuvak Sabha.34 In Jammu there was no organised local political party that could contest the elections. Considering Hari Singh as their only voice and leader, they didn’t launch any political party. Yet, some prominent members of the Rajya Hindu Sabha (state unit of Hindu Mahasabha) contested the election from Jammu. Those leaders who were not given tickets by any party contested independently.35 The polling was held on September 4, 1934. Out of 33 elected Assembly seats, 11 contestants were declared successful unopposed. MC defeated the nominees of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah by winning all the nine seats from Srinagar. AMC couldn’t win a single seat. In the remaining 12 Muslim assembly seats, one seat was won by a Jagirdar, three by Zaildars and two by pensioners. At the same time, the independent contestants won six assembly constituencies. However, all these candidates either belong to Zaildars or to the business elite classes36 (Table 1.1).

The non-Muslims of the state were chosen on twelve assembly seats, including the two seats from the Sikh minority community. In these seats, four contestants won the election unopposed. At the same time, the Hindu Mahasabha contested seven and it succeeded to win five seats. In Kashmir, the Yuvak Sabha contested three and won all three seats37 (Table 1.1). Sir Ivo Elliot supervised the election arrangements in J&K.38 In short, the State Legislative Assembly that was composed of Seventy Five seats include both nominated and elected. Out of seventy-five, thirty-three were elected members (two Sikhs, twenty-one Muslims and ten Hindus). At the same time, the other forty-two were nominated candidates, and fourteen were non officials. The first session of Praja Sabha was held on 17 October 1934, and Maharaja Hari Singh

33 Ibid., 144. 34 Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, 104. 35 Ibid., 104-105. 36 The Statesman, (Calcutta), September 20, 1934. 37 Ibid. 38 Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, 105. 23 attended it and Prime Minister Colvin out the royal decree defined the powers of the Assembly.39

The opening of the Assembly provided a legitimate political platform for political parties to raise the people’s issues. The 1935 annual session of MC held in Srinagar and presided over by Ghulam Abbas saw the first time participation of several non-Muslims leaders. On 8th of May 1937, MC sent out an appeal for observance of a ‘Responsible Government Day’ and requested non-Muslims to support the demand for people’s participation in the government. To quote Abdullah:

Our demand for a responsible government is not new we have been asking for it right from time to time we started our struggle. In 1934 when formation of the present Legislative assembly was under way, this demand was made in every nook and corner of the state. That is why over the last one year and a half, even minorities have been demanding a better constitution along with the majority community.40

On the one hand, in 1937, the Praja Sabha completed its first term. During the next elections, MC again dominated the political scene (Table 1.1). On the other hand, the rift and suspicions among the leaders of MC were increasing day by day. The politics of the State was deeply affected by both INC and Muslim League. This lead to an ideological clash among the Muslim leadership. One section was led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who identified himself as a follower of ideology of the Congress. Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah and his followers, toing a religious line, were drawn closer to the Muslim League. Other divisions were evident in the politics of Yuvak Sabha (representing the Kashmiri Pandits), Unjuman-i-Islahi Rasoom of Molvi Mohammad Syed Massodi, Unjuman Ithadul Muslimeen, and Dogra Sabha of Jammu, Youngmen’s Muslim Association.41 In such a political atmosphere, the leadership of MC, especially Abdullah, realized that the MC could not work effectively towards the realization of objectives for which the party was formed in 1932. The party needed to accommodate other shades of opinion, including non- Muslims, in a country with a multi-religious and multilingual society.

39 Sardar Budh Singh, a Sikh member of the Praja Sabha elected from Jammu, openly criticized the assembly and termed it a ‘Toy Assembly’ and Budh Singh boycotted its inaugural session by questioning the representative character of the assembly. Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 153-154. 40 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 162-163. 41 Rashid Taseer, Tehreek-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir (Srinagar: Muhafiz Publications,) Vol. 1, 80. 24

1.3 Conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference: A Debate

The leadership in J&K possessed powerful emotional associations with some of the leaders of Muslim League and Indian National Congress. The policies of both these all-India level parties played a significant role in shaping the future politics of the princely state of J&K.42 Sheikh Abdullah was a figure of more than local importance; he had close links with INC and particularly Nehru. It is generally believed that the he stood for association with INC.43 There is no denying the fact that Sheikh Abdullah occupied a unique and dominant role in the political history of J&K. After resigning from a government job, Abdullah participated in the freedom movement against the Dogra raj, attempting to overthrow the existing establishment of injustice and oppression.44 But over time, cracks surfaced in the MC leadership, precipitating in 1939 when Muslim Conference was converted into All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (NC).45

Sheikh apparently felt discomfort at the MC being considered an all-Muslim party. As a furtherance for an inclusive struggle, Sheikh Abdullah and Prem Nath Bazaz founded an Urdu weekly, the Hamdard, in 1935. By converting MC into NC in 1939, the doors of the party were practically opened for non-Muslims, although several Sikh and Hindu leaders had been its members for several years.46 Sheikh Abdullah and NC emerged as a broadminded force in J&K based on a secular ideology.47

42 Alastair Lamb, Birth of tragedy Kashmir 1947 (Hertingfordbury: Roxford books 1994), 3. 43 Ibid., 13. 44 See Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 23-30, 145-147 and 63. 45 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 17. 46 Ibid., 19. 47 The conversion of the MC into a nation-wide party led to the series of the exchange of views and controversies in and outside the MC. To arrive at a solution Abdullah called a session of the Working Committee on 24 June 1938 in which arguments were put forth for and against Abdullah’s proposal. At one stage, even Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Mirza Afzal Beg joined Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas, Abdullah Vakil, Ahmad Din Banihali, etc. in opposing the dissolution of MC. But the majority of members were in favor of Sheikh Abdullah. They maintained that the time had come for all progressive elements to valley under one banner and ask for responsible government. The Working Committee recommended to the Executive Committee to change the name and constitution of the organization in its forthcoming annual session to enable people of the hues and persuasions who desired participation in the political struggle to join the movement. On 27 April 1938, the General Council of the MC approved of the Working Committee’s Resolution. Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq chaired the special session of MC, which was held on 10 and 11 June 1939 at Shahi Masjid and Masoodi in his welcome address highlighted the objectives of the session as: “This session of MC is going to decide that from now onwards the organization will be known as the All J&K NC, and that any adult citizen of the state regardless of gender, religion, or creed is entitled to become its member, with the soul condition that he 25

The conversion of MC into NC was a painful process for the leaders of MC which is implicit in Abdullah’s words:

One can have a sense of this when one recalls the ordeals we had to face to give the new conference its amplitude. But that would be looking merely at the surface of the things. Beneath that surface lie the sacrifices I had to make turning hard hearts into sensible ones. On the one hand, I had to dispel the skepticism and mistrust of my own friends, while on the other I had to reckon with the wily people opposed to the idea of movement becoming an inclusivist one. There were people like Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas, Allah Rakha Saagar and Abdul Masjid Qarshi, whose endless objections I had to slam, and then there were persons like Sayyid Masoodi, Ghulam Muhammad Bakshi, Afzal Beg. I had to battle with their uncertainties and occasional betrayals. As for the people like Maulavi Abdullah Vakil, they were overtly opposed to the principle of pluralism.48

The resolution to convert MC into NC was put forth to the vote. Out of 176 delegates, only four cast their votes against the resolution.49 The most important speech of 1938 session was of Chaudhuri Ghulam Abbas. Prior to the conversion, he had feared that the Congress was going to boss over the NC. But subsequently, Abdullah was able to convince him. Thus, Abbas declared in his presidential speech that those opposed to the freedom struggle ‘know that once Muslims approve this change, their march towards a responsible government cannot be halted.’ He tried to dispel the notion that the Kashmiri leadership had turned into ‘lackeys of Gandhi-Ji.’ He declared that the National Conference was ‘neither dependent on the Congress nor on the Muslim League. We respect both Gandhi and Jinnah. Yet we never allow them to decide our destiny for us.’50

or she declares in writing that the establishment of the responsible government are achievement of personal liberties constitute his or her political aim.” Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 313-315; G.H. Khan, Freedom Movement, 376-78. See also, Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 173. 48 Ibid., 169. 49 Maulavi Abdullah Vakil, Khawaja Ghulam Ahmad Ganie Bhadrawali, Sheikh Ahmad Din Banihali and Choudary Hameedullah Khan opposed the move. However, it was also decided at the session that the general council working committee and the office bearers of the All J&K MC would be considered the office bearers of the All J&KNC and non-Muslims were included in the NC working committee among whom were Budh Singh, Jialal Kilam, Girdhari lal Dogra, Kashyab Bandhu, Prem Nath Bazaz and Sardar Mohindra Singh of Jammu. The flag was modified by Prem Nath Dhar and later Maulavi Saeed composed an anthem for it. Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 175-176. 50 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 174-175. 26

The conversion of MC into NC is believed to be a revolutionary act in the history of Kashmir politics. It was after a great persuasion on part of the Muslim leaders that a small segment of young Pandits eventually joined the NC. The papers run by people like Bazaz, Gawash Lal koul and Kashyap Bandhu played important role in creating a climate for uniting the Hindus and Muslims against the Dogra regime. The conversion of party also changed the tone of the press, and it brought politics into the forefront of discussions. Papers such as Hamdard, Kidmat, Khalid, Kesari and Desh now sought to educate the public on the political ideas of the NC. On the other hand, papers like Islah, Albarq and Millat criticized the political ideas of the NC as chimerical. Sheikh Abdullah was now opposed by the most powerful sections of the MC and Muslim League. Albarq, for instance, accused Kashmiri Pandits for the conversion of MC into NC, the conspiracy against the change. This was also noted in the Pasban of the Jammu; the paper was highly critical of Abdullah and attributed the conversion mainly to the influence of Gandhi and Nehru on Abdullah.51 Post-colonial writers, such as Jospeh Korbel, too held that anyone “responsible for this tragedy was none other than Abdullah.”52

After the conversion, the ideological closeness of Abdullah began to produce suspicious effect on some of the Muslim leaders of the NC. Doubts, as to the wisdom of their policy in having changed the MC into NC began to toss their minds, when Maulana Mohammad Syed (the general secretary of NC) was publicly accused of revival of MC with some other leaders. In these circumstances non-Muslims members began to feel disgusted, and soon the mutual suspicions began to take roots. With this, the party (NC) showed signs of disintegration and decay.53

1.4 Revival of Muslim Conference: Debate with National Conference

As discussed earlier, the political developments in the Indian sub-continent from 1939-1941 put a serious impact on the political discourses in Kashmir. When NC held its first session in 1939 at Anantnag (South Kashmir), most of the participants from Jammu province developed second thoughts about their actions and slipped out. In the same manner, when the second annual session of NC was held at Baramulla on 28

51 Khan, “The Social Background of Peoples Movement,” 184-185; see also, Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 263. 52 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 18. 53 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 323. 27

September 1940 presided by Sardar Budh Singh, the participation of Muslims from Jammu was absent, except for those from Mirpur district. Some petty issues were raised and provocations were made by some of the delegates to embarrass the leaders of the NC. This was apparently calculated to erode their influence among the Muslim population. Chaudhuri Hamidullah and several other Muslim leaders and MLAs from Jammu disengaged relations with NC. They again set the moment to set up the MC.54 One by one, a large number of workers and prominent members abandoned the NC, leading to a disruption in the Muslim political discourse of the time.55 NC was weakening day by day because of the drifts among its members, which led to the clash of differences within the party. Sheikh Abdullah was primarily held responsible for the political developments that led to the division between Muslim leaders and intelligentsia. As Bazaz would assert ‘it would be no exaggeration to say that Abdullah was NC.’56 In 1940, when Nehru visited Kashmir, NC arranged a royal reception for him. But when Nehru returned back to India, within a week’s time a disagreement erupted among NC leaders. Many leaders and members accused the NC of identifying itself with a ‘Hindu Body’, that is, the Congress. Ghulam Abbas presented his resignation. He was followed by Allah Rakha Saagar and few more. Consequently, NC lost the vigour and its spell was shattered.57 For two years, Chaudhuri Abbas was adrift in a state of uncertainty. He finally staged a comeback to politics and actively supported the cause of reviving the MC.58

By 1941, owing to the revival of the Muslim Conference, with Abbas leading it, there emerged another front contesting the NC politics, which was steering closer to Nehru and Congress. MC not only was pro-Muslim League and supported the Pakistan movement; it also showed its support for the Maharaja.59 Thereafter, the two political parties competed strongly with each other. The recreation of MC anticipated the later division of J&K into pro-Pakistan and pro-India areas, claims Christopher Snedden.60 No doubt the popularity and influence of Sheikh Abdullah and NC was still more powerful than the other groups, yet the political developments in the sub-

54 N.N. Raina, Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Maneuvers, 1846-1980 (New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, January 1988), 115-117. 55 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 266. 56 Ibid., 333. 57 Ibid., 326-328. 58 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent: An Autobiography (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982), 37-39. 59 Singh, Heir Apparent: An Autobiography, 53. 60 Snedden, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 133. 28 continent worked against NC as a sizeable section of Muslims in British India supported the League for an independent Pakistan. Slowly, more Muslims of the state began to identify themselves with the MC led by Ghulam Abbas. On the other hand, the visit of Mohammad Ali Jinnah to Kashmir, in 1943, gave a new life and authority to the organization when he addressed the annual session of MC.61 In his speech Jinnah addressed the people and asked them to support the MC. To quote Abdullah, “He clearly aimed his barbs at the NC, saying that it behaved fraudulently towards the Hindu minority in Kashmir as the Congress did Muslims minority in India.”62 When NC launched the ‘Quit Kashmir’ against Maharaja, Abdullah was charged of having lost public support due to his pro-INC and pro-Indian attitude. It was argued that he had launched the movement to regain his popularity. Bazaz accused Abdullah of opportunism and asserted that the latter had no right of claiming to represent both Muslims and Hindus. The Muslims, according to him, followed largely the MC while Hindus had their own parties.63

On the other hand, Mirwaiz Yusuf Shah of AMC publically criticized Sheikh Abdullah and NC. He allied with Muslim League and labeled Naya Kashmir Manifesto of NC anti-Islamic, primarily owing to its strongly socialist conceptions of society.64 At the same time, one of the prominent Pandits, Prem Nath Bazaz—who was once a close aid of Abdullah – used his pen in opposing the NC and Abdullah. Bazaz began supporting AMC, led by Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah through his newspaper Hamdard. Later, Bazaz also started writing in favor of Mohammad Ali Jinnah and ML; with that, he continued to criticize policies and programmes of INC and NC with regard to J&K.65 Bazaz also formed Kisan Conference and pitted it against NC.66

1.5 Other Oppositional Factions in Dogra Rule

61 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 19-20. 62 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 226-227. 63 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 20-21. 64 Gull Mohd Wani, Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule (Srinagar: Wattan Publications, 2011), 25. When Naya Kashmir Manifesto was adopted in 1944, the feudal lords of the Muslims League as well as the reactionary elements in the Congress scoffed at NC. Hindu Mahasabha met at Muzaffarabad, where Dr. Moonje (a prominent Mahasabhite) and Pandit Shiv Narian Fotedar (President of Kashmiri Pandit Yuvak Sabha) strongly reacted against the manifesto. They appealed people to strongly oppose the ideology. See, A. Jabbar, Kashmir and National Conference and Politics (Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 1984), 9. 65 Singh, Heir Apparent: An Autobiography, 40-43. 66 Abdullah, Blazing Chinar, 157-58. 29

There were many other socio-political organizations working in Kashmir although their work was limited and seldom decisive in nature. Among them the Students’ Federation, Kisan Sabha, the Kashmir youth league, and the Mazdoor Sabha were important which did cast an influence on socio-political milieu of the state. These organizations, it should be noted, were not as strong as the NC or MC or Yuvak Sabha but they played a significant role in the mobilization of the people.

1.5.1 The Students’ Federation

There were two Students’ organizations in Kashmir, the Kashmir Students Union and the Kashmir Students Union League. Both these organizations were founded about 1935. These two respectively derived their membership from college and school students but worked separately. The Kashmir Students Union was more liberal and broadminded, with progressive outlook than the Students Union League. However, with the passage of time both the Unions understood that they would be much more effective if united and consolidated into a single and strong association. Interestingly, the first session of the Students’ Federation was addressed by K.M. Ashraf, the Secretary of the All India Congress Committee and a well-known socialist.67 The politics of the state had their impact on the organizations which is why several members from the two organisations joined the MC in 1937. When Diwan Chaman Lal, a well-known leader of INC, was arrested, the Students’ Union convened a meeting on 18th April 1937 to protest against the incident. But there was hardly any resolution moved or passed by the union. In August 1937 the president of Punjab Student’s Federation, Prabhu Chand, was requested to come to Kashmir whose efforts made it possible for the two organisations to merge into the All Kashmir Students Federation. Kashi Nath Bamzai was chosen as the president and Mohammad Sultan as the secretary.68 The federation worked for some time to train the students and indoctrinate into them the feelings for the upliftment of political and social-economic condition of the state. However, it did not last long as most of its members joined other organisations.69

1.5.2 Kisan Sabha in Jammu and Kashmir

67 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 191-192. 68 G.H. Khan, Freedom Movement, 332. 69 Ibid., 333. 30

Kisan Sabha was one of the important organizations that played some role in the state politics right from its formation in October 1937. The first meeting of the Kisan Sabha was held in Srinagar under the presidentship of Sufi Mohammad Akbar on 28th and 29th October 1937.70 The meeting was attended by a number of people and one of the renowned leaders Sardar Budh Singh addressed them.71 The major objective of the Sabha was to unite the peasants under one umbrella association so that the party could fight for social justice.

1.5.3 Kashmir Youth League

The politics of princely State of J&K changed tremendously when the movement for the establishment of responsible government gained momentum from 1935 onwards. A group of youth, inspired by the leftist elements in the MC and radical in outlook, founded the Kashmir Youth League in 1936. The league was organized by none other than Prem Nath Bazaz72 It cooperated with other progressive forces among the Non- Muslims, so that it can bring the radical changes in the movement, which was started under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. The main political objective of the league was to fight for the formation of a responsible government, so that the society which was under oppression would live dignified life. In the later part, the league recognized itself with the policies, objectives and programmes of the Indian National Congress in its movement and played significant role in the politics of the state.

1.5.4 Mazdoor Sabha

The labourers of the State were organized for the first time under the flag of Mazdoor Sabha. The Sabha was formed in mid-1937 by the endless efforts of a group of people associated with the political ideology of Marxism and Socialism.73 These young people were in close contact with socialists like B.P.L. Bedi and his wife Freda Bedi, who during the early 1940s prepared draft of the Naya Kashmir Manifesto. When the idea emerged, the young leaders of the state started to give recognitions to the numerous other associations – like The Carpet Weaver’s Association, the Kashmir Motor Drivers Association and Tonga Drivers Association, etc. Later, all these

70 The Ranbir, (Jammu weekly), Nov. 1, 1937. 71 Ibid. 72 P.N. Bazaz, The History of Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir, (New Delhi: Kashmir Publication Co. 1954), (Ist Ed.), 167. 73 Ibid., 326. 31 associations and groups merged under the banner of Mazdoor Sabha. The Sabha was the first entity which detached politics from religion; and, it gave direction to the people and trained them to fight against the economic inequalities. However, in Jammu region there was hardly any such organization. It was Mazdoor Sabha which come forward as a fore-runner to the Labor Union of Jammu in 1938, Gauhar Rehman being elected its first president. But, the activities and actions of Jammu Mazdoor Sabha were not as broad-based as that of Kashmir Mazdoor Sabha. A similar type of organization was also formed in Muzaffarabad-Mirpur.74

All these different factions in the State played their own roles in shaping the politics from 1935 till 1947. These organizations put endless efforts to mobilize people for achieving the objectives of responsible government. However, little could be achieved owing to the autocratic nature of the Dogra State. While the demand for responsible government achieved prominence due to the efforts of all these groups, the factionalism within also resulted in the division of opinion at the time of the decolonization of the subcontinent in 1947. As the British decided to leave India, and hand over the government to two dominions—India and Pakistan—it divided the public in J&K among three major ideological entities. One was the NC, led by Sheikh Abdullah, which associated itself with the INC and its version of Indian nationalism. Another was the MC, a party that was inclined towards Muslim League and Pakistan. The third was the ruling class, headed by the Maharaja himself, who perhaps wished to remain independent. However, the war of 1948 between India and Pakistan led to an informal—and still disputed—bifurcation of J&K, one part under India and another under Pakistan. Post-accession, all the internal political and administrative powers were shifted to the National Conference government headed by Abdullah. Many MC leaders and political activists, both from Kashmir and Jammu, migrated to “Azad Kashmir” (designated as Pakistan-Administered-Kashmir). The post-1947 Kashmir presents a combined history of resistance and collaboration, with different parties aligning themselves to different thought-processes and phenomenon.

74 The Ranbir, (Jammu), January 24, 1938. 32

Table 1.1

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to Praja Sabha (J&K People’s Assembly) in Pre-1947 Phase

Political Election Seats Seats Election Seats Seats Won Party year Contested Won Year Contested MC 1934 21 14 1939 21 19 AMC Do 21 00 Do Boycott Nil Hindu Do 07 05 Do NA NA Mahasabha Yuvak Do 03 03 Do NA NA Sabha Sources: Compiled from The Statesman (Calcutta), September 20, 1934 and Shailendera Singh Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, (Jammu: Saksham Books International, 2011), 104-105. Note: In 1939, MC was converted into NC. However, MC was again revived in 1941 and Azad Muslim Conference under the leadership of Mirwaiz Yousuf Shah also announced to merger his party with MC. The 1946 elections were boycotted by NC, whereas MC won 19 seats.

Chapter–One

Evolution of Party System in Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective

Chapter One: Evolution of Party System in Jammu and Kashmir: A Historical Perspective

1.1 Dogra Rule and Party System

1.2 Emergence of Muslim Conference and External Factionalism

1.3 Conversion of Muslim Conference into National Conference: A Debate

The conversion of MC into NC was a painful process for the leaders of MC which is implicit in Abdullah’s words:

1.4 Revival of Muslim Conference: Debate with National Conference

51 Khan, “The Social Background of Peoples Movement,” 184-185; see also, Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 263. 52 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 18. 53 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 323. 27

1.5 Other Oppositional Factions in Dogra Rule

1.5.1 The Students’ Federation

1.5.2 Kisan Sabha in Jammu and Kashmir

67 Bazaz, Inside Kashmir, 191-192. 68 G.H. Khan, Freedom Movement, 332. 69 Ibid., 333. 30

1.5.3 Kashmir Youth League

1.5.4 Mazdoor Sabha

74 The Ranbir, (Jammu), January 24, 1938. 32

Table 1.1

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to Praja Sabha (J&K People’s Assembly) in Pre-1947 Phase

Chapter-Two

Jammu and Kashmir: One Part Dominance, Concept and Context

Chapter Two: Jammu and Kashmir: One-Party Dominance, Concept and Context

2.1 One-Party Dominance: Definition and Meaning

The concept of modern liberal democracy is exclusively based on the people’s participation and the existence of the democracy depends on the nature of political parties. The theoretical aspect of the modern democracy relies on the concept of fair and free elections along with the existence of the political parties that will contest the elections. The existence of one party democracy, questions the very essence of the democracy and what constitutes a democracy. When we study the general theories on democracy, we hardly found consensus on measure to be applied to a political party for the title of a ‘dominant party’. Maurice Duverger, one of the leading social scientist gave comprehensive definition ‘One Party Dominance’ as:

A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch. Domination is a question of influence rather than of strength, it is also linked with belief: A dominant party is that which public opinions believe to be dominant. Even the enemies of the dominant party, even citizens who refuse to give their vote acknowledge its superior status and its influence.1

According to Pempel, the reasons for the emergence of ‘One Party Dominance’ are the result of both development of democracy and the evolution of the party. The party’s aim to represent all the forces and alluring visionary policies touches upon the idea of democratic centralism or consultative democracy. In the idioms of politics, the manifestation of ‘Single Party Dominant System’ has a definite meaning and connotation. The well-known political scientist J.S Coleman was the first to coin this idiom in politics. With the passage of time the idiom was widely used in context of

1 Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organizational and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen Wiley, 1954), 308-309.

34 analyzing the Indian political system and also in few African countries.2 In some of the African countries and also in India, the phenomenon of competitive and political competition was unique in post 1950s era. The one elite political party always was so strong that it outdistanced its political rivals in electoral opposition for seizing political power. In ‘one party Dominant’ political system, there is hardly any political competition among the rival political ideologies or political groups. It is believed that the legitimacy and validity of any political system is only when there is political struggle among the political groups. Thus, we can say that the system of ‘One Party Dominance’ does not restrict or impose Constitutional bar on other political parties to exist. In this way, the system of ‘One Party Dominance’ does not have the habit of political struggle but if there is any opposition in such a system that will be weak, unequal and ineffective. In fact, in such an electoral political atmosphere the weak and unorganized political opposition could hardly be threat to a Dominant Party. It is true that such political system was common in most of the post-colonial states of Asia and Africa but at the same time many western countries too had the similar political culture.3 The ‘Single Party Dominance’ has certain unique political features such as; the party will be dominant because of its identification with great socio-political affairs and enigmatic leadership. Thus the great leadership, well-drafted party programme and historical role of the party makes electoral competition too simple for the party to gain political power. It is in this background that the Blanksten gave comprehensive definition of ‘One Party Dominance’:

It holds an effective monopoly of public power and controls access to government offices…(Other) parties may exist legally, but for reasons unrelated to legal questions or government coercion, find themselves

2 Coleman and Roseburg, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa (California: University of California Press, 1965), 10-25. However, in case of India this idiom or phrase was first used in the studies of Morris jones and Rajni Kothari, Morris Jones, Wyndraeth Humphreys “Dominance and Dissent: Their inter‐ relations in the Indian party system,” Government and Opposition 1, no. 4 (1966), 451-466; Morris Jones, “Parliament and Dominant Party: Indian Experience,” Parliamentary Affairs 17, no. 3 (1963), 296-307; Rajni Kothari, “The Congress' System in India,” Asian survey (1964), 1161-1173. 3 Balbir Singh, State Politics in India: Explorations in political processes in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Macmillan, 1982), 53. 35

unable to challenge effectively the dominant party’s hold on public power.4

On the other hand Duverger, one of the modern authorities of political parties explains idiom of ‘One Party Dominance’ as, “A party, larger than any other, heading the list and clearly outdistancing its rivals over a certain period of time…over a long period of political development.”5 Thus, in India the ‘Dominance of Indian National Congress’ (INC) both in Centre as well as in State Legislative Assemblies for more than two decades was described as ‘One Party Dominance’ or ‘One Party Rule’. Although, it is true that there were number of other political parties but in electoral competition Congress as a well-organized political party, with clean ideology, strong leadership and peoples emotional attachment makes Congress an umbrella party with least electoral competition. With regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) one can say it without any exaggeration that it was political discontent which gave birth to political parties and groups. Thus, both political discontent and political parties developed hand in hand. It is also true that Institutional arrangement such as social, educational, or political is the bed-rock on which a society stands. No society can prosper in the absence of strong institutions. In the modern history, J&K has been unfortunate as far as decline of institutions like political parties and strong leadership.6 There were number of political parties in J&K, however, most of them existed on papers as small groups. Some important political parties were the Kisan Mazdoor Conference in Kashmir, the Kashmir Socialist Party, the Democratic Socialist Party in Jammu, the Kashmir Democratic Union (a small exiled group in New Delhi around Prem Nath Bazaz) and the Sikh Akali Party. During post 1947, the politics of Kashmir was mainly divided between the popular NC, supported by artisans, peasants because of its ‘Naya Kashmir Manifesto’ program. While as on the other hand there was All J&KMC, supported by those who’s ideology was close to Muslim League and against the ideology of Indian National Congress. The politics of rivalry between NC and MC could not fulfill the ensuing political vacuum in the State.7 However one can say that the politics of Kashmir whether in pre or post

4 G. A. Almond and J. S. Coleman, The Politics of the Developing Areas (New York: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 479. 5 Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organizational and Activity in the Modern States, 308. 6 Gull Mohd Wani, Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule (Srinagar: Apple Books, 2011), 171. 7 J.B. Das Gupta, Islamic fundamentalism and India, Moulana Abdul Kalam Azad (Kolkata: Institute of Asian Studies, 2002), 7. 36 accession period was dominated by only two political parties namely NC and MC, both having an ideological clash with each other. But in Jammu province, one of the important political parties was the Praja Parishad; the party was the only political force which in real sense was opposed to the party in power i.e. NC.8 These main political parties played crucial role in shaping the future politics of the State. The post partition politics of the Indian sub-continent on religious lines also put serious impact on the State of J&K. The critical decision on state’s accession was also wholly determined by these two main political forces of the State. The conditional accession of J&K with Union of India by Maharaja Hari Singh led serious voices both in favour and opposition. On the other hand, the Pakistan factor also played its significant role on the question of accession; it rejected the Indian claims on the legality of the accession. While on the other side, Jammu based political force called Praja Parishad launched a campaign for the full integration of the State with the Union of India. The head of the State was Hindu in a Muslim-Majority State and even Hindu minority opposed the policy which had produced him. Despite that his government claimed to represent the entire nation. However, with two segments the Jammu Hindus and the Buddhists of Ladakh claimed for separation from Kashmir and called for full integration with the Union of India. On the other side, Sheikh Abdullah was claiming to be uncontested leader of the Muslims of Kashmir wanted to preserve the separate identity with greater powers or Autonomy for the State. There were also continued voices by many political forces in the state to unite their Muslim brothers on the other side of the border.9 In May 1946, Abdullah and his party NC launched a ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’ on the same lines of ‘Quit India Movement’ four years earlier. Prior to that Maharaja Hari Singh had taken some steps towards popular government in the state, including the Dyarchy experiment in 1944 with the setting up of a partially elected Praja Sabha (Legislative Assembly). But it did not satisfy the demands of NC.10 Christopher Sneddon in Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris remarks that the quit Kashmir movement strengthened Abdullah politically and of course his party too. At the same time it weakened the Jammu based opponents of the Maharaja Hari Singh while as on the other hand the MC’s decision to contest the

8 Josef Korbel, Danger in Kashmir (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 205. 9 Ibid., 230. 10 Karan Singh, Heir Apparent: Sadar-i-Riyasat: an Autobiography; 1953-1967 (India: Oxford University Press, 1985), 39. 37 elections of 1947 was partly aged by its increasing relationship with Jinnah and the Muslim League.11

2.2 Prelude to Accession: National Conference and State Politics

Maharaja Hari Singh announced State Assembly elections in January 1947. However, all the main political leaders of MC and NC were in prison. NC called for boycott, while as MC contested the elections and won sixteen (16) seats out of twenty one (21). But the voting percentage was too low. NC attributed low turnout as a success of boycott call given by its leadership, while as on the other hand MC ascribed that low turnout of voting percentage was because of snowfall. In between, when Britishers passed the Indian Independence act on July 16, 1947 and British power was lapsed on 15th August 1947.12 The British India got divided into two Nations i-e India and Pakistan. The act of independence gave a choice to princely states that were ruled by local Princes and Maharajas to join either one of the dominions by keeping in consideration the ‘Geographical and Religious’ factors. Although, it said that it was the dream of Maharaja Hari Singh to remain independent, this was supported by many other political parties and leaders of the time.13 MC assured all moral and political support to Hari Singh and to accept Maharaja as the first Constitutional and legal ruler of ‘Democratic and Independent J&K’.14 But Lord Mountbatten,15 in a visit to Kashmir urged Hari Singh not to declare independence but to join ‘one of the two states.’16 It should be noted that the politics of communal outlook of both INC and Muslim League greatly affected the State in this critical phase of history. Both parties saw one another with suspicious eyes. Although, Mountbatten number of times advised the leaders of INC not to visit so frequently. But leaders like Nehru, Kriplani and Gandhi visited J&K during the crucial months of July and August 1947.17 The visit of these leaders put serious impact on the future politics of Kashmir and it was from here, perhaps that the trend to integrate the people and the State of J&K by any means or logic with India was openly seen in the policies of these leaders. The development of hosting Pakistani flag

11 Christopher Sneddon, Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris (London: Oxford University Press, 2015), 133-134. 12 P. N. Bazaz, Truth about Kashmir (Delhi: The Kashmir Democratic Union, 1950), 233. 13 Rambir, (Jammu), February 20, 1947. 14 Singh, Heir Apparent, 38. 15 Lord Louis Mountbatten was the last Viceroy of India in 1947 and the first Governor-General of Independent India 1947-48. 16 M. J. Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale (London: Viking, 1991), 97. 17 Christopher Bromhead Birdwood, Two nations and Kashmir (London: Robert Hale, 1956), 56. 38 on post office in Srinagar on the day of 14th August; an ‘Independence Day for Pakistan’ was seen as suspicious by INC and NC leaders. The state’s Prime Minister namely Genak Singh18 issued notice to concerned authorities to pull down the flag.19 While as on the other hand the government of Pakistan sent two of its members namely Shaikh Sadiq and Mohammad Din Taseer to NC and its leader Sheikh Abdullah for state’s accession with Pakistan, however Abdullah being close associate of Nehru and INC rejected the offer of Pakistan.20

In 1947, September 29 Abdullah was released by government of Maharaja when he was under pressured by INC and its leaders especially Nehru and Gandhi.21 However, it should be mentioned here that the Abdullah tendered an apology letter to Hari Singh dated 26 September 1947.22 Subsequently after release of Abdullah, other members associated with NC were also released.23 After his release he made it clear that NC opposed any move regarding the unilateral state’s accession by Hari Singh. This was evident in his speech when he was released on 29 September 1947, he said:

If the State’s accession with India and Pakistan is done from upper chambers without the consent of the 40 lakh people of Jammu and Kashmir, I shall raise revolt, we will all have to launch another struggle.24

It is also fact that the all political parties of Kashmir were in favour of state’s accession with Pakistan except NC under Abdullah.25 Although, he sent members of his party to Pakistan to meet and discuss issue with Jinnah but, for this act Sheikh Abdullah was highly criticized by communal parties like RSS (Rashtriya Swayam Sewak Sangh). On the other hand being close associate of Nehru, Abdullah meet Nehru on October 15, 1947 in Delhi.26 He received Abdullah with open arms. It was here Abdullah made it clear in press conference, to quote him:

18 Genak Singh was the Prime Minister of J&K from August 1947 to October 1947, proceeded by Ram Chand Kak and succeeded by Mehar Chand Mahajan. 19 P.N. Bazaz, The history of struggle for freedom in Kashmir; cultural and political, from the earliest times to the present day (New Delhi: Kashmir Publication Co.1954), 320. 20 S. M. Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar (Srinagar: Ali Mohammad & Sons, 1985), 392-93. 21 Ibid., 386. 22 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 58-60. 23 Khidmat, (Srinagar), October 8, 1947. 24 G.M. Shah, Izhar-I- Haq (Srinagar: Kashmir Conspiracy case defence Committee, 1959), 19. 25 Bazaz, The history of struggle for freedom in Kashmir, 317-321. 26 F.M. Hassanain, Freedom Struggle in Kashmir (Delhi: Rima Publishing House, 1988), 149. 39

The people of Kashmir want to decide their future in a peaceful atmosphere and without any external intervention. If any decision was forcibly thrusted upon us, we shall revolt. It is the right of Kashmiri masses and not that of Maharaja to decide their future. But they cannot decide anything till their freedom is restored.27

2.3 Accession with India: Role of National Conference

The communal disturbances due to the partition of the sub-continent created fear and insecurity among people and thousands were killed, murdered and migrated on both sides of the borders irrespective of religion, caste or creed. The situation was worse in Panjab and northern parts. The effect of this was seen in province of Jammu, were Hari Singh ordered the Muslims soldiers and population to surrender before the Dogra force. This act was resisted in Poonch mostly by Muslims who were ex-servicemen. The fight between the two paved the way for communal riots, with passing days the whole region of Jammu became worst place of battlefield. Large numbers of people especially the Muslims of this region were either killed or migrated to other side of the border. The whole political and communal atmosphere created a space for ‘Pathan tribesman’ (Kahbeel) to resist, because they had good relations with the people especially with rebels of this district of the state. This event led to the entry of the tribals into the valley of Kashmir from Baramulla on 21 October.28 The tribesmen wanted to take revenge of those Muslims who were either killed or torched both in Panjab and Jammu. This act from the tribals led to the chaos and anarchy in the valley and number of people were killed irrespective of their caste and religion. These tribesmen captured vast territory of state, like Muzaffarabad, Kotli, Poonch, Bimbar and other small towns and villages. In between the ruler Maharaja Hari Singh left the Valley in deep crisis and chaos, because Maharaja felt that they will occupy whole state in few days. He also felt that he will lose his authority and power to rule the state and fled to Jammu from Srinagar on 25th October 1947.29 Although, it is also believed that Maharaja Hari Singh was advised by, then secretary of state’s government of India namely V.P. Menon to live the state.30 It is also important to mention here that the NC patron Sheikh Abdullah was in Delhi and on 21 October, he issued the statement that it was Maharaja and his administration that

27 Khidmat, October 20, 1947. 28 Alastair Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir 1947 to 1996 (London: Roultege, 1996), 44. 29 Vitasta, (Srinagar), October 26, 1947. 30 Bazaz, The history of struggle for freedom in Kashmir, 328. 40 was responsible for deteriorating situation in J&K.31 Abdullah and his party came openly in forefront and criticized the raiders and mobilized its workers in favour of India and communal harmony. Abdullah made it clear that until he was alive, the life, dignity and honour of Non-Muslims of the state would be safe.32 During this phase of Kashmir polity, Sheikh dominated the political discourse and coined the slogans like:

‘Sher-e-Kashmir Ka Kya Irshad, Hindu Muslim Sikh Ittehad’ –‘what is the message of Sher-e-Kashmir, Hindu Muslim Sikh unity; and ‘Hamla Awar Khabardar, hum Kashmiri hain tayar’—‘come on invaders, we are ready.’33

It was because of the role of NC and its workers played during these crucial days that Jawaharlal Nehru praised the leadership of Abdullah and NC in these words:

Srinagar was in peril and the invader was almost on its doorsteps. There was no administration left, no troops, no police…Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and his colleagues of the National Conference and their unarmed volunteers-Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs- took charge of the situation, kept order and prevented panic. It was a wonderful piece of work they did at a moment when nerves of the most of the people might have failed them.34

It was in these ill and miserable conditions, that the Hari Singh sought help from government of India to restore law and order in the state. While writing letter to Lord Mountbatten on 26 October, 1947 Hari Singh writes:

I have to inform your Excellency that a grave emergency has arisen in my State and request immediate assistance of your Government…With the conditions obtaining at present in my state and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for me, without my

31 Khidmat, October 23, 1947. 32 Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at Political Crossroads, 34; P.S.Verma, “Jammu and Kashmir Politics: Religion, Region and Personality Symbiosis,” The Indian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (1987), 561-574. 33 Balraj Puri, ‘Lion in the Gardens of Kashmir,’ The Indian Express, September 9, 1982. 34 Syed Mir Qasim, My life and Times (Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1985), 259. 41

State acceding to India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of accession for acceptance by your Government.35

This whole story about the state’s controversial accession and military intervention by India is well documented. However, this is also reality that the Kashmir question or dispute is still in the political discourse of both the countries. One important thing that should also be mentioned is that the Maharaja Hari Singh also writes to Mountbatten that interim government should be constituted in the state:

I am also to inform your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister…36

Later Abdullah was made emergency head of the state. It is also important here that where Maharaja sought help from government of India on conditional terms of accessions, NC leader Abdullah on the behalf of party signed the instrument of accession. Sheikh was then present with Nehru in Delhi.37 By signing the document of the instrument of accession, late Hari Singh handed only three powers to government of India that is Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communication and in other matters, State will remain Autonomous.38 However, the discourse of accession and fate of Kashmir will be decided by people of the State themselves. This was endorsed by Nehru in his many speeches and writings. In between Abdullah’s return from Delhi, and was made emergency head of J&K.39 While as on the other side members associated with NC became defacto administrators and officers in their respective towns and cities.40 The emergency government which was formed under Abdullah functioned according to the Constitutions act of 1939.41 However, it was not easy to rule the state during the emergency period. The differences between Sheikh Abdullah and Hari Singh were increasing. All NC members were in favour that all powers should be given to the

35 The Nation, (New Delhi), June 1, 1990; also see, Text of letter from Hari Singh the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir to Lord Mountbatten, Governor General of India, dated October 26, 1947. 36 Ibid. 37 Abdullah, Aatish-i-Chinar (1985), 418. 38 P.N. Lakhanpal, Essential Documents and Notes on Kashmir Dispute (Delhi: International Books, 1965), 58. 39 Korbel, Crisis in Kashmir, 206. 40 K.S. Bhat, Kashmir in Flames (Srinagar: AMS Publishers, 1981), 46. 41 Bhushan and Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), 184. 42

Abdullah’s government and demanded the termination of Mahajan42. Later it was only by intervention of government of India the issue was resolved and Sheikh Abdullah was made Prime Minister of interim government of the J&K on 5th March 1948.43

2.4 Interim Government 1948: Politics of Vengeance

The state’s first cabinet was formed in 1948; Sheikh as head and his associates like Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Mirza Afzal Beg, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, G.L. Dogra, S.L. Saraf, Sardar Budh Singh and Pir Mohammad Khan were sworn as ministers. The government under Abdullah started to take revenge to those who oppose him in past. The leaders of the MC and those who were opposing state’s accession with India were arrested. Almost all well-known political personalities of the time were imprisoned or thrown out of the state and were pushed towards Pakistan side of Kashmir.44 The State Assembly was dissolved by Abdullah, because this Assembly was represented by MC members and Sheikh Abdullah treated them as his enemies.45 The NC and its associates dominated and monopolized the spheres of the state. This rule and phase of Kashmir polity is known as ‘Halqa President Raj’ which means ‘Rule of Zonal Presidents.’46 The whole political narrative during this phase of Kashmir polity has been beautifully explained by Prem Nath Bazaz. He writes it was the first time in the history of state, that hundreds of Government officers, Heads of the many Departments, Judges and high profile persons of administration expressed their serious opposition to Sheikh Abdullah and his regime. Those people who stood against Abdullah and NC were thrown in the jail and number of officers was discharged from their respective services. Bazaz goes to the extent that all these people were not the supporters of MC and Pakistan but in fact they were the common people of Kashmir who stood against the Sheikh and his party rule.47

42 Mehr Chand Mahajan was the Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir from 15 October 1947 to 5 March 1948. He was preceded by Janak Singh and succeeded by Sheikh Abdullah. Mahajan also served third Chief Justice of India after independence. 43 Bhat, Kashmir in Flames, 169; For full details how Sheikh Abdullah was made as interim Prime Minister in 1948, see J.B. Das Gupta, The Internal Dynamics of Kashmir (The Hague: Springer,1968), 184-248. 44 Bhat, Kashmir in Flames, 169; Musarat Javed Cheema, “Pakistan-India Conflict with Special Reference to Kashmir,” South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (2015), 45; Ashutosh Varshney, “India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism,” Asian Survey, 31, no. 11 (1991), 997-1019. 45 Korbel, Crisis in Kashmir, 206. 46 Bhat, Kashmir in Flames, 46-48. 47 Bazaz, The history of struggle for freedom in Kashmir, 410. 43

The NC in post accession period was the only effective and strong political party in J&K, which had a local organization in every village of the State. The Statesman, a prominent Indian Newspaper which supported the policy of Abdullah observed in March 1949 that, “there are signs of establishment of police state-futile notices in restaurants forbidding political conversation when everybody talks politics; more “public safety” prisoners than are healthy…”48 Same words were repeated by Sir Owen Dixon during his mission that “the state government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrests”49 The nature of state politics during the crucial phase of Abdullah’s rule has been described by Balraj Puri in his book Kashmir Insurgency and After, that Kashmir became monolithic society led by authoritarian leader Abdullah and his party NC. Abdullah did not tolerate the slightest dissent. When Abdullah became head of the emergency administration on 27th October 1947, the Hari Singh’s administration was broken down and NC workers not only manned the 23 member emergency council but were appointed as government officials. Many government officials held different positions in the party. Abdullah’s administration functioned arbitrarily; even party workers assumed the de-facto authority to arrest and punish who so ever they held guilty.50

Ironically, when Abdullah was installed the administrator of the state in 1948 and NC under him started to realize the ‘Naya Kashmir’ goal, the party began to show cracks in its ranks. Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara had proved himself to be an able administrator and political leader all through the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement. But Abdullah began to see Mohiuddin Kara as a dangerous rival and kept him out, when he formed his cabinet in March 1948. Karra later quit NC and formed a new political party called Political Conference.51 The antiparty activities on part of Qasim, led Sheikh Abdullah to convince Bakshi and Maulana Masoodi that Qasim should be expelled from the party and he was expelled along with Khawaja Shamsuddin, Monohar Nath Kaul and Peer Ghulam Rasul of Mattan. However, the patron of Kisan Conference was Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, he sent his leader Abdul Salam Itoo to Qasim to join the party but he refused to join because this party publically advocated accession of J&K to

48 The Statesman, (Calcutta), March 1, 1949. 49 Korbel, Crisis in Kashmir, 206. 50 Puri, Kashmir: Insurgency and After, 47. 51 Qasim, My life and Times, 42. 44

Pakistan.52 The rule of NC in early phase was so coercive that Radio Pakistan was banned in the state. Those who violated this order were either arrested or fined. The whole communication system was single handedly controlled by NC. Although, before Sheikh and his party came into power, there were numerous newspapers not less than forty eight were published from different parts of the State.53 Most of these papers, periodicals and Journals were critical of government and policies. All these publications were banned and censorship was imposed by NC,54 and Daily Khidmat was the only paper which was published because this daily was official mouthpiece of NC. All officials were directed to subscribe only Daily Khidmat.55

The concentration of the political power and economy privileged the dominant social groups to the exclusion of the unprivileged (poor). The ‘one party dominance’ of the NC with absolute lack of inner party democracy and dynasty politics left no room for dissent and dialogue.56 Moreover, from democratic protestation/assertion point of view, the government under NC leadership of Abdullah did not welcome organized opposition in the state. But it retained the powers of detention and suppression of hostile press comments.57 According to Navnita Chadha Behera:

Constitutionally and politically, the state had no system of checks and balances. Sheikh Abdullah had painstakingly built a “monolith structure” in a “one-party state,”…Parliamentary democracy, resting on the principle of majority rule, was transformed into ‘Kashmiri rule’: Sheikh Abdullah’s five member cabinet had one representative from Jammu and none was from Ladakh’…There by subverting the democratic process and denying Jammu a voice in shaping the future political system…58

However, there are success stories of NC government, such as it ordered land reform in 1948 which abolished the landlordism and Jagirdari system in J&K. The state government under Abdullah passed ‘Big Landed Estates Abolishing Act’ in 1950. Through this act, land was transferred to all the tillers without any compensation who

52 Ibid., 48. 53 Bazaz, The history of struggle for freedom in Kashmir, 470. 54 Ibid., 410. 55 Ibid., 472. 56 Wani, Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule, 10-11. 57 Ibid., 132. 58 Navnita Chadha Behera, Demystifying Kashmir (Washington D.C: Brookings Institution Press, 2006), 109. 45 were under high Debt.59 One can say it was only because of this land to tillers that the NC and its patron Abdullah succeeded in consoling party position in each and every corner of J&K. The act to end landlordism was seen as synonymous to Independence. It was perhaps because of these acts that Abdullah was called the tall leader, even after he signed the ‘infamous Kashmir Accord’ with Indra Gandhi in 1975.60

When Indian leaders decided to frame new Constitution for the country, the J&K under the leadership of Abdullah sent four member body61 on 16th June, 1949 to represent the J&K in Constituent Assembly.62 It should be mentioned that the after debating and discussing with the members of Indian Constituent Assembly on many issues, the draft of Article 306-A was enshrined in Constitution of India on 17th October 1949.63 This provision of Indian Constitution provided Special Status to J&K, and most of the provisions of the Indian Constitution were not applicable to the State. It was only in the later phase when Article 306 (A) was replaced by Article 370 and state was granted Special Position.64 This Article also granted the State a right to frame its own Constitution. However, it was in 1951 April 20 that the new Head of the State, Karan Singh, Son of the Maharaja Hari Singh issued order for holding elections for Constituent Assembly. The elections were held on 15 October, 1951 and NC which was the main political force in J&K won seventy-three unopposed seats out of 75 seats and remained two were contested and won by NC (Table 2.1).

However, with the passage of time, differences arose between the leadership both in Delhi and Srinagar. To solve the difference and issues with Sheikh Abdullah, Delhi government under leadership of Nehru discussed the relationship of the state with Union of India. Both the leaders entered into agreement famously Known as “Delhi agreement” signed in July 1952. The agreement approved the state’s special status within the orbit of article 370. It is also important that this agreement paved the way for

59 See ‘Government of Jammu and Kashmir 1998, Report of the Committee on Economic Reforms for Jammu and Kashmir’, August 1998, 122. 60 Suhail-ul-Rehman Lone, “Land reforms in Kashmir (1948-1953): An analysis,” in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, (2015), vol. 76, 332-343 61 The four members were Mirza Afzal Beg, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Shri Moti Ram Bagda, and Maulana Syed Masoodi. 62 Government of India 1989, Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Reports, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, VIII, 915. 63 Government of India 1989, Constituent Assembly Debates: Official Reports, New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, X, 421. 64 A.S. Anand, The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, its Developments and Comments (Delhi: Universal Book Traders, 1994), 104-105. 46 end of hereditary monarch and new Constituent Assembly on 21th August 1952 elected Dr. Karan Singh as Sadr-e-Riyasat.

2.5 Post-Abdullah Dismissal: Process of Integration (1953-1963)

The relation between Sheikh Abdullah and Nehru did not go well after signing Delhi- Agreement in 1952. The cracks by and large were direct impact of the communal parties in India, who were supporting the Praja Parishad led agitation in Jammu. These developments seriously put their impact on ‘Central State Relations’. In was in this back ground that the few observers believe that Abdullah started again the dream of independent Kashmir, he started criticizing the Delhi for supporting the anti-Kashmir forces and anti-NC in India and Jammu. This whole trust deficit between the Nehru and Abdullah led to the politics of deceit and conspiracy. Sheikh was over thrown by Karan Singh on 9th August 1953. However, if Abdullah was arrested and sent to prison; there were still people within the ranks of NC to fill the gap and in fact they were more close to Nehru and Central government. One such leader was Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Bakshi was second leader after Sheikh Abdullah in the Party and government with portfolio of Deputy Prime Minister of J&K.65 The day Abdullah was dismissed and arrested, on the same day Karan Singh invited Bakshi to form the government. The cabinet under Abdullah was dissolved and Bakshi was sworn as new Prime Minister of J&K on 10th August 1953. This whole process was perhaps the first attempt to submerge the democracy in the state and more preference was given to national interests. Bakshi publically criticized Abdullah and his colleagues, and labeled them anti-Democratic and anti-state. He further added that these people led by Abdullah aimed to destroy the democratic fabric of J&K. Bakshi claimed that:

We were extremely shocked and grieved to see that our former colleagues were not only repudiating these vital principles but were attempting to destroy all vestiges of democratic functioning an all spheres of administration and organization.66

65 P.N.K Bamzai, Culture and political history of Kashmir (Delhi: MD Publications Pvt. Ltd., Vol. 1, 1994), 811-8. 66 Crisis in Kashmir explained, Text of Policy speech broadcast by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Prime Minister of J&K on 10th August, 1953, (Srinagar: Lalla Rookh Publications, 1953), 1. 47

Bakshi lashed out at Abdullah and his colleagues for disturbing law and order, aimed to create an independent Kashmir with the full support of Global powers of the time. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad in his many public and Assembly speeches justified the state’s accession with the India. In his belief, he stressed to implement all the provisions of Delhi Agreement which was concluded by Abdullah and Nehru in 1952. Bakshi and his colleagues were in favour to develop more Constitutional provisions of India with Democratic ritual.67 While as the decision of dismissing Abdullah was hailed not only by Indian communal parties but the state Assembly also and expressed “Complete faith in new Ministry” under leadership of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. He criticized those forces that were either in favour of state’s accession with Pakistan or Independence, and said, under Indian Constitution we have well-preserved our identity by maintaining Special Status of the State. He further maintained that our constitutional arrangements with India are final and Constituent Assembly was shaped to further strengthen this relation. The guarantee of Autonomy by people of India to the J&K is a proof of success of state’s accession with India.68 This was the period when the ties of state government under Bakshi were strong with Delhi.69 He finally got vote of confidence on 5th October 1953 in Constituent Assembly and selected his close associates as cabinet ministers.70

Commenting on change of guards and rifts in ruling NC in J&K, Nehru recalls that:

During my visit to Jammu and Kashmir by the end of May 1953, I was greatly distressed to see this, because I noticed that gradually the government of Jammu and Kashmir had ceased to function. It could not function because of internal conflicts. Naturally, in a friendly way, I advised them to pull together, to lay down a definite policy and carry it out as a government and not pull in two or three directions.71

67 Veena Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio (Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2004), 66. 68 Unanimous vote of Confidence in Bakshi Government (An account of the proceedings of the state Legislature) on the motion of Confidence in Bakshi Government adopted on 5th October, 1953, 3. 69 Bakshi was known for his political legacy during ‘Quit Kashmir Movement’, but the dismissal of Abdullah provides Bakshi both powers as well as opportunity to rule the state. Bakshi was born in 1907 and later became a school teacher, participated fully in national struggle against the Dogra rule and committed nationalist. 70 The cabinet includes, Syed Mir Qasim, Ghulam Rasool Ranzu, Sham Lal Saraf, D.P. Dhar, Kushuk Bakula and Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq. Singh, Heir Apparent, 1. 71 Jawaharlal Nehru, Selected speeches, volume III, 1953-57, 211. 48

While as on the other hand Abdullah termed his arrest and dismissal as conspiracy made by central government with the help of Syed Massodi72 and Bakshi. However, senior life time associate of Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg believes that, “it was not a conspiracy to stab anybody in 1953, but a political stand.”73 The arrest of Abdullah created state of emergency, people started protesting against this move and hundreds of loyalist of Abdullah’s were either arrested or detained in jails. However, due to the strong and powerful efforts of Bakshi government, peace returned and normal life was again started in the valley of Kashmir.74 In fact it was not easy to replace Abdullah and his leadership with new one but Bakshi proved more loyal to Delhi and started ruling the state with iron hand.75 The rule of Bakshi was so harsh even nobody dared to speak against the state’s accession with India. The dominance of this ‘One Party System’ under Bakshi created authoritarian type of polity in J&K. To suppress the voices that were against Bakshi and Delhi, he constituted special wing of police under then headship of Ghulam Qadir Ganderbali. This police wing under Ganderbali was used by the Bakshi for party purposes. These forces provide all aid and support to ruling NC government to suppress decency and opposition in the State.76

One of the loyalists of Bakshi was Syed Mir Qasim, criticizing Abdullah, he said, “We have recommended the application of all provisions which were necessary to define the relation of the state with the Centre.”77 He openly said that, it was Abdullah who was dragging from to implement the Delhi agreement which he concluded with Nehru. However, it was only Bakshi, who declares in Assembly that the Delhi agreement will be executed in totality.78 Subsequently Delhi agreement was approved by J&K Constituent Assembly on 6th February 1954. The state government under Bakshi started the process of integration with India and more provisions of Indian Constitution were applied to the state. These political developments in the state gave relief to those forces who were in favour of total integration like Jana Sang, Praja Parshad and other communal parties. The process continues and with the passage of time majority of the provision of Indian Constitutions were implemented with consent

72 Maulana Mohammad Syed Masoodi was the General Secretary of the ruling NC in 1953. 73 The Indian Express, October 24, 1976. 74 Bamzai, Cultural and Political History of Kashmir, 612. 75 Pyarelal Kaul, Crises in Kashmir (Srinagar: Suman Publications, 1991), 82-83. 76 Ibid., 89-92. 77 Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly Debates, February 1954, volume 8, 15th, 22. 78 Singh, Heir Apparent 11. 49 of State Assembly. In fact the process of integration was hailed by different state governments as well from Central government.79

After the dismissal of Abdullah in 1953, major Constitutional provisions were implemented because there was hardly any other political party who would have opposed these changes. However, Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg being in jail always criticized Bakshi regime and the policies of the government and called him ‘Delhi’s man in Kashmir’. But Bakshi would always talk about state’s final accession with India. It is also fact that under the rule of Bakshi, the state saw most of its economic and other development; however many people believe that this move was only to counter the Abdullah’s political narrative.80 It was during the time of Bakshi that many organizations from India started functioning in J&K. Asha Karan Singh was the first lady of J&K who started a local branch of ‘All India Women’s Conference’ and became its president.81 It was also during this time when the Ashok Mehta formed Praja Socialist Party in India and started its influence in J&K. After many meetings and deliberations a branch of Praja Socialist Party with Om Prakash Saraf as President and Khwaja Umar Bhutt secretary was formed in the State. This was a phase, when Praja Parishad a local Jammu based party announced its affiliation with Bhartiya Jana Sangh in India. It is important to mention that if the NC led by Bakshi and INC were close to each other after the dismissal of Abdullah, it was also time when the whole process of fully integration of J&K with India was in its peak.82

The year 1956 was one of the important in annuals of Kashmir’s political history. The state’s new Constitution was drafted and later adopted, affirms the ‘state’s accession’ is ‘final’ and integral part of India.83 On 17 November 1956, the ‘One Party’ (NC) of Kashmir Constituent Assembly, which was elected in 1951, adopted new Constitution. The Constitution declared the J&K to be an integral part of India (though contested by APHC and many groups in Kashmir and Pakistan also). It also included provisions for a Parliamentary government with the head of the State (Sadar-i-Riyasat)

79 Balraj Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: triumph and tragedy of Indian federalisation (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1981),150. 80 Singh, Heir Apparent, 3. 81 Ibid., 13. 82 Ibid., 114. 83 Administrative Report of Jammu and Kashmir for 1956-57, Government of J&K, Jammu, July, 1958, 6. 50 elected by Legislative Assembly and recognized by the president of India.84 Nevertheless, this political development was challenged by many political forces within the state and also in Pakistan. The Afzal Beg led Plebiscite Front strongly opposed this decision enacted by Constituent Assembly. Front criticized Bakshi government as composed of “goondas, opportunists and thieves.” He also criticized the Constituent Assembly and said that most of the members of Assembly were forced to accept the Constitution. But all these leaders associated with Abdullah were in jail including Mirza Afzal Beg.85 However, the process of enacting the Constitution was hailed as most important development by Pro-Indian state politicians and Nationalist leaders in Delhi. It was seen that it will further integrate J&K emotionally with India.

2.6 Elections of 1957: One-Party Dominance of National Conference

It was in March-April 1957 that the first State Legislative Assembly elections were held under the supervision of ‘State Election Commissioner’, who was then appointed by Karan Singh. Though, this power to conduct the elections in J&K was later conducted by Election Commission of India, when first amendment Act, 1959 was passed.86 NC under Bakshi started strong election campaign and prepared a Manifesto, in which NC made it clear that the J&K is integral part of India. The manifesto also declared that NC will defend both state Constitution and all those fundamental ideas on which party fight from its inception, i-e to fight for Socialist society, to end poverty, good health facilities, and fight against the illiteracy. However, during the same time in Jammu, the Praja Parishad being supported by Indian political elites of particular ideology stood for full merger. These political parties who stood for Praja Parishad hailed its policy as triumph and devotion towards ‘Indian Nationalism and Secularism’.87 When elections were conducted in all seventy five constituencies, NC under Bakshi dominated the political scene and won sixty eight seats. But it was first time that the state saw opposition within the Assembly in the form of Praja Parishad by making history of winning five seats from Jammu (Table 2.1). Thus despite opposition from Praja Parishad, it was NC which won overwhelming majority and formed the government.88 The role of Praja Parishad as an opposition political entity will be discussed in chapter third in details. Conversely,

84 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir,317. 85 Singh Heir Apparent, 28; Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 321-22. 86 Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio,70-72. 87 Administrative Report of Jammu and Kashmir for 1956-57, 18-19. 88 Bamzai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, 814-815. 51 mainstream political parties in India hailed this victory as triumph of Indian democracy and defeat of Abdullah and his supporters of Plebiscite Front. Though, it is believed that the development which was witnessed during Bakhshi’s era was also a major factor for NC’s victory. But it is fact that the elections of 1957 witnessed old phenomena i-e large number candidates won unopposed (Table 2.1). At the same time it is widely believed that the elections were not fair and free because these elections were conducted during the crucial years of UN involvement in Kashmir dispute.

Similarly, in other house of the Assembly i-e Legislative Council, elections were held on 22 seats and NC nominees were only elected to the Council. The remained members were nominated by Karan Singh.89 After State Assembly elections of 1957, Karan Singh invited Bakshi to form the government. Sadiq too was invited by Sadar-i- Riyasat to join the new government under Bakshi. However, the rift and differences between Bakshi and Sadiq led to the intra-party factionalism within the NC. Many efforts were made to solve the differences between the two but all attempts failed.90 Sadiq declined the offer of both Bakshi and Karan Singh to be part of new government. The new government was headed by Bakshi, when he was sworn as PM on 27th July 1957 without the support of Sadiq. It was in such political milieu that Sadiq and his close associates of five members91 resigned from the working committee of NC on 6th August 1957. However, Sadiq claimed in one of his speeches that almost nine members from NC led by Bakshi have seceded from legislature.92 It was in such circumstance of state polity that new political party within the ranks of NC emerged on 6th September 1957, recognized as ‘Democratic National Conference’ (DNC).93 When seventeen members of NC led by Sadiq officially announced to launch new political party. Yet, the defection within the ranks of NC did not put any serious impact on government under Bakshi, because during those days Bakshi was known as dictator having strong hold on party and state administration. Sadiq led DNC was more Pro-Indian in the context that Party believed in bringing J&K more integration to Indian Union. The Party was in favour to extend more central laws to the state i-e Jurisdiction Election

89 Administrative Report of Jammu and Kashmir for 1956-57, 22-23. 90 G.M. Sadiq, Girdhari Lal Dogra, Mir Qasim and D.M. Dhar were elected in the NC ticket. Singh, State politics in India, 6. 91 The members include, Girdhari Lal Dogra, Syed Mir Qasim, D.P. Dhar, and Ghulam Rasool Renzu. 92 Mahajan and Khan, Kashmir-An Integral Part of India, 8. 93 Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio 70. 52

Commission of India. It was during this period when the process of erosion of Special Status was started with the consent of Legislative Assembly of the State.

2.7 Abdullah’s Release in 1958: Role of National Conference

It was after at least five years that Sheikh Abdullah was released in 1958. This development in J&K was keenly watched by all political pundits in India as new mark in state polity. To release Abdullah, the decision was taken by Pandit Nehru and State premier Bakshi.94 Sheikh was released on 8th January 1958 from Kud Jail (Prison in Jammu). As it is believed that Nehru deeply felt that Sheikh, who was his close friend, should have been given a fair chance to come and join the mainstream politics, because during those days Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg was famous for their anti-state agenda. The release of Abdullah marked new political development in the state and people welcomed this move. The people in J&K especially in city of Srinagar celebrated the release of Abdullah.95 However, once he was released, he started his old style to criticize both Delhi and state government. He organized many public meetings and delivered many speeches where he insisted that the state’s accession with India was not final but provisional. It was after his release that Sheikh on 13th January 1958 delivered his famous anti-India and anti-government speech in Hazratbal. Recalling the shameful event of 9th August 1953 when he was dismissed from the Prime Ministerial chair and arrested, he said:

9th August was a blessing in disguise because on that day a rude shock gave us the realization of our weakness…we realized on that day in the presence of Jawaharlal Nehru democracy in Jammu and Kashmir could be murdered in a cold blood manner…96

Nevertheless, the political journey of Sheikh Abdullah after his release was not so easy, though he remained active for few months in state politics and criticized Delhi and Bakshi. Many times in his public speeches he lashed out at Delhi for ignoring the basic rights of Kashmiris i-e ‘right to self-determination’. He decided to use the political forces under the banner of Plebiscite Front that was established by his life time friend Afzal Beg to pressurize the government in Delhi as well as in the state. Both, Nehru

94 Singh, Heir Apparent, 55-56. 95 F.A. Abba, Profiles of Abdullah (Srinagar: Printed by Chinar Art Press, 1980), 140. 96 Ibid., 140-141. 53 and Bakshi took serious note of Sheikh’s ‘anti-national’ speeches and organization like Plebiscite Front. In many parts of J&K, people associated with Front and Bakshi’s NC clashed with each other, resulted in law and order problem.97 It was in this circumstantial state of affairs that serious anti-state charges were labeled against the Abdullah and his close associates. Sheikh was again arrested on 29th April 1958.98 However, on the other hand government lodged many charges against Afzal Beg and other twenty members associated with Front. This famous case was later known as ‘Kashmir Conspiracy Case’, Abdullah too was among the accused list of members who was charged by government of India.99

Conversely, on the other hand Sadiq who became founder of DNC made it clear that the jurisdiction of Election Commission of India should be implemented to J&K.100 Many other leaders in State Assembly supported this demand of Sadiq including Prem Nath Dogra. Dogra claimed that “while we claim to be integral part of Union of India, there is no reason why we should not enjoy the benefits of those institutions.”101 Finally, in 1959, Bakshi government extended the Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and ECI to the state.102 Whereas, the Constituent Assembly of J&K on 10th October 1956 passed the resolution that jurisdiction of Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) of India should be extended to J&K.103 It was during these crucial years when Abdullah was in Jail that more Central laws were extended to the state with the concurrence of State Legislative Assembly and the process of erosion of Autonomy was on full scale. It is also important to mention that all political parties ruling or opposition (except Jamaat-i-Islami) including Sadiq’s DNC hailed this historic Constitutional change. While as the dreams of Praja Parishad to integrate the state fully with India was achieved by these Constitutional changes.

2.8 Elections of 1962: Dominance of National Conference

It was in 1962 when State Assembly elections along with General elections of India were conducted. The ‘Single Party Dominance’ of NC again was the main feature of

97 Singh, Heir Apparent, 56. 98 This time Sheikh Abdullah was again sent to Kud prison where he was detained during his previous years. 99 B.L Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics (Delhi: Seema Publication, 1981), 64. 100 J&K Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 4, 13th Aug. 1958, 90. 101 Ibid., 85. 102 J&K Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 6, 30th Sep. 1959, 23. 103 J&K Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol.12, 10th Oct.1956, 17. 54 these elections. NC under Bakshi won seventy seats seventy out of seventy five seats (Table 2.1). The victory of NC was hailed by its leaders on the grounds that during Bakhshi’s last five years of rule, state witnessed all round development.104 It is believed that Sadiq also played a crucial role in the victory of NC because the merger of two parties (NC & DNC) again played significant role in shaping the future politics of the State. However, it is also imperative to remark that these elections were conducted under the supervision of ECI, while as the previous State Assembly elections of 1952 and 1957 were conducted by local State Election Commission. It is in this context that Professor Balbir Singh argues that:

The extension of the supervision of the federal election commission was obviously no guarantee for fair and free elections and the elections of 1962 were largely rigged was adequately established the unprecedented number of unopposed returns.105

Nevertheless, Plebiscite Front openly opposed these elections and called them as fraud and rigged. Both Abdullah and Afzal Beg accuse Bakshi’s NC of hand in glove with Delhi. Even Nehru wrote a letter to Bakshi, and said, “It would strengthen your position much more if you lost a few seats to bonafide opponents…”106 when 1962 elections were held. However, Bakshi was of different opinion, he believed, “If you stick to democratic principles, you will never be able to have peace in Kashmir.”107 This political belief of Bakshi is still subscribed by political leaders in J&K.

