University of Chicago Law School Chicago Unbound Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship 1973 The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses Philip B. Kurland Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles Part of the Law Commons Recommended Citation Philip B. Kurland, "The Supreme Court, Compulsory Education, and the First Amendment's Religion Clauses," 75 West Virginia Law Review 213 (1973). This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
[email protected]. West Virginia Law Review Volume 75 April 1973 Number 3 THE SUPREME COURT, COMPULSORY EDUCATION, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RELIGION CLAUSES* PmLip B. KUpLAND** I. INTRODUCTION As a preliminary to my usual jeremiad about the work of the Supreme Court, I would like to set out what I consider to be some essential background against which the Court's decisions on schools and the religion clauses of the first amendment should be seen. I want to suggest that you consider, along with my proferred analysis of the decisions, the American idealization of the educational pro- cesses to which we have become committed and some of the counter- vailing forces that have been rampant in our history. It has long been an American dream that education affords the means for upward mobility in an open society. The Supreme Court - here as elsewhere a mirror of the American commonweal, a mirror that sometimes distorts the facts- has framed much of the country's constitutional law on the unstated premise that formal education is the means by which American society remains fluid yet cohesive, pluralistic yet unitary, aspiring to be a democracy while being governed by a meritocracy.