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Comments

References

Cai, Peter. 2016. The Keqiang Index is dead, long live the new Li Keqiang Index. Available at www. lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/li-keqiang-index-dead-long-live-new-li-keqiang-index.

Horton, Richard. 2020. This Wave of Anti- Feeling Masks the West’s Own COVID- 19 Failures. Guardian. Available at www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/aug/03/ COVID-19-cold-war-china-western-governments-international-peace.

Silver, Laura, Kat Devlin, and Christine Huang. 2020. Unfavorable Views of China Reach His-

toric Highs in Many Countries. Available at www.pewresearch.org/global/2020/10/06/ Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/asep/article-pdf/20/1/105/1911922/asep_a_00816.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 unfavorable-views-of-china-reach-historic-highs-in-many-countries/.

Zheng, Jinghai and Liming Wang. 2015. Institutions and Development: The Case of China in Compar- ative Perspectives. Emerging Markets Finance and Trade 50(6):4–20.

Wang Xiaolu Comment on How China Managed the COVID-19 Pandemic

Wang Xiaolu, National Economic Research Institute: This paper convinc- ingly presents data to describe in detail the outbreak of COVID-19 in China in the first half of 2020, outlines the response measures taken by the government and the private sector, evaluates the effects of these measures, and explains how China quickly controlled the epi- demic and achieved both economic and social recovery.

Official statistics show that as of 31 October, there are a total of 91,931 confirmed COVID-19 patients nationwide, with 4,746 deaths, 86,671 recoveries, and only 514 patients who are still in hospital (CCTV News, 1 November 2020).

Aside from minor outbreaks in Qingdao and Kashgar in October that were quickly con- tained, economic and social activities throughout the country have returned to normal since the third quarter of the year. According to the National Bureau of Statistics, China’s cumulative GDP in quarters 1–3 recorded a positive growth of 0.7 percent from the previ- ous year, becoming the only major economy in the world to achieve positive growth.

This situation suggests that China has performed far better than most countries in terms of epidemic control and economic recovery. This may seem too good to be true to some, however. The following comments will focus on a few questions:

105 Asian Economic Papers Comments

Question 1: How trustworthy are the data provided by the paper and other official gov- ernment sources on the epidemic situation in China?

As mentioned in the paper, China’s first COVID-19 case was discovered in Wuhan in late December 2019. The author believes that the initial rapid increase in infections in Wuhan could be attributed to a lack of information and an underestimation of the seriousness of the disease. This inference is reasonable. Moreover, because local authorities were slow to react to the initial outbreak, Wuhan officials might have missed the opportunity to quickly nip the epidemic in the bud. The lack of transparency in information sharing at the time Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/asep/article-pdf/20/1/105/1911922/asep_a_00816.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 may also have caused some data distortion.

But China quickly learned a lesson from these mistakes. Since 23 January, the central gov- ernment intervened and implemented a strict lockdown in Wuhan. At the same time, var- ious regions initiated different levels of emergency response procedures according to the severity of their situation. Epidemic information is now directly reported by local Chi- nese Center for Disease Control and Prevention branches to the National Health Com- mission, bypassing local governments. The direct reporting mechanism basically elimi- nates the motivation of local authorities to conceal information and centralizes knowledge effectively and efficiently to coordinate pandemic response policies. This has greatly in- creased the transparency of information, leading also to significant improvements in the epidemiological situation.

The epidemic information announced since late January can therefore be considered cred- ible. The cumulative number of confirmed cases and total number of deaths may be less accurate than daily new incremental data to some extent due to earlier inaccurate report- ing or incomplete testing in January, but any discrepancy should be limited. In addition, because the virus is highly contagious and spreads quickly, efforts to conceal information would not last long and would quickly become meaningless.

Since the third quarter of 2020, economic operations have been restored across the whole country. Residents’ lives have all resumed, aside from the need to continue to wear face masks in crowded public areas. During the National Day and Mid-Autumn Festival hol- idays from 1–7 October 2020, railways, highways, waterways, and airlines transported over 500 million people without any major new outbreaks except a small number of cases in Qingdao and Kashgar. From April until October, the daily new confirmed cases in the whole country remained in single or double digits, mostly entrants from overseas. This return to normalcy would not have been achieved if information on the pandemic was not centralized.

Question 2: What is the role of government in the response to containing epidemics and pandemics?