The interesting part of the story during this period of Kashmir politics is that there were forces within the party (NC) who had strong opinion that Party should be merged with INC. However, Bakshi was strongly critical of this development, because Bakshi make it clear that NC from its inception had its own unique type of tradition. He also believed that NC had a sentimental representation within the state, as the party fought against the ‘Dogra Rule’; such sentiments should be respected at any cost.108 It is also fact that the political developments during the regime of Bakshi changed the future political narrative of J&K. The ‘Dominant One Party’ rule under NC from 1953

104 Bamzai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, 815. 105 Singh, State politics in India, 6. 106 Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at Political Cross roads, 118. 107 Ibid., 118. 108 Balraj, Jammu and Kashmir: triumph and tragedy of Indian federalisation, 15. 55 witnessed overall development in the State. Abdullah was in jail during those crucial years of state polity, when State Constitution was framed and many Central laws were extended. On the other hand Plebiscite Front, a separatist group under Afzal Beg dominated the political scene all those years. In next Chapter we will discuss in separate the role and emergence of the Front and how far it started its programme. However, the leadership of NC under Bakshi was total in favour of state’s accession with India. In this regard NC working committee on May 1963 passed a resolution in Srinagar, while it was made clear that state of J&K was and it will remain integral part of India.109 Commenting on the political developments within NC, Rekha Choudary observed that:

In post 1953 NC lost its political legitimacy. The party instead of representing local urges and necessities, the party became an appendage of Congress in Kashmir. Thus the linkage of NC with Congress was not only suicidal for the organization itself, but was to have long term implications for the identity politics of Kashmir.110

The politics of the sub-continent also played its due role in shaping the political climate of J&K. The invasion and full scale war of China against India deeply affected region. The policy makers in Delhi found it challenging in future because China was and is still a close ally of Pakistan. It was after India’s defeat from China that the leadership felt to review its old policies vis-à-vis J&K. The war between China and India not only disturbed the policy makers but political leadership in INC under Nehru too became the victim of this war. The party found it necessary that there should be structural changes within the party not only in Centre but States also. It was in these circumstances that Nehru called his Party cabinet ministers and Chief Ministers of the states to resign from their respective posts. This was done only to serve the Party all over the India to revive the old ethos of INC. A senior leader from Madras (Now Mumbai) K. Kamaraj came out with his formula, where he mentioned that all the high ranking Ministers including the Chief Ministers of States should submit their resignation to Prime Minister Nehru.111 Nevertheless, during those years there was no branch of INC in the State. However, the relation of Bakshi’s NC and others were close

109 Singh, Heir Apparent, 86. 110 Rekha Choudary, Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of identity and separatism (India: Routledge, 2015), 37. 111 Khushwant Singh, Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography of Sheikh Abdullah translated from Urdu (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993) 144-145. 56 with INC and its leaders particularly Nehru. The Kamaraj plan created many serious political crises in J&K; firstly it was expected that Kamaraj plan would not be implemented to J&K. But it rechecks happen; the nature of state polity compelled those in Delhi to implement the plan. The State premier Bakshi was asked to resign under this plan, the reasons for his resignation were more political in nature.112 In such political milieu Bakshi was compelled to resign from Prime Minister Office. Later on 4th October 1964 Nehru accepted his resignation as a State Premier. Thus, in this way the eras of Bakhshi’s decade rule, from 1953-1963 came to end in the politics of J&K.

However, on the other hand the NC on 19th October 1963 called a meeting which was attended by eighty six members out of one hundred one but a group of members led by Sadiq did not participate in this meeting and remained away. In this meeting Bakshi recommended Khwaja Shamsuddin’s name a next leader of the Party and he was elected unanimously. Later the proposed report of this meeting was sent to Karan Singh and it was then, Shamsuddin was sworn as Premier of J&K on 12th October 1963. The new cabinet of six members was formed under the headship of Shamsuddin.113 However, during his rule, State witnessed more directions from Delhi and compelled to adopt more provision of Indian Constitution. In this way more Autonomy was eroded by non-other than NC.114

The term of Shamsudddin as Premier was not easy; the political development within the State put serious challenges before him. One of such unfortunate event was theft of ‘Holy Relic’ of Prophet (PBUH) from Hazratbal Masque on 27 December 1963. This event led several violent public protests and government under Shamsuddin became paralyzed. Huge public rallies and protest were organized against ruling NC.115 The whole administration became victims of these protests and there was hardly any

112 The centre government under Nehru set three following reasons for his resignation. One, the Plebiscite Front which was started by Abdullah and Mirza Afzal Beg carried out strong propaganda against NC government led by Bakshi and they labeled him as ‘Delhi’s Man in Kashmir’ who betrayed the Kashmir cause. Second, the political differences within the NC was growing day by day, a group of NC members always criticized Bakshi and tried to please their bosses and carried out anti-Bakshi policies and tales to leadership in Delhi. This group was led by Sadiq who was more Pro-Indian and wanted to implement more Constitutional provisions of Indian Constitution to the state. Third, the regime under Bakshi and his associates produced corrupt and insufficient system of administration. There were strong charges of corruption and nepotism against Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad that further gave legitimacy for his resignation. Jagmohan Malhotra, My frozen turbulence in Kashmir (Delhi: South Asia Books, 1992), 100. 113 Singh, Heir Apparent, 91. 114 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, 241-271. 115 Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 69. 57 sign of governance. The Central government took serious note of it and B.N. Mullik was send to Valley, then Director Intelligence Bureau, to investigate this incident. Nehru was deeply worried about the theft of Holy Relic and public protests.116 To trace the relic, fifteen members ‘Action Committee’ was formed. This Committee was headed by Maulvi Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi and Mirwaiz Maulvi Mohammad Farooq (Father of Mirwaiz Kashmir Umar Farooq, Chairman of APHC). This Committee runs parallel government authority, because the government of NC was nowhere functioning. Nevertheless, Relic was found and both State government under Shamsuddin and Central under Nehru feel sign of relief.117

However, the Committee which was formed was not in a mood to surrender. The committee mobilized the entire valley and put five demands before the government. According to Karan Singh, the demands put forth by Committee were moderate in nature. The Committee had no trust on Shamsuddin.118 Later, it was on the recommendation of Nehru a team under Lal Bahadur Shastri was sent to Srinagar on 30th January 1964 to end the deadlock between the government and Action Committee.119 After meeting with all prominent members including Prime Minister Shamsuddin, the issue was resolved and protests came to end.120 However, it proved that government under Shamsudddin does not enjoy support and confidence of people.121 It is important to mention that the role of ‘Awami Action Committee’ as an effective opposition political and social entity in the politics of J&K will be discussed in Chapter third.

2.9 Holy-Relic Agitation: Advent of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq

The lack of confidence and support for Shamsuddin changed the attitude of Delhi vis-à-vis Shamsuddin. NC on the advice of Nehru elected G.M. Sadiq as leader of the Party.122 Later, Sadiq was sworn as Prime Minister on 28 February 1964 and replaced Shamsuddin.123 The advent of Sadiq as State Premier was hailed in Delhi for his pro-

116 Singh, Heir Apparent, 98. 117 Bamazai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, 817. 118 Singh, Heir Apparent, 101. 119 Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 69. 120 The debate around the Holy Relic theft and its trace out is still debated in the contours of Kashmir politics because many questions regarding this incident are still unanswered. 121 Balraj Puri, J.P. on Jammu and Kashmir (Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2005), 46. 122 Bamazai, Culture and political history of Kashmir, 816. 123 Qasim, My Life and Times, 99; Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 318-19. 58

Indian stance and political thinking. Sadiq’s phase opened new political dimension in Centre State relations.124 Being the most liberal and open politician, he played crucial role both in pre and post-1947 politics of J&K. During his rule, the State saw liberal policies. The authoritarian polity that was prevalent during Abdullah and Bakshi came to an end (though contested one). He lifted the ban on freedom of speech and assembly,125 freedom of press, and also gave freedom to those who were opposing his government like Sheikh Abdullah and workers of the Front. It is anticipated that, Sadiq was firm believer in ‘democratic nature’ of polity rather than autocratic or authoritarian means of his predecessors.126 This can be seen when he also ordered withdrawal of the ‘Kashmir Conspiracy Case’ in which Abdullah and his close associates were arrested.127 In the later years of his rule, he released all political opponents and prisoners including Abdullah, on 8th April 1964.128 The release of Abdullah was seen a welcome step and being a popular leader he was welcomed by people.129 During his rule, the ‘Peace Brigade’130 police force was disbanded. It was because of his liberal policies that the State saw signs of ‘democratic freedom’ and it was for first time in post 1947 polity, when new phase of political activity was seen. This liberal policy of Sadiq put positive impact in ‘development of democracy in J&K’. The essence of tolerance and democracy shows its colors and numerous numbers of Newspapers, periodicals and journals were published (That were previously banned by Abdullah and Bakshi). These publications were representing different political tendencies and political viewpoints.

However, it is also important to mention that when Abdullah was released, he out rightly rejected all Constitutional provisions that were implemented to State after 1953. He also made it clear in many of his speeches that the state’s accession with India

124 Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 70. 125 Jammu and Kashmir Government, A New Deal (A brief account of the achievements of the Government during the past six months: March-August, 1964), published by Directorate of Information, Srinagar, August 26th, 1964, 1. 126 Promise and performance, Government of India, New Delhi, 1965, 1. 127 The Sheikh Abdullah was under detention from August 1953 to April 1964 with a brief spell of freedom from January to April, 1958. 128 Qasim, My Life and Times, 101. 129 Singh, Flames of the Chinar,148; Singh, Heir Apparent, 108. 130 Peace Brigade was operative during the regime of Bakshi. This police force was responsible for serious human right violation and repression in the state. for full details about the role of the peace Brigade in Jammu and Kashmir see, Wajahat Ahmad, “Repression and resistance in Kashmir,” Aljazeera, August 2, 2011. Retrieved at https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/2011726122116677 591.html 59 is not final and people of Kashmir have yet to decide their future.131 Instead Abdullah openly started his support to Plebiscite Front led by Afzal Beg.132 Hence, the release and speeches of Abdullah created new serious political crisis for Sadiq. While as on the other side, Sadiq criticized those political forces that were either in favour of Pakistan or Independence. He openly said state’s accession with India is final and no power could move us from the path we have chosen.133 This whole political battle between two opposite political stalwarts of the state created unstable political environment in J&K. There were other important political groups in the Kashmir, one was the ‘Political Conference’ led by Mohiuddin Kara and other was ‘Action Committee’ led by Masoodi. Though, these political groups were having their own political and separate identities but the release of Abdullah over shadowed these groups as claimed by Karan Singh.134

Here Nehru invited Abdullah for talks and subsequently he was given mandate to visit Pakistan and offer mediation with Pakistan President Ayub Khan to settle the issue politically. However, the death of Nehru on 27th May 1964135 ends up this deadlock nowhere. Death of Nehru created both leadership and intellectual vacuum within India and INC. Lal Bahadur Shastri was elected Party leader and became Prime Minister of India. While as political activities in J&K continue to remain a challenging task for both State and Central government. Plebiscite Front under the patronage of Afzal Beg and Abdullah started new political campaigning and organize public protests and meetings. Abdullah took hostile stance and criticized Sadiq’s government. However, within his own government, there were people (both Muslims and Hindus) who were against the policies and politics of Sadiq. They always started criticizing his government and give him tough time to work.136 The difference between the Sadiq and Bakshi grew very fast and acute. The growing urge for Chair by Bakshi tried again him

131 Abba, Profiles of Abdullah, 145-146. 132 Singh, Heir Apparent, 109; David E Lockwood, “Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah's Reinstatement,” The World Today 31, no. 6 (1975), 249-256. 133 Abba, Profiles of Abdullah, 146; “Ghulam Mohammed Sadiq, 59, Kashmir Chief Minister, Dies,” The New York Times, December 13, 1971. Retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/13/archives/ghulam-mohammed-sadiq-59-kashmir-chief-minister- dies.html. 134 Singh, Heir Apparent, 110. 135 Y. D. Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah (Dehra Dun: Palit, NA), 128-30. 136 Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 76. 60 to gain power.137 Bakshi led the list of group of thirty five members to Karan Singh on 2nd September 1964 and asked Sadar-i-Riyasat to move vote of no-confidence against Sadiq. But he advised Bakshi not to move no-confidence motion because during those days, the Plebiscite Front was highly active against government. Bakshi refuted the order and said I cannot shut the mouths of thirty five legislative members. The threat to overthrow the Sadiq’s government by Bakshi was discussed by high level political leaders of Delhi and Srinagar. Nevertheless many representatives were sent to Bakshi for dialogue but all attempts failed. Later the conspiracy was hatched against the Bakshi and his colleagues. On 22nd September 1964, he was arrested along with other four members of Assembly and prisoned in Udhampur jail.138 The arrest and detention of Bakshi witnessed serious negative political events in the State and members associated with Bakshi tried their best to convince Karan Singh to plead for him. While as on the other hand, Abdullah find it proper time to cherish political motives. He condemned the arrest of Bakshi and other members. Abdullah labeled that the State Assembly have no representation of people and it have become ‘non-representative’. Though, government appointed Commission on 30th January 1965, under Justice Rajagopala Ayyangar to probe the charges against the Bakshi.139 The Commission submitted its report after nearly two years in 1967 and found Bakshi guilty of misusing the public funds and office for his personal and family benefits.140

However, in-between this political instability, Sadiq continued with the process of integration which was already done by his predecessors. He revisited the Centre- State relations and passed the resolution for extension of emergency provisions to J&K under article 356 and 357 of Constitution.141 The extension of emergency powers was yet another attempt to erode the Special Status. The Front, ACC and Jamaat-i-Islami who were opposing the government outside the Assembly strongly criticized Sadiq’s government decisions. They called these measures of government as ‘Unconstitutional and Undemocratic’. All opposition parties’ organized joint protests and complete

137 Singh, Flames of the Chinar, 156; Noor Ahmad Baba, “Democracy and governance in Kashmir,” in The Parchment of Kashmir Nyla Ali Khan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 103-124. 138Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 76-77; A.G. Noorani, Commissions of Inquiry. Corruption in India: Agenda for action (New Delhi: Vision Books, 1997), 218-250. 139Singh, Heir Apparent, 129; V. P. Bharatiya, “Central inquiry and State Ministers' Accountability,” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 18, no. 1 (1976), 56-84. 140 Kak, Kashmir: Problems and Politics, 77; “Eliminating Bakshi,” EPW, September 26, 1964. 141 Application to Jammu and Kashmir, Third Amendment Order, 1964: Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 1982), 11-17. 61 shutdown was observed on 15th January 1965. However, the process of integration continued and it was during the time of Sadiq, that NC was converted into INC and formally launched the party on 26th January 1965.142 The emergence and role of INC in the post 1947 period of Kashmir politics particularly after 1965 will be discussed separately.

2.10 Indian National Congress in J&K: (1965-75)

The inception of INC in J&K goes back to pre-partition of the Indian sub-continent. The Party in its early period of 1930’s indirectly extended its support to MC and its leaders especially Sheikh Abdullah. The ‘State People’s Conference’ was formed in India which was a very strong part of INC. This people’s party was an important group in shaping the future political discourse of J&K in both pre and post-partition period. The conversion of MC into NC in 1939 under Abdullah on secular ideology can be traced back to the legacy of this ‘State People’s Conference’, as Abdullah was influenced by the ideology and manifesto of both INC and its off-shoots in different states.143 The main motive of INC in its early days of state politics was only to prepare a ground for non-Muslims of the state to enter into the struggle against the ‘Dogra Autocracy and Despotism’. This aim and objective of INC was fulfilled in 1939 when the name of JKMC was changed into JKNC and it was opened for the non-Muslims of the State.144 The politics within the state prepared a smooth ground for the INC to take active part in politics. It is widely claimed that the party’s secular ideology fulfilled the gap, vested by some communal elements in the State. The main contribution of the INC in its early years was to ‘secularize and nationalize’ the politics of J&K. The ideology greatly impacted Abdullah and his colleagues, which in future fetched far-reaching consequences and significances on the political history of J&K. The close relation of NC especially of Abdullah with INC and its leaders particularly Nehru in this phase of history paved the way for state’s controversial accession with the Union of India, after the lapse of British paramountcy in 1947. In the backdrop of this whole political discourse, INC became one of the important political forces in future troubled political

142 Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio, 74; Ankit, “Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah of Kashmir, 1965–1975,” 88-102. 143 For detailed analysis of relationship between State People’s Conference, Jammu and Kashmir and British India see Suhail-ul-Rehman Lone, “The princely states and the national movement: The case of Kashmir (1931–39),” Studies in People’s History 4, no. 2 (2017), 183-196. 144 Alaster Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy 1946-1990 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1991), 93. 62 histories of J&K. But at the same time being the alien political entity in the State. INC as a Party could not generate public sympathy especially in the valley of Kashmir due to Muslim majority population. Although, it tried its best to accommodate the Muslims but due to the political ups and downs it could not generate the Muslim public response from the people of J&K. However, the Party in pre-1947 era, it stood against the Dogra regime and all those political forces that were against the liberal politics and Democracy. The Congress in its initial phase reached out to the leaders like Sheikh Abdullah and Prem Nath Bazaz. It is also true that, not all the leaders of INC were supportive to the princely states and their political movements. But there were leaders like Nehru and others who always take keen interest in J&K especially in favour of Abdullah and struggle for responsible government. Nehru in fact was the main critic of ‘authoritarian nature of princes’.145

The relation between Abdullah and Nehru grew stronger day by day and it was on 28th December 1935, a public meeting was organized in city of Srinagar and leaders of MC under Abdullah, who celebrated fiftieth anniversary of INC.146 On the other side, the changing political conditions both at International and National level influenced J&K as well. It forced the state political leadership under the banner of MC to get closer to those political forces where the voice of oppressed people of the state could be heard in a better way. It was in 1938 when in INC in its annual session at Haripora (Gujrat) provided full support for the princely states and their respective movements. The interesting part of this annual session was that the representative from J&K namely Prem Nath Bazaz participated in this meeting.147 The INC and its leaders were now clear in their ideology and programme that they will take active participation in the political affairs and movements of princely states, and Kashmir was no more exception for them. One can say that it was predominantly through the base prepared by none other than Sheikh and Bazaz that Congress was able to put their foot prints on the soil of J&K. However, it is an established fact that, Congress was not able to set its local units in the State, because the local non-Muslim population could hardly organize the

145 Ajit Bhattacharjea, The wounded Valley (New Delhi: UBS Publishers' Distributors, 1994), 49. 146 Ibid., 52. 147 G. H. Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir 1931-1940 (New Delhi: Light and Life Publishers, 1980), 322. 63 presence of units of INC in J&K.148 There was a small class among the Non-Muslims, who supported INC for their demand for National liberation.149

It was in late 1936, in month of October, that a number of Muslim and Non- Muslim leaders of the Jammu province founded a ‘Regional Committee’ of INC in Jammu.150 However, it should be stated that, INC rejected to give recognition to this Committee, because INC could not actively or directly participate in the state political affairs. So in this context Nehru ordered that no ‘Congress State Committee’ could be structured in J&K.151 Nevertheless it is also a well-established fact that the visits of the leaders of INC during this significant period of Kashmir polity played its due role in bridging the gap between state leaders and INC. It was only in early forties that the ‘All India States People’s Conference’ (AISPC) small branch was formed in city of Srinagar.152

2.10.1 Nehru’s visit to Kashmir

After the close relation between the NC and INC that the former invited the Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to visit Kashmir and it was on 19 May 1940 when Nehru along with Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan visited Valley. The core objective was to build the strong proximity between the two political entities. Both these leaders were welcomed by NC and its activists.153 While delivering his address Khan Gaffar Khan called Abdullah a ‘Gift of God’ and tried to convince the people for support and follow Abdullah.154 However, one must not forget that it was after the visit of Jinnah to Kashmir in 1944 and his active role in favour of MC; that leaders of NC particularly Abdullah decided to invite the Congress leaders and people associated with ‘State People’s Conference’ to attend the third annual session of NC held on 3rd August 1945. Both these

148 Santosh Kaul, Freedom Struggle in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1990), 32. 149Ibid., 32-33. 150 Some important leaders and members of the committee were Triolochan Dutt, Lala Girdhari Lal Anand, Chowdhary Nur Hussain, Ghulam Gous and Mohammad Shafi. 151 Jawaharlal Lal Nehru Papers, Nehru Memorial Museum, New Delhi, Jan, 1937; Khan, Freedom Movement in Kashmir, 309-313. 152 Mohan Krishen Tickoo was elected its president; He was member of the Hindu Progressive Party. Mian Ahmad Yar, member of MC in assembly/Praja Sabha was appointed secretary. With the passing time the Peoples Conference Unit in valley formed its own states Peoples Conference units all over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. For details, see Lone, “The princely states and the national movement: The case of Kashmir (1931–39),” 183-196. 153 Koul, Freedom Struggle in Jammu and Kashmir, 77. 154 Akbar, Kashmir behind the Vale, 87. 64 organizations accepted the invitation of Abdullah and top brass leaders of both the parties came to Kashmir.155

The fact is that the INC from its earlier days had encouraged the people’s movements which were going on in different princely states across British India through the ‘State People’s Conference’. During the crucial years of 1946-47, Abdullah was at the helm of affairs who headed the ‘State People’s Conference’ as Vice-President in 1946, while as Nehru served its President. The battle again started when the Dogra army arrested Abdullah on 20 May 1946.156 The arrest of Abdullah spread like a wildfire across British India and INC and its leaders missed no opportunity to condemn arrest of Abdullah. They strongly criticized the Dogra ruler Hari Singh for his repressive measures against the leaders of NC. Nehru came openly to defend his political friend, Abdullah. He decided to visit the Kashmir, although Maharaja denied the permission to Nehru for visiting the State.157 But, Nehru did not cared about the orders of Maharaja and visited the Valley where he was arrested by State forces. The news about the arrest of Nehru spread across the neighboring states. It was in this backdrop that the thousands of the Congress Committee’ workers particularly from Panjab try to proceed and enter into the State to challenge the order of Hari Singh. The arrest of Nehru was turning point in the annuals of Kashmir polity writes Maharaja’s son, Karan Singh.158

The political developments within the state were at its peak during the arrest of Abdullah. Nehru, who had very keen personal interest in J&K, visited the valley again on 24 July 1946. This time Nehru met Abdullah in Badami Bagh cantonment and both the leaders exchanged their ideas and discussed the political developments that were happening in the state and sub-continent.159 The political turmoil after the World War II greatly affected the region and British was no longer in a power to rule her colonies

155 Leaders who visited the valley, among them Pandit Nehru, Mian Iftikhar-ud-Din, Ashraf Ali, Maulana Azad, Khan Abdul Gaffer Khan and Jai Narayan Vyas were few prominent members who attend the third session of JKNC in 1945. This session of JKNC was inaugurated by Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan: Khidmat, Srinagar, August 11, 1945; While as Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru pledged for his full support of INC to fight against the Dogra oppressed autocratic rule in the Jammu and Kashmir and advised both Muslim and Non-Muslims of the state to come together under one banner of All J&KNC to achieve their goals and objectives. Akbar, Kashmir behind the Vale, 87. 156 Tribune, May 27, 1946. 157 Bhattacharjea, Kashmir the Wounded Valley, 87. 158 Singh, Hier Apparent, 40. 159 M.Y. Saraf, Kashmir’s Fight for Freedom (Lahore: n.a, Vol. 1, 1997), 680. 65 including India. The people of J&K were fighting against the Dogra autocratic rule. In between British government passed Indian Independence act 1947. Two new dominion states came into existence that is India and Pakistan. The princely states were given the option to join either two of the dominions. J&K being one of the princely state ruled by Hari Singh lapsed the power to rule.

There was one important factor in J&K; being one of the strategically important states in Himalayan Mountains had its boundaries with China, Afghanistan, former Soviet Union (USSR) and newly born Pakistan. The State was ruled by Hindu Raja while as majority of the population were Muslims. However, the interests of both INC and Muslim League in J&K were very high and both tried their strategies to merge the state with their respective countries. The changing political environment during these crucial years of the state is regarded significant vis-à-vis states accession with the India. The motivation power of leaders of INC to pursue Hari Singh to join with India was running high. While as on the other hand the leaders of INC were not happy the way Maharaja treated the leaders of NC, especially Abdullah who was in jail. INC and its leaders continue their efforts to win the confidence of both Abdullah and Maharaja.160 It was only after the very hard time that the State under the rule of Maharaja Hari Singh decided to accede with India. Nevertheless, both Abdullah and other NC leaders played their due role during the crucial months of 1947-48, when state acceded with India.

INC missed no opportunity to make it sure for state’s accession with India, and being one of the great minds of the time, Nehru played significant role in mobilizing the NC’s leadership and Maharaja in his favour. Thus it is well established fact that the leaders of INC particularly Pandit Nehru played his outstanding role in J&K. Although, it is true that the state’s accession was challenged by both Pakistan and MC leaders but later, due to the UN intervention, it was decided to hold Plebiscite in J&K; as was promised by both Nehru and UNSC. It was under these circumstances that the Maharaja appointed Abdullah as emergency head of the State on 29 October 1947. Later, it was on 4th of March 1948 when Abdullah was appointed as the Prime Minister of J&K. This has already been discussed in details above. In the subsequent section of this Chapter,

160 To win the confidence of Sheikh Abdullah and other leaders of the time particularly of JKNC many leaders of INC visited the valley among them was Congress president Acharaya Kriplani who reached the heart city of the valley, Srinagar on 17 May 1947 for a purpose to build consensus among Maharaja and NC leaders and for more details, Mahapatra Debidatta Aurbindo and Seema Shekhawat, Kashmir across Loc (New Delhi: Gyan Publication House, 2008), 14-15. 66 we will discuss the role and Dominance of INC as a permanent political entity in post 1964 era, especially the role of Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq who was the main architect of Congress Party in J&K.

2.10.2 Merger of National Conference into Pradesh Congress: Erosion of Autonomy

The Constitutional integration of J&K with India was followed by what we can call ‘Political Integration.’ The NC led by Sadiq converted this Party into branch of INC.161The sole objective behind this move was to integrate the State with rest of the India. It was on 3 January 1965 when G.M. Sadiq dissolved working Committee of NC and merged into INC. This offer made by Sadiq was accepted by INC and its working Committee on 10 January 1965 and thus the Party was formally launched in 26th January 1965.162 When All India National Congress amended its statutes in January 1965 and established a State organization in J&K, which until then had been the principal domain of the Congress’s affiliate, the All J&KNC. Sadiq became the head of the Party, and he proposed the dissolution of NC. Later he invited the members of NC to join the ‘State Organization of Congress Party’.163 However, it is also fact that Nehru during his life did not permitted his people for the foundation of Congress Party in J&K for certain reasons. Nehru was of the firm believer that as long as NC is working in J&K there is no need to start new political Party. He regarded NC, as the offshoot of Congress for all the practical purposes. Because it was NC, first under the leadership of Abdullah, then Bakshi and others that the Party followed the rules of Delhi, whatever they wish to do in J&K. But, things changed shortly after the death of Indian first PM Jawaharlal Nehru. There was complete shift in Union policies now vis-a-vis Kashmir. The new leadership in India was in no way ready to take any risk about the future political conditions of the State. It was decided in the political corridors of Delhi to start a unit of Pradesh Congress in J&K that will solemnly act according to the wishes and aspirations of Centre. It was after the death of Nehru that the ‘State Pradesh Congress’ was formerly launched. The direct entry of National Party like INC in J&K was one of the significant political developments. Although, leadership of INC was active in politics of Kashmir both in pre and post 1947 period, but this involvement was only

161 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir: Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, 155-156. 162 Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio, 74. 163 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 319-20. 67 advisable in nature. However, once Sadiq officially announced the formation of Party, the process of integration got more importance. The newly launched Party ‘Pradesh Congress’ dominated the political environment of the J&K almost one decade from 1965-1975. The Party ruled with core agenda of ‘policy of assimilation of Kashmir’ with rest of India till Sheikh Abdullah signed the Kashmir Accord with Indra Gandhi in 1975.164

All Constitutional and other Administrative relations are greatly significant in any democratic structure. These functions are conducted by political parties; they provide blood to the democratic process. The presence of INC in Kashmir was hailed a significant political development in India, because leadership in Delhi believed that it will attract the people of the state towards national integration and will end the ‘dominant character of NC’ in the politics of J&K.165 Conversely, the change of NC into State Congress was harshly criticized by Sheikh Abdullah and other political opponents in Kashmir. It provoked the Kashmiri sentiment because respectable numbers of people were closely associated with NC both in pre and post polity of 1947. Abdullah described this political development as threat to ‘Kashmiri Muslim identity’. He said: “A Muslim who becomes a member of the Congress Party will dig his own grave, not only of his own, his family but also of his nation…”166 and called complete boycott of those people especially Muslims who will join hands with INC. He whispered, “Those who refuse to join the boycott would be traitors.”167 The impact of this social boycott was seen in Kashmiri society and many people boycotted the religious functions, marriages and even did not participate in funerals of those people who were associated with INC.168 Ajit Bhattacharjea have explained this phenomenon in the following words:

The NC was designed as a vehicle to express and safeguard the secular Kashmir identity: It lost its raison d’etre and its following when attempts were made to merge or ally it with the Congress, the representation of

164 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 71. 165 Promise and Performance, 3. 166 The Hamdard, (Srinagar), January 17, 1965. 167 Ibid. 168 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, 156. 68

Central power and authority. This led to a drift towards communal organization.169

Nevertheless, Sadiq was the single man behind the formation of INC in Kashmir who continued his policy of ‘integration and assimilation’. The government under him allowed implementing more provision of Indian Constitution to the State. It was in the year 1964 that with the consent of Sadiq’s government, four more Central provisions were implemented in J&K.170 The process of integration did not stop here; Sadiq removed the nomenclatures of Prime Minister and Sadar-i-Riyasat with Chief Minister and Governor respectively.171 Karan Singh who was then Sadar-i-Riyasat became the first governor and Prime Minister G.M. Sadiq became first Chief Minister of J&K in 1965 respectively.172

Thus the symbolic Autonomy under article 370 was eroded and brought state at par with the other states of India. It was only after the death of Nehru; Congress was fully supported by Bhartiya Jana Sangh and Communist party of India for Constitutional integration of the State. There were many people in Kashmir who facilitated the process of assimilation; Sadiq and Shamsuddin were the most important.173 The Constitutional abrogation of article 370 further gave birth to alienation and bitterness among the people of Kashmir against the India. The Constitutional changes that were brought by Sadiq created serious political crisis. The Plebiscite Front launched strong protests against these changes. During this phase of Kashmir polity, Abdullah was not present in the state but was on his foreign visit. Sheikh criticized ruling regime and started strong anti-India speeches.174 The anti-state approach of Abdullah was closely watched by Indian leaders in post-Nehruvian era. Once Abdullah returned from his foreign tour and landed in Delhi on 7th May 1965, he was detained along Afzal Beg.175 The arrest of both these leaders led to the violent and vociferous protests in the state and Congress government under Sadiq allowed strong repression. People associated with Front and Political Conference were beaten by

169 Bhattacharjea, Kashmir: The wounded Valley, 14. 170 For full text see Anand, The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 320-334. 171 These changes were brought by Sixth Constitutional amendment of Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir on 10th April 1965. For full text Singh, Hier Apparent, 130; Anand, The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 230-237. 172 Ibid. 173 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 33. 174 Singh, Hier Apparent, 130. 175 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalisation, 15. 69 police, they even don’t spare leaders including Mohiuddin Kara and Sayed Masoodi.176 It is also important to mention that this was the time when Pakistan waged second war on Kashmir with India on 9th April 1965.177 The war between the two compelled the leaders and policy makers in Delhi and Srinagar to revisit Kashmir policy again. Nevertheless, an agreement was signed on 30th June 1965 between the two heads of both the countries for immediate ceasefire.

State Chief Minister Sadiq strongly criticized government of Pakistan for interfering in the internal affairs of India and Kashmir. To quote Sadiq:

We in Jammu and Kashmir have become victims of Pakistani aggression twice during the last eighteen years. Over these years our people have become all too familiar with the real designs of Pakistan. In embarking upon this present act of aggression, Pakistan should have realized that the people of this state through decades of experience are imbued with a sense of deep political understanding which cannot be easily affected either by use of force, acts of deceit or blandishments by our old enemies. This was amply demonstrated by the stout resistance which our people put up against Pakistani invasion in 1947. Now that Pakistan has dared to try a similar misadventure again, history is repeating itself and once again our people are giving a determined and fitting reply to the aggressor.178

He further added that:

The decision of accession to India taken in 1947 in reality concretized our long-cherished desire to come closer to the rest of the country and proceed ahead towards the goal of socialism and prosperity.179

On the other hand both the countries once again started their old rivalry in United Nation Security Council (UNSC) on the future of Kashmir dispute. In between, both countries under their respective heads of government signed Tashkent

176 Ibid., 158-59. 177 Akbar, Kashmir: behind the Vale, 169. 178 Kashmir Fights back Aggression, text of the speech delivered by the Chief Minister of J&K, Mr. G.M. Sadiq at a People’s Rally at Srinagar on 11th August, 1965, published by the Director field survey organization, J&K Government, Printed at Caxton Press, New Delhi, 1965, 2. 179 Ibid.

Declaration180 mediating by USSR on 4th January 1966. While as, the growing Constitutional abrogation of article 370 and extending central laws by process of Constitutional changes made serious negative impact within the state. Plebiscite Front under Afzal Beg along with Awami Action Committee under the leadership of Mirwaiz Farooq gave one day joint strike call to observe protest (Hartal) on 15 January 1965.181 The sole objective of this strike was against the undemocratic and unconstitutional measures adopted by India to grab Kashmir completely.

2.10.3 Elections of 1967: Dominance of Congress

After the death of Lal Bahadur Shastri, Indra Gandhi became the Prime Minister of India. Being the daughter of Pandit Nehru, she possessed all the leadership qualities to lead the India to new heights. Under her leadership new policy was formulated vis-a- vis Kashmir. State Assembly elections of 1967 were round the corner. All preparations were made to conduct the elections without any disturbances from the separatist political organizations like Plebiscite Front. It was under the tenure of Sadiq as Chief Minister that the State Legislative Assembly elections were held in the month of February 1967. NC led by Bakshi again took active part in political affairs of State. He returned after three years; after he was asked to resign under the Kamraj plan.182 During these years many central political leaders included Y.B. Chavan, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, and Gulzari Lal Nanda, also visited the state and gave full support to Pradesh Congress that was led by Sadiq and his close associate Syed Mir Qasim. It is also imperative to mention that Indra Gandhi also visited the state in 1966. In her election campaign Indra publically stated that there is no need of an opposition party in J&K. This statement from Indra Gandhi was taken serious not only by the mainstream

180 Tashkent agreement was a Peace Treaty between India and Pakistan which was signed by President of Pakistan Ayub Khan and Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on 10 January 1966 in presence of Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin and Bulganin in Tashkent then part of USSR. The main objective of this agreement was to end the hostile relations between the two countries and solve all their pending issues including Kashmir through peaceful means and both India and Pakistan agreed to withdraw their troops on 5 August 1965 from the places which were held by their forces. It was also decided to start the dialogue to free the prisoners on both the sides and adequate measures should be taken for good economic relation, cultural exchanges and better trade relations. However, the sad part of this agreement was the death of Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri on the same day that is 10 January 1966 after only few hours of signing the Tashkent declaration. For further details, Tashkent Agreement, 10 January 1966; M. Y. Saraf, Kashmiris Fight for Freedom 1947-78 (Lahore: Freedom LIC, vol. 2, 2005), 1141. 181 The Front, Srinagar, January, 13, 1965; Idress Kanth, “The Social and Political Life of a Relic: The Episode of the Moi-e-Muqaddas Theft in Kashmir, 1963-1964,” Himalaya, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 38. 2 (2018), 10. 182 Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 48 71 political parties but Front also.183 This was also the time when Justice J.L. Kapur, headed Delimitation Commission and announced its report. In state assembly, Kashmir got 42, Ladakh 2 and while as Jammu retains 32 seats respectively. While as in Lok Sabha Kashmir got three seats, Ladakh one while as Jammu two.184

In 1967, the General elections were held directly for the first time for Lok Sabha seats from the State. Karan Singh, then governor of Kashmir wished to enter into national politics. But reluctance from the Indra Gandhi from earlier resignation of Singh as governor, the party fold in Delhi agreed that he will not contest the election. It was made possible that a candidate of his choice would contest from Jammu (Udhampur) on the behalf of ruling Congress. Karan Singh chose Brigadier Ghansara Singh185 for this purpose, because he was the close aide of ruling establishment both in Delhi and in Kashmir. Besides Ghansara Singh, Congress selected Kushak Bakula, the head Lama of Ladakh for Ladakh Parliament seat. While as in Jammu Inderjit Malhotra was selected to contest the elections. In valley of Kashmir, the three who were chosen by Congress were A.M. Tariq from Srinagar, Aga Syed Ahmad from Baramulla and Shafi Qureshi from Anantnag186 (Table 2.3).

The Election Commission of India decided that elections will be held 21 February 1967. The Plebiscite Front announced that they will boycott the elections because Front was committed to its basic demand of right to self-determination for the people. While as the other group that was led by Mohiuddin Kara and Maulana Masoodi announced that they will contests the elections independently. But, when papers were submitted and later scrutinized for Assembly elections, it was already decided that the State Congress will not go for fair elections that is why twenty two nominees of Congress along with one Lok Sabha member from Anantanag namely Shafi Qureshi were declared unopposed (Tables 2.3 & 2.5). The returning officer rejected all the nomination papers of those who were opposite to Congress and Sadiq. The misuse of power by the state government under the patronage of Central government was seriously criticized by opposition leaders including former PM Bakshi. The NC led by

183 Ibid., 48-49. 184 Singh, Hier Apparent, 156. 185 Statistical reports on General election 1967 to the 4th Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, vol. I & II, 1968); Singh, Hier Apparent, 161-62. 186 Hari Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism: Jammu and Kashmir, (Seema Publications, 1983), 180. 72 him took serious note of it and clashes were witnessed in many parts of the state against the Congress. On the other hand a delegation of opposition leaders including Prem Nath Dogra of Jana Sangh, NC leader Bakshi and Dhan Raj Badgotra of Praja Socialist Party visited Delhi and lodged strong protest against the fraud and manipulation of elections. All these leaders’ demanded immediate resignation or dismissal of Sadiq. They also demanded that presidential rule should be imposed so that fair elections will be conducted without the meddling of the State government.187 The government in New Delhi directed election Commission under the headship of K. Sundaram to J&K. He was given authority to check the records and cases related to election, to hear the voices of those who protested against these elections. One of the noted social and political commentators late Balraj Puri also met Sundaram and showed him many hundreds of duplicate ballot papers. Instead of taking any legal action, Sundaram argued that Bakshi too used these duplicate ballot papers. To this Puri responded in anger and said I am not representing Bakshi or someone else here. I am here because I am the citizen of J&K and my democratic right to vote had been deprived. Instead of taking any legal action against the complaints made by Puri, Sundaram replied it was illegal to have the ballot papers and threatened to take action against the Puri. It was quite apparent that in Kashmir, National Interests were of more significant than what one calls the demands of Democracy for the people. It was in this background that Puri commented in March 1967 that:

If the people of Jammu and Kashmir get the impression that even in limited and safe choices, they cannot be trusted, no outside propaganda would be needed to undermine their loyalty. If badges of patriotism are issued to only those who do not cry for fair elections, how many honorable men and women would like to wear them?188

In 1967 General elections, under the leadership of Mrs. Indra Gandhi, Congress won a clear majority in Lok Sabha. However, in Kashmir elections witnessed old phenomena; Shafi Qureshi won unopposed from Anantanag because all opposition nomination papers were rejected. In case of Kushak Bakula the head lama of Ladakh, no nomination papers were filled against him. In Jammu province both seats were won by State Congress candidates, remaining Baramulla parliament seat was also won by

187 Singh, Hier Apparent, 159. 188 Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 49. 73

Congress by same means of fraud and rigging.189 But one important political development was, Bakshi who contested election from Srinagar defeated his rival A.M. Tariq (Table 2.3 & 2.5). The result was Bakshi was readmitted in Congress. This political development was hailed both in Kashmir as well in India as a “consolidation of the nationalist forces” by media and political leaders claims Puri.190

During the State Legislative Assembly elections, Congress retained its control in Jammu and won twenty six seats out of thirty one. The remaining three seats were conceded to Jana Sangh, another one seat to NC. While as in Kashmir valley seven seats were won by NC, two seats by independent members. Thus it was Pradesh Congress under Sadiq who won Fifty Nine seats out of Seventy Three Assembly constituencies191 (Table 2.2).

One thing that must be debated about the elections in J&K is that those were conducted since 1951 when first elections were held. State saw one of the important election features of unopposed returns. This was true of 1967 State Assembly elections also. In these State Assembly elections twenty two unopposed returns were guaranteed by practicing the old policy of rejection of nomination papers. About one hundred eighteen nomination papers of different candidates were rejected out of seventy five Assembly constituencies. However, NC managed to won eight seats192 (Table 2.2). Sheikh Abdullah in his interview in 1968 has observed about these elections that, “the political parties that participate in the elections of the Kashmir Assembly are all under the influence of the Indian parties and these elections as such are not fair”.193

However, it is also true that all opposition parties including Front called for whole boycott of these elections. This was also the time when Karan Singh resigned from position of governor and came into the National politics. It was in bi-elections that were held on 9th May 1967 that Karan Singh was elected from Udhampur Lok Sabha Parliament seat.194 While as on the other hand the regional tensions were high both in Jammu as well as in Ladakh. Since 1947 both the regions were neglected by the rulers

189 Statistical reports on General Election 1967 to the 4th Lok Sabha; Singh, Hier Apparent, 161. 190 Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 48-49. 191 Statistical reports on state assembly elections of 1967; Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of conflict, paths to peace (Harvard University Press, 2009), 85. 192 Behara Navnita Chada, State identity and violence (New Delhi: Manohar Publication, 2000), 127. 193 Testament of Abdullah, 52. 194 Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism, 180. 74 and State governments from time to time. It was Kushak Bakula who raised the voice against the government and threatened in August 1967 that he will ask for separation of the Ladakh, if their demands were not redressed by government.195 It was after his serious threat that Sadiq’s government appointed Gajendragadkar Commission196 to study the problems of both these regions.

However, once Sadiq formed the government with clear majority with full support from Indra Gandhi. The rules of Union over the state become more powerful and strong. The growing position both within the Centre and State allowed the local leaders under Sadiq to release the political prisoners and opponents including Abdullah and other political workers of Plebiscite front. Hence Abdullah was released on 2 January 1968 from detention. Besides Abdullah, his close aide Afzal Beg, Sayeed Masoodi and wife of Abdullah, Akbar Jahan were allowed to visit the state during the months of April and July 1967. But due to the growing anti-India feelings and protests more people were detained. Thus slowly ground was preparing smoothly that alienate people in general and opponents in particular from Delhi and rest of India. In Kashmir, the government under Sadiq was seen as direct rule of Congress at Centre under Indra Gandhi. It was for the first time that the Union Congress was directly ruling the State. It is believed that people were not happy with the state of affairs and felt this rule of alien one. For the first time since 1948 that NC was out of power for more than a decade.

Sadiq’s rule was followed by the Parliamentary elections in the State; preparations were going on to conduct the smooth elections with no interference from the Plebiscite Front and its allied organizations. Sheikh Abdullah continued his policy of criticizing the state and central governments and makes several anti-India speeches. Plebiscite Front under Afzal Beg which boycotted the previous State Assembly elections were in mood to contests the Parliamentary elections of 1971. However, Sadiq was in no mood to give them a chance to prove their presence and hence they were not allowed to participate in elections. The role of Front in the politics of the State as an opposition political entity during this period will be discussed separately in Chapter

195 Ibid., 128. 196 This commission was chaired by Gajendragadkar and two other members were Shankar Prasad and Badr-ud-Din Tyabji. Gajendragadkar Commission recommended many measures to develop each region with equally shared resources and opportunities. For further details see P. B.Gajendragadkar, Report of the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Inquiry, (n.a), 1 & 102. 75 third. The Parliamentary elections of 1971 were round the corner. In these elections Pradesh Congress won five out of six Parliamentary Constituencies (Table 2.4).

It was after a year that State Assembly elections were conducted in J&K. Pradesh Congress under the new leadership of Mir Qasim won clean majority. The Party won fifty seven seats out of seventy five Assembly seats (Table 2.2). However, the most important feature of these elections was the presence of Jamaat-i-Islami. It was for the first time that the Jamaat took an active participation in political affairs of J&K. The party (Jamaat) managed to won five seats (Table 2.2). Nevertheless, it is believed that the objective of the government behind the entry of Jamaat in political corridors of Kashmir was to oppose the pro-Azadi (Independence) group of Plebiscite Front (though, Jamaat too had a pro-freedom stance). At the same time, Bakshi again tried his luck to contest the election but he was defeated by Independent candidate namely Shamim Ahmad Shamim from Srinagar Assembly segment. Shamim was well known sympathizer of Front. In Jammu, Jana Sangh also managed to make their entry into Assembly and won three constituencies197 (Table 2.2).

The dominance of Pradesh Congress was perhaps one of the central political developments that shaped the future political milieu of J&K. The Congress till this day had played important role vis-a-vis Kashmir both internally and externally. The party becomes one of the fundamental political entities and still continued to do so. Once Sadiq become the CM, the Centre under Congress was now playing their open game. Indra Gandhi now publically declared that the Accession of J&K is final and part of history. She declared that History cannot be changed or reversed. There is no question called Kashmir, it have been solved once for all. It was now officially stated by government of India that there is no role of Pakistan vis-i-vis Kashmir problem. Once Indra Gandhi made her speech, the political workers of opposition in Kashmir, they were either in favour of state’s accession with Pakistan or Independence, where were taken to police custodies and later lodged in different jails. On the other hand the growing tension between India and Pakistan created its own political vacuum which in fact still continues in the State. The 1971 Bangladesh war further gave birth to new crisis between the two countries and put numerous grave repercussions for J&K.198 The

197 Statistical reports on state assembly elections of 1967; Bose, Kashmir: Roots of conflict, paths to peace, 86-87. 198 Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire (Chicago: IB Tauris, 1996), 211. 76 government in Pakistan after the fall of Decca was in hurry mood to declare peace treaty with India. There were number of Pakistani army soldiers who were kept hostage in India. Indian government under Indra Gandhi exploited this opportunity to pressurize Pakistan over her policy on Kashmir. The net result of these political developments was the Simla Accord199 of 2 July 1972.200 The defeat of Pakistan in 1971 has its own negative impact on J&K and there were political forces in the State, who shared the view that now there is no scope to settle Kashmir problem.

Back to state the death of most trusted Chief Minister Sadiq in 1971 again put the state under leadership crisis. It was only after deep deliberation and discussion both at Centre and state level that Syed Mir Qasim was sworn as Chief Minister of J&K in 1971. It was in this background and political development that the Sheikh Abdullah and his close associate Afzal Beg started the thinking to sign a deal with India. This change of approach was taken seriously by the leadership of India and subsequently Abdullah and his close associates were released. State Congress government under Qasim on the advice of Central leadership also announced to lift the ban on Plebiscite Front and Abdullah. After lifting ban there was complete U-turn in the policies, programmes and ideology of Abdullah and Front leaders. Abdullah was now focused on regional greater Autonomy and talked less about the United Nations resolutions on Kashmir to hold Plebiscite. Thus ground was set to hold talks between Indra Gandhi and Abdullah. Besides this, back channel dialogues were going on between the two. It was also a fact that without any deal or agreement with New Delhi it was impossible for Abdullah to regain the chair that he lost to his close friends after 1953. Thus he tried his best to build trust of Centre that he previously lost, to regain political career once again in the State. It was also the time when State Assembly elections of 1972 were announced in the

199 Simla Accord was signed between Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart Zulfikar Ali Bhutto on 2 July 1972 at Simla city of Himachal Pradesh after the fall of Decca, famously known as Bangladesh Liberation war. The Accord was the comprehensive blue print for better relations between the two countries and both agreed to abjure confrontation and conflict and to work for building durable peace, cooperation and long term friendship. The main objectives of this Accord were. 1. A mutual commitment to the peaceful resolution of all issues through direct bilateral approaches. 2. To build the foundations of a cooperative relationship with special focus on people to people contacts. 3. To uphold the inviolability of the Line of Control in Jammu and Kashmir, this is a most important CBM between India and Pakistan, and a key to durable peace. 4. To respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-interference in each other’s internal affairs; respect for each other’s unity, political independence; sovereign equality. For more details of Accord see https://mea.gov.in/in-focus- article.htm?19005/Simla+Agreement+July+2+1972 200 Naqash A. Nasir and G.M. Shah, Kashmir from Crisis to crisis (New Delhi: PH Publishing Corporation, 1997), 119. 77 month of March. Qasim was at the helm of affairs. However, the Congress under Qasim’s leadership again repeated the old phenomena. The Party won Fifty Seven out of Seventy Four Assembly segments. Jamaat-i-Islami made their maiden victory by winning five seats. At the same time Jana Sangh won three. Remained Nine seats were clinched by independent candidates (Table 2.2). In this way it was Congress under Qasim who returned to power and became CM of J&K.201 However, Abdullah described the State Assembly elections of 1972 as “Unabashed fraud on Democracy”, he further added that:

A new device was hit upon. All the primary members of the Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front were declared by law as ineligible to contest any elections or even to campaign for any candidate. Thus, by this despotic law, over a million political conscious members of the outlawed Plebiscite Front were conveniently removed from the field, to clear the path for a weak-over for the Congress. The doors of the democratic processes have thus been banged on the real representatives of the people.202

However, Qasim did not allow Plebiscite Front members to contest these elections, though some among them were ready to participate.203 The rule of Qasim was no better than his predecessors. State institutionalized Corruption was widespread during his tenure. There was hardly any say in policy making and Qasim was considered all and all of the State. There was no policy, what we call liberal democracy and state was in deep economic crisis. Everything from local contract to administration was controlled by Congress, as was done during the rule of Bakshi and Sadiq.204

On the other side Indra Gandhi pursued her policy and deputed his loyalist workers namely G. Pathasarathy, P.S. Bhagat and D.P. Dhar to visit the valley and explore the possibilities of talks with Abdullah. It was felt necessary by the political leaders and policy makers in New Delhi to hold talks as they thought it would bridge the gap and ensure people of Kashmir that they are emotionally integrated with rest of the India. While as Abdullah was now growing old. There was no hope for him to return to mainstream politics. The war of 1971 opened new chapter in his life.

201 Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism, 183. 202 The Hindustan Times, March 5, 1972. 203 Bamzai, Culture and political history of Kashmir, 820. 204 Peer, Understanding the Kashmir Insurgency, 48. 78

Abdullah’s thirst and temptation to regain power was now open secret. The political developments in mid-1970 created favorable atmosphere for him to recapture his chair that he lost in 1953. Now there was hardly any anti-India smell in his speeches, instead he decided to believe that the solution of Kashmir problem lies within the frame work of Indian Constitution and called to restore the pre-1953 position of Autonomy of J&K. This change in outlook and thinking of Abdullah was keenly observed in New-Delhi. Thus Central government prepared roadmap for further possibilities of talks with him. This time Indra Gandhi choosed her two loyalist persons, Pathasarathy and Sarwan Singh. Both laid down the base for future course for talks. Till this date all political affairs of the state were revolving around the personality of Abdullah. He was central political stalwart in politics of Kashmir. On the other side Abdullah announced in that he had chosen his close associate Afzal Beg with full authority to discuss the future political course of action with representatives of PM of India Indra Gandhi and Beg would talk for the greater political autonomy for the state of J&K.205

The deliberations and talks were carried forward by respective representatives on both the sides to explore the ways and means for approval of the Accord. Besides the representatives of New Delhi and Abdullah, state political leadership also played an important role and one among them was CM Syed Mir Qasim, Governor L.K. Jha, D. P. Dhar and Karan Singh facilitated the process and firmly believed in successful talks.206 Thus leadership in New Delhi moved strategy to sort out the political differences with Abdullah. The battle for demanding Plebiscite by Abdullah and co for the right to self-determination of people was no longer an ideology of him. In fact this demand was suspended by Abdullah in 1974. Though, during the process of reconciliation with Indra Gandhi, Abdullah said, “Let’s start from where I left in 1953.” To this political calculus, Indra was in no mood to offer what the Sheikh demanded. Instead Indra vehemently said, “Sheikh Sahib while I respect your sentiments, I must tell you that the Hands of the clock cannot be turned back.”207 Yet both the parties

205 Sheikh Abdullah’s speech on 23rd June, 1972; Khalid Wasim Hassan, History Revisited: Narratives on Political and Constitutional Changes in Kashmir (1947-1990) (Delhi: Institute for Social and Economic Change, 2009); A.G. Noorani, “Accord and Discord,” Frontline, Vol. 27, Issue 6, Mar. 13- 26, (2010). 206 Nasir and Shah, Kashmir from Crisis to crisis, 119. 207 R. Upadhyay, “Kashmir the autonomy, issues and the need for caution,” South Asia Analysis Group paper; Ankit, “Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah of Kashmir, 1965–1975,” 88-102. 79 agreed to conclude the six point draft plan famously known as ‘Kashmir Accord’208 of 1975. On 12 February 1975 Abdullah accepted the proposal. On 24 February 1975 Indra Gandhi make her statement in Parliament that:

Nobody had denied Sheikh Abdullah the previous role. In between, he seemed to have changed his mind and there was disagreements and estrangement. Now that he is again expressing his willingness to work for unity, for secularism, we welcome him.209

Sarwan Singh210 hailed the Kashmir Accord as “an accession of heart and mind and act of faith.” While as Abdullah described it as re-establishment of trust and confidence. To quote Abdullah, “We have established a solid foundation for mutual cooperation.”211 The acceptance on the part of Abdullah was hailed in India as ‘triumph of Democracy and National interest’ in J&K. This political move from Abdullah gave him chance to become CM of the state fully backed by Congress. On the other hand Accord somehow changed the environment of political uncertainty in the State. Abdullah was now again at the helm of affairs by virtue of this Accord. As claimed by veteran political commentator Balraj Puri that, “The agreement, as suggested by me and signed by the negotiators on November 13, 1974 at New Delhi.”212 Mirza Afzal Beg (Close associate of Abdullah and Patron of Plebiscite Front) and. G. Pathasarathy213 signed the final draft of Kashmir Accord.214 After deep discussion and debate that led to the Accord, both parties reached on two points: one, the plebiscite front that was functioning under Mirza Afzal Beg will be fully dissolved. Second, the Congress despite having majority in Assembly under Mir Qasim will resign from Chief Ministership and will surrender this power to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah.

208 Kashmir Accord was signed after a long deliberation and discussion between the representatives of Indra Gandhi on one side and Mirza Afzal Beg of Plebiscite Front on the behalf of Abdullah. The main feature of this Accord was Abdullah agree to shun the policy of separatism and was sworn as chief minister of the state. For further details “Role played by G. Parthasarathy in Indra-Sheikh Accord lauded,” The Hindu, October 30, 2013. 209 Jagmohan, My frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 143. 210 Swaran Singh was the Minister of external affairs in Indira Gandhi’s rule in 1975. 211 Jagmohan, My frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 144. 212 Puri, “How the Indira-Abdullah Accord was signed in 1974,” Mainstream weekly, Vol. L, No. 17, April 14, 2012. 213 G. Pathasarathy was the Former Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan and very close associate of Prime Minister Indra Gandhi. He played significant role during the talks with Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg as a representative of Indra Gandhi to set the deal for Kashmir Accord. He along with Afzal Beg signed this accord on the behalf of their respective leaders. 214 Noorani, “Accord & Discord,” Frontline, 2010. 80

On the other hand Abdullah on 24th February, 1975 reached Jammu from Delhi. He was received warmly by people especially by those who were close to him. Subsequently a Congress Parliamentary Party conducted meeting on evening 24th February where it was decided to give full support to Abdullah and was as chosen leader. The most important feature of this meeting was the presence of president of INC Dev Kant Baroah.215 Thus to keep the negotiation into consideration, the Pradesh Congress under Qasim on 22nd February, 1975 resigned from office of Chief Minister. In this way Abdullah after the gap of twenty-two years take over the ruins of state administration and was sworn CM. While as state Congress passed its Party resolution promised for full support to him.216 Hence Accord paved the way for Abdullah to return to mainstream politics. For India the Accord consolidated the forces of ‘democracy, socialism and secularism’ across J&K and India as a whole.217 Besides this it is also important to mention that Accord was seriously criticized both within the state as well as from Pakistan. One faction of Plebiscite Front and other opposition groups which were demanding the right to self-determination for the people criticized Abdullah of “Sell Out” politics for his personal gains and lust for power. On the other side Pakistan called this political development black day in the annuals of Kashmir politics and history. This whole debate around the role of opposition against such political developments shall be discussed separately in Chapter third of the thesis.

215 Singh, Flames of the Chinar, 164-165. 216 G.R. Najar, Kashmir Accord 1975-A Political Analysis (Srinagar: Gulshan Publications, 2007), 48. 217 Ibid., 45-46:Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio, 83. 81

Table 2.1

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951-1962

Name of Political Year of Seats Seats Number of Voting Party Election Contested Won unopposed Percentage returns National Conference 1951 75 (75)* 73 (04.37) Praja Parishad Do 29 Nil Nil (Nil) National Conference 1957 75 (68)* 41 (56.98) Praja Parishad Do 21 (05)** Nil (24.11) National Conference 1962 75 (70)** 34 (66.96) Praja Parishad Do 25 (03)* Nil (17.47) Independent/Others Do Not (02)*** Nil (15.58) Available Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1951, 1957 and 1972, New Delhi, ECI. *Seats won by NC. **Seats won by Praja Parishad. ***Seats won by Independent and other.

Table 2.2

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967-1972

Names of the Political Year of Seats Seats Voting Parties Election Contested won percentage Pradesh Congress 1967 75 (61)** (53.2)*

Jana Sangh Do 29 (03)** (16.45)* National Conference (Bakshi Do Not Available (08)** (21.44)* group) Independent/Others Do Not Available (03)** (09.09)*

State Congress 1972 75 (58)** (55.44)* Jana Sangh (BJS)/Janta Party Do 32 (03)** (09.84)* Jamaat-I-Islami Do 22 (05)** (09.18)* Independent/Others Do Not Available (09)** (26.75)* Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1967 and 1972, New Delhi, ECI. *Percentage of voting party secured. **Seats won by different parties.

Table 2.3

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 4th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1967 in J&K

Name of Name of Year of Name of winning Name of Runner up Political Party Constituency Elections Candidates with Candidates with Polling Polling percentage percentage INC Baramulla 1967 S.A. Agha A.G.Malik (JKNC) (55.60)* (44.40)** JKNC Srinagar Do G.M.Bakshi A.M. Tariq (INC) (46.76)* (39.49)** INC Anantanag Do M.S.Qureshi Unopposed (Unopposed)*** INC Ladakh Do Unopposed K.Bakula (Unopposed)*** INC Udhampur Do G.S.Bridagier B.Singh (BJS) (54.88)* (31.70)** INC Jammu Do I.J.Malhotra A.Rehman (BJS) (48.42)* (28.17)** Source: Statistical reports on General Election 1967 to the 4th Lok Sabha, volume I and II, Elections Commission of India, 1968, New-Delhi. *Polling percentage of wining candidates, **Polling percentage of runner up candidates, ***Candidates returned unopposed.

Table 2.4

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 5th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1971 in J&K

Name of Year of Name of Name of Name of Total Political Elections Constituency winning Runner up Percentage Parties Candidates Candidates with of Voting with Polling Polling percentage percentage INC 1971 Baramulla Syed Ahmad Syed Ali Geelani (50.62)** Aga (51.02)* (43.07)* (JMI) Independent Do Srinagar S. A. Shamin G.M.Bakshi (58.88)** (61.78)* (34.08)* (JNC) INC Do Anantnag M. Shaffi Peer Ghulam (67.25)** Qureshi Nabi Shah (60.30)* (36.15)* (JMI) INC Do Ladakh K. Bakula S. Wahgdus (71.26)** (55.41)* (49.59)* (IND.) INC Do Udhampur Karan Singh Baldev Singh (51.22)** (60.97)* (25.82)* (BJS) INC Do Jammu I.J. Malhotra Abdul Rehman (60.48)** (60.04)* (29.91)* (BJS) Source: Statistical reports on General Election 1971 to the 5th Lok Sabha, volume I and II, Elections Commission of India, 1973, New-Delhi. *Percentage of vote’s candidates secured **Total percentage of votes polled in respective constituencies.

Table 2.5

Region-wise polling percentage in Parliamentary Elections of 1967-1971 in J&K

Year of Election Kashmir Valley Jammu Region Ladakh

1967 3,20,654* 5,51,450 Returned Unopposed (44.43%) ** (64.17%) ** 1971 6,71,103 5,10,461 37,581 (59.09) ** (56.21%) ** (71.26%) ** Source: P.S.Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads (New Delhi: Vishal Publication, 1994), 169. *In Anantnag the ruling party returned unopposed, **Region-wise percentage of polling.

Chapter-Three

Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pre-Accord Phase (1947-1975) 84

Chapter Three:

Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Pre-Accord Phase (1947-1975)

3.1 Meaning and Definition of Opposition

Democracy and public legitimacy depends on the culture of dissent. The doctrine of ‘one party rule’ or political elite cannot represent the diverse political, social, economic, and cultural opinions of the people. David Apter one of the leading political scientists has defined this political phenomenon as:

The presence or absence of an opposition party is, for westerners, the crucial factor in determining the nature of the role of a political party and its activities. And there is no doubt that this is critical. No amount of emphasis on traditional forms of decision-making or traditional democracy can disguise the fact that, as a concrete structural characteristic of modern society, two or more parties competing for political power within the rules of a particular constitutional framework create a different kind of a politics than the single-party regime.1

William Harcourt’s dictum about the opposition, ‘Dinning with Opposition’ is most vital condition for bringing the opposition into co-operative with the ruling political party. The restless political opposition is backbone of any democratic structure and their criticism to the government policies and decisions, makes governance more people centric and responsible. The visible political opposition and their activities in Jammu and Kashmir remained weak, fragmented and ineffective. Though there were number of political groups and parties who were representing the diverse public shades of beliefs and opinions. These public opinions and diverse beliefs are essential for democracy and vibrant political culture. However, in case of Jammu and Kashmir the role of such political groups and opinions remain by and large weak and less satisfactory. It got exemplified when elite political party NC failed to understand the importance of political opposition which gave rise to the dominant character of ‘One Party Dominance’ in the state (Tables 3.1 & 3.4). A well organized, strong and vibrant political opposition sometimes can serve as an alternative political group that can claim to form government, because in

1 David Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965), 192. 85

Parliamentary form of government political parties compete with each other to gain power. However, in the early years of state accession with India, these political characteristics of political opposition were absent in J&K. The sweeping success of NC in Constituent Assembly cum Legislative Assembly elections of 1951 chocked the space for dissent in the State (Table 3.4). The ruling NC and its leader Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah did not allow and showed any soft approach towards building mature political opposition. Thus the feature of Democracy that the political parties acquire political power by active competition was completely missing in case of J&K. In fact it is the core idea of party system that makes a Democracy vibrant and politically mature. To quote one of the staunch supporters of Democracy Benjamin Disraeli “I believe that without parties, parliamentary government is impossible.”2 However, there is no denying of the fact that this political philosophy was hardly accepted by ruling regime in J&K. Almost from the very early days in sub-continent post Indian partition, the ruling political class NC in J&K never thought to establish free and accountable political institutions because of many political as well as other factors. One of the leaders believed that:

It was unrealistic to talk of parliamentary opposition in the Assembly when Kashmir itself was going through a critical phase. We had invited all the parties to contest the elections, but the fact that no one came forward to fight the elections, was convincing proof that National Conference was the only political party which could deliver the goods.3

However, this option also stands contested that there was no presence of political groups in J&K who would have participated in these elections. The fact is that the ruling regime NC led by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah rejected the nomination papers which belonged to opposition. Thus the political environment in J&K had witnessed weak and unorganized political opposition from its early days. Highlighting the importance of opposition in Democracy Jenning claims that:

The opposition is at once the alternative to the government and a focus for the discontent of the people. Its function is almost as important as that of the government. If there is no opposition, there is no democracy. Her

2 Benjamin Disraeli’s speech at Manchester, 1872, quoted in Singh, State Politics in India: Explorations in political processes in Jammu and Kashmir, 62. 3 Maulana Mohammad Syed Masoodi’s inaugural speech in the state Constituent Assembly on 31 October 1951. 86

Majesty’s opposition is no idle phrase. Her Majesty needs an opposition as well as government.4

The political system and culture that will not allow the dissent of opposition to function within the set rules and regulation can’t be termed as ‘matured Democracy’. The non-competitive struggle for power in despotic political environment results in tyranny of elite group. This is because there is hardly any check and balance of political power. Thus the political opposition is necessary to check the tyrannical and elite model of governance by effective mechanism of checks and balance. One of the well-known political stalwart and once been Prime Minister of J&K Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad commented on the role of opposition. He said “If any such opposition had emerged in the state; neither Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah nor I would have committed mistakes.”5 Though, it is true that Bakshi himself didn’t allow dissent of opposition during his rule of one decade, rather would always cut down and liquidate the dissent of opposition by coercion, treachery, intimidation and political corruption to keep him in power.

The state of J&K the very beginning witnessed conflict both internally as well as externally. Internally, the unhealthy political opposition in J&K added more problems to the conflict. It is a universal fact that conflict resolution and conflict management become promising in such a political atmosphere only that will allow the dissent to flourish. In the absence of such political atmosphere, it is much difficult to manage or resolve conflict. The absence of opposition had its own adverse impact, when conflict is already there. The absence of opposition gave birth to the ‘de- legitimization of Democratic institutions and political credibility’. The Himalayan state of J&K witnessed very little growth of political opposition which passed through many stages of both negative and positive political development. Thus political opposition (not vibrant but weak) in state emerged only after 1950s when number of new political forces began their political journey. Few important political forces which emerged both within the State Assembly and outside the Assembly were: Praja Parishad (Jammu based party), Plebiscite Front (Separatist political unit), Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front, Democratic National Conference (Led by G.M. Sadiq), Bakshi’s National Conference (A group of 20 members around Bakshi),

4 I. Jenning, Cabinet government, (London: Cambridge University Press 1969), 16. 5 M. Weiner, State Politics in India (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 176. 87

Awami Action Committee (Religious cum political force emerged after Holy relic theft), Kashmir Political Conference (Small pro-Pakistan group under Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra) and Jamaat-I-Islami (Socio-religious political organization). Although there were number of small political groups existing in J&K; but the above mentioned political parties played their respective roles in political dimensions of the State. Thus keeping their role in consideration, the present Chapter will discuss their emergence and the role of these political opposition groups vis-a-vis political atmosphere of state from 1947-1975.

