Stephen E. Sachs
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Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power
University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 2013 Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power William Baude Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation William Baude, "Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power," 122 Yale Law Journal 1738 (2013). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. 1738.BAUDE.1825_UPDATED.DOC 5/18/2013 4:48:48 PM William Baude Rethinking the Federal Eminent Domain Power abstract. It is black-letter law that the federal government has the power to take land through eminent domain. This modern understanding, however, is a complete departure from the Constitution’s historical meaning. From the Founding until the Civil War, the federal government was thought to have an eminent domain power only within the District of Columbia and the territories—but not within states. Politicians and judges (including in two Supreme Court decisions) repeatedly denied the existence of such a power, and when the federal government did need to take land, it relied on state cooperation to do so. People during this period refused to infer a federal eminent domain power from Congress’s enumerated powers or the Necessary and Proper Clause because they viewed it as a “great power”—one that was too important to be left to implication. And they refused to infer it from the Takings Clause either, because the Clause was not intended to expand Congress's power beyond the District and territories. -
Due Process As Separation of Powers
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL NATHAN S. CHAPMAN & MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL Due Process as Separation of Powers ABSTRACT. From its conceptual origin in Magna Charta, due process of law has required that government can deprive persons of rights only pursuant to a coordinated effort of separate institutions that make, execute, and adjudicate claims under the law. Originalist debates about whether the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments were understood to entail modern "substantive due process" have obscured the way that many American lawyers and courts understood due process to limit the legislature from the Revolutionary era through the Civil War. They understood due process to prohibit legislatures from directly depriving persons of rights, especially vested property rights, because it was a court's role to do so pursuant to established and general law. This principle was applied against insufficiently general and prospective legislative acts under a variety of state and federal constitutional provisions through the antebellum era. Contrary to the claims of some scholars, however, there was virtually no precedent before the Fourteenth Amendment for invalidating laws that restricted liberty or the use of property. Contemporary resorts to originalism to support modern substantive due process doctrines are therefore misplaced. Understanding due process as a particular instantiation of separation of powers does, however, shed new light on a number of key twentieth-century cases which have not been fully analyzed under the requirements of due process of law. -
Michael Stokes Paulsen
Michael Stokes Paulsen 2436 Humboldt Ave. S. University of St. Thomas School of Law Minneapolis, MN 55405 1000 LaSalle Ave. (h) (612) 377-2093 Minneapolis, MN 55403 (c) (612) 590-8915 (651) 962-4831 [email protected] [email protected] Academic Employment 2007 to Present THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS MINNEAPOLIS, MN Distinguished University Chair and Professor of Law (2007-date), Co-Director, University of St. Thomas Pro-Life Advocacy Center (“PLACE”), Dean’s Award for Scholarship (2011), Chair, Promotion and Tenure Committee (2010-2013, 2016-2017), Dean’s Award for Teaching (2015). Fellow (James Madison Program) and Visiting Professor of Politics, Princeton University (Spring Semester 2018); Visiting Professor, Daystar University (Athi River, Kenya) (Spring Semester, 2010). 1991 to 2007 UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA LAW SCHOOL MINNEAPOLIS, MN McKnight Presidential Professor of Law & Public Policy (2004- 2007), Law Alumni Distinguished Professor (2007), Briggs & Morgan Professor of Law (2000-2007), Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship (2004-2007), Julius E. Davis Professor (1998-1999), Full Professor (1998-date); Associate Professor (1991-1998). Visiting Professor, Uppsala Universitet Juridska Institutionen (Uppsala, Sweden) (2001); University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minneapolis, MN) (2003-04). Subjects taught: Civil Procedure, Constitutional Law, Law & Religion, Professional Responsibility, War & National Security, Separation of Powers, Lincoln & the Constitution. Committees: Appointments (chair); Education Policy (chair); Honor Code (chair), numerous other committee memberships. Editor-in-(mis)Chief, Constitutional Commentary 1 Education 1982 to 1985 YALE LAW SCHOOL NEW HAVEN, CT Editor, Yale Law Journal Winner, Yale Moot Court appellate advocacy competition, 1983 Director, Yale Federalist Society, 1984-85 Director, Yale Moot Court, fall 1983-84 1982 to 1985 YALE DIVINITY SCHOOL NEW HAVEN, CT Master of Arts in Religion, 1985 (concurrent with J.D. -
1 STEVEN G. CALABRESI Work Addresses: Northwestern University
STEVEN G. CALABRESI Work Addresses: Northwestern University Yale Law School Pritzker School of Law 127 Wall Street 357 E. Chicago Avenue New Haven, CT 06521 Chicago, IL 60611 (312) 503-7012 EDUCATION: Yale Law School, J.D. 1983 Note & Topics Editor, Yale Law Journal. Yale College, B.A., History, cum laude 1980 EMPLOYMENT: 2013 - present Clayton J. and Henry R. Barber Professor Northwestern Pritzker School of Law 1996 - 2013 Professor of Law, Northwestern University 2013-2020 Visiting Professor of Law, Yale University 2010-2015 Visiting Professor of Political Science, Brown University 2012 Joseph R. Weisberger Visiting Professor of Law, Roger Williams University School of Law 2003-05 Resident Scholar, Harvard Law School. 1993 - 1996 Associate Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 1990 - 1993 Assistant Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 1 1988 - 1990 Research Associate to Judge Robert H. Bork, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Washington, D.C. Assisted in research and preparation of Robert H. Bork's best-selling book, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law. 1987 - 1988 Law Clerk to the Honorable Antonin Scalia, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D.C. 1987 Special Assistant to T. Kenneth Cribb, Jr., the Assistant to President Reagan for Domestic Affairs, Second Floor, West Wing, The White House, Washington, D.C. Worked on the full range of domestic policy issues. 1985 - 1987 Special Assistant to Attorney General Edwin Meese III, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Worked on judicial selection and constitutional law issues. 1984 - 1985 Law Clerk to the Honorable Robert H.