106 Asian Economic Papers Comments

The paper by Wei Tian has actually provided the answer through its detailed descriptions of the Chinese government’s actions in response to COVID-19. In dealing with major ex- traordinary events such as COVID-19, reasonably strong government intervention is in- dispensable, and this has shown its effectiveness in China. After the COVID-19 outbreak in Wuhan in January, the government quickly imposed lockdown measures on Wuhan, strictly restricting the entry and exit of people and instructing residents to self-isolate at home. Local governments at all levels organized communities and volunteers to provide food and other necessities via home delivery services. Medical teams comprising more than 40,000 doctors and nurses from all over the country were sent to Wuhan. At the same Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/asep/article-pdf/20/1/105/1911922/asep_a_00816.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021 time, two large, specialized hospitals were built in Wuhan within 20 days, while 16 large public facilities were urgently transformed into shelter hospitals to treat mild patients and isolate asymptomatic patients.

In other parts of the country, schools, manufacturing firms, public entertainment outlets, education and training institutions, and other non-essential commercial service facilities were temporarily closed. Residents were only allowed to go out for essential activities and were required to wear masks in public areas. Food catering, store shopping, classes, and training conferences moved online. Meanwhile, the production of medical supplies such as face masks, disinfectants, protective clothing, and respirators were urgently arranged. Personnel contact was minimized and the spread of the virus was soon suppressed.

The adoption of these measures has indeed incurred high costs. The economy stalled in the first quarter and residents’ lives were disrupted. However, in hindsight, these decisive measures greatly reduced or interrupted the spread of the disease at the time.

These measures received severe criticism at the time, mainly from overseas, for restricting personal freedom and violating human rights, at huge economic costs. However, the tem- porary inconvenience experienced has significantly reduced illnesses, saved lives, and led to rapid economic recovery. Compared with the 9 million infections and 229,000 deaths in the United States so far as of 31 October 2020, the price China paid in exchange for only 91,000 infections and several thousand deaths is worth it. Given that China’s population is four times that of the United States, this comparison becomes more compelling.

On the other hand, China’s anti-pandemic performance has sparked other debates and dis- cussions. For example, some in China argue that China’s success on both economic and health outcomes proves that a system with strong government intervention has special ad- vantages in general. They believe that the so-called whole nation system can be extended from extraordinary emergencies such as COVID-19, to all economic and social fields. This is obviously misleading. China’s achievements in response to the virus does not mean that the role of the market can be replaced by the government. In fact, China’s economic suc- cess during the past 40 years should be attributed to the reforms that transformed China

107 Asian Economic Papers Comments from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. A fair and competitive market is an irreplaceable basic condition for economic success. Only in areas where the market fails and in the event of extraordinary circumstances that government interventions are neces- sary. If government interventions exceed reasonable boundaries, it would inevitably lead to inefficiency and economic non-sustainability.

Question 3: Is the success of China’s epidemic control entirely dependent on the role of the government? Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/asep/article-pdf/20/1/105/1911922/asep_a_00816.pdf by guest on 25 September 2021

No. The active cooperation of Chinese society and the sacrificial spirit of many individuals are important and indispensable. When the virus first broke out in Wuhan, 395 medical teams were organized in various regions of the country and sent to Wuhan and other cities in Hubei province to help fight the epidemic. Despite the risk of infection and the lack of information and protective equipment, 43,060 doctors and nurses rushed to the epidemic area (Tencent News, 9 March 2020). This played a decisive role in reversing the Wuhan crisis, and could not have been done without the social responsibility of these individuals.

During the epidemic, although many economic activities were halted, public utilities and the production, sales, and distribution of medical supplies, food, and other daily necessi- ties continued to operate. Millions of volunteers across the country participated in produc- ing a huge number of masks, disinfectants, respirators, and protective gear, not only for domestic needs, but also exported to many countries across the world to support their fight against the disease.

During the lockdown of Wuhan and other cities experiencing sever outbreaks, residents suffered considerable inconveniences, but these strict control measures received strong public support. During the epidemic, residents could be seen strictly abiding with the requirement to wear face masks in public areas. This is in sharp contrast to the situation in other countries where non-compliance and even protests occurred over the issue of mask wearing.

The act of mask wearing is just a small inconvenience, but reduces the individual’s risk of infection while also protecting others. Compliance with regulations is a form of social re- sponsibility that goes beyond self-interest. For a healthy society, the individual freedom of citizens is indispensable, but equally indispensable is the collective concern of individuals for public interests.

https://doi.org/10.1162/asep_a_00816

108 Asian Economic Papers