3.2 Praja Parishad: Emergence and Role as Opposition

The communal atmosphere in the sub-continent during 1940s and 50s played a significant role in shaping contours of J&K politics. It was largely because of state’s proximity with the state of Punjab, the Red Cliff’s partition impacted the state most. The movement which was initiated by Sheikh Abdullah in 1931 somehow failed to get the support of Hindu dominated parts of Jammu region. The political movement of 1931 in its evolution as well as for its ideology became suspicious in the eyes of Dogra supporters in Jammu. The people in this region perceived the movement as something foreign and intolerable. It was only in post-partition when Praja Parishad tried to represent the regional aspiration of the Hindus. Tracing the birth of Praja Parishad in Jammu P.S.Varma have observed that:

Praja Parishad was landed class and the most beneficiaries of the erstwhile feudal system under Dogra rule, the party represented economically wealthy people who during the Maharaja’s time enjoyed position of landlords.6

The Praja Parishad came into existence in the late 1940’s in Jammu province. The party emerged particularly against the Kashmir led political movement, anti- Dogra and Quit Kashmir movement of 1946. The people in the Jammu region associated with the Dogra rule viewed the Kashmir movement as an organized attempt to expunge their influence from the Valley of Kashmir. Hari Wazir became the first President of the Praja Parshad and Balraj Madhok the General Secretary. The Party became the main political opposition in Jammu, with the growing influence in

6 Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at Political Crossroads, 73. 88 the region many well-known political stalwarts such as Prem Nath Dogra and others played important role in shaping the future politics of the state. The party leadership was in close touch with Hindu Mahasabha, Jana Sangh and Rajya Parishad7; while as Praja Parishad in Jammu had no influence in Muslim dominated areas. The simple reason being that the Party was solely based on Hindu based structure. The obvious result of which was that the Kashmiri Muslim identity came in direct conflict against the Jammu based Dogra identity. In other terms, it was conflict between ‘Kashmiri Nationalism vs Hindu Dogra Nationalism’. However, the Party received good support from Hindu Mahasabha and RSS (Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh) in its creation and establishment.8 The Party was more worried about the Sheikh Abdullah’s tendency to draw J&K away from India, as well as their fate under his government. The member of the Indian Constituent Assembly Mihir Lal Chattopadhaja addressed a report in March 1949 to the government of India on his visit to Jammu. He stated that all the Hindus were convinced that if ever a Plebiscite is held, Ninety per cent of the Muslims would vote for Pakistan. In fact the Hindus were concerned about their gradual elimination from power.9

Once Abdullah became the ruler of State in 1948, there was a general perception in India that few Congress leaders have more sympathy with Abdullah while as National interests are harmed and compromised with. There was always a class of people within the state who never accepted Abdullah and his party (NC) and in Jammu number of such people were too high. They were unhappy with the state and the administration of Abdullah once Dogra rule was over thrown. As the leaders claim that Sheikh always used derogatory language to defame the Dogra Dynasty in the state,10 the leadership of Praja Parishad raised the demand for separate statehood of Jammu and subsequently the Party raised “Quit Jammu” programme against Abdullah and NC. On the other side the ‘communal parties’ of India like Hindu Mahasabha, Panjab Arya Samaj, Bharatiya Jana Sangh, Ram Rajya Parishad and some prominent leaders of Akali were never in a position to set their footprints in

7 All these political parties were communal in nature, which were present in India. The basic motive of these parties was to create a strong opposition to secular India and establish Hindu Rashtra. In Kashmir their main objective was to spread communal disturbance and merger J&K with rest of the India completely without any special provision or status. 8 S.N. Kaul, Dynamics of Kashmir Politics (New Delhi: Rajat publication, 2001), 364; Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and after, 28-29. 9 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 25. 10 Jagmohan, My frozen turbulence in Kashmir, 96. 89

J&K. All these parties were driven by Hindu nationalist ideology but the close relation between Nehru and Abdullah and then subsequently their granting special concessions for state provided them with the opportunity to mobilize their workers and party leaders. The regional tensions were already on a high once the leadership of Dogra was high jacked by Kashmiri leadership. The cause of communal parties of India in Jammu was carried forward by none other than Praja Parishad. It was from here that the Party framed the objective to end the ‘Kashmiri domination’ by complete merger of state with the Union of India. All these leaders were of the opinion that once the power will transfer from Kashmir based leadership to Delhi, it will reduce the sovereignty of Kashmiris, particularly of Abdullah and NC over Jammu.11 The leaders like Prem Nath Dogra and Kosihik Bakaula emerged as strong voices with a huge chunk of followers. The expulsion of Maharaja Hari Singh and the hoisting of State Flag instead of the Indian National Flag on official functions and occasions created further rifts between the regions and leaders. Many observers believe that the grant of Special Autonomy to J&K created legitimacy crisis in Jammu as well as in Ladakh (though this view is contested). The people of these regions started feeling alienated from the valley of Kashmir.12 Indeed the people of Jammu post-1947 felt like second class citizens because all administrative powers went or were given to Abdullah and his NC. As discussed in earlier Chapters, many MC politician and leaders either were exiled or went to ‘Azad Kashmir’ (PAK). Without MC, the opposition to NC was little effective in J&K.13 While as on the other hand the Kashmiri leaders were not only ignorant of the politics and personalities of Jammu but also prejudiced against its basic aspiration. So in this region, Kashmiri leadership had neither much popular support nor organizational strength claim Balraj Puri14 The evacuation of MC leaders and its workers, exile of its important leaders after the 1948 war between India and Pakistan over Kashmir left deep political space and vacuum. This vacuum was filled by none other than Praja Parishad, a ‘communal party’ which was supported by other ‘communalist parties.’15

11 Balraj Madhok, Jammu, Kashmir and Ladakh: Problem and Solution (New Delhi: Reliance Publishers, 1987), 29-30. 12 Shailendera Singh Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy (Jammu: Saksham Books International, 2011), 253. 13 Snedden, understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris, 134. 14 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and after, 28-29. 15 Behera, Demystifying Kashmir, 110. 90

The disputed nature of J&K in UNO led serious negative developments both in Jammu as well in Kashmir. This resulted in divided public opinion in both regions of J&K. The people of Jammu and some areas of Ladakh were ‘Disconcerted Agitated’ over the changes of the power from Jammu to Valley of Kashmir.16 The people of Jammu especially those who were closely associated with Dogra Darbar (to government of Maharaja Hari Singh) began to get estranged and alienated from the people of Kashmir. The result of which was that the Praja Parishad gained popular support among the people of Jammu. The Party officially declared opposition to the Separate Constitution and the State Flag for J&K. The party’s ideology was wholly and solely of Bhartiya Jan Sangh.17 The main objective and task of the Praja Parishad was the complete integration of J&K with the Union of India. The Party didn’t see any difference of J&K, for them Kashmir was similar to the other acceding princely states. The party’s stand was to safeguard and protect the ‘genuine and legitimate democratic’ rights of the people of Jammu from the anti-Dogra attitude of Sheikh Abdullah and his government. The main slogan of the party was ‘full accession’ and complete abrogation of article 370 of the State granted by Indian Constitution. The Party described its first and foremost duty towards a complete merger of J&K with India.18 The Party was supported by many like-minded political parties, among them one was Jana Sangh formed in 1951 by Dr. Shyama Prasad Mookerji. The main slogan of the Praja Parishad agitation was:

Ek Desh mein do Vidhan; Ek Desh mein do Nishan; Ek Desh mein do Pradhan Nahin Challenge Nahin Challenge” mean “In one Country two Constitutions; in one Country two Flags; in one Country two Prime Ministers are not tolerated” at any cost. Even the party strongly criticized the nomenclature of “Sadar-i-Riyasat” and “Wazier-i-Azam” for the state.19

The outcome of this political agitation was strong both in Jammu region as well as in Kashmir valley. In Jammu the normal life was disrupted and violent clashes occurred in different parts which resulted in loss of property as well as human lives.20

16 Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, 252. 17 Bamzai, Culture and political history of Kashmir, 791. 18 Hindustan Times (Delhi), November 12, 1957. 19 K. M. Malkani, “Why Article 370 must go,” Indian Express, June 10, 1989. 20 Jamwal, Jammu and Kashmir: Autocracy to Democracy, 253; Wani, Kashmir: Identity Autonomy and Self-Rule, 99. 91

Similar feelings of demonstration were witnessed in Ladakh, though they were not violent. However, such unrest was dangerous because of Ladakh’s proximity to communist Tibet and Sinkang. The government of Abdullah was trying to bring some measures of improvement to the hapless people of Ladakh but Buddhist leaders showed resentment against the Srinagar and Abdullah’s policy. They objected the policies and Centralizing tendencies of government of Abdullah. The head Lamba of the Ladakh, Kushuk-Balkola was the member of Constituent Assembly in Srinagar but from time to time he used to assert his independent position and to promote the slogan ‘Ladakh for Ladakhis.’ This whole narrative has been summed up by Joseph Korbel in his book Danger in Kashmir:

As Abdullah was reviewing with satisfaction the autonomous status he had wrested from the Central government in Delhi for his Country, but his hands were full with separatist tendencies in Jammu and the Centrifugal trend of thinking in Ladakh.21

The Party Praja Parishad first coined the slogan “Abdullah Hakumat Khatam Karo aur Jammu Alag Karo-Terminate Abdullah’s rule and Separate Jammu.”22 The leaders of the Party saw the state political realities through the religious prism. Even they labeled Sheikh Abdullah’s administration as ‘Islamic’ and accused him to ‘Islamize the state’. A pamphlet of Praja Parishad was distributed on a very large scale which described the Constituent Assembly as Muslim dominated group with Fifty members out of Seventy Five. Hence the Party thought that the dominance of Abdullah and Muslims is no more acceptable to Hindus of Jammu and Buddhists of Ladakh. While as on the other hand the decision to make Karan Singh the first head was also criticized as a ‘traitorous act’ which will formally legitimize the political ideology of Abdullah and “tantamount to selling the Dogras out to the Kashmiris.”23 However, the Party failed to gain the support of Muslims of Jammu and influential group of Hindu population. Even the Party failed to mobilize the Kashmiri Pandits and good number of Buddhists of Ladakh who shared their ‘secular ideology’ with Abdullah and NC. Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that Praja Parishad tried to make this agitation communal and religious between Hindus and Muslims. The Praja

21 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 230. 22 Navnita Chandha Behera, “A signal from Jammu,” Frontline, Vol.19, Issue 22, 2002. 23 Ibid. 92

Parishad as a strong political force worked vigorously and tried to bond the people of Jammu with the aim that any attempt favoring Special Autonomy or Status will be foiled at any cost. The Party got its main support among the business and commercial class who were mostly concentrated in the main city of Jammu. The Party also found its support in townships of Reasi, Kathua and Udhampur. It too received quite a substantial support from Rajputs among the Hindus, because Rajputs viewed NC and its leadership as destroyer of the Rajput dynasty and their rule. With the growing influence in the region the Praja Parishad became one of the principle oppositions in the main Hindu dominated areas of Jammu. Thus it can be stated that Praja Parishad was in real sense the main opposition party against the party in power—NC. The demand of Praja Parishad to abrogate the article 370 became nationalistic in nature, it provoked an anger and powerful reaction in Kashmir and in this regard Sheikh Abdullah called the demand of Praja Parishad as, ‘Unrealistic, Childish and Insane.’ Abdullah on 10th April 1952 addressed Party workers in Ranbir Singhpora and said:

We have acceded to India in regard to defence, foreign affairs and communication in order to ensure a sort of internal autonomy...if our right to shape our destiny is challenged and if there is resurgence of communalism in India how were we to convince the Muslims of Kashmir that India does not intend to swallow us.24

The Parishad was able to mobilize a grand Coalition with other ‘communal parties’ in Jammu. This agitation marked the beginning of what Balraj Puri describes “the end of Kashmiris emotional relations with India.”25 The Praja Parishad and its like-minded political groups constantly opposed the setting or formation of a ‘Separate Constituent Assembly’ for J&K. The Party was in favour of total application of Constitution of India to J&K.26 On May 1951, the Yuvaraj Karan Singh issued a proclamation of a Constituent Assembly on basis of free elections. Elections were held in summer of 1951 and people had to elect Seventy Five members, Forty Five of whom were to represent Kashmir and Ladakh and Thirty to Jammu. Though the Praja Parishad had very tough stand on Special Autonomy but in its special session held on 8th May 1951, the leadership of Party decided to contest the

24 Khidmat, August 13, 1952. 25 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 29. 26 Hindustan Times, (Delhi), December 18, 1950. 93

Constituent Assembly com Legislative elections.27 However, because of the authoritative character and politics of NC, the government authorities rejected the large numbers of nomination papers including the thirteen nomination papers of Praja Parishad as the leaders of the party put it, “on the flimsiest grounds and under pressure from the government.”28 However, three days before the elections in Jammu, on October 12, the Party decided to boycott the elections and accused the government under NC for using unfair means and “illegal practices and official interference, whole sale rejection of Praja Parishad nomination papers.”29 Though, some political commentators believe that the party during those days had good support in Hindu region of Jammu province but it failed to get inroads into the assembly. Thus, before the election date Sheikh Abdullah and his followers were sure of winning all of the Seventy Five seats (Table 3.4) which even no dictator could do, and in this regard Nehru stated that he was “sure that the way people had voted showed clearly that they were with the NC and India”30. However, on the other side in the year 1952 on 27 March a special committee on Land Compensation submitted final report to the State Legislative Assembly. This Committee in its report suggested that there should be no compensation to any landlords. The land reforms were basically socio-economic policies of Abdullah and his government but mostly Hindus viewed these reforms as communal. The basic cause was that the land that was distributed to tillers in J&K originally and mostly belonged to Hindus, while as most of the Muslim population were peasants in J&K.

When State Constituent Assembly passed a resolution on 07 June 1952 adopting a Separate Flag for a State, the President of Praja Parishad, Pandit Prem Nath Dogra condemned the decision as a ‘provocative act which has caused resentment in Jammu.’ Yet another time when Delhi Agreement was signed in 1952, Praja Parishad described it as an “Another surrender at the altar of communal intransigence and separation of Sheikh Abdullah.”31 The movement which was led by Praja Parishad in Jammu was not halted when Nehru-Abdullah signed the Delhi Agreement. The leadership of Praja Parshad commented that, “Instead of Kashmir

27 Hindustan Times, (Delhi), May 9, 1951. 28 Times of India, (Bombay), September 27, 1951. 29 The Times, (London), Oct. 13, 1951; Awais Bin Wasi, “Elections in Indian Held Kashmir and the Kashmir Dispute,” Policy Perspectives (2009), 149-165. 30 The Hindu, (Madras), Oct. 19, 1951. 31 B. P. Sharma, “Regional Autonomy-The only solution Problem-I,” Kashmir Times, June 14, 1992. 94 acceded to India; in fact India acceded to Kashmir.”32 Abdullah was accused of ignoring those sections which confirmed Kashmir’s ties with India. The opposition’s elements in Jammu and Ladakh gathered new strength and in 1953 they burst out, more particularly in Jammu, in an open and well-organized manner. The Party set a number of objectives among which the main eight demands of this Party were as under:

1. Complete abrogation of special status or article 370 of Indian Constitution 2. To integrate the state of Jammu and Kashmir fully with Union of India. 3. To remove the state subject laws of the state and there should be no distinction between the people of Kashmir and other states of India. 4. Complete implementation of Indian Constitution over the state of Jammu and Kashmir. 5. Remove all customs barriers that are between state of Jammu and Kashmir and rest of India. 6. To investigate the charges of corruption against all leaders by setting an impartial tribunal that will work independently without any political interference. 7. The jurisdiction of Supreme Court of India must be fully extended to state of Jammu and Kashmir in totality. 8. New and Fresh elections must be conducted for state Constituent Assembly and previous assembly must be dissolved.33 The Party demanded full merger of J&K and even threatened that if this was not achieved, they would detach Jammu from Kashmir and make it integral part of India. The Party did find support among few members of Indian Parliament especially Jayaprakash Narayan and Kripalani. The support of these leaders was strange for Abdullah because both the leaders belonged to left ideology. Abdullah believed that, “Nehru and Moulana Azad were interested in the preposition but did not agree with the strategy.”34 This situation of growing difference in Jammu and supported from Indian leaders was described by Abdullah in a broadcast on September first, 1952 as,

32 Wani, Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule, 106. 33 Tremblay and Reeta Chowdhary, “Jammu Autonomy within an Autonomous Kashmir,” in Perspective on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, ed. Raju G.C. Thomas (Boulder Colorado: West View Press, 1992), 160. 34 Wani, Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule, 107. 95

“The whole non communal structure of the state was in danger.”35 While as on the other hand the communal atmosphere and events which were happening in India encouraged opposition forces in J&K and three ‘communalists’ parties, the Hindu Mahasabha, Jan Sangh and Ram Raja Parishad solidarized themselves with the Praja Parishad movement. Later they started the full nationwide campaign of Satyagraha for full assimilation of Kashmir within India. The leaders of the Jan Sangh appealed to their followers to organize militant groups popularly known as ‘Jathas’ to march Jammu. As the leaders of the parties put, the government under Sheikh Abdullah answered by repressive measures to deal with the protests in Jammu. In May 1953, he issued an ordinance to imprisonment any person who will enter the state without permission. Abdullah also issued notice to ban public meetings. Newspapers too were banned and many were put under censorship.36 This agitation led by Praja Parishad shocked Nehru as observed by former Director of Intelligence Bureau (IB) B. N. Mullik:

The Jana Sangh leader Shyama Prasad Mookerji support to the Praja Parishad’s agitation in Jammu made matters worse…The Prime Minister was greatly distressed by these harmful developments. He talked to me on the disastrous effects which the Jana Sangh-Praja Parishad agitation was likely to produce on the Muslim mind in Kashmir. He said that the Government of India agreed with the Jana Sangh’s views that Jammu and Kashmir should be fully integrated with India and was taking steps in that direction. But, there were other forces like Pakistan and the Security Council which could not be ignored and it was not in India’s power to do whatever she liked in respect of this State. Referring to the Jana Sangh’s demand that at least Jammu should be integrated, the Prime Minister said that this would amount to subscribing to the two-nation theory and would destroy the raison d’etre of India’s existence in the valley. He said that the Jana Sangh agitation had given him a shock and for the first time in five years he had started feeling doubtful about the future of Kashmir.37

35 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 225. 36 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 232-33; Ian Copeland, “The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the 1947 Crisis,” Political Inheritance of Pakistan, (1991), 218-254. 37 B. N. Mullik, My years with Nehru: Kashmir (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), 30. 96

Meanwhile, Jana Sang and the Praja Parishad went back on the commitment of Dr. Shyama Prasad Mukherjee38 after his death in Srinagar. They gave slogans:

Abdullah Ko Phasi Do—Hang Abdullah, and ‘Mukherjee Ke Kaun Katil- Nehru Ya Abdullah—who are the murderers of Mukherjee-Nehru or Abdullah? And another slogan was ‘Khoon Ka Badla Khoon Se Lo’– Blood to be avenged by Blood.39

When Abdullah was offered to visit Delhi for talks, he refused and declined the visit. However, his Deputy Bakshi went and so did the head of the State, Karan Singh. In the same period the three ‘communalist parties’ paid heed to Nehru’s repeated appeals and called off the Satyagraha agitation for complete integration of Kashmir with Indian Union. The parties issued the statement that the movement has achieved the purpose in an objective manner. Praja Parishad withdrew the agitation in view of the harm it was doing to the national interest. However, the damage it had done was irreversible, addressing NC rally on 25th July 1953; Abdullah stated that, “the confidence created by the NC in the people here (regarding accession to India) has been shaken by the Jana Sang and other communal organization of India…”40 On 13 February 1953, in an open latter Mookerji wrote to Abdullah:

There cannot be a republic within a republic...Consciously or unconsciously you are creating a new sovereignty for Jammu And Kashmir State… India has been torn into two by the two-nation theory…You are developing a three-nation theory, the third being Kashmiris. These are dangerous symptoms.41

Abdullah criticized the agitation which was being supported monetarily and morally in India. He admitted that NC had lost its hold on the Muslims of J&K. The Praja Parishad agitations created doubts in the minds of Muslims and have become the frog in the well.

38 Mookerjee was the President of Communalist party in India. He was arrested in May while travelling to Jammu. In followed months he died of heart attack in Srinagar. The rumors of his death added new fuel to political unrest in Jammu which was already too high during the rule of Abdullah. Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 233; Dr. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Eminent Parliamentarian Monograph Series (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, 1990), 21-25. 39 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 31. 40 Satish Vashishth, Sheikh Abdullah, Then and Now (Delhi: Maulik Sahitya Prakashan, 1968), 97; See also Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After 32. 41 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the political crossroads 41. 97

On the other side, on August seven, Bakshi and other three members of NC government accused Abdullah of making ‘arbitrary decisions, despotism, inefficiency and wastage of public resources’. The memorandum informed Abdullah, that the cabinet had lost the confidence of the people. The Head of the State, Karan Singh suggested an emergency meeting of the government, Abdullah refused the request. However, on 9th August 1953 Karan Singh dismissed Sheikh Abdullah, nominated Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad as Prime Minister. Abdullah was arrested and booked to prison. The arrest of Sheikh Abdullah was celebrated as a ‘Day of Deliverance’ by Praja Parishad. The people of Jammu were overwhelmingly happy and believed that the root cause of all problems and grievances (Sheikh Abdullah) has been put in jail; therefore they would get their demands accepted.42 In State Assembly elections of 1957 Praja Parishad was in a healthy position to oppose the ruling NC. In these elections the Party succeeded in making entry into State Assembly by winning Five Assembly segments from Jammu with 26.09 per cent of valid votes (Table 3.1). Again the Party challenged the NC and President of Party Prem Nath Dogra accused NC of rigging and manipulating elections. He also alleged the State government under Bakshi with ‘unfairness, mismanagement and bungling.’43Though the Party managed to reach Assembly in 1957 and became headache for ruling NC but the Party failed to make its strong presence in Assembly in 1962, and was reduced to three seats with 14.47 per cent of votes (Table 3.1). Thus in this way Praja Parishad was not able to defeat the hegemonic character of NC (Table 3.4).

On the other hand on 2nd July 1967 the Bhartiya Jana Sangh’s working committee denounced the idea of regional Autonomy in its meeting in Shimla. The Party made it clear that any attempt to provide any sort of Autonomy or Special Status to Kashmir would benefit only the supporters of Abdullah and Pro-Pakistan elements in J&K.44 Later Praja Parishad was converted into Jana Sangh in the early sixties. As the successor of Praja Parishad, Jana Sangh for the first time contested the State elections in J&K in 1967. The Party contested total 29 seats, three from Kashmir valley and twenty six from Jammu. However, Jana Sangh was not able to pose any serious threat to Congress under G.M. Sadiq. It won only three Assembly

42 B.P. Sharma, “Regional Autonomy-The only solution Problem-II,” Kashmir Times, June 15, 1992. 43 The Tribune (Ambala), April 2, 1957. 44 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 42; for more detailed analysis see Carsten Busch, The Policy of the Bharatiya Janata Party, 1980 and 2008: Possible Influence of Hindu Nationalism on Indian Politics (CA: naval postgraduate school Monterey, 2009). 98 seats from Jammu with 16.45 per cent of votes (Table 3.2). At the same time Jana Sangh failed to make entry from Kashmir and could not won a single seat from three constituencies that the party contested. In the same way in the Assembly elections of 1972, the Party hardly improved its position. Though Jana Sangh contested five seats from valley and twenty seven from Jammu but the massive victory for State Congress both in Kashmir and Jammu routed out Jana Sangh and Party was reduced to three seats with 9.8 per cent of votes45 (Table 3.2). When Janta party was formed in 1979, Jana Sangh also became part of it. But Janta Party could not survive for a long time and new political parties emerged out of it. Though Jana Sangh was popular in Jammu but could not make inroads in Kashmir valley. Despite of the fact it contested State Assembly elections from Kashmir but could not make inroads because of many political as well as identity reasons. When Jana Sangh formed Janta Party in Jammu, it contested the 1977 Assembly elections. This was also the period when Sheikh Abdullah returned to mainstream politics after signing Kashmir Accord in 1975 with Indra Gandhi. The newly formed Janta Party contested twelve seats from J&K and Party again could not increase its tally and won only three seats. In fact this time it was not Praja Parishad or Jana Sangh but the Janta party that gained its position to win 10.78 per cent of votes in State46 (Table 3.2). It was in the year 1980 when prominent Hindu leader L.K. Advani launched new political force called BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) and Atal Bihari Vajpayee became its first President.47 The new political party, BJP not only opposed the powerful Congress at the Centre but it equally started to mobilize there workers in states also and J&K was no more exception. The Party in its resolution adopted its separate Flag, Constitution and powerful electoral symbol of Lotus.48 Thus in Jammu the ground that was occupied by Janata Party, previously known as Praja Parishad also joined the BJP. But the party’s core ideology was not compromised by BJP. The role of BJP in the state politics got momentum only after the eruption of armed struggle in Kashmir. The role and the political journey of BJP in Kashmir will be discussed separately in Chapter Fifth of the thesis.

45 Statistical report on general elections, 1972 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K, (New Delhi: ECI, 1973); Singh, Political Awakening in Kashmir, 106. 46 Singh, State politics in India, 86; Statistical report on general elections, 1977 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. 47 A. S. Narang, Indian Government and Politics (New-Delhi: Geetanjali Publishers, 1987), 305. 48 R. C. Agarwal, Indian Government and Politics (New-Delhi: S. Chand & Co, 1986), 474. 99

3.3 Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front: Emergence and Role

After two years of Abdullah’s arrest and dismissal in 1953, a well-balanced political opposition started its presence in very disturbed political conditions. Those members who had very close relation with Abdullah now tried to organize a well-knit political opposition within the assembly. This group called ‘Socialist Democratic Front’ represented those members who had sympathy with Sheikh Abdullah. Though the group was small in size and only six members were able to organize the party. The party was slomly controlled by Afzal Beg. When two members resigned from Bakhshi’s NC and joined ‘Praja Socialist Party.’ Afzal Beg took serious steps to accommodate those who resigned from NC. It was also the time when Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra was thinking to organize strong opposition against NC by uniting all the likeminded small groups and individuals. To quote Karra: “I am in favour of forming a healthy democratic opposition in Jammu and Kashmir legislature based on socialist principles as enunciated by Praja Socialist Party.”49

It was after the deep deliberation and discussion with the members of the PSP50; Chairman Om Prakash Saraf met the executive unit of PSP on 3rd March 1953 and approved the decision of party MLAs.51 Meanwhile, Afzal Beg was finally elected as leader of the Party called ‘Democratic Socialist Party.’ The Party consisted of eight members.52 At the same time the party ‘Front’ also elected its other office bearers.53 The newly formed ‘Socialist Democratic Front’ began to oppose the ruling regime of Bakshi tooth and nail. But due to the strong leadership of Bakshi and his authoritarian rule, the front failed to put serious threat to ruling regime. Bakshi didn’t find any difficulty to run his Party and government because he was the man who possessed all the skills to rule the State with iron hand. After all he was the ‘master in

49 The Leader, August 3, 1955. 50 Among the well-known political and social workers of the party were, Balraj Puri, Om Prakash Saraf, Ved Bhasin, Jagdish Gupta and Dhanraj Bhagotra. The Praja Socialist Party owns the political leadership without its rank and files. Further details see Singh, State politics in India, 69. 51 The Tribune, March 3, 1955; The Statesman, March 5, 1955. 52 The Tribune, March, 1955: for more details Josef Korbel, “The National Conference Administration of Kashmir 1949-1954,” Middle East Journal, 8. 3 (1954), 283-294. 53 Abdul Gani Lone was elected as deputy leader, Ghulam Mohiuddin as secretary and Ram Rakhamal was party whip. Besides its office bearers the other members of the Socialist Democratic Front were Ghulam Natu Wani, Hakim Habibullah, Syed Illaudin and Ghulam Rasool Raina, for further detailed report Singh, State Politics in India, 95-96. 100 art of political manipulations’.54 Under the leadership of Bakshi, NC once again showed the signs of monolithic structure because he used all his dictatorial methods by using all the party machinery for his selfish political objectives. Though, ‘Socialist Democratic Front’ showed some strong presence during the State Assembly session of 1955 and pressured the State government under Bakshi to democratize the State. It was in this back ground that one of leading newspapers Amrit Bazar Patrika observed:

The Kashmir Assembly session in Jammu from 2nd March 1955 may prove to be tempestuous because for the first time Pro-Abdullah elements are likely to make concerned efforts in the Legislature to trouble the Bakshi Government.55

It is also true that Bakshi was not in favour to accommodate the opposition in his ruling regime and it became the primary reason, that the Party could not make strong political inroads in Kashmir. Even the Nationalist leaders like Nehru and Jay Prakash Narayan strongly criticized Balraj Puri and accused leaders of PSP of, ‘Joining hands with enemies of the country.’56

However, the front leaders inside the assembly made many efforts so that the party would have been recognized as opposition group. The party lastly requested the state legislative assembly speaker to recognize the Socialist Democratic Front as principle opposition party and allot separate seats to the front. However, due to the harsh rules set by the speaker G.R. Renzu the opposition was not given any official recognition because Party failed to fulfill the condition laid down by the speaker.57 On the other side the political developments had their own implication and effect on Front. The Party faced many difficulties with the passage of time. The National executive body of Praja Socialist Party was not in favour of political arrangements with Afzal Beg and its separate State unit.58 Even the workers of the Bakshi led NC disrupted the public meeting of PSP in Srinagar and where ruthlessly beaten, recalls

54 Balbir Singh’s Interview with G.M. Sadiq and Syed Mir Qasim; quoted in Singh, State Politics in India, 79. 55 Amrit Bazar Patrika, (Bengal), March2, 1955. 56 Puri, State politics in India, 229. 57 According to rules and directions, the party would only be recognized as opposition if the party proves at least nineteen members to constitute a ‘Parliament Party’ and at the same time eleven members for a ‘Parliament group’. All these conditions were obviously very harsh for Socialist Democratic Front. The Hindustan Times, March 5, 1955. 58 The Times of India, September 28, 1955. 101

Balraj Puri.59 All these political opponents were declared enemies and agents of Pakistan.60

Yet another setback for the Front was the arrest of Afzal Beg. The arrest of Beg had very serious repercussion on further growth of any dissent of political voice in the form of any opposition party. The Front could have emerged as strong political alternative that would have played significant role as a ‘democratic alternative’ for the people of Kashmir. But due to the polices, adopted by both Centre and State, this alternative (Democratic Socialist Front) too was crushed and Front got disintegrated. The political downfall of the Front created void space that was filled by new forces like Plebiscite Front (More anti-India and Pro-Independence). It would not be wrong to say that, had state allowed the Democratic Socialist Front to function democratically the political climate that was slomly dominated by NC would have definitely challenged. That would have given birth to ‘matured secular democracy’, instead of alienation of people from the state in general and India in particular.

3.4 Democratic National Conference: Formation, Role and Disappearance

Soon after the State Assembly elections were conducted in 1957, the differences within ranks of leaders of NC aroused. The difference of opinions between Sadiq and Bakshi reached its new heights and the Party got divided into two groups. One faction was led by Bakshi, which was more strong and vibrant, second group was led by G.M. Sadiq. Thus a new political party under the name of Democratic National Conference (DNC) emerged in the political corridors of Kashmir. This whole political development was debated in leading newspaper The Times of India in these words:

The National Conference dissidents led by Mr. G.M. Sadiq today announced the formation of a new party to be known as the Democratic National Conference. Simultaneously they announced their resignation from the ruling party. Thirteen members of the legislative assembly, two members of legislative council and two others, in an appeal today, asked all patriotic elements to join the new party which they said would carry on the traditions and policies of the National Conference. They asserted that the National Conference was no place for honest men, since it had already

59 Balraj Puri, “Elections and Kashmir,” The Hindu, September 20, 2001. 60 Manzoor Fazili, Kashmir: Government and Politics (Srinagar Gulshan, 1982), 46; see also, Chowdhary, Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of Identity and separatism, 33-36. 102

lost its representative character and become a tool in the hands of a power- hungry coterie.61

In fact it is true that those who joined the new political party (DNC) under Sadiq were more progressive and of liberal ideology. The Party under his leadership attracted many more like-minded people into a single plate form. When the Party made its inroads, it influenced even members of Communist Party and many of the workers and sympathizers of Communist Party joined Sadiq. The prominent Communist leaders who joined the Party were Ram Piara Saraf and Krishan Dev Sethi along with other activists and Party members.62 A young Mufti Mohammad Syed, who became Chief Minister of the State in 2002 & 2014, (For details about PDP and Mufti Mohammad Sayeed see Chapter Five), too became the member of new Party in 1959.63 The new political opposition had well organized setup both within the State Legislative Assembly and outside. The Party proved its strong presence inside the Assembly; the members who left the Bakshi led NC were thirteen in number. Thus the Party emerged as vibrant secular, progressive and ‘democratic political opposition’ to ruling NC and Bakshi. Unlike Praja Parishad in Jammu, DNC was known for its radical ideology that believed in ‘democracy and secularism’. It was because of its ideology that the Party in a very brief time managed to open its branches in J&K and didn’t find any serious difficulties for managing the Party affairs.

The main motive behind the establishment of DNC was to provide the alternative political force that will oppose the authoritarian government policies of Bakshi. The Party chief organizer Sadiq labeled several corruption allegations against the ruling regime under the leadership of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad:

Mr. G.M. Sadiq charged that the National Conference is dominated by several figures who can easily sacrifice principles for personal ends.”64 The members who opposite Bakshi alleged that: “The National

61 The Times of India, September 7, 1957. 62 Interview of Krishen Dev Sethi with Tasavur Mushtaq, “A History’s witness,” Kashmir Life, (Srinagar weekly), May 24, 2012. 63 The Tribune, January 8, 2016; for detailed analysis see Wani and Bhat, “Political Legacy of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed,” Mainstream weekly, March 12, 2016. 64 South China Morning Post, August 19, 1957. 103

Conference, as it stood, lacked the capacity and purpose to fulfil its historic role.65

In this way the new political outfit led by Sadiq was supposed to provide the secular, strong, dynamic and democratic political opposition to the people of the State.66 All most all the members associated with DNC were experienced and educated political stalwarts possessed all the qualities of leadership to perform and fulfill their duties as a vibrant political opposition within the State Assembly67 (Table 3.4).

Conversely, on the other hand Sadiq, who became founder of DNC made it clear in State Assembly that the jurisdiction of Election Commission of India should be implemented to J&K. Many other leaders in Assembly supported this demand of Sadiq including Prem Nath Dogra. Dogra claimed that: “While we claim to be integral part of Union of India, there is no reason why we should not enjoy the benefits of those institutions.”68

Sadiq led DNC was more Pro-Indian in the context that this party believed in bringing J&K more and more close towards the integration to Indian Union. The Party was in favour to extend more Central laws to the State i-e Jurisdiction of Election Commission of India (ECI). In fact it was during this period when the process of erosion of Special Status under article 370 was started with the consent of Legislative Assembly of J&K.

It is also a fact that DNC didn’t face as much difficulties as ‘Praja Socialist Party’ faced before two years. The new political opposition was slomly based on ‘specific political ideology’ unlike PSP which had no definite ideas and objectives. The main strengthen of the DNC was its mass support of the people. NC led by Bakshi was not in a position to erode this mass following of DNC. Though the ruling NC of Bakshi was still upper hand in Assembly, as the Party was enjoying two-third

65 Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at Political Crossroads, 68. 66 Interview with G.M. Sadiq, quoted in Singh, State Politics in India, 79. 67 The core members of Democratic National Conference like G. M. Sadiq, G.L. Dogra, Syed Mir Qasim, D.P. Dhar, Ram Piara Saraf, Krishen Dev Sethi and Tarlochan Datt and many more were well educated and majority of them were law degree holders and participated in well-articulated sessions of legislative assembly. Thus it was the first time in post 1948 that vibrant and healthy discussion was witnessed in legislative house. 68 Jammu and Kashmir Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. 4, August 13, 1958, 85. 104 majority with fifty-five seats. But at the same time Sadiq led opposition was seen as main threat to the ruling NC. Bakshi and his administration failed to repeat the old policy to suppress the opposition this time, because all the leaders were well versed with the old policies and tactics of ruling regime. Thus Bakshi was not only exposed by these opposition members but at the same time they stood against all odds and strategies that Bakshi used to overthrow his enemies like Praja Socialist Party, Socialist Democratic Front and Praja Parishad in past. In this way all the relevance and validity of old policy of Bakshi to rule with iron hand lost its political relevance in changing political dynamics of State polity. In this way for the first time in Legislative Assembly the opposition was born with numerically well in number. In fact the ruling regime NC first led by Sheikh Abdullah then Bakshi used all dictatorial methods to suppress the opposition since State acceded with India. But once DNC started her political journey in very odd situation after 1957 State Assembly elections, the Party succeeded in making serious possible efforts to oppose the policies and programmes of ruling regime of Bakshi & Co. Thus the new brand of political opposition within the State Assembly became virtually much stronger, which Bakshi as premier could not take opposition lightly69 (Tables 3.1, 3.2, & 3.4). All these leaders and well-experienced political stalwarts of the State imparted a new life and image to the opposition within the State Legislative Assembly that was previously dominated by ‘single party and one ideology’ of NC. The political vacuum in the Assembly was for the first time filled by an alternative political force that had all the skills of healthy opposition and experience of many years of the state polity. Unlike past, the Assembly witnessed healthy debates pertaining to the issues of local and national importance. The monolithic culture of NC was seriously damaged by new forces. Earlier, there was unique type of Assembly represented by NC with no opposition at all. Because in the absence of any strong and vibrant political opposition there was no other political force, which could have challenged the Bakshi & his coterie. Hence whatever was the viewpoint or ideology of Bakshi or NC, it had to be accepted by its Party legislators and Assembly without any objection or rejection.

The birth of DNC thus ended this culture of NC and now Assembly was open to harshly criticize the local issues and policies of government. Almost all the members of the DNC fully participated in the discussion and debates of the

69 Interview with Syed Mir Qasim and G.M. Sadiq; quoted in Singh, State Politics in India, 79. 105

Assembly. As already discussed that all the members of DNC were well educated and experienced and this was one upper hand that all of them were familiar with the rules of proceedings, parliament work, and matters associated to the government issues.70 All the leaders of the opposition DNC were well acquainted with the policies and programs of Bakshi and of the government functioning. They also had the acquaintance of the ruling regime as how it dealt with the opposition groups in the past. This whole political scene was deliberated by The Times of India in the following words: “By any standard it was a very effective opposition giving no quarter or respite to the Treasury Benches.”71

In fact, till 1958 no other political group or Party was so much well organized, resilient political ideology, numerically strong, politically aware and above all support of the lager section of the society as was of DNC. It would not be wrong to say that the DNC because of its ideology and organized Party structure; got solely distinguished as a well-knit political opposition force. Noted political commentator Balraj Puri have explained this political phenomenon as:

G.M. Sadiq led the group of dissidents out of the party to form the Democratic National Conference which provided the most effective constitutional opposition the state had yet had…The party filled a new vacuum that had existed in the opposition politics of the state. It had the advantage of the stature of its leadership, wide contacts and resources, all of which it had earned by sharing power for a decade.72

However, the opposition in the form of DNC didn’t last long. Even this numerically small but Constitutional group could not, with the passage of time and changing political realities of the state, survive even minimum norms of a democratic opposition. Bakshi was able to rule without the support of Sadiq led DNC, but at the same time Bakshi also felt much concerned about the growing popularity of DNC and losing his social base to its rival group. He was also worried about losing the support of his own Party members in Legislative Assembly. It is also true that the leadership of Sadiq to organize DNC was much stronger than of Bakshi. Many members of the Assembly where now ready to join DNC, thus that would have further eroded the

70 Interviews with D.P. Dhar and Syed Mir Qasim, quoted in Singh, State Politics in India, 79. 71 Times of India, March 27, 1958. 72 Puri, State politics in India, 229-30. 106 position and popularity of premier Bakshi. Hence he was in no mood to give Sadiq more concession to weaken his own position in J&K. To prevent further erosion, Bakshi became more apprehensive because things were going out of his hand. In order to prevent any further harm, Bakshi was of the opinion that Centre especially Pandit Nehru must intervene to persuade the members of DNC particularly Sadiq to return NC. In Delhi, both political leadership and policy makers were keenly monitoring this whole political development (Drama), because State was passing through one of its most crucial times. Sheikh & Co was in no mood to give up their demand of Plebiscite or right to self-determination under UN resolutions. The social base of Plebiscite Front was growing much fast. Thus Centre felt it necessary to intervene to prevent situation in the State from going bad to worse, as geopolitically J&K was/is still a very sensitive territory. The fragmentation of mainstream politics was itself threat to the ruling regime. This whole political atmosphere was summarized by Professor Balbir Singh in the following words: “It was feared by the Centre that this would further weaken the hold of the state government by encouraging secessionist elements within the state and hostile ones outside.”73

Thus keeping all these political happenings in consideration, the Centre broke its silence and intervened to avoid further conflict between Sadiq and Bakshi. The leadership in Delhi used all its influence to persuade Sadiq for negotiation to return to the Bakshi led NC. Even few political commentators and State politicians believed that Bakshi used all his influence and requested Pandit Nehru for his special intervention to end the confrontation and ask Sadiq to return to the parent organization of NC. The nationalist leaders became more concerned about the State politics because it was the time when “Disunity among the ranks of nationalist forces”74 was too high in J&K. The leadership under Nehru took serious note of this; the two groups were merged together by intervention of late Indra Gandhi. It was on 5th December 1961 when both the parties DNC of Sadiq and NC led by Bakshi joined together. Sadiq formerly announced that his political group of DNC does not exist anymore. He along with his three members namely D.P. Dhar, G.L. Dogra and Mir

73 Singh, State Politics in India, 80. 74 Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 48; for details Rahul Jalal, “A bridge to the Valley,” Frontline, Feb. 5, 2016. 107

Qasim were included in State cabinet in 1961 under the leadership of Bakshi.75 While justifying his decision to merge the DNC with NC led by Bakshi, Sadiq claimed that:

I agree entirely with Bakshi Sahib that the time has come when a supreme effort must be made for bringing together and welding into a common endeavour all those who stand for the unity and integrity of Jammu and Kashmir as an integral part of India. Not only will such deep a step result in creating a favorable climate for the speedy implementation of the projects intended to raise the economic standards of the people, but it will at the same time defeat all such elements who wish to sow suspicion and discord in the minds of our people in order to divert their attention from the urgent task of economic reconstruction and social regeneration.76

To follow the same program and logic, the working committee of the DNC passed its resolution to merge with NC. The resolution stated that:

The Working Committee reviewed the situation both in the internal and external aspects and also the continuing difficulties and dangers confronting the country from the borders of our state. The Working Committee is of the opinion that in order to meet the new challenges to the security and integrity of our Motherland, it is the imperative need of the hour to unite all the secular and democratic forces within the state by eschewing controversies and bickering.77

Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that, on two separate occasions a strong political opposition was born as an outcome of split in NC. However, due to the strong intervention of Centre in the local political affairs of J&K and the policies of the ruling regime that was led by Bakshi & Co didn’t allow opposition to operate democratically. Thus State lost its first opposition group when Mirza Afzal Beg was arrested and second because of the political completions Sadiq led DNC was merged with NC on the advice and instructions of Jawaharlal Nehru. The dialogue between the two pro-Indian political parties and their merger with one another was seen as

75 Singh, Heir Apparent, 61. 76 Statement issued by Shri G.M. Sadiq, President of DNC, November 28, 1960, in ‘Reunion’, J&K National Conference (Publicity wing). Quoted in, Choudhary, Jammu and Kashmir: politics of identity and separatism, 38. 77 Ibid., 38-39. 108

National victory in India; even this political development was hailed by communal forces as ‘triumph of national interests’ of India in J&K.

3.5 Revival of National Conference: Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and Politics of the State

When Sadiq along his associates merged NC with INC, the decision was strongly opposed by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad and his few political workers. This group led by Bakshi became stronger after the death of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964. Bakshi was now able to do his political activities in free atmosphere. Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that for Bakshi it was impossible during Nehru’s time to come back in politics. Thus death of Nehru offered opportunity to Bakshi and his sympathizers to manipulate the State politics. It was during the rule of Sadiq that Bakshi & Co started to revive the NC. The main objective behind this political move was to revive a group that will discharge the duties of opposition within the Legislative Assembly. The motive was also to put check and balance on ruling regime of Congress under Sadiq and Qasim. It was in this back ground that about twenty members joined the Bakshi’s new NC.78 In post 1948, it was the third time when democratically well-organized political opposition was born in State political corridors. Thus the situation was not much different from what was witnessed in 1957, when Sadiq formed DNC. Perhaps we can say this time the political drama of 1957 was repeated but was reverse in nature. In 1957, it was Bakshi who was the premier of the State and Sadiq was in opposition. Now seven years later in 1964, Sadiq was in power and Bakshi was in opposition inside the Assembly. Though, the Bakshi’s group was numerically stronger in 1964 with twenty members, while as Sadiq in 1957 had only thirteen members79 (Tables 3.4 & 3.5). This whole state of political affairs is explained by Balbir Singh as:

Thus, the new opposition which emerged as a result of the party’s split was quantitatively stronger but qualitatively inferior to the opposition that emerged as a result of the party’s split in 1957. In 1965, the opposition group inside the state assembly consists of about 27 members in all, 20 of

78 Puri, Kashmir Towards Insurgency, 48; for detailed political development of this era see, Farrukh Faheem, “Three Generations of Kashmir’s Azaadi: A Short History of Discontent,” EPW, Vol. 51, Issue No. 35, 27 Aug, 2016. 79 The Statesman, March 6, 1965. 109

whom belonged to the National Conference, 5 belonged to the Jana Sangh and 2 were independents. For the first time the opposition in the assembly represented a little over one-thirds of the state Assembly’s total strength.80

However, due to the leadership crisis in NC (revived by Bakshi), the Party could not pose any serious threat to ruling regime of Congress led by Sadiq. Bakshi alone was a man who possessed the qualities of leadership to run the Party affairs, thus he become handicapped without having well known political faces in NC. As compared to Sadiq, the group that was led by Bakshi was not skillful and experienced enough to provide any serious alternative force to oppose Sadiq government.

It is true that group of NC, led by Bakshi could have survived as well- organized political opposition in state Assembly, had this group been able to provide the necessary and qualitative leadership inside Assembly. However, the arrest of Bakshi in 1965 was yet another setback to NC. The arrest of Bakshi not only weakened opposition in the State Assembly but at the same time it was yet another stroke to development of ‘mature democracy’ in the political corridors of J&K. Though the members associated with NC played vital role inside and outside the Assembly during 1965 to 1967, and after State Assembly was dissolved for conducting new elections that were going to be held in the same year. But it also is a fact that NC members created uproar and difficulties in running the Assembly smoothly. They criticized Congress government of ignoring the separate Kashmiri identity and Nationalism. Thus till 1967, the Sadiq was not able to function in independent atmosphere. He used to take all precautions with absolute care particularly after NC was merged with Congress. While as on the other hand, the elections of 1967 witnessed the old phenomenon of unopposed returns (Table 3.5). The NC was totally isolated, plus the Party defection within the NC was also the reason that Party could not make any strong inroads into Assembly. The process of political integration after 1953 was one of the reasons that people were deeply alienated from NC. Though the Party maintained its ideological allegiance to ‘Naya Kashmir Manifesto’ but political credibility of NC was eroded to a great extent. Bakshi was the only political figure who consolidated NC during this time; however, he was elected to Lok Sabha from Srinagar in 1967.81 The shift of Bakshi from State

80 Singh, State Politics in India, 81. 81 Ibid., 79-81. 110

Assembly to Lok Sabha was yet another setback to NC, it created serious political vacuum and there was no person like him in the Party, who could have filled his gap. Moreover, the unopposed returns in 1967 witnessed the trend going little bit downwards from 34 in 1962, the tally came down to 22 in State Assembly elections82 (Table 3.5).

Bakshi and his associates accused Congress of rigging, unfairness and malpractices in elections. Even all the State political stalwarts from Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, later Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Syed Mir Qasim all accused each other of rigging, fraud and malpractices in elections.83 Moreover, the members who belonged to the opposition parties like NC, Jana Sangh and other independent members boycotted Assembly session in protest of irregularities of election practices. During this period the State Assembly witnessed Fourteen members in opposition. Bakshi’s NC bagged eight seats. Out of the total Fourteen, Eight members returned to Congress. Thus opposition received serious setback because the total strength of the opposition in Assembly was now reduced to mere Nine.

In Parliamentary Democracy even one member of opposition had a great value to oppose the government. Though the opposition was numerically weak and fragmented but it still played its role. Many a times the opposition members put Congress government on defensive mode. The opposition didn’t allow government to function in monolithic culture and in fact all the opposition members didn’t miss a single opportunity to put the Congress Government of Sadiq in the dock. However, changing political realities of the State in mid-1965 to 1971, also led to the change in mind set of opposition members. The talks between Abdullah and Indira Gandhi were going on. To prevent further defection in the mainstream in Kashmir, Bakshi and his group was persuaded to return to ruling regime of Congress in 1971.84 In this way, State lost third chance to provide alternative political forces to the people of J&K to maintain democratic principles and features.

82 The Tribune February 7, 1968; Statistical reports of fourth general election in India 1967. 83 Interview with the state leaders, quoted in Singh, State politics in India, 66. 84 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the political cross roads 69; Ajit Kumar Singh, “J&K: Democracy and its Subversion,” South Asia Intelligence Review 9 (2011). 111

3.6 Opposition Outside the Assembly

The politics in Kashmir from the beginning of controversial state’s accession with the Union of India had been divided on ideological philosophy of both NC as well as of MC. The State saw both oppositions i.e. opposition within and outside the Assembly. Though, the opposition within the Assembly was not institutionalized and organized at that time. It was only post 1950’s that few candidates of Praja Parishad from Jammu could make to the Assembly. But the opposition outside the Assembly remained the permanent feature of Kashmir politics. The State saw many opposition groups which challenged the legality and legitimacy of state’s accession with India. If Praja Parishad in Jammu was in favor of complete integration of J&K with rest of the country, there were forces within the Kashmir who were in opposition to the ruling party i.e. NC. Among them one important party was Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara’s ‘Political Conference’. The Party came into existence as an outside opposition threat to the NC and its leader Abdullah. Though, Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara was part of NC during the anti-Dogra movement in Kashmir and played a significant role during the ‘Quit Kashmir’ movement, which was launched by Sheikh Abdullah. Kara emerged as top rank leader during this political struggle. However, Abdullah due to the personality threat of Kara did not offer or nominated him in cabinet neither in emergency administration nor was he nominated after the State election of 1952. The growing difference between the Sheikh and Kara led to the expulsion of Kara from the NC. The Party leaders labeled Kara with anti-party as well as anti-National activities. Leaders like Bakshi and others convinced Abdullah to expel Kara from the party, Sheikh, who had already foreseen Kara as a political opponent to his leadership expelled him.85

The first cracks in the monolithic politics of Kashmir and the leadership of NC occurred in 1948 when Ghulam Mohiuddin Kara parted his ways with Sheikh Abdullah. Though Kara remained neutral and did not participate in political affairs of the State from 1948. However, the growing communal tensions in Jammu under a well-organized manner under Praja Parishad and support of other ‘communalist parties’ from India led Kara to step into politics once again. The Delhi agreement, that was signed by Abdullah and Nehru in 1952 paved way for Ghulam Mohiuddin

85 “Man of the Match,” Kashmir Life (Srinagar weekly), May 26, 2014. 112

Kara to participate in politics. Many leaders and groups in Kashmir saw Delhi agreement again as an attempt to consolidate/assimilate the Kashmiri Nationalism within the Indian Nationalism. This led Kara to declare the inauguration of his party called ‘Political Conference’ officially in 1953. In the words of famous political activist and commentator late Balraj Puri, “the party emerged as first pro-Pakistan opposition party in Kashmir.”86 Puri quite interestingly gives this whole context when he met Nehru. To quote Puri:

In view of the importance of Kara’s personality and his well-known secular conviction, I pleaded with Nehru that his loyalty to the country need not be routed through Abdullah and that his democratic right to oppose the state government should be recognized, Nehru agreed on theoretical soundness of my argument but maintained that India’s Kashmir policy revolved around the personality of Abdullah and, therefore, nothing should be done to weaken him. I had a similar response from Jayaprakash Narayan, the leader of socialist party. He too disapproved the idea of opposition party within the state as long as it remained a subject of International dispute.87

Moreover, the political journey of Political Conference was not easy, the authoritarian rule of NC first under Abdullah and then under Bakshi suppressed the activists and workers of Political Conference from time to time. This resulted in successfully emerging discontent among the people both against the state government as well as against Delhi in Kashmir. The consequence of this suppression was evident in post 1953 politics of Kashmir, when many opposition groups emerged and challenged the state’s accession to India. Though Balraj Puri put his all efforts to convince Nehru for giving space to opposition politics in the State, but his all efforts failed to yield any results. To quote Puri, I ‘Balraj Puri’ was able to convince Ashok Mehta, president of Praja Socialist Party (PSP) to extend its activities in Jammu and Kashmir but Nehru dissuaded/discouraged leaders like Moulana Mohammad Seed Masoodi and Chaudry Mohammad Shafi, both were Parliament members at that time, from joining the party.” In this regard the activities of Praja Socialist Party were suppressed in J&K. Moreover, Nehru accused the PSP and its leadership of joining

86 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 50. 87 Ibid. 113 hands with enemies of the country. However, Nehru changed his attitude and suggested Balraj Puri in 1962 that PSP should contest the Assembly elections of the State as India was earning bad reputation in the world for its unopposed elections of 1952 and 1957 Assembly elections in J&K88 (Table 3.4). Like Political Conference there was yet another Opposition outside the Assembly that openly challenged the state’s accession with India. This organization namely Plebiscite Front was set up after the dismissal of Abdullah.

3.7 Plebiscite Front: Emergence, Role and Disappearance

The arrest and removal of Sheikh Abdullah, who was the ‘Chief proponent of Kashmiri Nationalism’, from Prime Ministership of State was made successful by his close aide G. M. Bakshi. The dismissal of Abdullah and installation of Bakshi as PM of J&K led serious Party rifts within NC. One group was represented under the leadership of Abdullah and Afzal Beg, who were in prison on famous ‘Kashmir conspiracy case’ against Abdullah and others. While as on the other hand group of NC was led by Bakshi who accepted the throne for himself. This split continued till Abdullah was released and joined the main stream politics again in 1975 as Chief Minister of J&K after signing Kashmir Accord. The political developments after 1953 and arrest of Abdullah generated a sense of ‘political alienation’ among large section of society. The dismissal of Abdullah was seen as a betrayal on part of the Indian leadership particularly of Nehru. It increased the separatist tendencies which were already there after ‘state’s controversial accession’ with Union of India and state’s disputed nature was still debated in UN. There were always groups of people who criticized Abdullah and his policies and pro-Indian attitude both pre and post 1947. The dismissal of Abdullah gave opportunity to these forces to come under single banner and fight for the right to self-determination. It was in the year 1955 when the right hand of Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg formed new political group, this Party was named as ‘Plebiscite Front’89 with the objective to fight for the right to self- determination that was promised by UN in its many resolutions. The Party came into existence when Abdullah was in jail. The members led by Afzal Beg started their political activity against the Bakshi led NC in every corner of Valley. Afzal Beg was

88 Ibid., 51-52; for detailed analysis see Balraj Puri, “Politics of the Elections in Kashmir,” EPW, Vol. 2, Issue no. 8, feb 25, 1967. 89 Prem Nath Bazaz, Democracy through intimidation and terror, The Untold story of Kashmir Politics (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1978), 17. 114 succeeded to formulate an opposition group of eleven members within the NC, however majority of the NC members were loyal to Bakshi.90 It was under Bakshi that the Constituent Assembly finally ratified the state’s accession with Union of India in the year 1956. The change in policy of Nehru after 1953 was evident in his many public speeches regarding holding Plebiscite in Kashmir. It was in the March of 1956, when Pandit Nehru addressed Indian Parliament and said “Plebiscite in Kashmir was beside the point” and “Pakistani aggression in Kashmir and the legality of Kashmir’s accession to India.”91 Nehru claimed that the state’s final word regarding the accession had been ratified by none other than the people’s body known as ‘Constituent Assembly’ in 1954. Thus change of guards in Kashmir not only affected the State’s Special Status but it led change vis-a-vis Kashmir dispute in Delhi. But on the other hand the people of Kashmir did not remain silent even during the calamity of hostilities between India and Pakistan. There were number of opposition groups which were underground who raised their voices by demonstrating and protesting on the streets in favour of Plebiscite. Among them groups like Kashmir Political Conference, the Awami Action Committee (ACC) and the Plebiscite Front, they were joined by Young Men, who were students and demanded the resolution of Kashmir dispute.92 In the words of late social activist and political commentator Balraj Puri, the secessionist movement continues to draw its legitimacy from the government of India’s commitment to a Plebiscite and the United Nations Security Council resolutions related to Kashmir. The prolonged uncertainty over the future of Kashmir has affected the Kashmiris Psyche deeply to enable the Kashmiris to develop loyalties to India.93 Once the State’s Constituent Assembly ratified the accession, Abdullah who was in jail missed no time to criticize the State and Centre government. He called immediate suspension of Constituent Assembly and called Bakshi ‘Delhi’s man in Kashmir.’ While as Afzal Beg, a close associate of Abdullah setup ‘war Council’ and subsequently on 9 of August 1955, Beg converted this Council into new political force called (Mahazi-i-Rai Shumari) Plebiscite Front94. However, Beg was

90 Singh, Heir Apparent, 15. 91 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of conflict, paths to peace, 70-71. 92 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 345; For detailed analysis see, Gull Mohammad Wani, “Political assertion of Kashmiri identity,” in The parchment of Kashmir (ed) Nyla Ali Khan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 125-152. 93 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 22. 94 Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 12 November 12, 1955; Khalid Bashir Ahmad, “Plebiscite, Kashmir and Sher-e-Kashmir,” Kashmir Ink (Srinagar weekly), March 7, 2017. 115 not alone in establishment of this front; he received full patronage of Abdullah and other close members who were against Centre and State government. The ‘Front’ during its earlier days functioned in closed doors. Most of its workers were working underground to strengthen the Party and its ideology with an aim to fight for the cause of right to self-determination through free and fair Plebiscite. The front usually used slogans like:

Rai Shumari foran karo (Hold plebiscite at once), Jis Kashmir ko khoon se seencha woh Kashmir hamara hai (Kashmir that we irrigated with our blood belongs to us) and Yeh mulk hamara hai iska faisla hum karaingay (This country is ours and we will decide its future.95

Thus the Front emerged as a strong political entity only after the dismissal of Abdullah in 1953 in the disturbed political climate of Kashmir. Afzal Beg took very harsh stand when he contested the legality of state’s accession with India. He was of the opinion that the final authority lays with the people of J&K to decide their birth right by holding impartial Plebiscite in J&K.96 People started to follow Abdullah and Beg not as mainstream leaders but as separatists who were demanding something that was against Indian Constitution and Delhi. The organization became so strong, that each year 9th August was observed as ‘Black Day’ by people in general and activists in particular. Pakistan on the other hand fully supported Plebiscite Front led by Afzal Beg. The NC flag was replaced by ‘Front Green Flag’.97 In all of their speeches Abdullah and Beg challenged the provisions of Indian Constitution and asserted that state’s accession with India is not final but temporary. The Front made it clear that it is with the peaceful settlement of Kashmir dispute but that settlement should fall within the ambit of United Nations resolutions on Kashmir to hold free and fair Plebiscite.98 The Front got huge momentum from public and was followed with full zeal and vigor to achieve right to self-determination. While as on the other side Delhi tried all its means to label the Front as an anti-national organization that was backed by Pakistan. People firmly stood with leadership of Abdullah and Beg during all these miseries and trouble times. Though a number of people associated with Front got

95 Ahmad, “Plebiscite, Kashmir and Sher-e-Kashmir,” Kashmir Ink, March 7, 2017. 96 The Tribune, (Ambala), January 17, 1955. 97 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, triumph and tragedy of Indian federalism, 159-160. 98 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 49; For detailed analysis, Inderjit Badhwar, “History of Kashmir is a tortuous web of intrigue, reconciliation, deception and revolt,”India Today,May 31, 1989. 116 ruthlessly killed and many were arrested for supporting the cause of self- determination. On the other side, Delhi agreement that was signed between Nehru and Abdullah in 1952 for state’s confirmation of Autonomy or Special Status was now challenged by Afzal Beg and Plebiscite Front who had been then Party to agreement. However, the NC and Bakshi welcomed the agreement as a step towards building close and irrevocable relation with India.99 The Plebiscite Front not only opposed the state accession but it strongly came forward as the main political force which boycotted the Assembly elections of 1957 and 1962. The elections were rigged and it was already decided by the State and Centre as to not tolerate any opposition, be it mainstream or separatist. Thus in this way, Bakshi was sworn as premier of J&K both in 1957 and 1962 with absolute majority.

Abdullah was released in 1958 but due to popularity among the masses and his frequent anti-India speeches, he was charged to make a plan to overthrow the Bakshi government.100 He was again arrested along with other associates but many of the activists continued the legacy while opposing the government. Following the Plebiscite Front, Kashmiris begin to find a new spirit since the release of Abdullah in 1958. People of the state protested against the complete integration of J&K with India. There were many political channels that came into existence to express their feelings.101 Like Hurriyat Conference, article 370 of the Constitution of India was a much more irrelevant provision for Front leaders, because Party believed and recognized ‘Kashmir as a dispute’ and did not recognize the accession with India. For Front the article 370 was giving political legitimacy to the Indian claims that State is the integral part of India and to accept this provision would mean recognition of ‘Democratic institutions of India’. On the other side the Front labeled Bakshi government as fascist which is forcing people of Kashmir to accept the Constitution that have no public consent. Plebiscite Front boycotted the Constituent Assembly, when State Constitution was placed before Front leaders on 10 October 1956. One of the leading leaders of the Front Ghulam Mohi-ud-din Hamadani in his press statement said they had rejected the Draft of Constitution because this House of people had lost it symbolic character after the dismissal and arrest of Abdullah in 1953.

99 Constituent Assembly Debate, volume III, No. 3, 12 June, 1952. 100 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 99; Naqash, Kashmir from Crisis to Crisis, 113. 101 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 335. 117

Sheikh Abdullah along with Afzal Beg was released on 8 April 1964 after the Holy Relic of Prophet Mohammad PBUH disappeared in Srinagar and people started agitation in Kashmir. Release of Abdullah gave him yet another chance to raise the voice against the Constitutional changes and subsequently in his speeches, Abdullah insisted Delhi to hold Plebiscite in J&K. This whole political development was reported by The Times of India as: “Abdullah denies the state’s accession to India which was confirmed by the state Constituent Assembly.”102

Although the release of Abdullah was a calculated move from Delhi and talks between Nehru and Abdullah were going on. Thus it paved the way for Abdullah to visit Pakistan and convince the leadership there for acceptable solution of Kashmir problem. This whole political atmosphere was summed up in the following words:

Since our release from jail, we have tried to take stock of things and assess facts in relation to the Kashmir problem, its repercussions on the people of the sub-continent and on the relations between India and Pakistan. We have come to the inescapable conclusion that all efforts and energies should be concentrated on bringing about an amicable solution of this problem so as to ensure lasting friendship and amity between the two neighbours. Such a solution should of course reflect the will of the people of the state and satisfy their aspirations.103

However, the talks did not yield any result, as the death of Nehru in 1964 marked the end of era over Kashmir. In between Sheikh Abdullah continued his anti- state speeches publically. These developments were closely watched by media and new political leadership in Delhi. The press report of Times of India summoned the objective of Abdullah’s speeches in following words:

India was in forcible occupation of Kashmir….India should realise that she could not carry a nation (Kashmir) with her on the strength of her army and with the help of a few paid agents. The United States with all its strength could not keep Cuba under control. In today’s world no nation can be suppressed with the help of rifles.”104 “Kashmir would try their utmost

102 Times of India, (Delhi), April 11, 1964; for detailed analysis, Latif Ahmed Sherwani, “Kashmir's Accession to India Re-examined,” Pakistan Horizon, 52. 4 (1999), 49-77. 103 The Hindu, May 13, 1964. 104 Times of India, June 24, 1964. 118

to secure a peaceful solution of the problem, but if peaceful method fails, we shall have to launch a struggle.105

These statements from Sheikh Abdullah came when Plebiscite Front worked under his blessings. He openly challenged the state’s accession with India. The change of guards from Bakshi to Sadiq and later merger of NC into Congress by Sadiq created its own negative political vacuum. The process of integration reached its zenith when both the nomenclature of Wazir-i-Azam and Sadar-i-Riyasat were changed into Chief Minister and Governor respectively. Both Plebiscite Front and Awami Action Committee called for Hartal. Both parties issued the statement that “India wants to grab Kashmir completely by any constitutionally illegal and undemocratic means.”106

On June 27 and 28, 1964, the delegates of the Front in its white papers issued by Afzal Beg was an open Manuscript about the policy and attitude of Front vis-a-vis state’s accession and other provisions that were implemented to State after the dismissal of Abdullah. The white papers of Front were a proof of its ideology that to hold Plebiscite and the party stood for its ideology for near about twenty years, till 1975. On the other hand both the leaders Abdullah and Beg along with Beigum Abdullah went to Mecca on pilgrimage in 1965; ironically all the three described their nationality ‘Kashmiri Muslims and not Indian’.107 Apart from performing the rituals of Haj, Abdullah met many Muslim leaders including King Faisel of Saudi Arabia. All Muslim countries fully supported the right to self-determination of people of J&K.108 During this time Abdullah visited many countries and met many world leaders including the Chinese Premier Chou-En-Lai after his invitation.109 The visit of Abdullah created serious uproars within Indian intelligentsia. Quite understandingly, Prime Minister of India, Shastri took serious note of Abdullah’s contact with Indian enemy (China). However, during his absence in Kashmir the Plebiscite Front associates, under the leadership of Sofi Mohammad Akbar continued their protests

105 Hindustan Times, November 14, 1964; for detailed report Sumantra Bose, “Kashmir: sources of conflict, dimensions of peace,” Survival, 41.3, (1999), 149-171. 106 The Front, Srinagar, January 13, 1965; for detailed report of political developments of this period see Jyoti Bhusan Das Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir (Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), 377-383. 107 Puri, Insurgency and After, 158; Gundevia, The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah, 127-130. 108 Singh, Flames of the Chinar, 158. 109 Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 50. 119 and mass movement.110 When Sheikh Abdullah along with Afzal Beg returned from abroad, they were arrested in 1965 and detained in Madras (Mumbai). The arrest of both the leaders generated anger in the valley and protests erupted. The response of the Indian state was very harsh and forces hammered the protestors with brute force. Activists of the Plebiscite Front were arrested on a large scale.111 At the same time noted political commentator late Balraj Puri remarked that the Plebiscite Front which was led by Abdullah and his close associates continued to swear by secularism and Gandhian values.112

After the 1964 Holy Relic movement there was a remarkable rise and growth in secessionist youth politics in J&K. Two prominent youth organizations were born, one was led by Abdul Rashid Kabli known as ‘Students and Youth League’ and the other was called as ‘Young Men’s League’ which enjoyed the full patronage of Plebiscite Front founder Afzal Beg. The 1965 Students upsurge saw the emergence of a few more organizations such as ‘Youth Action Committee’ and ‘Students Plebiscite Front.’ These youth organizations and their political movements in the J&K were by and large peaceful. They had the same slogan like that of Plebiscite Front i.e. right to self-determination. However, the fragmentation of these youth movements and organizations plus multiplicity of their numbers infused an element of militancy in some of them.113 In 1971, some youth were arrested in connection with an attempt of looting Hazratbal branch of J&K bank. The main accused in this incident were identified with Alfateh. During those days in Kashmir, Alfateh had emerged as a militant rebellion armed organization. The aim and objective of this armed group was to liberate Kashmir from India by armed struggle. The militancy which emerged in Kashmir in post 1987 period can be traced back to this Alfateh cell. It is believed that the Alfateh group was sole brain child of Plebiscite Front led by Afzal Beg. The Chief of this organization was Ghulam Rasool Zahgeer.114 However, inside the four walls of prison Alfateh got divided into two groups. One group was led by Ghulam Rasool

110 Akbar, Kashmir behind the vale, 169; for detailed analysis Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay, “Kashmir: The valley's political dynamics,” Contemporary South Asia , 4.1 (1995), 79-101. 111 Korbel, Danger in Kashmir, 322-325; Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 34. 112 Puri, Kashmir insurgency and after, 32. 113 Zafar Mehraj, “Rise of Militancy in Kashmir-A perspective,” Kashmir Times, Sunday, September 24, 1989. 114 Some other prominent members of this organization were Nazir Ahmad Wani, who was then district agricultural officer in the state government. Mohammad Fazul Haq, Dr. Farooq Ahmad Butt, Dr. Abdul Alla, Mohd Altaf Khan (Alias Azam Iquilabi) for details see Noorani, “Jammu and Kashmir Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 120

Zahgeer who was a pro-Plebiscite Front leader, while as the other group was led by Nazir Ahmad Wani, who was against the Plebiscite leaders including Sheikh Abdullah.115 Towards the end of 1973, all arrested activists of Alfateh Cell were released from the jail. The two factions or groups of Alfateh cell in jail emerged as two political parties. One was led by Zahgeer called Awami Inquilabi Mahaz (People’s Revolutionary Front) and the other led by Nazir Ahmad Wani came to be known as People’s League.

During the Premiership of G.M. Sadiq, State Assembly elections were held in 1967. As it was expected that Plebiscite Front will not contest these elections, the Party rejected to file nomination papers and boycotted elections. Thus result was evident; Sadiq became the Chief Minister with the help of fraud and rigged elections. The opposition parties were not allowed to contest, except three candidates from Praja Parishad no one succeeded to enter into Assembly from Jammu. Although leaders like Afzal Beg and wife of Sheikh, Beigum Abdullah were allowed to visit the State in 1967 from Delhi. Later Abdullah too was allowed to visit the State. However, he continued his policy of criticizing State and Central government in many of his public rallies. Abdullah and other political activists of Plebiscite Front were again arrested and were lodged in different jails. In the meantime there was a shift in Abdullah’s ideology after the Bangladesh liberation war in 1971. Following the war with Pakistan and fall of Decca, the security issues in J&K was now a major challenge for Delhi and State government. Though Abdullah, this time was ready to contest the Assembly elections of 1972, but Indira Gandhi was in no mood to lift the ban on Abdullah and his associates. The Assembly elections of 1972 were conducted in which Congress won 57 of the seats. While as it was for the first time Jamaat-i- Islami contested these elections and won Five Assembly segments (Tables 3.3 & 3.5). Many political commentators like Sumantra Bose believe that Jamaat was backed by State Chief Minister Qasim to oppose the Pro-Independence Front of Afzal Beg.116 On the other side of the State politics, the Plebiscite Front which was fighting for the right to self-determination was declared unlawful. Even the members of Plebiscite

115 Mehraj, “Rise of Militancy in Kashmir-A perspective,” Kashmir Times, September 24, 1989. 116 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to peace, 86-87; Statistical report on general elections, 1972 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K, 1973. 121

Front were also debarred form taking part in State elections.117 The reason was clear that State was not in a mood to give Front a chance to enter into Assembly and wreck the State Constitutions within. All-important leaders of Front were externed from the State. In this way the doors of the Democracy were closed for the Front members while as rigged and unfair polls gave birth to new political tendencies in political climate of Kashmir.118 Thus we can say that it was a deliberate attempt not to allow the Front leaders to enter into Assembly and to get public legitimacy which would strengthen the separatist trends in J&K. In this way the Front became a major irritant for both Centre and State government. In the eyes of Delhi, “Prison apparently had taught Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah nothing.” While as on the other side leadership in Delhi under Indira Gandhi closed all doors of the state’s accession by making her statement public that: “Accession of Kashmir is part of our history and history cannot be reserved or changed. The Kashmir question has been settled once for all.”119

After the fall of Decca and Tashkent agreement, government decided to lift ban on Plebiscite Front. All its leaders including Afzal Beg and Abdullah were released and there was complete shift in the policies and programs of Abdullah and Beg. They started batting for Autonomy and forgot the demand of Plebiscite. It was from here that Sheikh appointed his close political associate Afzal Beg to assure peaceful negotiations with Delhi. This in due course of time was known as ‘Kashmir Accord’. Once the Kashmir accord of 1975 was signed, the case for right to self- determination was closed by Plebiscite Front firebrand leader Afzal Beg. This led to the change of guards and it was in the year 1975 Sheikh Abdullah was sworn as the Chief Minister of State along with other Cabinet ministers including Afzal Beg. While on the other side the group which was led by Zahgeer had full support of the leadership of Plebiscite Front and the Constitution of this group believed in separation of J&K from India. However, when Kashmir Accord was signed, this organization was wound up and its members were either inducted into government services or given other favours. In this way Sheikh Abdullah not only made compromise on the basic right i.e. right to self-determination but at the same time Autonomy, that was eroded after 1953 was never restored till date. The political leadership at Centre under

117 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After 54; Noorani, “Roots of the Kashmir dispute,” Frontline, May 27, 2016. 118 Varma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 86-87. 119 Copeland, “The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the 1947 Crisis,”, 218-254. 122

Indira Gandhi achieved her goal for Nation and here was Abdullah who spent twenty two years in prison, accepted the Accord on humiliating terms, merely for the Chair of Chief Ministership. However, things changed after Beg entered into talks with Delhi and Plebiscite Front got divided into two groups. One group was led by Afzal Beg and another faction was represented by People’s League120 as the main anti- Accord youth organization. The Party led several protests and demonstration against the Accord. These people opposed to give up demand of right to self-determination and criticized Abdullah and Beg of selling out the cause for which they were fighting from two decades under the banner of Plebiscite Front.

3.8 The Advent of Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq: Role of AAC as an Opposition

This group of people was also one of the strong resistance Socio-Political forces which served as a well organized opposition in J&KS. Though the history of AAC in J&K can be traced to the late 1960s, when Holy Relic (Moi-e-Muqaddas) of Prophet Mohammad (PBUH) disappeared in Hazratbal in 1964. It was under the leadership of Maulana Syed Masoodi, Party secretary of NC, who laid the foundation of ‘All Action Committee Party.’ This Committee comprised of fifteen members and was headed by Maulvi Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi and Farooq Abdullah (Son of Sheikh Abdullah) and Mirwaiz Moulvi Mohammad Farooq were few young faces who were included in the Committee. With the passage of time the Committee succeeded in establishing local branches all over the State, particularly their main focus was Valley of Kashmir. Thus Committee became one of the main political opposition to the ruling NC government. The agitation for the recovery of the Holy Relic created frustration in Delhi, because there has never been dearth of people in Delhi who have a genius of converting every opportunity into a problem. This can be analyzed in speech of then home secretary, Vishwenathan and I.B Director B. N. Mullik declared that the AAC was an instrument of Pakistan and their demand for the identification of the Holy Relic was anti National.121

120 The league leaders include Nazir Wani, Hamidullah Bhat, Azam Inquilabi and Shabir Shah presently president of Democratic Freedom party and Member of the Hurriyat group led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Shabir shah, who was then district president of People’s League. 121 Puri, “Hazratbal and After Honour the word,” Hindustan Times, December 6, 1993; for detailed analysis of holy relic agitation see, Idrees Kanth “The Social and Political Life of a Relic: The Episode 123

While as on the other side, NC government under Shamsuddin was hardly working during this incident. It seems whole administration was run by AAC. Mirwaiz Molvi Farooq along with Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra a prominent leader of Political Conference (then a Pro-Pakistani group as discussed in the Chapter above) called public protest at historic Lal Chowk Srinagar, where thousands of the people assembled. Both Mirwaiz Farooq and Karra addressed the large gathering. It was from here Mirwaiz Farooq threatened government of raising Fidayeen-e-Islam to mobilize the villages and every corner of State. Although the Relic was found within few days but the damage it had done was irrevocable. The AAC became stronger and now started new political discourses within J&K. It did not give up and started organizing public meetings in Srinagar city.122 The Relic incident shacked the political setup of J&K. The new leader emerged in the form of young Mirwaiz Molvi Mohammad Farooq. People began to call him ‘Young Farooq.’123 The demands made by AAC were not any serious threat to nation, claims Karan Singh, then Sadar-e- Riyasat of J&K. Singh believes that despite the public violent movement and failure of government, the AAC did not resort to any anti-national activities. They appealed to the government of India to look into this serious matter not as any outsider power.124 It was after the brief debate and discussion in Delhi under the leadership of Nehru that Lal Bahadur Shastri was sent to Srinagar on 30th January, 1964. He met many leaders including Premier Shamsuddin.125 After the Hazratbal incident the Central government under Nehru redesigned its approach and policies towards Kashmir. State witnessed change of guards. Sadiq was elected leader of NC on the advice of Central government.126 Similarly Sadiq replaced Prime Minister Shamsudddin on 28th February 1964.127 Sadiq was more loyal to Delhi and Nehru. He enjoyed unqualified support from government of India, particularly of Nehru, because he believed in total integration of state with Union of India.128

of the Moi-e-Muqaddas Theft in Kashmir, 1963-1964,” Himalaya the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies, 38.2 (2018), 10. 122 Bamazai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, 817. 123 Dr. Kamran Khan, “The immortal character of Mirwaiz Farooq,” Rising Kashmir, May 21, 2017. 124 Singh, Heir Apparent, 101. 125 Others he met were Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq, Mir Qasim, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, D.P. Dhar and other six members of Awami Action Committee including Maulana Masoodi, for further see, Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 69. 126 Bamazai, Culture and Political History of Kashmir, 816. 127 Qasim, My life and Times 99. 128 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 70. 124

However, the Party AAC could not survive for long and it was on 20th June 1964 that the Party got divided into two groups. Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq led his own group known as ‘Awami Action Committee’. This group under Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq led several public protests against the government to investigate the theft of ‘Holy Relic’ in 1963. The Party played significant role during these crucial months in recovery of Relic.129 But things changed very fast, once Relic was found; the Party i.e. led by Mirwaiz Farooq started to take active role in political affairs of the State. Party was already divided between the supporters of Plebiscite Front led by Abdullah and Beg, while as on the other hand there were number of people who followed Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq. Mirwaiz emerged a strong voice of his time, after joining politics; he urged India and Pakistan to resolve Kashmir issue by trilateral talks. He released his own Urdu newspaper which he published under the pen name of ‘Hurriyat and Haroof-e-Haq’.130 This was weekly paper that in due course of time became mouth piece of ACC. It is also fact that before the Committee was divided Sheikh Abdullah was using the platform of same ‘All JK Awami Action Committee’ for his political gains to pressurize State and Central government for his release. The split of Committee into two groups was not good sign for Abdullah as he suffered a setback. Later Abdullah who once used this political entity called it as merely a small faction and not a strong opposition political body, led by Mirwaiz Farooq for his personal benefits.131 Since the formation of AAC in Kashmir its firebrand leader Mirwaiz Farooq succeeded in making his group develops an open Pro-Pakistan attitude that had its own impact on the political land scape of J&K. In many of his public gatherings, Mirwaiz lashed out to those forces that were defending the state’s accession with India.132 Mirwaiz regarded Kashmir a political dispute that was yet to solve according to the aspirations of people of Kashmir. Like many other leaders of the time Mirwaiz Farooq also blamed Sheikh Abdullah for joining the state with Indian Union for his individual intrigue. He not only criticized Abdullah but equally accused the New Delhi government for denying the basic human rights to the people of the state. Nevertheless the Constitution of AAC was

129 Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 74. 130 Khan, “The immortal character of Mirwaiz Farooq,” Rising Kashmir, May 21, 2017. 131 Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, 329. 132 Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 118. 125 established on the principle of right to self-determination for the people of J&K to decide their political future with partial and fair Plebiscite.133

Though Molvi Farooq was not taking active participation in electoral politics but the political developments in the State after 1975 changed this discourse also. Till now Mirwaiz was aloof from politics and was raising the demand of right to self- determination. But Mirwaiz Farooq made a paradigm shift in 1977 Assembly elections when he extended his partial support to Janta Party. He took a stand against Abdullah and stood with Moraiji Desai. Desai as a Prime Minister of India came personally to Mirwaiz for his support. Thus Mirwaiz changed his approach of not favouring electoral politics in the state. Yet it is also a fact that the AAC did not participate directly in Assembly or Parliamentary elections. Thus we can say that AAC was a well-organized political force that played significant role as an opposition outside the State Assembly. The Party first put serous pressure on both Central and State government to trace out the Holy Relic and second, the Party emerged a vibrant political group that challenged the Indian claim of Kashmir as an integral part. However, it is also important to mention that the AAC played its historic role in post 1975 political climate of Kashmir. The same will be discussed in Chapter fourth. The Party still exists today as a constituent unit of ‘All Parties Hurriyat Conference’ (APHC) led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, son of late Mirwaiz Molvi Mohammad Farooq.

3.9 Jamaat-e-Islami in J&K: Emergence

The Jamaat-e-Islami was founded by Syed Abu Ala Maudoodi134 and seventy five influential Indian Muslims in 1941. The Jamaat has emerged one of the most dominant Islamic movements both in South Asia and worldwide also. A local branch of Jamaat was established in Jammu during the early days of 1942. The Jammu region having the close geographical affinity with Panjab and Pathankot had its own implication on Kashmir political history. In Jammu, Mohammad Shafi one of the leading religious men was the main force to establish the branch of Jamaat and he was accompanied by another religious minded person Ghulam Ghause. It was from here that many Muslims from Jammu region attended the regular programs of Jamaat-

133 Gupta, Jammu and Kashmir, 329. 134 The main stalwarts, who founded Jamaat-I-Islami in 1941, including Maulana Maudoodi, Moulana Islahi and Afzal Hussain. 126 i-Islami. Slowly some influential Muslim faces from Kashmir also participated and attended the Party as observers.135 With the passage of time large numbers of people were influenced by the literature and the ideology of Maulana Maudoodi. Two persons played significant role in Kashmir. One was Saaduddin and other was Maulana Ahrar. Both these leaders organized meeting of like-minded persons in 1942 at Shopian. This meeting is regarded the first unofficial gathering (Ijtema) of Jamaat- i-Islami in J&K.136 It was in the year 1945 when Jamaat-i-Islami under the leadership of Syed Maudoodi held its first gathering (Ijtema) at Pathankot Panjab. The most important feature of this Ijtema was that at least four members from Kashmir participated in it. It was from here that the need was felt that there should be the organized party in Kashmir. Thus three prominent voices Saaduddin, Qari Saifuddin and Muhammad Hussain Chishti tried their best to enlarge the roots of the Jamaat in Kashmir. Saaduddin Tarabali was elected as first ‘Amir’137 of Jamaat which he holded till his retirement from Jamaat in 1985.138 He led the organization and made every possible effort to strengthen the Party at grass root level. He was greatly influenced by the organizational Chief Syed Maudoodi and his writings about Islam.139 It was by the efforts of these leaders that the first organized Ijtema was held in the heart of Srinagar. Thus the origin and trace of Jamaat-i-Islami J&K can be seen in the late nineteen century, when new middle class of Muslims erupted against the Dogra Autocracy. Many organizations came into existence during this phase notably ‘Anjuman Nusrat ul-Islam (The society for the victory of Islam) under Mirwaiz of Kashmir Moulana Rasul Shah, who played important role in reformation of society. The appeals of the religious and political leaders to the oppressed people of Kashmir during rule of Dogra gave birth to so many revolutionary organizations in Kashmir. Jamaat-i-Islami was one among them. Thus we can say that it was in the changing socio-political conditions that took place in Kashmir during 1930s and 50s that the Jamaat gained its roots also. Jamaat from its earlier years till eruption of armed

135 An interview with Ghulam Nabi Faridabadi, Ex-Amir of the Jamaat-i-Islami in Jammu Province and the member of Majhis-e-Shura and Majhis-e-Namiandgan at his residence on 23.02.1990, quoted in Singh, Political Awakening in Kashmir, 76. 136 Yoginder Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s–1990),” Modern Asian Studies, 36, 3 (2002), 16. 137 The head of the party is known as Amir-i-Jamaat and he is supported by Central Advisory Council Markazi Majlis-i-Shur’a. The Constitution of the Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir (Srinagar: Department of Publications and Publicity, Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, n.a), 12-13. 138 Sarwat Jamal, Qissa-i-Dard (Srinagar: Mizan Publications, 1996), 46-47. 139 Abdul Khaliq Hanif, Hamari Muhajirat: Asbab-o-Alal (Srinagar: Tulu Publications, 1998), 24. 127 struggle in Kashmir in mid 1980s made deep footprints in the State. The Party successfully managed to create a large support base within the valley in particular and whole state in general.

3.10 Jamaat-I-Islami: Role as an Opposition

After the bloody partition of the Indian Sub-Continent in 1947 into two dominion states, India and Pakistan, the founder of the Jamaat-I-Islami Syed Maudoodi also migrated from Pathankot Panjab to Lahore Pakistan. On the other side, the war of 1948 divided Kashmir between two countries. The members of Jamaat in Indian side of Kashmir were in favour of states accession with Pakistan.140 The Party remained committed to the state’s accession to Pakistan and its anti-India stand that won a massive support for the Party. The Muslim separate identity of state was under threat from the Hindu chauvinist in India. While as the growing influence of Kashmiri Pandits in administration from top to bottom and rigged elections also generated safe ground for the Jamaat an opportunity to oppose the rule of both NC and Centre claims Balraj Puri.141 Earlier, the followers of Jamaat always criticized secular forces of Nationalism especially of NC and its leaders.142 Jamaat with the passage of time attracted mostly the middle class educated people into Party fold. That is why during 1947-52 Jamaat opened its first school and launched the first Urdu newspaper of the party known as Azan. However, till 1952 the Jamaat-i-Islami Kashmir was governed by Constitution of Jamaat-i-Islami Hind. Because after the partition Jamaat too got divided into two groups Jamaat-i-Islami Pakistan which was headed by Maudoodi himself and another was Jamaat-I-Islami Hind. However, because of the disputed nature of J&K, the Jamaat-i-Islami Hind decided that the state branch of J&K should be detached from Jamaat-I-Islam Hind. Thus it was in this background that the Jamaat-I-Islami Kashmir came into existence. A separate Constitution was made which was completed in 1953 and those members who were associated with Jamaat accepted and passed this Constitution.143 It was post 1952 that the organization saw the substantial expansion in the valley. The undemocratic rule of NC under Abdullah during the early years from

140 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,”, 723. 141 Puri, Kashmir, Towards Insurgency, 29. 142 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,”, 717. 143 Ashiq Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970 Vol.2, (Srinagar: Markazi Maktaba-i-Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, n.a), 42. 128

1948 to 1953 and state’s accession with India was seen as ‘Sell Out’ by many leaders and common people, these members and people later become sympathizers of Jamaat claim Sikand144 which in later time became its hardcore members. Thus state’s disputed nature played its significant role in shaping the political ideology of Jamaat from its very early days. The dramatic arrest and imprisonment of Abdullah in 1953 led serious anti-India voices in Kashmir. People now openly challenged the Indian rule. The denial of democratic rights to the people of Kashmir from the Indian state was one of the factors that Jamaat found many well-wishers and new sympathizers and the Party emerged as one of the strong socio-political organizations. On the other hand the unique stand of the Jamaat regarding the state’s future according to the UN resolutions and people’s will also played a major role in making the Jamaat a relevant socio-political entity in J&K. The new members associated with Jamaat were not happy with the western and Indian style of ‘secular democracy’. They were also against the Kashmiri nationalist leaders like NC and Abdullah. Thus the Jamaat and its leaders who laid down the foundation of Jamaat had different and clear vision in mind.145 The members of the Jamaat extended full support to those forces especially MC who were in favour of Pakistan. In post 1947 period the anti-Dogra feelings changed into anti-India, because for large number of the people, especially Jamaat viewed India as ‘Hindu Nation’ where Kashmiri Muslim identity was under threat. Jamaat believes in establishing the Nizam-I-Mustafa.146 However, at the same time Jamaat also favours Parliamentary form of Democracy. Since the Jamaat believes that this form of government is more or less in accordance to the accepted doctrines of ‘Islamic Democracy’, thus like other political parties, Jamaat laid stress on Constitutional methods to achieve their goals. The Party wants to bring radical changes through missionary activities, education and debates rather than by violent methods.147 The ideology of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir is same of Jamaat elsewhere based on the writing of Syed Abu Ala Maudoodi. Jamaat sees Islam as a complete code of life Nizam-i-Hayat.148 The Party does not believe in separation of religion

144 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 725. 145 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir, vol. 2, 170-1. 146 Nizam-I-Mustafa means to establish a state of political system in which an individual is obligatory to conduct his socio-economic and political life according to the laws governed by Quran and Hadith Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad PBUH. 147 Singh, Political awakening in Jammu and Kashmir, 79. 148 Nizam-I-Hayat means Islam provides the complete code of life for detailed analysis see, Raoof Mir, “Communicating Islam in Kashmir Intersection of Religion and Media,” Society and Culture in South Asia, (Sage), 5.1 (2019), 47-69. 129 from politics. Allah is the lone law maker, he is sovereign of all.149 According to Pir Saaduddin, “Religion serves man’s Soul, politics serves man’s body. Body and Soul make man.”150 The Jamaat having good quality of literature, opposition to un-Islamic traditions of Sufism, modern educational schools and the commitment of Jamaat for political assertions made the Jamaat a unique Party during those days. It was in this background that the Party organized many public rallies (Ijtemas) in every corner of the State. However, the journey of Jamaat was not easy as many Kashmiri Muslims within the state associated with Sufi tradition of Islam challenged the Jamaat and labeled it as extension of ‘Wahhabism151’ in Kashmir. The people and religious scholars associated with shrine cult declared Jamaat-i-Islami as one possessing ‘wrong beliefs’ (Bad Ayteqadi) and of ‘denying the Sufis’ (Auliya-i-Allah Ke Munkar).152 While as there were many people who criticized Jamaat as ‘Deniers of Prophetic traditions’ (Munkar-I-Hadith), ‘Communalist’ (Firqa Pasand), ‘Obscurantist’ (Qadamat Pasand) and above all ‘Anti-National’ (Mulk Dushman) and ‘Agents of CIA.’153 Though Jamaat faced lot of hardships yet Jamaat emerged as a most strong and very powerful force having mass support particularly in the valley of Kashmir. The Jamaat felt that the Indian education system is a threat to the Muslim character of J&K, so their main focus was on education. It was during this phase that the networks of schools of Jamaat were opened to counter the State and Central government policy. As one of the Pakistani members of Jamaat-i-Islami and sympathizer puts it as; these schools and educational institutions in J&K intended as a bulwark against the “Indian on slaughter in the cultural sphere…to lead a silent revolution”,154 to keep the demand for right to self-determination against the Indian occupation alive in the hearts and minds of people. In this way the Jamaat consolidated its position in odd political conditions to carry out ‘silent revolution’ by

149 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 707. 150 Nikhil Lakshman, “Trouble in Paradise,” Illustrated Weekly of India, March 10, 1985, 9. 151 Wahhabism comes from an Arabic word ‘Wahabiya’ developed in Sudia Arabia which means an Islamic doctrine and religious movement founded by Mohammad ibn Abd Al-Wahab. This Wahhabi movement laid stress on Tawhid that is Uniqueness and Unity of God. It has been described as ‘ultraconservative’, ‘fundamentalist’, and a reform movement to restore pure monotheistic worship by devotees. 152 Qari Saifuddin, Vadi-i-Purkhar (Srinagar: Markazi Maktaba-i-Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, 1980), 62-64. 153 Saifuddin, Vadi-i-Purkhar, 9; Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 734. 154 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir”, 734 130 these educational institutions. It is believed that many students who obtained education from these schools later became pioneer of armed struggle in Kashmir in late 1980s155 (Though the number of youth associated with Jamaat who joined armed struggle later was not more than few hundred). The government under NC never gave official recognition to these schools because of its hostility towards Jamaat and their ideology. Throughout the mid-1960s, the Indian state was in direct conflict with Jamaat, because Jamaat was questioning the legitimacy and legality of state’s accession with India. Jamaat recognized Kashmir as an internationally acclaimed dispute and insisted that Kashmir should be resolved according to the UN resolutions. During this phase Hazratbal Holy Relic theft (Mo-i-Muqaddas of Prophet PBUH) mass protests were organized. Soon after the Relic was found the movement turned political in nature and demanded peaceful settlement of Kashmir issue. Jamaat played significant role in mobilizing the people during Relic agitation and after. Qari Saifuddin represented Jamaat in Awami Action Committee which has been discussed in this Chapter previously. Though the Jamaat had very hard stance about the future of state but in mid-1960s the Jamaat’s flexible position on participation in electoral politics made dramatic shift in their ideology. However, it is believed that the change in perception of Jamaat was a well-planned strategy to use democratic methods to take over the ruins of the state administration claims Sikand.156 It was in the year 1963 when the Jamaat took part in local panchayat elections. Many candidates who belonged to the Jamaat filed papers as independent members. The Jamaat defended the participation to “acquaint the people with the guidance of Islam in Political affairs.”157 In the same way in the panchayat elections of 1969 which were held on non-party basis in Kashmir. The Jamaat indirectly participated in these elections by giving support to many like-minded candidates and several of its members won the elections. The Jamaat again justified their participation on the basis that ‘Politics cannot be separated from Islam.’ The Jamaat also claimed that by taking part in elections they will effectively spread their political ideology by electing their members into power.158 But the main political justification on part of Jamaat about these elections was to urge and pressurize the Indian government to resolve the

155 Alifuddin Turabi, “Tehrik-i-Azadi-i-Kashmir: Taalimi Idaron, Asatizah Aur Talaba Tanzimon Ka Kirdar,” in Kashmir: Azadi Ki Jad-o-Jehad Safir Akhtar ed., n.a, 71. 156 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 740. 157 Saifuddin, Vadi-i-Purkhar, 10. 158 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970, vol. 2, 201-2. 131

Kashmir conflict according to the wishes of people.159 However, the Jamaat Secretary General Qari Saifuddin made interesting remarks about the participation in elections. To quote him:

If through constitutional and democratic means it is possible to bring about any sort of reform in the system of governance, the Jamaat-I-Islami cannot ignore them.”160 Qari Saifuddin also justified the participation of Jamaat that “elections will provide an opportunity ‘to serve people’ and to ‘put before them the Islamic alternative’, and he also insisted that Jamaat had no intention to garner seats.161

The mouth piece Azan of Jamaat-I-Islami also mentioned that the participation in elections was a strategy to help the pious Muslims who were committed to Islamic teachings come to power by democratic means. The Party criticized the mainstream political parties such as NC, Congress and other parties. All these parties were raking those matters up in the State which were not necessary for the Jamaat in particular and people in general. However, these parties found that the entry of the Jamaat in the electoral politics will weaken their social base and hence they will lose the ground.162 The role played by Jamaat as a vibrant opposition and contender political force to ruling NC in the electoral politics of the State was as proof to this fact that people were alienated from ruling regime of National Conference. The dictatorial rule of NC and secondly the erosion of Special Autonomy under article 370 created favorable political environment for Jamaat to emerge a strong political opposition in the political corridors of Kashmir. Thus, Jamaat as political force developed as an alternative political rival to NC in J&K. The participation of Jamaat in local panchayat elections were followed by General elections in 1971. Though the Jamaat this time expected to won at least one Parliamentary Constituency but it failed to win because it is believed that these elections were rigged and extensive electoral malpractices (Table 3.6). However, the Jamaat in their Central Advisory Committee passed the decision and decided that Jamaat will fully participate in State Assembly elections of 1972. The Party believed

159 Sayyed Ali Shah Gilani, Millat-i-Mazlum (Srinagar: Tulu Publishers, 1998), 10. 160 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 742. 161 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970, vol. 2, 206; Sikand,“The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 742. 162 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970, vol.2, 311. 132 that by participating in these elections, it will provide a chance to Jamaat in order to challenge the western concept which holds the doctrine that politics and religion are separate.163 Thus the Party saw it imperative to prove it to the people that politics is the part of religion. It was in this background that the Jamaat decided to contest from all the Assembly segments of the State. But due to the financial and other limitations the Party (Jamaat-i-Islami) decided to contest from twenty two Assembly seats only. In this way the participation of Jamaat in these elections revealed its political character.164 The most prominent leaders who participated in 1972 elections were Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Abdul Rashid Islahi, Qari Saifuddin and Hakim Ghulam Nabi. Though the Jamaat was expected to win good number of seats but it failed to make maximum gains in electoral politics. The Party believed that because of massive rigging in these elections Jamaat was able to win only five seats (Table 3). However, after the elections were over the State government harassed many political activists of Jamaat who were government employees. Even few were suspended and terminated from their services165 (Tables 3.3 & 3.5). The participation of Jamaat by and large was a serious blow to ruling Party. In the words of Yoginder Sikand:

Breaking the inertia of the last twenty years, it showed the people the value of the vote and in this way prepared new ground for the struggle.”166 But for the Jamaat these elections helped to produce “Trained, fearless and brave activists.”167 Who in future played significant role when armed struggle was launched against Indian state.

It was for the first time within the State Assembly that the government witnessed an opposition which was vibrant and organized. The opposition members of the Jamaat challenged many orders of the government. Even they staged walk-out whenever government took such a decision which the Jamaat felt was wrong and against the wishes of people. The Party stood firm on the ban of Alcohol and legalize abortion. During Assembly debates the Party repeatedly raised the questions related to education and prevailing laws. Opposition within the Assembly did not stop here but the Party (Jamaat-I-Islami) and its members raised the question related to the

163 Ibid., 248. 164 Ghulam Hassan Khan, Government & Politics of Jammu and Kashmir (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 2011), 468. 165 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 742. 166 Ibid., 743. 167 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970, vol. 2, 24. 133 disputed nature of state at UN. They criticized both the State as well as Central government for not holding the Plebiscite. Regarding the Kashmir dispute one of the leading members of Jamaat expressed his viewpoint: “The right to self-determination is the basic thing…who can deny it? Any person at any place has a right to self- determination. Be it Kashmir or elsewhere.”168 One of the fellows of Jamaat Mohammad Razak, a MLA in 1972 stated that, “Jamaat-I-Islami believes in establishing a truly responsible government in the state on the principles of Islam.”169 When Sheikh Abdullah returned to power by entering into Kashmir Accord and accepted the Indian claims on J&K. He called state’s accession with Union as final and irrevocable. However, the Jamaat and its members in assembly strongly criticized the Kashmir Accord and argued that the Accord is the violation of United Nations promise to hold Plebiscite in J&K. The Jamaat condemned Abdullah and said one individual has no right to sign the agreement with India. Jamaat argued that the only way out for ensuring peace in the State is to establish peace between India and Pakistan.170 When Indira Gandhi declared emergency in 1975, its effect was felt in Kashmir also. The Jamaat was declared anti-National organization and was banned, offices were sealed down. The leaders and activists of Jamaat were either arrested or sent to prison. Large schools of the Jamaat were banned and closed by government. The Jamaat was labeled as ‘communal force’ which was spreading hate and communal divide in the society. However, the Jamaat defended their ideology and vehemently denied all the charges which were labelled against Jamaat.171 The ban on Jamaat was not too long; it was lifted after two years when Janta Party came to power in 1977. During the Assembly elections of 1977 which was conducted after Kashmir Accord, Sheikh led NC again won absolute majority. However, this time the opposition led by Jamaat contested for nineteen seats but Jamaat secured only 3.57 per cent of votes. The Jamaat won only one Assembly segments from Sopore (Table 3.3). Thus in this way Syed Ali Geelani172 was the only Jamaat member inside the

168 Pir Saaduddin, then Amir of Jamaat-I-Islami Jammu and Kashmir in an interview with Nikhil Lakkshman. “Trouble in Paradise,” Illustrated weekly of India, March 10, 1985, 9-25. 169 Interview with Mohammad Razak a Jamaat-i-Islami legislator at M.L.A hostel Jammu, Dec. 11, 1989, quoted in Singh, Political Awakening in Kashmir, 80. 170 Kashmiri, Tarikh-Tahrik-Islami Jammu Aur Kashmir 1947-1970, vol. 2, pp. 280-4. 171 Saifuddin, Vadi-i-Purkhar, 13. 172 Among the early well-known faces of Jamaat-I-Islami Jammu and Kashmir was Syed Ali Shah Geelani (Present chairman of APHC). He with the passage of time become one of the stanch supporters of Jamaat and has a very special love for Maudoodi and his literature. He became permeant member of 134

Assembly who represented Jamaat and their ideology for next six years as an opposition leader and challenged the authoritarian regime of Abdullah and NC. In this way Jamaat continued their work both politically as well as socially and large number of people came to the fourfold of Jamaat. It is believed that the era of 1970 was the period when Jamaat fully consolidated and emerged a well-organized political entity in J&K. In 1977 the Jamaat carved out a separate student wing namely Islami Jamiat-i- Tulaba (The Islamic Union of Students). The aim was to mobilize the student community to combat the un-Islamic westernization. These young men who were associated with Jamaat played significant role in 1990s when they start armed struggle against Indian state. Though, the Jamaat was always in favour of peaceful means to settle the Kashmir issue but with the growing number of Jama’at-i-Tulba in the armed struggle under the banner of ‘Hizb-ul-Mujahedeen’ the means were now clear to solve the issue militarily. The Jamaat recognized the Indian army as ‘Occupational forces’ and J&K as ‘Occupied territory.’173 However, the Jamaat witnessed a very serious setback in 1979 because of many political developments in the South Asia. Notably the execution of Prime Minister of Pakistan Zalfiqar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq followed by wide spread protests in Kashmir against the killing of Bhutto. Jamaat in J&K believed that Bhutto’s hanging in Pakistan was supported by Jamaat-I-Islami Pakistan. Thus every political opponent that was against the Jamaat in Kashmir attacked the offices and property that belonged to Jamaat. All this was done ‘out to spread a reign of hatred and revenge’174 against the particular organization.175 The study of Jamaat-i-Islam’s manifesto that was formulated during 1972 State Assembly elections is proof to this fact that the Jamaat as a political party had a well-documented and thoughtful political and socio- economic ideology. Some important basic agenda of Jamaat can be summarized as: To end the political uncertainty, the Jamaat will play a powerful, fearless and institutionalized role of opposition to safeguard and safety of special identity of the

Jamaat in 1953. For detailed life and struggle of Syed Ali Geelani see Abdul Hakeem, Paradise on Fire: Syed Ali Geelani and the Struggle for Freedom in Kashmir (NA: Kube Publishing Ltd, 2014). 173 Sikand, “The emergence and development of the Jamaat-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” 739. 174 Ibid., 744. 175 During clashes in Kashmir, property of worth of four hundred million rupee that was belonged to Jamaat was destroyed and torched and government under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah failed to restore law and order to maintain peace in the state. For details see Arpita Anant, “Identity and conflict: perspectives from the Kashmir Valley,” Strategic Analysis, 33.5, (2009), 760-773. 135 people. Facilitate the two countries both India and Pakistan to pursue to resolve all the conflicts for peaceful future and continue its strong efforts to make Kashmir a welfare State. Jamaat also pledged to ensure a society that will be free of crimes and evils. Jamaat will stood against all harsh laws of the State and Central government that have curbed the civil liberties and freedom of people. The Jamaat will oppose any laws that have placed restriction on political parties without trial. To ensure fight for free press, civil liberties and freedom of speech and act against laws that restrict them. The Party will facilitate their efforts to strengthen the communal harmony and will fight to protect the rights of minorities. In economic agenda the Jamaat will offer a well-planned proposal for development of horticulture, to establish industries, fight for the wages of laborers and promised to create job opportunities for unemployed youth.176 Besides these, the election manifesto of Jamaat laid stress on other state related issues too. Although the Jamaat witnessed a set-back in 1979 but due to its strong organizational functioning within the state, Jamaat again contested State Assembly elections of 1983 and twenty six candidates fielded their nomination papers but the old policy of the government to rig and manipulate elections was again repeated and Jamaat was unable to win a single constituency within the State with 3.14 per cent of votes (Tables 3.3 & 3.5). In this way Jamaat was routed completely, though the Jamaat during those days had very strong party base both in North and South Kashmir. But the Party failed to gain any Assembly seats. While as, on the other side the continuous rigging of elections, lack of basic democratic space and rights, hatred for opposition, poor economic conditions, and denial of Plebiscite and rise of anti-Muslim forces in India. All these factors gave birth to new political movement in mid-1980s and people start anti-India protests. That we will discuss in Chapter fourth, when Muslim United Front and Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front emerged as a strong political voice in Kashmir. Although Jamaat-i-Islami continued to play more decisive role in post 1987 State politics and was supported by many like-minded political groups and small parties. But the period from 1960 to 1970s was significant vis-a-vis Jamaat, because it emerged as well knit political opposition that not only challenged the state administration but equally laid future plans that shaped the political environment of Kashmir till this day.

176 Jamaat-I-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, Election Manifesto (Srinagar: 1972), 2-4. 136

Table 3.1 Electoral Performance of Praja Parishad to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951, 1957 and 1962 Year of Seats Seats Percentage of votes Elections Contested won 1951 29 Nil Nil 1957 21 5 24.11 1962 25 3 17.47 Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1951, 1957 and 1972, New Delhi, ECI

Table 3.2 Electoral Performance of Bharatiya Jana Sangh to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967, 1972 and 1977 Name of Year of Seats Seats Percentage of the Party Election Contested won votes polled Jana Sangh 1967 29 3 16.45 Jana Sangh 1972 32 3 9.84 Jana Sangh (As part of Janta 1977 12 3 10.78 Party) Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1967, 1972 and 1977, New Delhi, ECI.

Table 3.3 Electoral Performance of Bharatiya Jana Sangh to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1972, 1977 and 1983 Name of Party Year of Seats Seats Percentage of votes Election Contested won polled Jamaat-i-Islami 1972 22 5 9.18 Do 1977 19 1 3.57 Do 1983 26 Nil 3.14 Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1972, 1977 and 1983, New Delhi, ECI. 137

Table 3.4

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1951, 1957, and 1962

Name of Political Year of Seats Seats Number of Voting Party Election Contested Won unopposed Percentage returns National Conference 1951 75 (75)* 73 (04.37) Praja Parishad Do 29 Nil Nil Nil National Conference 1957 75 (68)* 41 (56.98) Praja Parishad Do 21 (05)** Nil (24.11) National Conference 1962 75 (70)** 34 (66.96) Praja Parishad Do 25 (03)* Nil (17.47) Independent/Others Do Not (02)*** Nil (15.58) Available Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1951, 1957 and 1962, New Delhi, ECI. *Seats won by National Conference. **Seats won by Praja Parishad. ***Seats won by Independent and others.

Table 3.5

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1967-1972

Names of the Political Parties Year of Seats Seats won Voting Election Contested percentage State Congress 1967 75 (61)** (53.2)*

Jana Sangh Do 29 (03)** (16.45)* National Conference (Bakshi Do Not Available (08)** (21.44)* group) Independent/Others Do Not Available (03)** (09.09)*

Table: 3.6

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 5th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1971 in J&K

Name of Political Name of Winning Name of Runner Voting Parties Constituency Candidates up Candidates Percentage with Polling with Polling percentage percentage INC Baramulla Syed Ahmad Syed Ali Geelani (50.62)** Aga (51.02)* (43.07)* (JMI) Independent Srinagar S. A. Shamin G.M.Bakshi (58.88)** (61.78)* (34.08)* (JNC) INC Anantnag M. Shaffi Peer Ghulam Nabi (67.25)** Qureshi Shah (36.15)* (60.30)* (JMI) INC Ladakh K. Bakula S. Wahgdus (71.26)** (55.41)* (49.59)* (IND.) INC Udhampur Karan Singh Baldev Singh (51.22)** (60.97)* (25.82)* (BJS) INC Jammu I.J. Malhotra Abdul Rehman (60.48)** (60.04)* (29.91)* (BJS) Source: Statistical reports on General Election 1971 to the 5TH Lok Sabha, volume I and II, New-Delhi: Elections Commission of India, 1973. *Percentage of vote’s candidates secured **Total percentage of votes polled in respective constituencies.

Chapter-Four

Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: Post-Accord Phase (1975-2002)

139

Chapter Four:

Opposition Politics in Jammu and Kashmir: The Post-Accord Phase (1975-2002)

The political development since 1970s in the State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) as discussed in Chapter third led to the signing of the Kashmir Accord of 1975. The Accord received both appreciation as well as criticism. For India and her sympathizers in Kashmir (the Accord was termed as) a historical and a sacred document which will solve the Kashmir Problem once forever. However, things didn’t go well. The Accord was criticized both internally in Kashmir1 as well as externally in Pakistan.2 This led to the change of guards in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah who had (led a political struggle) for Plebiscite for nearly twenty-two years was now at the helm of power sworn as Chief Minister of J&K. While as Syed Mir Qasim (the Congressman in Kashmir) was asked to step down. Thus in this way, Sheikh Abdullah succeeded Qasim with the full support of Congress and Indra Gandhi hoping that the Accord (would subsequently) end the old rivalry between Abdullah and New Delhi.

The Accord, if on the one hand achieved for the State a Special Status under Article 370 of Indian Constitution, it, on the other hand, proved detrimental for the political stability of the state in future. Although the Central government agreed to revise and review a few less important laws that were extended to J&K between 1953

1 Within the state of J&K, Sheikh Abdullah and his party were severely criticized by all those forces that were in favour of Plebiscite. Mirwaiz Moulvi Mohammad Farooq was the one who distressed by what seemed to be an impending settlement of the future of the state of J&K by his arch rival Sheikh Abdullah to preclude forever the prospect of free plebiscite. He considered that Abdullah had sold out to the India in general and Indra Gandhi in particular. There were many more voices that were against Abdullah and his decision of signing Accord. However, if Kashmiri leaders were against the Accord for what they believe was sold out but in Jammu region, Accord was also criticized on the basis of any favour to Abdullah for more autonomy under article 370 of Indian constitutions. The Jana Sangh was the main vocal opposition party which urged the Centre government to abrogate the special status and the state should be incorporated into the Indian union like other states of India. Lamb, Kashmir A Disputed Legacy, 308-309. In Jammu there were apprehensions that the return of Sheikh Abdullah as Chief Minister will help separatist tendencies in the state to further spread hatred against India. For more details see Singh, Political Awakening in Kashmir,156. 2 Pakistan being the party to the Kashmir dispute criticized Kashmir Accord of 1975 in strong words and said it had violated the terms and conditions of Simla Agreement and United Nations requirements for Plebiscite. See Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 217. Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto called for general strike throughout the Pakistan on 28 February 1975 and termed the Accord as “Sell Out” by Abdullah. He criticized Abdullah and said this man who had set himself up as the defender and champion of democracy and birth right of the people of J&K was now about to take charge the head of the Government. That is dominated by Congress party to which He (Abdullah) didn’t belong in an Assembly of which Abdullah was not even a member. Lamb, Kashmir: A Disputed Legacy, 308. 140 till 1975, it nevertheless, did not fulfill its promise.3 Thus the commitment to revise the Centre-State relationship was hardly honoured. It was in this background that one of the famous political stalwarts of the State Prem Nath Bazaz harshly criticized Abdullah’s government as a “Democracy through intimidation and terror.”4 Similarly another noted writer Giyas-ud-Din Peer has reviewed the post-1975 phase of the NC in these words:

The new phase of Sheikh Abdullah lacked and was devoid of past idealism as demonstrated by him during freedom struggle. After 1975 Sheikh Abdullah reshaped it out of ‘Plebiscite Front. History repeats itself-event and persons. The new National Conference was an amalgam of Bakshi’s National Conference, erstwhile congressites and plebiscite rump. It has forgotten its historical precious heritage: “Naya Kashmir.” Money and muscle power are its growing organizational features. It had failed to implement essence of Accord.5

Nevertheless, the NC defended the Accord. The words of Mustafa Kamal, the Son of Sheikh Abdullah:

This Accord was actually to repeal or relook all the laws which have been extended (Ninety Two Laws) to Jammu and Kashmir since 1953 when Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was sent to jail. The basic purpose of this Accord was to restore the special position under article 370 to Jammu and Kashmir.6

3 Till 1973 the Central government extended as many as 262 provisions of Indian Constitution with the consent of state legislature of J&K. Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and tragedy of Indian Federalism, 151.Though, Sheikh Abdullah was in favour to review these laws that were extended from 1953-1975. Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism: Jammu and Kashmir, 141. However, once the government came into existence under Abdullah, the Pradesh Congress which supported earlier NC declared that they will not support proposal to restore pre-1953 position. Abdul Jabbar Gania, Kashmir and National Conference Politics (1975-1980) (Srinagar: Gulshan Books, 1984), 84. Though, Abdullah also appointed committee under Afzal Beg to study the laws that were extended to the state from time to time. The committee submitted its report in 1978. But no provision of Indian Constitution was repealed or reviewed. In this way NC’s attitude towards special autonomy under Sheikh Abdullah’s leadership undergone major change in post 1975 politics of the state. Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism, 142. 4 P.N. Bazaz, Democracy through Intimidation and terror (New-Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1978), 24. 5 Peer, Understanding the Kashmir Insurgency, 51. 6 Interview with Sheikh Mustafa Kamal, Greater Kashmir, January 15, 2014. 141

However, these claims of NC are outrightly rejected by State senior Congress politician late Makhan Lal Fotedar7, who tenders his disagreement in these words:

The acceptance of Chief Minister’s post by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in 1975 after the unconditional Accord was reached upon between the two parties, indicates itself that nothing more was to be done after, the transfer of power. Had there been any truth in the statements of the sons of these two leaders, the Lion of Kashmir would not have accepted the Chief Minister’s post. It is but natural that the sons will always try and have every right to defend their father. He further said that, it has cleared one thing that the 1975 Accord was nothing but just a transfer of power from the Congress party to National Conference.8

4.1 The Merger Proposal: Sheikh Abdullah and Indra Gandhi

Soon after the Kashmir Accord, it is widely believed that Indra Gandhi had wanted Sheikh Abdullah to join the Pradesh Congress so that she could have direct control over the political affairs of Kashmir. However, this political calculus was not accepted by Abdullah9. Instead, he suggested to dissolve both Congress and the Plebiscite Front with a view to merge the two political entities in order to form a new NC. The premise of this suggestion was to defeat the secessionist forces in Kashmir. However, this offer could hardly find any takers either in New-Delhi or in Srinagar. The Congress high command in Delhi out-rightly rejected this offer.10 While as the

7 Makhan Lal Fotedar was a senior politician from Jammu province. He served state Pradesh Congress on many posts and was also member of Central working committee of Congress party and one of the close associate of late Indra Gandhi. He died 28 September 2017 in New Delhi, considered as the ‘Chanakya’ of Congress party. See “Congress veteran ML Fotedar passes away,” The Indian Express, September 28, 2017; “Who was Makhan Lal Fotedar,” Financial Express, September 29, 2017. 8 Greater Kashmir, June 26, 2013. 9 If Sheikh Abdullah would have accepted the offer to merge, it would have mean that he returned because of Centre and Congress; not of his own leadership. After all he vehemently opposed the creation of Pradesh Congress in 1964 when he threw ‘Tark-e-Mawalat’ (Social Boycott) against all those who join Congress party. Thus it would have been too much difficult for Abdullah to save himself from public criticism, if Abdullah would have joined hands with Congress. One more factor was if he would have joined Congress his own popularity among people could have received serious setback to his leadership. 10 The merger of the two political parties would have again led to the NC dominance in J&K. In every democratic political system every political party wants to maintain its separate identity. Same was with Pradesh Congress to maintain her position and influence the party didn’t accept the offer of merger. Najar, Kashmir Accord 1975-A Political Analysis, 35; ‘Congress rejected the proposal to merge with National Conference’, Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism, 185; ‘both state unit and party high command rejected this offer to merge with National Conference,’ Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference Politics, 71. 142 political commentators believe that the unusual distribution of power and strained relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and New Delhi again led to a change of thoughts between the two.11 Thus keeping in view the political conditions of J&K, both the parties were actually busy in consolidating their own position to remain a relevant political entity in the state politics. This was perhaps done, as it appears, to grind their own axe and not for what they earlier stood for instance, the consolidation of the democratic institutions and the secular forces. Despite knowing this fact that in such a political atmosphere it would not have been possible for the Congress to merge with NC and at the same time it would have equally not been possible for Sheikh Abdullah to merge with Congress.12 One can argue that the liquidation of the Congress from J&K was not a politically correct step taken by Abdullah, however, at the same time, Congress in New Delhi also questioned the very essence of having a regional party.13 Hence both the parties were essentially acting against the basic principles of democracy to ‘flourish smooth and strong party system with valuable opposition’.

Therefore we can say that the politics in J&K from 1975 to 1976 was mainly attributed to the major rifts between NC and Congress. Centre and the leadership in Delhi were more concerned to retain the state by any means mostly authoritarian.14 Indra Gandhi who wished to retain direct control of the state advised the local Pradesh Congress leaders (Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and Mir Qasim) and other workers to keep her party alive.15 In fact, New-Delhi was not ready to take more risks. Thus the years from 1975 to 1977 were status-quo in nature that defined the state politics.

4.2 The Revival of National Conference: Role of Abdullah

Soon after Kashmir Accord of 1975, Sheikh Abdullah revived his NC and was nominated as its president.16 After deep deliberation, Abdullah and Afzal Beg decided to change both its Constitution and name of ‘Plebiscite Front’ in a special session that was held on 4th and 5th July 1975 at Mujahid Manzil in the city of Srinagar and about 1500 members attended this session. An important resolution was moved by Sheikh

11 Schofield, Kashmir in the Crossfire, 217. 12 Najar, Kashmir Accord 1975-A Political Analysis, 37. 13 Ibid., 57- 59. 14 Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference Politics, 72. 15 Singh, Flames of the Chinar,166. 16 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and Tragedy of Indian Federalism, 179. 143

Ghulam Mohd Badarwahi, one of the senior members of the Front which was passed unanimously. The resolution stated that:

Today, 4th and 5th July, 1975, the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front in a special session, after due deliberation for about thirteen hours amongst the delegates from all parts of the state, giving due cognition and serious thought to prevailing political situations, decided to change the name of the Plebiscite Front into the National Conference, for this purpose, appropriate amendments are visualized so that there is collaboration between the name and the deed further the committees subordinate to it would Accordingly bring change. The Conference unanimously agreed to request Sher-i-Kashmir to accept the leadership of the National Conference-the acceptance of the offer would encourage the integration of various regions of the state. Consequently, it will help the country and the nation to move on path of reconstruction and honour…17

Sheikh Abdullah who was of the view that the Front has confined his political activities only in valley (Kashmir) since its inception and therefore needed to be changed into NC so as to give the Party a character of representing all the regions of the State. The idea behind the revival of his Party was to extend his social base and to defeat the secessionist. Though, there was a proposal to change the ‘Plebiscite Front’ into ‘Democratic Front’ or ‘People’s Front’, but both these names were dropped in an opinion that a Party with such a name would not find its takers in other regions i.e., Jammu and Ladakh. Hence Abdullah and Beg were left with the only choice, to revive the old NC.18 One more significant reason which Abdullah favoured was that it would reshape the economic development of the state as embodied in ‘Naya Kashmir.’ To quote Abdullah:

In my support for the rebirth of the National Conference it was my sole purpose to see this organization as an effective instrument for giving a solid shape to the economic programme embodied in its famous

17 Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference Politics, 69-70; All J&K Plebiscite Front Special Delegation Session (Srinagar: Mujahid Manzil, Publicity Section of the Front, 1975), Para ii. 18 Najar, Kashmir Accord 1975-A Political Analysis, 53-54. 144

document, the Naya Kashmir and execute it so that, we may…justify our roles on the eyes of the coming generations.19

Though the NC was revived, Abdullah chose his own family to support himself—his wife Begum Abdullah, two sons Farooq, and Tariq. Besides his brothers; Abdullah also chose his son-in-law Ghulam Mohammad Shah to revive NC. The presence of family members from top to bottom led to acute corruption and nepotism both within the party as well as in the state government. At the same time, the Party could not make serious inroads on her promises; as the State Assembly was dominated by the members of Pradesh Congress. Therefore, it didn’t bring any dividends from its policies and programmes.

After the revival of NC, the Party formulated its official election manifesto which was published on May 23, 1977. The Party made its commitment they will revive its old glory under the dynamic leadership of Sheikh Abdullah. The party’s manifesto read:

My, Sheikh Abdullah’s, goal is to free my mother country from slavery. Let us rise above the petty communal contradictions and unite to fight for freedom and share the responsibility to uphold the welfare of the people. I request my Hindu brethren to shun off the harassment and fear and not to be vitiated by doubts. We assure them that in case they cooperate with Muslims, we shall protect their rights as we shall protect ours.20

Nevertheless, after coming to power, NC in post-1975 faced many crises. The first crisis was the withdrawal of the support in the state legislature by the Congress and second was the growing discordant politics within the regions especially in Jammu and Ladakh.21 Before the elections of 1977 NC tried to revive its old glory. In

19 Ibid., 56. 20 National Conference Ka Intikhabi Manshoor (Urdu), General Secretary All J&KNC, New Kashmir Press, 1977. 21 Though, the regional imbalances were present in J&K since long after the state’s controversial accession with the union of India. In this regard government appointed Commission in 1967 under P.G. Gajendragadkar. Though this commission found no such imbalances but it recommended many measures on many important issues regarding states regional imbalances. In 1978 NC government appointed another Commission under Justice S.M. Sikri and two other members Dr. Malcom S. Adiseshait and Dr. A.R. Kidwai. The Commission also doesn’t found any major imbalance within the three regions of J&K. But the Commission saw imbalance of regional individuals and suggested few 145 its election manifesto, the Party promised to be devoted to the cause of economic development under what the Party called Naya Kashmir Manifesto. The main points of the election manifesto were as:

The election manifesto also stood for ending corruption in state administration; provision of good and transparent admiration; to work on promises made in Naya Kashmir manifesto; achieving self-sufficiency, equality and justice; working for speedy financial reconstruction and bringing peaceful atmosphere in state education institutions for absorption of unemployed youth.22

In fact for NC the programme of Naya Kashmir was not only the well documented economic plan but at the same time its aim and objective was to create a state which will be based on four pillars of ‘Democracy, Secularism, Nationalism and Socialism.’ NC was of the opinion that there is no intention to create a misunderstanding. It was of the view that Congress has lost the power in New Delhi and the thirty years of rule of Congress has ended. The Manifesto defended the Special Status under Article 370.23 On the other side, under the leadership of Abdullah, the Party reminded the people of old glory (though contested one). As the Party played an instrumental role in abolishing hereditary monarch and ended the Jagirdari system.24 It was in this context that the political commentator(s) believe that, it was the NC which offered real power to the people in post-1947 (though this notion is contested by the present political leadership of separatist parties especially APHC). Thus taking advantage of its past glory NC contested the elections of 1977 on two points. The first was internal Autonomy by defending article 370 and second to respect and honour the people of J&K.25 As almost all the majority provisions of constitutional measures between these three regions of the state. Report of the Jammu and Kashmir Commission of Enquiry, Government Press, Srinagar, 1980, 4-24. 22 National Conference Ka Intikhabi Manshoor (Urdu) 1977, 12-13. 23 Ibid., 11-17. 24 During the rule of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah from 1948-1953, he introduced land reforms in the state. Land was distributed to the tillers without any compensation to landlords that ended the landlordism and Jagirdari system. That was prevalent during Dogra regime. For detailed analysis of land reform in J&K see Suhail-ul-Rehman Lone, “Land reforms in Kashmir (1948-1953): An analysis,” in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 2015, vol. 76, 332-343. 25 NC also promised to deliver on many important issues like pension for old age, handicapped persons, to develop orchard economy, more encouragement of tourism and also to develop transportation. The manifesto also reads that every opportunity will be used to ensure and develop socialist society. The party under Abdullah further promised to restoration of basic fundamental rights of the people of J&K. One more significant promise of Abdullah’s NC was to reforms the agrarian sector. National Conference Ka Intikhabi Manshoor (Urdu) 1977, 15-16. 146

Indian Constitutions were extended till 1977 to state and the Special Status was completely eroded that was reduced to ashes. (See Chapter third: Integration phase).

4.3 Elections of 1977: Dominance of National Conference

Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg always used Pakistan card to defeat their rivals and can get majority support. Both the leaders used to carry a piece of white rock salt of Pakistan and a green piece of fabric Handkerchief to please the local population of having a political, religious, cultural and social affinity with Pakistan. In many of his public speeches, Abdullah criticized Pradesh Congress of destroying the basic democratic credentials and values in J&K. Both accused New Delhi and Indra Gandhi of choosing their own political proxies in J&K to rule at her own will. During election campaigning, Abdullah asked people to teach these forces lesson and get rid of this dirty gutter politics.26

NC and Abdullah used elections of 1977 as a referendum that will prove people of Kashmir are masters of their own identity27 rather than what New Delhi said it was a vote for Accord. However, it is true that for the first time in the history of NC, the Party was concerned about its electoral gains. The loss of the basic support which NC was receiving from the Centre from time to time to rig polls and manipulate elections in their favour. Now there was a strong political opposition against NC in the electoral fray. The situation was arising where NC was compelled even under Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah to campaign door to door, because there was a threat to him of losing elections and people’s mandate for the first time. It is believed that it was the most testing time for NC and the leadership of Abdullah. He used every opportunity to defame opposition by even raising the issue of Article 370 and in his many election campaigns Abdullah planted these apprehensions in the minds of people that Janta Party is a threat to the Kashmir identity and will abrogate the Article 370.28 The elections which were held on 30th June and 3rd July saw a polling percentage of 67.19. NC emerged as a leading political party that won 47 seats under. The Pradesh Congress could secure only eleven seats while as the newly formed Janta Party won thirteen seats; though they had expected, their achievement was that for the first time in the history of J&K a new Party entered into the State Assembly. Jamaat-i-

26 The Indian Express, November 8, 1977. 27 Batacharjee, Kashmir the wounded valley, 238. 28 Jagmohan, My frozen turbulence in Kashmir, 107. 147

Islami could only manage to win one seat and four seats were also bagged by independent legislators29 (Table 4.1). In this way it was apparent that the Hindu factor was much manifest in Jammu where Janta Party, Jana Sangh and Congress won a good number of seats but at the same time Muslim factor played a crucial role in Muslim dominated constituencies for NC and other Muslim candidates. Abdullah was sworn as Chief Minister on 9th July 1977 which ended the governor’s rule. Even though, the Janta Party which was the main contender of NC in the electoral politics could not manage to get seats requisite to form the government, it nevertheless, won good number of seats and therefore established itself as the opposition30 (Table 4.1). Since the state had a past experience of rigging and malpractice in elections, many political experts and political leaders both within the state and outside are of the view that the elections of 1977 were by and large clean, free and fair.31 The fairness in elections, one can argue, was perhaps because these elections were conducted when the state was under the Governors rule. No political party used the state machinery for their political gains as was done in previous elections. As Abdullah was able to secure the majority in assembly with forty seven (47) seats but at the same time, Pradesh Congress supported NC both in and outside the assembly. In this way, NC again dominated the political scene of J&K. It was also the time when NC developed good relation with Central political leadership of Janta Party.32 Though the party (NC) made its strong inroads in Kashmir valley by winning forty (40) seats out of forty two (42), it nevertheless, failed to win a good number of seats from Jammu region and could only secure seven (7) out of thirty two (32) seats.33 While as Janta Party and Congress and other won a considerable number of seats from Jammu—thus the electoral politics of the state was divided dominated by religious as well as regional ideologies and identities.

As soon as the NC formed the government in 1977, the party due to its internal crisis was subjected to defection in 1978. Sheikh Abdullah even declared his old friend Mirza Afzal Beg as ‘Star-hero’ of a gang of ambitious men who, according to

29 Statistical report on general elections, 1977 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K; Bazaz, Democracy through Intimidation, 172-173. 30 Singh, Flames of the Chinar, 169. 31 Ram Nath Sharma, Kashmir Autonomy, An Exercise in Centre–State Relationship (Delhi: Shubhi Publications, 2000), 92. 32 Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference Politics, 82-83. 33 Statistical report on General Elections of 1977 to the legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECI, 1977). 148 him was motivating many members of NC to bring down the Chief Minister by repeating 1953 political drama. In this political scenario Beg was forced to resign.34 Abdullah exposed his hypocrisy and sacked Afzal Beg towards the end of September 1978.35 In this way, the long political journey of forty-six years between Abdullah and Beg came to a bitter end. In spite of this unpleasant behaviour of Abdullah, Afzal Beg still called Sheikh as ‘the master of the masses.’36 His expulsion created rifts within the party which subsequently resulted into its split. The split in the party led to the creation of a new political party which emerged within the ranks of NC and was called ‘Inquilabi National Conference’. Though, Sheikh Abdullah did not saw it as a danger to his government and party.37 He made it clear that there were people who were hatching conspiracies against him. To quote Abdullah:

Beg Saheb has been working with me for the last forty-five years. I had to secure resignation from him because he had become power thirsty. He desired Chief Ministership. His task for the last some months has been to encourage factionalism in the National Conference. I accept that he has been all along faithful to me but I gave him everything except Chief Ministership. I consider him responsible for the indiscipline in the election to the legislative council. He had personal alliance with Congress, to see that his own candidate is elected. In getting Yaqub Beg elected, though he has public stigma, he (Beg Saheb) used Malik Mohiuddin, the speaker of the Legislative Assembly to arrange his victory. Malik Saheb is presently out of the country and when he returns he shall have to be accountable.38

Nevertheless, Prem Nath Bazaz is of the view that’ with the passage of time NC under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah become more authoritarian in nature. On the one hand, the party members diverged from real issues and showed more loyalty

34 B. L. Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters (Jammu: Jay Kay Publishers, 1987), 111- 112. 35 It was after the expulsion of Afzal Beg that Abdullah government passed ‘Anti-defection Act’ in 1979. The sole aim of this act was to curb the defections from one political party to another in the state legislature. For more detailed analysis, Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference Politics, 87. 36 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 86. 37 It is also fact that the Sheikh Abdullah’s second term from 1975-82 was not easy. The growing level of corruption and nepotism and party factionalism within NC added more problems to the fragile politics of the state. Though, Abdullah tried to keep Pro-Pakistan and Pro-Plebiscite people at bay during his tenure of Chief Minister but there were always forces which were either Pro-Pakistan or Independence of J&K. 38 Ganai, Kashmir and National Conference, 86. 149 to Abdullah, on the other hand Sheikh Family (Wife, Sons and Son-in-Law) become more powerful and were controlling NC from lower to higher ranks. The personal dominance did not stop here, Abdullah sacked Afzal Beg. In this way, no dissent was allowed and respect for opposition voice by NC.39 Commenting on the administration of Abdullah in post-1975, Iffat Malik, noted Pakistani academician is of the view that:

Sheikh Abdullah’s government had been showing signs of nepotism/corruption and authoritarianism before the 1977 elections. However, once Abdullah was established as Chief Minister with a majority in the state assembly these traits became far more obvious. Abdullah’s closet relatives were involved in running the government. The criterion for the appointment and promotion in the National Conference administration was loyalty to Sheikh Abdullah. In the process, economic development was totally neglected.”40

It was during the tenure of Sheikh Abdullah that the State Assembly passed the Public Safety Ordinance on 6th November 1977 (which still exists in the state in the form of Public Safety Act—PSA). The act authorized the State government to detain any person without any trial for as long as two years. This ordinance was not only used to curb the voices of those who opposed the Sheikh Abdullah led government and the New Delhi per se but at the same time numbers of newspapers were banned. Though many political commentator(s) believe that it was not expected from Sheikh Abdullah to issue the Ordinance of Public Safety as he himself was detained from 1953 to 1975 from time to time and become a victim of preventive detention of Congress rulers. However, Abdullah defended this act by saying that the State of J&K is strategically important and have many security issues which are confronted both internally and externally.41

It is important to mention that the elections of 1977 were interpreted by different political commentator(s) differently. M.J Akbar in his book ‘Kashmir: Behind the vale’ looked these elections as public approval of both the state accession with the Union of India and Kashmir Accord of 1975.42 While Iffat Malik (Pakistani

39 Bazaz, Democracy through Intimidation and Terror, 22. 40 Iffat Malik, Kashmir Ethnic Conflict International Dispute (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005), 147. 41 Ram, Special Status in Indian Federalism, 145-151. 42 Akbar, Kashmir: Behind the Vale, 192-193. 150

Author) is of the view that the elections of 1977 was Abdullah’s return to demand for Special Autonomy not the mandate for Kashmir Accord of 1975 or its approval.43 Another writer N.C. Behera is of the opinion that,

In the 1977 elections, the National Conference’s main plank was restoration of Kashmir’s Autonomy, an objective Abdullah had failed to secure in the 1975 Accord; the people were urged to prove that Kashmiri Nationalism cannot be undermined by conspiracy of New-Delhi, only the people of Kashmir can decide about their future.44

However, Rekha Chowdhary and Nagendra Rao argue that this phase of NC was quite different than of its earlier. The Party under Abdullah and Afzal Beg was stronger and there was a sense of autonomy in making decisions regarding the political matters of J&K and Party affairs. The regional assertions become dominant forces for NC under Abdullah, and thus much of the strength of NC was to regain and re-establishing the party’s political constituency in Kashmir valley. The Party was of the view that it is because of the local support and not the external backing of Centre which will help the Party to regain its lost political ground and to remain a vibrant and relevant political entity in the state politics. It was in this background that the most important elections of 1977 were conducted in the political history of Kashmir politics in which NC under its founder Sheikh Abdullah proved his leadership qualities and the Party was able to win overwhelming majority and mandate of the people of J&K.45

Koithara Varghese is of the view that Abdullah’s returned to mainstream in 1975 was found by New Delhi as an apt time to weaken him politically within Kashmir. Centre find it easy for National Interests to encourage political opponents against Abdullah not only in Jammu but at the same time even Jamaat-i-Islami and Awami Action Committee under Mirwaiz Farooq were seen openly challenging his rule.46 It was in the year 1979 when a couple of opposition parties opposed the Abdullah government. Though this opposition was strange in nature, the parties like

43 Malik, Kashmir Ethnic Conflict International Dispute, 145-146. 44 N.C. Behera, State Identity and Violence, Jammu and Kashmir (Delhi: Monohar Publishers, 1999), 140-141. 45 Rekha Chowdhary and V. Nagendra Rao, “National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir: From Hegemonic to Competitive Politics”, Economic and Political Weekly, vol. 39, No. 14/15, April 3- 16, (2004), 1521-1527. 46 Koithara Varghese, Crafting Peace in Kashmir, (New-Delhi: Sage Publication, 2004), 60. 151

‘Inquilabi National Conference’ (Under Afzal Beg), Pradesh Congress (Then represented by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed), Awami Action Committee (Under Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq) and Janta Party strongly opposed Abdullah and NC.47

4.4 Pradesh Congress: Role as an Opposition

The trust deficit which was created after the event of 1953 between the Centre and the state was very tough to rebuild because both the parties Congress & NC could not materialize their own differences. Sheikh Abdullah was very harsh when he described the political development of post-1953 as ‘Dark Patch of 23 years.’ In this way, the Centre-state relation become the main source of irritation, both the parties differed widely on many critical issues. It was in this background that Abdullah commented, “an artificial and exhibitionist show of false progress was put-up. The people of the state refused to yield before the temptation and the terror that followed August 1953.”48 All these political developments were not easy that Centre would have taken them so lightly. The cracks were now evident. But Sheikh was known to history, he was in no hurry to repeat the event of 1953 when he was dethroned from the power. In this way, he remained more vigilant to save both the Chair of Chief Ministership as well as NC from further downfall. On the other hand, despite having a majority in the State Assembly, Pradesh Congress was neither in a position to run the government nor assumed the role of opposition from 1972-1977.49 Thus this was the period when the difference between the two sides (Congress and Sheikh Abdullah) didn’t come down but both accused one another. Nevertheless, Indra Gandhi on January 1977 dissolved Parliament and fresh elections were announced. In J&K both NC and Congress contested these elections by entering into compromise. Congress contested from two constituencies of Jammu and one from Ladakh, while as NC contested rest three seats of the Valley. Congress won all the three Parliamentary seats while as NC won two

47 The objective that brings all these parties together despite strong differences was the representation of the People (Amendment) Bill. The bill decreed that any party member who resigned his party or desisted from voting According to his party’s wish would lose his seat. The bill which became law on 29 September 1979 was reasonably defined by all opposition parties as an act that will lead towards the establishment of a one party rule in J&K. For more detailed report see, “Jammu and Kashmir CM Sheikh Abdullah successfully pushes through Anti-Defection Bill”, India Today, October 31, 1979. 48 Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects, 85. 49 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 107. 152 and one seat was captured by Independent candidate from Jammu Thakur Baldev Singh50 (Table 4.2).

After Abdullah returned to power, he faced many political upheavals both within the state as well as in Centre. The emergency that was operated during the Indra Gandhi’s tenure had its own repercussions on J&K. Indra Gandhi lost elections in 1977, which resulted in weak state units of Congress and Kashmir was no exception. Pradesh Congress which had a majority in the Assembly was treated as a minority by Abdullah and his associates. This led to the further rift between the two political parties. That finally resulted in withdraw of support as a coalition partner to NC in February 1977 subsequently resulting into fresh elections in June 1977. After the elections of 1977, NC formed a government under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah and Congress assumed the role of opposition within the State Assembly (Table 4.1). However, once Abdullah took control of the state, he appointed his close associate Afzal Beg as Deputy CM in government. But, there were reports that Beg enjoyed the support of fifteen members of Assembly belonging to NC. On hearing this, Abdullah become more worried and started his plan to ask Indra Gandhi for support. Indra instead said Abdullah, to convince (Congressman) Mufti Mohammad Syed not to give any support to Afzal Beg.51 In this way, Indra succeeded in making cracks in already disturbed tectonic plates of politics in J&K.52

Soon after the Accord, Abdullah ignored his son-in-law G.M. Shah and appointed his old friend Afzal Beg as Deputy Chief Minister. However, the relation between the two didn’t go well and Abdullah removed Beg. ‘Asian News Magazine' narrated the whole political scenario in the following lines:

Ignoring G.M. Shah his son-in-law and appointed Mirza Afzal Beg as Deputy Chief Minister. He made later as de facto head of the government during his illness and absence. But Sheikh seems [to have] discovered that Beg was getting too big for his boots and promptly gave him the boot.53

50 Statistical reports on General Elections, 1977 to the Sixth Lok Sabha. 51 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 29. 52 Batacharjee, The wounded Valley, 238. 53 Asian News Magazine, (New Delhi), April 13, 16, 1981. 153

Though the removal of Afzal Beg54 did not pose any threat to NC government under Abdullah, but at the same time, the negative political development in neighbouring country Pakistan had its impact on Kashmir’s political history. The execution of former Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created serious political uproars in the valley. In the events that unfolded in the state as a result of Bhutto’s execution the sympathizers and members of Jamaat-i-Islami and Ahmadyas became the worst target of loot and arson. The law and order was the major challenge before the Abdullah government. The opposition forces blamed NC government of hardly taking any serious measures to restore law and order and to prevent street protests that caused several civilian killings and destruction of property at large scale. The main problem of law and order in J&K become the main irritant between the parties which shuttle the cock. Both the parties accused each other of disturbing the peace and order. Congress labelled NC leadership of having closely conspired with fundamentalist group like Jamaat-i-Islami in Kashmir and Jana Sangh in Jammu to further their political designs against Pradesh Congress. There were many other issues that opened the state’s debate over the accession with the union of India.55 The difference both Congress and NC were intensifying day by day. The withdrawal of support to Abdullah in 1977 was taken as betrayal and against the objectives and basic principles of Accord. Thus there was no trust between the Centre and the leadership of NC.

Indra Gandhi on many occasions alleged NC leadership of having involvement in boosting radical and communal parties like Jamaat-i-Islami and Jana Sangh. Even she alleged Abdullah’s administration as corrupted and full of nepotism. Mrs Indra accused him and his government of not safeguarding the minorities.56 There were many reasons why the relationship between the two sides of leadership was not good, and one among was the sensitive state and its geopolitical location. Indra Gandhi was so harsh to Abdullah’s government that she declared that the government of J&K cannot run without the help and tolerance of New Delhi. On her visit to Srinagar, she

54 The term careers of Afzal Beg, the long term friend of Sheikh Abdullah from early 1940s till 1977 came to an end once he was sacked from the party (NC). He died at the age of 74 on 11 June 1982. For more details of the Afzal Beg see Mohammad Sayeed Malik, “Tribute: Mirza Afzal Beg,” Kashmir Times, June 11, 2011. 55 Manzoor Fazili, Kashmir Government and Politics (Srinagar: Gulshan, 1982), 59. 56 India Today, May 16, 31, 1981. 154 vehemently attacked Abdullah and declared that without our help Kashmir government under Abdullah couldn’t last even for half an hour.57

When Congress was completely wiped out all over India and the Janta Party came to power, its effect was seen in J&K also. It was in this background that the State unit of Congress decided to withdraw support to Sheikh Abdullah. Pradesh Congress submitted its requisition to the governor and declared that we had lost confidence in Abdullah.58 On the other hand, Sheikh claimed that “Since the Congress Party has withdrawn its support the Accord that had been concluded between him and Indira Gandhi should be deemed to have ended.”59 There were many party leaders in Congress that were not in favour of supporting Abdullah during the Kashmir Accord. All these people were not cherishing the presence of NC and Abdullah in the state. They were of the opinion that, NC has blocked the way of the economic and political development of J&K. After all, these Congress members were more interested in claiming a power which they had lost to Abdullah previously. It was clear that all members of Pradesh Congress were not happy in 1975 when Congress transferred power to Abdullah. The most powerful person who opposed NC in tooth and nail was Mufti Mohammad Sayeed (then President of Pradesh Congress J&K). Once the Congress regained power again under the leadership of Indra Gandhi in 1980, Sheikh Abdullah felt more heat from New Delhi and faced numerous problems.

There were reports that New Delhi will overthrow Abdullah’s government in Kashmir. Even platform was set in the valley by organizing public lectures and rallies by Pradesh Congress about the failures of Abdullah’s government.60 However, after meeting with state Congress members in 1980, Indra Gandhi turned down the proposal to dismiss the state government. Nevertheless, the meeting of Congress leaders created apprehensions in the ranks of NC, particularly of Abdullah. After all, Sheikh was made Chief Minister against the wishes of Congress members. However, Sheikh annoyed Indra Gandhi; when he addressed the public conference on 13 July 1980. To quote Abdullah, “No one would be allowed to enslave us again whether it is India or Pakistan.”61 This statement of Abdullah annoyed Indra, who summoned

57 Inder Malhotra, The Times of India, (Delhi), June 3, 1982. 58 Singh, Flames of the Chinar,168. 59 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 15. 60 Ibid., 30. 61 Romen Basu, Torn Apart (India: Sterling Publishers, 1997), 16. 155

Abdullah to New Delhi and the meeting between the two took place on 22 July 1980. However, after meeting, Abdullah made another statement that he had been misunderstood as had happened in past. Nevertheless, Indra was not convinced by Abdullah and she appointed B.K. Nehru as governor of State. B.K. Nehru was more loyal to Indra and of L.K. Jha to serve the national interests of the Indian Nation.62 It is also important to mention that once Sheikh sensed dishearten about the unfilled promises, he in his public speech at Srinagar on Martyr’s Day on 13 July 1980 strongly criticized Central government and leadership and said: “The people have firm faith and confidence in the National Conference even now and for this reason they do not care for anybody be it, General Zia or Mrs. Gandhi,.”63

The statement of Abdullah created serious political uproars in Delhi which further led to the deterioration of the Center-State relationship. Thus old rivalries and animosities between Abdullah and Congress (I) were the main irritants of his public speech at Martyr's graveyard in Srinagar.64 Therefore Congress Party played a dominant role as opposition as well as in government in the state, which shaped the political discourse of J&K till today. In fact, Congress cannot be isolated from the political developments that occurred in J&K during the phase of 1975-2002 and of course in the post-2002 politics as well.

4.5 Janta Party: Emergence, and role as an Opposition

It was in early 1976 when Nationalist leaders of Janta Party organized its state unit in J&K after visiting Srinagar. These members consisted of Ashok Metha, Banu Pratab Singh and Nanaji Deshmukh.65 Though there were no takers of Janta Party in the valley, it still succeeded in making its presence in political corridors of electoral politics of J&K in 1977 elections. On the other hand in General elections of 1977, Indra Gandhi lost the public support and Moraiji Desai became the Prime Minister of India. His close and politically well-known faces of the time questioned the pro-Indra and pro-Congress governments in many states and Kashmir was no more exception

62 Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 319; A.G. Noorani, “The betrayal of India,” Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 1, January 18-31, 2003. 63 Lamb, Crisis in Kashmir, 103; for more detailed analysis Sten Widmalm, “The rise and fall of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir,” Asian Survey 37, no. 11 (1997), 1005-1030. 64 Times of India, (Delhi), July, 1980. 65 The Indian top rank leaders of Janta Party visited Valley including Prime Minister Morarji Dasia, Charan Singh and Jag Jivan Ram to nurture and build a strong unit of Janta Party in Jammu and Kashmir. Singh, Flames of The Chinar, 168; Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 109. 156 for them. In fact, the Janta Party was of the view that if Kashmir will go for elections there are chances to form a government.66 It was in this background that Abdullah met Prime Minister Moraiji Dasia in New Delhi67 and motion was set to conduct elections in J&K. In this way governor dissolved State Assembly68 on 27 March, 1977 and Governor’s rule was imposed for six months.69 There were many political leaders both in Centre as well as in the State who were in favour of Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq becoming president of the Janata Party's State unit. However, leaders of the Party in Jammu showed opposition to accept him. The reason was well known, Mirwaiz Farooq was opposed to the state’s accession to India.70

Yet in Kashmir valley, Mirwaiz Farooq offered his support to Janta Party. Besides him, many people like Maulana Masoodi (former prominent member of NC) and one of the Congress members Abdul Gani Lone joined the Janta Party.71 Prem Nath Bazaz is of the view that the policies of Janta Party regarding the internal aspect of Kashmir were different as of past. Sheikh took new government under Desai for granted.72 Though Abdullah offered his support to New-Delhi leadership of Janta party for the electoral coalition but Janta Party hardly trusted Abdullah because of his changing political behaviour. Instead, the Central leadership of Janta advised Abdullah to disband his NC and formally join mainstream politics. The event has been beautifully summarized by Prem Nath Bazaz in these words:

This would have upset Sheikh Abdullah’s apple cart and foiled his game of keeping aloof the state as his private preserve and left no opportunity for him to use by turns the National Conference as pro and anti-India force as suited his book.73

66 Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 108. 67 Batacharjee, Kashmir the wounded valley, 237. 68 State assembly was dissolved by Governor Laxmi Kant Jha under 92 section of Jammu and Kashmir Constitution despite Congress party enjoyed majority. However, no one cared about it. Even he didn’t consult leader of majority party before dissolving the house. In this way state governor pleased none other than his own boss in New-Delhi— Morarji Desai. Kak, Kashmir the untold story of Men and Matters, 108-109. 69 Singh, Flames of The Chinar, 168. 70 “Move to install Maulvi Farooq as president of Janata Party's J&K unit runs into rough weather”, India Today, December 31, 1978. 71 Khem Lata Wakhlu and O.N. Wakhlu, Kashmir, Behind the White Curtain, 1972-1991 (Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992), 50. 72 Bazaz, Democracy Through Intimidation, 62-63. 73 Ibid., 63. 157

Nevertheless, Sheikh Abdullah in many of his public meetings in South Kashmir criticized Janata Party of playing politics over the Special Status of J&K under article 370. He even warned the people that Janta Party was planning to abrogate article 370, which would reduce the position of J&K to much lower level than other states of India. However, these claims of Abdullah were strongly opposed by Janta Party leaders. Even Prime Minister Morarji Desai, Home Minister Charan Singh and Atal Bihari Vajpayee (then Minister of External Affairs of India) made it clear in their respective press and public statements that there was no plan of abrogation or amendment of Article 370 with regard to J&K. They blamed Sheikh of using unnecessary things to create confusions among the people for his pity electoral gains. After all, Abdullah was a master in his political thinking because he was well aware of the nature and emotions of Kashmiris and had all the experience from the very beginning to exploit the common Kashmiris for his political advantage and benefits. Abdullah not only pledged to preserve the Special Status under Article 370 but at the same time, he made the revelation that if he and his party failed to deliver in these promises, he will not hesitate to end the relation of state with Union of India and secede from it.74

Yet in the State Assembly elections of 1977, the newly Janta Party won a good number of 13 seats75 (12 from Jammu & 2 from the valley with 25.31 vote percentage)76 (Table 4.1).The Assembly saw open debates on many issues; though Abdullah was still a popular leader the opposition parties especially Janta Party adherents didn’t allow the government to function arbitrarily. There is no doubt that the result of 1977 was a proof to the fact that the leadership of Abdullah was still one of the key factors around which state politics revolved. However, at the same time Assembly also got few good number of opposition members from different political parties. With the passage of time, all political parties in India reconciled to the continuance of Special Status. Even, Jana Sangh which became part of Janta Party in 1977 and later reincarnated Jana Sangh into Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1980. Though Sheikh Abdullah from time to time again talked about Autonomy but his

74 Vasudeva, Kashmir Imbroglio, 239. 75 Statistical report on general elections 1977 to the legislative assembly of Jammu and Kashmir; Bazaz, Democracy Through Intimidation, 172-173. 76 Ibid. 158 demand for Autonomy didn’t provoke any suspicion among the right wing political parties about the patriotism of Sheikh Abdullah claims Balraj Puri.77

4.6 Death of Abdullah: Weakening of National Conference

The 7th Lok Sabha of 1980 was around the corner. Sheikh was at the helm of affairs; both Congress and NC contested elections along with other regional and National parties. Sheikh along with other NC leaders started a strong campaign to prove his social/electoral base. NC contested 5 and won 03 seats from the valley with 36.88 polling percentage. While as Congress (U) and Congress (I) clinched one seat each. One seat of Ladakh was won by independent candidate Phuntsong Namgyal. The most important about the election was Farooq Abdullah returned uncontested from Srinagar Parliamentary Constituency78 (Table 4.3).

There is no doubt that NC dominated the political horizons of Kashmir politics since its inception. However, the death of Abdullah in 1982 created a serious political crisis both in the party as well as in J&K. It is true that the plank of Autonomy was a major reason for Abdullah to return to power but after his death this political tool could not sustain its political relevance. The new problems started between Centre and state over the issue of resettlement Act 1982.79 When relation between the two leaders became constantly irritant and on the other side Abdullah was growing old, in such political atmosphere Sheikh Abdullah also gave his blessings to his son Farooq Abdullah for his new assignments of his Party in August 198180 which he founded and led all these years of political turmoil both in pre and post 1947. Farooq Abdullah in his presidential address to a large number of people made his commitment that “I pledge to you that I would rather give my life than betray you—Jan dey doonga par is qoum ki izzat say kabhi nahi khelooga.”81 But his hollow political slogans too could not fill the gap and vacuum his father had created. The son of Abdullah could not

77 Puri, Jammu and Kashmir, Triumph and tragedy of Indian Federalism, 191 78 Statistical reports on General elections 1980 to the Seventh Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, II, 1981). 79 The resettlement act 1982 was passed by state legislature which provisions for the return of state subjects who migrated to Pakistan in 1947-48. However, Congress criticized the bill but Abdullah condemned all critics and said, those who criticize the bill are, ‘Hindu Communalists of North India’. He further added that there main motive is to set the state divided on communal lines and turn the Muslim majority into minority. However, governor didn’t give assent to the bill and return back for review. But due to the poor health conditions of Sheikh Abdullah and later his death on 8 September 1982, the bill remained a distant dream of Abdullah. Times of India, June 3, 1982. 80 The Indian Express, August 3, 1984. 81 Tavleen Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of errors (New Delhi: Penguin, 1995), 18. 159 maintain the dominance of NC his father had maintained, instead he entered into coalition both at regional and National level. However, when Congress in Centre was not able to get a majority, instead Congress was on the ebb of declining to what Rekha Chowdhary is of the view that “National Conference too became susceptible to its manoeuvring.”82 On the other hand, the nomination of the son as Party President led to the war of words between Farooq and his brother-in-law (Ghulam Mohammad Shah) even when Sheikh Abdullah was alive. This was because G.M. Shah was considering himself as a natural successor of Abdullah. There was a reason for this; after all, he was the long ally of Sheikh Abdullah’s political journey from the very earlier days. Shah was the part of every political movement which Abdullah had launched from time to time to what Abdullah calls ‘to protect the Kashmiriyat’.83 However, Shah was not much popular and pleasant, because he was not known to the people as was Abdullah. Thus he lost his battle to secure his position as President of NC to Farooq Abdullah. The whole political drama of this event has been narrated by famous Indian journalist Tavleen Singh as, “All the local and National newspapers described this ceremony as the ‘Coronation of Prince Abdullah’.”84 The health conditions of Sheikh were going from bad to worse with each passing day. After prolonged illness, he passed away and in this way, the political journey of one of the political stalwarts of J&K from 1930s came to an end on 8 September 1982. Once the Indra Gandhi heard about the sudden death of Abdullah, she ordered her Party men to organize the state funeral for him with ruling Party NC. In fact, she herself paid homage to Abdullah in the city of Srinagar.

It is widely believed that the death of Abdullah was a serious blow to what we call unique culture and secular ethos of J&K and above all the much hyped Kashmiriyat. Nevertheless, Farooq was installed at the helm of affairs by combining together both ‘democratic and dynastic politics.’85 Indra lost no time to nominate the Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister. However, in the death of Abdullah, Central leadership in New Delhi felt that whatever the danger persisted in Kashmir after 1971 had now vanished (Reference was obviously towards Sheikh Abdullah). The Centre

82 Chowdhary and Rao, “National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir from Hegemonic to Competitive politics,” EPW, 1512-1527. 83 Nyla Ali Khan, Islam, Women and Violence in Kashmir between India and Pakistan (Srinagar: Gulshan Publishers, 2011), 79-80. 84 Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of errors, 17. 85 Bose, Roots of Conflict and Paths to Peace, 90. 160 found it easy to start squeezing the son for more political gains.86 In this way a weak and fragile leadership took the administration of J&K that was not only fully backed by Centre but at the same time had no public or emotional backing of the people. In fact, Farooq remained state’s Chief Minister from September 1982 to April 1983 even without the member of Assembly. Hence the dreams of the Sheikh Abdullah to review the Centre-state relation were buried after his death. After assuming power, Farooq Abdullah again tried to pass the ‘Resettlement or the Permanent Return to the State Bill 1982’87 but again due to the pressure from Centre and opposition parties to threaten the Farooq to sack his government for their electoral gains, the bill was not passed. It was only later when the matter was referred to the Supreme Court of India to check the Constitutional validity of the bill.88 However, there is no denial to this fact that the death of Abdullah weakened NC to a great extent that was much evident in post-1982 politics of the State (Table 4.4).

4.7 Elections of 1983: Dismissal of Farooq Abdullah

Soon after Sheikh Abdullah’s death, State Assembly elections were announced in 1983. Indra believed that she would easily motivate Farooq to join Congress (I) as pre-poll coalition alliance. She was of the opinion that Congress would contest elections on twenty-three constituencies out of seventy-six. However, the dream of Indra was short-lived; the relation of Farooq and Indra was falling down. It was in these political conditions that NC under the leadership of Farooq Abdullah announced that NC will contest from all seventy-six constituencies without any alliance with any political party. In this way, the elections of 1983 were directly fought between the two strong political parties (Congress (I)89 and NC). Though there were many other opposition parties that were stronger, e.g., Jamaat-i-Islami in Kashmir and Jana Sangh (turned BJP) in Jammu. However, Farooq Abdullah, the President of NC was right in

86 Varghese, Crafting Peace in Kashmir, 61. 87 Indra Gandhi was no ordinary politician, she take full advantage of regional differences. After all it was very much difficult for Mrs. Gandhi to ignore the Hindu voters of Jammu for her electoral gains. She finds it appropriate opportunity to challenge the NC and its social base from Jammu. Thus in this way Indra successfully exploited the voice of both Hindus as well as Sikhs for her partisan/biased political benefits. Sumit Mitra, “J&K elections: Farooq Abdullah desperate to legitimise popular support,” India Today, June 15, 1983. 88 M. S. Pampori, Kashmir in Chains 1819-1992 (Srinagar: Pampori Publishing House, 1992), 415. 89 In J&K, Congress was led by young and dynamic person Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. Who later played crucial role in state politics in post 2002 period when he formed political party PDP in 1999; for detailed legacy of Mufti Sayeed, Wani and Bhat, “Political Legacy of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed”, Mainstream weekly, Vol. LIV No 12. March 12, 2016. 161 his assertion that “if they agreed to such alliance, they would gradually be wiped out.”90 It is in this context that the strong political assertion by Farooq Abdullah and not crumbling down before New Delhi helped him to a great extent to enlarge his image and credibility among the people of Kashmir.

However, the entry of Indra Gandhi into the politics of Jammu communalized the whole atmosphere. Each political party used religion and identity symbols to defeat one another for electoral gains. In Jammu, Congress used all its power to make people believe that the ‘Hindu identity of the region is under threat from Muslim majority Kashmir’.91 Sumit Mitra has discussed this whole debate in an essay published in India Today in the following words:

What was indeed new to the scenario was the dogged attempt made by Mrs Gandhi to bulldoze her way into the politics of Jammu & Kashmir, the bastion of NC and its founder, the late Sher-i-Kashmir Sheikh Abdullah… for the first time since it cast itself as an adversary to the NC in 1977, was able to register a visible presence in all the 42 constituencies of the valley.92

Former BJP leader Arun Shourie is of the view that the entry of Indra and Congress (I) in the politics of J&K was to create insecurity, fear and divide the regions for reaping the electoral achievements.93 The things didn’t stop here; there was a well-planned strategy to send Muslim leaders to Muslim dominant areas for election campaigning and Hindu faces were sent to Hindu areas. This led to the politics of animosity for the first time in J&K. It was in this background that Inder Malhotra writes that, “The electioneering set a new record in viciousness which often degenerated into downright vulgarity.”94 The nature of political affairs of the State during the 1983 elections is beautifully narrated by Sumit Mitra in these words:

90 Farooq Abdullah, My Dismissal (New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1985), 21. 91 In the Kashmir Valley Mrs. Indra Gandhi projected herself as ‘Kashmir Ki Beti’. She avoided criticizing the Resettlement Act there and agreed that genuine cases of permanent “State Subject” estranged from heart and home should be sympathetically considered. Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of errors, 25; Sumit Mitra, “Farooq’s Fierce fight,” India Today, June 15, 1983; Varshney, “India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism,” Asian Survey, 997-1019. 92 Sumit Mitra, “J&K elections: Farooq Abdullah desperate to legitimise popular support,” India Today, July19, 2013. 93 Arun Shoray, “Eighty or one thousand,” India Today, July 31, 1983. 94 Inder Malhotra, Indira Gandhi (London: 1989), 278. 162

For Farooq, the coming few days are crucial; for the future of the politics of Jammu & Kashmir, they are even more so. In 1977, with the Sheikh at the helm of affairs, and aided by veterans like the late Mirza Afzal Beg, the National Conference (NC) had won altogether 47 of the 76 seats in the state Assembly. It's tally: 39 of the 42 seats in Kashmir valley; seven of the 32 seats in Jammu; and one of the two seats in the Ladakh region. In 1983, it cannot afford to lose more than eight seats from its 1977 harvest. But the odds seemed to have piled up against the NC…This surely calls for a lot of luck as the Sheikh and Beg have left a void in the party which is yet to be filled.95

It was in such a political atmosphere that there was yet another political alliance in J&K between Farooq Abdullah and Mirwaiz Farooq. The alliance was known as ‘Double Farooq Accord’. The main objective of this Accord was to preserve the Kashmiri identity from New Delhi. Even Farooq used the elections as a referendum on who should govern the state: the rulers of New Delhi or the local people. Farooq tried his best to play Kashmiri identity as the main political tool to blackmail the New Delhi to regain power.96 In fact, the ground was prepared in the State to change the guards because the leadership in Delhi was in no mood to give further concessions to Farooq Abdullah. Congress was of the opinion that if Farooq succeeded in his mission, then it will be much difficult to stop him from raising demands of Autonomy. Farooq-Farooq Accord was seen as a threat to Nation; because Mirwaiz Farooq and his Party (Awami Action Committee) were Pro- Pakistan.97 Hence suspicious aroused in Delhi to stop Farooq from doing more harm.98

It was already evident by the rigorous communal election campaign by all political parties in the state, that the results will be polarized both on regional and communal grounds. Voting percentage was 73.24. Once the results were declared, the politics of communal and identity showed its colours. NC that had contested the

95 Mitra, “J&K elections: Farooq Abdullah desperate to legitimise popular support”, India Today, July19, 2013. 96 M. J. Akbar, India: The Siege Within: The challenges to a Nations unity, (New Delhi: UBSPD, 1996), 283-84. 97 Akbar, Kashmir behind the Vale, 199. 98 It was in the year 1983 when first international cricket match was played in Srinagar between India and West Indies but the match was cancelled due to the strong protests. It was not for the first time when anti-India slogans were chanted. Singh, Kashmir A Tragedy of Errors, 40. 163 election on a plank of Kashmiri identity won 38 seats from the valley and retained seven from Jammu and only one in Ladakh. The main characteristic was that all winning were Muslim majority constituencies. In a similar fashion Congress (I) won twenty-three (23) seats from Jammu, two from Kashmir and one from Ladakh. Only five candidates out of twenty-six were Muslims. Thus, both parties NC and Congress (I) dominated respective regions on religious grounds. However, the Jamaat-I-Islami and BJP, though having good political and social base were completely wiped out99 (Table 1.4). Soon after the Assembly elections of 1983 were over Farooq was sworn in as the CM. The next challenge for NC was the General election of 1984 to the 8th Lok Sabha because this time the competition was not easy for NC. A number of new national parties entered into electoral fray in J&K. However, it was only NC and INC who won three seats each. NC contested 5 and was able to win 3 seats with 46.17 per cent votes, while as INC contested 4 and won 3 seats with 30.23 per cent of votes. The other parties could not make any inroad into the Parliament from J&K100 (Table 4.5).

The politics of Plebiscite was now no issue for NC, in their eyes, “people said that the past was dead and they were participating in this election as Indian.”101 However, once results were declared, Congress (I) started its campaign against NC and accused Farooq of manipulating and rigging of elections. Tavleen Singh writes:

In that summer of 1983 there was no turmoil in the valley despite Congress attempts to create it. The Congress had an important ally in the national press and in retrospect, I would go far as began.102 She further is of the opinion that ‘Every decision was taken personally by Mrs Gandhi decided of subverting the elected government?103

It was evident from the policies of the Central government under Mrs Gandhi that she did not want to let Farooq Abdullah rule in peace.104 Thus in such a political environment where Centre was in no mood to give Farooq a fair chance to rule in a

99 Statistical report on general elections, 1983 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECI, 1984). 100 Statistical report on General elections of 1984 to the Eighth Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1984). 101 Singh, Kashmir A Tragedy of Errors, 30. 102 Ibid., 38. 103 Ibid., 40. 104 Malhotra, Indira Gandhi, 279. 164 democratic setup, the violence was a natural outcome. Soon after Farooq formed a government; the state witnessed several riots both in Srinagar and Jammu. Numbers of people were injured when clashes erupted between workers of NC and those who opposed them. It is widely believed that Farooq was not forgiven by Indra for the Congress (I) defeat. Consequently, there was well-planned strategy to overthrow him. One of the former Chief Minister of J&K puts it as, “She (Indra Gandhi) was like an injured tigress seeking an opportunity to pounce on Dr Farooq and his government.” The local Congress workers under the leadership of Mufti Sayeed held several public protests and blamed Farooq’s government for failing to maintain law and order. Several corruption charges were levelled against Farooq and other NC leaders.105 To get an idea of the state of affairs in at that time it will be apt to quote former Member of Parliament and Union Minister Mohammad Shafi Qureshi:

It is strange that in a democracy you are killed or beaten if you raise the Congress (I) flag in the valley of Kashmir or shout ‘Azad Hindustan zindabad!’ But those who shout ‘Pakistan zindabad!’ and say ‘Indian dogs go back!’ are making hay.106

On the other hand, the government in New Delhi took a serious note of Farooq’s electoral alliance with pro-Pakistan party AAC (headed by Mirwaiz). This act of Farooq was seen as a threat to Indian Nation and he was therefore labelled as Anti- National.107 For Congress, the people like Maulana Iftikhar Ansari, G.M. Shah, Mohiuddin Salati and Mohammad Shafi Qureshi and many other like-minded persons who were previously accused of being anti-nationals and pro-Pakistanis now suddenly became nationalist and patriots for the Party, because all these were against Farooq Abdullah and NC.108 However, once we study the background of political

105 Behara, Demystifying Kashmir, 152. 106 Prabhu Chawla, “Leader under siege: Farooq Abdullah becomes a prisoner of forces beyond his control,” India Today, February 15, 1984. 107 The national press tended to report the truth in Jammu and Kashmir as the Congress saw it. Singh, Tragedy of errors 38-39. 108 G.M.Shah was a prominent leader of the Plebiscite Front, and during the 1970’s a Congress pamphlet “Red Book” leveled serious corruption charges against him. Mohammad Shafi Qureshi was an activist of the People’s Conference in the 1950’s which had opposed Kashmir’s accession to India and only two years earlier had been jailed on the charges of being a Pakistani spy. Mohammad Salati had also opposed Kashmir’s accession to India and his son was close to the pro-Pakistan Jamiat-ul- Tulba, the student youth wing of the Jamaat-i-Islami. Maulana Ansari was the founder of the Shia Youth Federation, which always celebrated 9 august as ‘Youm-e-Siah’ (black-Day), the day in 1953 when the central government had dismissed Sheikh Abdullah’s government. Behara, Demystifying Kashmir, 154. 165 complexities of the time; we find these entire allegations against Farooq were not all true but major among them were politically motivated to dethrone the Farooq from the government. In fact, it was Congress (I) that were in favour of an alliance with Mirwaiz Farooq but when he refused to support Congress and sided with NC, the Congress and other leadership in Delhi labelled him ‘anti-national, pro-Pakistan and communal’.109 One more reason for the dismissal of Farooq became his invitation to opposition parties to hold a conclave in Srinagar in 1983110 and the murder of Ravindra Mahtre111 in Britain. This was perhaps the last nail in his coffin because Indra was already too much upset by the behaviour of Farooq and she was in no mood to tolerate her opposition. Therefore the Central political leadership consulted its state Congress unit for implementing the further strategy. It was clear that Farooq would have to go. The plan was already on the table; just what was needed was the proper time for its execution. However, CM (Farooq Abdullah) still believed that Indra Gandhi will not take state Congress seriously because for him they had misinformed PM (Indra Gandhi) about the political developments in the state. To quote Farooq Abdullah:

I don't think she approves of what is happening in the state. She is misled by the people in the state. The local Congress (I) party is a group of burglars, thieves and goondas. They just can't remain out of power.112

109 India Today reported that Rajiv Gandhi and Vijay Dhar had visited the Moulvi Farooq’s house as late as 1982. In September 1980, the Congress-I government had done him a special favour by exempting donations worth 11.41 lakh to the ‘Anjuman-I-Nusratul Islam Trust’ from paying income tax for three years. When it became clear that Mirwaiz Farooq would turn down the alliance with the Congress-I, the income tax department wrote back asking why the exemption should not be withdrawn. “Tremors of tension,” India Today, February 29, 1984; Abdullah, My Dismissal 28-30. 110 Farooq was accused of helping secessionist forces in the state. The three day opposition conclave conference was organized by Farooq Abdullah in Srinagar in October 1983 in which more than seventeen opposition parties participated. The parties take strong note of Indra Gandhi’s authoritarian rule. Dr. Farooq added fuel to the fire and encouraged these opposition parties against Indra. Thus Mrs. Gandhi became more worried and felt insecure to rule further. She termed the demands of autonomy as anti-national sentiments. Bhattacharjea, Kashmir the wounded valley, 245-246. 111 One more reason that Congress levied against Farooq was the murder of Ravindra Mahtre. He was the assistant high commissioner in Britain and was kidnapped in 1984. For his release the kidnappers demanded 1 million dollar ransom and the release of several prisoners held in India including Maqbool Bhat who was awaiting execution in Tihar jail after India’s re introduction of the death penality. That was first kidnapped allegedly by JKLF armed group. Farooq visit to Pakistan in 1974 and his meeting with Amanullah Khan was now given a sinister interpretation that Farooq cannot be trusted any more. Bhattacharjea, Kashmir the wounded valley, 246-247. 112 Prabhu Chawla, “Leader under siege: Farooq Abdullah becomes a prisoner of forces beyond his control,” India Today, February 15, 1984. 166

The Brother-in-Law of Farooq, G.M. Shah was a natural choice to be used at this critical time. There were already rifts between Farooq and Shah. Even Shah was well prepaid to repeat what Bakshi had done in 1953. He prepaid the list of candidates who opposed Farooq and his government within NC. Congress found it an appropriate time to take their revenge. The list was sent to Governor B.K. Nehru to dismiss the Farooq government but he questioned the Constitutional modesty of sacking his government.113 Things didn’t stop here, as within the state there were people who never wished Farooq to be on top of position and first among them was G.M.Shah. Shah had been expelled by Farooq in 1984, though he didn’t give up and retained his leadership by forming a new political party called ‘Awami National Conference’ (ANC). It is alleged that much money was spent to make Shah a strong contender for the post of CM and money was spent to create a breakaway faction in NC.114 Consequently, Centre took full advantage of factionalism of NC and Congress find it an apt time to dismiss Farooq and install his brother-in-law as CM of J&K.

On the other hand, Congress leader Mufti Sayeed on 28 October 1983 in a very brief press conference announced that Farooq Abdullah had lost hold on the government. Even there were protests both in Jammu as well as in Kashmir, which were organized by Congress against government. Though the Congress head command gave many reasons for dismissing the Farooq led government but one thing was clear that there was no foreign or what they believed Pakistani hands involved this time. Tavleen Singh is of the opinion that “charges of Pakistani involvement were openly banded about by the Congress leaders.”115 However, with the support of Congress MLA’s Shah claimed of having thirteen members while as Congress had twenty-six in the State Legislative Assembly. Though B.K. Nehru was not in favour of dismissing Farooq Abdullah’s government but due to the pressure from Centre leadership he wrote to Farooq Abdullah:

113 She (Indra Gandhi) removed all those forces that were against her and government. She used every method to break the governments in states such as, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Jammu and Kashmir. The Chief Minister of J&K (Farooq Abdullah) was top on the list because of his sin of favoring opposition parties instead of Congress. Akbar, The Siege Within, 207. Even the Congress leadership in Jammu admitted this reality that, they would have no problem with Farooq as Chief Minister even if he would have confined his politics limited to state only but what he did, he permitted all opposition parties of India to use our state resources against Mrs. Indra Gandhi. Behara, Demystifying Kashmir, 153. 114 Schofield, Kashmir in the cross Fire, 226. 115 Tavleen, Kashmir A Tragedy of Errors, 53. 167

I write to say that in these circumstances, if and when such delegation were to come to me and I were convinced through counting of heads-a procedure I have hitherto stubbornly refused to follow-that you have lost your majority I would have no option but to dismiss your government as all proper constitutional process have now been unfairly pre- empted.116

B.K. Nehru was of the view that Farooq is no doubt an immature politician in comparison to G.H. Shah, for whom he had no trust at all. Once Indra asked him to dismiss Farooq, Nehru maintained that since there is no law and order problem, the dismissal of Farooq would only create problems for ourselves.117 However, Gandhi was determined to install her own like-minded person in Kashmir. B.K. Nehru was in between posted in Gujrat and new governor Jagmohan was sent to Kashmir to carry out tasks that were refused by B.K. Nehru. On the other side, the clashes erupted between NC and Congress workers that resulted in law and order problem. Indra accused Farooq of failing to fulfil his duties. During the same time, twelve members under the leadership of G.M Shah met governor Jagmohan and in this way on 2 July 1984 the government of Farooq Abdullah was dismissed.118 This is what state governor Jagmohan recalls that after all this whole operation to install Shah and dismiss Farooq was planned in New Delhi and executed in Srinagar.119 When Farooq Abdullah visited Jagmohan, he told him, “Do what you like but don't let that man become chief minister.”120 But Farooq was not even allowed to test the government’s strength on the floor of the Assembly. In this way, G.M. Shah was installed the CM of J&K. Tavleen Singh has narrated Indra Gandhi’s objective in Kashmir, “I am not worried about the democratic norms, I am not going to kiss Kashmir away just

116 Battacharjea, Kashmir the wounded valley, 246. 117 B. K Nehru papers, f. no.17, Nehru Memorial Museum, New Delhi. B. K. Nehru, Nice Guys Finish Second (Delhi: Viking Adult, 1997). 118 The Congress (I) was well ever about the state politics so it decided to choose longer road to enticing defectors from National Conference because under the anti-defection law, the member or defector will automatically loses his seat in state assembly. It was only after deep deliberation in New Delhi with state Congress top brass leaders that Congress (I) began to exploit the family division of Sheikh Abdullah and found Ghulam Mohammad Shah a willing partner to overthrow the Farooq Abdullah. Thus provoking rifts within the family of Abdullah and divide the electoral base of National Conference to weaken the party from within and end its dominance to prevent Farooq Abdullah from taking any bold decision viv-a-viz state of Jammu and Kashmir. Chawla, “Leader under siege,” India Today, February 15, 1984. 119 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 255-317. 120 Prabhu Chawla, “Farooq Abdullah's dramatic dismissal as CM throws J&K into acute political instability,” India Today, July 31, 1984. 168 because of them.”121 Even Bharatiya Janta Party (BJP) an arch enemy of Farooq Abdullah and NC adopted a resolution condemning Jagmohan for imposing a rump government in J&K. Farooq Abdullah in later pointed out that my dismissal was the obedience of Jagmohan to New Delhi:

He was a direct party to the conspiracy but various trapping were given a dramatic touch to make it appear as natural political event…The governor’s action in dismissing my government was invalid in law. The Raj Bhawan was not the place to test my majority that day; it should have been tested on the floor of the house.”122 Former Chief Minister of State Syed Mir Qasim wrote in this context that, “Jagmohan’s unconstitutional act was another nail in the coffin of the Kashmir’s faith in Indian democracy and law.”123 While as BJP member and ministry in NDA Vajpayee government George Fernandes puts it concisely: “The Congress (I) simply refuses to tolerate Farooq because he refuses to be part of Mrs. Gandhi's fiefdom.124

Indra Gandhi during his tenure as Prime Minister was playing with hot fire in J&K. Her policy of appeasement and hate put the state on new dangerous lines. For Indra, it was mandatory for Kashmiris to prove their nationalism. Farooq Abdullah writes:

Wear a certificate of nationalism and prove their loyalty to India every day was not only insulting but also dangerous because waiting in the wings were restive youth active in campuses of colleges and universities who could cause havoc in the valley by unleashing the power of the gun against Indian state.125

The attempt of the Centre to dismiss the highest authority of Chief Minister was not first of its kind. It had earlier in 1953 dismissed Sheikh Abdullah—Prime Minister of Kashmir from the power. However, the dismissal of Farooq gave a profound shock to the mainstream politics of J&K. The people’s faith in electoral politics and democracy got lost and became meaningless. The message corresponded

121 Singh, Tragedy of errors, 60; Abdullah, My Dismissal, 12. 122 Abdullah, My Dismissal, 11. 123 Qasim, My life and Times, 163. 124 Chawla, “Leader under siege,” India Today, February 15, 1984. 125 Abdullah, My Dismissal, 31. 169 by New Delhi was that the state has no say in local governance and decision making. It was in this context that Balraj Puri has rightly observed:

Sheikh Abdullah’s dismissal had signaled the message that even if the Kashmiri people did not wish to remain within India, they would not be allowed to secede whereas the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah conveyed the message that even if the people wished to remain within India they would not be free to choose their own government.126

As a result, the Centre found it easy to destabilize the Farooq Abdullah and was replaced by none other than his brother-in-law as Chief Minister in 1984. It was in this context that, “the second Kashmir problem actually began in the month of June 1984.”127 In fact there is no denial of this fact that New Delhi was more interested in seizing power than in asserting democracy, which became clear by its decision to remove Farooq from the office. If the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 was a blunder on the part of Delhi to seize power and rule over the state by any means of fraud and deception, the same things were repeated in 1984. The event of 1984 was the reversal of 1953. Khalida Shah Daughter of late Sheikh Abdullah criticized his brother Farooq, when her husband took over the administration of state as CM, in the following words:

My brother had lost the moral support of the people. His ouster will mark the beginning of a stable and clean administration in the state. Barring a few noises, the state is happy with the smooth change-over. But Farooq in response to her sister addressed his followers on 5th July at Mujahid Manzil and they chanted slogans ‘Gul Shah-Chor Shah’, ‘Marqazi Sarkar Murdabad’ (Down with the Central Government) and ‘Indira Gandhi Murdabad.’ Farooq asked sarcastically: ‘Where is their mass support? Here is a chief minister who can't move without gun-toting cops in a city which he claims is his.’ While as Begum Abdullah declared, ‘Nobody can rule over you from outside. The Congress (I) has been able to install a puppet government with a few quami gaddars (traitor) but their rule will not last long.’128

126 Puri, Kashmir towards Insurgency, 34. 127 M.J. Akbar, “The second Problem,” Seminar, 392, April 1992, 16. 128 Chawla, “Farooq Abdullah's dramatic dismissal as CM throws J&K into acute political instability,” India Today, July 31, 1984. 170

The dismissal of Farooq created havoc because most the people who were associated with NC during Sheikh Abdullah time regard him as his natural successor. The new government that was installed under Shah was lacking basic ‘criteria of democratic credentials’. People hardly regard him as a legitimate ruler. The J&K entered into a new phase where bribery and corruption were seen as a natural medicine to buy the loyalty of the Kashmiris. However, the assassination of Indra Gandhi129 in 1984 finally detached draftswoman of Farooq Abdullah’s dismissal. But, the dismissal of Farooq was yet again the betrayal to the leadership of Kashmir. The dismissal message was louder that New Delhi suspects Kashmiris, even though the state had Special Status but it was proof that only those leaders could remain in power that will enjoy the goodwill of New Delhi. This is what happened in 1986 when Congress and NC were in an alliance.130 About the dismissal of Farooq Abdullah’s government, Syed Mir Qasim, a former Chief Minister of state wrote that “Jagmohan’s unconstitutional act was another nail in the coffin of the Kashmir’s faith in Indian democracy and law.”131 Nevertheless, after the assassination of Indra Gandhi her son Rajiv Gandhi took over the office in New Delhi. However, during those days JKLF has already put her imprints on the politics of Kashmir. Though J&K was relatively peaceful but Pradesh Congress was busy in capturing power at any cost.132 Hence this period was also dominated by Congress to weaken the NC in J&K.

4.8 Dismissal of G.M. Shah: National Conference-Congress Electoral Cooperation

It was only after two years on 7 March 1986 that G.M. Shah was dismissed. There were communal riots and curfew was imposed for many months.133 Balraj Puri observes that all these communal incidents were engineered through planned

129 Mrs. Indra Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards in October 1984 to take revenge for ‘operation Bluestar’ that was carried out by Indian army in Golden temple in Panjab to kill the militants, demanding a separate country for Sikhs called Khalistan. William K. Stevens, “Indra Gandhi assassinated by gunmen; police seal off 2 areas as crowds gather,” The New York Times, 1984 retrieved at https://www.nytimes.com/1984/10/31/world/indira-gandhi-assassinated-by-gunmen-police-seal-off- 2-areas-as-crowds-gather.html. 130 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict India, Pakistan and the Unending war (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2004), 135. 131 Qasim, My life and Times, 163. 132 Singh, Tragedy of errors, 90-91. 133 Ghulam Mohammad Shah was nick named as ‘Gul-e-Curfew’, because under his administration J&K was under curfew for many months and people used to call him ‘Gul-e-Curfew’. Abid Bashir, “This curfew was harshest than ‘Gul’e curfew’ days, say people,” Greater Kashmir, Aug 30, 2016. 171 campaign of rumours. Shah’s government was dismissed as arbitrarily, as he was appointed two years before as CM. The governor Jagmohan stated when he dismissed shah’s government that:

Today I have dismissed G.M. Shah Ministry. His regime was another sad chapter in the unfortunate history of Kashmir. The task before me is truly awesome. The communal passions are running high. The minorities are fear striken. The government machinery is rudderless. The officers are demoralised. Indiscipline has made deep inroads into the state secretariat. Fundamentalists and obscurantist are nursing their own designs. Malpractices, corruption and intrigues are rampant. The economy already in a poor shape is further sliding downwards. The judiciary is wayward. Regional tensions are mounting.134

Once Shah was dismissed, the state was handed to the governor to rule. However, this time there were strong voices from all opposition parties against the governor’s rule. But the politics of Kashmir took a U-turn in 1986; Farooq once against was cherished by Congress as a Nationalist when he concluded an Accord with Rajiv Gandhi famously known as ‘Rajiv-Farooq Accord’. Now those who previously were labelled as Nationalist and pro-Indians were termed as communal and anti-Nationalist by same Congress party. Commenting on the dismissal of Farooq and installation of G.M. Shah as CM of the state Tavleen Singh has observed:

The clock has been put back thirty years’…Kashmir has been reminded that no matter how much it feels that it belongs to the mainstream of India, no matter how often its Chief Minister asserts that he is Indian, it will always be special, always be suspect.135

The fact of the matter is that the INC and its state unit failed to set up its strong base belt despite the fact that its leaders tried each opportunity to build the Party in the valley of Kashmir. However, the Party emerged with good followers from Jammu and Ladakh regions. It was in such a political atmosphere that Rajiv Gandhi and his top functionaries in the Party got convinced that Farooq Abdullah is the only political choice to improve their presence in J&K. On the other hand, Farooq was too fearful because of his bad past experience of overthrowing his democratic government

134 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 346. 135 Tavleen Singh, India Today, July 11, 1984. 172 by Indra Gandhi. Farooq was sure that without the electoral alliance of Congress it is impossible for him and his Party NC to seize power. Nevertheless, he was not wrong in his political calculus. He was able to understand the Central government policies vis-a-vis Kashmir. He was sure of this fact that he can only enjoy the power by confidence and backing of New Delhi. Even he admitted this fact that the harsh language which he used in his previous years had ultimately cost the Kashmir too greatly.136 Political observers believe that the year 1986 November was yet another ‘unfortunate political development’ in Kashmir when this new Accord was signed between Rajiv-Farooq.137 The Accord paved the way for an electoral alliance between the two political parties.138 For both the leaders, Accord was need of the hour to ‘consolidate the democratic and secular forces’ in J&K. Commenting on the importance of the Accord, Farooq Abdullah said:

The biggest political gain of the Accord will be to fight unitedly-forces of disruption in Jammu and Kashmir to fight the fundamentalist whether Hindus or Muslims and to spend our energies in getting something better for the state, remove poverty, disease and unemployment.139

However, the Rajiv-Farooq Accord was severely criticized by opposition parties. Commenting on the Accord, Abdul Gani Lone said, “division of spoils between the two parties”. On the other hand, the principle opposition Jamaat-I-Islami termed this Accord as a “Friendship between Kafir and Muslim.”140 Even the rightwing parties like BJP and Panther’s Party also criticized Accord. For BJP the Accord was ‘an unholy alliance’ and for panther’s as ‘opportunist.’141 M.J. Akbar has

136 Kashmir Times, November 8, 1987. 137 It was decided that Farooq will lead the new government in coalition with Congress. But the unfortunate part was that the terms and conditions of the Accord were not made public. Even the party leaders of the both parties were not aware about the details. Nevertheless, after the study of the diverse sources, the conditions and terms of the Accord can be identified as: 1. Congress and NC both the political parties will fight those forces that have emerged such as secessionist, extremists and communalists. Both believed that the accord will help the state to develop more rapidly economically and politically. 2. The coalition government of the both political parties will form the government before and after 1987 state assembly elections if voted to power. 3. The ideology of NC and Congress was secularism, socialism and to preserve integrity of India. Both decided to co-operate each other to fight against the other opposition parties of the state. 4. It was also decided that Congress will contest few seats from Kashmir valley, but at the same time NC would support Congress candidates. Kashmir Times, November 17, 1986. 138 Times of India, November 8, 1986. 139 Times of India, November 4, 1986. 140 Yograj Sharma and Parveen Rahilla, India-Pakistan And Kashmir: The Emerging Trends (Jammu: Saksham Books International, 2013), 35. 141 Times of India, November 6, 1986. 173 rightly observed that Farooq was accused of betraying of his Father’s legacy by people of Kashmir. To quote Akbar;

It created a vacuum where National Conference had existed and extremists stepped into that vacuum. Kashmiriyat had become vulnerable to the votaries of violence and Muslim hegemony, both injuring Kashmir and perverting Kashmiriyat.142

But the hard reality is that the Accord closed down all roots of secularism that would have led to the development of a peaceful J&K. However, what subsequently happened was totally opposed to the terms of the Accord. The popular discontent among the people of Kashmir that was high during Plebiscite Front movement was now low but the Accord generated a new wave of discontent among people against both State and Central governments. It is generally believed that the Rajiv-Farooq Accord highly damaged the basic ‘secular political identity’ of J&K that was known as Kashmiriyat. People associated with NC saw it as a betrayal and surrender of Farooq Abdullah in front of Congress and Rajiv Gandhi. In fact, Balraj Puri has quite interestingly noted that “the Accord destroyed the raison d’etre of both parties and forced all types of discontent to seek fundamentalist or secessionist outlets.”143

Thus to conclude we can say the Accord of 1987 (Rajiv-Farooq) was yet another setback to democracy in Kashmir. The main objective was to rule the state without giving them choice to elect their representatives. The opposition parties were highly critical of the Accord because it was against the basic tenets of democratic credentials. Instead in the end the irritants in Centre-state relationship the Accord created more problems than it solved. The Accord gave opposition parties especially the ‘fundamentalist’ a chance to unite against the Congress-NC electoral alliance. Things didn’t stop here; the basic objective of the Congress to spread the base in the valley of Kashmir was fundamentally faulty. Instead, it gave birth to new problems that shaped violent gun culture in post-1988 era of Kashmir politics. Though, it was not the only reason that led to the armed struggle in Kashmir but the failure of ‘democratic institutions and interference of the Centre’ in one way or the other created both governance and democratic deficit in J&K. That led to the further

142 Akbar, Kashmir Behind the vale, 213. 143 Puri, Kashmir Insurgency and After, 57. 174 alienation of masses from state institution and finally eruption against the Indian state in the form of gun in 1988.This resulted in a weak state government and strong domination of Centre in local affairs. Consequently gradually NC headed towards decline, where it lost its considerable political constituency in future electoral politics of J&K. (See the electoral Tables from 1951 to 1987).

4.9 The Rise of Secessionist Parties: The Politics of J&K in Post-1975 Era

It is beyond doubt that Congress had a very poor record in Kashmir. The Party undermined the ‘separate regional identity’ of the state. It had a legacy of betraying the people when in 1953 Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed and jailed and again in 1984 when his son Farooq Abdullah was dismissed. Not only this, the Party imposed many undesirable Central laws through obscene methods to erode the Special Status of J&K. There is no denying the fact that INC being the outsider political force couldn’t generate local loyalties in J&K in the past. Same is true of post-1980’s. The Party couldn’t generate its base in valley despite it succeeding in making inroads in Jammu region. However, the wrong political approach adopted by Congress and the New Delhi vis-a-vis J&K from 1953 to 1984 gave birth to the strong anti-India assertions but due to the leadership qualities of Sheikh Abdullah, these sentiments were controlled till his death in 1982. But after the death of Abdullah, the political vacuum was filled by new ‘fundamental forces’. Nevertheless, the so-called secular parties including INC hardly earned the sympathy of the majority of the people of J&K during this phase. As a result the secular politics was now replaced by identity politics based on regional and religion that shaped later political history of Kashmir for next two decades which in fact is still playing a dominant role in the politics of the state.

Once the state’s secular fabric was gradually eroded the process of new forces was natural to occur. In Chapter Third, we have discussed the emergence and role of Jamaat-I-Islami, Awami Action Committee, and other like-minded parties where always present to continue their political activities. The death knell of secular parties after the death of Abdullah gave the opportunity to them to increase their role in politics and Rajiv-Farooq Accord provided them a good opportunity and platform to unite under one banner called ‘Muslim United Front. The imposition of governor rule after the dismissal of Farooq in 1984, the parties like Jamaat-I-Islami, Jamaat-e-Tulba, People’s League, Independent Front, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front, Mahaz-e- 175

Azadi, Awami Action Committee, Dukhtaran-I-Milllat (Daughters of the Nation), People’s Conference, Political Front, and Ummat-e-Islami all where either pro- Pakistan and anti-India parties.144 After the death of Indra Gandhi, political changes were bound to occur. During her tenure Farooq was pursuing the policy of anti- Congress and anti-Delhi, but her death also changed his tone. He was now ready for reconciliation with New Delhi which resulted into the Rajiv-Farooq Accord of 1986 and was therefore installed as the Chief Minister on 7 November 1986.145 By concluding Accord with Rajiv, Farooq lost his stature in the politics of Kashmir. All opposition parties called Farooq “New Delhi’s man in Kashmir, puppet and stooge of Delhi.” There was one section in Congress that believed the formation of a government with Farooq will create political uncertainty and chaos in J&K.146 This whole political scene is aptly explained by Tavleen Singh in these words:

People could not understand how a man who had been treated the way he had by Delhi, and especially Gandhi Family, could now be crawling to them for Accords or alliances.147

The alliance between the Congress and NC was seen as a threat to the Muslim identity of Kashmir by some socio-religious cum political forces. Hence the thought was developed to counter the Congress-NC alliance with strong opposition in Kashmir and many small socio-religious groups came together and formed an alliance under the name of Muslim United Front (MUF).148 Therefore we can say that the events like sacking of Farooq Abdullah in 1984, installation of G.M. Shah as CM, later imposition of governor rule, dismissal of Shah and lastly the concluding of Accord with Farooq to install him as CM proved this fact that Centre was not in favour to develop democracy in Kashmir. Instead, Centre’s frequent intervention from time to time eroded the very essence of democracy in J&K. Hence it is true that the growth of pro-Pakistan elements got momentum only after 1980s. Though, such elements were present in past also as discussed in Chapter Second and Third. But during this time they were now an open secret that challenged the Indian state and her

144 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 135-136. 145 Ibid., 136. 146 The Tribune, August 4, 1986. 147 Singh, Kashmir: A Tragedy of errors, 98. 148 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 136-137. 176 wrong policies openly. Some important Political parties and groups are discussed below.

4.9.1 Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League

The politics of Plebiscite in J&K gave birth to a number of political groups and militant organizations in post-1970’s era. However, during the late 1960s one important political group came into forefront under the patronage of Mohammad Farooq Rehmani. The group was called ‘Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League’ (J&KPL) formed in the year 1974. It was during those days that a young and energetic youth icon Shabir Ahmad Shah joined Farooq Rehmani and became Chief of this organization.149 The main objective of the J&KPL was a peaceful solution of Kashmir conflict, though Shabir Shah was a staunch supporter of ‘Islamization’ in his earlier years. However, the League due to its low political profile and many other political problems couldn’t make any headway in its political agenda. Thus it was imperative for them to find an alternative where they can carry their political activities and attain the objective of peaceful resolution of Kashmir dispute. It was in this background that League under Shabir Shah became part of ‘All Parties Hurriyat Conference’ (APHC) in the year 1993. But due to his secret political dialogue with New Delhi in the year 1996 created distrust among APHC which resulted in Shah’s resignation. Soon after cutting ties with J&KPL, Shabir Shah floated a new political group called, ‘Jammu and Kashmir Democratic Freedom Party’ (JKDFP). Though in the recent past Shabir Shah was much busy to unite the two factions of Hurriyat Conference but couldn’t achieve this objective. Later he along with Nayeem Khan and Aga Syed Hassan Al- Mosvi Al-Safvi separatist leaders parted away from Mirwaiz led Hurriyat faction and formed separate third front Hurriyat called ‘Jammu and Kashmir Hurriyat Conference’ (J&KHC) in the year 2014.150 But trio decided to disband the third front and joined Hurriyat Conference led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani in 2015.151 However, there was no change in objectives vis-a-vis solution of Kashmir dispute.152

149 Noorani, “Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 150 The Indian Express, January 18, 2014. 151 The Tribune, (Chandigarh), September 9, 2015. 152 Javid Iqbal, “Third Hurriyat: How about the Goal?,” Rising Kashmir, January 20, 2014. 177

4.9.2 Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference

The history of Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference (JKPC) goes back to the days of 1978 by late Abdul Gani Lone. He was a known lawyer of his time was also elected to State Legislative Assembly on Congress ticket in 1967.153 However, after serving for a decade in the mainstream politics he got disappointed once Sheikh Abdullah signed Kashmir Accord and lost hope of finding the respectable solution of Kashmir dispute. It was in the year 1973 when Abdul Gani lone resigned from the Assembly and became a prominent voice in opposition. In the year 1976, he was expelled from Congress by Indra Gandhi for allegedly having anti-party and anti- India political views. He subsequently joined the Janta Party. In the year 1977, he again contested elections on Janta Party ticket and won the elections. But due to political differences on the restoration of ‘internal autonomy,’ he resigned from both Assembly as well from Janta Party and floated his own party called ‘Jammu and Kashmir Peoples Conference.’154 The Party stood firm to fight for the solution of the Kashmir issue by all peaceful means. Though Lone accepted the offer of MUF to fight united against NC and Congress in 1987, later the Front didn’t admit his entry into MUF. It was in this background that ‘Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League’ contested elections of 1987 independently on 25 seats. Commenting on the elections of 1987, Lone said: “We fought independently in 1987. The same thing happened all over. We were winning in three or four constituencies. We like others were made to lose.”155

However, once armed struggle erupted in 1990s and the emergence of ‘APHC’ in 1993, Lone became one of its founding members. Nevertheless, Gani Lone continued to Chair J&KPC with an objective to find the respectable solution of Kashmir dispute by involving all the parties in dialogue. But at the same time, Lone represented a separate armed wing called ‘Al-Barq’ and Bilal Lodhi was its Chief Commander.156 However, the tragic assassination of Abdul Gani lone by unknown gunmen on 21 May 2002 led to the end of the political journey of one of the seasoned

153 “Hurriyat Leader Lone Shot Dead”, Outlook, May 21, 2002. 154 Lawrence Lifschultz interviews Abdul Ghani Lone, “A voice from Kashmir,” Frontline, Vol. 19- issue 16, August 3-16, 2002. 155 Ibid. 156 Noorani, “Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 178 politician of Kashmir.157 Though his two sons, Sajad and Bilal formally joined politics after his death and revived Peoples Conference but due to the political differences of Sajad Gani Lone with Hurriyat, he decided to join mainstream politics and contested 2014 Assembly elections by floating his separate political party called ‘Peoples Conference’. Sajad was elected to the State Assembly from Handwara and his party won two seats.158 However, Bilal Lone continued his father’s legacy and remained a constituent member of APHC to fight for the solution of Kashmir dispute.

4.9.3 Jammu and Kashmir Political Front

Fazal Haq Qureshi is perhaps one among those political stalwarts who gave Kashmir struggle a new name. Praveen Swami (noted Indian journalist) is of the opinion that Qureshi laid down the ‘foundation of the Jihadist movement in Kashmir’.159 He was first arrested in the year 1967 and was released after one year in 1968. Instead of remaining silent to the political developments that were taking place in Kashmir, he joined Al-Fateh Cell led by Ghulam Rasool Zahgeer and Nazir Ahmad Wani. Though, he was again jailed for anti-India activities for a couple of years. The signing of Kashmir Acord in 1975 led to the disunity in Al-Fateh Cell. One group was pro- Abdullah and another was anti-Accord. It was Fazal Haq Quereshi who raised the voice against Sheikh Abdullah and Accord along with Nazir Ahmad Wani. It was in this background that he decided to float his own Party and formed ‘Jammu and Kashmir Peoples League’ (J&KPL) in central jail Srinagar in 1974.160 It is also a fact that in post-1975 period Sheikh could not suppress his oppositions as he had previously done in 1950s. However, like other anti-Abdullah and anti-Accord leaders, Qureshi associated himself with armed struggle in post-1987 period along with his old friend Abdul Majid Dar and co-founded the Tehrik-e-Jihad Islami but a couple of years later this group was merged with Hizb ul Mujahedeen in 1991.161 It was in these troubled years that Fazul Haq Quereshi set up yet another Party in 1993 called ‘People’s Political Front.’ (PPF)162 Though Qureshi was arrested and was imprisoned for many years, after his release and experience of the secessionist politics, he helped found APHC. During the 2002 dialogue process between Hurriyat and government of

157 “Hurriyat Leader Lone assassinated in Srinagar,” The Hindu, May 22, 2002. 158 “Sajad Lone-From being a separatist to a minister,” The Indian Express, March 1, 2015. 159 “Patriarch of Jammu and Kashmir jihad turned peacemaker,” The Hindu, December 05, 2009. 160 Noorani, “Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 161 “Patriarch of Jammu and Kashmir jihad turned peacemaker,” The Hindu, December 05, 2009. 162 Noorani “Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 179

India, Fazul Haq Qureshi played a significant role to bring militant groups on the table. There is no denial of the fact that Qureshi played a significant role since his entry into secessionist politics from the days of 1967. Though, he was attacked by a couple of times by unknown gunmen for his alleged involvement of secret talks with New Delhi. Presently Fazul Haq Qureshi is an executive member of APHC led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.163

4.10.4 Elections of 1987: National Conference and Collapse of Indian Democracy

After the Rajiv-Farooq Accord, the political vacuum was now reality in J&K. In Jammu, this vacuum was filled by like BJP, J&KPP and other small regional ‘communal navies’. But in Kashmir, the separatist tendencies were present even before 1987 and the vacuum was filled by MUF, (Muslim United Front) of which Jamaat-i-Islami was one of the strong driving forces. In this way, the battle of ideologically different political forces gave rise to new problems that haunts J&K even today (public protest and revival of militancy). The election campaign is proof of this fact that regions got divided into communal lines. In Kashmir, it was MUF that waged ‘Electoral Jihad’ against NC & Congress alliance. MUF used all its religious and political influence to mobilize people to vote and it largely succeeded in its programme. In Jammu, BJP and co-ideological parties geared up against alliance of NC-Congress and accused them of dumping national interests. The State 8th Assembly elections were held on 23 March 1987. All political parties like MUF, NC, Congress and other small parties started strong election campaigning to mobilize voters. The elections saw 74.88 percentage of voting. It was for the first time in the history of Kashmir that such a huge number of polling was recorded. Even in Kashmir valley alone, the voting percentage was touching 80.164

On the other hand, MUF in a very short time became one of the strong opposition to NC and Congress. It was now a political reality that the state will enter into a difficult phase. As we have previously discussed how the electoral politics of post-1982 State Legislative Assembly elections greatly harmed the very nature of democracy in J&K. Nevertheless, NC-Congress alliances contested 76 seats, while as

163 “Who is Fazal Haq Qureshi?,” Greater Kashmir, December 05, 2009. 164 Verma: Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 137; Bose, Kashmir: Roots of the conflict Paths to peace, 49; Scofield, Kashmir in conflict (2003), 137. 180

MUF decided to contest from 43 constituencies. NC led alliance won 66 seats, while as MUF was restricted to four seats despite the fact MUF managed to secure 31 per cent votes165 (Table 1.6). However, the elections were rigged due to the growing threat of MUF ideology.

The state machinery was used to curb the opposition parties especially the MUF even before the elections. The government charged several members of MUF before elections for ‘rousing religious sentiments of the people and demanding independence from the Indian Union.’ All these members were charged and cases were filed under TADA (Terrorist and Disruptive Prevention Act).166 Besides this number of leaders and close sympathies were arrested for anti-National actions and logged in jail.167 Although Farooq Abdullah blamed Centre and denied any charge of rigging and mal-practice in elections by saying that my own law minister lost his seat. If there had been rigging would I not have ensured that he retained his seat? However, there are people who criticize Farooq for this remark and argue that Farooq never really wanted his law minister to win the elections. Tavleen Singh argues that ‘the rigging was blatant.’168 Hence the 1986 Accord was, in fact, one of the personal attempts of Farooq to develop a romantic relationship with Centre that resulted in massive set-back both to the state as well as to NC. The base support of NC was eroded to a great extent. Though the alliance and cooperation between the two was welcomed by some political forces because it was expected that alliance will counter the anti-India and pro-Pakistan elements and keep them at bay.169 However, that didn’t happen and instead, they become stronger with each passing day and pro- Pakistan and pro-Independence parties still have a greater sway in J&K.

In this way, democracy was murdered even before elections took place. The opposition was crushed with iron hand policy and there was no room left for dissent in politics of Kashmir. This whole political scene is well documented in the political history of Kashmir. One of the firebrand leaders of MUF, Abdul Gani Lone expressed his deep frustration in these words: “this simply deepened people’s feelings against

165 Statistical report on General Elections of 1987 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECl, 1987). 166 “8 MUF Men Charged Under Terrorist Act,” The Indian Express, March 9, 1987. 167 Hindustan Times, 26 March 1987; Widmalm, “The rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir,” (1997), 1020-1021. 168 Singh, Kashmir the tragedy of errors, 101. 169 Editorial, “Congress-NC Alliance,” Patriot, February 4, 1987. 181 the government of India. If the people are not allowed to cast their votes where will their venom go except into an expression of anti-national feelings?”170 Lone was a great admirer of democratic societies, but the election of 1987 changed his mindset also turned him into one of the leading protagonists of militancy in Kashmir. His words about the 1987 State Assembly elections are haunting state even today. To quote Lone:

It was the authoritarian crackdown on opposition MUF members and rigging of elections that motivated the young generations of Kashmiris to say, to hell with the democratic process and all that this is about’ and they said, ‘Let’s go for armed struggle.171

The opposition parties both in Kashmir and Jammu showed substantial presence and secured a good percentage of votes in their respective dominated areas. However, they could not make a strong presence in Assembly due to the rigged elections and malpractices that resulted in resentment among the ranks of MUF. With the passage of time, the Kashmir valley turned into a battlefield between Kashmiris on the one side and Indian state on the other. Once the voice of MUF was curtailed, agitation politics became the norm of the day. The electoral politics was now replaced by a new non-electoral dominant narrative of armed resistance. These political developments made its significant impact on the politics of the state which still continues. It was, in fact, an infeasible political environment which was created by New Delhi in Kashmir that led to the emergence of armed struggle and total breakdown of democratic institutions. The opposition parties in the valley which contested 1987 elections boycotted Parliamentary polls of 1989 and became leading front ranks of militant movement172 in Kashmir. As noted by Professor P.S. Varma:

The entire democratic process has been strangulated and trampled time and again by local zealots to serve their narrow political ends. These

170 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (New Delhi: foundation Books, 1997), 99. 171 Interview of Abdul Gani Lone, 1994, quoted in A. Ejaz, “US Strategy of Preventing Conflicts in South Asia,” Pakistan Vision, 17(2), 2016. 172 Mohammad Yusuf Shah (Presently head of United Jihad Council ‘UJC’ in Azad Kashmir under the pen name of Syed Salahuddin become leader of Hizbul Mujahedeen. An indigenous group of armed wing in Kashmir which is fighting for the separation of Kashmir from India) contested 1987 elections from Amirakadal constituency in city of Srinagar. Mohammad Yasin Malik was his polling agent later turned militant commander of one of the largest armed group in Kashmir called JKLF. Bose, Kashmir: Roots of the conflict Paths to peace, 48-49; Harinder Baweja, “In the Mind of the Militant,” India Today, December 31, 1994. 182

perversions, in the long run, have not only ridiculed the electoral process but also contributed to the spurt of fundamentalism, subversion and militant violence in the state.173

The Rajiv-Farooq agreement only that choked the secular and nationalist ways of widespread discontent, but at the same time elections of 1987 also closed down all democratic and Constitutional means of protests in the valley. People felt themselves in prison and got disgusted, disillusioned and disappointed the way ‘Guided Democracy’174 from New Delhi was imposed on Kashmir. This led to the change in the mindset of people and a good section of society was now ready to achieve their objective right to self-determination through violent means. The demand for secession became a single dominant narrative that got legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the people. The animosity against the Indian state and mainstream politics was evident in general Parliamentary elections of 1989. There was huge support for boycott call given by militant leadership.175 However, the state machinery was used for electoral malpractices that became the major cause for the growth of anti-India sentiments in the valley. In the Parliament elections of 1989, the voter turnout was recorded all-time low of 7 per cent in the valley176 (Table 4.7). In Parliamentary elections of 1989 NC and Panthers Party were the only two state parties that participated including other national parties like INC, BSP, BJP and other small parties. Due to the election boycott call given by the militant leadership of JKLF, there was only 25.68 per cent of voting in the State. NC managed to won 3 and INC 2 while as one seat was clinched by an independent candidate from Ladakh177 (Table 4.7). It is widely believed that, had the elections of 1987 and 1989 not witnessed fraud and deception, it is possible that the violence we saw in post-1990s and which still continues would not have erupted the way it did.

173 Verma: Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads, 125. 174 Meghnad Desai, “Groundhog State,” The Indian Express, June 24, 2018. 175 The Statesman, (Delhi), November 17, 1989. 176 Sumantra Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir-Democracy Self Determination and Just Peace (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1997), 48. 177 The candidates who won the elections were Baramulla Saif Ud-Din Soz of NC from Baramulla defeated Sheikh Abdul Rehman independent. From Srinagar Mohammad Shafi Bhat of JKNC returned uncontested. While as from Anantnag P. L. Handoo of JKNC defeated Abdul Rashid Khan Independent. Mohd Hassan Independent candidate from Ladakh defeated Phuntsong Namgyal of INC. In Jammu division of Udhampur, Dharam Paul of INC defeated Abdul Rehman of JD. In Jammu Janak Rai Gupta of INC defeated Rajinder Singh Chib of JD. Statistical report on General Elections of 1989 to the Ninth Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1990). 183

In post-1987 era, NC lost its political cum moral legitimacy to rule; so did Congress and other political forces. This gave birth to a political vacuum that was filled by none other than the separatists or what we call pro-Independence or pro- Pakistani camp in J&K. The upsurge of militancy got enormous public support not because people were in favour of violent means of resistance but due to the fall-out of Indian democracy and the electoral process. It reached its new heights in 1990 when Farooq Abdullah was forced to abandon power. About Farooq Abdullah’s rule in Kashmir, Sumantra Bose writes:

Farooq Abdullah's second term till Jan 1990, when his Govt. was dismissed following the eruption of the mass uprising was an unmitigated and unsurpassed disaster. His behaviour during his first term has been compared to a little boy with a toy and second was a virtual abdication of governance. The promise of development proved to be a cruel joke and corruption among politicians reached levels extraordinary by Kashmiri standards...while the CM kept himself amused.178

In such a political situation, it was much difficult for NC to rule. The mainstream political parties were completely wiped out from the political scene of Kashmir and governance was the first causality that haunted the state for many years (even today) followed by the governor’s rule.179 All political parties especially the regional NC went into hibernation mood. All political processes collapsed and political activities halted due to the eruption of armed resistance. This led to strong indigenous demand for independence Aazadi. Perhaps one of the important factors that led to the armed struggle was to curb the growth of opposition from the very earlier days and 1987 became a flashpoint. Commenting on the origin of militancy and secessionist tendency in J&K Ved Marwah states that:

Kashmiri Youth Organizations gained momentum in Kashmir after the death of Sheikh Abdullah. Most of the militants are the desperate election candidates of 1987 elections. The alliance of National Conference and Congress rigged the 1987 polls At best the Muslim United Front at the admission of its senior leaders could have got 15

178 Bose, The Challenge in Kashmir-Democracy Self Determination and Just Peace, 46. 179 Jagmohan, My Frozen Turbulence in Kashmir, 373. 184

seats which would not come in the way of forming a coalition govt. Most of the candidates were defeated and arrested under the Public Safety Act and sent to different jails and subjected to torture also. It was this policy of the govt. that led to the sentiment of alienation of youth and the rise of militancy and secession. Youth who had joined mainstream felt cheated due to rigging and later due to indiscriminate arrests.180

4.11 The Upsurge of Armed Resistance: Role of JKLF

In pre-1985, there were many secessionist political forces that were operational in J&K which we have already discussed above. However, all these secessionist opposition parties were not organized. Among them, the Islamic Students League (ISL) was one of the prominent group that came into existence in the year 1985, one year before Rajiv-Farooq Accord was signed. It is believed that this group came into being only because people felt betrayed after Sheikh Abdullah signed Accord in 1975. This secessionist opposition group was called ‘HAJY’ group.181 On the other side, the fraud and rigged elections of 1987 yet again internationalized the Kashmir issue. Pakistan took full benefit of ‘persistent policy failure’ of the Indian state in J&K. There is no denial to this fact that the government that was formed after Rajiv-Farooq Accord was not a popular regime and lacked both political and moral legitimacy. Hence it failed to restore peace and order. Although, Kashmir did witness secessionist protests and hartals in past also, the post-1989 Kashmir got engulfed in armed conflict.182 Amanullah Khan183 along with Mohammad Maqbool Bhat184 and other

180 Ved Marwah, Uncivil Wars Pathology of Terrorism in India (India: Harper Collins, 1997), 55. 181 HAJY was born out of student activism during those days in city of Srinagar. The (HAJY) members include Hamid Sheikh, Ashfaq Majid, Javed Ahmad and Yasin Malik. The group vehemently opposed state’s accession with India. Noorani “Jammu and Kashmir Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000; Puri, “Young victims of militancy,” Frontline, vol. 22, Issue 16, Jul 30-Aug 12, 2005. 182 Gul Mohd Wani, Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects (New Delhi: Ashish Publishers House, 1993), 94. 183 Aman Ullah Khan was born in Astore Gilgit on 24th August 1934 was a pro-independence political leader of J&K who outstretched armed struggle against India. He was part of many political organizations in his life time that were tirelessly working for achieving the cause of Independent J&K. Khan launched JKLF and served its chairman as well. This legendary political leader died on 26 April 2016 and was buried in his ancestral village Astore Gilgit Baltistan (presently part of Pakistan administrated Kashmir). Mohammad Yasin Malik, “Amanullah Khan: the legend I knew,” Greater Kashmir, April 26, 2017. 184 Mohammad Maqbool Bhat along with Amanullah Khan was the founding members of “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front” and was a stanch believer of armed resistance against India. It was Maqbool who floated armed wing of JKLF under the name of “Kashmir Liberation Army”. Bhat was arrested by Indian security forces and was allegedly convicted in anti-National and secessionist activities. After 185 prominent members had formed a group under the pen name of ‘Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front’ during the critical years of 1960s.185 On the one hand, Sheikh Abdullah was in jail for his anti-India and pro-Plebiscite stance, but on the other side, the mainstream political party NC (then headed by Bakshi & Sadiq) were busy with Central leadership of Delhi to assimilate Kashmir with India by eroding Special Status. As discussed in the Chapter Third about the emergence and role of Plebiscite Front in Kashmir, during those years Sheikh Abdullah remained mostly in prison. The policy of Delhi’s political leadership along with local leaders in Kashmir to curb the opposition by rigging elections and detaining leaders for having different/opposite viewpoint gave birth to the new political discourses in Kashmir. In such political scenario, Amanullah Khan with the help of many other leading political activists of J&K floated a new name of the party called ‘Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front’ (JKLF) in Birmingham on 29 May 1977. Yet another important decision was to form a separate armed wing of JKLF under the pen name of ‘National Liberation Army’ in the year 1977. This political development was not isolated from what was happening in Kashmir in the years of 1960-1970s that followed the Kashmir Accord in 1975. Though, an armed group like Al-Fateh was there as a militant wing of Plebiscite Front but it was not well organized. As we have discussed in the Chapter earlier that the election of 1987 was contested by NC-Congress to curb the secessionists in the state. However, post-1987 gave birth to the new violent political atmosphere in J&K; when disaffected, disillusioned and alienated youth find no other option than to cross Line of Control (LOC) to Azad Kashmir for armed training. There is no denying the fact that Amanullah Khan’s group was operative in Azad Kashmir; thus the place became a natural destination for those who crossed the border for armed training. Here in Indian side of Kashmir, the Islamic Students League was very much present that was operative under four well-known faces of the time called

serving in Tihar Jail (one of the prisons in New-Delhi) for many years, and was hanged on 11th February 1984. He was buried within the four walls of jail. The people of Kashmir remember Maqbool Bhat as the first martyr who sacrificed his life for the cause of freedom and honor Maqbool as Baba-e- Qoum (father of the nation). His death anniversary is celebrated every year on 11th February with enthusiasm and zeal all over the state. Ahmed Ali Fayyaz, “Kashmiri’s Tale of Two Executions,” The Hindu, February 10, 2013; Parveen Swami, “Tanzeems and their leaders,” Frontline, Volume 17-Issue 17, Aug. 19-Sep. 01, 2000. 185 Praveen Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947-2004 (Routledge: Asian Security Studies, 2006), 130. 186

HAJY group.186 JKLF in no time emerged a well-organized armed group that established its separate branch in Azad Kashmir in 1982. It was in these years that JKLF started its secret underground activities in Indian administered Kashmir. It is believed that it was during the decade of the 1980s that JKLF marked their presence on the streets of Kashmir. Slowly with the passage of time, JKLF succeeded in mobilizing public opinion in favour of Aazadi (Freedom) movement and thus earned a lot of support and love of populace till it emerged a strong-armed wing in 1989.187

The main objective of the Front was the liberation of Kashmir from India. The rigged elections gave them an opportunity to launch an offensive strategy in Kashmir.188 By then, the youth of Kashmir were disillusioned and far alienated from mainstream politics. The ground situation shaped by Rajiv-Farooq Accord and rigged elections forced youth to pick up a gun against the Indian state willingly. The birthright of self-determination was now the ultimate objective of secessionist forces in J&K. Though there is an allegation that militant organizations were now targeting the mainstream political leaders and workers either by kidnapping or threatening to kill. Many active members of mainstream sympathizers were killed. The state vice president of BJP, Tika Lal Taploo was allegedly killed by militants on 14 September 1989. The killing of BJP leader revived the old politics of BJP to campaign for the repeal of article 370 of the Indian Constitution and movement for the complete merger. BJP also led a strong protest against Farooq Abdullah and demanded his immediate dismissal.189 The streets of Kashmir were deserted for many months. JKLF and other rebel organization were roaming freely and were chanting anti-India and pro-freedom slogans. Large processions of people were demanding Aazadi. Commenting on the state of affairs in Kashmir, the then Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in an interview with India today said, “Mishandling of the situation by the previous (Centre and State) governments…The 1987 Assembly

186 Hameed Sheikh, Ashfaq Wani, Javed Ahmad Mir and Yaseen Malik received armed training and returned back to valley to launch armed struggle against Indian state. In this way ‘HAJY’ became the first armed group that started armed rebellion against India for independence of J&K. Within only two years of its appearance, the armed wing emerged as the “Vanguard and spearhead of the popular uprising” against the Indian state. Swami, India, Pakistan and Secret Jihad 163-164; Paul Staniland, Networks of rebellion: Explaining insurgent cohesion and collapse (Cornell University Press, 2014), 72-73. 187 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to peace 128-129. 188 Ishfaq Majeed Wani was the first person who was killed by Indian security forces in August 1990, while as Mohammad Yasin Malik was captured and was imprisoned for couple of years till he was released in 1994. Noorani “Jammu and Kashmir Contours of militancy,” Frontline, 2000. 189 Battacharjea, Kashmir the wounded valley, 258. 187 elections were rigged and the people lost faith in Democratic institutions.”190 The hate against the mainstream and Indian state was much evident when people of the state observed complete shutdown and blackout on the birthdays of Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Nehru on 5th December and 14th November respectively. It was for the first time since Sheikh Abdullah’s death in1982, that his birthday too was seen as a ‘manifestation of Indian rule in Kashmir’.191 On the other side during the governor rule, there was not a single attempt to resolve the Kashmir conflict. In fact, every possible political solution was kept aside and the policy of authoritarianism and suppression was followed to muzzle the voice of people who even demanded redressal of local governance issues.192 The Daily Telegraph observed that despite the orders of the government to ‘shooting on sight’ people in thousands were chanting the slogans of ‘Hum Kah Chatey Aazadi’ ‘we want freedom’, ‘Indian dogs go back’, and ‘long live Islam.’193 There was a complete breakdown of the political system. Even many local and foreign newspapers correspondents were banned. It was in this background that Balraj Puri has observed that:

Militancy entered a new phase. It was no longer a fight between the militants and the security forces. It gradually assumed the form of a total insurgency of the entire population.194

However, there emerged a dramatic shift in 1990, when JKLF adherents were killed and arrested; the ground was now filled by new armed wings like Hizb ul Mujahedeen and others with pro-Pakistan political ideology. It is also a hard reality that JKLF which stood for an independent J&K was not only targeted by the Indian state but at the same time Pakistan also. Pakistan gave full support to those armed wings that stood for Kashmir’s merger with Pakistan, while as all the logistic support to JKLF was ceased, because of its pro-Independence political ideology claims

190 Singh, Kashmir A Tragedy of Errors, 120. 191 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict India, Pakistan and the Unending war, 144-145. 192 Once armed struggle was launched by JKLF, it was expected that New Delhi will act harshly against anti-India forces. All government machineries were breakdown. There was hardly any government institution that was working. In such political conditions Centre imposed governor rule in Kashmir and extended many special acts such as TADA, AFSPA and other draconian laws. Government didn’t allow the dissent opposition parties to develop and function democratically. Farooq led coalition government curbed civil liberties. The whole political scenario capitalized Kashmiri youth to cross the border and receive armed training in Pakistan administered Kashmir and waged war against Indian state which is still going on even after 29 years. Lawrence Lifschultz, “Death in Kashmir: Perils of' Self-Determination,” EPW, (2002): 3225-3234. 193 Daily Telegraph, (Delhi), January 22, 1990. 194 Puri, Kashmir towards Insurgency, 60. 188

Sumantra Bose.195 The change in Pakistan’s policy towards JKLF led to the change of means from armed to peaceful struggle. The Front announced a unilateral ceasefire in 1993 and gave up arms. The Front Chief Mohammad Yasin Malik announced to fight the Indian state by peaceful and Gandhian means. However, independent and united J&K remained its basic political objective and motive. Nevertheless JKLF become part of the APHC amalgam since 1995.

4.12 The Advent of APHC: Role in State Politics

After the disintegration of USSR (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) and its defeat in Afghanistan, Kashmir witnessed many political changes. The Centrally arranged election of 1987 was perhaps the major destructive step that prepared the smooth ground for armed resistance. The leaders and people who contested the 1987 elections as believers of Constitutionalism turned into worst adversaries of the false notion of Indian democracy in the State. Though number of militant groups emerged during this period, among them Hizbul Mujahedeen, Lashkar Tauiba, Jaish Mohammad, JKLF, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen and many small groups that were and are still operative under single banner of United Jihad Council (UJC) based in ‘Azad Kashmir’ under the leadership of Mohammad Yousuf Shah nom de guerre Syed Salahuddin. However, the need was felt in the political corridors of Kashmir and across the border that militant movement alone can’t pressurize Indian state. Thus, after a well thought plan; a new political organization came into existence under the pen name of ‘All parties Hurriyat Conference’ (APHC). When at least more than thirty small political groups and individuals opposed mainstream politics in the state came together under one umbrella to resist the state politically, while giving moral and hidden material support to armed rebels.196 The genesis of Hurriyat Conference can be traced to MUF.197 Once the violent armed struggle erupted in the 1990s, the political space for mainstream was chocked. The vacuum that was therefore created was filled by secessionist

195 Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to peace, 3-4 and 128-129. 196 Aditya Sinya, The pioneer, (Delhi), April 11, 1994; Muzamil Jaleel, “Hurriyat: Its history, role and relevance,” The Indian Express, August 31, 2015. 197 Wajahat Habibullah, My Kashmir: Conflict and the Prospects of Enduring Peace (Washington, D.C: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008), 82. 189 political forces and Hurriyat emerged one strong voice that got legitimacy in the eyes of people of Kashmir.198

However, MUF believed in electoral participation but APHC refused to take part in any such political arrangements. Consequently, a well-organized political entity was born in 1993 that not only challenged the state mainstream political discourse. But at the same time gave new political direction to the movement of the right to self-determination that was once led by Plebiscite Front and its allied organizations. In this way, the Hurriyat Conference emerged an ideal platform that promoted secessionism of J&K from India and demanded the implementation of United Nation resolutions.199 The Hurriyat believed that all concerned parties including Pakistan are pre-requisite for any meaningful political dialogue. The political alliance under the banner of APHC claim to be the sole real representative of the aspirations of the people of J&K and this has been endorsed explicitly by Pakistan but outrightly rejected by India. The APHC claim that Kashmir is an unfinished agenda of partition and believes that the Kashmir dispute needs to be resolved by taking into consideration the aspirations of the people.200 With the passage of time, the new challenges were born; the immense human rights violations by security forces and application of draconian laws like, Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act (TADA), Armed Force Special Powers Act (AFSPA), Public Safety Act (PSA) and above all the militarization of Kashmir became new concern of Hurriyat Conference. With the passage of time, the relevance and role of Hurriyat has drastically changed but the main motive remains the same. Commenting on the relevance and role of APHC, Muzamil Jaleel has observed that:

At a time when militancy was at its peak, this conglomerate represented the political face of the militant movement, and claimed to “represent the wishes and aspirations of the people”. It had brought together two separate, but strong ideologies: those who sought J&K’s independence from both India and Pakistan, and those who wanted J&K to become

198 Mir, Fayaz Ahmad, “The Birth of Hurriyat as a Political Platform,” Greater Kashmir, February 1, 2007. 199 Interview with Syed Ali Shah Geelani Chairman APHC; Praveen Swami, “The autumn of an Islamist,” Frontline, Vol. 20, Issue 12, June 07-20, 2003. 200 Syed Ali Geelani, Nawai-i-Hurriyat (Srinagar: Maizan Publication, 1995), 63. 190

part of Pakistan. Most of the groups that were part of the Hurriyat had their militant wings, or were linked to a militant outfit.201

However, this is also the political reality that Hurriyat is divided between two factions from 2003, but the objective and goal has remained identical. Both aim that the people of J&K should be given the right to self-determination by an impartial Plebiscite. Nevertheless, the relevance and the role of APHC in post-2002 politics of the state will be discussed in Chapter Fifth, when regional mainstream political parties played significant role vis-a-vis process of electoral politics and issues pertaining to the state; especially the role of PDP and coalition governments that emerged in post- 2002 in J&K.

4.13 The Resurgence of Mainstream Politics: Diminishing the Dominance of NC (1996)

The ‘volcano’ that erupted in the form of an armed struggle in Kashmir not only disturbed the ‘tectonic plates—regional peace—but it gave a complete death-knell to the mainstream politics in Kashmir from 1987 to 1996. To revive such dead mainstream political institution in the violent political scenario was a challenging task for New Delhi and its policymakers in Srinagar. However, the Centre took every step to streamline the mainstream politics and NC was the only single political entity that was fully backed by Delhi to review its political arrangements. There is no denying the fact that it was the most difficult task for any political party to lay claim and legitimizes its role in Kashmir. Because mainstream had not only to face militancy but at the same time it had to contend with new political forces in the form of separatist or pro-freedom parties under the banner of APHC and JKLF to find its political space. The period from 1987 to 1996 in Kashmir was perhaps one of the most troubled time after the state got divided into two parts in 1948. Everything from the issues of governance to the decisions of counter-insurgency operations was directly under the command of New Delhi. In such a political atmosphere human rights violation and killings were only natural to happen. Security forces along with state-backed Ikwanis (armed renegades) were at the forefront to fight armed insurgents. The local inhabitants were caught between three guns viz. security forces, Ikwanis, and the militants. In such a horrible political scenario, mainstream lost the trust of masses and

201 Jaleel, “Hurriyat: Its History, Role and Relevance,” The Indian Express, August 31, 2015. 191 it was much difficult to shift the political discourse from separatism to mainstream. Once armed resistance gained momentum, the Centre and its allied security agencies increased their influence to counter-narrative of armed struggle.

The unfortunate part of this story was that the state was treated more on security paradigm than of democratic realms.202 Jagmohan was installed governor in 1989. Instead of serving the state to pull out from the mess of mis-governance, his appointment gave birth to new issues that are haunting J&K till now. He was replaced by another like-minded person K. V. Krishna Rao, retired Chief of the army staff. Rao was known for his expertise in anti-militancy operations and hardcore (muscular) policies. None among the governors were experts on politics and civil administration. Centre was highly criticized of CM Farooq Abdullah of mishandling the situation.203 In fact, Farooq’s reaction to militancy was more ‘a sense of bravado’ than hold the state by maturity and understanding claims Balraj Puri.204 On the other side India saw a change of guards in 1989, Rajiv Gandhi lost power and VP Singh emerged new political leader of Coalition front. An old Congressman Mufti Mohammad Syed joined a Coalition of VP Singh’s government and was appointed first ever Muslim Home Minister of India. Governor Krishna Rao was replaced by Jaghmohan. He dismissed Farooq Abdullah’s government and Centre declared governor rule in the state.205 Farooq in anger resigned from the office on the ground that he cannot tolerate and co-operate with Jaghmohan because for him, the governor was ‘a man who hates the guts of Muslims.’206 The state of affairs can be understood by this fact that the 10th Lok Sabha General elections were not held in J&K due to the armed resistance. In fact, when the state was coming to its normal phase in 1996 JKNC boycotted the 11th General elections of Lok Sabha (Table 4.8). Though National parties contested the elections but there was no competition or opposition to these parties. INC dominated

202 The Centre adopted regressive policies viv-a-viz Kashmir once armed struggle erupted in Kashmir. Even if the local demanded their economic rights, religious rights and protection of civil liberties, the state crushed all demands with one and same methods. No political party was able to accept the ground reality that it is because of the Kashmir conflict, wrong policies of past and rigged elections of 1987 that culminated in the form of militancy in the state. Instead each political party blamed each other for growing discontent and alienation of Kashmiris. Shujaat Bukhari, “Wrath of Kashmir?,” Frontline, August 19, 2016. 203 Schofield: Kashmir in Conflict, 144. 204 Puri: Kashmir: Towards Insurgency, 56. 205 Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir, 62. 206 For full text see Farooq Abdullah, Interview with Varsha Bhosle, Rediff.com, Sep.1, 1999. Available at https://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/01farooq.htm 192 the scene and won 4 seats, while as BJP and Janta Dal clinched one seat each207 (Table 4.8).

On the other hand, Jagmohan followed the extremist ideology of BJP to integrate Kashmir with India by any means. He was one of the opponents of article 370 and wanted its abrogation. In fact, during his tenure as governor, the political resolution of Kashmir conflict was put aside and policy of authoritarianism was followed to suppress the voice of people. The state especially Kashmir valley turned into an open war zone during his tenure. On the other hand the year 1990 saw yet another tragedy—the forced migration of Kashmiri Pandits.208 After about six year’s governor rule, the political situation was ‘restored’ by counterinsurgency operations. It was NC that tried hard, though without less success to resume its political activities in few parts of the state. What is important is that it was again NC that provided Indian state a legitimacy to restore the mainstream politics after the destructive phrase of governor’s rule. The Party once again used the political plank of Autonomy to regain its base, as was previously used by Sheikh Abdullah during his political journey till his death. Though elections were held in 1996 and NC came into power but political observers such as Rekha Chowdhary and Balraj Puri believe that this election was as much arranged by Delhi as were previous ones. In this way, the election of 1996 is regarded as one of the most controversial elections.209 These elections were conducted under the shadow of three different guns-that of security forces—counter insurgents renegades (Ikwanis) and rebels.210 The conduct of elections in such a horrible political atmosphere naturally raises eyebrows about their impartiality and fairness. The sworn in of Farooq as CM was hailed as the turning point in the ‘nightmarish chapter in Kashmir’s recent history.’211 The State Assembly

207 Statistical report on General elections, 1996 to the Tenth Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1997). 208 Soon armed struggle erupted in Kashmir; the minority community (Kashmiri Pandit Hindus including some Muslims and Sikhs) started the feeling of insecurity due to many reasons. Many non- Muslims were killed by non-state actors during 1989 to 1991. That led to the forced migration of Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley of Kashmir to other parts of the India but most of them lived in Jammu. Though there are many narratives regarding the Pandit migration. The Kashmiri Muslims especially the APHC believe that it was the conspiracy of Delhi and then governor of the state Mr Jagmohan to suppress the Muslim majority population for demanding the right to self-determination. But these assertions are contested by New Delhi political leadership and many other Pandit organizations blame the Kashmiri militant groups and Pakistan for their forced migration from Kashmir. 209 Chowdhary and Rao, “N C of J&K from Hegemonic to Competitive,” EPW, 2004. 210 Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict, 199. 211 Ibid., 199-195. 193 elections were dominated by NC as it seemed that these elections were pre-planned to favour JKNC to rule over J&K. NC won 57 seats out of 81 with 37.98 per cent of votes (Table 4.9). Indian political establishment in New Delhi hailed the return of Farooq as a victory against the armed resistance and separatists. It was for the first time since 1996 that a civilian government was formed. But to govern the state was not an easy task for NC, because the onset of armed rebellion had eroded the very legitimacy of mainstream politics. In such a fear-provoking nature, it was not easy for NC to reclaim its legitimacy that the Party once enjoyed under the patronage of its founder Sheikh Abdullah writes Rekha Chowdhary and V Nagendra Rao.212

Yet the Party succeeded to make inroads to the Assembly by three major factors: one, there was no other political party that would have challenged NC. Though Congress and BJP were very much present in the state, their presence was merely in an organizational form not of any public base and support. Second, New Delhi not only abundantly supported NC by arranged-rigged and manipulated elections but also gave free ground to NC to reclaim the legitimacy of mainstream politics of the state. The third was the popularity of Sheikh Abdullah that helped the Farooq Abdullah to arouse sympathy of workers associated with NC. It was because of these three major factors that the Party gradually succeeded in maintaining its base in mainstream politics. Perhaps one more important factor was the politics of Autonomy that become the ideological tool for NC to strengthen its base and electoral base.

The Party believed that the solution of Kashmir problem lies in the restoration of Autonomy. The Party put autonomy as an alternative political discourse against the ‘Aazadi or Freedom’ discourse of APHC and JKLF. The NC in its Autonomy report of 1996; state that the problem of alienation and militancy is because of the extensive erosions of Autonomy. To address the issues, NC considered restoration of Special Status as a much needed political solution to address the political grievances of people.213 Nevertheless, this view is strongly contested by APHC and militant leadership in Kashmir.

212 Chowdhary and Rao, “N C of J&K from Hegemonic to Competitive Politics,” EPW, 2004. 213 Working Committee Resolution of National Conference 1994. 194

On the other hand, the 12th General elections to the Lok Sabha were again around the corner which was scheduled in the year 1998. The state was now governed by NC under Farooq Abdullah. Anti-militancy operations were on peak and mainstream parties were leaving no stone unturned to restore the faith of people on ‘Indian democracy’. A number of national political parties contested these elections along with the independent candidates. NC was the only dominant political force which participated in all 6 seats and won 3 with 36.35 per cent of votes, while as Congress could only win one. BJP was able to clinch two seats of Udhampur and Jammu respectively.214 Thus slowly NC lost its electoral hegemony and new political forces emerged in post-1998 politics of J&K (Table 4.10). Only after one year of 12th Lok Sabha elections in 1998, the Vajpayee government lost the vote of confidence. In the year 1999 General elections to the 13th Lok Sabha were conducted and this time 22 parties both national and the state took part in J&K. Though polling percentage was recorded low of 32.34, it was again NC that dominated political atmosphere and won 4 seats out of 6 with 28.94 per cent of votes a less percentage the Party was polled in previous elections. INC could not make entry to Lok Sabha from J&K despite winning 17.83 per cent of votes. However, it was BJP that secured 31.56 per cent of votes and again managed to keep hold of two seats of Udhampur and Jammu215 (Table 4.11). Despite the fact that NC won 4 seats, the statistics in the (Tables from 4.1 to 4.11) shows that the Party lost its electorate with each passing elections with the exception of 1987 and 1996 Assembly elections.

Hence it was not the developmental issues but the demand of Special Status on which the NC contested the State Assembly elections of 1996.216 Though Autonomy resolution was passed by the State legislature and was dispatched to Centre government. However, the Autonomy report217 was not taken seriously by National Democratic Alliance (NDA) headed by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and was

214 Statistical Report on General Elections of 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1999). 215 Statistical report on General elections, 1999 to the 13th Lok Sabha, (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1999). 216 Robert G. Wirsing, Kashmir in The Shadow of War (London: M.E.Sharpe, 2003), 203. 217 Once, NC came into power after six years of governors’ rule. The government appointed SAC (State Autonomy Committee) to review the Centre-State relationship. The report prepared by Committee recommended many political measures to restore the special status under article 370. The report focused that the pre-1953 position of the state must be restored to address the issues affecting the state. For detailed report see Balraj Puri, “Jammu & Kashmir regional autonomy: a report,” 1999; Official report Assembly Debates on Autonomy report, (English version), (the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly secretariat), 2000. 195 out rightly dismissed and rejected by New Delhi.218 In spite of the rejection of Report, NC took the decision in 1999 to join the NDA alliance.219 The decision of NC to join NDA was perhaps another setback to NC. It harmed the Party more than it could have benefited it. The Party lost its ground and the social base to legitimize its politics because Centre humiliated them by rejecting their proposal of Autonomy. Perhaps it would not be wrong to say that the decision to join BJP in Centre eroded the very electoral base of NC, which was evident in State Assembly elections of 2002 when NC was thrown out of power by PDP-Congress Coalition government.220 Accepting this fact, Omer Abdullah took the decision to withdraw his Party alliance with BJP in 2002.221 It was for the first time that NC with 28 seats was in opposition, although the Party was the only ‘single dominant political entity’ till 2002. However, they lost considerable electoral hegemony since its inception in the political corridors of Kashmir. The Party received tough political confrontation in 2002 Assembly elections from its arch-rival PDP for the first time and lost power. The emergence and the role of PDP and the role of NC as an opposition and ruling regimes in the fragile political scenario of Kashmir in the post 2002 period will be discussed in Chapter Fifth separately.

218 Koithara, Crafting Peace in Kashmir, 65. 219 Chowdhary and Rao, “N C of J&K from Hegemonic to Competitive Politics,” EPW, 2004. 220 Strategic Insights: Post election Jammu and Kashmir, Vol. II, Issue 3, March 2003. 221 Kashmir Times, October 1, 2000. 196

Table 4.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1977

Political Party Number of Seats Voting Percentage Candidates Won in Party seats Contested Contested J&KNC 75 47 46.73% INC 63 11 21.68% Janta Party 72 13 25.31% Jamaat-e-Islami 19 1 13.48% CPI 6 0 1.56% Independents/others 174 4 13.16% Source: Compiled from Election Commission Reports of 1977, New Delhi, ECI. **Polling percentage 67.19.

Table 4.2 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 6th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1977 in J&K

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats Won in Party seats Contested JKNC 03 02 33.92%

INC 03 03 16.37% Bhartiya Lok Dal 02 00 08.23% Independents/Others 21 01 41.48% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1977 to the Sixth Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New Delhi, 1978. **Polling Percentage 59.18.

Table 4.3

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 7th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1980 in J&K

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 05 03 36.88%

INC(U) 02 01 14.52% Janta Party (JNP) 01 00 08.64% INC(I) 01 01 18.68% Independents/Others 20 01 21.28% Source: Statistical report on General Elections, 1980 to the Seventh Lok Sabha, Volume I, II, ECI, New Delhi, 1981. **Polling Percentage 48.05. 197

Table 4.4 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1983

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested out of 76 Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 75 46 47.29% INC 71 26 32.15% BJP 27 0 9.07% J&K Jamaat-e-Islami 26 0 11.03% CPIM 1 01 8.48% J&K Peoples Conference 38 01 8.61% CPI 03 0 4.59% Lok Dal 07 0 1.5% Janta Party 10 0 2.21% Independents/others 254 02 10.88% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1983 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. ECI, New Delhi 1984. **Polling percentage 73.24.

Table 4.5 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 8th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1984 in J&K

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 05 03 46.17%

INC 04 03 30.23% JNP 01 00 0.03% Lok Dal (LKD) 01 00 00.11% J&KPP 01 00 04.35% BJP 01 00 01.17% JKPC 01 00 0.03% Independents/Others 35 00 17.41% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1984 to the Eighth Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New Delhi, 1985. **Polling Percentage 66.41 198

Table 4.6 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1987

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested out of 76 Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 45 40 54.68% INC 31 26 50.90% BJP 29 02 13.99% CPIM 03 00 05.29% J&KPC 23 00 12.24% CPI 07 00 02.31% Lok Dal (LKD) 10 00 04.51% Janta Party (JNP) 12 00 3.04% J&K Panthers Party 21 00 06.85% Independents 344 08 34.76% (Including MUF) Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1987 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, ECI New Delhi 1987, **Polling percentage 74.88. Note: The election to state assembly of 1987 was contested by NC and Congress in as alliance partners.

Table 4.7 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 9th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1989 in J&K

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Won Voting Percentage in Contested For 6 Seats Party seats Contested J&KNC 03 03 06.16%

INC 03 02 38.95% JNP 01 00 01.06% J&K Panthers Party 01 00 02.16% BJP 02 00 07.15% JD 02 00 30.05% BSP 01 00 04.06% Independents/Others 50 01 09.22% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1989 to the Ninth Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New Delhi, 1990. The Total number of candidates were 63 and Polling Percentage was 25.68. 199

Table 4.8 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 11th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1996 in J&K

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC Boycotted Nil Nil INC 06 04 27.46% AIIC (T) 03 00 00.83% J&K Panthers Party 05 00 04.8% BJP 05 01 19.04% Janta Dal 05 01 17.63% BSP 02 00 05.95% Independents/Others 84 00 24.28% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1996 to the Tenth Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New-Delhi, 1997, **Polling Percentage, 48.96, Total number of candidates 63.

Table 4.9 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 1996

Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested out of 87 Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 81 57 37.98% INC 84 07 20.39% BJP 53 08 17.58% All India Indra Congress 09 01 06.59% (Tiwari) CPIM 04 01 16.41% J&K Awami League 27 01 07.70% CPI 03 00 01.03% Bahujan Samaj Party 29 04 15.07% Janata Dal 76 05 12.63% J&K Panthers Party 45 01 04.33% All India Minorities Front 02 00 02.66% Independents/Others 134 02 12.48% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir, ECI, New-Delhi 1996. **Polling percentage 53.92. 200

Table: 4.10

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 12th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1998 in J&K Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage in Party Contested For 6 Seats Won seats Contested J&KNC 06 03 36.35% INC 06 01 19.24% All India Congress(S) 01 00 0.83% Republican Presidium 01 00 0.12% Party of India BJP 06 02 28.64% BSP 04 00 4.97% Lok Shakti (LS) 03 00 0.22% Rashtriya Janta Dal 03 00 0.13% National Panthers 03 00 0.75% Party Jammu & Kashmir 01 00 0.97% Awami League (JKAL) Independents/Others 52 00 07.91% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New Delhi, 1999. **Polling Percentage, 44.21.

Table 4.11 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 13th Lok Sabha General Elections of 1999 in J&K Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Won Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats in Party seats Contested J&KNC 06 04 28.94% INC 05 00 17.83% CPM) 01 00 1.00% Janata Dal (Secular) 05 00 0.92% Samajwadi Janata Party 04 00 0.65% (Rashtriya) (SJP-R) BJP 06 02 31.56% Bahujan Samaj Party 02 00 4.84% J&K Awami League 03 00 01.84% Janta Party (JP) 04 00 0.81% Communist Party of India 01 00 0.11% CPI(ML)(L) J & K National Panthers 03 00 0.88% Party Independents/Others 43 00 11.39% Source: Statistical report on General Elections of 1999 to the 13th Lok Sabha, Volume I, ECI, New-Delhi, 2000. **Polling Percentage, 32.34.

Chapter-Five

Multiparty System and Coalition Governments Since 2002 201

Chapter Five: Multi-Party System and Coalition Governments since 2002

5.1 Meaning and Definition

The rise of ‘Multi-Party System’ and end of ‘Single Party Dominance’ in Parliamentary form of government like Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has given birth to ‘coalition governments’. In political science, Coalition is a temporary alliance to form a government and share the structures of power between two or more political parties. Coalitions are usually formed when no single political party is in a position to form government on its own; due to the fractured electoral mandate. In politics, Coalitions are mainly formed with certain objectives such as capturing political power, contesting the elections, removing the particular party or individual from power, and executing the specific programmes and ideologies to rule over the state or country. What is important in Coalition is the time, political situation, circumstances and above all the electoral results. The main objective of the coalition is to attain and retain political power when two or more than two political groups cooperate irrespective of their ideological incompatibility, interests, overlapping and above all opposing political perspectives/viewpoint. Coalition implies a “government consisting of the people from two or more political parties who have decided to work together in order to govern”.1

In similar note sociologists define coalition as a combination of two groups, or two people. The term ‘coalition’ can be defined as “an act of coalescing or a temporary alliance of distinct parties, persons for cooperative action.”2 However, the motive of coalition is to achieve a particular objective or purpose. That is why coalition is formed after deep deliberation on issues on mutual understanding.3 In coalition an endeavour is made to share the resources jointly, however, the parties in the alliance can be unequal or equal in strength. They set the certain common objectives and to succeed in these objectives—a well-defined methods are adopted. One significant feature of coalition governments is that all alliance partners keep aside their political differences and form the government to carry out their mutual policies.

1 Sukadev Nanada, Coalition Politics in Orissa (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1979), 12. 2 Advance American Dictionary (London: Longman 2000), 255. 3 E.W. Kelly, “Technique of Studying Coalition Formation,” Mid-West Journal of Political Science, vol. 12, no. l, February (1968), 62-84. 202

But this partnership is not permanent in a way that they can’t pullout from coalition. Instead it is temporary engagement of power sharing. William Gamson one of the noted scholar on subject of coalition claims that, “there is generally little value consensus in a coalition and the stability of coalition requires tacit neutrality of coalition on matters which go beyond immediate prerogatives.”4

Coalition governments all over the word are found in the democratic countries that follow Parliamentary form of government such as Itlay, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh where various political parties participate in electoral fray. In ‘Single Party System’ (such as China) there is no concept of any coalition or alliance because only ‘One Party’ governs the state. However, in case of ‘Multi-Party System’ the failure of any single party to come up with absolute majority has given birth to the coalition governments. Such coalitions are seen working in India due to the decline of ‘One Party Dominance’ of Indian National Congress (INC) and emergence of many new strong regional and national forces.5

The operational dynamics of coalitions suggest that coalitions are not formed in a vacuum. In fact coalitions are outcome of various considerations. For some scholars it is rational decision to utilize the situation to minimize the problems and maximize the gains—political or otherwise. Political scientists are of the opinion that change in the party system deeply alters the working of a political system. The nature of coalition is determined by the number of political parties in political system or electoral process.6 However, we often use the word ‘alliance’ in place of ‘coalition’. Though, alliance is a pre-poll cooperation of political parties to defeat their rivals and ensure electoral victory. While as, coalition are formed in post-election results when no particular party has sufficient numbers to form government. To keep other players away from forming the government, coalitions become political reality. In alliance, parties share common election manifesto, share seats adjustments and above all

4 W.A. Gamson, “A Theory of Coalition Formation,” American Sociological Review, vol. 26, no. 3, Junarary, (1961), 373-382. 5 For more detailed analysis about the meaning and emergence of coalition, K B. Saxena, “Theories and Concept Associated with the Formation and Working of Coalition Governments,” in, KP Karunakaran ed. Coalition goverments in India Problems and Prospects (Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1975), 16-20. 6 Rajni Kothari, Politics in India (Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972), 192. 203 alliance partners don’t oppose each other’s contender in elections. India is a best example of such alliance both at regional and national level.7

Maneesha Roy has quite remarkably argued that:

No political arrangement, even if it is sanctioned by a constitution, remains unchanged over time. It is generally expected that the constitution shapes political processes and events without being affected by the changing character of politics. And yet the fact remains that political processes and events also have a great impact on how political institutional arrangements work and change over time.8

This is also true of J&K, where ‘One-Party Dominance’ (Dominant parties National Conference ‘NC’ later Congress and later again NC) governed the state. Nevertheless, political changes have gradually occurred that has adversely affected the destiny and fate of NC in general and the state in particular. Politics in J&K has undergone a three-phase evolution in the last seven decades of contested constitutional relationship with India. Starting with ‘One-Party Dominance’, later in mid 1970s, state saw the rise of an incipient/emerging two-party system or competition (with small other actors). This gave birth subsequently to a ‘Multi-Party System’,—making coalition politics a necessary political arrangement for share matrix of power. But this led to the increasing politicization and assertion of regional and ethic identities.9 For over more than two decades since 1996, no single party has been able to gain an electoral majority. The trend (coalition politics) doesn’t seem likely will cease to operate in J&K in the foreseeable future. Due to the changing political milieu since 2002, the new political forces emerged in mainstream politics. In Parliamentary system like Kashmir, the power of

7 However, to govern the state or country in coalition is not an easy task due to the multiple reasons. Such as, lack of political stability due to fractured mandate, conflicting interests of the parties, and above all the ideological differences are always threat to coalition government. India, Bangladesh, Itlay and Pakistan are some primary examples of such coalitions, for detailed analysis, Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha and P. Mandar Oak, “Coalition governments in a model of parliamentary democracy,” European Journal of Political Economy, vol. 24, issue 3, September (2008), 554-561. 8 Maneesha Roy, “Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India”, in India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, ed. Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (India: Sage Publications, 2011), 94. 9 Aijaz Ashraf Wani, “Electoral Politics in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Problem of Communal Polarisation,” in Rise of Saffron Power: Reflections on Indian Politics, ed. Mujibur Rehman (London: Routledge, New Your, 2018), 317-346.

204 the executive is rising and so is the case with the number of its power sharing actors. As a result, ‘One Party Dominance’ with ‘Multi-Party System’ is becoming too difficult. That is why coalitions have become norm rather than exceptions from 2002 State Assembly elections. This is the reason that Assembly elections of 2002 in J&K are most vital for political commentators and researchers to study the nature of electoral politics, role of opposition and politics of separatism. It was for the first time when NC was thrown out of power by newly emerged local political party, PDP, under the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. The hegemonic character of NC since the days of its presence came to an abrupt end. The end of monopoly of NC over the electoral politics created serious impact vis-a-vis people’s faith in the state institutions and elections. The state entered into new phase while political parties re- claimed their lost electoral constituency that was eroded in the post-1989 armed struggle. The hegemonic nature of NC changed into competitive character, where number of new political forces emerged and challenged the very presence of NC. It is believed that the growth of new political class facilitated in democratizing the state, especially the Valley of Kashmir—where opposition to NC was negligible.10 The discontent among the people vis-a-vis the state institutions and against Indian state was also too high. In such political atmosphere the mainstream lost their political constituency and stayed nonexistent. The NC lost its regional character by its policies and programmes, particularly the broken promises over the issue of greater Autonomy (NC’s main political armament was/is Autonomy) by New Delhi with its leadership. The hostility of NC and its leaders towards the development of alternative political opposition force created a sense of authoritarianism of ruling political elite in the politics of J&K. It prevented to flourish the ideas of democratic norms and values. The nonappearance or presence of any democratic opposition, that too in a conflict torn state of J&K, had multiple impacts on the state institutions. The political phenomenon is succinctly analyzed by noted commentator Balraj Puri as:

Let the State's people enjoy as much dignity and self-respect as those in the rest of the country. They should have the same rights, in choosing, changing and opposing the Government at the Centre as are taken for granted by people elsewhere. The ruling party in Jammu and Kashmir should be able to enjoy as much autonomy as those in other States in

10 Arun Joshi, Eye Witness Kashmir, Teetering on Nuclear war (Singapore: Mars Hall Cavendish International, 2004), 265-276. 205

political relations with the party in power at the Centre and also with national Opposition parties and other regional parties, unaffected by inducements of more aid or threats of its curtailment and to its stability.11

The separatism that was high (still continue much greater) during this era blocked all forms of any democratic opposition in the state. The space that could have been filled by mainstream political parties was in fact occupied by separatist parties like APHC and JKLF. In this way separatist parties under the banner of APHC and JKLF were the only existing political galaxy—claiming to represent the aspirations of people. However, the post-2002 era witnessed unexpected change in mainstream political discourse. The birth of PDP and participation of other small parties, along with huge number of independents in the electoral process gave rise to the ‘Competitive Politics’ in J&K.

5.2 Elections of 2002: The Advent of PDP and Competitive Politics

The birth of PDP in J&K politics is combination of multiple factors like local, national and regional. Such factors have historically impacted the politics of state. The 2002 State Assembly election results show the complexity to differentiate between these factors. Though, there are conspiracy theories regarding the emergence of PDP. NC would make us to believe that PDP was the creation of New Delhi to harm the interests of the state in order to foil the chances of any Party particularly NC to come up with special majority in the State Assembly in future. NC believes that the Party (PDP) received huge amount of money and funding from Delhi to diminish the image and character of NC. As Abdul Rahim Rather, one of the senior NC leaders put it, since NC was seen as a ‘Dominant political force in Kashmir’, New Delhi allegedly created ‘parallel regional parties to fracture the mandate and counter NC.’ However, the leader argued, NC had still emerged victorious and managed to ‘rule the political scene in Kashmir.’ Nevertheless, New Delhi had successfully managed to divide the Kashmiri vote which, A. R. Rather asserts, was a ‘part of New Delhi’s game plan.’12

This assertion of NC, that no party would get majority in Assembly became political reality in the State Assembly elections of 2002, 2008 and in 2014. At the

11 Balraj Puri, “Kashmir and the Union,” The Hindu, June 12, 2002. 12 Abdul Rahim Rather, “Creation of some regional parties in Kashmir is based on the ideology that Kashmiri vote should not go a single party i.e. NC,” Kashmir Life, (Srinagar: Weekly) April 14, 2014. 206 same time APHC equally believes that ‘PDP was the creation of New Delhi agencies.’ The faction led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani share his strong accusation that the Party (PDP) was formed to cover up, ‘black face of democracy in Kashmir.’13

The wife of Sajad Gani Lone, Mrs. Asma Khan Lone (daughter of JKLF founder Amanullah Khan), shared her opinion about the birth of PDP and its role in her long essay published by The Express Tribune (Pakistan) in 2013 as;

A systemic strategy to restrict the separatists on the one hand and claim the sentiment of separatism on the other.This gave birth to the concept of ‘soft separatism’ or the more self-explanatorily—‘mainstreaming dissent’. As the separatists got increasingly consigned to the periphery, the mainstream parties progressively encroached their turf. The process was institutionalised into the political structure of the state by engineering the creation of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP)…created on the eve of the state assembly elections of 2002 had multiple vested functions. Its foremost utility was the fragmentation of the Kashmiri vote. This was aimed at arresting the gain of majority votes by a single Kashmiri party, thus reducing its stakes to power. Consequently, giving rise to the politics of coalition, it institutionalized the role of Congress party in the government-formation of the state. Unable to gain the majority vote in the state, either of the two Kashmiri mainstream [pro-India] parties—the National Conference (NC) or the PDP had to rely on the Congress to form the government as was the case both in 2002 and 2008 assembly elections. Tough the creation of PDP, the Congress was deftly integrated into the political equation of Kashmir by positioning it as the indispensable power broker within the state, a far cry from the times it was resented or representing New Delhi’s unnecessary interference in the state. The other utilitarian function of the PDP was to provide a viable democratic alternative to the dysfunctional NC, headed by Farooq Abdullah. The result of more academic analysis, it premised on the fact that the underlying reason for Kashmiri youth to turn to the gun was a lack of political alternatives in a monopolized single-party polity. By providing a political alternative, which additionally gave the thin covering of democratic virtue, New-Delhi sought to channelize Kashmiri grievances within political structures of the state

13 For more details of the role of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir from his earlier life to his death see Praveen Donthi, “The Collaborator: How Mufti Mohammad Sayeed became Delhi’s man in Kashmir,” The Caravan, January 1, 2016; Muzamil Jaleel, “Mufti is a master in sugarcoating poison as remedy: Syed Ali Shah Geelani,” The Indian Express, March 16, 2015. 207

rather than external and especially violent alternatives. It was also a means of reigning in on any ‘stray’ proclivities of both the PDP and the NC by creating a mechanism of counter-balancing each by the threat of the other, hence making New-Delhi’s grip on the state more firm…The gambit remains an essential element of New Delhi’s offensive against the separatist narrative.14

The Party in its infancy reached out to the people afflicted by post 1990s violence especially in South Kashmir—known as bastion belt of PDP. It began to penetrate into the rural areas—focused mainly on poor; violence hit people and paid attention to them that were mostly neglected by other mainstream parties since 1990s. As a result PDP reaped rich divedents from the sustained work of coalition government from 2002 to 2008 in its later electoral ground. There emerged a new notion of ‘follow one leader’ in post-2002—Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. Mufti succeeded in providing ‘inclusive leadership’ both in the Party as well as in the State.15 Mufti Sayeed with her daughter Mehbooba built Party as ‘party of workers’ at grass root level not the ‘party of leaders’.16 The political phenomenon is analyzed by Matthew Webb as:

As a distinctly pro-Kashmiri party that campaigned on a platform of autonomy, the PDP is faced with the difficult task of maintaining its base of support in the Valley without at the same time alienating non-Kashmiri residents of the state. By taking a conciliatory approach towards separatist organisations, the PDP was able to garner public support amongst Kashmiri Muslims. The release of the Common Minimum Programme with its emphasis on a dialogue with separatists, the release from jail of prisoners and

14 Asma Khan Lone, “The Changing Political Chessboard of Kashmir,” The Express Tribune, November 14, 2013. Retrieved at https://tribune.com.pk/story/631976/the-changing-chessboard-of- kashmir/. 15 Author’s personal observation during interaction with PDP voters in Sopore and Baramulla during field study in March and April 2017. 16 Though, in post Mufti Sayeed’s death and break down of coalition in June 2018 this assertion was contested by many rebel party members. They labeled PDP of making family rule or what in Kashmir called ‘Khandaani Raj’. They criticized party president and former Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti of serving her family in politics by appointing her close relatives including her brother in the party high positions and also in government. For further details see, Javaid Malik, “Will PDP Survive the Rebellion,” Kashmir Ink, (Srinagar weekly), July 16, 2018; see also Peerzada Ashiq, “Revolt in PDP as three MLA’s speak against Mehbooba’s Leadership,” The Hindu, July 3, 2018. 208

the redress of past injustices further consolidated the PDP’s popularity in the Valley.17

The 2002 elections were not only historical in the sense that they were conducted in fragile polity of Kashmir but also because of the Competitive perspective (Character). These elections were more Competitive in nature than ever before in post-1951 era. In the last 50 years of contested Constitutional relation with India, it was for the first time that all regions (Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh) witnessed strong and intensive ‘Competitive Party Competition’. The most interesting part of this election was that it was in the valley of Kashmir that saw more vicious competition. The newly formed PDP was seen only an alternative that eroded the electoral base of NC (Table 5.1). This state of electoral affairs is aptly captured by Professor Rekha Chowdhary as:

The emergence of PDP as a consequence of the Muftis [Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and Mehbooba Mufti] leaving the Congress by itself indicates the level of maturity the electoral and competitive politics has achieved in the region. The realisation that a National Party does not have much scope in the Valley, as it cannot compete with a regional party like NC, led to their formation of a regional party. That is also why the PDP refused to have an alliance with the national parties during the 2002 election even when an alliance was proposed and offered by the Congress and the CPM. As sharing the seats with other parties would have diluted the nature of competition with the National Conference and would have affected the outcome of the election, it decided to contest election on its own. This not only paid the PDP in terms of its electoral performance, but also resulted in changing the very character of electoral politics in the valley-from hegemonic to highly competitive politics.18

On one hand the formation of non-NC (PDP-Congress) government in 2002 in J&K was hailed in India as ‘Victory of Democracy’ and New Delhi government in a no time said that people of Kashmir have rejected the armed struggle, separatism and

17 Matthew J. Webb, “Political change and prospects for peace in Jammu and Kashmir: The 2002 state election and recent electoral trends in India,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, n.s., Vol.XXVIII, no.1, April, 2005 18 Rekha Chowdhary and V. Nagendra Rao, “Jammu and Kashmir: Political Alienation, regional Divergence and Communal Polarization,” Journal of Indian School of Political Economy, Jan-June, (2003), 211. 209

Pakistan.19 While as on the other side the mandate to a new political regime was seen as rejection of Sheikh Abdullah’s dynasty20 that dominated the political discourse of the state for many decades (which still continues). There is no doubt that the 2002 State Assembly elections were conducted in a hope that democratic institutions will work out for the people. That is why international media and world leaders all over the globe were keenly observing the political process of conflict torn state of J&K. The Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, NDA led government promised to the state leaders of conducting smooth, free and fair elections. (All previous elections till 2002 were rigged, manipulated and unfair, which are well documented by Indian academicians and journalists). This was endorsed by then Chief Election Commissioner J. M. Lyngdoh, in a brief press conference where he told reporters that, “No coercive measures would be used by the security forces to force voters to exercise their franchise and that full security measures would be taken to ensure protection of voters”.21 Though government of India also tried to persuade the separatists (APHC) to contest the elections and return to the mainstream. However, they not only reject the Indian offer to be part of any electoral process but also called state wide election boycott call.22 Nevertheless, it is widely believed that elections were conducted by and large fair, but not entirely free. However, Hurriyat leaders blamed Indian deep state of playing fraud and deception methods to hide her failures to solve the Kashmir dispute. This can be understood by this fact that even in some places (Mostly on border areas not in towns) security forces forced local populace to turn over their faces towards polling stations. Many attacks were witnessed during the election time and most of the polling booths were covered with three types of security forces; J&K Police, CRPF, Rashtriya Refiles and even in border areas Border Security Force (BSF) were directly involved in electoral process.23 During the elections at least some 28 foreign diplomates visited the state to ascertain the situation of political

19 Rajiv Desai, “Message from Kashmir: New Hope for Liberal Heritage,” The Times of India, Oct. 16, 2002; Rama Lakshmi, “Kashmir’s Ruling Party Defeated at Polls: Results Seen as Evidence of Fair Elections, Diminished Control by India,” The Washington Post, Oct. 11, 2002. 20 See, “Kashmir Dynasty Toppled in Fair Poll that Cost 700 Lives,” The Sydney Morning Herald, Oct. 12, 2002. retrieved at https://www.smh.com.au/world/kashmir-dynasty-toppled-in-fair-poll-that-cost- 700-lives-20021012-gdfpsq.html 21 Indian Express, (Jammu edition), September 16, 2002. 22 Report by Institute of Social Sciences New Delhi, “Jammu and Kashmir: Assembly Elections 2002: Under the Shadow of Fear,” EPW, Vol. 37, Issue No. 43, 26 October, 2002. 23 For full details of how people voted in 2002 elections see, “Kashmir Assembly Elections: How Free and Fair?,” EPW, Vol. 38, No. 2, Jan.11-17, (2003), 101-105; Vanashree Samant, “Free and Fair Elections in Kashmir,” Harvard International Review, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Spring 2003), 10-11. 210 conflict and people’s response to the electoral politics. Reporting the elections in the state, noted Kashmiri journalist late Shujaat Bukhari wrote in The Hindu, it is true that Hurriyat Conference had called for boycott but the Party had not campaigned all over the state as they used to do in 1990s. Instead it carries a simple message to the people of Kashmir to remain away from voting. All over the voting turnout was good when we compare it with last Assembly elections of 1996 (Table 5.9). This time, the state authorities didn’t interfere in polls as was done in past. Many poling irregularities were either reduced or prevented. However, these elections were far from being free.24 These assertions have been contested by APHC as baseless in many of their public speeches and press conferences.

When the results were declared the tally of NC was reduced from 57 to just 28 seats inside the Assembly with 28.24 per cent of votes. The number of independent candidates who won the elections increased to 13 out of 244 with 16.50 per cent of vote share. This was one of the strange features of 2002 State Assembly elections (Table 5.1). In fact the election outcome in the valley of Kashmir was entirely different from the previous election of 1996. PDP and NC emerged only two strong contenders in the valley of Kashmir. While PDP seized 16 seats from valley—NC somehow managed to win 18 seats (Table 5.4). It was the most unexpected political phenomena in J&K, because till 2002—NC alone dominated the political landscape of Kashmir. There was a time when NC—ruling political dynasty Party won 90 per cent of seats, because there was hardly any political contender that could have challenged NC in electoral fray. Observing the nature of Party System in J&K Rekha Chowdhary writes:

Hence the politics of the valley was defined by the phenomenon of a single party hegemony with no choice available to the people. With the emergence of PDP as a real competitor to the National Conference, this

24 While making his further assessment about the elections Bukhari is of the view that, the presence of the rebel groups in the state created an environment of fear while as the huge number of security forces in the state also contributed to making the people’s choice unfree. However, these elections were far better than the elections held in past. Shujaat Bukhari, “Lyngdoh satisfied with the first phase of J&K polls,” The Hindu, September 21, 2002. 211

situation changed and, with people getting a chance to choose between these two parties, the electoral arena became competitive.25

After deep deliberation and discussion and nature of electoral results, PDP and Congress agreed to form the coalition government. In an interview with India Today over the formation of government and people’s mandate, the President of Kashmir Pradesh Congress Committee (PCC) Ghulam Nabi Azad said, “The new government represents the will of the people…It is a mandate for governance. Good governance will be the catalyst of change.” On the question of autonomy he replied: “We are not for pre-1953 status. The 1975 Sheikh-Indira Gandhi Agreement could be the basis for discussion on autonomy”. While as on the query of corruption and opposition from NC President Omer Abdullah, Azad reacted with strong assertion that, “The NC's worries are understandable because we have promised to probe the misdeeds of the Farooq Abdullah regime.”26 In a parallel interview with India Today the PDP president and former Chief Minister of J&K (Mufti Sayeed) talked about the successes of PDP in 2002 elections. Mufti was of the opinion that the present defeat of NC and good performance of his Party was due to the anger of people against the misrule of previous Farooq Abdullah’s led government. In a query Mufti was asked that his Party used the ‘soft-separatist’ or what we call Hurriyat language short of secession that helped his Party to gain votes and won many constituencies? To this Mufti was of the opinion that “our party articulated the people’s hardships, the human rights violations by security forces and the senseless violence.” Perhaps it was only because of these issues that the Party in a very brief period marked appearance in electoral politics of J&K. In a question when he was asked that PDP got tacit support of militants? To this Mufti answered in a very strategic way that “they might have done that in certain pockets but it shows that even militants want an honorable exit route.” Explaining the role of new coalition government (PDP-Congress) regarding the Kashmir issue, he was of the belief that, “election is not an end by itself. We are

25 Chowdhary and Rao, “Jammu and Kashmir: Political Alienation,” Journal of Indian School of Political Economy (2003). 26 For further details of the interview see, “The new government represents the will of the people: Ghulam Nabi Azad,” India Today, October 21, 2002. 212 for dialogue, for cessation of hostilities.”27 Commenting on the 2002 Congress-PDP coalition Vanashree Samant has observed;

Today, a joint coalition of the local People's Democratic Party and the Congress Party leads Kashmir. Despite speculation that the newly elected Kashmir assembly would encounter a clash of personalities and agendas in the attempt to select a Chief Minister, the regional PDP and the main opposition Congress Party allied and chose Mufti Muhammed Sayeed as the new Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. The PDP gained popularity as a result of its platform of unconditional talks with separatists and militants to end the long and bloody revolt. Sayeed and his daughter Mehbooba Mufti are highly regarded as new players in state politics who might be able to lift Kashmir out of its present concerns. As leaders in the coalition government, they must now work to allay fears of division.28

Similarly since 2002, PDP under the duo leadership of father-daughter (Mufti Sayeed and Mehbooba Mufti) widened PDP’s geographical and electoral reach. The Party in the last three Assembly elections of 2002, 2008 and 2014 has significantly strengthened its electoral and political supremacy in J&K. The figures in tables (5.1, 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4) are proof to this fact that the electoral hegemony that was once in the hands of NC has now changed in to ‘Politics of Competitiveness’. The Party (PDP) has emerged single most dominant or largest political force in the State Assembly elections of 2014 with 28 seats. The Party has succeeded in capturing power two times since its emergence—one in 2002 in coalition with Congress and another in 2014 when the Party preferred its alliance partner BJP. Both the times, PDP succeeded in shambling NC to keep away from government formation. Though, it is also true that PDP could have ruled the state in all consecutive elections but its decision to withdraw the coalition support to Congress in 2008 led the Party to sit in opposition for six years.

However, this rapid expansion of PDP was possible due to many local and of course National factors. The main plank was ‘soft-separatism’29 and the strong

27 For full manuscript of this interview see, “Even militants want an honorable exit route: Mufti Mohammad Sayeed,” India Today, October 21, 2002. 28 Samant, “Free and Fair Elections in Kashmir,” (2003), 10-11. 29 ‘Soft Separatism’ is a term mostly used by media analysts and political commentators in the context of PDP’s political ideology. It broadly means following the middle path between the ideology of 213 political leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed that the Party succeeded in changing the political face of state polity from ‘One Party System’ to ‘Competitive Polity’. Matthew J. Webb has observed that;

The sudden rise of the PDP—a party which until the 2002 elections was almost unheard of—is a direct result of factors which, while influenced by national and regional politics, were primarily indigenous to Jammu and Kashmir. Amongst these factors the most significant were the loss of popular legitimacy of the two dominant political groups in the Valley—the National Conference and APHC—and frustration with the political deadlock between these two parties as well as the lack of political and economic progress that this deadlock had produced… The sense of political alienation in the Valley and produced a situation where no one party was able to claim the overwhelming support of Kashmiris. It was this political stalemate that mainly led to the rise of the PDP…While local issues indigenous to the state were certainly a factor, equally important was the national trend where voter support appeared to be shifting from the BJP to its opponents—particularly Congress (I)…The ruling party’s fortunes were also not assisted by the continuation of political violence and economic stagnation in the state…30

The logical step that perhaps consolidated the position of PDP in J&K was its appeasement policy with the people of Kashmir that were badly hit by violence and conflict from mid-1980s. The ‘soft-separatism’ and talking of different issues that were concerned with the people directly like, demilitarization, removal of draconian laws, human rights violation, talks with Pakistan, release of political prisoners, talks with Hurriyat, change in governance, end of nepotism and corruption, streamlining the administration, justice to the victims, rehabilitation of surrendered militants, cross LOC trade, opening of routes and many other important issues that helped the party to establish close affinity with local population31 (Table 5.8). These policies and programmes paid rich electoral divedents and fortunes for PDP in 2008 and 2014 Assembly elections (Tables 5.2 & 5.3). Second what actually helped the PDP was

National Conference on one hand and Hurriyat Conference on the other. It is widely believed that the ‘Soft Separatism’ helped PDP to hijack political projects of APHC and mainstream parties in Jammu and Kashmir to expand its electoral and social base, since its formation in 1999. For further see, Hassan Zainagiree, “Echoing ‘soft-separatism,” Greater Kashmir, April 13, 2018. 30 Webb, “Political change and prospects for peace in Jammu and Kashmir,” (2005). 31 Author’s discussion with cross sections of the society in Kashmir during filed survey April 2017 and March, April 2018. 214 that; people were anxious to see change of guards in Kashmir. The monopoly of NC was seen as Khandaani Raj (Dynastic Rule) by most of the electorate. The political workers of PDP usually shouted slogans like, ‘PDP hai apni Jamaat, Yaad Rakho qalam dawaat—(PDP is our own party, remember to vote for it)’, Yeli yi Mufti, Teli Chaeli Sakhti—(when Mufti will come, difficulties will go)’. Mufti Mohammad Sayyed also used to shout the political slogan of Na Bandooq se na goli se, baat banega boli se—(Neither gun nor bullet but talk will help resolve Kashmir issue).32

The organizational skills of PDP patron Mufti Sayeed were beyond questionable. He faced all the challenges despite being single handed man in politics of state. He opposed every move of NC, from his earlier days till he became the CM. Mufti and her daughter appealed people to give their Party a chance in 2002 and with the passage of time both nurtured the Party on anti-NC and pro-people issues. Both succeeded in slogan like ‘Party with a difference’ and it not only emerged an alternative to NC but Congress also. The PDP has been very much able to expand its political base in the state because of the various factors (Table 5.8). These factors are; well thought planning to curb the NC as main competitor, superior electoral strategies, and better voter outreach programme. All these factors played crucial role for extending its electoral arena because its programmes were far better than its rivals especially NC. The Party selected best candidates from the constituencies—under them, electoral victory at any cost became the driving force of the PDP in 2008 and 2014 respectively.33 PDP intoned the slogan of ‘Kashmir issue needs a solution’ and the Party prepared a separate model in the form of ‘Self Rule’34 (Table 5.8).

While there is no denial to this fact that the coalition between Congress and PDP from 2002 to 2008 performed reasonably well on many fronts confronted to the state. However, the decision of PDP to withdraw support to Congress during Amarnath land row agitation created serious rifts between PDP and Congress for future joining hands in coalitions. The decision of PDP to withdraw support all together benefited its main adversary NC; when they formed new coalition government with Congress and PDP was sacked out of power. Jammu boiled due to the Amarnath Land row agitation in 2008. The protests were initially started by BJP

32 Author’s personal participation in election rallies of 2014 assembly elections of J&K; “Politics of Slogans,” Kashmir Life, April 28, 2014. 33 Author’s interview with cross sections of the society in Kashmir during March and April 2018. 34 For more details see Self-Rule document of PDP, retrieved at http://jkpdp.org/category/self-rule/. 215

Jammu unit but later it intensified and at least thirty five other socio-political cum religious groups joined the BJP agitation under the banner of Amarnath Shrine Sangharsh Samiti. The Samiti put two demands before the state and Central government: first that Governor N. N Vohra should be recalled back and second restoration of land to the Shrine Board. In this way Jammu became the focal point of the 2008 agitation which later spread communal tension between Srinagar and Jammu.35 PDP’s post 2008 politics was perhaps the best phase when Party worked hard to flourish in every corner of the state. The policy paralysis of Congress-NC Coalition (2008-2014) grounded with series of alleged corruption charges, unemployment, fake encounters, unrest of 2010, and civilian killings, execution of Afzal Guru in Tihar jail in 2013 and finally the natural disaster of 2014 in form of flood—prepared a well smooth ground for PDP to rise in electoral politics. PDP leadership managed to capitalize on the popular discontent against Congress-NC led coalition government and won majority of the seats in 2014 (Table 5.8). It would not be wrong to say that since 2002, PDP has been working like a ‘well-oiled electoral machine’ in J&K. The Party increased its tally of seats in every election that were conducted since 2002 (Table 5.4). It dominated the state discourse like no other Party has done in recent decade and a half. As political and social activists believe that, ‘PDP turned into mass-based party from a cadre-driven’.36 The PDP’s charge of calling Omer Abdullah a ‘weakest Chief Minister’ created strong perception among masses about the powerlessness of Omer Abdullah during his tenure as Chief Minister. PDP created a strong notion that elections are ‘nothing less than a war.’ Mufti advised his Party men that elections should not only be fought with the clarity of mind but also with an objective of victory. This led to the dramatic change in Party political fortunes in the last 15 years.37

However, winning elections, forming governments in the state and the plea of the PDP by representing the Valley dominated interests (though these assertions are

35 The coalition government under the leadership of Ghulam Nabi Azad transferred 99 acres of forest land to the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB) in Kashmir on 26 June 2008. This decision of transfer of land caused violent state wide demonstration, and protests which later intensified for many months, for further details, Balraj Puri, “It’ not Jammu or Kashmir,” Hindustan Times, August 12, 2008. 36 Author’s personal interaction with PDP voters in election rallies during 2014 assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir and with civil society activists during field survey April 2017 and March, April 2018. 37 Author’s personal interview during filed survey April 2018 with Mehraj Din Najar, M.J. Aslam and Jalal ul din Shah, prominent social activists in Srinagar. 216 contested by APHC) and abandonments the concerns of the other two regions (Jammu and Ladakh) had further sharpened the regional as well as religious divide in J&K. In fact the communal atmosphere in which the state engulfed in 2008 agitation—when Jammu boycotted the goods and essential food items to valley—was perhaps because of this selective approach of mainstream parties that led to the communal tensions in the region. This in long run not only gave rise to BJP (BJPrization) in Jammu.38 But it equally empowered the co-ideologists of BJP like RSS, Bajrang Dal and Hindu Maha Sabha to put their presence in the local politics of the state. Thus the voices of trifurcation of the state on ethno-religious basis became more powerful and assertive in the last decade, mostly represented by communal elements of Jammu and Ladakh. It would not be wrong to say that the political mandate in post-2002 elections and later the different coalition governments between different regional and national parties have further added to the fuel of communal and regional divide in J&K.39 The fractured mandate in 2002 and later coalition of Congress and PDP gave birth to communal fault-lines between Valley of Kashmir and Jammu, because both these political parties draw their support from respective regions of the state.40 For Delhi and Congress, the stand of PDP as a coalition partner to Congress in pursuing its policy of dialogue with Hurriyat and militant organizations became problematic for

38 State assembly elections results of 2008 and 2014 are proof to this fact that BJP have increased its space in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Statistical reports to the state and parliamentary elections of Jammu and Kashmir from 2002 to 2014, (New Delhi: ECI). 39 The three coalition governments that emerged in Jammu and Kashmir in post-2002 era were. The first coalition was between PDP and Congress headed PDP leader and President Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, by sharing the post of Chief Ministership for three years. Mufti was replaced by President of Pradesh Congress Ghulam Nabi Azad in 2005 till 2008; when PDP announced to withdraw its support to coalition due to the Amarnath Land row issue. The state assembly elections of 2008 gave again a fractured mandate where no party got clear majority. This time Congress in departure from its earlier choice in form of PDP choose another regional party. In this way the second coalition came into existance between NC and Congress in 2008 headed by NC leader Mr. Omer Abdullah. The period of 2008 to 2014 of NC-Congress coalition again failed to deliver due to the continuous public protests and other issues threatening to the state. The regional divide and politics of soft-separatism by PDP on one hand while as hard-Hindutva politics of BJP in Jammu prepared a soft ground for 2014 polls where public mandate was again fractured between four keys parties NC, PDP, NC, and BJP. This resulted in formation of third coalition in Jammu and Kashmir. However this time, the Congress that played significant role in previous two coalitions find itself nowhere to form government. Same was case with NC too. The two divergent political ideological parties—BJP-PDP formed coalition government under the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed. Thus the national parties continued to dominate the local politics. See, Aijaz Ashraf Wani, “Ethnic Identities and the Dynamics of Regional and Sub-regional Assertions in Jammu and Kashmir,” Asian Ethnicity, Rutledge, Vol. 14, Issue 3, (2013), 309-341; See also Wani, “Electoral Politics in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Problem of Communal Polarisation,” in Rise of Saffron Power: Reflections on Indian Politics, ed. Mujibur Rehman, 317-346. 40 In the assembly elections of 2002, the demographic divide was evident. In the valley of Kashmir, the PDP returns from Muslim majority seats. While as in Jammu, the Congress dominated Hindu belt and won maximum seats. For detailed analysis see, Chowdhary and Rao, “Jammu and Kashmir: Electoral Politics in a Separatist Context,” EPW, (2004), 5449-5455. 217 coalition. For Congress, it was a political suicide to go for talks, because most of the seats that the Congress captured were from Hindu dominated constituencies of Jammu. Thus the party (Congress) was not able to take any risk in future to loss its voting belt.41 Whereas, on the external front the dialogue with Pakistan had hardly any takers in Jammu Hindu dominated region and of course in certain pockets of mainland India (especially the north belt), because they constitute a big vote bank for political parties—for both Congress as well as for BJP. Whenever there is an attempt to negotiate with Hurriyat or Pakistan; these things always become political force to pressurize New Delhi government for cancelation of talks.

Although, after the 2002 coalition government, the dilemma of PDP was to balance between the objectives stood by NC on one front; such as (accession is final but Kashmir issue needed to be resolved by peaceful means and talks with Pakistan/Hurriyat). On the other hand displacing the objectives of APHC (issues of Human Rights violation, Repeal of Draconian laws, Demilitarization and the larger question of Kashmir dispute) to keep the Party a relevant political entity among the people in legitimate ways. In the first case, PDP played the political calculus by formulating the agenda of ‘Self-Rule’42 document; that the Party displayed in its election manifestos. While as, on the second front—Mufti succeeded in exploring the means to persuade the Centre for talks with Hurriyat—and the Pakistan factor was always there (Table 5.8). The change of guards in Pakistan and emergence of General

41 For any national or regional political party to engage with Hurriyat for negotiation or dialogue means that, the party that will hold talks will have to give certain concessions to Hurriyat or any secessionist political force in the state. However, political realism demands that no parties [like BJP, Congress or any other] in India are in a position to offer any concessions to secessionists in Jammu and Kashmir. The new-Delhi government [who so ever may be in power BJP or Congress] simply can’t afford to commit any political suicide by pleasing Hurriyat or secessionists or Pakistan. In 2002 Congress were having their eye on parliamentary elections of 2004 to defeat the Vajpayee led NDA government and in such political milieu; Congress was in no mood to give separatists in valley of Kashmir any chance or any discounts. It would have directly benefitted the hardcore rightist political party BJP and other Hindutva forces. Thus in earlier years of coalition Congress couldn’t materialize the demands of PDP to negotiate with Hurriyat or other secessionist forces in the state. Same happened after the Mumbai 26/11 attacks. Congress that was ruling at Centre under UPA could not make any serious inroads in dialogue process both with Hurriyat and Pakistan, as the party was more interested in 2009 parliamentary polls than peace process. Chowdhary, Jammu and Kashmir: Politics of identity and separatism (India: Routledge, 2015). 42 PDP proposed its ‘Self-Rule’ document in elections of 2008, though they also talk about it in previous elections of 2002 when party was elected to power. The ‘Self-Rule’ is a combination of intra- state measures with inter-state measures and supra-state measures. PDP is of the view this is the only practical solution of Kashmir, to ‘eliminate the sources of ethno-territorial conflicts, entrenched in the traditional notions of sovereignty, self-determination, national and ethnic borders’. “PDP Election manifestos of 2008, and 2014,” retrieved at http://jkpdp.org/manifesto-2014/; Shujaat Bukhari, “PDP unveils ‘self-rule framework’ for Kashmir,” The Hindu, October 26, 2008. 218

Musharraf, a single strong voice, prepared soft ground for talks between Delhi and Islamabad on one hand, while as Srinagar and New Delhi on the other. Thus the working coalition between Congress and PDP somehow succeeded in their objectives of economic development, talks with Hurriyat, engagement with Pakistan, trade relation between Srinagar and Muzaffarabad and many other common minimum agendas. However unfortunate part was that—violence and political instability continued to hit the state during this coalition also.

Soon after the Amarnath land row agitation in 2008, PDP generated new form of separatism to mobilize the voters to their side. After the loss of State Assembly elections in 2008, PDP being an opposition inside the Assembly used every opportunity to gain sympathy of the people. The Party protested over the issues like, Shopian allegedly rape incident of 2009, the fake counter insurgency operations in which civilian were killed, the 2010 public uprising in which more than 100 young civilians were killed by security forces and hundreds other injured. In fact the Party used every emotive slogan and language against ruling NC-Congress led coalition with this objective to strengthen its vote bank and political constituency for the upcoming State Assembly elections of 2014. The Party won three Lok Sakha seats of Kashmir valley and later in State Assembly elections of 2014 the Party (PDP) clinched 28 seats (Tables 5.7 & 5.3). What was notable feature of this election was the fierce competition among the mainstream political actors that further strengthened ‘Politics of Competitiveness’ in J&K. However, PDP emerged single largest party43 and formed the government with BJP.

5.3 National Conference: A Voyage from Opposition to Realization of Power (2002—2014)

It was in the year 2002 when a number of regional and national political parties and political leaders found a feasible political environment to restore what the Indian writers cum politicians call ‘the faith of Democracy in Kashmir.’ These political parties carved out their role in a political atmosphere that was mostly dominated by Gun and Separatism. Despite the insurgency and counter insurgency operations continued in this era which resulted in killing of number of militants, civilians and security forces in the state. On one hand it is believed that many mainstream political

43 Statistical reports on the state assembly elections of 2014 and Parliamentary elections in J&K. 219 workers and Party sympathizers were allegedly killed and tortured by militants and other non-state actors. On the other hand state administration jailed and tortured many political opponents that were pro-independent sympathizers (APHC, J&KLF, and Jamaat-i-Islami). In such political conditions Central government then headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee took the political initiatives both within the state as well as with neighboring Pakistan to restore peace in J&K.44 He also promised with the political leadership of the state to conduct free and fair elections.45

The Assembly elections of 2002 witnessed one of the rare occasions in the political history of J&K when NC was thrown out of power by non-NC regime— (PDP and Congress). The PDP under Mufti Sayeed handed NC one of the worst electoral defeats since its inception in J&K. The Party (NC) lost its electoral constituency beyond expectations. The Party that enjoyed monopoly lost its political pre-eminence and ‘Single Party Dominance’ in 2002. The moral decline of NC started during the life time of Sheikh Abdullah when he expelled his senior and lifelong friend Afzal Beg. Later choosing Farooq Abdullah as successor by Sheikh Abdullah led to the infighting in the Party and in Sheikh Family too. All this was openly aired in the public domain that led to the ethical decline of NC. In fact this was the second moral decline of the Party and dilution of its political legacy which in future led to the gradual loss of the mammoth mass support. That it commanded among the people in the state during the Sheikh Abdullah’s era.46

Analyzing the defeat and decline of NC in 2002, then President of the Party Omer Abdullah in an interview with India Today made few interesting remarks. Omer believed that the defeat of NC was—because the Party failed to sell successes and positive performance of the government to the people. But at the same time Omer

44 Atal Bihari Vajpayee started peace process with the neighbor Pakistan on many issues including Kashmir, at the same time Vajpayee also talked to Hurriyat Conference led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq to build consensus to peace in the state. However, Hurriyat led by Syed Ali Shah Geelani didn’t participate in the dialogue process. Though, many peace initiatives were taken by both the countries to restore trust and at the same time to normalize the relation to a level where both the countries would be able to solve the long pending issue of Kashmir. For details peace process see, Happymon Jacob, “The Kashmir Uprising and India-Pakistan Relations: A Need for Conflict resolution, not Management,” Asie.Visions, No.90, Ifri, December (2016). 45 It is important to mention here that most of the political commentators believe that all elections in Jammu and Kashmir since 1952 were rigged and unfair except 1977 state assembly elections that were conducted after Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah signed Kashmir Accord in 1975- For further details see, previous chapters. The change in the electoral politics was effectively noticeable in the elections of 2002. Chowdhary and Rao, “Jammu and Kashmir: political alienation,” (2003), 199-200. 46 For detailed analysis see chapter 4th. 220 blamed ‘certain agencies in Delhi resorted to dirty tricks. To prove the credibility of elections, for this they damaged NC.’ He questioned the increasing number of independent candidates in the elections and said ‘where from these independent contenders get the money to fight elections?’ Omer’s obvious hint was New Delhi’s agencies. Though, he accepted the fact that making coalition with BJP led NDA government at Centre was also responsible that ‘had bearing on the people’s thinking.’47 Even the Party President Omer Abdullah in his interview with Rediff.com in 2003 also accepted this fact that NC was sidelined by NDA government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee, particularly regarding the decisions of J&K. While showing his anger Omer said:

I find it strange that the National Conference's views were sought whether Indian troops should be sent to Iraq or not. But when it came to taking a decision on Jammu and Kashmir our views were never sought. How is it that my opinion on Iraq is more important than my views on Jammu and Kashmir? We were allies of the government and yet the prime minister thought it fit to share a platform with Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, the chief minister of Jammu and Kashmir, rather than with Dr. Farooq Abdullah or Omar Abdullah…So why is it that he comes to Jammu and Kashmir and addresses a rally with Mufti Sayeed and neglects the National Conference completely? As partner of the NDA we have thought we would have a role to play. They behaved as if we did not exist. He made no mention of the contribution of six years of National Conference rule. Not a word about Sheikh Abdullah, the towering personality of Kashmir but for whom Jammu and Kashmir would have been part of Pakistan long ago.48

Omer further added that New Delhi needs Kashmiri face to flaunt around the world and Delhi will find one. Omer’s obvious hint was PDP patron Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and he was in fact trying to convey a message that Mufti was ‘Delhi’s Man in Kashmir’. While commenting on end of alliance with NDA at Centre, Omer was quick that he will try to resurrect his Party (NC). In his eyes NC had lost its

47 For full interview see, “Certain agencies in Delhi resorted to dirty tricks: Omar Abdullah,” India Today, Oct. 21, 2002. 48 For full interview of Omer Abdullah see, “The government could do some give and take with the people of Kashmir,” Rediff.Com, July 22, 2003, retrieved at http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/22inter.htm. 221 political credibility among people due to the alliance with NDA in 1999.49 Though, Omer publically apologized for joining NDA government and positioned NC as a ‘Kashmir Centric Party’ but it was too late for the Party to reclaim its lost status. Omer was well aware about the down fall of NC in 2002 elections. This scenario can be understood by this fact when Omer was defeated by low rank political leader Qazi Afzal of PDP in Ganderbal constituency; once known as bastion of Abdullah dynasty. The defeat was the first political downfall of Sheikh Family since Sheikh Abdullah returned to mainstream politics in 1975. The defeat of Omer was beyond expectations and for the first time in State Assembly in post 1975 there was no Abdullah sitting inside.50 The reason was obvious, in NC; the ‘ivory tower syndrome’ among the political leadership isolated it from grassroots’ workers on one hand, while the increasing anti-India sentiments in the form of armed struggle cut its roots with people. People in general and workers in particular lost zeal and trust on the Party that gave birth to new political class in Kashmir. The political ‘halo syndrome’ that NC is the only Political Party which could rule and govern the state was seriously challenged and breached since 2002 onwards. The period from 2002 to 2008 of NC could be seen as an interregnum for the Party as it was out of power and a non-NC regime governed the J&K.

However, it is also true that in post 2002 state politics, NC comprehended this reality that the linkages between the people and the Party had adversely affected its political constituency. It was this electoral constituency that was filled by PDP in the valley and in Jammu by Congress and other political parties. It created an electoral atmosphere where NC was bound to reclaim its legitimacy to capture power by talking different political issues vis-i-vis Kashmir. In this way electoral politics in J&K by and large became vibrant and more competitive. It is in this context when NC emerged as strong contender in Assembly in post 2002 that forced the Party to revisit its policies and strategy. To remain in the opposition was perhaps also beneficial for NC, because it not only democratized the state polity but it forced NC to adopt itself in the changing political atmosphere and circumstances. It is perhaps because of the

49 Ibid. 50 Statistical reports of J&K state assembly elections of 1977, 1983, 1987, 1996 and 2002. 222 emergence of competitive politics in Kashmir that has compelled NC to take up the issues of governance, development and peace talk’ 51(Table 5.8).

One can also comprehend the position of NC in the words of Begum Akbar Jehan (wife of Sheikh Abdullah) when she in her interview with The Indian Express in 1999 created huge political stir. She openly criticized her son Farooq Abdullah (then CM of State) of ‘fallen into the net of intrigues of New-Delhi, and letting the party’s regional character become diluted…’52 Though, she proved right after three years when NC lost not only power but its political constituency too to its rival PDP in 2002. However, Akbar Jehan made one interesting point during her interview, when she held out a hope on her Grandson Omer Abdullah in these words, “I am sure Omer will prove himself and be the real ideological successor to Sher-i-Kashmir (Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah).”53 Although, Omer and his Party was defeated in 2002, but he continued his struggle to ride the NC in political corridors of state. Nevertheless, NC captured power and Omer became the CM in 2008 as her Grandmother once predicted on ‘promise of change.’ NC would have been declined beyond redemption but thanks to the legacy of Sheikh Abdullah and the low index of opposition leaders and candidates. This led to the repositioning of NC on stability plank which brought it back to power in 2008 in coalition with Congress. However, the Party could not increase its tally of seats from 28 in 2002 and ended up with the same numbers in 2008 (Tables 5.1 & 5.2). The Party (NC) lost much of its electoral constituency to PDP in the Valley—BJP and Congress in Jammu (Table 5.4). It is also true that NC was the single largest opposition Party in State Assembly from 2002 to 2008 (Table 5.4) and the Party tried to build its social and electoral base under the new young leadership of Omar Abdullah. Though, ‘Omar had repeatedly stressed that his key goal was to undo the NC’s image of being a party that bowed before New Delhi.’54 Omar rejuvenated the Party cradle on Autonomy plank and tried his best to counter the PDP in public as ‘party with a difference’. This is implicit by his statement that, “The NC will not survive if its politics goes against its base. We have to represent the aspiration of the people of Kashmir.”55 Omer openly spoke about the talks with Hurriyat and Pakistan; even he was the first NC’s leader after his

51 Chowdhary and Rao, “NC of J&K from Hegemonic to Competitive Politics,” EPW, (2004). 52 Jaleel, Indian Express, July 27, 2014. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 223 grandfather who visited Pakistan and met political establishment there. It looked like NC was captivating the issues of its opposition PDP. Like PDP, NC too demanded the withdrawal of most draconian law ‘Armed Force Special Powers Act’ (AFSPA) as poll promises (Table 5.8). As Praveen Swami has observed:

From mid-2005, the National Conference has set about returning the favour. Its politicians have appropriated almost all the PDP’s key issues: negotiations with terrorists, dialogue with Pakistan, and the termination of human rights violations.56

In the later phase, when PDP withdraw its support to Congress in 2008, NC issued its unique manuscript called Vision Document 2008. The document by and large was proof to this fact that how in changing political conditions of the state forced NC to revisit its old policies with new one. A clear look at the Vision Document, gives us ample evidence that it was no more different from the ‘State Autonomy Report 2000’57 (Table 5.8).

However, the ride of Omer was not as easy as he assumed; soon after his oath ceremony as CM. The wounds of 2008 public uprising were still alive among the people, especially the killing of more than 100 young people, hundreds other injured and imprisoned under PSA. It was just a start to govern the state, when NC suffered damage from mishandling the public uprising of 2009 and 2010. The brute force was used by NC-Congress Coalition government headed by Omer Abdullah to curb the public anger and ‘Azadi Rallies’ in Kashmir valley, which resulted in killing of more than 128 people in Kashmir valley. Though, Omar’s government ordered time bond probe, which never happened till date.58 This coupled with mis-governance, serious corruption charges, and failing to represent people’s aspirations before New Delhi, and most important failure to set ‘Truth and Reconciliation Commission’ to investigate the custodial deaths and serious human rights violation by security forces.59 In 2011, the official inquiry claimed that there are as many as 2156 unidentified bodies in unmarked graves at 38 sites in North Kashmir alone. (These

56 Praveen Swami, “A winter of transformation in Kashmir,” The Hindu, November 5, 2007. 57 For detailed analysis of the Vision document, its objectives, and future plans of the NC for the state to develop on social, educational and political front, Vision Document for Jammu and Kashmir (The Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, October, 2008). 58 Jaleel, “Omer Abdullah’s six years rule: The shrinking of a CM,” The Indian Express, July 27, 2014. 59 Shujaat Bukhari, “Let Assembly seek Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Omar,” The Hindu, March, 6, 2011. 224 figures were contested by APHC and APDP who put the number more than what the government claimed in its official report).60 Nevertheless, Omer promised to take action but with the passage of time this issue too died silently.61 On one hand all these political developments in less than six years made Omer politically isolated CM. While as on the other, he continued to let the Congress occupy the political space within the state. Though coalition was formed between NC and Congress but the fact is there was no written document between the coalition partners to define the ‘Common Minimum Programme.’ That would have guided the state towards political stability. Instead NC suited happy with CM post and gave most of the Ministerial berth to coalition partner Congress.62

Despite all odds, NC governed the state in coalition with Congress from 2008 to 2014 for full term. However, in 2014 both Parliamentary and State Assembly elections the party’s political fortunes dipped further by many political factors.63 The regional and religious divide was apparent in 2014 elections, when BJP won 25 seats from Jammu (mostly from Hindu dominated areas) and PDP won 28 seats (from Muslim dominated region) of J&K (Tables 5.3, 5.4 & 5.7). On both the sides of the state—Kashmir and Jammu—BJP and PDP became the two main actors that politicized every issue concerning to people and J&K. In such political milieu; NC could not continue its electoral base. The electoral mandate was purely against NC in 2014, when the Party was reduced to just 15 Assembly seats out of 87 (Table 5.3). It is certainly worst political performance of the NC in the electoral history of J&K since its origin. The weak and fragile NC could not sustain its previous numbers of 2002 or 2008 (Tables 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3). The Party was brushed under the carpet by its

60 Jason Burke, “Kashmir unmarked graves hold thousands of bodies,” The Guardian, August 21, 2011. Retrieved at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/21/kashmir-unmarked-graves- thousands-bodies. 61 Bukhari, “Let Assembly seek Truth and Reconciliation Commission: Omar,” The Hindu, March 6, 2011. 62 Wani, “Electoral Politics in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Problem of Communal Polarisation,” ed. 317-346. 63 The differences over issues of demilitarization, removal of AFSPA, Politics of Separatism, and many other controversial matters became much evident during coalition government. The dual control over the government between NC and Congress ran into rough weather that created serious policy paralysis in the state. That resulted in loss of people’s trust on NC in the valley and Congress in Jammu. For detailed analysis see, Mehmood ur Rashid, “Why Kashmir's Armed Insurgency Is Not a Variant of Terrorism,” EPW, Vol. 53, Issue 19, May 12, 2018.

225 own failures and weaknesses. In this way the invincibility (strength) tag of the NC was punctured by electoral defeats since 2002.

However, the 2008 Assembly election was a battle between NC and PDP in the valley, while as in Jammu this battle was evident between Congress and BJP mostly. While NC and PDP also showed their presence in Jammu along with number of other small parties and independent candidates which performed well (Table 5.2). The reasons for the decline of NC were evident and surfaced during Farooq Abdullah’s time. However, the leadership failed to address the issues confronted to the State and the Party. Instead the Party kept in limbo and the working of coalition headed by Omer Abdullah gave birth to new problems which hastened its downslide further. That resulted in loss of people’s trust on NC in the valley and Congress in Jammu.

In his interview with Muzamil Jaleel carried by The Indian Express, Omar talked about many diverse issues that his government faced during 2008 to 2014. He considered that Congress have emerged as kingmakers in Kashmir politics. However, he believed that it is the people who have made Congress a ‘Party in power perpetually.’ Though, he accepted that the 2014 Lok Sabha elections were influenced by ‘Modi Wave’ (Modi Hawa). Yet, he blamed his Party workers too for NC’s poor performance in 2014 Assembly elections. He was of the view that the Party workers didn’t go out and work as they would do in the past. They did not foresee the benefits of coalition government. On alliance with Congress, Omar was of the view that both the parties were on the same page to end the alliance. However, he admitted that the absence of his father, Farooq Abdullah put serious challenge to NC and its electoral performance. While replying to the query on performance of coalition government; he made fascinating remark that the state of J&K is facing many challenges and political uncertainty is one among the issues that state is confront with. In the words of Omar, “I have been consistently saying that no matter how much money is thrown at this (Kashmir) problem, how many economic measures we take, it will not be resolved unless we resolve it politically.”64

64 For full interview Muzamil Jaleel, “Omar Abdullah’s six year rule: The shrinking of a CM,” The Indian Express, July 27, 2014. 226

5.4 Congress in Kashmir: The Politics of Coalition and Electoral Competitiveness

Congress, despite being one of the prominent political forces since the days of its inception in Kashmir, failed to gain sympathy of people. In past the competition between the NC’s ‘Plough’ (Al-Beahn) and Congress ‘Right Hand’ (Dushun Athe) presumes a historical significance.65 The symbol of Congress was selected by Indra Gandhi when Congress got divided into two groups in India—one was led by Indra and another by Kamraj. Thus two parties emerged out of Congress, ‘New Congress and Old Congress.’ However, Election Commission of India recognized ‘Indra’s New Congress’ as ‘Official Congress.’ Though in J&K Congress had already set its state unit in 1964.66 In J&K the original symbol of the Congress Party was ‘two bullocks with plough.’ Political commentators and activists in Kashmir see this symbol as strategic and well calculated move of Congress to gain legitimacy among the people who were mainly associated with the symbol of NC’s ‘Plough’. In fact it created a little bit sense of belongingness among good section of the people for Congress due to its analogous symbol of NC.67 However, due to the absence of strong leadership in Pradesh Congress in post 1990’s, the Party could not make any serious inroads from the valley of Kashmir. The old leadership of Sadiq, and Qasim were no more present in Kashmir. It is true that till 1990 Mufti Sayeed was a well-known political face of Congress in Kashmir. However, soon after he bid goodbye to Congress and joined the Janta Party as prominent face in Union Cabinet. Nevertheless, he used his all good office and experience and succeeded in forming new Political Party in Kashmir under the pen name of ‘Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party’ in 1999. Thus, with passage of time Congress couldn’t flourish in Kashmir due to the absence of leadership in the valley. However, in Jammu Congress had one prominent face Makhan Lal Forder but due to the changing political landscape since 2008, the Party couldn’t sustain its electoral constituency (Tables 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3). It is true that relatively Congress did well in Jammu mostly in the Hindu dominated areas. Nevertheless, the Party constantly lost in Jammu to BJP in 2008 and which continued in 2014, when Party was reduced to just 12 seats in Assembly all over the state (Table

65 In Kashmiri language ‘Plough’ is called Al-Beahn and ‘Right Hand’ Dushain Athie. 66 For further details about the role of Congress in the politics of Kashmir see chapter 3th and 4th 67 Authors Interview with Jalal Din Shah and Mehraj Din Najar prominent social activists in Srinagar, October 17, 2018. 227

5.4). There are many reasons which led to the defeat of Congress. Some have been already discussed in the Chapter above. However, one noticeable reason was/is the Party does not own strong charismatic leadership (like in case of NC Farooq Abdullah and PDP late Mufti Mohammad Sayeed) who could have mobilized people in all three regions of J&K. Nevertheless, it is widely believed that in 2005 Ghulam Nabi Azad filled the vacuum, when he was sworn as CM after Sayeed stepped down as per the ‘coalition agenda’. Azad was the first CM who belonged to Jammu region since 1948. Due to his leadership qualities and his long experience in national politics Azad reformed the organization and started the numerous membership drive campaign in all regions of the state. However, political atmosphere in post Amarnath agitation of 2008 again put the Congress in serious predicaments.68 Though, the Party succeeded in making coalition with NC in 2008 and returned power but the Party couldn’t succeed in extending its electoral constituency (Table 5.4). On the other hand Ghulam Nabi Azad was elected to Parliament in 2009 which resulted it weak leadership of Congress in the state. Though, Professor Saif Din Soz emerged a strong voice of Congress in valley, but he too could not enlarge the Party at the grass root level. This political phenomenon was aptly put by Party senior leader Mr. Monga publically in 2010 that “it is because of his leadership that people have reposed faith in our party…and Mr. Soz does not encourage factionalism.”69 Thus, the Congress due to its organizational skills lingered weak and fragile in J&K. Commenting on the relevance and role of Congress in the state of J&K noted columnist and author Dr. Mirza Ashraf Beg observed:

Coming back to NC-INC association their checkered relationship has created more problems for the state than solved any…However owing to its frail roots it will need to bank upon its willy-nilly ally in J&K regardless of some ‘sitting city ducks in NC’s wetlands.70

Over the issue of Kashmir Conflict, there is no denial of the fact that the local Kashmiri leaders of the Party (Congress) always prefer either silence or economic

68 Praveen Krishna Swami, “Jammu and Kashmir: Ethnic—Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009,” In, India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, ed. Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (India: Sage, 2018), 333- 353. 69 Shujaat Bukhari, “In Kashmir valley, Congress gains ground,” The Hindu, April 5, 2010. 70 Dr. Mirza Ashraf Beg, “NC-Congress relationship: The mystery and its impact on J&K,” Greater Kashmir, November 29, 2013. 228 measures to solve the Kashmir issue. They neither endorse Plebiscite nor do they support the document of ‘Self-Rule’ of PDP or ‘Autonomy’ of NC. Nevertheless, sometimes there are divided opinions within the Congress on the resolution of Kashmir dispute. Majority of the Party want engagement with Pakistan but do not compromise on the Party stand that ‘Kashmir is the integral part of India.’71

Whereas as, it is beyond any doubt that its ideological agenda to assimilate J&K by Constitutional measures with Indian Union was/is yet another reason that the Party is not fully endorsed by large sections of people particularly in valley of Kashmir. The Party (Congress) that was ‘Dominant Political Entity in Jammu’ is now high jacked by BJP despite the fact that Congress was in power for at least 12 years in J&K from 2002 to 2014 in coalition with two regional parties—PDP and NC (Tables 5.1, 5.2 & 5.3). When BJP kick started its ‘Mission 44+’ during the 2014 Assembly elections, it was Congress in Jammu that became most worrisome due to the election results of Lok Sabha 2014.72 The Party had already lost its Parliamentary seats and power in Delhi. The Party irrespective of enjoying power from 2002 to 2014 with two coalition governments finds it hard to even reveal its poll card in 2014 until election dates were announced.73 Instead the Party let the independents to contest and fragment the electoral space in the state, especially in Jammu. The move was strategic to cut the vote share of regional parties particularly NC. In such political atmosphere Pradesh Congress found itself in a ‘win-win’ situation. However, the Party forgot to enrich the ‘secular agenda’, which in contrary adversely effected Party performance. Congress remained in illusion that due to the ‘hegemonic power structure’ to form coalition governments for more than a decade it could not be defeated or remain away from government formation in future. The Party failed to understand the presence and politics of BJP and other like-minded organizations in Jammu. The Party also failed to revive its organizational base in Jammu as elsewhere. It was in all sorts of illusion that, “only Congress has been a constant partner in government formation—either

71 However, all regional political parties especially the valley centric always talk issue like demilitarization, withdrawal of AFSPA, curb human rights violation, and talks to Pakistan and Hurriyat Conference. Though, New-Delhi is of the opinion especially the BJP and co-ideologists believe that, such issues that are raked by political parties in Kashmir gave strength to politics of separatism in the state. 72 Wani, “Regional Divide on Communal Lines: Lok Sabha Election 2014 in Jammu and Kashmir,” in Electoral Politics in Indian States: 2014 Elections and Beyond, ed. Kumar and Sisodia (2018). 73 “Jammu and Kashmir polls: Congress releases manifesto, promises reforms,” The Economic Times, November 26, 2014; Nilofar Suhrawardy, “Modi-wave and Dalit-Card’s Impact in Hindi Belt!,” Mainstream weekly, Vol. LII, No. 26, June 21, 2014. 229 with NC, or PDP.”74 Nevertheless this belief of the Congress turned out to be a complete ‘political naivety’ for the Party when it faced the ‘Modi Wave’ in Jammu. The election gave disturbing statistical results when BJP emerged second largest Party in the state by wining 25 seats. While as Congress showed poor performance in curbing the ‘Modi+BJP’ wave in Jammu (Tables 5.3 & 5.7). The bad performance of the Party (Congress) can be understood by this fact that all its tall political bigwigs were defeated from Jammu. Tara Chand, Raman Bhalla, Sham Lal Sharma (who wished to install Hindu CM in J&K) were defeated by low rank BJP leaders and Congress was reduced to twelve numbers inside Assembly.75

After cutting ties with the NC, INC top brass leaders were now dreaming for yet another alliance/coalition with PDP for next government formation. Senior leaders in both the parties were reportedly working behind the scenes to keep BJP at bay due to the ‘Modi Wave.’ Even Congress top brass leaders including Saif Din Soz and Ghulam Nabi Azad buried their differences. However, things didn’t go as Congress have predicted in post-election scenario, the Party was reduced from 17 to just 12 seats in the State Assembly (Table 5.3). Thus the fractured mandate made it difficult for the Party to claim to form government in coalition with PDP or NC. Though, there were speculations that the three parties (PDP+NC+Congress) will form coalition to keep BJP away from power sharing but PDP patron Mufti Sayeed choose BJP as a Coalition partner to end these speculations.76

Thus from the above discussion it is apparent that Congress had played a significant role in the political corridors of Kashmir from its very inception. However, changing political atmosphere after the rise of BJP in Jammu had reduced the Party (Congress) presence and decision making status in power sharing matrix of the state to a considerable extent since 2014. The Party could only regain its political constituency especially in Jammu if the Party will re-write and re-visit its ideological agenda of ‘within its broad spectrum of secular politics’ and ‘strong political

74 Bilal Handoo, “Secular (Hand) Shake,” Kashmir Life, December 29, 2014. 75 The overall performance of the Congress in J&K was low when we compare with previous two state assembly elections of 2002 (20 seats) and 2008 (17 seats). The party could only win 12 assembly segments with low percentage of votes all over the state. The party won three seats in Ladakh (Leh, Nubra and Kargil), five seats in Jammu (Banihal, Gool Arnas, Surankote, Gulabgarh and Inderwal) and it somehow succeeded in winning four seats from Kashmir valley (Devsar, Bandipora, Shangus and Sopore). Statistical reports of 2014 assembly election (New Delhi: ECI, 2015). 76 “BJP, PDP to form government in Jammu and Kashmir, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed could be CM,” India Today, December 30, 2014. 230 leadership’. That will help in re-building the Party organization and it will set grassroots ‘political rebound in the distant future’ in all regions of J&K. This move only can make Congress a relevant political entity in the politics of the state to counter forces like BJP in Jammu—that used to be the strong belt of Congress in past decades.

5.5 The Rise of BJP in J&K: Role and Realization of Power

There are number of political parties now that exist in J&K—both national as well as regional. However, with two regional parties PDP and NC—BJP and INC are the most significant national political players.77 Though, BJP had only in recent times showed its strong presence, but there is no denial of the fact that the Party (BJP) had its deep-rooted seeds in the politics of J&K. In the early years they remained as an opposition outside the Assembly and acted as pressure group to check the nuisance of power structure and grievances of the Jammu region. But with the passage of time the Party built its strong empathies with Jammu based political elite who were either ‘Pro-Hindutva or anti-Congress and anti-NC’.78 The birth of BJP in J&K is of late 1980s, when first Praja Parishad Party in Jammu amalgamated with Jana Sangh and later Jana Sangh was finally merged with BJP in 1980. The party’s stand on J&K was no longer different from its predecessors like Praja Parishad or Jana Sangh. The Party believed the old ideology of Parishad. That is complete merger of the state with Union of India by abrogating the Special Status under article 370 of Indian Constitution.79 However, in the growing atmosphere of communalism and religious based political parties in India, the Party in the last two and a half decades has considerably marked its presence in Jammu.80 Though, it is true that, in its initial years Party couldn’t generate the sympathy of people but due to the continuous presence of violent conflict in valley of Kashmir for ‘Pro-Independence’ and rise of ‘Hindutva Nationalism’ in India had helped the Party to a great extent to spread its social and electoral base. In

77 In India the Indian National Congress is considered as centre-left (scholars mark Congress a Secular), on the other hand Bhartiya Janta Party is known as centre-right (Scholars call Hindu National Party) due to their political ideologies. For detailed analysis, see Praveen Rai and Sanjay Kumar, “The Decline of the Congress Party in Indian Politics,” EPW, Vol. 52, Issue No. 12, Mar. 25, (2017). 78 Author’s personal interaction with cross sections of the society in Kashmir during field survey, May 2017, March, and April 2018. 79 For detailed emergence of Praja Parishad and later Jana Sang and its role in the politics of J&K see previous chapters. 80 Harish K. Thakur, Alienation and Integration in Jammu and Kashmir (Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 2000), 151-152. 231 fact the politics of BJP in J&K since its inception is actually based on its opposition or contention with National Conference. The Party stood against everything that was demanded by NC from time to time, especially the question of greater Autonomy. As noted academician Rekha Chowdhary observes:

As the Praja Parishad merged with the Bharatiya Jana Sangh, it remained obsessed with the issue of integration of the state with India. This issue continued to remain the focal point of BJP politics till it formed the coalition government at Centre in 1998 and declared a deferment of its demand for abolition of article 370 to a future date.81

With the passage of time and changed political atmosphere both at national and state level, BJP channelised the local political grievances against the ruling political elite (mostly of the time NC at state and Congress at Centre) through its ideology of complete merger of the state with Indian Union and principle Party to opposition of article 370. As Chowdhary again observes that:

Without going into the question of what exactly does this article imply, the BJP has generated by sentiments against this article, and a politics of opposition to it has been constructed which appeals at the common sense levels to many people of the Jammu region, mainly urban Hindus.82

The BJP had successfully used the Kashmir conflict and the political instability in the form of armed struggle to reiterate its long ideological philosophy that Autonomy breeds more separatism in J&K. It is by this political philosophy that the Party has extended its political base beyond the district of Jammu to others parts of the region and the state. There is no denial to this fact that the ‘communal mindset’ of BJP in reaction to the armed struggle in Kashmir has benefited the Party. This can be understood by the electoral performance of the Party in pre-1987’s era in comparison to the post-1990’s elections of J&K. The Party could not make any strong entry in to the State Assembly before 1990’. In the State Assembly elections of 1983, BJP was not able to consolidate itself to win a single seat from Jammu region. The Party contested from 27 seats and was able to won 9.07 per cent of votes, but was

81 Rekha Chowdhary, “BJP's Alliance with National Conference: Predicament at State Level,” EPW, Vol. 34, No. 48 (1999), 3342-3343. 82 Ibid. 232 unable to make entry to the Assembly.83 However, the Party continued its stand on the issue of Autonomy during these years and played crucial role of opposition outside the Assembly. The Party always stood against any decision of government that they deemed to be anti-Hindu in general and anti-Jammu in particular. The Party workers always stood on their stand and majority of times issued many protest calls to prove their existence. Slowly, with the passage of time in the Assembly election of 1987 (regarded as most crucial—for further study see Chapter 4th) the Party used all its manpower and ideological tools to put the people of Jammu against the people of Kashmir. In such a political milieu, the Party contested 29 seats and was able to win two seats while increasing its voting tally to 13.99 per cent and entered into the Assembly.84

However, there is also another success story of BJP, the Party in its negligible political journey succeeded, to enter in 11th Lok Sabha elections that were held in 1996. The Party contested five seats and was able to win one seat with 19.04 per cent of votes.85 There was considerable increase in the BJP’s tally in State Assembly elections of 1996 that were held after the gap of six years due to armed struggle. The Party (BJP) for the first time since its inception was able to contest fifty three Assembly segments and won eight seats with 17.58 percentages of votes 86 This was for the first time that the Assembly witnessed strong opposition on issue pertaining to the state; especially BJP raised many controversial issues from article 370 to local governance and problems confronted to Jammu region. The Party actively participated in Assembly sessions, debates and challenged the every decision of NC government—headed by Farooq Abdullah.

BJP again made its presence felt during the 12th General elections for the Lok Sabha, 1998. The Party not only defeated NC and Congress but contested all six Lok Sabha seats and won two Parliamentary constituencies of Jammu and Udhampur with

83 Statistical report on general elections, 1983 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECI, 1984). 84 Statistical report on general elections, 1987 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: ECI, 1989); Note: The election to state assembly of 1987 was contested by NC and Congress by entering into pre-poll alliance. 85 The 1996 parliamentary elections were boycotted by NC, while Congress won 4 seats. For further information see Statistical report on General elections, 1996 to the Tenth Lok Sabha (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1997). 86 Statistical report on general elections 1996 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K, (New Delhi: ECI, 1998). 233 unexpected 28.64 per cent of votes. In a surprise the ‘right wing party’ was able to win two Parliamentary seats from Muslim majority state of J&K.87 However, due to the collapse of Vajpayee government in Centre in 1999; new elections were announced to 13th Lok Sabha. BJP once again showed its social and electoral base and won two Parliamentary seats with highest voting percentage of 31.56 among all political parties followed by NC 28.94 per cent.88 Thus from the above electoral study of BJP in both Parliamentary and State Assembly, it gives us clear picture that Party slowly but surely succeeded in making inroads in the electoral politics of J&K. That was previously either most of the time dominated by NC or some times by Congress. This political phenomenon is aptly explained by Chowdhary in these words:

This electoral bonanza for the BJP is not so much the result of the national level politics of the party as the outcome of local issues related to militancy. What helped the BJP consolidate its position in the Jammu region during the period of militancy was its vociferous and sustained campaign against separatism in Kashmir. In this campaign opposition to Article 370 and the special status of Jammu and Kashmir formed the central point.89

However, after BJP’s (NDA) alliance with NC in 1999 at Centre level, the local political leaders of the Party always stood firm on their ideology and political commitment and remained vocal in opposition to the Special Status. In State Assembly it always remained utmost vocal and criticized the policies of NC government. One interesting thing to note here is that despite the Party won eight seats from Jammu in the Assembly elections of 1996 and later two seats of Lok Sabha also, the Party failed to repeat its performance of 1996 and could only win one seat. Not only the Party was net looser to Congress and NC, but its vote share also came down and reduced to 12 per cent in 200290 (Table 5.1). Though, the Party couldn’t make any headway to Assembly but it mobilized public opinion in Jammu and worked hard to prove existance in conflict politics of Kashmir. It is also true that the Party couldn’t make any tough assertions within the State Assembly due to its low performance of having just one candidate. The Assembly failed to witness the open

87 Statistical report on General elections, 1998 to the 12th Lok Sabha (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 1999). 88 Statistical report on General elections, 1999 to the 13th Lok Sabha (New Delhi: ECI, Vol. I, 2000). 89 Chowdhary, “BJP's Alliance with National Conference: Predicament at State Level,” EPW, (1999), 3342-3343. 90 Statistical report on general elections 2002 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECI, 2002). 234 debates from BJP side. However, the Party played important role as an opposition outside the Assembly. It criticized the programmes and policies of PDP-Congress coalition government of allegedly being the more pro-Kashmiri and anti-Jammu agenda. The defeat of BJP in Jammu in 2002 was due to local factors; such as weak leadership, factionalism within the Party, ideological clashes with workers, and its alliance with NC in 1999 at national level. While as the same BJP unit criticized the NC for giving soft corner to militant movement in the state.91 This whole political milieu was perhaps enough that could have eroded the electoral base of BJP. That in fact occurred in 2002; BJP that won eight seats in 1996 Assembly elections managed to win only one seat in 2002 Assembly elections.92 Thus, its main contender in Jammu (Congress) benefitted much. The Party (Congress) increases its tally from seven seats in 1996 to twenty in 200293 (Table 5.1). The Party (BJP) despite out of power after 2004, at the national level, continued its pressure on Centre and the state government to abrogate the Special Status. The Party revealed its anger by organizing many protest calls (Band Calls) in Jammu and mobilizes its social and electoral base. The Party leaders not only criticize the government—headed by Sayeed but it condemned all those forces especially Congress, NC and other Kashmiri based parties. In eyes of BJP all these parties were pro-Kashmiri separatist, anti-Jammu and anti-Hindu in nature.94 Thus slowly and steadily the Party succeeded in its objective of extending its social and electoral base in most of the Hindu dominated areas of Jammu (Hindu belt—Jammu, Kathua, Udhampur and Samba). This can be understood by the Assembly elections of 2008 that were conducted in post Amarnath agitation 2008. It was for the first time that the Party was able to win eleven seats from Jammu95 with

91 “BJP Splits in J&K,” The Hindu, July 22, 2002. 92 The BJP paid double anti-incumbency price. The common voters of Jammu turned upset with local leadership and people saw to vote BJP is actually backing the NC-that was partner in New Delhi NDA coalition government, though NC was main political rival of BJP in the Jammu. It is believed that the orthodox and conservative Hindu constituency in Jammu felt down by the promises made by BJP to grant separate statehood for Jammu and hard approach towards Pakistan and Hurriyat. For further details, see Ramesh Vinayak , “Abdullah raj ends in Jammu and Kashmir spells opportunity for Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, PDP,” India Today, October 21, 2002. 93Statistical reports on the general elections 1996 and 2002 to the legislative assembly elections of J&K, (New Delhi: ECI, 1997 to 2003). 94 Kanchan Gupta, “Jammu's Hindu uprising,”Rediff.com, August 05, 2008. Retrieved at https://www.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/05gupta.htm; Paul Staniland, “Kashmir since 2003: Counterinsurgency and the Paradox of ‘Normalcy’,” Asian Survey, 53. 5 (2013), 931-957; Chris Ogden, “A Lasting Legacy: The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and India's Politics,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, 42, no. 1 (2012), 22-38. 95 Of the 11 Assembly seats that BJP won in Jammu, 10 were located in the “Hindu belt” of the region. Comprised of 21 assembly constituencies, this belt runs across the four predominantly Hindu districts of Jammu, Kathua, Samba and Udhampur. The party scored the highest vote share in this belt which 235

22 per cent of votes polled96 (Table 5.2). Though, it is also right that it was not the BJP that won maximum seats and voting share from Jammu but the rival Congress that emerged as the largest Party in the Jammu and won thirteen Assembly seats with 23 per cent of votes. While as the State regional Party NC was not able to win double digits and it secured only 6 seats with exceptionally sound poling per cent of 19.3197 (Tables 5.2 & 5.4).

At the same time PDP also managed to make entry in Jammu province and the Party won two seats with 6.59 per cent of votes, while as, Panthers Party won two seats with 5.78 per cent98 (Table 5.4). Thus it was for the second time after 2002 when state witnessed healthy electoral competition among different political parties that was till 2002 mostly subjugated by ‘One Party Dominance’ of NC. Commenting on the electoral politics of the state Rekha Chowdhary said:

The 2008 elections largely reflected the electoral tradition of the state where the Congress or the NC (or both together) acted as the bridge across regional and communal divides. Significantly, these two parties together dominated the electoral scene of the region with 22 and 24 seats and 45% and 49% of vote share during 1996 and 2002 elections, respectively. Similarly in 2008 too, the NC and Congress together held 19 seats and 41% of the vote share in Jammu.99

Similarly, the General elections of 2014 in India are as important to the state of J&K as any other previous elections. There is a famous saying that, ‘Delhi Kih Sarkar Uttar Pradesh see Ban Kar Aatey Hai’.100 Same is said of state of J&K. There is a larger perception in Kashmir that, government in the state comes from New Delhi and people have least say in government formation. Though, the phrase about UP is acceptable democratically but in the case of Kashmir it is all altogether different. Almost in last seventy years of electoral and contested political history of the state, it was around 27% of the total votes cast in these districts. Of the 11 constituencies that it registered its victory, three were reserved constituencies. Chowdhary, “BJP's Unprecedented Victory in Jammu,” EPW, vol. l, no 19, (2015); Chowdhary, “The second uprising," EPW, (2010), 10-13. 96 Statistical report on general elections 2008 to the Legislative Assembly of J&K (New Delhi: ECI, 2009). 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Chowdhary, “BJP's Unprecedented Victory in Jammu,” (2015). 100 This phrase is attributed to state of Utter Pradesh, because the state had 80 Parliamentary seats. The party which won good number of seats from UP is seen as main player that form the government in New Delhi, latest example is BJP. The party won 71 seats out of 80 Lok Sabha seats. 236 was Central government in Delhi that decided and still decides the political discourse of the J&K—both internal as well as external dimensions.101 Coming to the 2014 polls, the nationwide ‘anti-Congress wave’ and ‘Modi+BJP’ had grave ramifications on J&K. While the General elections of 2014 marked the decline of Congress and UPA alliance in India on the other hand it boosted saffron Party back to power in Delhi after 10 years in opposition.102 The return of BJP as a strong and dominant political forces had far reaching consequences in India in general and J&K in particular. The Party dominated the national spectrum of power politics since it came to power in 2014. After its victory in Parliamentary elections with huge mandate, BJP didn’t look back and kept on winning one after the other state Assembly elections. BJP is now in power at least 18 states, either directly or in coalition with regional parties.103 In such political milieu J&K was no more an exception for BJP. In Parliamentary elections of 2014, the Party first defeated Congress and NC and won three Lok Sabha seats—two from Jammu and one from Ladakh (Table 5.7). Later the BJP announced its ‘Mission 44’104 for State Assembly elections. The Party top leaders including Prime Minister Narender Modi kick started robust election campaigning in J&K to boost the morale of BJP workers and state unit across the state. On the other hand, the deteriorated political conditions from 2008 to 2014 under Congress-NC coalition gave birth to new problems which further tarnished the image of NC and Congress. This created feasible political conditions that helped BJP to flourish in Jammu region. The Party could not make any inroads in Kashmir though it succeeded in contesting as many as 30 out of 46 seats from the valley. At the same time, the

101 Author’s interview with cross sections of society in Kashmir during field survey March and April 2018. 102 For more detailed analysis about the rise of BJP in India and Modi, John Harriss, “Hindu Nationalism in Action: The Bharatiya Janata Party and Indian Politics,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies, 38, no. 4 (2015), 712-718; see also Suhas Palshikar, “The BJP and Hindu nationalism: Centrist politics and majoritarian impulses,” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2015): 719-735. 103 Milan Vaishnav, Jayaram Ravi and Jamie Hintson, “What’s fuelling BJP’s dominance in Indian politics?,” Hindustan Times, Oct 08, 2018. 104 BJP rain hard election campaign and declared ‘Mission 44+’ in Jammu and Kashmir that was what the party need to form the government in the state out of 87 seats. The main election campaigning rallies were addressed by PM Narendra Modi and other top rank BJP leaders. The mission was clear— to defeat the Congress and other regional parties and form the government in J&K. Though, BJP did not succeed in ‘Mission 44+’, but the party bagged 25 seats and formed coalition with PDP. Aijaz Ashraf Wani, “Regional Divide on Communal Lines: Lok Sabha Election 2014 in Jammu and Kashmir,” in Electoral Politics in Indian States: 2014 Elections and Beyond, ed. Ashutosh Kumar and Yatinder Singh Sisodia (Orient Blackswan, India, 2018). 237

Party contested all 41 remaining seats of Jammu and Ladakh.105 The BJP mobilized the voters in Jammu for many issues from Autonomy to Separatism. However, one important political stunt was that the Party called for the end of the ‘Khandaani Raj and Kashmiri Raj’ (Dynasty and Kashmiri Rule) over the state of J&K i.e Kashmir region in general and Jammu region in particular.106 In fact the Party invoked the concept of the ‘Dogra Raj and Dogra Pride’107 as a counter narrative to the NC, PDP and Congress in Jammu. This was reflected in many of the election rallies that were organized by BJP from time to time. Even the Party leaders publically announced themselves as ‘Dogra decedents’ and called for restoration of this lost identity which they believed received setback due to regional parties like NC and PDP.108 However, once election results were declared, BJP formed coalition government with PDP to cherish its long dream of governing the Muslim majority state of J&K.

The coalition government (PDP-BJP) headed by Sayeed after signing what these parties called ‘Agenda of Alliance’, crumbled before Centre from the first day. The issues concerned to the state became hardly a matter of seriousness for BJP. Instead, the Party (BJP) started to talk on the controversial issues from the day—it captured power for the first time in 70 years. The death of Mufti Sayeed in 2015 caused leadership crisis both in the PDP and the BJP yet coalition continued between the two after deep deliberations. However, the remote control of the coalition (which most of the political analysts believe was in New-Delhi) and managing the alliance (PDP-BJP) created frictions not only in government but state wide.109 The ‘high command syndrome’ of BJP-PDP which decided coalition matters at state level was never on same pages. There was absolute powerlessness of Chief Minister to take decisions with respect to the problems and troubles related especially to law and order, civilian killings by security forces, transfers of higher officials, share of funds, talks with Hurriyat, release of political prisoners, and most importantly about article 370 and article 35A which was/is the bone of contention between the coalition

105 Statistical report on general elections 2014 to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: ECI, 2014). 106 “Vote for BJP, end dynasty rule in Jammu and Kashmir: Modi,” India Today, November 22, 2014. 107 Zahid Rafiq, “Dogra was a visionary: Modi,” The Hindu, July 18, 2015. 108 Authors interview with cross sections of society both in Jammu and Kashmir during field survey April 2017. 109 For detailed analysis of the BJP-PDP coalition government in J&K, Anuradha Bhasin Jamwal, “Multiple of the BJP-PDP Alliance,” EPW, vol. 50, issue no. 11, March 14, 2015; Mudasir Amin, “Three years of PDP-BJP: Co-operation, Collaboration, Conflict,” EPW, Vol. 53, issue no. 10, March 10, 2018. 238 partners.110 Terming the PDP-BJP alliance as biggest enemy of Kashmiris, All Parties Hurriyat Conference Chairman Syed Ali Shah Geelani said:

Unfortunately the narrow-minded leaders of one pro-India party (NC) established relations with the Indian National Congress in 1947 and made the entire nation slave of Indian imperialism and now another pro-India party (PDP) is establishing its relations with fanatic communal forces who want to eliminate Kashmiris from this region…111

The serious political crisis over the issues that confronted the state became constantly subjects of irritants between the coalition partners. It finally ended with backlash to the PDP when BJP finally withdrew from coalition/alliance in June 2018 that was headed by Mehbooba Mufti.112 The reason was obvious, the killing of Burhan Muzaffar Wani in 2016 (Commander Hizbul Mujahedeen) led to the serious political disturbances in the valley. The five months long public uprising had its adverse effect on mainstream politics. The ruling PDP as well as the opposition parties could not withstand their relation with people that resulted in no connection with party functionaries at ground/grassroots’ level. The absence of interaction between the people and political parties due to the anger and anti-India sentiments in the form of public protests and stone pelting gave complete blow to mainstream politics in the valley of Kashmir. This was possibly best reflected by the voting turnout (just 6.5 per cent) during the bi-parliamentary elections of Srinagar, 2017. In fact this was one of the worst polling recoded in last 30 years of electoral history of the state.113 Though, Farooq Abdullah won from Srinagar seat but elections to South Kashmir Parliamentary constituency was halted later by Election Commission of India due to the prevailing political anarchy. However, the Congress which supported

110 Author’s interview with cross sections of the society in Kashmir during field study dated March April 2017, March 2018. 111 “PDP-led govt biggest enemy of Kashmiris, says Geelani,” Greater Kashmir, May 31, 2016. 112 Mufti Sayeed was sworn as CM of the state in the year 2014 and BJP retained Deputy CM post. The sudden death of Sayeed led to the confrontation over the formation of government. It was finally after deep debate and deliberation that Mehbooba Mufti (daughter of Mufti Sayeed) was sworn as first female Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. However, the government didn’t survive for long to complete its full tenure of 6 years. The sudden announcement of BJP to withdraw support to coalition partner PDP in June 2018 finally gave death-knell to coalition government and state was handed over to governor to rule. Javid Ahmad Ahanger, “Of Democracy, elections and Mainstream Politics in Kashmir,” Mainstream Weekly, Vol. LVI, No. 33, August 4, 2018; Mudasir Amin and Samreen Mushtaq, “What Next for Kashmir? From Agenda of Alliance to Agenda of Split,” EPW, Vol. 53, Issue No. 26-27, 30 Jun, (2018). 113 “J&K: Eight killed during Srinagar bi-poll; only 6.5 per cent turnout recorded, worst in 30 years,” The Indian Express, April 9, 2017. 239

Farooq Abdullah termed his success as ‘rejection of communal forces’ while as Farooq claimed that, his victory is rejection of PDP. Nevertheless, the APHC applauded the people for showing resistance in form of poll boycott and said the poll boycott is clear referendum of people against the Indian state in J&K.114 In this way mainstream again lost its political legitimacy in the state due to what political leaders call ‘muscular policy’ of government of India towards Kashmir.

5.6 Other Players

The changing political climate of the J&K since 2002 has given birth to multiple mainstream political actors. It was due to both internal and external factors that gave rise to such ‘players and actors’ which played crucial role in mainstreaming and democratizing the state polity. Though, some small parties were there before 2002; like J&K Panthers Party, CPI (M), BSP, and many other independent candidates who were participating in election fray. However, since 2002 the ‘politics of competitiveness’ in state made their presence more than ever. These small parties and independent individual based groups could not generate much sympathy of people but due to their presence in electoral competition the polity become more competitive than past. Some important political actors were, J&K Panthers Party, Communist Party of India (M) headed by Mohammad Yousuf Targami, Awami Itihad, J&K People’s Conference, and many other independents who contested the State Assembly and Parliamentary elections from time to time. Their emergence and role needs to be analyzed separately.

5.6.1 Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party The Party was formed in the year 1982 by one of the fire brand leader of Jammu province, Professor Bhim Singh and many young socio-political activists of the time including Jay Mala. Bhim Singh was the member of Legislative Assembly from J&K

114The bi-parliamentary election from the Srinagar-Badgam Parliamentary constituency was held due to the resignation of PDP founding member and sitting member parliament Tariq Hamid Kara during the 2016 unrest. The elections witnessed violent state wide protests in which at least eight civilians were killed and hundreds other injured including security forces. Indian Express, April 9, 2017; the state’s chief electoral officer Shantanu in his brief press conference in Srinagar accepted this fact that conducting election in present political conditions was challenging task. However, NC patron Farooq Abdullah defeated his adversary Nazir Ahmad Khan of PDP by 10,766 votes. See, “Farooq Abdullah wins Srinagar byelections,” The Hindu, April 16, 2017; “Kashmir’s Shrinking Electoral Space,” EPW, Vol. 53, Issue No. 44, November 03, (2018). 240 representing INC. The Party came into existence due to the Bhim Singh’s difference with INC leaders on the controversial Resettlement bill. The purpose of forming new political party in the words of Professor Singh was, ‘demolish corruption, criminalization, and communalism to establish ‘real democracy’ in the country.’115 However, the Party couldn’t generate people’s loyalty in its earlier years in J&K. It contested as many as 50 seats in the State Assembly elections of 1983 but was able to win only single seat that too of the Party founder, Bhim Singh. He defeated his Congress rival and gained 34.37 per cent of votes.116 Soon after the Assembly elections were held, the Party contested 1984 Parliamentary elections but failed to enter into Lok Sabha despite Bhim Singh securing 26.24 per cent of votes. However, the presence of the Singh gave tough competition to hegemonic NC and Congress. The Party couldn’t succeed in 1987 State Assembly elections either, it contested 21 seats out of 76 but failed to enter into Assembly and reduced to just 6.85 per cent of votes.117 In this way, the Party failed to come up with the purpose of strong opposition within the Assembly. But the Party played crucial role as a pressure group outside the Assembly and mobilized people in Jammu. However, the Party President didn’t blame the voters and leaders; instead he accused the NC President and Congress of rigging the elections which led to the armed struggle in J&K.118 Similarly the Party contested the Lok Sabha elections of 1989 and 1991 but didn’t flourish and failed to enter into Parliament.119 However, things changed in the year 1996 with the onset of militancy leading to the total breakdown of the mainstream politics as discussed in the previous Chapters. While NC boycotted the General elections of 1996, it was Panthers Party that contested from five seats but didn’t win a single seat. The Party miserably failed and it clinched lowest vote percentage of 5.06.120 Nevertheless, it was only after 1996 that the Party unfolded its wings. The Party president Bhim Singh was the first mainstream leader who used his life long experience as a lawyer to mainstreamize the Kashmir politics in 1996, when mainstream politics was non-existent due to armed and public revolt against the Indian state. He moved the Supreme Court and election

115 Thakur, Alienation and Integration in Jammu and Kashmir, 151-154. 116 Statistical reports on general elections, 1983 to the legislative assembly of J&K. 117 Statistical reports on general elections, 1987 to the legislative assembly of J&K. 118 Prof. Bhim Singh, “J&K situation: the genesis and the resolution,” The Hindu, July 10, 2001. 119 Statistical reports on the General Elections of 1989 and 1991. 120 Statistical reports on general elections of 1996. 241 commission of India to fight for the ‘democratic processes’ in J&K.121 Though, the Party contested 46 seats out of 87 to the State Assembly elections of 1996 but couldn’t generate much sympathy of the people especially in Jammu region where the Party had its head office. The Party was polled 4.34 per cent across the state and Harsh Dev Singh was the lone member who won.122 In similar way the Party contested the General elections of 1998 and 1999 but failed to perform well. However, it did succeed in making presence in government formation in 2002, when the Party became part of larger coalition government of PDP-Congress headed by Mufti Mohammad Sayeed.123 It performed reasonably well and clinched all seats of Udhampur district when it contested 36 seats out of total 87 and won 4 seats with poll percentage of 7.24. But the Party didn’t succeed to win in Kashmir Valley124 (Table 5.1).

All the members of the Party took active participation in Assembly debates and forced the government to democratise the institutions. Most of the time, the Party talked the issues of Jammu region but at the same time it maintained its progressive character to keep the communal elements at bay. However, in the recent times the decreasing relevance of the Party due to the rise of Hindutva forces especially BJP in Jammu, the Party compromised with its secular ideology. It organized many protests in Jammu that were anti-Muslim and anti-Kashmir in general to mobilize its electoral base. It was due to the poor performance of Party which led it to compromise with its secular and progressive ideology. Due to the communal and regional divide in 2008 Amarnath Land Row Agitation, Bhim Singh announced to withdraw his support to PDP-Congress led coalition of which he was partner.125 Though the Party showed its presence in 2004, 2009 and 2014 general elections in J&K but the Party miserably failed to give any robust competition to its opposition parties (Tables 5.5, 5.6 & 5.7). However, the Party continued its struggles to strength electoral constituency and it received its electoral dividents in 2008 Assembly elections. The Party contested 73

121 Bhim Singh, The murder of democracy in Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publication, 2002), 27-30. 122 Statistical reports on general elections, 1996 to the legislative assembly of J&K. 123 In 2002 coalition government two of the Panthers’ party members were given ministerial berths. Harsh Dev Singh served state education minster while as Yash pal Kundal was served animal and sheep husbandry. Govind Shamra, “Panthers Fall flat,” Daily Excelsior, Jammu, December 24, 2014. 124 Statistical reports of state assembly election to J&K 2002. 125 Neeraj Santoshi, “Panthers Party withdraws support to J-K coalition,” The Indian Express, Jammu, June 17, 2007. 242 seats out of total 87 but couldn’t win more than 3.78 per cent of votes. In spite of the fact poling percentage was better than of previous elections. But the Party this time succeeded in winning three seats and entered into the Assembly (Table 5.2). However, the Party didn’t join coalition headed by Omer Abdullah; instead it preferred to remain in opposition along with PDP and BJP. It played instrumental role inside Assembly as an opposition entity to make government accountable and fight for the people’s issues. In curbing the government on the divergent issues confronted to the state, its leaders and Party workers organized state wide protests and strikes to pressurize the government.126 Not only this, elected members inside the Assembly disrupted proceedings and forced government to relook, reopen and revive number of official orders. The Party workers and leaders not only targeted the government at the state level but at the same time it criticized Modi led government at centre level. It blamed the Modi and BJP of destroying the secular character of the Indian society. Nevertheless, the Party received huge setback in 2014 Assembly elections due to the ‘Modi-Wave’ across the country. While contesting 60 out of 87 seats in 2014 Assembly elections, the Party couldn’t sustain its previous seats inside the Assembly. It ended up without any seat and was polled record low percentage of 2.67127 (Table 5.3). It was for the first time in the last eighteen years of the Party history, when not a single member was inside the Assembly in both the houses.128 However, the Party continued its presence outside the Assembly as a vibrant political opposition to criticize the BJP-PDP coalition government on diverse issues. In post Burhan Wani killing, the Party workers protested in Jammu and other places of India, and criticized the state and Central government of mishandling the Kashmir valley. It stood against the government decision of using excessive security forces especially the pellet guns in the valley in dealing with the public protestors.129 At the same time, Party leaders accused the BJP of selling and bartering the aspirations of Jammu masses for political power in J&K. However, the Party didn’t stop in criticizing the governments but it showed its communal color when the Party protested in Jammu for ‘immediate eviction’ of the Rohingya refugees. Like BJP and other communal parties, JKNPP termed these refugees ‘a ticking bomb.’ The Party displayed many anti Bangladeshi

126 “JKNPP holds rally, blocks National Highway,” Daily Excelsior, October 12, 2012. 127 Statistical Reports on the general election, 2014 to the legislative assembly of J&K. 128 Shamra, “Panthers Fall Flat,” Daily Excelsior, December 24, 2014. 129 “Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party protests against PDP-BJP government for ‘deteriorating’ situation in JK,” The New Indian Express, February 17, 2018. 243 and anti-Rohingya slogans like, “Rohingyas, Bangladeshis quit Jammu”, “Quit Jammu”, “Go Back”, “Wake up Jammu”, “Don’t save Rohingya” and “Bharat Mata ki Jai.”130 The Party leader Harsh Dev Singh addressed many rallies and public protests. Here he challenged other political forces, he said:

Panthers party is the lone crusader for Jammu cause and bound to restore the pristine glory of the Duggar land which has been dented by BJP for its vested party political interests during their ominous rule in the past three years.131

Being one of the potential political forces, it demanded immediate suspension/dissolution of state Assembly and called for fresh polls in J&K.132 However, due to the changing political contours of the state politics in post 2014 period and decreasing the relevance of the Party. It had used communal outlook to reclaim the lost political constituency in Jammu. That in fact is very much dangerous for the secular character of J&K, especially when the BJP and Co-ideological groups have emerged strong communal forces in Jammu.

5.6.2 Jammu and Kashmir Awami Ittehad Party Sheikh Abdul Rashid; a professional engineer turned most controversial politician in J&K. The life of Rashid is the struggle for justice that led his involvement in politics. Before joining politics, Rashid was arrested several times by states’ counter insurgency group (SOG) of J&K police on the charges of supporting the militants. Rashid alleged that he was arrested in fake militancy cases and was seriously, “interrogated, beaten, water-boarded and made to undergo electric shocks” by security forces. Even he alleged that; to release from the prison, he negotiated with the state police and paid handsome money of 1.5 Lakh by selling his personal property and other assets.133 In the words of Rashid, the unabridged incidents from the arbitrary arrests and later humiliation by security agencies have led to his participation in the political process. It was in recent past 2008 when Rashid as an independent candidate contested state assembly election from Langate Handwara constituency. The decision to contest election turned fortune for him and he won the Langate seat by defeating

130 “Front-Page Advertisements in Jammu’s Local Dailies Call for Deportation of Rohingya Refugees,” Outlook, March 5, 2018. 131 “NPP Lone crusader for Jammu cause: Harsh Dev,” Daily Excelsior, May 13, 2018. 132 “JKNPP urges immediate dissolution of J&K Assembly, holds protest,” Greater Kashmir, October 26, 2018. 133 “I am the most misunderstood MLA in India, Engineer Rashid,” The Hindu, October 22, 2014. 244 the tall leaders of NC and PDP.134 In this way Engineer had turned a new contested face of Kashmir polity in the last decade from 2008.

After elected to the State Assembly in 2008, Rashid formed his own state Party ‘Jammu and Kashmir Awami Ettihaad’ in 2013. Rashid believed that the Party will represent the will and aspirations of the people that have been demonized by two regional parties—PDP and NC. It came into existance with the promise of three Ps, ‘Progress, Prestige and Protection’ for the people of J&K. He blames the Kashmiri mainstream parties for the utter failure of ‘governance’ in Kashmir and accused that, “Present mainstream parties should represent Kashmir in New-Delhi but unfortunately they are representing New-Delhi in Kashmir.”135 However, the Party couldn’t make any serious inroads to State Assembly in 2014 elections. Rashid continued his wining mantra from Langate constituency where he defeated NC and PDP.136

However, diverse state actors see Rashid differently, like Rashid have himself admitted that:

Indian news channels had reduced him to a separatist masquerading as an MLA, while in Kashmir, the separatist leaders abhorred him for ‘embracing’ the Indian Constitution.’ he further adds that, ‘I think it’s fair to say I’m the most misunderstood MLA…people [Indian TV anchors] call me a traitor, a separatist for my view. But what I really talk about is realism.’137

The role he played since 2008 inside the State Legislative Assembly speaks volumes about his ideology and manifestos. Be it NC-Congress or PDP-BJP Coalition governments, he remained vocal in criticizing the policies and programmes. Many times he disrupts Assembly and even didn’t allow governor to address the house. In PDP-BJP Coalition, Rashid was thrashed by BJP members inside the Assembly, a day after he organized ‘beef party’.138

134 Rashid defeated NC’s Sharif Din Shariq and Mohammad Sultan Panditpuri of PDP by margin of 210 votes, Statistical reports on general elections, 2008 to the legislative assembly of J&K. 135 “MLA Rashid Launches new party,” Hindustan times, June 12, 2013. 136 Statistical report on General elections 2014 to the J&K legislative assembly. 137 Mehboob Jeelani, “I’m the most misunderstood MLA in India: Engineer Rashid,” The Hindu, October 22, 2015. 138 Yusuf Jameel, “Ruckus in J&K Assembly: BJP legislators thrash MLA who hosted beef party,” Deccan Chronicle, October 8, 2015. 245

Rashid has unique methods of protesting, on one hand he writes articles and opinions op-eds in Srinagar daily newspaper Greater Kashmir and other national dallies. Where he articulates his viewpoints and contests the state and New Delhi narratives by his writings. At the same time, Rashid uses his social media applications such as Facebook, Twitter and other networking sites to reach out to the maximum number of people and address them. There is hardly any issue both internal as well as external which Rashid doesn’t talk of. He is one of the serious voices in Kashmir who protest on diverse issues. Be it the beef ban in India, attacks on minorities, arrests of activists in India or any other issue of national importance, he organized rallies and protests. On the other hand, Rashid had given tough fight to state governments and security establishment from time to time. Rashid is known for his protests across the state, be it the issue of governance, corruption, nepotism, civilians killings, article 370, article 35A, human rights violation by security forces, VVIP culture, or the larger issue of Kashmir dispute and its possible solutions. Despite in the mainstream politics Rashid hold the view that whole J&K including the parts that are administrated by Pakistan and China is a ‘disputed territory’ that needs political solution to end the bloodshed. Nevertheless, it is harsh to distinguish between the politics of Hurriyat Conference and Engineer Rashid, when both seek the resolution of Kashmir issue according to the United Nation resolutions.

5.6.3 Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference The Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference (J&KPC) was formed by Abdul Gani Lone. However, Lone was killed by unidentified gun men on 21 May 2002 in Srinagar. He being the founding member of APHC believed in ideology of ‘Poll Boycott’ against the principle of ‘electoral participation’ in the state. However, it is alleged that in 2002 State Assembly elections it was not only the PDP that challenged the NC—the People’s Conference, of late Abdul Gani Lone is believed to drive proxy candidates into election fray. The proxies gave tough competition to NC, because north Kashmir’s frontier district Kupwara was/is still base belt of People’s Conference. It is alleged that at least 5 proxy candidates of PC were succeeded in making entry to State Assembly. The drive of proxies by PC in the elections led to war of words in separatist camp under banner of APHC. In fact this was one of the reasons that Syed Ali Shah Geelani parted away from Hurriyat Conference and 246 formed his separate faction Tareek-i-Hurriyat in 2003.139 While as PC was led by sons of late Lone—Bilal Gani lone and Sajad Gani Lone. Both remained associated with APHC led by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq. However, Syed Ali Geelani’s prediction proved true when the PC President Sajad Gani Lone participated in 2009 Parliamentary elections as Independent candidate from Baramulla.140 Though, Sajad was defeated by Sharifuddin Shariq of NC, but the participation of Sajad Lone in the elections was hailed by New Delhi and Indian media as death of ‘separatist movement’ in Kashmir.141 The entry of PC in local electoral politics had far-reaching effect on Kashmir politics. The main impact of Sajjad’s entry to the mainstream politics was his decision to contest State Assembly elections of 2014. Sajjad’s PC won two Assembly seats from north Kashmir—Handwara and Kupwara (Table 5.3). Thus, the separatist turned mainstreamized Sajad became most controversial political character in the state by supporting the right wing political party of India—BJP. The story of Sajad didn’t stop here; he joined PDP-BJP Coalition government in 2014 and was given ministerial berth. There is now common notion that he is very close associate of BJP in Kashmir.142 Even it is widely believed that Sajjad’s PC has the power to emerge the third-front—that can mainstreamize Kashmir for next decade or so.143 How for such observation will come true only time will decide. But one thing is certain neither New Delhi nor state regional parties can sideline Sajad’s presence due to his crucial role of mainstreamsizing the fragile polity of Kashmir. That too at a stage when militancy and public anger is at all the time high and mainstream have yet again lost its political relevance in J&K.

5.6.4 Communist Party of India: Role in State Politics

The history of Communist ideology in J&K goes back to the pre-partition phase. Leaders like G.M. Sadiq, Sheikh Abdullah and many others who fought against the Dogra rule were greatly influenced by communist ideology. However, in post accession period the influence of Communists remain low and the ideology couldn’t generate much sympathy among the common masses. Though, both the factions of the

139 Praveen Swami, “The battle within,” Frontline, vol. 20, issue 15, (2003). 140 Shujaat Bukhari, “Sajjad’s switchover,” The Hindu, April 29, 2009. 141 Sankarshan Thakur, “Off boycott coldstore, on steep uphill,” The Telegraph, May 11, 2009. 142 “Sajjad lone—from being a separatist to a minister,” The Indian Express, March 1, 2015. 143 Authors interview with cross sections of the society during field survey April 2017 and May 2018. 247

Communist Party of India (CPI) and Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPIM) contested the State and Parliamentary elections in J&K but couldn’t succeed.144

However, things abruptly changed after the eruption of armed struggle in Kashmir. The CPI (M) as a National Party continued its struggle to win the electoral constituency in J&K. Mohammad Yousuf Targami of CPI (M) emerged one of the strong voices in post 1990’s period. It was due the able leadership of Targami that the Party triumphs from Kulgam Assembly segment in 1996 Assembly elections by defeating NC’s candidate Ghulam Nabi Dar.145 In 2002 elections, the Party arose one of the potential political force in J&K by contesting seven Assembly seats and fortunately it won two seats from South Kashmir with 17.15 percent of votes (Table 5.1). Though, the Party widened its basic membership all over the state since 2002 but it failed to repeat its performance in 2008 State Assembly elections. The Party contested 8 seats out of 87 but its voting share comedown to 08.41 per cent in 2008 from 17.15 per cent in 2002. Mohammad Yousuf Targami was the only member who succeeded to enter into Assembly from Kulgam constituency (Table 5.2). In a similar squat performance in 2014 Assembly election, the Party contested only 03 seats and registered victory from Kulgam (represented by Targami) constituency. However, the Party increased its voting share from 08.41 in 2008 to 13.57 per cent in 2014 (Table 5.3). In this way Mohammad Yousuf Targami was the only communist candidate who won the State Assembly elections four times in a row from 1996 to 2014.146 But, the Party has very frail performance in Lok Sabha elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 in J&K.147 It couldn’t register a single victory in its entire electoral history from the state (Tables: 5.5, 5.6 & 5.7).

However, since 2002 coalition governments in the state, the CMI (M) have played significant role as a responsible opposition party in democratizing the state polity. The party remained very vocal in criticizing the policies and programmes of the coalition governments. The Party under the leadership of Targami protested both

144 For more details about the presence of Communist Parties in electoral politics of J&K see the previous chapters and tables of, statistical reports of state and parliamentary elections from 1967 to 1999. 145 Statistical reports to the general state assembly elections of 1996 in J&K. 146 Statistical report on General elections, to the Legislative Assembly elections of the state of J&K from 1996 to 2014 (New Delhi: ECI, 1996, 2002, 2008 and 2014 respectively). 147 Statistical report on General elections, 2004 to the 14th Lok Sabha, 2009 to the 15th Lok Sabha and 2014 to the 16th Lok Sabha (New Delhi: ECI, 2004, 2009 and 2014 respectively). 248 within the state assembly as well as outside over the issues concerned to the people directly or indirectly. Communist parties, CPI and CPI (M) both has similar approach towards Kashmir and criticize the Delhi government and state governments in J&K for not evolving prudent policies for solving the vexed Kashmir issue. The Party believes that due to the wrong policies by successive governments in Srinagar and Delhi have amplified the Kashmir problem. CPI is the ardent critique of the Congress and BJP policy towards Kashmir. The Party sees the solution of Kashmir conflict in giving Autonomy to the state. The Party expresses:

Our party holds the view that for this, it is necessary to give maximum autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir, as well as regional autonomy to Jammu and Ladakh with this framework. For this, the center should open a meaningful dialogue with Kashmiri leaders including the Hurriyat and others.148

In a similar kind of ideology, the Party in its election manifesto in 2014 called for larger debate vis-a-vis Kashmir conflict. The Party maintained that of all the uncertainty in J&K is the outcome of ‘Political Uncertainty’ of decades old. Strongly denouncing the security solution to this vexed issue, the Party believed that both India and Pakistan need to come on table along with the people of Kashmir to find ‘acceptable solution’. The Party further added that the “Dismembering the constitutional and administrative institutions beyond repair has played a considerable role in deteriorating the situation” in Kashmir and the Draconian laws like Armed Force Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and Public Safety Act (PSA) must be revoked for the greater good of the state and people. The Party maintained its stance that unless and until holistic measures in politics, good governance, economic development, social mobility and end of communal atmosphere will not be taken seriously; nothing substantial will change on the ground situation in J&K.149 Over the formation of coalition government between PDP-BJP, the Party termed it as ‘huge disappointment’. In an interview with Frontline, Targami termed the PDP-BJP alliance as ‘unprincipled alliance’, ‘unnatural alliance’, and ‘huge disappointment’?

148 Communist Party of India, Resolution adopted at the 18th National Congress held at Thiruvanthapuram March 26-31-2002 (New Delhi: CPI Publications, 2002), 63. 149 “Communist Party of India (Marxist) Manifestos to Jammu and Kashmir,” retrieved from http://massstruggle.com/manifesto/ 249

He criticized PDP of selling out the mandate by joining hands with BJP.150 However, the Party demanded free and fair investigation of all the killings by state security forces during the public uprisings in Kashmir.

Thus from the above discussion we can say that mainstream political actors since 2002 have played significant role in democratizing the state institutions by representing the diverse political opinions both within and outside the state Assembly. But at the same time the emergence of multiple actors have reduced the power of regional actors (parties) to bargain from the Delhi over the most crucial issue of ‘Autonomy’ and ‘Self-Rule’. Even the political position of mainstream regional parties in the power matrix of the state from the last one and a half decade have reduced the power to talk on issues of human rights violation, removal of AFSPA, talks with Pakistan and Hurriyat and above all the release of political prisoners. The national parties (both Congress and BJP) have increased their say in political discourse of J&K that has far-reaching political consequences on J&K.

150 For full interview, T.K. Rajalakshmi, “Listen to the people’ Mohammad Yousuf Targami,” Frontline, August 19, 2016; retrieved from https://www.frontline.in/cover-story/listen-to-the- people/article8932978.ece 250

Table 5.1 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2002 Political No. of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Party Contested out of 87 Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 85 28 28.24% INC 78 20 26.17% BJP 58 01 7.86% JKPDP 59 16 14.64 % CPIM 07 02 17.15% DM 01 01 25.26% JKAL 09 01 10.91% BSP 33 01 7.86% J&KNPP 36 04 7.24% Independents/others 244 13 16.50%

Source: Statistical report on General elections 2002, to the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly, Volume I, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2002. Note: In 2002 state assembly elections, twenty national and state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties contested the election. It was for the first time since armed struggle erupted in Kashmir that 709 contestants were in electoral fray. Among them, 244 independent entrants also filled their nominations; that gave birth to competitive politics in the state. The election witnessed 43.70 per cent of polls.

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Table 5.2 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2008

Political Party No. of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage in Contested out of 87 Won Party seats Contested J&KNC 85 28 23.41% INC 78 17 19.93% BJP 64 11 15.227% JKPDP 78 21 17.51 % CPIM 08 01 08.41% JKDPN 30 01 4.91% PDF 19 01 06.24% J&KNPP 73 03 3.78% Independents/others 481 04 16.44% Source: Statistical report on General elections 2008, to the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly, Volume I, II, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2008. Note: In 2008 state assembly elections, 43 national & state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties and 481 independent candidates contested the election. The election saw a rare high polling record of 61.16 per cent and 1354 total number of contestants, despite the 2008 Amarnath Land Row Agitation. In this way the competitive politics that got momentum since 2002 emerged more robust and vibrant in 2008.

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Table 5.3

Electoral Performance of Political Parties to State Legislative Assembly of J&K Elections of 2014

Political No. of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage in Party Contested out of 87 Won Party seats Contested J&KNC 85 15 21.14% INC 86 12 18.36% BJP 75 25 26.235% JKPDP 84 28 23.85% CPIM 03 01 13.57% JKDPN 03 00 17.51% JKPDF 03 01 20.69% J&KNPP 60 00 2.67% BSP 50 00 07.42% JKPC 26 02 07.75% Independents/oth 274 03 07.75% ers Source: Statistical report on General elections 2014 to the Jammu and Kashmir legislative assembly, Volume I, II, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2014.

Note: In 2014 state assembly elections, 33 national & state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties and 274 independent candidates contested the election. Despite the 2009 and 2010 public uprising, the election saw record high polling of 65.52 per cent with 831 total numbers of contestants. In this way the competitive politics became permanent feature of state polity.

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Table 5.4

Region wise share of seats of Political Parties to State Assembly Elections of J&K from 2002 to 2014

Year of Name of Total Seats Seats Seats Election Political Strength secured in secured in secured in Party of Kashmir Jammu out Ladakh Assembly out of (46) of (37) out of (04)

NC 18 09 01 2002 PDP 16 00 00 INC 05 15 00 BJP 87 00 01 00 JKNPP 00 04 00 NC 20 06 02

PDP 19 02 00

2008 INC 03 13 01 87 BJP 00 11 00

JKNPP 00 03 00 NC 12 03 00 2014 PDP 25 03 00 INC 87 04 04 03 BJP 00 25 00 JKNPP 00 00 00 Source: The website of the Election Commission of India (www.eci.nic.in)

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Table 5.5 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 14th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2004 in J&K Political Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage in Party Contested For 6 Seats Won Party seats Contested J&KNC 06 02 22.02% INC 03 02 27.83% JKPDP 03 01 11.94% J&KNPP 04 00 03.02% BJP 06 00 23.04% BSP 03 00 02.22% Independents/others 37 01 07.38% Source: Statistical report on General elections, 2004 to the 14th Lok Sabha, Volume I, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2004. Note: The 2004, 14th Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir, 56 national & state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties and 37 independent candidates were in the fray for six seats. PDP and Congress contested this election as coalition partners by sharing the three seats each. There were 83 total contestants in the fray and due to the political stability due to the PDP-Coalition government 35.20 pooling was recorded. In this way the competitive politics which was instinctive in 2002 assembly elections remained feature of 2004 parliamentary polls also. Each party was in a fray to contend the other parties in all six seats.

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Table 5.6 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 15th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2009 in J&K Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage in Contested For 6 Seats Won Party seats Contested J&KNC 03 03 19.11% INC 03 02 24.67% JKPDP 06 00 20.05% J&KNPP 02 00 02.81% BJP 06 00 18.61% BSP 05 00 03.10% Independents/others 28 01 06.2 %

Source: Statistical report on General elections, 2009 to the 15th Lok Sabha, Volume I, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2009. Note: The 2009, 15th Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir, 53 national & state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties and 28 independent candidates were in open fray for six Lok Sabha seats. NC-Congress contested this election as alliance partners by sharing the three seats each. There were 81 total contestants in the electoral fray. Though, due to the political instability of 2008 and 2009, it was expected that percentage of votes will go down. But it went reverse; elections witnessed 39.66 polling percentage. Both national & state parties, along with Independents were in a fray to contend one another in all six seats that gave birth to politics of competitiveness.

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Table 5.7 Electoral Performance of Political Parties to 16th Lok Sabha General Elections of 2014 in J&K Political Party Number of Candidates Seats Voting Percentage Contested For 6 Seats Won in Party seats Contested J&KNC 03 00 11.22% INC 03 00 23.07% JKPDP 05 03 20.72% J&KNPP 05 00 01.23% BJP 06 03 32.65% Independents/others 32 00 06.2 2% Source: Statistical report on General elections, 2014 to the 16th Lok Sabha, Volume I, Election Commission of India, New-Delhi, 2014. Note: The 2014, 16th Lok Sabha elections in Jammu and Kashmir, 45 national & state recognized, registered (unrecognized) parties and 32 independent candidates were in open fray for six Lok Sabha seats. NC-Congress contested this election as alliance partners by sharing the three seats each. There were 77 total contestants in the electoral fray. The election witnessed record 49.72 polls percentage. Both national & state parties, along with Independents were in a fray to contend one another in all six seats that gave birth to politics of competitiveness. However, BJP and PDP dominated the political scene.

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Table 5.8 Content Analysis of Election Manifestos of NC and PDP from 2002 to 2014 Election National Conference (NC) People’s Democratic Party (PDP) Manifest os for the years Types of Issues Types of Issues Conflict subjects of Governance Conflict subjects of Governance NC and PDP and Developmental Developmental issues of NC issues of PDP Restoration of To tackle the Unconditional Corruption free autonomy (pre-1953 growing dialogue with and clean 2002, position) with readiness unemployment separatists administration. for alternative solutions. in the state. (APHC+JKLF+Paki Governance 2008 Talks with all Strengthening stan) & armed reforms to attain And stakeholders including vigilance groups (United good separatist (APHC- commission. Jihad Council). governance. To 2014 JKLF) and extremists Tackle growing Peace, prosperity of tackle the groups like (United corruption at all people with honour. growing

Jihad Council) for levels. Healing touch to the unemployment democratic solution of Strengthening victims of violence. through conflict. the governance Reigning in security enterprise and Repeal of AFSPA, mechanism at forces. other DAA. all levels. alternatives. Repeal of POTA, New face to counter Rehabilitation of Improve the AFSPA and release insurgency operation flood affected delivery of of all political groups (SOG). people. public utilities prisoners. Self-Rule Truth and reconciliation like food, as a guiding To increase the commission for water, framework for health facilities. addressing the electricity and conflict resolution To reduce the grievances of the reframing the of Kashmir. Respect power shortage. people. 258

Welfare centres for agreements for of article 370 and To build tourism orphans of insurgency. their enhanced regional identity. sector in state. To give humane face to share to the Free regional trade, New schemes security apparatus in the state. common market. for people state. Strengthening Make borders associated with Restoration of SHRC. the right to irrelevant, closer horticulture & Sub-regional autonomy. information ties across the line agriculture. Openness of cross-LOC (RTI) in the of control. trade & travel. state. To regulate the Review cases

traffic system against youth &

and replace old withdraw them after tariff into new scrutiny. Make tariff system. passport facilities

easier for families and youth that face difficulties. Review the use of inhuman methods to deal with the protests. Source: The election manifestos of NC and PDP for the year 2002, 2008 and 2014 and NC’s vision document of 2008 and PDP’s Self Rule Document of 2008.

Conclusion

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CONCLUSION

Historically, the Muslim Majority State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been the abode of diverse religions, cultures, identities and sects. Till 1947, it were Dogras who ruled J&K, but the political struggle that was led by the National Conference (NC) and Muslim Conference (MC) gave birth to a divided public opinion owing to their ideological clash with the Indian National Congress (INC) and Muslim League (ML). However, one must not forget that it was only in 1940s that the political process picked up momentum in J&K that was previously dormant or non-existent. Though Maharaja Hari Singh carried out some Constitutional reforms by forming Praja Sabha (State Assembly), however, the right to vote rested with mere 5 per cent of the population. Thus, during the Dogra period, civil rights such as right to vote, free speech, freedom and protest, or freedom to form political opposition were denied to the people. With regard to the emergence of Party System one can safely divide public opinion in J&K in the three categories: first, there were those who supported the Hindu Dogra rule of Maharaja Hari Singh; second, the Muslim Conference which claimed to represent the Muslims in Jammu region and the Kashmir valley and third was National Conference, the creation of Sheikh Abdullah, which originally until 1939 had been called Muslim Conference, and in opposition to which the Muslim Conference eventually revived itself and opposed Abdullah’s secularization project (though contested by Muslim Conference leadership). These oppositional factions in J&K played a key role in shaping the politics from 1930 to 1950 when the British left Indian Sub-Continent after dividing it into two countries—India and Pakistan.

Nevertheless, the post-1947 saw ‘Single Party System’ and no dissent was allowed to flourish. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, however, displayed autocracy and highhandedness. As a result of which the ‘Democratic Institutions’ became the first casualty in J&K. The eras of Sheikh Abdullah, Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad, Shamsuddin and later Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq and Mir Qasim were phases of exceptional politics in the post-1948 political history of the state. The period from 1948 to 1975 was by no means normal, but it had its effect on the working of the Party System in J&K. While Pradesh Congress gained its strength from 1964, the NC was not in a position to consolidate itself due to many political reasons, chief among which were Sheikh’s prolonged incarceration and lack of patronage in New Delhi. 260

This obviously had resulted in fragile opposition which in the long run caused democratic deficit – because there was hardly any ‘democratic institutionalization’ in the post-accession period.

The electoral politics in J&K in the 20th Century was propelled by a ‘One- Party Dominant system through manipulation and rigging of elections, and New Delhi’s interference in the local politics to safeguard what they called as ‘national interests’. In this way, democracy that flourished in other parts of the India after the horrible partition days and India’s independence could not take-off in Kashmir. The hostility of NC and its leaders towards the development of alternative political opposition force created a sense of authoritarianism of ruling elite in J&K. It prevented the flourishing of democratic norms and values in the state. The authoritative and centralized polity shaped and maintained what political commentator(s) like Balraj Puri et al call ‘Single Party Dominance’ in J&K. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad himself didn’t allow least dissent of opposition during his one decade rule, but had always used such methods to cut down and liquidate the dissent of opposition by coercion, treachery, intimidation and political corruption to keep in power. Though, political opposition (albeit weak) emerged only after the 1950s when a number of new political forces (actors/parties) began their political journey. Few important political forces which emerged both within the State Assembly and outside were: Praja Parishad (Jammu based party), Plebiscite Front (Separatist political entity), Praja Socialist Party/Socialist Democratic Front, Democratic National Conference (led by G.M. Sadiq), Bakshi’s National Conference (A group of 20 members around him), Awami Action Committee (religious com political force emerged after holy relic theft), Kashmir Political Conference (small pro-Pakistan group under Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra) and Jamaat-I-Islami (socio-religious political organization). Though, less in scope, these political opposition groups played a significant role in the political atmosphere of J&K from 1947-1975.

However, after the Indra-Sheikh Accord of 1975, NC returned to power and the Party once again remained ‘the preponderant political force in the state’ till the death of Sheikh Abdullah in 1982.The politics in J&K from 1975 to 1977 was characterized by major rifts between National Conference and Congress. The leadership in Delhi was more concerned to control the state by any means (including authoritarian) rather than to promote democratization and people’s participation. Indra 261

Gandhi wished to retain direct control of J&K so she advised local Pradesh Congress leaders (Mufti Mohammad Sayeed and Mir Qasim) and workers to keep Congress alive. Thus the years from 1975 to 1977 ensured status quo in the state politics. After the death of Sheikh Abdullah there emerged a good section of politicians who were interested in assuming power. In fact, there was no concept of ‘intra-party democracy’ in NC during the time of Sheikh Abdullah and it continued after his death that created many rifts between the Party members. It finally ended up with division of NC into two groups—NC led by Farooq and Awami National Conference led by Ghulam Mohammad Shah. The internecine skirmishes among the two contending factions of NC continued and finally resulted in a vertical split within the NC. Though, majority choose Farooq Abdullah and remaining meager section with Ghulam Mohammad Shah. Whereas, the death of Sheikh Abdullah ended up ‘personality cult’ in Kashmir politics, on the one hand, and created instable and feeble political formations, on the other.

The emergence of armed struggle in the late 1980s against the Indian state reduced the participation of people in the electoral arena up until 2002. Prior to 2002, opposition parties in J&K were divided and weak and had not posed any serious threat to ruling establishment of NC. Within the NC Sheikh Abdullah pulled all the strings in the Party to establish his personal and family control over NC. However, baffled with small opposition, his son could not sustain the ‘Single Party Dominance’ status of the Party after father’s death. A close-look at the formation of various goverments since the state acceded (read conditional accession) with India shows that the state remained in a political turmoil. Though, ‘relative peace’ remained there till 1987 but due to the what Indian academicians and state regional parties (both mainstream and separatists) call ‘rigged elections of 1987’, ‘New Delhi’s malignant policies to destabilize the Democratic Institutions’ and ‘sabotage the chances of resolution of Kashmir dispute’ resulted in the rise of a violent armed struggle, which till this day couldn’t stop. Instead, the last decade has showed both revival of armed struggle and public uprising in Kashmir. After 1984, coalitions/alliance (New Delhi represented by Congress) kept on what reginal mainstream parties call ‘deceitful strategies’ on political spectrum of J&K except the interval period from 1990 to 1996 when Presidential rule was imposed. It is true that the growth of pro-Pakistan elements got momentum only after 1980’s. Though, such elements were present in past also as we 262 have discussed in Chapter second and third, but in post 1980 era they were now open secret that challenged Indian state and Policies in Kashmir.

It is true that the political process was started in the year 1996 in the form of elections and ‘democratic elected government’ but that did not yield any result to restore the people’s faith in ‘Indian State or Democracy.’ The miseries of the people continued to increase despite Farooq was elected as Chief Minister. However, one thing positive happened, the direct six years long rule of Centre was now replaced by civil rule. But opponents believe that Farooq was merely an administrator—elected by New Delhi to save ‘black face of Indian State and Democracy’ in Kashmir. Though, people expected that the new government that was formed would end the long pause and will kick-start the political process to resolve both issues pertaining to the people and the Kashmir conflict itself. However, due to the inadequacies of NC at political and ideological front, the Party lost its dominant character of regional party. Thus, during Farooq Abdullah’s tenure the Party considerably lost much of its political constituency due to poor decisions and by toeing the line of New Delhi in Kashmir. Later, NC joined the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government at Centre and Omer Abdullah was made a junior minister (minister for state external affairs). The decision of joining the NDA eroded the very appeal of the NC in Kashmir. The political initiatives that were kick-started to restore the people’s faith in dialogue process become irrelevant. The NDA government under Vajpayee rejected the proposal of greater Autonomy proposal on 4th July 2000, which was passed by NC government to restore the 1953 political position of J&K. It was in such a political atmosphere that the coalition of NC with NDA at Centre created a vacuum where new regional actors attempted to fill. This space that was engendered by NC was now immediately filled by new regional force under the leadership of Mufti Mohammad Sayeed by forming his separate Party under the pen name of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP).

The birth of PDP was seen as an important political development vis-i-vis electoral politics of J&K. The new Party (PDP) filled the space of the separatists as it envisioned alternative to both NC and APHC. The Party successfully adopted all those issues pertaining to the common people in its election manifestos. The most important was the soft approaches towards APHC and militant groups to start an unconditional dialogue (though contested by secessionist parties in Kashmir). To 263 restore faith in ‘Indian Democracy’, the Party promised to provide good governance and corruption-free administration that was too high during NC regimes. The Party also believed that there was a need to disband the Special Operation Force (a separate wing of J&K police commonly known as SOG or Task Force that was allegedly involved in many civilian killings). Party also stood for new rehabilitation policy for surrendered militants. Most important Party manifesto was the policy of ‘healing touch’ to the families affected by militancy. Here was NC that took tough stand on issues pertaining to the state politically. NC had already earned bad name after the death of Sheikh Abdullah and in post 1990s it was no longer considered a regional Party to safeguard the interests of people. Instead, people, especially the APHC, saw NC as extended version of the INC that worked against the wishes of people of the state. It was in such political atmosphere that PDP patron late Mufti Sayeed understood the mood of people of Kashmir. He along with many other senior members led strong anti-NC political campaign in the valley and many other parts of the state. The political ideology of PDP was new to the people of Kashmir and opposite to the ideology of NC. However, both the regional parties draw on some similar discourse such as ‘Kashmiriyat’, ‘unique secular political separate identity’ and the ‘self-autonomy’ of J&K. It were these discourses that helped New Delhi to counter the narrative of pro-Independence and pro-Pakistan in J&K. It also helped the state to come out of hegemonic discourse of NC in ‘Competitive electoral Politics’. In the long term, it helped in mainstreaming Kashmir polity, which was previously filled by either militants or secessionists under the banner of APHC. Similarly, the Panthers Party, Communist Party of India (M), many other small parties did not succeed in becoming anything other than a loosely opposition knit of ambitions of leaders and political parties in J&K. These all parties retain meager social and electoral acceptance and didn’t flourish as a vibrant oppositions till 2002. In the same way we can also say that PDP that emerged with good number of seats in 2002 was not actually representing the diverse sections of the state. The Party was less polled as compared to NC in 2002 and it won mainly from the valley. That too in those Assembly seats where boycott played important role. Thus, the claim of New Delhi that it was a mandate of ‘Victory of Democracy’ in Kashmir is partially true because the Party (PDP) didn’t get the absolute mandate of the people. 264

The politics in J&K have been predominately dominated by two main narratives. One is the separatist political discourse endorsed by APHC and other similar ideological groups. They don’t believe in state’s final accession and for them people of Kashmir has yet to decide their future. They recognize India as colonial power that had occupied Kashmir against the will of people. The contrast to this narrative is the mainstream politics—mainly believers of state’s final accession with India. However, most of the mainstream regional parties also recognize Kashmir as a political problem that needs a solution within the ambit of Indian Constitution or talks with Pakistan. Soon after the armed struggle erupted in Kashmir the political narrative of mainstream politics was reduced to ashes. It lost its legitimacy that created serious challenge for mainstream political parties to resume political work. However, the political process was gradually restored from 1996 and it reached its zenith in 2002, when democratic assertions became strong in the form of new political parties, among them was PDP. However, it is also true that the state didn’t come out completely from violence and separatist politics. Secessionists were very much present during this era. In the words of Rekha Chowdhary:

As the separatist political space remains intact, the two kinds of politics–the democratic and the separatist-operate side by side–overlap at a number of points and impact each other in interesting ways. A manifestation of this phenomenon of duality of politics of Kashmir is reflected in the political events before and subsequent to the 2009 Parliamentary election.1

During the first 55 years from 1948 to 2002, due to the ‘Single Party Dominance’ the state polity couldn’t draw a line between the ‘agenda of governance’ and ‘electoral discourse’, as both were in consonance with each other. The trend has been recently changed in the state, when PDP emerged an alternative to NC. On one hand, people in the electoral arena (read mainstream politics) realized the importance of their vote, while as pro-India political parties also realized the fact that electoral outcomes are dependent upon garnering of votes from the people. Though the arena of political conflict remained there but mainstream politics succeeded in exploring the new issues concerned with the state—in past political system failed to cope with such

1 Chowdhary, “Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and Political Divergence: An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary elections in Jammu & Kashmir,” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 3 (2009). 265 issues. Nevertheless, the dominant narrative in the arena of electoral politics revolved around the ‘politics of governance’ and ‘politics of separatism’ that become the major factor for electoral mobilization in the state since 2002. After 2002, the language of political discourse in the state was intensely influenced to make difference between the ‘politics of separatism’ and ‘politics of governance’ and thanks to the PDP that succeeded in changing the ‘politics of vocabulary’ in Kashmir.

It was in the fragile state’s contextualization—political violence and, of course, the ‘fall of Democratic Institutions’ from decades—that set feasible political environment (stage) for the emergence of PDP. However, it is also true that the political conditions in which PDP emerged against NC became hurdle for the Party to prove its hegemony in the state in future. It can be understood by the 2008 Assembly elections when Congress instead of PDP chose NC to form government. Thus the undisputed claims of PDP—that the Party is the sole representative of Kashmir valley—lost its political significance. Thus we can say the future of PDP lay in the local politics, but the external forces (the external forces here means New Delhi and sometimes Pakistan) are equally important if the Party wants to remain a relevant political entity that will exercise its influence.

The mainstream constituency in the Kashmir has reached a stage where no ‘Single Political Party’ would emerge to form the government on its own. After 2002 Assembly elections, state witnessed fractured mandate and have witnessed three Coalition governments till 2014. In such political environment the fractured mandate will remain permanent feature in Kashmir politics. The creation of new parties in Kashmir has led to the divided public vote. The two regional parties—NC and PDP, obviously considered a competition by every new entrant in the state. That will further divide the electoral constituency particularly in the valley of Kashmir. Nevertheless, anti-incumbency factor play significant role in determining the parties or fate of independent candidates. Politics since 2002 have redefined the role of political parties. The reason was obviously the emergence of new political actors. They changed the content of electoral discourse and use of ideological jargons as per the convenience. The ‘politics of absence of mainstream’ changed into ‘politics of presence’. At the same time the politics of ‘Single-Party System’ changed into ‘Politics of Multi-Party System’. Nevertheless, it took at least more than 5 decades for political leadership both in the state and New Delhi to understand the role and 266 importance of ‘Opposition Political Forces’ in democratization of state that has been immersing into conflict and violence. The politics of ‘non-presence’ or ‘weak presence’ or ‘minimum presence’ of multiple actors have now changed into ‘politics of competitiveness’ or ‘maximum presence’. It not only has democratized the state polity in statistical terms (read elections results since 2002) in the last one and a half decade, but also created a political sense that mainstream parties can play a considerable role in conflict management, if not in conflict resolution of Kashmir. However, what was notable thing along with ‘competitive politics’ was the rebirth of ‘protest movement’ or ‘politics of separatism’ that unfolded in the state in post 2008 Amarnath crisis. In this way, political instability continued in the form of public uprisings and protest movements and revival of militancy from 2010.

As far as Coalition governments are concerned in J&K, they have proved unstable and short living so far. Be the Coalition of Ghulam Mohammad Shah (Awami National Conference with Congress in 1984) or (Congress-NC alliance in 1987) both proved short-living and disastrous for the J&K. The later Coalition of 2002 between (PDP-Congress) could not complete its term of six years; due to the rift over 2008 agitation. However, Congress-NC Coalition (2008-2014) was the first kind of Coalition that not only completed its term of six years, but it gave hope that two different ideological parties can ensure somehow a least suitable government in the state. Though, there were tough times for Coalition partners over the matters like those of 2009 Shopian rape and murder case, 2010 mass uprising, fake encounters of civilians, debate over removal of AFSPA, killing of civilians etc. But despite all odds the Coalition government under Omar Abdullah succeeded to complete six years in office. As discussed in Chapter V, the 2014 Assembly elections gave fractured mandate that resulted in yet another Coalition in J&K between PDP-BJP. Due to the unremitting political differences between the Coalition partners, BJP announced to withdraw its support in June 2018. Like the previous Coalitions, this Coalition also couldn’t complete its tenure of six years. Thus, all the Coalitions and electoral alliances from 1980s to 2014 were weak, fragile, and unsuitable that could not accomplished their respective terms in office except the Congress-NC Coalition of 2008-2014. Nevertheless, the regional parties in J&K realized the political realism that no Coalition is possible without the national parties due to the emergence of ‘Competitive Politics’ since 2002. The power sharing in J&K has set dangerous 267 parameters ever since the Coalition governments have become an inevitable feature. These Coalitions also illustrate the picture of highly rising fragmentation of state polity and most of the time these Coalitions were governed by the exigencies of circumstances rather than of people’s choice.

Similarly, we cannot deny the importance of regionalism and state regional parties that grew from the last one and half decade in J&K. While they become dependent on national parties like Congress or BJP to attain or retain power and likewise national parties are dependent on regional parties. It led to the four visible trends in state politics, viz, the decline of dominance of NC, rise of PDP as an alternative to NC, growing number of small individual parties and most important the growing influence of national parties in power sharing in the state. From 2002 to 2014, no ‘Single Political Party’ could get requisite numbers to form the government. The 2008 Coalition government was significant for more than one reason: it ushered in an era of successful coalition government and it showed that a coalition was possible in a state like Kashmir, where state is divided on regional lines and due to the local identities followed by powerful Centre. The 2014 elections marked another turning point in the Kashmir politics. Rocked by charges of corruption, inefficiency and anger against the NC-Congress Coalition resulted in again fractured and divided mandate. The Omar led Coalition couldn’t manage to retain power. As such, strengthen of these parties in state Assembly was just reduced to 27 out of 87 (NC-15, Congress-12) and NC-Congress Coalition was replaced by BJP-PDP Coalition. In Jammu, BJP skillfully divided the people on number of issues such as; the Hindutva politics, regional divisions, anti-state parties (NC, PDP), anti-Congress, abrogation of article 370 and most important economy development. The environment was created where people were convinced on a slogan ‘why should they support BJP’.

BJP, the ‘Right Wing All India Party’ (Hindu Nationalist Party), in 2014 realized the growing clout and significance of the state actors in Kashmir politics, because for Party like BJP it was impossible to form the government in J&K without the Coalition or Alliance. Before elections, BJP managed to find Sajad Gani Lone’s (People’s Conference) as alliance partner, while as in post-election results, the Party achieved its long cherished goal of governing the Muslim majority state by forming Coalition with Mufti’s PDP. Though, Coalition did not survive but BJP’s ally Sajad Gani Lone emerged as an alternative political force to both NC and PDP. 268

The seemingly sacrosanct/holy position of the two main regional parties (PDP & NC) and strong entry of National parties (Congress & BJP) in the electoral fray increased competition on one hand, while as on the other heightened fragmentation of seats and poll percentage. Nevertheless, it gave rise to greater prevalence of Coalition politics in J&K in the last one and half decade. The state of J&K experienced many alliances and coalitions (mostly unsuccessful) in the last one and half decades, but every coalition nosedived to fulfill the promises they made in their respective ‘Agenda of Alliances’. The politics of the state has reached a stage, where no single party will emerge with absolute majority to form the government, but a Coalition of different parties will come together and share power. However, the political dictum is not ‘this party versus another’, but who does Centre (New Delhi) see best for the interest of nation and power. That will be surely next Coalition partner of Centre. The anti-NC factor and coupled with other issues have united many political actors in the past to counter the ‘hegemony of NC’. The phrase ‘Umbrella Party’ that was associated with NC is no more relevant today and it was seriously questioned by different opposition political parties from time to time. Those politicians and parties who earn patronage of New Delhi in the state are surely part of the larger picture of state politics. As there is famous saying in Kashmir, “Kashmir mai sarkar Delhi kai aashirvaad say bante hai—Government in Kashmir is formed with Delhi’s blessings.”

However, the share of voting percentage and seats by different political parties have showed that the character of ‘Multi-Party System’ have evolved in the state in post 2002 electoral politics. This change in the nature of ‘Party System’ has increased the greater participation of people in electoral politics that have unfolded the scope of ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ and PDP became one of the vital political forces that facilitated the return of ‘Electoral Democracy’ in J&K. However, Coalition politics in pre and post 2008 elections has shown that it is the politics of ‘Maximum Presence’ or ‘Multi-Party System’ that have played a predominant role in shaping the issues of the state. The regional and national political parties have formed Coalitions in the state in contradiction to their professed ideological arena; latest 2014 PDP-BJP is an example. The electoral discourse in J&K has melt down (political melt down) in the power- sharing Coalition matrix. The problems like ‘regional eruption’, ‘revenge of the regions’, and ‘fragmented politics’ have enlarged due to certain factors as discussed in 269 the thesis. For electoral purposes, the political parties make Alliances or Coalitions that seem to care for more power than upholding the principles. It in reverse has led to the decline of people’s trust on ‘Democratic Institutions’ in general and ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ in particular. Thus from the above discussion we can say that mainstream political actors since 2002 have played significant role in democratizing the state institutions by representing the diverse political opinions both within and outside the State Assembly. But at the same time the emergence of multiple actors have reduced the power of regional actors (parties) to bargain from the Delhi over the most crucial issue of ‘Autonomy’ and ‘Self-Rule’.

The representative character claim of political parties for the state didn’t authorize them to speak up for the larger dispute, though they won the elections and form the governments. But, when mainstream parties are less secure about their mass support and political constituency, they balance it either by turning ‘separatists’ in the valley or some turn ‘Hindutva’ politics in Jammu. The coincidences between different ideological groups and dichotomous relationship between mainstream and separatist politics have continued its impact on state politics. The diverse needs of J&K and their solution are obviously strategic, situational and most important historical- specific. How far the ‘Multi-Party System’ and ‘Coalition Politics’ will be able to balance the needs is a debatable question!

Suggestions and Recommendations

 The loss of human capital coupled with economic downfall due to the protests (Hartal) and curfews by governments continue to haunt the state. In fact, it emerges as a vital anti-incumbency factor for the party in power. The issue needs a special attention from policy makers.  The challenge for mainstream parties is to take up the issues related to the people in their political contention without compromising political ideology. We argue that the ‘Parliamentary Democracy’ and mainstream parties, especially the opposition, can play a positive role in safeguarding the tainted ‘Democratic Institutions’. Methods to build consensus for conflict resolution and addressing the issues such as human rights violations, revocation of AFSPA, and other related issues should be a priority of the state polity. 270

 The mainstream parties need to carve out political space and constituency as independent political entities. For that they must shun the tendency of merely obtaining power and formation of governments.  The mainstream parties have the power to act as a third-party arbitrator to reconcile the conflict among the conflicting parties democratically. However, the intolerance towards the political regional parties by Delhi at this stage could lead to serious negative impact on the democratic development of J&K.  Mainstream political parties, in the government or in opposition, have little direct role to play in the resolution of Kashmir dispute, but it is also true that these parties can play the role of facilitators for durable peace and final settlement of Kashmir issue. Perceived as a popular voice outside the J&K, they can play a crucial role in forming the public opinion on Kashmir conflict and possible solutions with that other issues pertaining to the people of J&K. 279

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Raina, N. N. Kashmir Politics and Imperialist Manoeurs.1846-1980. New Delhi: Patriot Publishers, January 1988. Saifuddin, Qari. Vadi-i-Purkhar. Srinagar: Markazi Maktaba-i-Jama'at-i-Islami Jammu and Kashmir, 1980. Saraf, M.Y. Kashmir’s Fight for Freedom. Lahore: n.a, Vol. 1, 1997. ______. Kashmiris Fight for Freedom 1947-78. Lahore: Freedom LIC, vol. 2, 2005. Schofield, Victoria. Kashmir in Conflict India, Pakistan and the Unending War. New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2004. ______. Kashmir in the Crossfire. Chicago: IB Tauris, 1996. Shah, G.M. Izhar-I- Haq. Srinagar: Kashmir Conspiracy case defence Committee, 1959. Sharma, Ram Nath. Kashmir Autonomy, An Exercise in Centre–State Relationship. Delhi: Shubhi Publications, 2000. Sharma, Yograj and Rahilla, Parveen. India-Pakistan And Kashmir: The Emerging Trends. Jammu: Saksham Books International, 2013. Singh, Balbir. State Politics in India: Explorations in Political Processes in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: Macmillan, 1982. Singh, Bhim. The Murder of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir. New Delhi: Har- Anand Publication, 2002. Singh, Karan. Heir Apparent: An Autobiography. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1982. Singh, Khushwant. Flames of the Chinar: An Autobiography of Sheikh Abdullah translated from Urdu. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1993. Singh, Tavleen. Kashmir: A Tragedy of Errors. New Delhi: Penguin, 1995. Snedden, Christopher. Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris. United Kingdom: C- Hurst & co Publishers, 2015. Staniland, Paul. Networks of Rebellion: Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Na: Cornell University Press, 2014. Swami, Praveen. India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad: The Covert War in Kashmir 1947-2004. Routledge: Asian Security Studies, 2006. Tasir, Abdul, Rashid. Tarikh-i-Hurriyat-i-Kashmir Vol.1. Srinagar: Muhafiz Publishers, n.a. 287

Teng, Mohan Krishen, Ram Krishen Kaul Bhatt, and Santosh Kaul. Constitutional History and Documents. New Delhi: Life and Lime Publishers, 1977. Thakur, Harish K. Alienation and Integration in Jammu and Kashmir. Jaipur: Aalekh Publishers, 2000. Busch, Carsten. The Policy of the Bharatiya Janata Party, 1980 and 2008: Possible Influence of Hindu Nationalism on Indian Politics. CA: naval postgraduate school Monterey, 2009. Vaid, S.P. Socio-Economic Roots of Unrest in Jammu and Kashmir (1931-47). Jammu: Shyama Publication, n.a. Varghese, Koithara. Crafting Peace in Kashmir. New-Delhi: Sage Publication, 2004. Vashishth, Satish. Sheikh Abdullah, Then and Now. Delhi: Maulik Sahitya Prakashan, 1968. Vasudeva, Veena. Kashmir Imbroglio. Delhi: Kalinga Publications, 2004. Verma, Pratap Singh. Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroads. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers, 1994. Wakhlu, Khem Lata, and O. N. Wakhlu. Kashmir, Behind the White Curtain, 1972- 1991. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992. Wani, Gull Mohd. Kashmir Politics: Problems and Prospects. New Delhi: Ashish Publishers House, 1993. ______. Kashmir, Identity, Autonomy, and Self-Rule. Srinagar: Wattan Publications, 2011. Wiener, Myron. State Politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Wirsing, Robert G. Kashmir in the Shadow of War. London: M.E.Sharpe, 2003. Y. D. Gundevia. The Testament of Sheikh Abdullah. Dehra Dun: Palit, NA.

Book Chapters

Baba, Noor Ahmad. “Democracy and Governance in Kashmir.” in The Parchment of Kashmir, edited by Nyla Ali Khan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. Khan, Mohammad Ishaq. “The Social Background of Peoples Movement in the Jammu and Kashmir State 1846-1931,” in Peoples Movements in the Princely States, edited by Y. Vaikunthan. Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2004. Roy, Maneesha. “Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India.” in India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress 288

Continuity, edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy. India: Sage Publications, 2011. Saxena, K.B. “Theories and Concept Associated with the Formation and Working of Coalition Governments.” In Coalition Governments in India Problems and Prospects, edited by KP Karunakaran. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Study, 1975. Swami, Krishna Praveen. “Jammu and Kashmir: Ethnic—Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009.” In India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity, edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy. India: Sage, 2018. Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari. “Jammu Autonomy within an Autonomous Kashmir,” in Perspective on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, edited by Raju G.C. Thomas. Boulder Colorado: West View Press, 1992. Wani, Aijaz Ashraf. “Regional Divide on Communal Lines: Lok Sabha Election 2014 in Jammu and Kashmir.” in Electoral Politics in Indian States: 2014 Elections and Beyond, edited by Ashutosh Kumar and Yatinder Singh Sisodia. Orient Blackswan, India, 2018. ______. “Electoral Politics in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and the Problem of Communal Polarisation.” in Rise of Saffron Power: Reflections on Indian Politics, edited by Mujibur Rehman. London: Routledge, New York, 2018. Wani, Gull Mohammad. “Political Assertion of Kashmiri Identity.” in The Parchment of Kashmir, edited by Nyla Ali Khan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012.

Research Articles

Alberti, Marina. “Measuring Urban Sustainability.” Environmental Impact Assessment Review, 1996, no.16: 381-424. Amin, Mudasir. “Co-option, Collaboration, Conflict.” Economic and Political Weekly 53, no. 10 (2018): 15. Anant, Arpita. “Identity and Conflict: Perspectives from the Kashmir Valley.” Strategic Analysis 33, no.5 (2009): 760-773. Bandyopadhyay, Siddhartha, and Mandar P. Oak. “Coalition Governments in a Model of Parliamentary Democracy.” European Journal of Political Economy 24, no. 3 (2008): 554-561. 289

Bharatiya, V.P. “Central Inquiry and State Ministers' Accountability.” Journal of the Indian Law Institute 18, no. 1 (1976): 56-84. Bose, Sumantra. “Kashmir: Sources of Conflict, Dimensions of Peace.” Survival 41, no. 3 (1999): 149-171. Chawla, Muhammad Iqbal. “Role of the Majlis-i-Ahrar Islam in the Kashmir Movement of 1931.” Pakistaniaat: A Journal of Pakistan Studies 3, no. 2 (2011): 82-102. Cheema, Musarat Javed. “Pakistan-India Conflict with Special Reference to Kashmir.” South Asian Studies 30, no. 1 (2015): 45. Chowdhary, Rekha, and V. Nagendra Rao. “Jammu and Kashmir: Political Alienation, Regional Divergence and Communal Polarisation.” Journal of Indian School of Political Economy vol. 15, No. 1&2, Jan.-June15, (2003). 189-219. ______. “National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir: From Hegemonic to Competitive Politics.” Economic and Political Weekly 39, No. 14/15, (2004): 1521-1527. Chowdhary, Rekha. “BJP’s Unprecedented Victory in Jammu.” Economic & Political Weekly 50, no. 19 (2015): 71. ______. “BJP's Alliance with National Conference: Predicament at State Level.” Economic and Political Weekly vol. 34, No. 48, (1999): 3342-3343. ______. “The Second Uprising.” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 45, No. 39, 25 Sep (2010): 10-13. Coalition of Civil Society. “Kashmir Assembly Elections: How Free and Fair?.” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 2, Jan.11-17, (2003): 101-105. Copeland, Ian. “The Abdullah Factor: Kashmiri Muslims and the 1947 Crisis.” Political Inheritance of Pakistan (1991): 218-254. ______. “Islam and Political Mobilization in Kashmir, 1931-34.” Pacific Affairs vol. 54, No. 2, (1981): 228-259. Dowding, Keith. “Explaining Urban Regimes.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 25, no. 1 (2001): 7-19. Gamson, William A. “An Experimental test of a Theory of Coalition Formation.” American Sociological 26, no. 3, Review (1961): 565-573. 290

Harriss, John. “Hindu Nationalism in Action: The Bharatiya Janata Party and Indian Politics.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2015): 712- 718. Jacob, Happymon. “The Kashmir Uprising and India-Pakistan Relations: A Need for Conflict Resolution, not Management.” Asie.Visions, No.90, Ifri, December (2016). Jamwal, Bhasin Anuradha. “Multiple of the BJP-PDP Alliance.” Economic and Political Weekly 50, no. 11, March 14, (2015): 12-18. Kanth, Idrees. “The Social and Political Life of a Relic: The Episode of the Moi-e- Muqaddas Theft in Kashmir, 1963-1964.” HIMALAYA, the Journal of the Association for Nepal and Himalayan Studies 38, no. 2 (2018): 10. Kelly, W.E. “Technique of Studying Coalition Formation.” Mid-West Journal of Political Science 12, no. l, February (1968). Khan, Adil Hussain. “The Kashmir Crisis as a Political Platform for Jama'at-i Ahmadiyya's Entrance into South Asian Politics.” Modern Asian Studies 46, no. 5 (2012): 1398-1428. Korbel, Josef. “The National Conference Administration of Kashmir 1949- 1954.” Middle East Journal 8, no. 3 (1954): 283-294. Lakshman, Nikhil. “Trouble in Paradise.” Illustrated Weekly of India, March 10, (1985): 14-17. Lifschultz, Lawrence. “Death in Kashmir: Perils of' Self-Determination.” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 37, No. 31, (2002): 3225-3234. Lockwood, David E. “Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah's Reinstatement.” The World Today 31, no. 6 (1975): 249-256. Lone, Suhail-ul-Rehman. “Land Reforms in Kashmir (1948-1953): An analysis.” in Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, 76, (2015): 332-343. ______. “The Princely States and the National Movement: The Case of Kashmir (1931–39).” Studies in People’s History 4, no. 2 (2017): 183-196. Morris-Jones, W. H. “Parliament and Dominant Party: Indian Experience.” Parliamentary Affairs 17, no. 3 (1963): 296-307. Morris‐ Jones, Wyndraeth Humphreys. “Dominance and Dissent: Their Inter‐ relations in the Indian Party System.” Government and Opposition 1, no. 4 (1966): 451-466. Noorani, A. G. “Accord and Discord.” Frontline 27, no. 6 (2010): 13. 291

Ogden, Chris. “A Lasting Legacy: The BJP-led National Democratic Alliance and India's Politics.” Journal of Contemporary Asia 42, no. 1 (2012): 22-38. Palshikar, Suhas. “The BJP and Hindu nationalism: Centrist Politics and Majoritarian Impulses.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 38, no. 4 (2015): 719- 735. Puri, Balraj. “How the Indira-Abdullah Accord was signed in 1974.” Mainstream weekly, L, no. 17, April 14, (2012). ______. “Politics of the Elections in Kashmir.” Economic and Political Weekly vol. 2, No. 8, (1967): 457-458. Rai, Praveen and Sanjay Kumar. “The Decline of the Congress Party in Indian Politics.” Economic and Political Weekly, 52, no. 12, March 25 (2017). 08- 13. Rajni, Kothari. “The Congress System in India.” Asian Survey Vol. 4, no. 12 (1964): 1161-73. Rana, Surinder. “Post-Election Jammu and Kashmir.” Strategic Insights Vol. 2, no.3 (March 2003): 19-25. Samant, Vanashree. “Free and fair.” Harvard International Review 25, no. 1 (2003): 10. Sherwani, Latif Ahmed. “Kashmir's Accession to India Re-examined.” Pakistan Horizon 52, no. 4 (1999): 49-77. Sikand, Yoginder. “The Emergence and Development of the Jama ‘at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir (1940s–1990).” Modern Asian Studies 36, no. 3 (2002): 705-751. Singh, Ajit Kumar. “J&K: Democracy and its Subversion.” South Asia Intelligence Review Vol. 9, No. 52, (2011): 21-27. Staniland, Paul. “Kashmir Since 2003: Counterinsurgency and the Paradox of Normalcy”. Asian Survey 53, no. 5 (2013): 931-957. Suhrawardy, Nilofar. “Modi-wave and Dalit-Card’s Impact in Hindi Belt!.” Mainstream weekly, LII, no. 26, June 21 (2014). Tremblay, Reeta Chowdhari. “Kashmir: The Valley's Political Dynamics.” Contemporary South Asia 4, no. 1 (1995): 79-101. Varshney, Ashutosh. “India, Pakistan, and Kashmir: Antinomies of Nationalism.” Asian Survey 31, no. 11 (1991): 997-1019. 292

Verma, P. S. “Jammu and Kashmir Politics: Religion, Region and Personality Symbiosis.” The Indian Journal of Political Science 48, no. 4 (1987): 561- 574. Wani, Aijaz Ashraf. “Ethnic Identities and the Dynamics of Regional and Sub- regional Assertions in Jammu and Kashmir.” Asian Ethnicity 14, no. 3 (2013): 309-341. Wasi, Awais Bin. “Elections in Indian Held Kashmir and the Kashmir Dispute.” Policy Perspectives Vol.6, No. 2 (2009): 149-165. Webb, Matthew J. “Political Change and Prospects for Peace in Jammu and Kashmir: The 2002 state election and recent electoral trends in India.” South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies 28, no. 1 (2005): 87-111. Whitehead, Andrew. “The People's Militia: Communists and Kashmiri Nationalism in the 1940s.” Twentieth Century Communism Vol. 2, no. 2 (2010): 141-168. Widmalm, Sten. “The Rise and fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir.” Asian Survey Vol. 37, No. 11 (1997): 1005-1030.

Works not cited

Ahuja, M.L. Electoral Politics and General Elections in India: 1952-1998. New Delhi: Mittal Publication, 1998.

Atul, Kohli, ed. Indian’s Democracy, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1988. Bhatt, Roop Krishen. “Kashmir: the Politics of Integration.” In State Politics In India, by Iqbal Narain, 147-176. New Delhi: Meenakshi Prakshan, 1976. Biju, Mootheril Raghavan. Parliamentary Democracy and Political Change in India. Kanishka Publishers, 1999. Brass, Paul R., and Francis Robinson. The Indian National Congress and Indian Society. New Delhi: Chanakya Publication, 1978. Chowdhary, Rekha. “Changed Political Scenario.” Economic and Political Weekly 41, no. 20 (2006): 1963-1965. ______. “Electioneering in Kashmir. Overlap between Separatist and Mainstream Political Space.” Economic and Political Weekly 43, no. 28 (2008): 22-25. ______. “Jammu and Kashmir BJP's Alliance with the National Conference.” Economic and Political Weekly vol. 39, no.48 (1999): 3342-43. 293

Dulat, Amarjit Singh, and Aditya Sinha. Kashmir: The Vajpayee Years. India: Harper Collins Publishers, 2015. Hassan, Zoya. Congress after Indira: Policy, Power, Political Change, 1984-2009. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012. Laver and Norman Schofield. Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990. Ram, D. S, ed. Readings in the Parliamentary Opposition in India. New Delhi: Kanishka Publication, 1996. Stanley A, Kochanek. The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One Party Democracy, Princeton University Press, 1998.

Newspapers

Daily Excelsior (Jammu). Deccan Chronicle Financial Express (Delhi) Greater Kashmir (Srinagar) Hindustan Times (Delhi) Kashmir Ink (Srinagar weekly) Kashmir Life (Srinagar weekly) Kashmir Times (Srinagar) Khidmat (Srinagar) Ranbir (Jammu) Rising Kashmir (Srinagar) The Economic Times The Hamdard (Srinagar) The Hindu The Indian Express The Statesman The Statesman, (Calcutta) The Telegraph The Times (London) The Tribune (Panjab) Times of India Vitasta (Srinagar) 294

Magazines

Frontline India Today Outlook The Caravan

Internet Sources https://tribune.com.pk/story/631976/the-changing-chessboard-of-kashmir/ https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/kashmirtheforgottenconflict/2011/07/201 1726122116677591.html https://www.smh.com.au/world/kashmir-dynasty-toppled-in-fair-poll-that-cost-700- lives-20021012-gdfpsq.html https://www.nytimes.com/1971/12/13/archives/ghulam-mohammed-sadiq-59- kashmir-chief-minister-dies.html https://www.rediff.com/news/1999/sep/01farooq.htm http://www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/22inter.htm https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/21/kashmir-unmarked-graves- thousands-bodies https://www.rediff.com/news/2008/aug/05gupta.htm https://www.frontline.in/cover-story/listen-to-the-people/article8932978.ece https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/44/comment/kashmirs-shrinking-electoral- space.html https://www.epw.in/journal/2018/26-27/commentary/agenda-alliance-agenda- split.html http://www.mainstreamweekly.net/article8134.html https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1964_16/39/dandakaranya_stink.pdf https://frontline.thehindu.com/static/html/fl1922/stories/20021108006002000.htm https://www.epw.in/.../three-generations-kashmirs-azaadi-short-history- discontent.html https://frontline.thehindu.com/other/obituary/a-bridge-to-the- valley/article8123709.ece https://www.epw.in/engage/article/why-kashmirs-armed-insurgency-not-variant- terrorism https://www.epw.in/journal/2002/43/commentary/jammu-and-kashmir-assembly- elections-2002-under-shadow-fear.html 271

Appendices

J&K Constituent Assembly. Rinpoche is sitting in the front row first from left. Source: Sonam Wangchuk

Elected unopposed as the MLA of Ladakh region. Source: Sonam Wangchuk 272

Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah was arrested and imprisoned on 9 August 1953 as Prime Minister of J&K. He was replaced by Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad. Source: The Times of India 10 August 1953.

Bashir Ahmad Bashir (BAB) drew a cartoon in daily newspaper Kashmir Times showing the state election favouring the Congress candidate, Ghulam Mohammad Sadiq in state during 1970's. Source: Kashmir Life.

273

People greeting Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah in Jammu after he singed the Kashmir Accord with Indra Gandhi in 1975, also known as Indra-Sheikh Accord. Sheikh was freed after prolonged incarceration and he was made Chief Minister of J&K. Source: Frontline.

The rise of Muslim United Front (MUF) at the peak of disconnection between Delhi and Srinagar led to unprecedented participation in the 1987 Assembly elections. Source: Kashmir Life.

Founding members of Muslim United Front (MUF): Source: Kashmir Life

274

The Accord that changed the political discourse of Kashmir after 1987 is popularly known as ‘Rajiv-Farooq Accord’. The accord was signed before the state assembly elections of 1987 in J&K to curb the Opposition led by MUF. Source: India Today.

MUF leaders protested in Srinagar in 1987 wearing Kaffan posh (Shroud), after alleged rigging and unfair state Assembly elections of 1987. The MUF had contested 40 seats across the Kashmir but the party won only four seats. It won Islamabad (Mohammad Sayeed Shah), Kulgam (Abdul Razak Mir), Homshalibugh (Ghulam Nabi Sumji) and Sopore (Syed Ali Geelani). Source: India Today.

275

Post March 23, 1987 elections, Farooq Abdullah with his cabinet after taking oath of office and secrecy. Source: Kashmir Life.

Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) Kashmiri insurgents holding AK-47 during 1990s in Somewhere in Srinagar. Source: Free Press Kashmir.

All parties Hurriyat Conference leaders address the people in 1996 and call for boycott of assembly elections during 1990s. Source: India Today. 276

Mufti M. Sayeed shakes hands with Governor Girish Chandra Saxena after taking the oath as CM office along with his Cabinet in Srinagar on November 2, 2002. Source: Frontline.

Ghulam Nabi Azad while taking oath as CM of J&K in 2005, he becomes the first Congress Chief Minister of J&K in 30 years after Syed Mir Qasim stepped down in 1975. Source: India Today.

During the Amarnath Land Row Agitation 2008, followed by 2010 protests, half a million people gathered in ‘Freedom March’ call by APHC at Eidgah Srinagar. Source: The Indian Express and World Press. 277

Omar Abdullah (NC) and Mehbooba Mufti (PDP) address the election rally during the 2014 state Assembly elections in Kashmir. Source: India Today.

BJP supporters at Prime Minister Narendra Modi's election rally in Kishtwar and Jammu, J&K 2014. Source: Rediffmail.com.

Narender Modi (PM) hugged Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, after taking oath of CM in 2014. Sajad Gani Lone of (PC) was also sworn as Cabinet member in PDP-BJP Coalition government. Source: The Hindu. 278

Public Uprising in Kashmir after famous Hizbul Mujahideen Militant Commander Burhan Muzaffar Wani was killed by security forces in South Kashmir in July 2016. Source: Free press Kashmir.

Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti along with new Council of Ministers and Governor N. N. Vohra after swearing-in ceremony at Raj Bhavan, Jammu on 4th April 2016. Source: Daily Excelsior.

Opposition parties protested in legislative assembly (Srinagar) in 2016 against the civilian killings and curfews in the valley. Source: Deccan Chronicle.